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The purpose of this Electoral Security Best Practices Guide (Guide) is to provide USAID’s development professionals, as well as electoral assistance and conflict prevention policy-makers and practitioners, with a global overview of best practices in programming to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict and violence.

A “best practice” can be defined as a process, program, or method that produces results superior to others as measured by a set of objectives. Within the context of electoral security, a “best practice” can be defined as a policy, practice, or program intervention that has demonstrated measurable results in achieving electoral conflict prevention, management, or mediation. For the purposes of this Guide, best practices are organized as follows: 1) electoral phase; 2) thematic area; and 3) policy, practice, or program activity by state and non-state stakeholder. In order to inform the preparation of this Guide, electoral security assessments were conducted in Guatemala, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Burundi, employing the methodology described in USAID’s Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers (Framework).¹ These country cases present a diversity of electoral conflict profiles in perpetrators, victims, motives, tactics, locations, timing, and intensity.

There are several overarching lessons learned from these assessments and associated research for this Guide. First, by identifying the underlying security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur; early warning signs can be identified to focus planning for program interventions. Second, through establishing a profile of the threats, program responses can be specifically crafted to address the conflict emerging from these threats. Third, a history of electoral conflict can be a predictor of future electoral conflict. Therefore, previous threat profiles may have relevance for future elections. And fourth, comprehensive program responses
should be multi-sectoral and can involve elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, rule of law, civil society, media, women’s empowerment, and security sector programs.

Based on USAID’s Framework, the four assessments, and desk research, this Guide is divided into five sections. Section I provides a brief overview of USAID’s Framework and the Electoral Cycle Approach to programming. Sections II, III, and IV describe best practices organized by phase of the electoral cycle—pre-election, election day, and post-election. The profile of electoral conflict and violence can vary with the phase of the electoral cycle, requiring different electoral security practices as responses. Section V is focused on best practices that are applicable throughout all phases of the electoral cycle. Through this approach, the user can cross-reference the country context in which they are programming with best practices used in similar environments and phases of the electoral cycle.

I. USAID’S ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

This Guide is a companion publication to USAID’s Electoral Security Framework, which provides a methodology to profile electoral threats so that planning, programming, and metrics can be crafted to address the conflict emerging from these threats. With this Guide, the user can identify policies, programs, and practices that can be implemented to counter these threat profiles.

Over the last three decades, USAID has assisted emerging and consolidating democracies in conducting free and fair elections. This technical assistance is strategically premised on the assumption that credible elections foster improved governance and societal well-being. Through its experience in hundreds of elections, USAID has recognized that electoral conflict can compromise electoral integrity through its impact on candidate selections, voter turnout, or the accuracy of the announced results. Persistent cases of electoral violence create obstacles to democratic consolidation as institutions of governance are under threat, compromised, or remain fragile as a direct or indirect result of the violence. The Framework and this Guide combine to provide the user with the diagnostic tools to profile electoral conflict and programmatic approaches to dampen the potential for conflict and counter the threats identified in the profile.

In framing the timing and duration of electoral security interventions, there are two perspectives to consider: First, the electoral cycle can be divided into three phases: 1) Pre-Election Phase: The long run-up to electoral events (18 months to Election Day); 2) Election Day Phase: Polling day(s); and 3) Post-Election Phase: Between voting and proclamation of post-election outcomes and their aftermath. Second, in conflictive electoral environments, it is also conceptually useful to examine the electoral calendar grouped by activity: 1) political; 2) technical; and 3) peace-building (if in a post-conflict environment). By examining the electoral calendar from both a chronological and activity perspective, program planning is improved.

II. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: PRE-ELECTION PHASE

The pre-election phase involves activities that can have either an immediate or medium- to long-term impact on the potential for electoral conflict to occur. The following categories of best practices can be associated with the pre-election phase: electoral security legal frameworks; political party conflict management; political finance and electoral conflict; and security force electoral security training.

A. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral security legal frameworks is to put forward a set of guiding principles on constitutional, peace agreement, and legislative content which reduces the potential for electoral conflict, establishes penalties for electoral violence, and creates mechanisms of justice for victims and their families. For the purposes of this best practice analysis, the legal framework relevant for electoral security is defined through a hierarchy of articles, provisions, and laws from the following legal instruments: 1) constitutions; 2) peace agreements; 3) electoral legislation; 4) women’s protection and equality legislation; and, 5) land ownership legislation. Each of these legal instruments can possess some intersection with electoral security.

B. BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The objective of identifying best practices in political party conflict management is to reduce the incentives for political rivals to use violence as a campaign tactic. In many countries, political rivals are the primary sources of electoral violence. The best practices identified here are intended to impose standards on political behavior (and sanctions for non-compliance), foster communication among political rivals, and provide a forum for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) of electoral disputes. The
IV. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: POST-ELECTION PHASE

Chronologically, the post-election phase can be benchmarked to begin with the closing of polling stations and preliminary tabulation of ballots through adjudication of disputes, certification of results, and inauguration of victorious candidates. However, for the purposes of measuring the longevity of conflict connected with a past election, the post-election phase may be conceptually extended for several months after election day as acts of retribution related to election outcomes are committed over time. Post-election phase best practices are grouped into two thematic areas: electoral results management and electoral justice and mediation.

C. BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL FINANCE AND ELECTORAL CONFLICT

The objective of including political finance as a thematic area for electoral security is to recognize the connections between money and electoral violence and the imperative to disrupt these connections through accountability and transparency. Money is needed to acquire weapons and ammunition, hire enforcers, buy votes, and finance other illicit political activities. Opaque political finance also fosters illicit relationships between perpetrators and public officials, resulting in compromised elections, governance and insecurity. As a result, political finance regulation addresses the “supply side” of financial resources that enable electoral violence to occur. The programming trio of enforcement capacity, public campaign resources, and civil society monitoring can combine to bring accountability and transparency to political finance by creating obstacles for the use of campaign funds for violent purposes. In conflictive electoral environments, the implementation of a political finance system faces numerous challenges, including limitations on the mechanisms for transparency, lack of enforcement capacity, and abuse of state resources for political or campaign purposes. Nevertheless, if catalyzing events create a public sentiment for greater control on political funding, these best practices can be introduced to initiate political finance reform.

D. BEST PRACTICES IN SECURITY FORCE ELECTORAL SECURITY TRAINING

The objective of programming for security force training in electoral security practices is to establish standards on the rules of engagement for public order management, enhance protection of electoral violence targets, and create incentives to pursue justice for victims, all within the bounds of the legal and policy restrictions governing USAID assistance to security forces, including police. In fulfilling this objective, the electoral security curriculum should include instruction on international standards and practices regarding public order management and rules of engagement as well as focus on methodologies for assessing and profiling electoral threats, including USAID’s training program on its Electoral Security Framework. Through the training, there should be a common theme of political neutrality, respect for human rights, and the political will to pursue justice.

III. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: ELECTION DAY PHASE

Best practices for the election day phase center on enhancing electoral security administration as a sub-practice area for EMB and security force partners to gain the skills and capabilities to conduct electoral security threat assessment, planning, and implementation. The planning process commences with the development of an electoral security concept, which is a strategic and operational scenario on the electoral security situation in each phase of the electoral cycle. State stakeholders should establish coordination and communications mechanisms which could follow one of three models: 1) EMB led; 2) security force led; or 3) mixed operations. With any of the models there remains a need to decentralize electoral security administration as conflicts are often localized and prevention measures can be more effective with knowledge of the local conflict history. Security and civilian rapid response mechanisms are valuable tools to provide specialized quick reaction forces (QRFs) or for security forces to rapidly respond to a crisis and for civilian authorities to mediate electoral disputes. The EMB and security forces should conduct a review following the election and assemble lessons learned for use in future planning. Remember that all USAID-assisted interventions involving security forces must receive legal clearance in advance.
A. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTION RESULTS MANAGEMENT

The objective of identifying best practices in election results management is to reduce the potential for public mistrust in announced outcomes to become a trigger for post-election violence. The threat is mitigated by the EMB through the development of a plan (and the public announcement of this plan) for the timing and sequencing of election results announcements. Transparency in the ballot counting process can be enhanced through parallel vote tabulation conducted by political parties or CSOs, where appropriate. If electronic voting is employed, to avoid a "black box" syndrome of voter mistrust in the automated tabulation, public education and equipment testing should be performed, and some form of paper trail should be maintained.

B. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL JUSTICE AND MEDIATION

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral justice systems is to reduce the potential for post-election violence to occur because of the failure to effectively adjudicate electoral disputes. These adjudication mechanisms can be formal or informal. Formal electoral justice mechanisms can follow three fundamental models: 1) judicial; 2) unified/shared; and 3) special. The relative effectiveness of each model depends on the independence of the adjudicating body – the EMB, judiciary, or special tribunal – from governmental or political influences. Informal electoral justice mechanisms can also be employed to resolve disputes including the involvement of non-state stakeholders such as CSOs, FBOs, and traditional leaders. In some cases, compensation can be awarded to victims of electoral violence and their families. And, in cases where electoral violence has occurred at a scale or with an intent that it becomes a crime against humanity, the procedures exist for the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation, as with cases involving elections in Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire. It should be noted that while electoral justice is discussed in the post-election phase of this Guide, electoral disputes, crimes and infractions can occur throughout the electoral cycle, requiring electoral justice mechanisms to be available throughout the process.

V. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: ALL PHASES OF THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

While the practices described above are generally linked to a particular phase of the electoral cycle, there are other practices which are relevant to all phases: grassroots electoral peace-building; electoral conflict monitoring and mapping; preventing political violence against women in elections (PVAWE); de-mobilizing youth from electoral conflict; and media monitoring and electoral conflict.

A. BEST PRACTICES IN GRASSROOTS ELECTORAL PEACE-BUILDING

The objective of identifying best practices in grassroots electoral peace-building is to foster public intolerance for electoral violence and to provide sources of social services for victims of electoral violence. CSOs and FBOs are cited in their roles as educators, advocates, and care providers. Through citizen networks and task forces, a variety of projects and activities can be undertaken including peace pacts, peace caravans, and peace messages, to build public support for peaceful elections and reforms. Additionally, these organizations can help to provide social services to victims including emergency medical, psychological, and legal assistance.

B. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL CONFLICT MONITORING AND MAPPING

The systematic monitoring of electoral conflict by state and non-state stakeholders provides documentation of incidents and offers the opportunities to analyze the incidents for conflict patterns and profiles. In some cases, this data is aggregated in database form and then developed into visual maps which demonstrate locations of such incidents. Such monitoring and mapping can provide several public benefits. First, by collecting and disseminating information on incidents, such initiatives can raise public awareness about the problem of electoral violence. Second, documenting incidents of electoral violence provides information that enforcement authorities may employ to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. However, in so doing, the safety of the victim and of the monitor must be considered from a “do no harm” standpoint. And, third, data on incidents can be provided to those authorities responsible for electoral security who can then use this information (in some cases aggregated into map form) to inform their planning for future electoral processes.
C. BEST PRACTICES IN PREVENTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ELECTIONS (PVAWE)

The objective of identifying best practices in PVAWE prevention is to recognize that women in elections may possess special vulnerabilities for violence, and programming should reflect these vulnerabilities. While previous analysis of violence against women discusses such violence occurring in the contexts of home, community, and state, this Guide supports the view that elections can be considered as a fourth context because of the potentially conflictive nature of elections and the vulnerabilities of women in them. Political violence against women can occur in public spaces during electoral activities or as domestic abuse in private space. Women in elections can be protected and empowered through the legal framework, which assigns firm penalties for violence against women in general and political violence against women in particular. EMBs can play a role in preventing political violence against women through electoral procedures, such as confidentiality in voter registration. Information communications technology (ICT) can be useful to document and convey incidents of PVAWE because of the anonymity they can provide to the victim or monitor. And, public education campaigns to enhance intolerance for PVAWE can be conducted by CSOs, FBOs and political parties.

D. BEST PRACTICES IN DEMOBILIZING YOUTH FROM ELECTORAL CONFLICT

The objective of identifying best practices in demobilizing youth from electoral violence is to reduce their vulnerabilities for recruitment and instill electoral values consistent with international norms and standards. This objective can be fulfilled through programming aimed at education, engagement, and employment. Special electoral education programs with youth audiences can provide focused civic education on democratic values and processes. The engagement of youth election workers can create a stake for them in the electoral process. And, as youth vulnerabilities are often economic in nature, employment programs during the electoral cycle can provide income and disincentives to accept other employment involving violence.

E. BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA MONITORING

The objective of identifying best practices in media monitoring is to reduce the potential for rumor, misinformation, and hate speech to trigger electoral violence; and, to examine the technologies associated with documenting and reporting on electoral violence. Media monitoring can be conducted by state and non-state stakeholders and media organizations could be requested or required to comply with a code of conduct providing guidelines on accuracy and integrity in reporting. Efforts to implement new media strategies, however, should only be used as part of a broader plan for conflict prevention and management. Implementers will also have to deal with issues of prioritizing verified information, or allowing a wider selection of data, that might not be as trustworthy. Before building a monitoring program, implementers should develop clear guidelines on what type of information will be collected, how it will be used, and how they will validate information so that fraudulent data is not included.
The purpose of this Electoral Security Best Practices Guide (Guide) is to provide development professionals with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as electoral assistance and conflict prevention policymakers and practitioners, with a global overview of best practices in programming to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict and violence.

A “best practice” can be defined as a process, program, or method that produces results superior to others as measured by a set of objectives. Within the context of electoral security, a “best practice” can be defined as a policy, practice, or program intervention that has demonstrated measurable results in achieving electoral conflict prevention, management, or mediation. For the purposes of this Guide, best practices are organized as follows: 1) electoral phase; 2) thematic area; and 3) policy, practice, or program activity by state and non-state stakeholder. In order to inform this Guide, electoral security assessments were conducted in Guatemala, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Burundi, employing the methodology described in USAID’s Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers (Framework).

These country cases present a diversity of electoral conflict profiles in perpetrators, victims, motives, tactics, locations, timing, and intensity. There are several overarching lessons learned from these assessments and associated research for this Guide. First, by identifying the underlying security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur, early warning signs can be identified to focus planning for program interventions. Second, through establishing a profile of the threats, program responses can be specifically crafted to address the conflict emerging from these threats. Third, a history of electoral conflict can be a predictor of future electoral conflict. Therefore, previous threat profiles may have relevance for future elections. And fourth, comprehensive program responses...
should be multi-sectoral and can involve elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, rule of law, civil society, media, women’s empowerment, and security sector programs.

In all four country cases noted above, candidates are the most frequently targeted stakeholder—municipal candidates in Guatemala and parliamentary candidates in the other three cases—while supporters and voters are targets of both indiscriminate violence and attempts to influence or suppress their participation. Police and journalists (with varying levels of intensity) are also the victims of electoral violence in each of the four countries; and, election workers were targeted in Guatemala and Afghanistan.

By contrast, the profile of the perpetrators of electoral violence in each of the four countries varied. In Guatemala, the perpetrators are largely drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), in particular the Mexican drug cartel the Zetas, who employ homicide, physical assaults, and intimidation to capture local governments in order to maintain transit routes or safe havens for their illicit activities. In Afghanistan, the primary perpetrators are insurgents, in particular the Taliban, who use heavy weapons such as rocket propelled grenades and suicide bombers to disrupt and delay the election process, which they regard as a Western-imposed institution. In the Philippines, political rivalries, manifested as political “clans” or “dynasties,” are the primary perpetrators of electoral violence—employing their “private armed groups” equipped with automatic weapons to intimidate or murder rivals. Insurgencies in Mindanao and other provinces also pose threats to peaceful elections. In Burundi, political rivals are also the principal perpetrators of violence; however, the ruling party has been the dominant one. Having consolidated power and state resources in the 2005 election, the ruling party in Burundi has deployed its “youth wings” to attack and intimidate opposition candidates and supporters. Intimidation tactics by police have also been reported.

Based on USAID’s Electoral Security Framework, the assessments, and research, this Guide is divided into five sections. Section I provides a brief overview of USAID’s Framework and the electoral cycle. Sections II, III, and IV are devoted to a particular phase of the electoral cycle—pre-election, election day, and post-election, respectively. Each of these phases is subject to particular vulnerabilities and threats that may generate violence and conflict. These particular threats are summarized at the beginning of each section, followed by a description of those best practices that development practitioners can leverage in order to prevent, manage, or mediate violence in the specific phase. The final section—Section V—is focused on best practices that are applicable throughout all phases of the electoral cycle. Throughout each of the sections, best practices are disaggregated by state and non-state stakeholder. Through this approach, the user can cross-reference the country context in which they are programming and leverage best practices used in similar environments and phases of the electoral cycle.

A list of acronyms is shown as Annex I. A glossary of electoral security terminology is included as Annex II. A survey of web-based tools and data for electoral security is shown as Annex III. Criteria for evaluating electoral legal frameworks are provided in Annex IV. A conceptual approach to joint election operation centers is outlined in Annex V. An overview of the EVER methodology is shown in Annex VI. Examples of conflict mapping are available in Annex VII. And, endnotes for the Guide are cited in Annex VIII.
I. USAID’S ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

A. ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK

This Best Practices Guide is a companion publication to USAID’s Electoral Security Framework, which provides a methodology to profile electoral threats so that planning, programming, and metrics can be crafted to address the conflict emerging from these threats. With this Guide, the user can identify policies, programs, and practices that can be implemented to counter these threat profiles. As a result, the Framework and this Guide combine to provide the user with the diagnostic tools to profile electoral conflict and programmatic approaches to dampen the potential for conflict and counter the threats identified in the profile.

There are four analytical sections that form the basis of the original Framework and the subsequent identification of best practices:

1. **Assessment:** This step is divided into three sections: a) contextual analysis; b) historical conflict factors; and c) stakeholder analysis.

The assessment examines those security, political, social, and economic factors that create underlying vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur. Some of these factors can serve as early warning signs for potential conflict. The contextual analysis also examines factors specific to an election that hold the potential as triggers to transform vulnerabilities into violence. The assessment then chronicles the history of electoral violence by the three phases of the electoral cycle – pre-election, election day, and post-election. In this analysis, the patterns of the conflict dynamics are crystallized by identifying victims, perpetrators, motives, tactics, locations, and intensity. The assessment concludes with a profile of electoral stakeholders by status and role. Stakeholders are grouped as state,
non-state, and international in nature. The state stakeholder group is further subdivided into security, regulatory, and judicial actors. Non-state stakeholders include political parties, CSOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs), media, and traditional leaders. International stakeholders may bridge both state and non-state sectors, and can include inter-government organizations (IGOs), transitional justice mechanisms, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged with electoral assistance, conflict resolution, rule of law, civil society, media, women’s empowerment, and security sector reform. The roles of each stakeholder in electoral security or conflict are described.

2. Planning: This step examines donor constraints, United States Government (USG) priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.

Taking into account the findings of the assessment, the next component of the Framework is planning. It is here that strategic objectives are identified to shape interventions which address a problem revealed in the assessment. A problem statement and development hypothesis should be developed to frame the overall objectives of the interventions. Other planning activities include budgeting, inter-agency coordination within the USG, IGO coordination, and identification of implementing partners.

3. Programming: This step identifies programming activities to be undertaken by USAID as well as activities that may be implemented by other organizations.

Program activities are presented by strategic objective, stakeholder, and phase of the electoral cycle when the activity is to be implemented. These activities are organized into a matrix to provide an overview of potential interventions throughout the course of the electoral cycle.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): The step establishes data, targets, and indicators to measure the effectiveness of the interventions.

The development of an M&E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: 1) baseline data; 2) program targets; and 3) custom indicators. The baseline data can be grouped into fields describing the incidents of electoral conflict during the most recent electoral cycle. The following Governing Justly and Democratically program targets and indicators can be employed in results measurement: 1) rule of law and human rights; 2) good governance; and 3) political competition and consensus-building. Custom indicators are developed for each program activity.

WHY IS ELECTORAL SECURITY AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT ISSUE?

Over the last three decades, USAID has assisted emerging and consolidating democracies in conducting free and fair elections. This technical assistance is strategically premised on the assumption that credible elections foster improved governance and societal well-being. Through provision of this technical assistance in hundreds of elections, USAID has recognized that electoral conflict can compromise electoral integrity through its impact on candidate selection, voter turnout, or the accuracy of the announced results. Persistent experience with electoral conflict creates obstacles to democratic consolidation as institutions of governance are under threat, compromised, or remain fragile as a direct or indirect result of the conflict.

