THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS AND PROGRAMS

WHAT WORKS AND THE WAY AHEAD

August 2020

DISCLAIMER

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Cover photo (top left): An Egyptian anti-Mubarak protestor holds up scales of justice in front of riot police. (Credit: Khaled Desouki, Agence France-Presse)

Cover photo (top right): Royal Malaysian Police deputy inspector-general looks on as Selangor state police chief points to a journalist during a press conference. (Credit: Mohd Rasfan, Agence France-Presse)

Cover photo (bottom left): Indian traffic police officer poses with a body-worn video camera. (Credit: Sam Panthaky, Agence France-Presse)

Cover photo (bottom right): Indonesian anti-riot police take position to disperse a mob during an overnight-violent demonstration. (Credit: Bay Ismoyo, Agence France-Presse)

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- Brooke Stearns Lawson, USAID Senior Conflict Advisor, Organized Crime
- Laura Van Berkel, USAID Social and Behavioral Change Advisor
- Andrew Solomon, USAID Senior Rule of Law Advisor
- Peggy Ochandarena, Director, Chemonics International Inc.
- Stacia George, Director, Chemonics International Inc.
- Elizabeth Constable, Director, Chemonics International Inc.

ACRONYMS

CAF Community accountability fora
CSP Community safety partnerships
DFID Department for International Development
EIS Early intervention system
LPPB Local Policing Partnership Boards
NGO Non-governmental organization
NOPRIN Network on Police Reform
SSR Security sector reform
U.K. United Kingdom
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIP United States Institute of Peace
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is a study of police accountability measures within security sector reform (SSR) programming. Its purpose is to provide empirical examples of mechanisms for strengthening and improving police accountability and to summarize the existing evidence that links these mechanisms to improved police accountability. It draws on systematic studies, anecdotal evidence, and personal correspondence with experts and programmers; and provides recommendations for effective programs and activities.

There are different perspectives and cross-cutting approaches for studying police accountability and measuring programmatic effectiveness. This document defines police accountability broadly by: 1) Police behaviors (individual, unit, and institutional e.g. The extent to which police officers engage in corruption or human rights violations); 2) Performance outcomes/results (e.g. The extent to which the police ensure citizen safety and security); 3) Policies and procedures (e.g. The extent to which the police policies are coherent and actionable); and 4) Managerial efficiencies (e.g. The extent to which police departments deploy resources in a cost-effective manner).

Evaluating accountability is complex because all four of these elements can or should be evaluated when assessing a police system’s effectiveness. In addition, this review covers each of the four dimensions within which police accountability systems operate: 1) Horizontal - the system of checks and balances across government institutions; 2) Vertical - an institution’s internal mechanisms, processes, and procedures; 3) External - independent organizations and groups that lie outside the official public governance system; and 4) Diagonal - local and grassroots mechanisms by which communities directly interact with their local public service providers, such as the police.

SSR evidence for this report has been culled from lessons learned in SSR, police accountability program evaluations, current criminology, and effective governance and accountability initiatives. However, with extremely limited data on what works in police accountability, this report was not able to provide conclusions drawing upon rigorous data points. Instead, this report summarizes which interventions show promise given the data that exists and which interventions merit more research.

Some of the strongest evidence points to incremental, diagonal approaches in which police-civilian partnerships create a forum for accountability. Police-civilian partnerships at the neighborhood and community level are an example of diagonal accountability (local and grassroots mechanisms through which communities directly interact with their local public service providers, such as the police). The promise of diagonal mechanisms is mirrored by the most recent studies in effective governance and accountability, including the 2017 World Development Report, Governance and Law.
Starting new police units is also a promising way to increase police accountability, although it is a rare occurrence for a country to disband a current police unit in order to reconstitute it. It has mostly been done at the cessation of conflict. Training on soft skills and emphasizing the importance of police-civilian communication has potential, most significantly when norms are changed by training the entire unit. Updating use of force and firearms/use of force continuum protocols may increase police effectiveness and accountability by providing clear expectations to inform personnel of how they should perform as well as expectations against which they can be held accountable. The introduction of new technologies shows effectiveness in some contexts, as does the introduction of specialized police units into high-crime and violence neighborhoods. Finally, early intervention systems are information management tools that identify police officers whose behavior is problematic so that corrective steps can be taken before the need for disciplinary procedures.

There are numerous police accountability programs that include administrative policy reforms that guide procedures and processes for how the police are managed and expected to perform or to improve government control over the police, but the results are mixed. One administrative procedure that shows potential is the requirement that performance reviews are documented (on paper or electronically). Setting up administrative procedures that document use of force procedures also shows promise. Additional data is required to definitively state the effectiveness of these efforts, but there is value in continuing to pilot this type of programming as long as it is combined with strong evaluation methods to determine whether those investments should continue.

Other initiatives seem less likely to work, though empirical evidence demonstrating their (in)effectiveness is limited, almost entirely anecdotal, and require more research. For example, there has been little research demonstrating that building the institutional capacities of internal affairs units and civilian oversight complaint and review bodies is likely to succeed. Further, there is also not enough research to know whether training on de-escalation or implicit bias works in police units, or whether criminal prosecutions of police officers deter their own or their colleagues’ future misconduct. This lack of evidence does not signify that they do not work, but that more data needs to be collected. Ultimately, given the varying contexts in which programming occurs, much remains to be learned. Strong investment must be made in methods to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts to better inform approaches.
This report is an empirical study of security sector reform (SSR) programming, which aims to capture current evidence of what works to strengthen and improve police accountability. This report analyzes a range of accountability programming to identify effectiveness and specific options for SSR practitioners.

There are many different perspectives and cross-cutting approaches for studying police accountability and measuring programmatic effectiveness. The phrase “police accountability” has been defined broadly for this document, covering the four areas that are discussed in further detail in Section 2: police behaviors, performance outcomes/results, policies and procedures, and managerial efficiencies. In addition, there are four dimensions reviewed within which the functional systems of police accountability operate: horizontal, vertical, external, and diagonal. Further discussion of these dimensions is also found in the ensuing section. The challenge is to determine how each of these four dimensions influences each of the four elements of police effectiveness and under what circumstances.

This report draws on a combination of systematic studies, anecdotal evidence, and correspondence with experts and practitioners to provide practical recommendations regarding programming to increase police accountability. The key challenge in any program evaluation is to attribute changes in outcomes to the program being evaluated. Simply comparing program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is likely to yield biased results, since beneficiaries may differ from non-beneficiaries in ways that also correlate with the outcomes of interest. The direction and magnitude of this bias is typically unknown and beyond the resources of most programs to uncover.

For example, if police officers self-select into de-escalation training programs (discussed in Section 3), and if the officers who self-select into these programs are more likely to value mutually respectful, procedurally just communication with civilians, then a comparison of officers who do and do not receive training is likely to overestimate its impact. Conversely, if officers with especially long records of citizen complaints are more likely to be assigned to de-escalation training, then a comparison of officers who do and do not get trained is likely to underestimate its impact. The same problem of selection bias arises when comparing police departments that do and do not adopt new technologies to improve police accountability (e.g. body cameras, discussed in Section 3), or when comparing countries that do and do not undertake tabula rasa reforms (also discussed in Section 3).

This report uses the terms ‘anecdotal’ and ‘impressionistic’ to characterize studies that do not bring any systematic data to the question of effectiveness and uses the term ‘descriptive’ to characterize studies that cite data but otherwise do not attempt to solve the fundamental problem of attribution. For example, a study that critiques Early Intervention Systems by citing measured rates of police corruption in a given country or
police department would be characterized as descriptive if it does not attempt to attribute corruption rates to a particular policy (or lack thereof). The report will use the term ‘correlational’ or ‘observational’ to refer to studies that attempt to solve the attribution problem by controlling for observable confounding factors. For example, a study that compares police officers usage of body cameras while controlling for age, gender, and rank would be described as observational.

Finally, the report uses the term ‘rigorous impact evaluation’ to describe studies that more credibly solve the attribution problem through the use of experimental (i.e. randomized controlled trials) or quasi-experimental methods. These involve some attempt to create ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups that are, in expectation, identical along all observable and unobservable dimensions. While these kinds of studies have limitations of their own, they are unique in their ability to mitigate or eliminate selection bias and therefore overcome challenges to attribution. However, it should be noted that this report does not utilize experimental studies conducted in a laboratory setting or on university students. The findings of such studies may be intellectually informative, but this report does not consider them due to potentially limited external validity.

The challenge of determining whether approaches are transferable to other contexts arises when examining evidence derived from a range of environments. This is a particularly acute issue in studies of police accountability, but this report has been able to find evidence of programming that has the potential to produce effective police accountability outcomes and results in some or all contexts.

This report is divided into four sections including this introduction and the second section that discusses the various approaches to and perspectives on police accountability. The third section presents empirical evidence of police accountability drawn from contemporary criminology and lessons learned in SSR programming. The fourth section concludes and proposes a way forward for effective police accountability in SSR.

Annex A discusses how these findings correspond to and track the evidence of what works for effective governance and accountability writ large. Annex B summarizes the findings from USAID-funded quasi-systemic review of all rigorous evaluations that have been done on programming to increase public servant accountability and reducing corruption. Annex C is a full bibliography.
Defining and Examining Accountability

Police accountability is a broad and multi-variant concept. A clear understanding of police accountability is crucial to capture what works to enhance it.

There are two complementary lenses for analyzing and programming for police accountability. The first concentrates on analyzing police behaviors, policies and procedures, managerial efficiencies, and results. Focusing on outcomes, it is the methodology by which to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of a police accountability program. The second is a systems and functional lens which examines each of the four different types of accountability mechanisms (vertical, horizontal, external, and diagonal) and the procedures, processes and disparate actors involved in each. These two lenses and methodologies need to be brought together to understand the correlation between the approach and the outcomes on effectiveness and to design programs to achieve their intended objectives.

Measuring Behavioral Outcomes and Results

Using the behavioral and results lenses, police accountability refers to and encompasses:
1) Police behaviors (individual, unit, and institutional)
2) Performance outcomes/results
3) Policies and procedures
4) Managerial efficiencies

On its most basic level, police accountability is concerned with the private and public behaviors of individual police officers and the units to which they belong. These behaviors pertain to how the police conduct themselves and respond to calls for their service. From this perspective, police accountability is about the day-to-day behaviors and actions of the police and their communications with the public.

The behaviors of individual police officers and their units can be measured according to their adherence to police practices, policies, and procedures. This can be viewed as a measure of police discipline. Accountability also relates to alleged police malfeasance, a police officer or unit’s alleged involvement in criminal acts, organized crime, corruption, and human rights violations. Controlling corruption and human rights violations is a critical element of police accountability. However, accountability is much more than...
addressing corruption and/or human rights violations. Police accountability also refers more broadly to how a country’s police and law enforcement organizations deliver safety and security. This perspective corresponds to their aggregate performance, which is the effectiveness and quality of the public goods and services the police provide. Police accountability also refers to the quality and coherence of police policies and procedures and the extent they are consistent with national and international standards and best practices.

A fourth perspective on police accountability pertains to the efficiency of policing organizations. Police and law enforcement agencies are publicly-funded state institutions. As with all state institutions, they are responsible for using their funds in the most cost-effective and timely manner possible.

Each of these four types of police accountability results are equally important and complementary. Police accountability programs can be designed to correspond to one or more sets of results and outcomes. Along each dimension, police and their organizations must respect and adhere to the rule of law and human rights. They are held responsible by their own organization(s), other state institutions and the citizenry to whom they provide the tangible and concrete public goods and services of safety and security. Therefore, police accountability resides in the adherence to the rule of law and human rights and the ways in which police further those objectives in a positive way to achieve greater and better safety and security. Conversely, they are also to be held responsible if and when their behaviors, policies, procedures, and practices transgress those principles and the law.

A SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Police accountability can also be analyzed using a systems and functional schema. This approach typically identifies the different types of accountability mechanisms, procedures, and processes and the disparate actors involved in each. A systems analysis is commonly used to examine police accountability in terms of effective governance and has four dimensions:

1. Horizontal
2. Vertical
3. External
4. Diagonal

1. **Horizontal.** Horizontal accountability pertains to the overall governance system of checks and balances. At the national and state level, prosecutors, parliaments, and ministries of finance and justice conduct horizontal checks on all institutions and agencies of the state, including the police. Other ministries may also exercise horizontal accountability on the police, such as ministries of human rights, women and children, and defense, especially if a gendarmerie exists and falls under its jurisdiction. Anti-corruption and ombudsman offices, as well as legal aid organizations, also conduct vital accountability functions and fall under this category if they are official government institutions. 

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agencies. City, state, and national auditors can also check and balance state institutions and agencies.

The law and its provisions serve as a horizontal accountability mechanism. In some cases, there may be a need to strengthen or tighten varying administrative codes of procedure and other legal standards. For policing, these codes and processes range from habeus corpus to privacy, public access to information, and intimate partner violence. The rights of citizens to sue state institutions and agencies, including the police, as well as the ability and process by which they can do so is a key horizontal mechanism. Civil society legislation is also a key horizontal mechanism given its potential to function as an accountability mechanism.