United Nations (UN) reporting and academic research have revealed that, on a global scale, measurable levels of electoral violence are experienced in about one in five elections, principally occurring in those countries rated as “Partly Free” by the Freedom House ranking system. Electoral violence is experienced in all regions, for example, Europe (Albania), the Americas (Guatemala), South-east Asia (Philippines), South Asia (Pakistan), West Africa (Nigeria), East Africa (Ethiopia), and Southern Africa (Zimbabwe). Electoral violence is threatening the progress of political transitions in “Arab Spring” countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Some of the countries experiencing electoral violence are of strategic interest to the international community including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo.

Additionally, the impact of electoral violence may not be confined to the political sphere alone but also have links with other forms of criminality. For example, DTOs have been known to employ electoral violence to capture local government posts in such countries as Mexico and Haiti so that their transit points are secure. Many of these narcotics are shipped to US endpoints. Electoral violence can also have a disproportionate impact on women, as a 2012 UN report on conflict-related sexual violence reflects. Finally, electoral violence can become a crime against humanity, as in the cases of Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire, where post-election violence led to widespread human rights abuses; cases against electoral violence perpetrators in these cases are now on the docket of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
To examine best practices in electoral security, we first use the analysis gleaned from the Framework, and then we develop programming responses shaped around the electoral cycle. An effective best practices programming strategy must recognize that different phases of the electoral process put forward different challenges and demands, and assistance must be crafted to address the need framed in each phase. As such, in framing the timing and duration of electoral security interventions, there are two perspectives to consider: 1) chronological; and 2) activity-based.

First, electoral security interventions should address the specific conflict profile identified in each phase of the electoral cycle. The electoral cycle can be divided into three phases:

- **Pre-Election Phase:** The long run-up to electoral events (18 months to Election Day);
- **Election Day Phase:** Polling day(s);
- **Post-Election Phase:** Between voting and proclamation; post-election outcomes and their aftermath.\(^6\)

This Electoral Cycle Approach is a chronological calendar for program activities. Diagram 1 below illustrates the dynamics of the Electoral Cycle Approach.

Second, in conflictive electoral environments, it is also conceptually useful to examine the electoral calendar grouped by activity: 1) political; 2) technical; and 3) peace-building (if in a post-conflict environment). Political calendars reflect the time required to draft electoral legislation, constitute an electoral management body (EMB), and establish political parties – that is, those activities associated with creating the political and legal platform upon
which to build an electoral administration. Because of their deliberative nature, political calendars can be unpredictable. Technical calendars, in contrast, are operational in nature and involve the mechanics of electoral administration – procurement, facilities, recruitment, training, education – those activities required to conduct the electoral process. Because of their technical nature, these calendars can be more predictable than political ones and will tend to dominate as elections become routine.

Finally, in post-conflict environments, election organizers may be confronted with peace-building calendars over which they have little control. Peace-building calendars include demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), de-mining, and the prosecution of war criminals. Although not directly linked to electoral operations, many of these peace-building tasks must be accomplished for the conduct of a secure election. Each of these three calendars must dovetail for electoral processes to have administrative and political legitimacy. By examining the electoral calendar from both a chronological and activity perspective, program planning is improved. The combined electoral cycle and activity-based approach provides guidance for the timing and duration of interventions and recognizes the sensitivities associated with the relationships among these factors. Thus, within this Guide, best practices have been organized by phase and thematic activity (thematic activities that can be implemented throughout the entire electoral cycle are shown in a separate section). The engagement of state and/or non-state stakeholder partners is discussed in the best practice description.

The best practices in this Guide are organized according to the following phases, and sub-organized into the following activity themes, bulleted below:

- **Pre-Election Phase** – This is the phase during which electoral legislation is adopted, delimitation takes place, voter registration is conducted, voting preparations are undertaken, and political campaigning occurs. Depending on context, key areas for best practice implementation can include the following thematic areas:
  - Electoral Security Legal Frameworks
  - Political Party Conflict Management
  - Political Finance and Electoral Conflict
  - Security Force Electoral Security Training
- **Election Day Phase** – This is the phase during which voting occurs and the preliminary tabulation of ballots is completed. The major activities comprising this phase – electoral security management and coordination – are defined under the following consolidated thematic area:
  - Electoral Security Administration
- **Post-Election Phase** – This is the phase during which the final tabulation of results is completed, electoral disputes are adjudicated, election results are certified, the new governance structure is inaugurated, consequences for political losses are realized, and criminal justice is addressed. Therefore, best practices in electoral security under this phase can be grouped into two thematic areas:
  - Electoral Results Management
  - Electoral Justice and Mediation
- **All Phases of the Electoral Cycle** – There are best practices which are not confined to a phase and can be implemented throughout the electoral cycle. These practices can be considered under the following thematic areas:
  - Grassroots Electoral Peace-building
  - Monitoring and Mapping Electoral Conflict
  - Prevention of Political Violence Against Women in Elections
  - De-Mobilizing Youth from Electoral Conflict
  - Electoral Conflict
II. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: PRE-ELECTION PHASE

People in a village in Uganda use drama sessions to train citizens how to vote and participate in the electoral process.

The pre-election phase involves activities that can have either an immediate or medium- to long-term impact on the potential for electoral conflict to occur. The following thematic areas of best practices can be considered for the pre-election phase: electoral security legal frameworks; political party conflict management; political finance and electoral conflict; and, security force electoral security training.

A. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral security legal frameworks is to put forward a set of guiding principles on constitutional, peace agreement, and legislative content which reduces the potential for electoral conflict, establishes penalties for electoral violence, and creates mechanisms of justice for victims and their families. For the purposes of this best practice analysis, the legal framework for electoral security is defined through a hierarchy of articles, provisions, and laws from the following kinds of legal instruments: 1) constitutions; 2) peace agreements; 3) electoral legislation; 4) women’s protection and equality legislation; and, 5) land ownership legislation. Each of these types of laws possesses some intersection with electoral conflict and security.

1) CONSTITUTIONS

Constitutional provisions should be inclusive and assure that no sector of society is excluded from political participation. Constitutions define citizenship, eligibility, and national political rights. Forms of political exclusion can trigger violence by generating...
or deepening grievances among affected groups. In general, political exclusion creates vulnerabilities during each phase of the election cycle – in the pre-election phase as voter registration is denied, on election day as casting a ballot is denied, and in the post-election phase when representation is denied. For example, in Cote D’Ivoire, the constitutional definition of citizenship, or Ivorite, has created persistent tensions between those born within the current borders of the country and those who have migrated there or are descendants of migrants, principally from Burkina Faso. This exclusion has an impact on the political rights of a significant segment of the population and has created a longstanding, persistent vulnerability for electoral violence in Cote D’Ivoire. Conversely, political inclusion codified within a constitution can help mitigate longstanding conflicts. For example, in post-conflict Burundi, the constitution was designed to balance the inter-ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis (the trigger for Burundi’s civil war lasting from 1993 to 2005), as well as to ensure the inclusion of minorities and traditionally marginalized groups in government, through quotas for the Twa and women. In part by specifying agreed upon percentage allocation among Hutus and Tutsis within Burundi’s parliament, the constitution’s provisions helped mitigate inter-ethnic electoral conflict.

2) PEACE AGREEMENTS

During the first cycle of elections following a conflict, some electoral terms of reference may be put forward in peace agreements. Such peace agreements generally contain ten fundamental components: 1) security guarantees; 2) DDR of ex-combatants; 3) protection of all parties’ human rights; 4) return or resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; 5) social, political, legal, and economic restructuring; 6) settlement of border disputes; 7) nature of transitional government; 8) elections; 9) implementation strategies; and 10) timeframes. Such agreements may determine timing and sequencing of elections, the electoral system, electoral eligibility, and the role of the international community in electoral supervision and security.

As mediators are engaged in negotiating the terms of the peace agreements, the international community is likely to play a role in the drafting process and can look to the following guidelines concerning elections and conflict.

First, electoral calendars – political, technical, and peace-building – must manage expectations and reflect operational realities. An accelerated elec-

toral calendar may diminish the uncertainty that accompanies post-conflict governance; however, it can also favor those parties with the most standing resources and capacity, often the principal former combatants. At the same time, administrative difficulties and delays may threaten citizens’ confidence in the electoral process. For example, the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mandated that national, entity, and municipal elections be conducted within six-to-nine months of the Accord’s signing. While the electoral calendar may have created incentives to sign the Accords, the political and operational consequences of this timeline beset the implementation process with problems. From a political standpoint, the timeline did not allow for adequate development of political parties or inter-ethnic political coalitions. The administration of the election required the development of a regulatory framework and international operational control, conducting four levels of balloting in two distinct sub-national entities and refugee voting in dozens of other countries. While the timeline was largely met (municipal elections were postponed) and the election outcomes were accepted, the voting occurred along ethnic lines, reflecting those cleavages which triggered the conflict; and the electoral administration was burdened by logistical problems and shortfalls which did not foster public confidence in the management of the process.

Second, peace agreements should open political space for all stakeholders. To mitigate the potential for certain groups to remain spoilers outside of post-conflict electoral and political processes, space must be opened for all stakeholders. Two peace agreements resulting in post-conflict elections widely regarded as successful were the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique and the Chapultepec Agreement for El Salvador. For Mozambique, Protocol III enumerated the freedoms of association, expression, and political activity; described electoral procedures; and issued guarantees on the electoral process. For example, the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mandated that national, entity, and municipal elections be conducted within six-to-nine months of the Accord’s signing. While the electoral calendar may have created incentives to sign the Accords, the political and operational consequences of this timeline beset the implementation process with problems. From a political standpoint, the timeline did not allow for adequate development of political parties or inter-ethnic political coalitions. The administration of the election required the development of a regulatory framework and international operational control, conducting four levels of balloting in two distinct sub-national entities and refugee voting in dozens of other countries. While the timeline was largely met (municipal elections were postponed) and the election outcomes were accepted, the voting occurred along ethnic lines, reflecting those cleavages which triggered the conflict; and the electoral administration was burdened by logistical problems and shortfalls which did not foster public confidence in the management of the process.
3) ELECTORAL LEGISLATION

In providing assistance to draft electoral legislation, there are several best practices that can be considered in order to reduce electoral violence.