At the local level, horizontal governance structures include mayors, chieftain systems, and municipal, village, and commune councils. In policing, the systems often associated with these local offices are separate and distinct from national, state, or provincial police services and may also be capable of performing check and balance functions.

2. Vertical. Vertical accountability refers to an institution’s internal mechanisms that perform accountability functions. These include the state agency’s mission statement, its policies and procedures, and its various codes of conduct. Organizational units that monitor and enforce these policies and procedures are vital and include, but are not limited to, policy and planning units, auditing functions, and disciplinary bodies. Personnel and information management units play key roles in vertical accountability.

For the police, the ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ is the central principle around which vertical accountability revolves. This continuum is composed of the policies, rules, and regulations by which police officers are authorized and mandated to engage in coercive action to fulfill their responsibilities to provide safety and security to citizens and residents. It extends to a range of operational manuals that prescribe tactical police practices and behaviors including the rules, regulations, and process by which police officers are disciplined by their own service for misconduct or malfeasance and the organizational units mandated to oversee police behavior, such as professional standards and internal affairs units. Personnel departments play a role and may also be charged with managing allegations of misconduct by police officers as they may control the information vital to these types of allegations.

3. External. External accountability relates to independent organizations and groups that lie outside the official public governance system and whose activities are to observe, record, and report on state agency policies, tactics, operations and performance. The media is a key player and other groups include think tanks and research centers that collate and analyze data on state activities.

For the police, external accountability mechanisms include not only policy and research centers, but also labor relations boards, national and local bar associations, and human rights commissions and ombudsman offices that are not official government offices. External oversight systems and independent police auditors fall within this category as
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are organized thematically such as women's or human rights groups are key accountability actors. Police labor unions also possess accountability functions.

As already noted, the police are liable to be sued by citizens for alleged wrongdoing, given that they are a public state institution and agency. While the right to sue is a horizontal form of accountability, the exercise of that right, whether lawsuits are supported by civil society organizations as they often are or brought by individuals, is best considered to be an external form of accountability. This is an oft overlooked and understudied potential accountability mechanism that has the potential to provide rich information on police performance and behavior.

4. **Diagonal.** This fourth category is a more grassroots mechanism than external accountability. It refers to the way in which the public goods and services provided by state institutions and agencies, including the police, are directly accountable to the needs of local communities and neighborhoods. It is also a mechanism by which the public service provided corresponds to and coincides with the actual priorities and interests of communities and neighborhoods.

Community-policing partnerships, community safety councils, and other local police-community participation mechanisms fall under this category. Organized procedures by which residents visit their police stations and record their opinions, score card mechanisms, and local audit and budgeting groups all perform accountability functions from below. Local religious organizations, associations of local traders and merchants and other types of neighborhood groups fall under this category.
SECTION 3
WHAT WORKS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

This section is divided into three parts. The first part lays out four conceptual and practical challenges to any analysis of and recommendations on what works in police accountability. These challenges are:

- The search for reliable data and theories of change
- The use of indicators
- The transferability of lessons learned
- Scalability of police accountability programs

This section’s second and third parts present the types of programming that can increase police accountability and those for which the empirical record is thinner.

CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

THE SEARCH FOR RELIABLE DATA AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

Police accountability is, first and foremost, a managerial challenge that includes the means and methods by which police organizations supervise and control the behaviors of individuals and units and evaluate performance and operate efficiently. Research exists on police officer attitudes and beliefs on questions of police accountability.\(^{10}\) However, there is “little research on the organizational culture of policing”\(^ {11}\) or what motivates police to comply with administrative and operational rules and regulations.\(^ {12}\)

In 2007, the leading U.S. criminologist on police accountability, Samuel Walker, stated that little is known about the effectiveness of police accountability procedures,\(^ {13}\) whether they are vertical or external mechanisms. In 2014, Mr. Walker cautioned that though police accountability research is slowly accumulating data, there continues to be an absence of comprehensive data on the various dimensions of police accountability;\(^ {14}\) little research on the dynamics of ensuring the continuity of reforms in policing related to accountability\(^ {15}\) and that new approaches to police accountability have not been tried and evaluated.\(^ {16}\) It is of significant importance for programs to establish rigorous methods to evaluate police accountability initiatives.

FORMULATING INDICATORS

There are innumerable possible indicators for evaluating police accountability programs given the various behaviors and outcomes for measuring police accountability. Security sector programs must carefully spell out what types, characteristics, and categories of police accountability they are seeking to enhance.\(^ {17}\) Otherwise, the program may measure an element of accountability other than one the program intended to influence.
To give a sense of the variety of indicators, a partial list of police accountability indicators includes changes in:

- Annual numbers of alleged and proven human rights violations, which can include extra-judicial killing
- Incidences and rates of grand or petty police corruption, defined as rates of payments to prompt a police activity and those actively solicited by police officers while performing a police function
- Public perceptions of procedural justice with respect to police behavior
- Public perceptions that police and community priorities are well aligned
- Victimization rates for specific crimes, by neighborhood
- The degree to which police behavior adheres to a cogent and well-formulated ‘use of force and firearms’ policy and what occurs when behavior transgresses that protocol
- Thorough investigations of complaints against police officers lodged by members of the public and their fellow officers
- The efficient use of budgeted state resources

Each of these indicators is potentially a valid and important indicator of a police accountability outcome. However, each focuses on a different element and requires a different program approach. Every police accountability program must make explicit the specific outcomes they are designed to achieve with indicators carefully calibrated to align with the activities that are justified by reliable theories of change. Many programs to date have only measured output data, reflecting activities rather than the results of those activities. Clear, relevant indicators that test theories of change would help address the dearth of data on program effectiveness. Consequently, there is no single measure by which police accountability’s overall effectiveness can be evaluated. Furthermore, accountability cannot be conflated to only corruption and malfeasance. A police accountability program can be effective in some elements without reducing the incidence of corruption or human rights violations.

TRANSFERABILITY OF LESSONS LEARNED

This next section explains, in order, the most promising approaches to accountability as outlined in the text box to the right. Most existing evidence originates from programs conducted in western, developed countries. While it may be possible to extrapolate from these, a key challenge is to determine what lessons and practices can be transferred to another context. There can be no assumption that what works in one environment can be replicated in another. For example, it is imperative to ask whether effective U.S. managerial and police information systems can be successfully replicated in Ukraine, South Africa, or Thailand where norms and values as well as police management systems and procedures significantly differ from the U.S. It is necessary to specify which
characteristics of an effective project can be reproduced and requires a political economy analysis to determine:

1. At what political and police management levels does the requisite political will exist (if it exists at all)
2. Who will be the constitutive allies (civil society organizations, community/neighborhood groups, etc.) and how can their support be fostered
3. Who will resist implementation and how can resistance be mitigated or overcome
4. Whether the country possesses or is ready to strengthen requisite managerial systems, human and financial capital, technological capabilities, and norms and values to implement and sustain innovative police accountability programming.

SCALABILITY OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMS

Combinations of political constraints, organizational and managerial bottlenecks, budgetary restraints, and a lack of infrastructure and training resources are frequent hurdles to scaling pilot programming. Therefore, it is recommended to evaluate how each of these factors will affect scalability.

WHAT SHOWS PROMISE IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

The following section summarizes police accountability programming that has shown promise in the field. The analysis draws on systematic studies where available, anecdotal evidence, and correspondence with police accountability experts and practitioners. **Note, there can be no improvement in police accountability without the police as an active and committed partner. Practitioners must carefully analyze each level of police hierarchy (i.e. national, state/provincial, municipal/local), as well as an analyze the political will within each of the police entity's senior, mid-level, and line levels, when determining which reform efforts are most likely to succeed.**

**TABULA RASA AKA BLANK SLATE INITIATIVES**

Starting new police units is likely a promising way to increase police accountability. One approach is to completely replace them and start from scratch. This can be described as a form of vertical accountability in that an entire police unit is established anew or built after a previous one has been disbanded. However, it must be stated that this cannot be done everywhere. Such efforts are difficult, long, and expensive. Political will is paramount for *tabula rasa*; it can only be successful in very particular circumstances. With that said, when such commitment does exist, significant positive reform is possible.

For example, in Peru the traffic unit was disbanded and a reconstituted unit established, in which women officers constituted over 90% of the unit. Initial feedback suggests that starting over, and the presence of women, helped to address corruption. Other descriptive surveys suggest that Peruvians generally approve of the traffic unit's work.
Georgia is another example of a tabula rasa effort.\(^2^1\) The winner of a national election sought to assert his and his party’s control over the security services and reduce police corruption. Police pay was dramatically increased, and wages were deposited directly into the police officers’ individual bank accounts.\(^2^2\) The police were no longer allowed to collect administrative fees and fines (traffic violations, passports, driver’s license, vehicle and weapon registration, etc.), and approximately 85% of all police officers were replaced.\(^2^3\) The successful reforms in Georgia involved a combination of many of the mechanisms described in this report: the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of State Security were merged into one unit; a zero tolerance policy was instituted to deter crime; a media campaign was launched to demonstrate police toughness and efficiency; police cars were outfitted with new technologies; and the police academy began providing professional training services, among other initiatives.\(^2^4\)

It is impossible to determine which of these mechanisms (or which combination of mechanisms, if any) was responsible for any subsequent improvements in police accountability. Nonetheless, descriptively at least, across a range of indicators such as rates of petty corruption and better service delivery, police accountability and performance improved after the reforms. However, the cost of that strengthening was significant. Political control over the police was heightened and deeply politicized.\(^2^5\) In addition, certain types of human rights violations continued, and high-level corruption was left largely untouched or new forms emerged.

Political will to completely overhaul entire police forces or units is likely to be low in most cases. Tabula rasa efforts seem to be most common in countries recovering from conflict or internal strife. SSR is often a key component of comprehensive peace agreements, and the United Nations and its local and international partners often play a lead role in rebuilding post-conflict police forces more or less from scratch. UN missions have taken a tabula rasa approach to police reform in East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. While evaluating the impact of tabula rasa approaches is inherently difficult for reasons described in Section 2, there is observational evidence suggesting that restructuring police forces from the ground up can effectively improve performance and accountability and restore citizens’ trust in post-conflict settings.\(^2^6\)

While tabula rasa reforms are less common in wealthy Western countries, they are not unheard of. In the US, for example, the City Council of Camden, NJ disbanded the municipal police force and replaced it with a new one under county control in 2013. All city police officers were laid off and told to reapply for new jobs with the county under less generous non-union contracts. The size of the force increased markedly, from around 250 officers in 2012 to over 400 in 2013. With pressure from local civil rights activists, the city also implemented a number of additional reforms, including revisions to its use of force policies and changes to the internal metric system used to rate officers’ performance. Camden experienced a 23% decrease in violent crime from 2012 to 2018, and a 48% decrease in nonviolent crime, alongside a gradual decline in complaints over excessive use of force.\(^2^7\)
The restructuring of Camden’s police force required enormous political will. And while the reforms were followed by improvements in police performance, it is unclear to what extent those improvements can be attributed to the city’s *tabula rasa* approach to reform. Some analysts argue that local activism, rather than *tabula rasa* per se, is the “key to understanding the gains made in Camden.” Nonetheless, it seems that such efforts can help create a window of opportunity for other reforms. While it is impossible to disentangle these reforms’ impacts from the impact of *tabula rasa*, existing observational evidence suggests that overhauling police forces can help improve police accountability, assuming there is sufficient political will to follow through on reform.

**CIVILIAN-POLICE PARTNERSHIPS**

Civilian-police partnerships are widely believed to be an effective mechanism for improving police-community relationships and enhancing police accountability. In the US, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, convened by President Barack Obama, recommends that “law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions,” through, for example, joint training programs, police-community advisory committees, “community action teams,” and other fora where “all community members can interact with police and help influence programs and policy.” There is also anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggesting that diagonal civilian-police relationships (a form of diagonal accountability) may be effective. The following are some specific examples.

**Sierra Leone and Nigeria:** In Sierra Leone, an initiative created local policing partnership boards (LPPBs) that brought together the police and local elites, including traditional chiefs, leaders of quasi-vigilante groups and officials of secret societies to discuss local safety and security issues. The LPPBs served as community liaisons between the police and the citizenry. The LPPBs were dominated by the elites in contrast to the Nepalese example (discussed in further detail below) where special efforts were made to ensure that vulnerable and marginalized groups were included in the dialogue.

Interviews and focus groups with the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and LPPB members and users suggest that the LPPBs helped incorporate ordinary citizens into the process of setting policing priorities for their communities; that they were sometimes successful in mediating petty crimes and non-violent disputes; that they served as liaisons between civilians and the police, especially for crime reporting; and that they on at least some occasions successfully arbitrated disputes between civilians and the SLP. There is also anecdotal evidence that LPPBs contributed to the SLP being perceived as friendlier and that they may have contributed to crime prevention by addressing ‘low-level’ crime.

A similar program in Nigeria included community accountability fora (CAF) and community safety partnerships (CSP). Conducted in more stable areas of the country, the CSPs were platforms for the police to meet regularly with community and business leaders in individual police catchment areas to discuss security issues and generate joint solutions to community safety problems. CAFs brought together the police, the
voluntary policing sector (VPS), and community and acted as oversight bodies to improve relationships at the local police level and improve service delivery to the communities by both the police and VPS.\(^\text{32}\)

These fora provided a space for the Nigerian policing organizations to meet their constituencies and to resolve local problems by improving the relationship between traders and the police, reducing burglary rates, introducing additional police and police-neighborhood patrols in high crime areas, and handling accusations of police extorting money. The implementer suggests that the Nigerian program was well received by civilians.\(^\text{33}\) The Nigerian police informed program officials of its intention to roll-out CAFs and CSPs throughout the country as a principal part of the expansion of the program’s model police stations. While the Sierra Leone project did not address questions of police corruption or malfeasance, the Nigerian one did. However, in a country whose police are challenged by severe systemic and performance deficiencies, such programming will need complementary efforts to address accountability.\(^\text{34}\)

**Nepal:** A United States Institute for Peace (USIP) civilian partnership program in Nepal involved a series of facilitated dialogues that brought together communities and police to establish collaborative relationships.\(^\text{35}\) The program included a survey and mapping exercise of safety and security, which served as the foundation upon which the dialogues took place. The dialogues focused on problem-solving.

The project included special youth-police dialogues and the broadcasting of radio programs. The former may have been of particular significance in that USIP undertook special care to ensure the participation of a group that may have otherwise been slighted due to their unequal access to power and traditional Nepalese cultural norms that do not prioritize the perspectives of youth, particularly from lower caste populations. The same pertains to the radio component as it broadcast the activities that were jointly conducted by the police and communities so local neighborhoods were made aware of the services that were being provided. Findings were able to demonstrate increased interactions with the population but the challenge of determining whether that changed accountability remains.

**Liberia and Colombia:** While anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggests that civilian-police partnerships may be effective mechanisms for increasing police accountability, it is important to note that rigorous impact evaluations from multiple settings illustrate the potential limitations of these mechanisms. In Liberia, for example, the national government’s *Confidence Patrols* program deployed newly-retrained, better-equipped police officers from an elite subunit of the Liberian National Police (LNP) on recurring visits to rural towns and villages. During these visits the patrolling officers held town hall meetings and Q&A sessions with citizens, conducted foot patrols and door-to-door outreach, disseminated informational posters and pamphlets, and played soccer with local youths. A randomized controlled trial found that the program increased citizens’ understanding of Liberian law, improved security of property rights, and reduced the incidence of some types of crime, but had no effect on citizens’ trust in the police or on their perceptions of the police as fair and transparent.\(^\text{36}\)
Similarly, in Colombia, the Plan Cuadrante program helped police officers in eight of the country’s largest cities transition from a reactive to a proactive approach to crime prevention, placing special emphasis on soft skills, communication with citizens, and collaboration with communities to identify and respond to their needs. As in Liberia, a rigorous impact evaluation found that the program reduced the incidence of crime, but had no effect on police-citizen relationships or on “management indicators” for police accountability — for example, the extent to which police officers successfully diagnosed and followed up on the most pressing security concerns in their quadrants.37 Launched in 2016 and running until mid-2020, a set of six linked randomized controlled trials will test the efficacy of similar interventions in Liberia, Uganda, Colombia, Brazil, Pakistan, and the Philippines.38 Results from this study are forthcoming.

**United States:** One key recommendation from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is that law enforcement agencies should evaluate police officers on their efforts to create partnerships with citizens.39 But evidence is mixed from programs that offered consistent and continuous feedback to police officers about their interactions with citizens or programs that provided managers with information about citizen perceptions to improve police service delivery. A rigorous impact evaluation of a Quality Service Audit program in Nebraska found that the it had no effect on officers’ performance, no effect on their attitudes towards the communities they serve, and no effect on their engagement in activities that might increase the quality and frequency of contact with civilians.40 Similarly, a rigorous impact evaluation of an analogous program in Chicago similarly found that providing police officers with citizen feedback in the context of the CAPS community policing program increased residents’ confidence in their ability to solve problems and improved police officers’ perceptions of their relationship with civilians, but otherwise had no effect on most attitudes or behaviors. Training police officers to incorporate citizen feedback and engage in problem solving during community meetings had no effect either, and if anything, may have diminished actual problem solving in the field.41

**Papua New Guinea and the Philippines:** Recent rigorous impact evaluations in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines suggest that the effects of civilian-police partnerships may vary by sex and indicators of locally privileged status. As part of the Community Auxiliary Police program in Papua New Guinea, respected local leaders were randomly recruited to serve as community police officers in their own rural villages. The goal of the program was to create closer ties between civilians and the police, especially in remote locations. While women became less likely to report negative experiences with the police as a result of the program, men became more likely to report negative experiences, especially when the officer was a woman.42 This echoes another finding from the Liberia study cited above, which showed that strengthening civilian-police partnerships provoked backlash from residents who benefitted from the status quo, under which local leaders resolved most disputes informally. At the same time, the program created an ‘exit option’ for residents who felt systematically disadvantaged by existing informal mechanisms of dispute resolution.43
There is a risk that if civilian-police partnerships become too close, they may reproduce dynamics of exclusion at the local level, especially in rural areas where residents’ access to security and justice often depends on their degree of connectedness within local social networks. A rigorous study in the Philippines found that police officers who were highly embedded within their communities tended to alienate locally unconnected citizens, resulting in lower rates of satisfaction with public safety among socially marginalized individuals and exacerbating the incidence of local feuds and disputes.44

USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS/FORCE CONTINUUM

The use of force and firearms and, more recently, the force continuum45 are the central principles with which police exercise their authority and work day-to-day. These function as a foundational principle for the police much as rules of engagement operate for the military and comprise a vertical accountability mechanism. Restrictive policies include a series of protocols on how to handle different incidents, detailing what applications of force, weapons, and procedures can be used under what circumstances. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing advocates the creation of comprehensive use of force policies that address training, investigations, prosecutions, data collection, and information sharing, and that mandate criminal investigations when police use of force results in civilian deaths.46

Some evidence suggests that these policies are correlated with improvements in certain types of police accountability. Police shootings fell in a number of large US cities—including Philadelphia, San Francisco, Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and Phoenix—after their police departments reformed their use of force policies to match Department of Justice recommendations.47 One study in New York City, later replicated in Memphis,48 indicates that the police tend to discharge their weapons at lower rates after stricter use of force policies are implemented. However, from an evidence perspective, it is impossible to tell from these ‘before and after’ comparisons whether the reduction in use of force can be attributed to the policies themselves, for reasons discussed in Section 2 on defining and examining accountability.49 For example, is the reduction in the discharges due to the policy itself or is it due to increased management oversight on use of force, or some other factor altogether?

Similar results were found in Las Vegas, where use of force reports declined by 50% over a two-year period after a policy change that prohibited police officers who were involved in foot pursuits to physically arrest suspects (though again, it is impossible to tell if the policy change was responsible for the decline in use of force).50 Using high quality, third party data on police killings compiled by The Guardian and The Washington Post, a more credible observational study from 2016 showed that “after taking into account other factors, each additional use of force policy was associated with a 15% reduction in killings by police” (bold in the original).51

After examining 265 police departments in the U.S., one study found that after controlling for region and violent crime rates, use of force complaints tend to be lower for police forces in which a supervisor or another police official is required to complete
the filing and recording of use of force reports as compared to departments where only
the involved police officer completes the necessary paperwork. This is supported by
the fact that in a related study of Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, it was shown that
close supervision alone is not correlated with lower levels of use of force. Drawing on
the Indianapolis and St. Petersburg study, a broader review of police accountability
practices reaffirms that the close supervision of police officers by their leadership in
itself is not directly related to the quotient of force used by police officers. It is the
additional administrative processes required related to supervision including the filing
processes and accountability related to use of force that appears to make the difference.

Not all use of force by police officers is necessarily deadly. With regard to non-lethal
force by police, there seems to be no comparable study that directly investigates
whether restrictive policies on the use of non-lethal force reduces the overall rates of
force or the incidence of excessive force by police officers. In the US, police
departments that reported larger reductions in arrests from 2013-2018 also reported
larger reductions in police shootings both in absolute terms and compared to
departments that made smaller reductions in arrests. But again, it is impossible to tell
from these correlations whether the reduction in arrests caused the reduction in
shootings, or whether some other factor was responsible.

Use of force and firearms/force continuum procedures, such as more restrictive policies
that include documenting ‘critical incidents’, can readily be drafted into police practices
and managerial responsibilities. However, initiatives that require documentation tend to
require increases in the number and quality of middle management, close supervision of
subordinates, delegation of responsibility to subordinate police officers, and a heavy use
of information management systems. With the notable exception of the U.K.’s police
development in Malawi, it is rare to find policing programs that have provided significant
and substantive support for reform of ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’
protocols, along with the managerial systems such reforms require. But force and
firearms/force continuum standards are central for all policing and police practices; it is
good SSR practice to ensure that this foundation of police behavior is put in place, even
if actual police accountability improvements do not occur. Revised use of force and
firearms/force continuum policies and standards should be accompanied by training to
ensure that all officers understand the new policies.

SOFT SKILLS: PROCEDURALLY JUST POLICING

There are some specific types and methods of police training that are showing evidence
in improving effectiveness in accountability. Anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggests
that civilian-police partnerships may be effective mechanisms for increasing police
accountability due to the “soft skill” of communication that may help police officers win
civilians’ trust. However, evidence also indicates these trainings may impact citizens’
perceptions of police accountability related to specific individual interactions rather than
broader systemic accountability.
A police development program in Rajasthan, India concentrated on training, specifically ensuring maximum training coverage. Police were trained on 'soft skills' such as communication, mediation, leadership, and team building. The percent of personnel trained ranged from 25%, 50%, 75%, to 100% of the entire workforce of the station. The training was then combined with one or more of three additional interventions: limitations of arbitrary transfers, rotation of duty assignments and days off, and increased community involvement through the presence of community observers. A randomized controlled trial demonstrated that these latter interventions were not effective. The training was successful at improving satisfaction among crime victims, with the effect being substantively large: moving from zero percent trained to one hundred percent of the workforce trained within a station resulted in an increase of more than fifty percent in the total satisfaction of victims of crime.

In another rigorous impact evaluation in Manchester, England, police officers were randomly invited to participate in one of three training courses: a two-day course delivered entirely in the classroom, two days of classroom-based training and 1 day of scenario-based training, or one day of classroom-based training and 1 day of scenario-based training (e.g. Role-playing exercises focused on “experiential and reflective learning”). In all cases, the training aimed to help officers develop the capacity for positive, empathic communication. Officers who were randomly invited to participate in any of the trainings expressed more positive attitudes about the importance of delivering high-quality service, making decisions fairly, and building empathy and rapport with victims of crime. They also received more favorable ratings on the quality of their interactions with civilians, based on videotaped interactions with role play actors and the retrospective self-reports of actual crime victims over the six-month period following the training as compared to individuals who did not participate in any training. The sample size was not large enough to compare the effects of the different types of training approaches.

Police need to be able to communicate with the civilians in the neighborhoods where they provide safety and security. This is a soft skill, which can take various forms. In police partnerships, it typically refers to the police’s ability to engage constructively in problem-solving dialogues and processes. For example, in India, such training focused on the soft skills of mediation, conflict resolution and leadership and can be assessed in terms of public perceptions of police adhering to procedural justice standards or increases in public perceptions that their safety and security priorities align with those of the police and are being addressed.

The importance of communication aligns with evidence on the significance of procedural justice to policing. Procedural justice is the perception by an individual of the fairness he/she receives from the police officer(s) during their interaction. It refers to the police officer’s decision-making in his/her exchange with a civilian and the ways in which those decisions are communicated to the concerned civilian. Procedurally just policing is grounded in four key principles: (1) treating citizens with dignity and respect; (2) giving citizens “voice” during their encounters with law enforcement officers; (3) being neutral
and transparent in the way decisions are made; and (4) conveying trustworthy motives and intentions.  

Many criminologists believe that the greater the perceived fairness of the interaction with the police, the higher the individual’s belief in the legitimacy of the police. They propose that when people perceive the police as legitimate they are more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction and confidence in the police (both for individual officers and the institution), perceive the police as effective in their crime control efforts, be more willing to assist police, as well as be more likely to accept the manifest outcomes of an interaction with police. This applies to virtually all forms of civilian-police interactions. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing goes so far as to recommend that “law enforcement agencies should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with rank and file officers and with the citizens they serve.”

While the importance of procedural justice has long been an article of faith among criminologists, it has recently come under scrutiny from skeptics. As a recent review by two prominent criminologists notes, while “studies consistently find that perceptions of procedurally just treatment are closely tied to perceptions of police legitimacy,” a “credible case for causality has not been made.” An update to that review by the same authors reaches similar conclusions, while also noting “some encouraging evidence on the effectiveness of procedural justice training in affecting officer’s attitudes and the effectiveness of community policing infused with elements of procedural justice in improving citizen perceptions of police.”