First, a legal framework for impartial electoral administration can diminish mistrust in electoral integrity and reduce the potential that such mistrust may trigger post-election conflict. Perceptions that the EMB is not impartial can lead to grievances and trigger electoral conflict, in particular in the post-election phase when results are announced. To mitigate such mistrust, the legal framework should foster both structural and behavioral independence of the EMB. Structural independence is determined by such factors as the diversity of the appointment and confirmation process, institutional relationship to the government, and budget control, among others. Structural independence can be approached through a variety of methods, including the following three features: 1) establishing the EMB as a constitutional body; 2) diversifying the nomination and confirmation authority among the executive, legislature, and judiciary; and 3) diversifying the membership profile among political parties and civil society.

Behavioral independence refers to the political will of election officials to resist political pressures to skew the process. Behavioral independence is influenced by the “appointment identity” associated with being selected as an election official. For example, in Iraq (2005), while it was widely recognized that the membership of the newly formed Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq must have representation from the Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish communities, the UN did not designate seats or appointments along such ethnic lines, which could have resulted in a kind of de facto obligation for members to represent their communities. Instead, the members were selected as individuals, through a public, merit-based selection process supervised by the UN. While the 2005 elections were not without problems, the independence of the Electoral Commission from political and sectarian influences was not an issue.

Second, consider the implications of electoral system design on electoral violence when assisting electoral system reform. In some contexts, the electoral system can be a source of electoral conflict, and those advisors involved with system design or reform must take into account its consequence both on representation and conflict prevention. This conflict is triggered by the electoral stakes created by the rules of the contest. However, the potential for electoral system-based conflict will vary with the country context. For example, a single member district, majoritarian system can create a “winner-take-all” environment where candidates employ violence to suppress opposition turnout. Some examples of countries with majoritarian/plurality systems that have experienced electoral conflict among political rivals include Nepal, Nigeria, Haiti, and India. By contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems, where parties obtain seats based upon the percentage of votes received, may also trigger conflict. These triggers may involve smaller parties employing “bonding” strategies to seek support from a given ethnic, linguistic, religious, or regional group, which may exacerbate existing social cleavages and conflicts. Examples of countries with PR systems that have experienced conflict among political rivals include Burundi and Rwanda.

There is no optimal system for preventing election violence that will work in every environment. PR systems, especially those with high district magnitude, may be more representative than plurality/majority systems. PR systems tend to do a better job of representing minority and opposition groups who could otherwise become violent “spoilers” if they feel unrepresented in government. On the other hand, proportional systems may have the effect of calcifying ethnic fault lines in a society, which can lead to or reignite violence. In contrast, plurality/majority systems may force parties to make broader appeals to the population at large, but tend to be less representative than proportional ones. For example, in Lesotho’s parliamentary elections in both 1993 and 1997, which used plurality voting, violence resulted when the largest opposition party’s failure to win any individual districts effectively shut it out of government.

As these examples demonstrate, a relationship between electoral systems and conflict is contextual, linked to other factors, and varies across countries. The questions in Box 1 (on the following page) can be posed in order to assess the relationship between electoral systems and conflict.

Third, building transparency and accountability into delimitation processes can reduce their potential to serve as a trigger for electoral conflict. Delimitation can trigger violence in the pre-and post-election phases. In the pre-election phase, the conflict takes the form of disputes over the drawing of constituency boundaries. In the post-election phase, the conflict emerges as seats are allocated to victors and losing candidates and supporters come to the belief that the boundaries have been rigged against them. Prior to the election, significant changes to
Box 1 - Questions to Identify an Electoral System’s Impact on Electoral Violence

1) What is the electoral system and typical outcome patterns?
2) Which parties are advantaged by the current system and why?
3) Which parties are disadvantaged by the current system and why?
4) What are the existing social cleavages and how are these cleavages reflected in the composition of political parties?
5) Is there a history of campaign violence between political rivals?
6) Are there set aside seats for marginalized groups?
7) Is there constituency delimitation? If so, what authority performs the delimitation?

Boundaries can trigger violence by stakeholders who feel excluded or that the re-districted lines will decrease the likelihood of their victory. If said changes affect or are perceived to affect results, tensions can trigger violence in the post-election phase as losers retaliate. This tension is compounded when delimitation is viewed as being politically driven and not legitimate. However, mechanisms can be established to de-conflict delimitation processes. In order to counter the potential for violence, stakeholders have used mechanisms via which the delimitation process is transparent. The redistricting process in Sierra Leone in 2006 illustrates a practice of introducing a public and party consultative mechanism to build confidence in the delimitation process and its results. Under the auspices of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the Boundary Delimitation program was launched. A nineteen day national consultation was conducted by the NEC with political parties, traditional leaders and the public in order to obtain their opinions on how boundaries should be drawn to respect communities of interest.

Fourth, the legal framework should seek greater accountability and transparency in political finance. There are connections between money and electoral violence. If violence is employed, money must be available to fund weapons and enforcers. An opaque political finance system allows these transactions to occur without visibility. While enforcement remains a challenge, the introduction of political finance disclosure and restrictions is a legislative step which can be taken to constrain the connection between money and electoral violence. (See Section II.C. for additional information on public finance best practices related to electoral security.)

Fifth, electoral legislation should include parameters for actions and accountability for security forces surrounding electoral security can be introduced through electoral legislation. Such legislation could include police rules of engagement in maintaining public order during the election period, the parameters for engagement by security forces in electoral processes, as well as consequences for non-compliance (such as excessive use of force or targeting of voters supporting a particular party) so that citizens and security force staff alike do not perceive the security forces as being above the law. In principle, such a practice mitigates electoral conflict by managing the use of force by police in public order management and the backlash by protesters who are targets of police actions.

There should also be legal parameters regarding the involvement of national military forces during elections. For example, in Sierra Leone, the Military Assistance to Civilian Police was invoked during the 2012 and 2007 elections. In this case the military, under the command of the Chief of Police, helped provide security around the elections. To ensure successful coordination, the Office of National Security convened weekly election security meetings that included the police, military, civil society representatives, the UN, and donor country representatives to plan for the 2012 elections.

Sixth, electoral or criminal legislation should include penalties for perpetrators of electoral malpractice and violence. In many countries experiencing electoral crimes, including all four country cases assessed for this Guide, a culture of impunity persists for crimes of electoral malfeasance and violence. Without penalties for electoral crimes codified in law, few legal disincentives exist for perpetrators to cease such activity. One example of state stakeholders attempting to codify such penalties is in the Philippines where, at the time of this writing, the House of Representatives was considering legislation to define electoral violence as a specific form of criminality and strengthen the penalties for such crimes. While enforcement is an issue as well, the
penalties and sanctions must be established in law so that enforcement can take place. The severity of penalties is equally as important as their introduction. One example of inadequate penalties is in Guatemala, where clear expenditure limits for political parties are established in law, yet the fine is so minimal (approximately $125 USD) that it is ineffective in deterring violations of the spending ceiling.

Additional criteria for the evaluation of electoral legal frameworks, as developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are shown as Annex IV.

4) OTHER LAWS RELEVANT TO ELECTORAL SECURITY

Other categories of laws can also have relevance to electoral conflict. While they are not specifically electoral legislation, these categories of laws deal with issues that can trigger or further enable election-related violence. The following best practices can be considered in these legal areas.

First, laws on gender equity in employment, the development of an electoral and political framework that protects and promotes the interests of women, and the inclusion of women in key electoral and political institutions can institutionalize societal concepts of gender equality and enhance the participation of women in elections and politics. The inclusion of quotas for participation of women as parliamentarians and party list members is increasingly prevalent in countries around the world. For example, in January 2012, Libya adopted an election law that effectively guarantees women one-fifth of the seats in its 200-member assembly by requiring party lists to assign half their seats to women. To ensure that parties did not try to obfuscate their quota requirement by placing female candidates at the bottom of their lists, the Libyan election law requires party lists to alternate male and female candidates. To further mainstream gender equity into the electoral process, EMBs should also take more of a leadership role by ensuring the representation of women in their ranks (as well as other minority or marginalized populations).

Regardless of these formalized structures for gender equality in elections, however, in cultures where the participation of women in the political process has not historically been accepted or is viewed as “improper,” violence is often used to prohibit women’s participation even in the face of such formalized mechanisms for participation. For information on best practices related to preventing Political Violence against Women in Elections (PVAWE), see Section V.C. below.

Second, potential linkages between land rights and electoral violence should be considered, and ownership opportunities should be based on economic factors alone. In 2009, Straus and Taylor found that post-independence elections in Sub-Saharan Africa have opened up a competition for land rights not just for the land itself, but also for the market places and trading routes. To avoid land rights becoming a cause of electoral violence, land ownership laws should be explicit and equitable in their ownership clauses, proof of ownership, and land ownership rights. As stated in a report by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), “The politicization of ill-designated or unfair land tenure laws has served to motivate violence in a number of cases.” For example, in Kenya, land rights have been a trigger for electoral violence since the early 1990s. Post-election violence after Kenya’s 2008 general elections was perceived by some experts as possessing a land tenure dimension. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process identified land reform as a key to long-term peace.

B. BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The objective of identifying best practices in political party conflict management is to reduce the incentives for political rivals to use violence in response to unfair campaign practices, rumors and misinformation, electoral disputes, or myriad other issues. In many countries, political rivals are the primary sources of electoral violence, using it as a campaign tactic. The best practices identified here are intended to impose standards on political behavior (and sanctions for non-compliance), foster communication among political rivals, and provide a forum for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) of electoral disputes. The best practices described here include party consultative mechanisms (PCMs) such as political party councils and political party codes of conduct. Party councils can be voluntary or statutory in nature and convened by either the parties themselves or the EMB. The enforcement of the provisions of the code of conduct can be performed by state stakeholders, such as the EMB, or in partnership with CSOs and FBOs.

The objective of identifying best practices in political party conflict management is to reduce the use of violence by political parties and their agents as a campaign tactic. In many countries, political rivalries...
are primary sources of electoral conflict. The conflict takes many forms including incumbent-on-opposition violence, violence among opposition parties, and post-election violence by losing parties against rivals and electoral administration targets. Incentives for political parties to use violence include the perceived closeness of contests and the impact that violence could have on outcomes. Measures can be taken to change behaviors through sanction, communication, and mediation.