In general, efforts to establish a causal link between procedural justice and police legitimacy have yielded mixed results. For example, a recent randomized controlled trial in Queensland, Australia found that procedurally just communication during routine traffic stops improved perceptions of the arresting officer and of the police force as a whole. Preliminary results from another randomized controlled trial in Mexico suggest that procedural justice training improves rank-and-file officers’ attitudes and behaviors towards civilians, especially when their managers receive training as well.

However, a replication of the Queensland study in Scotland found that procedurally just communication among traffic police diminished trust in the officer who made the stop and reduced satisfaction with the encounter. The intervention had no effect on trust in the police or perceptions of police legitimacy. A rigorous impact evaluation in Turkey similarly found that while procedurally just communication improved perceptions of specific police encounters relative to “business-as-usual” communication, it had no effect on perceptions of the police more generally. This suggests that procedurally just interactions may not affect citizens’ perceptions of police accountability outside the context of the interaction itself.

Studies in the U.S. have produced similarly mixed results. A rigorous impact evaluation of the Quality Interaction Program for police recruits in Chicago found that training in
procedural justice and communication skills increased officers’ respectful and reassuring behavior during simulated encounters with civilians reporting (fictitious) domestic disputes, but did not improve officers’ assessments of their own interpersonal communication skills, nor did it affect their perceptions of the importance of showing respect and treating civilians in a procedurally just way. Nonetheless, these studies suggest that communication and soft skills are, at the very least, important for ensuring cooperative and mutually respectful relationships between citizens and the police.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES

While new technologies such as the wearing of body cameras and e-payments are innovative approaches that hold a promise of generating effective results, the findings can be varied because they are applied in different contexts and sometimes against different objectives so they must be evaluated differently. They are not automatically the right solution for police accountability programming in a developing context, and the findings on their effectiveness are very dependent upon the context that they are being used in as well as the objective against they are being evaluated.

E-payments. E-payments for salary and payment of fines (e.g. Traffic violations, parking tickets, etc.) to reduce corruption and improve efficiencies and transparency is one technology that shows promise of being a valuable means by which to reduce corruption and, therefore, may have applicability to increase police accountability. An e-banking initiative was launched in Afghanistan in 2013 and, as of July 2017, approximately 70% of all Afghan police officers were enrolled and 80% paid through electronic bank transfers. E-payments were implemented alongside other reforms, including biometric IDs and a computerized personnel tracking system. Together these three initiatives helped the police identify ‘ghost’ officers in the country.

Body cameras. Body cameras may be evaluated for whether they are effective in reducing use of force or they could be evaluated as being effective for improving perceptions of the police, and they could be effective in one and not necessarily the other.

There is a lack of unanimity in findings related to body cameras because the contexts, policies and methods of implementation, and management of police agencies varies tremendously. It may be crucial to vary the indicators by which the effectiveness of body cameras is measured. For instance, it is plausible that cameras may not decrease citizen complaints or police use of force. There may be instances where the use of body cameras increases citizen complaints against the police. Their use could potentially affect a range of indicators in how citizens and residents of selected communities perceive the police. It is plausible the use of body cameras could improve overall police performance in terms of the number of cases prosecutors accept from the police and their rate of convictions, because of the existence of video evidence that could be presented in court. If this were to hold true, then body cameras, despite the costs of implementation, could be considered an efficient use of police funds, as they did in the Las Vegas pilot in terms of cost savings to investigate alleged police misconduct.
To look more closely at the use of body cameras, four studies have shown that when police wear body cameras, the number of complaints against police officers tends to decline. Only one of these studies (in Rialto, CA) was able to causally attribute reductions in citizen complaints to body cameras, and even in that study, the mechanism underlying the reduction is unclear. It is possible, for example, that citizens simply stopped filing as many complaints when they knew their encounters with officers were being recorded.

One study has also indicated that the wearing of body cameras decreases the police’s use of force. A Las Vegas randomized controlled trial of body cameras indicated that complaints against officers and their use of force declined by 25% and 41%, respectively. Finally, a 2017 randomized controlled trial conducted in the suburbs of Washington, DC. found that police officers trained in the use of body cameras experienced a 38% drop in complaints, while other officers experienced a 4.1% increase in citizen complaints.

Another and more recent randomized controlled trial, conducted over 18 months in urban Washington, D.C., however, did not show that body cameras had a discernible impact on citizen complaints or officers’ use of force. A larger scale rigorous impact evaluation spanning seven research sites found that while citizen complaints declined following the introduction of body cameras, the number of complaints per shift was no different when officers wore body cameras than when they did not. Another multi-site randomized controlled trial found that body cameras did not reduce police use of force and actually exacerbated assaults against police officers. A review of four studies (including the Rialto study cited earlier) concluded that there is not enough evidence to offer a definitive recommendation regarding police adoption of body-worn cameras; most claims made about the technology are untested; and departments considering body-worn cameras should proceed cautiously.

However, in summary, a review of all of the studies writ large show that there is evidence that body cameras could provide some impact on certain objectives under certain conditions but other studies show that the results are mixed and counterproductive. As a result, it is worth examining the use of body cameras, but the desired objective of their use must be clear and their use must be done in concert with data-driven research to determine whether they are appropriate for the long term.

SPECIALIZED POLICING PRACTICES

Evidence suggests that the introduction of specialized policing practices and/or units can enhance vertical accountability and improve rules and regulations around the use of force against community members. Specialized policing is a new approach and therefore, there are not many cases from which to draw. Brazil provides the most large-scale and long-running case.
In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian police have been confronted by drugs gangs and militias who controlled neighborhoods and impeded the police from providing safety and security to the residents. The number of killings from police shootings was high. The police designed a tactic and policy around the introduction of pacifying police units (UPPs) to regain control of the neighborhoods. The policy had a narrow focus; it was not designed to eradicate drug trafficking but to weaken criminal organizations and their dominance of the favelas.\textsuperscript{89}

There have been three key planks to the policy and practice. The first was the takeover of the favelas by heavily armed specialized police units, but only after the neighborhoods had been informed that these operations were to occur. Once the neighborhoods had been stabilized by the presence of these police units, they were turned over to the UPPs, who engaged in a form of community policing, which in Brazil is called proximity policing and resembles the Nepalese, Sierra Leonean, and Nigerian initiatives. Third, the UPPs were placed on a ‘pay-for-performance’ incentive system.\textsuperscript{90} Originally, bonuses were paid according to the results of three indicators: homicide and other violent deaths; car theft; and street robberies.\textsuperscript{91} Eventually, indicators regarding the reduction in killings perpetrated by police were added to the bonus scheme.\textsuperscript{92} The quasi-experimental impact evaluation determined that the program, which lasted for a period of six to eight years, reduced the number of deaths caused by police action by approximately 60\%, a marked improvement in one measure of police accountability.\textsuperscript{93}

**EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS WHEN INCLUDED IN BROADER MANAGEMENT REFORMS**

There is another vertical accountability mechanism that may have the potential to strengthen police accountability: Early Intervention Systems (EIS). An EIS is an information management tool that identifies police officers whose behavior is problematic so that corrective supervisory actions can be taken before disciplinary procedures would need to be implemented.\textsuperscript{94} This is important because “it has become a truism among police chiefs that 10 percent of their officers cause 90 percent of the problems.”\textsuperscript{95} Comparing officers who discharged their weapons with those who were at or near the scene of a shooting but did not fire their weapons, there does appear to be a correlation between officers involved in shootings and those who have a higher number of negative marks in their personnel files.\textsuperscript{96} Although the causal link cannot be established, the correlation suggests that focusing on problematic officers may be an effective way to improve police accountability overall.

In three cases studies, citizen complaints declined following the introduction and implementation of EIS, though in each case the EIS was implemented in the context of a larger commitment to increased accountability on the part of the police department. As a result, “it is impossible to disentangle the effect of this general climate of rising standards of accountability on officer performance from the effect of the intervention itself.”\textsuperscript{97}
A more rigorous study evaluated the impact of an EIS that was implemented independently of larger police management reforms. The EIS involved the creation of an Officer-Citizen Interaction School (OCI) for officers who had received a disproportionate number of complaints for verbal abuse, physical altercations, or otherwise poor communication during interactions with civilians. While citizen complaints, personnel complaints, and secondary arrests all declined after the implementation of the OIS, the decline was similar for comparable officers who did and did not complete the training, suggesting that the changes should not be attributed to the OCI School intervention. It should be noted that the OCI training appears to also have had a “fairly modest” detrimental effect, by deterring OCI-trained officers from engaging in proactive policing practices.

Therefore, current evidence is showing that EIS may be effective when coupled within a wider program of managerial enhancements, assuming the police department has the capital infrastructure and capacities to accommodate the high levels of information that will need to be processed and managed. But there is currently not enough evidence to show that EIS alone will have an impact.

**WHAT REMAINS UNDER-STUDIED IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY**

There have been two major portfolio evaluations of SSR that are pertinent to police accountability programming. The majority of these reforms concentrated on institutional capacity building support and activities focused primarily on internal affairs departments and external oversight/citizen complaint mechanisms. A 2015 independent review of the United Kingdom’s portfolio, including programs that had been running for more than a decade, concluded that they had invested in internal affairs and professional standards units for police across many of its programs, without much evidence that this contributed to improved police behavior. One of the conclusions of the 2015 assessment was that few programs, including the accountability components, had a clear or plausible articulation of how the program would contribute towards the stated impact, and none appear to have formally analyzed or evaluated what contribution towards impact the program achieved. A 2011 assessment of European Union (EU) programming reached a similar conclusion. Existing police accountability programs funded by donors are not often enough grounded in coherent theories of change and are only rarely subjected to rigorous impact evaluation.

A case in point is a 2015 review of police accountability and reform in Kenya. The program was a comprehensive effort with a police accountability component being central to the initiative. Two accountability institutions were established as part of a reformed policing architecture. But there has been little to no use of reliable and valid indicators by which to assess the police accountability reforms with regard to the
investigation and disposition of police misconduct; merit recruitment; compliance with the code of conduct and ethics; or compliance with the conflict of interest policy.\textsuperscript{106} Even the 2015 review itself provides only broad descriptive claims with little to no empirical evidence to support them.

To supplement these findings, an informal survey was conducted to determine the current police accountability thinking from within donor agencies and research institutes.\textsuperscript{107} Interviews were conducted with more than 15 police development practitioners with extensive years of experience and who had worked in or are conversant with almost every major donor-supported police development program over the past 15 years. Queries were also posted on the field’s two major knowledge networks operated by the International Security Sector Advisory Team and United States Institute of Peace (USIP). While the survey is anecdotal and unsystematic, its results mirror the portfolio evaluations of DFID and the EU and clearly show that practitioners and scholars are, generally, unable to identify projects in which, as one practitioner noted, behaviors were changed or success was sustainable. Another senior official of a leading non-governmental organization (NGO) said, “We just don’t have that data and, other than good stories, cannot show we’ve bettered police accountability.”\textsuperscript{108}

The remainder of this section looks more closely at some specific types of initiatives which lacked sufficient evidence to determine effectiveness.

**ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND CONTROLS**

Intuitively, drafting and promulgation of policies, procedures, and written manuals seems unlikely to increase police accountability without the political will to ensure that the new policies are enforced. In addition, the structural, cultural, and managerial practices that inhibit the application of these policies may need to be addressed at the same time. However, there seems to be a lack of research on whether one particular approach to performance evaluation is associated with lower levels of undesirable outcomes (use of force, citizen complaints, civil litigation) than other approaches.\textsuperscript{109}

While writing a new policy in and of itself is not enough, a randomized controlled trial in India linking police performance evaluations to the promise of a transfer to a more desirable police station appears to have increased accountability among officers at drunk driving checkpoints: they were 50\% more likely to carry out checks, stayed longer at their posts, and caught more drunk drivers while they were there.\textsuperscript{110}

The role of middle management and sergeants may help instill and maintain police accountability as well.\textsuperscript{111} Policing studies generally recommend that the number of direct reports to sergeants – which in policing is called ‘span of control’ – is optimized at a ratio of no greater than 1:8 (sergeants to uniformed subordinates), though this recommendation is grounded in the anecdotal experiences of police departments rather than systematic research.\textsuperscript{112} There is also little understanding of how to improve the performance of sergeants and, therefore, how they can be best utilized to address police accountability challenges.\textsuperscript{113}
INTERNAL AFFAIRS/PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OR EXTERNAL CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT BODIES

There is little information as to the effectiveness of either internal affairs/professional standards (vertical accountability) or external civilian oversight bodies (external accountability) as methods of enhancing police accountability.\(^{114}\) There is little empirical evidence and no reliable theories of change to suggest “that one approach to the structure and management of internal affairs units is more effective than other forms in reducing citizen complaints, use of force, or unacceptable conduct.”\(^{115}\) Part of the problem is that the indicators to evaluate accountability – complaints, rate of resolution of complaints, and rate at which complaints are sustained – are misleading, at best.\(^{116}\) For example, an increase in complaints could mean a greater level of confidence in the police or could mean that more incidences have occurred. This is why having an appropriate basket of indicators to evaluate effectiveness is critical to ensure all dynamics around these issues are understood. For more information on baskets of indicators, see USAID’s indicator guides.\(^{117}\)

The lack of evidence does not imply that internal affairs/professional standards or external civilian oversight bodies as accountability mechanisms are unimportant or ineffective. The issue is that there is currently little evidence to guide security sector practitioners on how to effectively establish, structure, staff, manage and train the police and/or civilians who staff these units.\(^{118}\) Consequently, even though these units and systems are crucial for contemporary police services, the current data is not sufficient to show how to make them capable of reducing police misconduct and/or malfeasance.\(^{119}\) It is also worth emphasizing that professional standards bodies typically suffer from a lack of resources, and often have a reputation for offering unattractive career choices for the police officers who serve on them.\(^{120}\) Whether and how these problems can be overcome remains an open question.

There is some evidence that station-level monitoring by civilian third parties can improve performance and reduce corruption. A randomized controlled trial in India tested the effectiveness of decoy visits by researchers posing as crime victims, who subsequently revealed their identity to give officers a sense that they were being monitored. This intervention increased the likelihood of a case being filed by over 15 percentage points while also increasing the officers’ politeness in responding to criminal complaints.\(^{121}\)

In contrast, in a multi-site randomized controlled trial spanning four West African countries — Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo and Benin — the unannounced presence of a third party observer at highway checkpoints staffed by customs officials, police officers, and gendarmes did not reduce corruption.\(^{122}\) Combined with the finding that a doubling of police salaries did not reduce petty bribe-seeking on Ghanaian highways (see Annex B research on wage increases), these results suggest that some acts of corruption are not susceptible to quick fixes, especially when they occur far from an actual police
department, where supervision can be more robust. See Annex B for some evidence of what has worked with non-police government organizations which may be applicable.

MILITARIZATION OF THE POLICE

In the U.S., militarization of the police typically means being equipped with military vehicles, weapons, and other hardware. While not originally intended to increase police accountability, the militarization of police forces may have important implications for the use of force and for the relationship between citizens and the police more broadly. However, militarization can bring problems if it brings a “warrior mindset” with it, which it typically does. Sue Rahr, former executive director of the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, explains these potential problems:

> The soldier’s mission is that of a warrior: to conquer. The rules of engagement are decided before the battle. The police officer’s mission is that of a guardian: to protect. The rules of engagement evolve as the incident unfolds. Soldiers must follow orders. Police officers must make independent decisions. Soldiers come into communities as an outside, occupying force. Guardians are members of the community, protecting from within.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing argued that “law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian—rather than a warrior—mindset to build trust and legitimacy both within agencies and with the public.” In some cases, militarization may bring more of a guardian mindset, but regardless of the mindset, whether militarization in itself enhances or diminishes police accountability remains an open question. Indeed, one team of scholars has argued that, if anything, police forces in the U.S. should seek to emulate the military by adopting stricter rules of engagement and legal standards governing the use of force. Police forces might benefit from similar training regimens. They also argue that soldiers receive more and better training in techniques for deescalating “stressful, unpredictable, and dangerous scenarios.”

Evidence on the impact of the straight provision of military-grade equipment on police accountability is mixed. In the U.S., three recent studies have tested the effects of the 1033 Program, which delivered military equipment to numerous police departments in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Two of the three studies find that the impact of the program was benign or beneficial with reduced street-level crime, increased drug crime arrests, reduced citizen complaints, reduced assaults on police officers, and no increase in offender deaths. One reason may be that a better armed officer who is aware that he or she has the likely advantage in a combative confrontation may approach sensitive situations with greater restraint. However, these results represent an average, and some communities and populations may benefit more or less from this approach. The third study finds evidence of adverse effects, including an increase in civilian casualties from officer-involved shootings, though these results are purely correlational. Another study finds that militarization in the form of increased...
SWAT team deployments has no effect on crime or officer safety, but may diminish the reputation of the police among citizens.\textsuperscript{129}

The Harris et al. study also notes that some communities may benefit more / less than others: “It is entirely possible that in certain jurisdictions these armaments may or may not be necessary, have not increased the efficacy of drug interdiction, or have led directly to increased violence by police against civilians. In other words, our findings do not necessarily mean that saturating our local law enforcement agencies with military hardware is good policy”\textsuperscript{130}. They find that military hardware has benign or beneficial effects on average.

Evidence from outside the U.S. is limited but similarly mixed. Most studies from outside the U.S. focus on the “constabularization” of the military — i.e. the use of military or paramilitary forces to conduct domestic policing operations. The UPP program in Brazil, described above, involved a heavily militarized approach to policing in Rio de Janeiro. A quasi-experimental impact evaluation found that UPP reduced civilian casualties caused by the police by 60\%.\textsuperscript{131} Preliminary results from an ongoing rigorous impact evaluation in Cali, Colombia suggest that deploying soldiers to conduct routine police operations can reduce violent crime in homicide hot spots, at least on days and times when soldiers are physically on the streets, apparently without a marked increase in human rights violations.\textsuperscript{132} In contrast, recent observational research from Mexico suggests that both militarization of the police and constabularization of the military are associated with increased abuses against civilians.\textsuperscript{133}

**DE-ESCALATION TRAINING**

Even though the evidence is inconclusive regarding police accountability and how to reduce the use of non-lethal force, the experiences of different police departments as discussed by police chiefs, mental health officials, and other practitioners suggest that a relatively new model and approach to ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ may help ratchet down and de-escalate confrontations.\textsuperscript{134} The emerging approach is to train officers to act with a greater range of responses, among which is the awareness of how to de-escalate, which may imply a tactical re-positioning or withdrawal rather than the gradual increase in the application of coercive methods.

In New York, this rethinking has begun with the proviso that all officers and their supervisors within an entire police squad train together on de-escalation tactics. In Dallas, police-involved shootings and complaints about excessive use of force reduced after the police department introduced de-escalation training (though the training was combined with body cameras), a new de-escalation focused foot pursuit policy, and stricter traffic citation guidelines, making it impossible to tell which of these policies (if any)\textsuperscript{135} was responsible for the improvement in police accountability.\textsuperscript{136}

Despite the promise of de-escalation training in anecdotal accounts and despite the proliferation of state laws in the U.S. requiring that officers receive this training, rigorous empirical evidence remains scarce. As a 2018 review notes that no impact
evaluations of de-escalation training have been conducted or published,\(^\text{137}\) another review published in 2019 observes that “we know little about the effects of de-escalation training on officers and police-citizen interactions.”\(^\text{138}\) One rigorous impact evaluation of de-escalation training was published in the months after the 2018 review went online, focusing on the “Verbal Judo” program in Halifax, Canada.\(^\text{139}\) It appears to be the only study of its kind. The study found evidence of a modest immediate behavioral impact, but no effect on the majority of outcomes measured.\(^\text{140}\) Another rigorous impact evaluation of de-escalation training focused on adaptive decision-making is currently underway in four states, but results are still forthcoming and expected to be published around late 2020 or early 2021.\(^\text{141}\)

**IMPLICIT BIAS TRAINING**

Problems of police accountability are often especially severe when law enforcement officers interact with members of historically marginalized or underrepresented groups, such as racial or ethnic minorities. Police departments in the U.S. and other Western countries have increasingly adopted implicit bias training in an attempt to mitigate these problems. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that police departments incorporate “content around recognizing and confronting implicit bias and cultural responsiveness” into both basic and in-service training, and that they implement “ongoing, top down training for all officers in cultural diversity and related topics.”\(^\text{142}\)

There is ample experimental evidence demonstrating that police officers are susceptible to implicit bias. Studies have shown, for example, that police officers rate stereotypically black faces as more “criminal” than stereotypically white faces;\(^\text{143}\) that they are more likely to associate words that evoke criminality (e.g. arrest, shoot) with black citizens;\(^\text{144}\) and that they are more likely to “fire their guns” at suspects in simulated shooter games when the suspect is black.\(^\text{145}\)

There is also some experimental evidence from the civilian space demonstrating that training can reduce implicit bias, for example by offering counter stereotypical exemplars or providing strategies to counteract bias. However, most of these studies measure outcomes in the short term only, and findings are mixed.\(^\text{146}\) There appears to be no analogous studies of implicit bias training for police officers. One recent review concludes that, “although psychological science gives us good insight into the causes of racially biased policing, there are as yet no known, straightforward, effective intervention programs.”\(^\text{147}\) Another review cautions that while implicit bias training for police officers “seems moderately promising,” it is unlikely to reduce disparities in policing along racial or ethnic lines.\(^\text{148}\)

**CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF POLICE AND CIVIL LAWSUITS AS DETERRENCE**
There is also little evidence to suggest that horizontal accountability through criminal prosecutions of police officers for malfeasance deters their or their colleagues’ misconduct or malfeasance. In a similar light, there is little evidence to indicate that civilian lawsuits against law enforcement organizations and its officers for misconduct and/or violations of civil and human rights serve as a deterrent. Most police departments do not have computerized systems to track lawsuits against them; few investigate the claims made in those lawsuits. Nonetheless, there is evidence that police departments that do track lawsuits are able to use them to formulate policies that address the sources of civilians’ complaints. There is also some evidence of improvement in accountability when lawsuits result in insurance companies and city managers becoming actively involved. Even in these cases, however, it is difficult to attribute improvements in accountability to the lawsuits themselves. Attribution is made more difficult by the fact that reform does not originate within or from the police, but rather with those who control the purse strings of the police, though the police are involved in the reform effort).
The objective of this report is to capture anecdotal and empirical evidence of what works to strengthen and improve police accountability and make recommendations for what works to improve accountability. It analyzed a range of accountability programming across SSR, police accountability program evaluations, current criminology, and effective governance and accountability initiatives to identify successful efforts and specific options for SSR practitioners.

Starting new police units is a potential way to increase police accountability, although it has been rare for a country to disband a current police unit in order to reconstitute it or establish one that previously did not exist. While anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggests that police-civilian partnerships at the neighborhood and community level may be a promising mechanism for improving police accountability, evidence from rigorous impact evaluations is more mixed. Further research is needed here.

This report also identifies other types of police accountability projects with promise. These include: soft skills training on how to communicate and engage with citizens; updating use of force and firearms/force continuum protocols; introducing new technologies and internal early intervention systems (in certain contexts); and introducing specialized police units into neighborhoods in which there are high levels of crime and violence (with the caveat that they would likely need be to highly skilled and robustly supported for increased police accountability to transpire).

There are programming areas that merit further research. For example, there is limited empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of projects that built the institutional capacities of internal affairs units and civilian oversight complaint and review bodies. These initiatives face challenges of political commitment, transferability and scalability. There is a large focus on de-escalation training but there is still little research on its impact in police units. There is also little evidence to suggest that criminal prosecutions of police officers for malfeasance deters their or their colleagues’ future police misconduct or malfeasance, though again, existing research on this topic is scarce.

Police accountability continues to be a great challenge. The lack of data demonstrating effective programs (and the lack of data writ) large further complicates matters; however, the current data in police accountability programs (and in government effectiveness writ large) provides important starting points. It remains crucial that SSR programs build into their design robust empirical measures of what is working and under which conditions in order to further deepen the field of knowledge of what will work in regards to police accountability.
ANNEX A. LESSONS FROM GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

This section explores the relationship between what works in police accountability reform and what works in effective governance writ large. Anecdotal evidence on good and effective governance suggests that national, provincial, and local efforts coordinated across all four dimensions of accountability may be especially promising (horizontal, vertical, external, diagonal). Various evaluations and assessments of anticorruption programming have been conducted; qualitative case studies suggest that alliances, mechanisms, and platforms linking state actors who are champions of change with local initiatives help to promote good governance and increase accountability. These analyses (including a 2017 USAID review of all rigorous evaluations of programs to combat corruption and increase public servant accountability) argue that successful programs must weave together enhancements of the state’s various accountability mechanisms with local demands for more accountability. Key points from these analyses are outlined below.

Building on USAID’s Anticorruption Strategy and the Anticorruption Assessment Handbook, USAID’s Practitioner’s Guide for Anticorruption Programming Guide offers practical programming advice and synthesizes lessons gleaned from more than 300 USAID programs from 2007-2013 which all had anticorruption elements. For example, evidence has shown that strictly bottom-up approaches – public awareness campaigns (see footnote below) or citizen monitoring groups – on their own have little impact without willing coordination with the government. Strong USAID programming now blends bottom-up and top-down approaches together.
Transparency and oversight measures, which can do little more than naming and shaming, have proven inadequate. More information does not lead to more accountable or responsive governance on its own. It must be part of broader accountability—an ownership processes, which requires both answerability (responsiveness) and enforceability (capacity to sanction an abuse of power). Multiple studies have shown that in order for civil society anticorruption programs to be successful, they must include specific actionable activities for civil society to do. This means going beyond simple monitoring. For example, accountability is improved through independent oversight only when it is: 1) supported by authorities; who 2) are capable of sanctioning the wrongdoing. For example, creating MOU agreements between the government and civil society are an effective way to change the incentives of civil servants. Support by the government to strengthen performance and accountability processes is essential (see chart above).