First, political party consultative mechanisms (PCMs) can help foster accountability for political behavior to prevent violence, facilitate inter-party communications to manage violence, and provide a dispute resolution mechanism to mediate disputes before they lead to violence. Political party councils provide a platform for rivals to meet among themselves and with the EMB. For parties, these councils can serve the trio of purposes outlined above—foster accountability for political behavior to prevent violence, inter-party communications to manage violence, and dispute resolution to mediate conflict. For example, this can be the context to train party members in electoral procedures, such as party poll-watcher training, which can help to prevent election day and post-election violence by ensuring members know how to identify polling place irregularities and the mechanisms used to lodge complaints. For the EMB, these PCMs represent formal opportunities for EMB officials to meet with contestants and learn about their issues and concerns. In form, political party councils can be statutory, as in South Africa and Malawi, with the EMB as the enforcement authority, or voluntary, as in Liberia. In Lesotho and Ghana, political parties partner with CSOs and FBOs in monitoring and compliance.

Some of the features of PCMs that have been noted to contribute to their effectiveness are regular meetings and a handout of minutes or reports from those meetings; EMB requests of input on key policy decisions being deliberated; and maintaining an open forum for the parties to bring their concerns to each other and the EMB. CSOs and FBOs can be engaged as mediators when required. With respect to electoral conflict, in South Africa, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has established a conflict mediation panel with representation of professional, civil society, and local leaders to mediate electoral disputes. The representatives of these panels must be approved by political parties.

Second, Political Party Codes of Conduct should be adopted or mandated to define expectations, actions, and prohibitions intended to reduce conflict. A political party code is either a statutory or political instrument that sets forth fundamental political principles and mandates the behaviors and expectations for a defined set of political stakeholders participating in an electoral process to conform to these principles. While each code is unique, a review of texts reveals some common features. First, the codes express a set of principles, often in the form of a Preamble. These principles generally involve the recognizing of fundamental rights and freedoms as being essential to a free and fair election. The codes often provide definitions and descriptions of which stakeholders are or can be covered by the code’s requirements. The codes also mandate certain conduct and behaviors both as prohibitions and positive actions. For example, prohibitions include hate speech, defacing campaign posters, disrupting campaign events, and intimidation of voters. Positive actions include engaging women as candidates and party leaders as well as the involvement of youth in party activities. Further codes may restrict the use of certain symbols on campaign materials or the manipulation of other parties’ symbols for political gain.

Political party code initiatives can be championed by domestic stakeholders, the international community, or both. Codes of conduct can directly apply to a range of electoral stakeholders including political parties as institutional entities, independent candidates, coalitions, and movements comprising the leadership, officials, candidates, members, agents and other representatives. Therefore, political party codes of conduct could be considered as one element of a “system” of codes applied to other electoral stakeholders (the police, judiciary, election observers, election officials, and media may each be subject to a dedicated code of conduct for their own profession or responsibilities). Codes of conduct are signatory documents. As such, whether the code is legally binding or informally monitored, the signatory representing the stakeholder should have the authority to commit his or her organization to the terms of the code.

Third, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms must be established for code provisions to be effective conflict prevention instruments. An external monitoring body can come from the state, the international community, and/or civil society. The configuration of state and non-state stakeholders engaged in enforcement is contextual and depends on which sectors and institutions possess the capacities to assure compliance. For example, in the Somaliland party code, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) is instructed to form an Integrity Watch Committee managed by a Somaliland NGO, the Academy for Peace and Development, which
provides this oversight. For Sierra Leone’s 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – through the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) – supported the establishment of a Code Monitoring Commission (CMC) composed of political party representatives, police, CSOs, the National Commission for Democracy, and the Inter-Religious Council. Further, district CMCs were established in each of Sierra Leone’s 14 districts to monitor compliance with the code on the local levels.

To provide an enforcement mechanism with “teeth,” the terms of the codes of conduct can be mandated in legislation, such as in the case of Malawi, where the terms of the code of conduct are legally binding and can be enforced with legal sanctions under the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act (1993, 61 (2)), which tasks the Electoral Commission with the establishment and enforcement of a political party code. South Africa is another such example where the party code is derived from the Electoral Act, and promulgated and enforced by the IEC. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the Political Parties Registration Commission was established under the 2002 Political Parties Act in accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the constitution in order to register and regulate the conduct of political parties. Enforcement may also include an appeals function for parties to be able to turn to higher levels of justice rather than violence. For example, in Liberia, the code created the Inter-Party Consultative Committee (IPCC) composed of the signatory political parties. Under the terms of the code, if one party charges another with a breach, the first step is to attempt adjudication of the complaints between themselves. If these measures are insufficient, then the complaint is taken to the IPCC where the members may choose direct enforcement actions or referral to Liberian judicial authorities.

C. BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL FINANCE AND ELECTORAL CONFLICT

SUMMARY – BEST PRACTICES IN POLITICAL FINANCE AND ELECTORAL CONFLICT

The objective of including political finance as a thematic area for electoral security is to recognize the connections between money and electoral violence and the imperative to disrupt these connections. Money is needed to acquire weapons and ammunition, hire enforcers, buy votes, and finance other illicit political activities. Opaque political finance also fosters illicit relationships between perpetrators and public officials, resulting in compromised governance and insecurity. Thus, while political finance reform may seem less central to electoral security than other thematic areas, it remains a critical component of any broad strategy to tackle the issue of electoral violence. The programming trio of enforcement capacity, public campaign resources, and civil society monitoring can combine to bring accountability and transparency to political finance by creating obstacles for the use of campaign funds for violent purposes. In conflictive electoral environments, the implementation of a political finance system faces numerous challenges, including limitations on the mechanisms for transparency, lack of enforcement capacity, and abuse of state resources for political or campaign purposes. Nevertheless, if catalyzing events create a public sentiment for greater control on political funding, these best practices can be introduced to commence political finance reform.

The objective of identifying best practices in political finance and electoral conflict is to create transparency in campaign contributions and expenditures so that a) funding to political candidates and parties from entities promoting electoral violence (such as DTOs) are revealed; and b) funding of political violence by politicians and/or parties is made more difficult. In undertaking political finance reform, a number of lessons learned can be identified. As noted under Section II.A., a legal and regulatory framework is necessary to clearly define allowable sources and expenses and the penalties for evading these regulations. Further, conflict and violence can erupt when some candidates or parties are seen as having an unfair advantage due to disallowed sources of funding and expenditures. Therefore, the political finance system should be designed to “level the playing field,” and the regulations must be communicated to all stakeholders so that there is a comprehensive education effort about acceptable practices. However, while regulations must be enacted, a complex code of administrative procedures may prove unenforceable. Thus, beyond regulations, steps must be taken to prevent the use of public resources for political purposes.13

First, Political Finance Regulators (PFRs) may require and therefore should receive training and capacity building in detection and enforcement techniques. In a given country context, the PFR may be the EMB, or an agency mandated solely with political finance enforcement, or another government agency. In any case, political finance enforcement capacity is also a practice area where PFRs may require assistance. The professionalism of PFRs can be fostered through peer mentoring and networks. One such vehicle for this mentoring and networking is the Council for Government Ethics Laws (COGEL), an international
association of professionals engaged in political finance regulation, public ethics, and lobbyist oversight. COGEL offers opportunities for on-line instruction, workshops, and other training and networking opportunities to build the capacities and professionalism of regulators. Additionally, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) developed a capacity building program on Training in Detection and Enforcement (TIDE) for political finance regulation and monitoring. An overview of the TIDE training program is shown in the adjoining text box.

Second, public campaign financing can be considered as a means to reduce candidate and party reliance on illicit forms of funding and therefore its influence on electoral violence. State provide direct and indirect financing and support of various forms to political parties—65 countries have provisions codified in law for direct public funding of political parties, while 79 countries have provisions for indirect public funding. Public assistance to parties is not just limited to direct cash transfers to national party organizations as linked, for example, to a threshold of seats or votes; assistance can also take the form of tax exemptions and in-kind subsidies for public billboard space, the use of public halls for party rallies, and reduced fee or free air time on public or publicly licensed radio and television. The level and scope of this assistance varies across cases. In Colombia, for example, parties receive funding only during the election period, with funds allocated based largely on performance in prior elections and current representation in the legislature—the purpose of the funds is to support general party administration and campaign activities. In Hungary, parties also receive public support based on prior electoral performance and legislative representation; by contrast, however, these funds are not earmarked for a particular purpose and are provided during and between electoral cycles.

In an electoral security context, public funding of parties can be considered one tool to diminish parties’ reliance on illicit sources of funding and thereby reduce or remove the influence of perpetrators of electoral violence. To ensure this is functional, however, it should be accompanied by a stringent political finance monitoring regime whereby parties are required to report amount and source of financing (lest they accept the public funding and simply continue to take illicit, private monies). As part of this effort, public funding should be excluded for all parties that fail to comply with transparency and reporting regulations as codified in law. The objective of identifying best practices in election security development for police and other security forces can be disaggregated into several dimensions. First, it is to ensure that security forces exercise appropriate rules of engagement for managing electoral demonstrations in an orderly manner. Second, it is to provide security forces with basic...
information on topics such as gender discrimination around elections, understanding the election laws, prosecuting people under the election laws, assisting disabled and vulnerable persons at polling centers, and media relations. Third, it is to protect potential targets of electoral violence. And fourth, it is to foster the will and capacity to apprehend perpetrators and to pursue prosecution and conviction.

It should be noted that all USAID-assisted interventions involving security forces must receive legal clearance in advance. For example, in Sierra Leone, USAID's General Counsel's Office ruled that USAID funding could be provided to the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the United States Department of Justice to provide a technical advisor to help the Sierra Leone police develop a use of force policy, public order management plan, and to develop election security training. ICITAP also assisted the police in developing and implementing a civic education strategy that taught citizens the role of police in elections. See the above text box for additional information on ICITAP.

The following best practices in electoral security training have been identified from ICITAP and other international organizations providing security sector assistance.