Similarly, DFID’s systematic review of anticorruption impact evaluation studies found that community monitoring does not work unless they have the power to change the situation, which requires government involvement and support. Research on 150 case studies shows that citizen action in promoting good governance becomes most effective through strategies that build alliances, mechanisms, and platforms linking champions of change from state and CSO together. Second generation programming restores the relationship between a state and society by building accountability mechanisms through feedback loops and by changing power structures and norms through joint top-down and bottom up programming. A 2020 U4 study went so far as to say, “if official [government] support is lacking then [community engagement program] efforts might become limited, even irrelevant, or in some cases counterproductive.”

Even more specifically, the USAID-funded “Combatting Corruption Among Civil Servants: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works” report evaluated evidence on ten specific anti-corruption strategies. Although the culture in the police is different than that within which traditional civil service serve making it difficult to directly transfer lessons from anti-corruption efforts with civil servants to anti-corruption efforts with the police, the data from this analysis does provide useful starting points for examining what might be the most effective in the police.

### OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS OF WHAT WORKS IN COMBATTING CORRUPTION AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Rewards and Penalties</th>
<th>Ethnographic/qualitative</th>
<th>Macro Quantitative</th>
<th>Micro Quantitative</th>
<th>Lab Experiments</th>
<th>Field/Natural Experiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Extrinsic: Wage increase</td>
<td>Necessary but insufficient</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Extrinsic: Pay-per-perform</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bold = particularly robust evidence; Italics = particularly weak evidence; NA = lack of evidence
### III. Intrinsic motivations
- NA

### IV. Penalties
- Ineffective
- NA
- NA
- Effective
- NA

### B. Monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. Top-down audits</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Contested</th>
<th>Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii. Bottom-up monitoring</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Transparency: Free press</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Transparency: FOI laws</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Transparency: Disclosure</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. E-governance</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. Restructuring Bureaucracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. Decentralization</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Contested</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii. Bureaucratic discretion</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Bureaucratic competition</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Staff rotation</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Whistleblowing</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. Streamline regulation</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. Electoral incentives</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Contested</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D. Screening and Recruiting

| i. Meritocratic recruitment | Contested | Effective | NA | NA | NA |
| ii. Integrity screening | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

### E. Anti-corruption Agencies
- NA
- NA
- NA
- NA
- NA

### F. Education Campaigns
- NA
- NA
- NA
For a full summary of key findings on this research, please see Annex B.

Rewards and penalties. As noted above, the research corroborated what other research shows – that low civil servant wages that are below the poverty level contribute to corruption. However, this USAID review of existing research also shows that increasing the wages much beyond the poverty level as a reward will have a limited effect (and potentially a harmful effect) unless coupled with a broader anti-corruption strategy. In regard to penalties, there was some limited evidence using a case of Ghana that penalties such as repaying funds or returning stolen goods had an impact that was more effective than jail.166

To-down and bottom-up monitoring. A key finding is that the studies are emphatic that top-down monitoring, one of the most studied approaches, significantly reduce corruption at minimum in the short-term. Additional research is required to understand the long-term effectiveness.

Examining bottom up strategies from anticorruption and broader accountability programs writ large are more nuanced. In Peru, for example, where there were connections between state authorities and civil society, accountability was increased through monitoring of by civil society organizations in the construction of public infrastructure, in part because it was combined with a pre-existing anti-corruption state authority responsible for auditing, evaluating, and investigating all government activities.167 A rigorous impact evaluation found that monitoring did reduce infrastructure project costs but not completion time.

Through Making All Voices Count (MAVC), USAID has done extensive research on best practices and lessons learned in regard to CSO oversight of government institutions.168 It has consistently been found that CSO oversight of the government does not work unless the government wants to change. Programs that assist citizens in demanding change on a topic the government is aloof about have repeatedly not been successful. This is true regardless of the type of technology the CSO uses for such oversight. What makes a difference is whether the government has a willingness to be accountable and responsive to the technological system that is set up. If they do not, citizen efforts will unlikely change things regarding corrupt practices. Similarly, the aforementioned USAID study on combating corruption among civil servants found that these interventions can increase community participation but are not effective unless they have a government partner (hence why the Peru example was more effective).169

As indicated in the chart above, investigative journalism / free press and e-governance have all been found to be effective tools. This is particularly the case because it supports information flows required for other monitoring strategies.
Decentralization. As noted in the USAID-funded “Combatting Corruption Among Civil Servants: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works”, with respect to the internal workings of government, there has been conflicting evidence on whether decentralization of authorities and finances reduces corruption. Many suggest that by putting more power in the hands of individuals who are closer to the local population, it is easier to hold them accountable. On the other hand, others point to evidence that alludes to the increased layers of bureaucracy and/or that multiple entities could be reaching out to seek bribes as enabling corruption. The strongest results show that fiscal decentralization to a local level does reduce corruption but only when there is ample capacity at the local level to take on the additional responsibilities of local governance—it is a relatively high bar. In many of the countries USAID has supported with decentralization in the past, this level of capacity has not existed.

Accountability and elite incentives. The existence of a well-functioning state-level accountability institution or system that enables the linkage between state, provincial, and local levels can help to produce accountability results. Without a pre-existing and functional accountability mechanism, linkages between the different levels of state government are less likely to occur, potentially limiting the effectiveness of civil society anti-corruption efforts.

The reason is straightforward. As described in the World Bank Development Report (WDR): Governance and the Law, improvements in effective governance and accountability hinge upon national and provincial level state actors, institutions, organizations and agencies being committed to change existing power structures, revise asymmetrical rules of the game, reverse state capture and clientelism, and, lastly, rewrite previously negotiated political settlements. As the WDR states, improvement in effective governance and accountability “is unlikely to occur unless power actors – elites – in the country agree to that change” and “[are] likely to be effectively enforced only when they are aligned with the interests of powerful actors.”

The existence of well-functioning accountability mechanisms at the national-level is prima facie evidence of that commitment. Anticorruption and accountability programs benefit from the commitment and will of a country’s ruling elite. As the scholar upon whose work the World Development Report’s section on corruption is based describes “it is now widely recognized that the poor [governance and accountability] enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries is not an anomaly that can be solved simply by investing in enforcement agencies or supporting transparency initiatives or the rule of law…. [T]he configuration of organizational capabilities and powers means that informal processes of rent allocation and capture by powerful and largely informal organizations are likely to remain important for some time. In particular, informal power
networks are likely to continue to distort the operation of formal institutions in these countries."\(^{175}\)

A 2017 USAID-funded literature review amplifies this finding, concluding that “the anticorruption agenda of the last several decades has been focused on the individual level rather than system level policies” and there is a convergence of evidence that “corruption reforms fail in the long term when they are focused only on cases of individual deviance (emphasis in original).”\(^{176}\) The USAID review went on to conclude that donor-supported programs to reward good behavior or punish bad behavior may eventually fail (additional research is required to understand the long-term effectiveness) if those tasked with doing the rewarding and punishing are themselves corruptible. Programs of monitoring are only as corruption-free as the monitors themselves.\(^{177}\) Therefore, there needs to be a focus on both the individual level and the larger system and the influencers within it and what will incentivize them to support anti-corruption efforts.

In SSR programming, this challenge is particularly acute and, perhaps, more so than in other sectors.\(^{178}\) In part, this is because there appears to be little incentive by state actors, parliaments, and police agencies to alter existing power structures, change the asymmetrical rules of the game, or oppose state capture and clientelism in ways that will positively affect police accountability outcomes.\(^{179}\) Police accountability systems frequently lack capacity and are deprived of resources, only exacerbating the situation.

Research does show that diplomatic incentives such as grants, loans, or security alliances could get support for anti-corruption initiatives but only under certain conditions. The USAID Practitioner’s Guide to Anticorruption provides specific guidance on how these tools can be utilized.\(^{180}\)

In fact, the likelihood exists that increasing information for information’s sake can further empower the elite networks, technocrats and policy makers, thereby reinforcing the asymmetrical rules of the game, clientelism, and state capture rather than enhancing accountability.\(^{181}\) Similarly, community-driven development initiatives, whose premise is to augment community participation, if not designed appropriately, often promoted greater state capture by local elites.\(^{182}\)

The key appears to be availability of “information for benchmarking performance of local levels of government, e.g. municipalities; or across local service providers (schools; electricity and water supply), where service quality can be measured and compared”\(^{183}\) when the government is willing to work with CSO on its own government criteria. Information that is usable to community and neighborhood groups working with state agencies at very localized levels can increase accountability when state institutions are willing to be responsive to citizen concerns.\(^{184}\)

Homogenous versus heterogenous communities. In addition to bundling social accountability initiatives into partnerships with local state providers as well as ensuring that information provided can be used to benchmark government performance, numerous studies indicate the need to differentiate between communities that are relatively
homogeneous and those that are heterogeneous. As the 2017 World Bank report argues, in communities where asymmetrical power and inequality are pronounced, social accountability programming may be less likely to produce effective governance and accountability outcomes and may only exacerbate state capture. Projects need to explicitly enhance local participation to circumvent local elites’ ability to capture the state through their asymmetrical power. For example, programming could include mandates for representational quotas for differing demographic groups such as women. It also implies, as in the dialogue components of the Pakistani, Nepalese, and Nigerian police-civilian partnerships, that in order to achieve effective accountability outcomes, programs need to establish well-articulated deliberative processes that counteract the tendency of elite domination to skew outcomes in their favor.

E-governance, restructuring bureaucracies, screening and recruiting, and anti-corruption agencies. Lastly a few additional findings from the USAID study on anti-corruption highlighted in the previous chart are worth mentioning. This research reinforced the previously referenced finding that e-governance shows promise in policing and references a United Nations study in 160 countries over 14 years that showed corruption did on average go down in correlation to increased e-governance. The USAID study also examined the impact of restructuring bureaucracies including decentralization, bureaucratic discretion, bureaucratic competition, staff rotation, whistleblowing, streamlining regulation and electoral incentives. It showed that it is known that both limited as well as extreme bureaucracy can create ripe conditions for corruption, but of all seven areas extreme bureaucracy is most correlated with more corruption. The study examined whether anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) might be an institutional response, but they appear to only be successful in small authoritarian regimes due to a need for the ACA to be incorruptible, independent, and embedded in anticorruption legislation as well as have appropriate resources, the support of top leaders, and the ability to impartially enforce laws. Lastly, the study remarks how meritocratic recruitment needs to be researched further but policies to increase female participation in government show favorable results in reducing corruption.
ANNEX B. SUMMARY OF COMBATTING CORRUPTION AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS

The below are direct quote excerpts that summarize the findings from the USAID-funded quasi-systemic review of all rigorous evaluations that have been done on programming to increase public servant accountability and reducing corruption. Northwestern University’s Institute of International Education’s research titled “Combatting Corruption Among Civil Servants: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works”. The excerpts below are in regard to the following strategies: 1) rewards and penalties, 2) monitoring, 3) restructuring bureaucracies, 4) screening and recruiting, 5) anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), 6) educational campaigns, and 7) international agreements. Below is a short summary of its findings.

1) Rewards and penalties

“There is a near consensus across disciplines that poverty-level wages for civil servants contribute to corruption, and that sudden declines in salaries can be particularly detrimental. However, ethnographic and qualitative research also indicates that increasing wages beyond that—at least in isolation from a broader anti-corruption strategy—often has a modest effect on corruption levels. From Uganda to China, examples exist of wage increases failing to stem corruption (Fjeldstad 2005, Gong and Wu 2012).” Page 8.

“There is some argument that a sense of obligation to society, a desire to help others, or professional norms (Perry and Wise 1990, Perry 1996) could increase accountability. The limited existing evidence suggests that anti-corruption strategies targeting intrinsic motivation could prove promising…..Regarding penalties, in a Ghanaian case, encouraging civil servants to repay embezzled funds or return stolen goods has often proved more effective than jail time or fine.” Page 10.

2) Monitoring

Top down monitoring. “From a policy impact evaluation perspective, top-down monitoring is arguably the most thoroughly and rigorously studied anti-corruption policy to date—and the findings are nearly unanimous in the ability of audits to significantly reduce corruption at least in the short term…..When conducted prior to an election, audits reduce municipal corruption levels by around 67% relative to audits carried out after elections. However, they find no evidence of audits’ longer-term effect on corruption….Additional research on the long-term effectiveness of top-down audits also is warranted.” Pages 12-13.
Bottom-up monitoring. “While these interventions can increase community participation in the monitoring process, they have no statistically significant effect on corruption levels. By contrast, Serra’s (2012) laboratory experiment…indicates that combining top-down and bottom-up monitoring may be effective.” Page 13.

Press. “Ethnographers such as Hasty (2005) and Chalfin (2008) also point to the importance of robust investigative journalism for combatting corruption. And emerging evidence additionally indicates that information flows work in conjunction with other monitoring strategies, as shown by the spillover effects noted above of municipal government audits in Brazil resulting from media coverage of audit findings (Avis et al. 2016).” Page 14.

E-Governance. “Drawing on a UN e-governance index measuring the scope and quality of online services, telecommunication infrastructure and human capital, Elbahnasawy (2014) finds—in a dynamic panel of more than 160 countries across a 14-year period—that the introduction of more e-governance is on average followed by lower levels of perceived corruption…..e-governance itself is relatively new, yet a high-quality literature on its effectiveness is already emerging.” Page 15.

3) Restructuring bureaucracies

“Disagreement persists about whether decentralized or centralized bureaucracies are more conducive to anti-corruption efforts…. Overly complex bureaucratic regulatory policies can be breeding grounds for corruption (e.g., Hoag 2010, Anand 2012, Gupta 2012, Mathur 2012)….. There is ample evidence that merely rolling back the state rarely leads to reduced corruption…laboratory experiments have offered important insights into the potential impact of increased competition among bureaucrats but more research is needed….laboratory experiments suggest that rotation of cadres may be an effective anti-corruption policy, but whether these findings generalize to a real world setting remains to be studied…it is clear that direct evidence regarding whistleblowing laws’ effectiveness has yet to emerge…there is little evidence that reducing the size of government is an effective anti-corruption strategy but appropriately targeted deregulation deserves further attention…..more research on the role of elections versus appointments at a micro-level in reducing corruption—as opposed to macro-level debates over regime type—is warranted.” Pages 17-20.

4) Screening and recruiting

“In summary, despite the topic’s clear importance and recent attention to bureaucratic recruitment strategies more broadly (see Finan et al. 2015 for a review), the effects of meritocratic recruitment on corruption have yet to be rigorously studied.” Page 21.

“Many of these studies exilitely, though cautiously, suggest that increasing the number of women civil servants may reduce corruption.” Page 22.

5) Anticorruption agencies (ACAs)

“1990s was the adoption of ACAs, national-level specialized law enforcement agencies devoted to the control of corruption. Inspired by the cases of Hong Kong and
Singapore, which had achieved significant anti-corruption reform in the 1970s and 1980s through ACAs, more than 100 countries had adopted them by 2008. However, these have generally not proved successful outside the small authoritarian contexts in which they were pioneered, as we discuss in greater detail below (Klitgaard 1988, Quah 2011, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).” Page 6.

“Quah (2007) seeks to establish why ACAs in Singapore and Hong Kong proved more effective than their counterparts in South Korea and Thailand, emphasizing six conditions necessary for ACAs’ success, including: 1) the incorruptibility of the ACA itself; 2) independence from politics and other law enforcement bodies; 3) embeddedness in comprehensive anti-corruption legislation; 4) adequate staffing and funding; 5) the capability to impartially enforce laws; and 6) support—or “political will”—from the country’s top leaders (see also Choi 2009, Quah 2011, Quah 2013). In most cases, achieving all six of these proves difficult, making many ACA’s less than successful.” Page 24.

6) Educational campaigns

“Case study evidence indicates that anti-corruption educational campaigns deserve more attention but the limited existing experimental evidence points to the importance of carefully crafting and formulating such campaigns.” Page 26.

7) International agreements

“There is a glaring discrepancy between the prominent role of international anti-corruption conventions in the global effort to reduce corruption and the lack of rigorous empirical knowledge about these convention’s effectiveness.” Page 26.

Addressing The Social Problem of Corruption

“Other studies have found evidence of a U-shaped relationship: corruption appears to be lower in stable dictatorships and well-established democracies, and higher in unstable authoritarian regimes or regimes in the process of democratizing (Montinola and Jackson 2002, Rock 2009).” Page 19.

“The authors conclude that there exists what appears to be a universal and cross cultural condemnation of corruption. Survey research has shown that ordinary people in places like sub-Saharan Africa, including in cultures insulated from globalization and industrialization, take a very clear stand against corruption…” Page 30.

“This report finds scholarship converging on the consensus that corruption reforms fail in the long term when they are focused only on cases of individual deviance—the “bad apples” who need to be rewarded for good behavior and punished for bad behavior. In many developing country contexts, the problem is that corruption represents not individual deviance from a social order, but an alternative social order…The overarching
lesson of this section is that successful, long-term corruption reform requires that there be endogenous demand for corruption reform and, specifically, that some group or set of individuals develop a stake in fighting corruption.” Page 1.

Often, the problem is that corruption represents not individual deviance from a social order, but an alternative social order. Citizens feel they need to be corrupt to meet everyday requirements, such as finding electricity or water.

“The ability to play the game is perceived, then, not as a source of embarrassment, but rather as a source of pride and a measure of competence. Blundo and de Sardan (2006) even note that refusing to engage in corruption in these contexts can be perceived as a lack of propriety or a break with normal solidarity.” Page 33.

“Much corruption exists because citizens need to be corrupt to meet everyday requirements, such as finding electricity or water. In such contexts, citizens often need the help of intermediaries to navigate state bureaucracies, and these intermediaries can drive up levels of corruption. Reformers should consider providing citizens with other ways of navigating the state for intermediaries further corrupt and frustrate the system.” Page 2.

“…an effective anti-corruption strategy needs to focus on citizens’ need for help in navigating state bureaucracies. The kind of intermediaries that currently exist could be replaced with a corps of civic advocates who facilitate citizens’ access to the state…” Page 39.

“Some scholars suggest that if there is a collective action problem regarding corruption—that is, a problem that transcends individual actors – then strategies that focus on individuals will not work, and only a “big bang” approach can work, that is, an approach which multiple changes occur at the same time.” Page 39.

“It may be possible to address corruption organization by organization, by conducting a “big push” inside one organization at a time.” Page 2.


Department of Justice. *Principles for Promoting Police Integrity*. Department of Justice, 2008.


Donaghy, M. “Seats at the Table: Civil Society and Participatory Governance in Brazilian Housing Policy”. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 44. 2011.


Haberfield, Maria. Police Leadership. Pearson Pretice-Hall. 2006


Kupatadze, Alexander. “Police Reform in Georgia”. Center for Social Sciences, 2012


This framework has been adapted, updated and refined from DFID Practice Paper, Accountability Briefing Note. February 2008.

These dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Vertical, horizontal, and external fall under the “long route” to accountability and, taken together, most frequently emphasize institutional capacity building, see World Bank, World Bank Development Report – Making Services Work for the Poor, 2004. It should also be noted that the most recent World Bank Development Report on governance refers to and maintains this functional method of analyzing accountability, World Bank, World Bank Development Report – Governance and Law, 2017.

Accountability from below is, often, labeled social accountability.

The term ‘observational’ refers to the fact that analysts can only control for factors they can observe. The limitation of observational studies is that unobserved (or unobservable) factors can still create severe attribution problems. For example, if highly organized and cohesive police units are more likely to develop civilian-police partnerships, and if organization and cohesion cannot be reliably measured and controlled for, then a study comparing police units that do and do not engage in civilian-police partnerships may produce biased results, even if they control for other observable confounders (e.g. Size of the police unit).

In experimental studies, researchers randomize which units (police officers, stations, departments, etc.) receive particular police accountability programs and which do not. In quasi-experimental studies, researchers leverage ‘as-if’ random variation in police accountability programs – for example, variation induced by a government’s idiosyncratic decisions about where and when a particular program will be implemented.


This understanding of police accountability echoes and parallels the definition of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, see INL Guide to Police Assistance. U.S. Department of State, 2016, pp. 29-31: police “are accountable to the people for their performance. This includes the extent to which they have achieved their mission, the manner in which they perform assigned duties and responsibilities, and their general conduct on and off-duty” (p. 29). See also Louis Radelet and David Carter, who define accountability as “the quality of policing, whether the police are involved in the types of activities or programming that the public wants, whether the police are providing good ‘value for money’ in the services they provide, and whether the police are holding up their end of the social contract.” The Police and the Community, Prentice Hall, 1994, p. 529.


The New World, p. 22.
13 Walker, Police Accountability: Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs, National Institute of Justice, 2007, p. 3; see also Special Issue on Police Integrity.
14 The New World, p. 265.
15 Ibid, p. 266.
18 There appears to be an almost insurmountable problem in the classification of the type of corruption, as there are no means by which to tease apart whether grand or petty corruption is a ‘worse’ form of corruption with regard its effect on perceptions of state legitimacy or the economic harm they cause.
19 http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2802; accessed July 2018. It should be noted that very few women have been promoted in managerial positions and significant percentage of women officers are frustrated by their assignments into traffic police because of their automatic assignment to the traffic police upon graduation from the police academy and their apparent inability to be transferred to other policing units after their initial assignment.
20 Ibid. This analysis makes no assumption that women are inherently less susceptible to corruption and misconduct than are men, see Anne Marie Goetz. Political Cleaners: How Women are the New Anti-Corruption Force. Does the Evidence Wash? Development and Change. Vol. 38, 2007.
22 Similarly, efforts to transfer police wages electronically into individual bank accounts were undertaken in both Afghanistan and Congo, but with less success in reducing police corruption. Interviews conducted 2016.
23 Why Does Police Reform Appear to be More Successful in Georgia, p. 6. The actual percentage of police officers removed from police payroll is debated and uncertain with other reports indicating it was upwards of 50%, see Police Reform in Georgia, p. 7. The traffic police unit, as in the case of Peru, was disbanded and reconstituted.
24 Police Reform in Georgia.
25 See Police Reform in Georgia.
28 Stephen Danley. “Camden police reboot is being misused in the debate over police reform.”
31 Ibid.
33 Personal correspondence, June 2016.
35 See USIP, Evaluation of USIP’s Strengthening the Rule of Law and Security in Nepal Program.
38 See http://egap.org/metaketa/metaketa-iv-community-policing
39 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, p. 44.
43 “Establishing the Rule of Law in Weak and War-Torn States: Evidence from a Field Experiment with the Liberian National Police.”
45 National Institute of Justice. The-Use-of-Force Continuum. Department of Justice, 2009; see also Department of Justice. Principles for Promoting Police Integrity. Department of Justice, 2001. It should also be acknowledged that there is a growing debate about the utility of ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum,’ particularly with regard to officer-involved shootings, see Police Executive Research Forum. Critical Issues in Policing Series: Guiding Principles on Use of Force, 2016.
46 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, pp. 20-21.
49 James Fyfe. Administrative Intervention on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination. Journal of Criminal Justice 7 (4), 1979: 309-323. See also http://useofforceproject.org/#project; accessed July 2018, where a 2016 study concludes that ‘we found that police departments with policies that place clear restrictions on when and how officers use force had significantly fewer killings than those that did not have these restrictions in place.” PolicyLink. Limiting Police Use of Force: Promising Community-Centered Strategies, 2014, p. 12. This protocol has been put in place because research has found that the pursuit itself seems to increase the aggressiveness of the arrest if the pursuing officer conducts that detention.
50 Use of Force Project; accessed July 2018.
53 Skogan, Fairness and Effectiveness, p. 283.
54 Walker, Police Accountability, pp. 6-7.
55 Samuel Sinyangwe. “Police Are Killing Fewer People In Big Cities, But More In Suburban And Rural America.”


65 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, pp. 1, 11.


74 The introduction of new technologies, not related to policing, such as biometric smart cards and e-governance, have been shown to be effective in reducing corruption. See, respectively, Karthik Muralidharan, et. Al. “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.” American Economic Review, 2016. Abhijit Banerjee, et. Al. “Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy, 2016.

75 Kate Clark. Update on the Afghan Local Police: Making Sure They are Armed, Trained, Paid and Exist. Afghan Analysts Network, 2017. What is unknown is the long-term sustainability of the system, if and when donor support is withdrawn.
One of the largest makers of body cameras for police, Axon, claims that in San Antonio, for instance, use of the cameras has reduced use of force by 42% and citizen complaints by 21% since they were first implemented in 2015. See www.insidescience.org/news/science-behind-where-police-should-place-their-body-cameras; accessed July 2018.


It is also plausible to believe that the use of body cameras could improve overall police performance, in terms of the number of cases prosecutors accept from the police and the rate of convictions, because of the existence of video evidence that could be presented in court. See thecrimerereport.org/2017/11/29/why-police-body-cams-arent-what-they-seem-to-be; accessed July 2018. If this were to hold true, then body cameras could be considered an efficient use of police funds and would be, in that sense, an invaluable means by which to increase police accountability. See thecrimerereport.org/2017/11/29/why-police-body-cams-arent-what-they-seem-to-be; accessed July 2018.


Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid., p. 35.


Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: Assessing the Evidence, p. 35.


Ibid., p. 13.

Ibid.