First, training programs should be multi-faceted and reflect both professional principles of performance and operational tactics for securing electoral processes. Training provided in 2011 by the OSCE in Armenia can be viewed as a model for developing such a multi-faceted approach. The OSCE developed two guidebooks on police conduct and public order management. In preparation for Armenia’s 2012 elections, the OSCE, in partnership with the European Union (EU), used these guides to train the Armenian police force in operational planning, effective command and control, negotiation techniques in line with international standards, threat and risk assessment, use of information and intelligence, legality, accountability and transparency, as well as how to liaise with the media and communication methods more broadly.¹⁸

Second, training curriculum should be developed in collaboration with host country police instructors and prosecutors and address the following underlying vulnerabilities to electoral security so that police policies can be crafted to address these factors:

- A politicized and non-professional police force;
- Inadequate and unclear electoral laws;
- Ineffective electoral commission;
- Poor civic education about community-police relationships during elections;
- Failure to be part of the planning process at the local level;
- Failure by the police and/or EMBs to engage political groups to determine issues around political campaigning and demonstrations that would impinge upon public safety laws; and,
- Failure to adequately prepare police staff at all levels with information about the electoral law, their role in elections, the role of the civil authority in elections, and a specific understanding about the application of criminal and public order laws in these circumstances.¹⁹

In addition to evaluating threats through these political factors, security forces can also be instructed on USAID’s Electoral Security Framework to provide them with a methodology by which they can assess vulnerabilities, profile electoral conflict threats, and deploy assets accordingly.

Third, training curriculum should address the following technical, operational, and theoretical topics and themes:

- The nature of the electoral legislation and an overview of the electoral process;
- Election processes and methods, and security forces’ roles in protecting these;
- Human rights issues in relation to the police’s role in the election;
- Security objectives and strategy in relation to the election;
- Standards of professional, neutral and non-intimidating conduct to be upheld by police forces during the election;
- Contact mechanisms and liaisons between the electoral commission/EMB and police/security forces;
- Details of specific offenses against electoral laws;
- Details of other laws, such as those governing public gatherings that will impact police planning,²⁰,²¹ and,
- Effective civic education and citizen engagement strategies and tactics.
III. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY: ELECTION DAY PHASE

PHOTO: COURTNEY BODY

Voters in Kabul, Afghanistan cast their votes for members of Parliament under the watchful eyes of election observers.

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

The objective of electoral administration programming is to establish a sub-practice area within EMB and security force partners so they gain the skills and capabilities to conduct electoral security threat assessment, planning, and deployments. The planning process commences with the development of an electoral security concept, which is a strategic and operational scenario on the electoral security situation in each phase of the Electoral Cycle. State stakeholders should establish coordination and communication mechanisms that could follow one of three models: 1) EMB led; 2) security force led; or 3) mixed operations. With any of these models there remains a need to decentralize electoral security administration as conflicts are often localized and prevention measures can be more effective with knowledge of the conflict history. Security and civilian rapid response mechanisms are valuable tools to provide specialized Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) or for civilian authorities to mediate electoral disputes. The EMB and security forces should conduct a review following the election and assemble lessons learned for use in future planning. Remember that all USAID-assisted interventions involving security forces must receive legal clearance in advance.

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral security administration is to put forward fundamental management and coordination techniques for EMBs and security forces to employ during elections. In the election day phase, the primary threats are to polling stations and the routes to and from them. Targets include candidates, voters, poll workers, journalists, observers, and security forces. Management and coordination techniques include: 1) developing an electoral security concept; 2) establishing an electoral security coordination mechanism; 3) decentralizing electoral security administration; 4) mobilizing security forces for election day; and 5) assessing electoral security administration initiatives.
First, an electoral security concept should be developed as the strategic platform upon which subsequent planning and administration takes place. An electoral security concept is the strategic view of threats and the security framework that outlines stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities for responding to them. Developing the concept represents a point of departure in formulating the strategic response to the threats that have been identified or anticipated. In Guatemala, a security plan was developed by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the military, along with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and experts provided by USAID. The plan outlined roles and responsibilities for the National Civilian Police (PNP) and Army, as well as priority areas and commensurate plans for deployments, which were based on analysis of violence and conflict in past electoral cycles. Actions for the pre-election, election day and post-election phases were included in the plan.

In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan security forces established a three-cordon security concept, with ISAF providing QRFs and other special functions; the Afghan National Army (ANA) providing a general atmosphere of security; and the Afghan National Police (ANP) providing point and mobile security (poll workers managing minor disputes within the polling stations could be considered a fourth security cordon). The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) coordinated election security planning and the associated asset deployments with the IEC, ISAF and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). The electoral security concept is further elaborated in the adjoining text box.

Second, coordination mechanisms should be established to ensure integrated cooperation across all stakeholders—at the national and subnational levels—in electoral security administration. Electoral security administration is a multi-stakeholder effort with military, police, and civilian authorities all playing unique roles to prevent, manage, and mediate conflict throughout the electoral cycle. This constitutes the process of electoral security administration. In each of the four countries examined (Guatemala, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Burundi), state stakeholders faced operational challenges in electoral security administration. To facilitate the working relationships among stakeholders, organizational management structures for coordination, control, and communication have been formed. In three of the four case studies (Afghanistan, Guatemala, and the Philippines), state stakeholders established variants of what can be termed electoral security coordination bodies, with associated mechanisms for communication and joint action. Although models vary in structure and purpose, three models of coordination are employed by state stakeholders: 1) EMB leadership model; 2) security force leadership model; or 3) parallel models. Below are three examples of how these different models have been implemented.

**OPTION 1: EMB LEADERSHIP MODEL** - In Afghanistan, cross-agency coordination in electoral security administration was addressed by establishing an Electoral Security Working Group. The IEC served as the central coordinator for the working group, which included representatives of the MOI, Ministry of Defense, NDS, the ANA, and ANP. Using risk mapping, the ANSF informed the IEC which polling stations it would be able to secure with ANP staff as well as ANA deployment for perimeter security. Based on this feedback from the ANSF and associated coordinating bodies, the IEC then made decisions on which polling centers were to be closed for security reasons. The working group included subnational electoral and security stakeholders as well as those at the national level (see below for best practices in decentralizing election security administration).

**OPTION 2: SECURITY FORCE LEADERSHIP MODEL** - In the Philippines (2010), the Philippine National Police (PNP) led electoral security operations and coordinated efforts with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). To ensure coordination with the PNP and AFP, the COMELEC appointed liaison officers to work with each institution on electoral security planning and administration. The terms of reference for the coordination were put forward in a memorandum of understanding signed by the heads of the participating agencies, Joint Security Control Centers (JSCCs) were established at national and subnational levels with representatives of each of these three bodies. COMELEC representatives participated in national and regional command conferences with the PNP, AFP, and other law enforcement agencies to plan and organize for electoral security.

**OPTION 3: MIXED MODEL** - In Guatemala, state security forces collaborated to develop an electoral security plan for the 2011 electoral cycle. In contrast to other cases where the EMB led the coordination, the Guatemalan EMB, the TSE, was not directly charged with providing electoral security administration; however, they coordinated the planning process for provision of electoral security with the PNC and other government ministries. A high level coordination mechanism was established in which the following actors participated: the TSE’s magistrates; Vice Ministers from Interior; Army, Communications, Energy, and Foreign Affairs; and the National Coordinator for the Reduction of Disasters. A working group command center was established on election day along with the command center.

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**The Strategic Concept from the Operational Plan Outline for the 2004 Afghanistan Presidential Election:**

“The creation and maintenance of a security environment conducive to the conduct of free, general, secret, and direct voting will be principally the responsibility of the Police and Military forces of Afghanistan operations... [The military] will conduct cooperative security operations with Afghan forces including but not limited to area security operations and the deployment of quick reaction forces (QRF). It is understood that security conditions in regions, provinces or districts vary widely. The organization/grouping and deployment/assigning of security forces in relation to tasks in each phase will be best coordinated jointly by military and police commanders at these levels. Local coordination between the security partners will determine priorities of security coverage in given areas of operations.”
of the TSE. Corresponding with their institutional mandates, the PNC maintained leadership in security planning and oversight, and the army played a support role, deploying in line with the security plan and in compliance with Guatemalan law. In order to provide support to the PNC during the electoral process, the Army deployed members of the Special Forces who assisted the PNC with, among other tasks, capturing perpetrators of violent acts. The PNC also coordinated with the Army through the technical working groups and retained the ability to ask the Army for assistance and intervention if the level of violence required such a response.

Regardless of the model employed, the coordinating body will require a physical hub to conduct its activities, often referred to as a joint electoral operations center (JEOC). An example of a JEOC formed in Nepal is presented in Box 2 below, and a conceptual approach to establishing a JEOC for electoral security coordination and communication is provided as Annex V.

Third, because the nature and intensity of the threat will vary across subnational locations, electoral security administration should be decentralized. The decentralized structure should follow the leadership models established at the national level, that is, EMB led, security force led, or mixed. Each level of state administration possesses the potential for different types of incidents to occur: JSCCs in the Philippines were established at the national, provincial, and local level, with representation from COMELEC, AFP, and PNP at each. In Afghanistan, provincial security officers (PSOs) stationed at the IEC’s provincial offices coordinated electoral security at the provincial level. In Guatemala, a lessons-learned session was conducted between the first and second rounds (and before the inaugurations) to see how the strategy and operations should shift to manage new threats in the next phases. In the Philippines, the COMELEC worked with its military and law enforcement partners after the 2010 election to conduct provincial sorties to assess the effectiveness of its electoral security measures and to further refine the identification and intensity of hot spots, including the presence of private and other armed groups.

In the Philippines, to respond to election-related violence incidents for the 2010 election, the PNP stationed special action strike forces at the regional and provincial level as well as in specific hot spots. Doing so enabled the PNP to quickly respond to requests for assistance throughout the country. In areas where insurgents are active, the AFP deployed two soldiers for every estimated insurgent in the area. The AFP also oversaw Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units as counter-insurgency forces who were issued small arms as a grassroots force to combat insurgents. Stakeholders should also consider establishing civilian QRFs comprised of fire and ambulance workers to provide protection against arson at polling stations and emergency medical services to victims of violence.

Fifth, electoral security administration should be assessed in the post-election phase and refined in preparation for future elections. The timing of these retrospective assessments can vary. For example, in Guatemala, a lessons-learned session was conducted between the first and second rounds (and before the inaugurations) to see how the strategy and operations should shift to manage new threats in the next phases. In the Philippines, the COMELEC worked with its military and law enforcement partners after the 2010 election to conduct provincial sorties to assess the effectiveness of its electoral security measures and to further refine the identification and intensity of hot spots, including the presence of private and other armed groups.

**Box 2 – Example of Electoral Security Coordination in Nepal**

In 2008, ICITAP worked with the Home Ministry in Nepal to develop an election security working group that included all Government of Nepal officials and security force commanders under a chairperson (the elections commissioner) appointed by the prime minister. This working group coordinated developmental and governmental support for all education, training, planning and operational security and communications related to the elections. ICITAP helped the police develop a Police Operational Mentoring (POM) plan, and then delivered a POM training tailored for the realities of Nepal. A JEOC was developed that included both security forces and the elections commission in one ministry building. The Government of Nepal built election command centers for police agencies that fell under both the Home Ministry and the main Nepal Police Headquarters. These centers linked the elections commission’s JEOC to regional and local elections offices by way of wide band net-wireless connectivity.
Elections ballots for national election in Guatemala that drew large numbers of voters, especially in rural areas.

Chronologically, the post-election phase can be benchmarked with the closing of polling stations and preliminary tabulation of ballots through adjudication of disputes, certification of results, and inauguration of victorious candidates. However, for the purposes of measuring the longevity of conflict connected with a past election, the post-election phase may be conceptually extended for several months after election day as acts of retribution related to election outcomes play out over time.

This Section is divided into the following thematic areas: electoral results management and electoral justice and mediation.

A. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTION RESULTS MANAGEMENT

**SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTION RESULTS MANAGEMENT**

The objective of identifying best practices in election results management is to reduce the potential for public mistrust in announced outcomes to become a trigger for post-election violence. The threat is mitigated by the EMB through the development of a plan (and the public announcement of this plan) for the timing and sequencing of election results announcements. Transparency in the ballot counting process can be enhanced through Parallel Vote Tabulation conducted by political parties or CSOs, where appropriate. If electronic voting is employed, in order to avoid a “black box” syndrome of voter mistrust in the automated tabulation, public education and equipment testing should be performed, as well as maintaining some form of paper trail.
The objective of election results management best practices is to build public confidence in the tabulation and certification process and reduce the potential for post-election conflict resulting from disputed election results. In the process of reporting election results, a natural tension exists between the need to reduce the uncertainty created by an absence of information and the need to announce the results correctly. Both delaying the announcement of results and releasing results that are incorrect can trigger post-election electoral conflict. In either case, results which are flawed or perceived to be flawed can motivate losing candidates’ supporters to mobilize into potentially violent street actions or to attack polling stations. For example, following a series of staggered announcements which saw the first-place holder shift back and forth between the two main candidates in Zambia’s 2008 presidential election, a further delay in the final announcement provoked supporters of losing opposition leader Michael Sata to organize street protests and destroy property.

When addressing the issue of how best to structure the announcement of results, an EMB should consider the following best practices:

First, the EMB should develop and publicize the plan for announcement of election results. EMBs should develop a plan for results announcement, and revise this plan according to lessons learned from prior elections. Variance in electoral systems and voting, as well as tabulation technologies across countries, demonstrate that there is no single “best” reporting model. However, in developing an election results announcement plan, the EMB should take into consideration the following issues and options. The announcement protocols should be included in EMB public education programs and provided to media and observation organizations. When batching the ballots for announcement of results in stages, the EMB should put forward clear criteria for the batching, whether it is first-in/first-out or batching by some geographical unit. The results announcements can be conveyed on different platforms including press briefings and web site postings.

Critically, the tabulation rules and procedures should remain consistent throughout the entire electoral process. In the 2011 Albania municipal elections, the Central Election Commission changed the rules for how to count spoiled ballots mid-way through the counting in a contested district of Tirana, changing the result of the election. Losing candidate supporters violently protested, and the disputed results were contested in court for months.

Second, EMBs employing electronic voting and tabulation should use public education and testing to reduce mistrust in machine-based results. The introduction of electronic voting poses both risks and mitigation opportunities in post-election phase conflict. The risks are associated with “black box” notions by voters of electronic voting as an opaque tabulation process. Procedural controls by the EMB can reduce these perceptions through pre-election, election day, and post-election testing of the tabulation software for the public. Introducing some form of paper trail, which does not compromise ballot secrecy, would provide an avenue for further verification of outcomes in question. As most electronic voting applications are proprietary products of commercial firms, the source codes employed in the tabulation software should be escrowed with an impartial party in case the firm ceases business or fundamental questions about the integrity of the source codes come into question.

While electronic voting poses these risks, it also presents opportunities to reduce post-election phase conflict because of the efficiency and accuracy of the results, reducing the period of uncertainty, and building confidence in a fraud-free tabulation. Such was the case in the Philippines during the 2010 presidential and congressional elections, where electronic voting was introduced in many locations. Given that the systems were new, those individuals who had typically sought to defraud the vote-counting process were momentarily halted in their malpractice. As a result, voter confidence in the machine-verified results dampened the basic incentive for post-election violence, which had been common in previous years. However, it is unclear whether such an impact will hold in future elections or perhaps transfer the violence to an earlier phase.

Fundamentally, the choice to use electronic technology in voting and counting processes should be based on a rigorous evaluation of the technical capacity and political will of the electoral stakeholders. Introducing new and uncertain electronic technology in conflict-prone hot-spots and/or in cases where basic paper-based voting is seriously distrusted may further trigger conflict. If seriously considering electronic election administration technologies, the following procedures should be in place: appropriate timelines for implementation; transparent audit procedures; fail-safe backup voting and counting systems; assessment of the energy capabilities of voting centers; and wide-ranging voter education on these new technologies.
B. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL JUSTICE AND MEDIATION

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL JUSTICE AND MEDIATION

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral justice systems is to reduce the potential for post-election violence to occur because of the failure to effectively adjudicate disputes. These adjudication mechanisms can be formal or informal. Formal electoral justice mechanisms can follow three fundamental models: 1) judicial; 2) unified/shared; and 3) special. The relative effectiveness of each model depends on the independence of the adjudicating body – the EMB, judiciary, or special tribunal – from governmental or political influences. Informal electoral justice mechanisms can also be employed to resolve disputes, including the involvement of non-state stakeholders such as CSOs, FBOs, and traditional leaders. In some cases, compensation can be awarded to victims of electoral violence. Further, in cases where electoral violence has occurred at a scale that it becomes a crime against humanity, the procedures exist for the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation as with cases involving elections in Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire. It should be noted that while electoral justice is discussed in the post-election phase of this Guide, electoral disputes, crimes, and infractions can occur throughout the electoral cycle. Therefore, it is essential for countries to make electoral justice systems available throughout each phase of the electoral cycle.

The objective of identifying best practices in electoral justice is to assure that these mechanisms are fair and effective in peacefully resolving electoral disputes and will reduce the potential for post-election conflict to occur. For the purposes of this Guide, electoral justice refers to the formal mechanisms employed by state stakeholders to adjudicate and resolve civil electoral disputes. While electoral disputes can emerge during any phase of the electoral cycle, the topic is strategically positioned in the post-election phase because of the volatility toward violence which may result from electoral outcomes being perceived as invalid, adjudication mechanisms weak or unfair, and the logic which emerges to the aggrieved parties to take their grievances into the sphere of violence to overturn the results. The practices described below form a framework by which the efficacy, independence, and impartiality of electoral justice mechanisms can be evaluated.

1) ELECTORAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS

Generally speaking there are three models of electoral justice systems: judicial, unified/shared, and special. International IDEA also identifies two additional models involving legislative bodies and ad hoc institutions (see the adjoining text box for examples of ad hoc election dispute resolution mechanisms). The relative effectiveness of each model depends on the independence of the adjudicating body – the EMB, judiciary, or special tribunal – from governmental or political influences.

2) ELECTORAL JUSTICE BEST PRACTICES

While the model of electoral dispute resolution body may vary, electoral justice best practices exist that are applicable across systems. As highlighted in International IDEA’s Electoral Justice handbook and the Electoral Integrity Group’s Accra Guiding Principles Towards an International Statement of the Principles of Electoral Justice, the following best practices in electoral justice can be noted.

First, formal electoral justice bodies and mechanisms should be constituted in law, independent, impartial, and accessible to all. To avoid an electoral justice system that is susceptible to political pressures and bias, electoral justice bodies should be permanent and/or independent. Electoral systems should establish the right to bring a challenge before an administrative or judicial body against any electoral act or decision that a complainant considers prejudicial. The system should guarantee the right to a hearing and a defense under equal conditions, which includes full access to election dispute resolution proceedings and the relevant files and materials. Additionally, petition procedures and authorities for formal electoral dispute resolution should be codified in the electoral legal framework.

When complainants do not have access to non-violent avenues to address their grievances, then violent acts become viable alternatives. For example, directly following November 2012 district and council elections in Somaliland, a number of political organizations appealed to administrative courts to halt the release of voting results they believed to be fraudulent. When the courts – perceived by many to favor the executive power – ignored these appeals, opposition supporters took to the streets where violence erupted, including government use of live ammunition against opposition protesters, and opposition shelling of NEC headquarters in Sanaag Province.

Second, electoral justice – from challenge to resolution – should be expeditious and public. In the interest of maintaining public order, public certainty in the electoral process and its results is vital. In post-conflict environments, the international community has established ad hoc election dispute resolution mechanisms which supervised the complaints process. Three examples are Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), with the Electoral Appeals Sub-Commission; Kosovo (2000), with the Electoral Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission; and Afghanistan (2005 and 2009), with the Electoral Complaints Commission. In each case, the judicial panel was composed of both international and domestic jurists. The Balkans examples were organized by the OSCE and the Afghanistan commission was UN-directed.
According to USAID’s Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDS) framework, mediation is an appropriate tool for reducing electoral tensions in the following situations:

- The issues in the conflict are complicated by a strong emotional element;
- The parties know each other intimately and wish to preserve the relationship;
- One party feels uncomfortable confronting the other side unless someone else is present;
- The parties work or live together, or for other reasons cannot avoid the conflict;
- A decision must be reached soon;
- The parties are unsure of their ability to work out the problem;
- Many people are involved or indirectly affected; and
- One or both parties want to avoid formal proceedings.