The incentives built into the Brazilian pay-for-performance scheme stand in sharp relief to a Ghanaian attempt to reduce corruption through better pay for the police. A doubling of police salaries increased the incidence of solicited bribes by police, the average size of and the total amount of the bribes paid, see Jeremy Foltz and Kweku A. Opoku-Agyemang. Do Higher Salaries Lower Petty Corruption? A Policy Experiment on West Africa’s Highways. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2015.

Instance of police violence against individuals and the political repercussions that those instances unleashed, eventually undermined the effectiveness of the UPPs. It should be noted that the project had no effect on the overall murder rates in the favelas, Killing in the Slums, 2015, p. 6.

To identify police with problematic behaviors, EIS uses a set of the indicators by which to measure and establish an agency ‘threshold’ of police behavior. Officers whose actions fall above that threshold are identified as a ‘problematic’ and a performance review is, then, undertaken and a work plan devised to ameliorate those issues.


Ibid, p. 6. It is also worth noting that in two of the three cases, the EIS changed dramatically over the course of the study.


Ibid., p. 427.

Ibid., p. 429.
Police Use of Deadly Force. http://www.sheldensays.com/deadlyforce.htm; accessed July 2018; David Graham. What PNTL with regard to the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of the unit’s personnel. The program could also enhance the national-police-pntl; downloaded May 2016. The program may prove to be successful in building the capacity of the Timor-Leste National Police unit’s managerial systems. However, the final results of its effectiveness remain to be seen.

The Atlantic Can the U.S. Do to Improve Police Accountability? There’s No Shortage of Solutions but How Effective Are They? Doing with the relevant unit of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), see evaluations conducted by the major donors in this SSR. Nevertheless, be necessary for donors to support such activities for political or other reasons, as USAID has been PNTL with regard… [its] the effectiveness,” Skogan, who engage in deviations” (footnote 1, p. 4). For non-scholarly reports, see Randall G. Shelden and Pavel Vasiliev. A study focusing on the factors that may facilitate or thwart the effective conclusion of processes against police officers against Police. I

Unfortunately, there is no empirical justification given with which to choose which mechanism or why ‘good practice’ lays out a comprehensive list of external accountability mechanisms, accompanied by judgments of ‘good practice.’ Unfortunately, there is no empirical justification given with which to choose which mechanism or why ‘good practice’ is actually ‘good;’ see also Rachel Neild. Through current and former officials, the following agencies and organizations were consulted: USAID/USA, Stabilisation Unit and DFID/UK, World Bank, United Nations Office of Drug Control, Danish Institute of International Studies, SaferWorld, African Policing Civil Oversight Forum, Overseas Development Institute, International Security Sector Advisory Team, United States Institute of Peace, SSR Resource Centre, and Institute for Security Studies. Interview conducted spring 2016 with a senior staff person of a leading international non-governmental organization (NGO). In other interviews conducted in spring 2016, practitioners with decades of experience stated that “if one really looks at [police accountability], we have not succeeded” and “beyond moving closer to getting ‘enabling platforms’ from which little was implemented… [I have] not seen a lot that was successful.” It may, nevertheless, be necessary for donors to support such activities for political or other reasons, as USAID has been doing with the relevant unit of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), see USAID Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police; www.usaid.gov/timor-leste/project-descriptions/accountability-strengthening-timor-leste-national-police-pntl; downloaded May 2016. The program may prove to be successful in building the capacity of the PNTL with regard to the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of the unit’s personnel. The program could also enhance the unit’s managerial systems. However, the final results of its effectiveness remain to be seen.


The New World, p. 56.

With regard specifically to external civilian oversight, “there is very little credible evidence regarding… [its] the effectiveness,” Skogan, Fairness and Effectiveness, p. 289; see also, Christina Murtaugh and Michael Poe Establishing an Independent Police Oversight Body. INPROL Consolidated Response (10-007) August 2010, which lays out a comprehensive list of external accountability mechanisms, accompanied by judgments of ‘good practice.’ Unfortunately, there is no empirical justification given with which to choose which mechanism or why ‘good practice’ is actually ‘good;’ see also Rachel Neild. USAID Program Brief: Anti-Corruption and Police Integrity: SSR Program, 2007. Police Accountability, p. 19; see also The New World, p. 127. For a recent study of the internal affairs unit in an unnamed state in Brazil, see Sandro Cabral Sérgio G. Lazzarini. Guarding the Guardians: An Analysis of Investigations against Police. Inspy Working Paper, 2010, where it is concluded that “to our best knowledge there is no specific study focusing on the factors that may facilitate or thwart the effective conclusion of processes against police officers who engage in deviations” (footnote 1, p. 4). For non-scholarly reports, see Randall G. Shelden and Pavel Vasiliev. Police Use of Deadly Force. http://www.sheldensys.com/deadlyforce.htm; accessed July 2018; David Graham. What Can the U.S. Do to Improve Police Accountability? There’s No Shortage of Solutions but How Effective Are They? The Atlantic, 8 March 2016; Daniel Denvir. The Elusiveness of Police Accountability. CityLab, 2 April 2012.
The New World, pp. 130-131. Among the challenges are that citizens frequently do not file complaints, even when they appear to be justified in doing so given the circumstances. Other issues that preclude the reliability and validity of the data include the lack of comparability across, U.S. police departments and oversight bodies; between police agencies and oversight bodies; on procedures on how to file complaints; the levels of accessibility of complaint mechanisms; and on how information is classified, archived, and reported.

https://www.usaid.gov/node/33416

Ibid., p. 125. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to determine whether external accountability mechanisms are more or less effective than internal ones, Police Accountability, p. 20; see also Anti-Corruption and Police Reform. Anti-Corruption Resources Centre, U4 Expert Answer, No. 247, 2010. This suggests that the choice of which accountability mechanism to implement is more a question of ideology, politics, and the political economy analysis of where political will exists than effectiveness. Donor support for external accountability mechanisms may represent a good result in and of themselves, but the objective for doing so should not pertain to an increase in police accountability.

It should also be noted that there is no evidence to determine whether external accountability mechanisms are more or less effective than internal ones, Police Accountability, p. 20; see also Anti-Corruption and Police Reform. Anti-Corruption Resources Centre, U4 Expert Answer, No. 247, 2010. This suggests that the choice of which accountability mechanism to implement is more a question of ideology, politics, and the political economy analysis of where political will exists than effectiveness. Donor support for external accountability mechanisms may represent a good result in and of themselves, but the objective for doing so should not pertain to an increase in police accountability.

Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training.”


Ibid., p. 13.

President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, p. 58.


For a discussion on deterrence, see What Police Learn from Lawsuits.

See Joanna Schwartz. Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking. UCLA Law Review. Vol. 57, 2010; Candace McCoy. Lawsuits Against Police: What Impact Do They Really Have. Criminal Law Bulletin. Vol. 20, 1984. It is important to note that this statement does not refer to past U.S. Department of Justice consent decrees or memoranda of agreement reached between the department and municipal police departments, such as in the cases of New Orleans, Seattle, and Cincinnati. In the U.S., consent decrees are mutually binding agreements between two parties, most frequently a municipality and the Department of Justice (DOJ) on behalf of the federal government.

What Police Learn from Lawsuits.


See, for instance, Rema Hanna et al. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn’t and What We Don’t Know. EPPI-Centre, 2011.


OECD

Positive messages (i.e. corruption decreasing or being less widespread than expected) can reduce corruption by harnessing social norms. Negative corruption messaging is less effective and can even backfire, inadvertently increasing

159 “Unless those in positions of power to change things (locally and / or nationally) are allies in the process, efforts are unlikely to meet with success.” ICT-facilitated accountability and engagement in health systems: a review of Making All Voices Count projects.

160 Lagunes, Paul. Guardians of accountability: experiment on corruption and inefficiency in Peru’s local public works.


162 Rachel Kleinfeld, Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: The next Generation Reform. See also OECD’s DAC study of 90 interventions, which found that only by interlinking demand & supply, voice and accountability, were any improvements to governance & development outcomes seen.

163 U4 Issue 2020:3 Overcoming the pitfalls of engaging communities in anti-corruption programmes. The relationship between corrupt officials and citizens is driven by underlying structural power inequalities.


167 See, for instance, Rema Hanna et al. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn’t and What We Don’t Know. EPPI-Centre, 2011.


169 World Bank, Governance and the Law, 2017. It should be noted that there is little empirical evidence in the World Development Report 2017 on how, programmatically, to enhance accountability. The Report stays mostly on the conceptual, policy, and prescription level, arguing for the need to increase contestability, change elite incentives, and shift preferences and beliefs. Even as the Report notes that “the rules of the game is where the action is,” the Report provides little empirical data on how the international community can programmatically support local actors in changing those rules, (pp. 18 and 64). The argument in the World Development Report is, primarily, historical from a western and developed world context, theoretical, and/or academic, based upon experimental data and game theory. Most of empirical programmatic data presented in the World Development Report is also cited in this report. that is not also presents actual and successful good governance and accountability programs or projects. The scarcity of reliable and valid empirical data in the World Development Report about how the international community can support programming to strengthen local accountability mechanisms is telling. As one commentator noted, the World Development Report, while representing a paradigm shift, still requires to be operationalized, see Stefan Kassoff. The WDR 2017 on Governance and the Law: Can it Drive Transformation in Development Practice. Global Policy, 2017, www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/02/2017/wdr-2017-governance-and-law-can-it-drive-transformation-development-practice, accessed October 2018. Another observed that the World Development Report’s theory of change has not been elaborated but remains on the theoretical and conceptual level, Duncan Green. WDR 2017 Governance and the Law: Great Content, Terrible Comms, and a Big Moral Dilemma on Rights and Democracy. From Poverty to Power, 2017, oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/wdr-2017-on-governance-and-law-great-content-terrible-comms-and-a-big-moral-dilemma-on-rights-and-democracy, accessed October 2018. See also Rachel Kleinfeld, Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: The next Generation Reform
The case of Ghana is an excellent example, in that it has taken more than 30 years for Ghana to achieve what can be called a “functionally institutionalized state,” in which the institutions of governance are capable and perceived to be legitimate. 

Conflict, Security and Development. World Development Report 2011, p. 10. Unfortunately, that level of institutionalized statehood has resulted in the “receptive environment” in which the civil service, political parties, the political elite, and the institutions and agencies of the state remain largely unaccountable and “petty and grand corruption is endemic,” Ivan Briscoe and Dana Goff. Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties. Clingendael Institute, 2016, p. 24. See also Erik Wibbels, et al. Endline Impact Evaluation: Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms, USAID, 2018, p. iv. It should also be noted that the perception of political partisan manipulation by local state administrators rose, which may suggest there having been “sensitized” to budgetary manipulations by politicians (p. iv). In both instances, however, programmatic ‘outcomes’ hinged on perceptions.

Khan, Anti-Corruption in Adverse Contexts, p. 13.


There is some evidence that computerized integrated financial management systems that enhanced accounting and reporting procedures are associated with reductions in fraud, see Context Choices in Fighting Corruption, 2011. It should be noted, however, that there cannot be ascription of causality between the computerized systems and the reduction in fraud, given attribution and measurement issues. There is also the beginning of evidence that procurement and construction costs can fall with better monitoring and auditing of procurement officials, see Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky. “The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires.” Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 46, 2003. There is, however, a measurement problem with most donor-supported procurement reforms in that they do not evaluate their projects using non-perception data or cost-based analyses, which can call into question the reliability and validity of the evaluation, see Why Corruption Matters, 2015, p. 60.


Fox, Social Accountability. P. 348; see Martina Bjorkman and Jakob Svensson. When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda. Journal of European Economic Association, Vol. 8, 2011: see also “the review of the literature finds that participants in civic activities tend to be wealthier, more educated, of higher social status (by caste and ethnicity), male, and more politically connected than nonparticipants” Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. P. 5. The opportunity and marginal costs for poor and vulnerable groups to participate are high and higher than their more privileged neighbors, which reduces the likelihood of the participation of the poor and vulnerable.


A review by the Bank Information Center and Global Witness concerning extractive industries and local communities argues that revenue data has more impact if it were made more meaningful to those at the local level, McGee, Review of Impact. P. 18.

Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. P. 5.


See Lori Beaman, et al. Women Politicians, Gender Bias, and Policy-making in Rural India UNICEF 2006, where mandated women’s membership on local village decision-making councils enabled other women to participate more in village discussions, improved school attendance and health outcomes. It also seems to be true that women in leadership positions leads to a decrease in incidents of the paying of bribes for the delivery of public service, but, also can lead to decrease in public satisfaction in the quality of the public service being provided (in this case, healthcare), see, E. Duflo and P. Topalova. Unappreciated Service: Performance, Perceptions, and Women Leaders in India. Working Paper, Department of Economics, MIT, 2004.

Deliberative dialogues are extraordinarily intricate undertakings and cannot be ‘taught’ as if it were a skill to be learned in a classroom. Furthermore, deliberative dialogues may more readily occur when the question being discussed is a local problem, see Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. Pp. 266 – 270 and 135. In one instance, it was the combination of the scorecards, making public the contrast between health worker and community perceptions of performance and facilitated dialogue between community members and the healthcare providers that was key. See McGee, Review of Impact. P. 12.