Thus, timeliness in electoral challenges and their resolution needs to be mandated. In an effort to expedite the electoral dispute resolution process in Nigeria, the 1999 constitution was amended to require that all judgments on election petitions be handed down within 180 days from the filing date, and all appeals should be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of delivery of judgment. To supplement the need for a timely hearing and resolution, timely challenges are also required. Acts and decisions of the electoral authority that have not been challenged in a timely fashion within a period specified in the electoral law become irrevocable (provided that the opportunity to challenge the irregularity was afforded at that moment). Additionally, to prevent manipulation of the system for political purposes, the validity of a challenged action should not be suspended until the challenge is resolved. This also provides an additional incentive to maintain short timeframes for resolving challenges.

3) ELECTORAL CONFLICT MEDIATION AND COMPENSATION

ADR mechanisms are identified in the section of political party conflict management above and grassroots electoral peace-building below. Practices identified here on electoral conflict mediation, as an informal reflection of the formal electoral justice system, also include both formal and informal award of compensation to victims.

First, non-state stakeholders can be trained in conflict mediation skills and techniques to serve as grassroots negotiators of minor electoral disputes. Non-state stakeholders can be at the frontlines of preventing, managing, or mediating violence. In many cases, they may be confronted with low-level disputes that they can, if properly trained, diffuse before the incidents further escalate. USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, in partnership with its Education and Training Center — International, offered mediation workshops in Sudan in preparation for the planned February 2010 elections. These workshops (built on earlier USIP work in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria), were designed to address strategies for managing electoral conflict in Sudan and training in conflict resolution skills, communication skills, conflict and negotiation styles, negotiation concepts, and problem solving skills. All of USIP's workshops are organized in partnership with local NGOs.

Second, the type of ADR mediator employed should depend on the situation and parties involved. Mediators can be classified as social network mediators, authoritative mediators, or third party mediators. A social network mediator is an individual who is either invited or volunteers to intervene in a dispute because of their existing relationship with the parties. However, in some cases, persons who have an authoritative relationship with the parties may intervene. In other contentious cases, independent third parties with no vested interest in the conflict may be invited to mediate. The model trains community leaders to work with local electoral commission staff to promote transparent and free elections and voter turnout, and to mediate and arbitrate conflicts surrounding elections and election results. Training of the panel members includes psychosocial aspects of conflict; the phenomenon of rumors; human emotions; intra-communal vs. interpersonal vs. inter-communal dynamics of conflict; notions of groups think and opinion leaders; as well as electoral principles and laws.

**Box 3 – EISA’s Conflict Management Panels**

Beginning in South Africa in 1999, EISA introduced Conflict Management Panels as an electoral dispute resolution mechanism. “The panels are meant to act as mobile social intervention units,” and early warning systems. The model was subsequently adapted by EISA in more than fifteen African countries.

Panel members are chosen from particular communities and groups and are comprised of traditional leaders, religious leaders, youth, women, civil society, labor unions, public administration officials, and others such as members of particular ethnic groups where appropriate. Panel members are not affiliated with any party or candidate and are chosen in consultation with local communities for showing wisdom, leadership and impartiality.

The model trains community leaders to work with local electoral commission staff to promote transparent and free elections and voter turnout, and to mediate and arbitrate conflicts surrounding elections and election results. Training of the panel members includes psychosocial aspects of conflict; the phenomenon of rumors; human emotions; intra-communal vs. interpersonal vs. inter-communal dynamics of conflict; notions of groups think and opinion leaders; as well as electoral principles and laws.
violence in Nigeria, in November 2011, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) awarded Nigerian Nairas (NGN) 28.5 million ($175,000 USD) to the families of 42 INEC staff who were killed in the post-election violence. Advocates for victims’ services have also made progress at the subnational level in Nigeria. While most subnational state governments have provided no or little compensation, several have awarded meaningful damages. The state government of Kaduna, for example, has promised to pay the medical bills of those who were injured during the clashes, while the Bauchi state government and Dangote Foundation awarded 273 victims NGN 37 million ($235,000 USD).

It is possible for non-state stakeholders or philanthropic efforts to provide forms of compensation when a state is either unwilling or unable to do so. For example, in Zimbabwe, the government has been unwilling to pursue justice for perpetrators or compensation for victims; however, Heal Zimbabwe (a Zimbabwean CSO) has, among other services, provided economic assistance to victims and their families.

Fourth, in cases where electoral violence has resulted in crimes against humanity but domestic stakeholders are unwilling or unable to prosecute these crimes, a case may be pursued by the ICC. The ICC was established to complement (not replace) national level justice systems, and is authorized to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals only in cases where the state in question does not, is unwilling to, or cannot do so. The following are two examples of ICC involvement in investigating post-election violence: Kenya’s 2007 Presidential Election; and Cote D’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential election. Otherwise, domestic initiatives can be undertaken to investigate electoral violence and identify perpetrators. Such investigative panels may or may not have judicial authority, but their evidence may be given to the judiciary. One example of such a domestic panel is the Lemu Commission in Nigeria, established to investigate the post-election violence of 2011. Box 4 below highlights the conduct and results of the Lemu Commission.

**Box 4 – Highlights from Nigeria’s Lemu Commission Investigation**

Nigeria’s Lemu Commission – Investigating the 2011 Elections

In May 2011, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan approved establishment of the Investigation Panel on Election Violence and Civil Disturbances (Panel) to identify the causes of pre- and post-election violence surrounding the 2011 election in the states of Kaduna, Adamawa and Akwa Ibom. The panel was led by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu (and thereafter commonly referred to as the “Lemu” panel), comprised 22 members, and had the mandate of determining the number of persons killed (and where possible, evidence linked to perpetrators) as well as identifying the extent of damage, including to personal and public property. In identifying the number of deaths and perpetrators, the commission was also to identify the type and source of weapons used by these individuals, as well as put forth recommendations on how to prevent transport of weapons into Nigeria in the future.

The panel did not have authority or jurisdiction to indict or identify any individual or group of individuals, given that it was not established as a Judicial Commission of Inquiry. However, in its report, the panel could present documents and other information that the security agencies could then use to follow up and prosecute individuals.

The Lemu panel released its report in October 2011. In addition to citing some of the root causes of pre- and post-election violence, the report called on the government to leverage its security agencies to use all resources at its disposal to arrest the perpetrators as well as provide compensation to identified victims. Since the release of the report, the Kaduna state government charged 45 people as perpetrators of post-election violence.
With Cambodia’s male population decimated by the violence of the Khmer Rouge regime, currently fifty-six percent of the population is female, and 28 percent of those women are widows. To help women assume new roles in business and in the family, Women for Prosperity, with USAID’s support, is training women to participate in local governing councils and lobby for more representation of women in National Party lists.

While the practices described above are generally linked to a particular phase of the electoral cycle, there are other practices that can be implemented in all phases: grassroots electoral peace-building; electoral conflict monitoring and mapping; preventing political violence against women in elections (PVAWE); de-mobilizing youth from electoral conflict; and media monitoring and electoral conflict.

Grassroots education, advocacy, and victims’ services programs provide a platform to inform the public about electoral conflict and advocate for reforms and protections. The CSOs and FBOs engaged in such programs may also play a role in providing social services to victims. Monitoring and documenting incidents of electoral violence benefits state and non-state stakeholders seeking to respond effectively to the conflict, and in the collection of evidence for later use in the prosecution of perpetrators.

In each of the four country cases assessed for this Guide, state and non-state stakeholders performed incident monitoring and mapping activities. Second, women may be targets of electoral violence specifically because they are women. As a result, special measures need to be adopted to prevent this kind of violence against women (VAW). Monitoring the media for responsible election reporting can document inflammatory rhetoric or misinformation that could become triggers for electoral violence. New media and social networking sites can be “wild cards” in electoral conflict, serving, on the one hand, as conveyances of intimidation, and, on the other, as mechanisms to document and report incidents of violence. Finally, youth are often the enforcers of electoral violence. As a result, practices intended to de-mobilize them from this conflict are included.
A. BEST PRACTICES IN GRASSROOTS ELECTORAL PEACE-BUILDING

SUMMARY – BEST PRACTICES IN GRASSROOTS ELECTORAL PEACE-BUILDING

The objective of identifying best practices in grassroots electoral peace-building is to foster public intolerance for electoral violence and to provide sources of social services for victims of electoral violence. CSOs and FBOs are cited for their roles as educators, advocates, and care providers. Through citizen networks and task forces, a variety of projects and activities can be undertaken, including peace pacts, peace caravans, and peace messages to build public support for peaceful elections and reforms. Additionally, these organizations can help to provide social services to victims, including emergency medical, psychological, and legal assistance.

The objective of identifying best practices in grassroots electoral peace-building is to foster public intolerance for electoral violence, to advocate for reform, and to care for the victims. Non-state stakeholders, such as CSOs and FBOs, can serve as effective partners in conducting these programs and services. While the leadership behind electoral violence may be centralized, electoral conflict occurs at the local level and therefore requires local-level, decentralized interventions as grassroots counter-measures. As community-based groups, CSOs and FBOs may possess personal access to local communities and understand the potential triggers for conflict. Therefore, involving these groups in electoral security coordination bodies and awareness raising activities is a key component of electoral security administration.

First, citizen groups and civil society should be included in multi-stakeholder coordination and awareness raising surrounding electoral security. In the lead-up to Timor Leste’s March/April 2012 presidential elections and July 2012 parliamentary elections, the Policia Nacional Timor-Leste, in collaboration with the Asia Foundation, convened an electoral violence prevention forum under the jointly funded USAID and New Zealand Aid Conflict Mitigation through Community Oriented Policing Program. The forum brought together stakeholders from government, police, community leaders, civil society, and the international community, to develop strategies for preventing electoral violence. With participants deciding on a community-based approach to electoral conflict mitigation, USAID’s Community Policing Program reactivated three Community Policing Councils in Dili and Bacau, engaging the national police, community leaders and local citizens.

Second, public awareness of the potential for violence can be raised through CSOs and FBOs to promote peaceful elections by reducing public tolerance of electoral violence. This can be achieved through various awareness raising activities, which should ideally be developed from the local knowledge and connections of civil society groups. Two examples of effective CSO-led efforts in electoral conflict prevention campaigns can be found in Masbate, Philippines before the 2010 elections and in Ghana during the 2012 presidential elections. Prior to the 2010 election cycle, the province of Masbate had been a hot spot for election-related violence. Through the efforts of the Masbate Advocates for Peace (MAP), a consortium of CSOs, individuals, and local businesses, election day 2010 was largely violence free. MAP coordinated peace pacts, peace caravans, and peace messages to build public support for peaceful elections and reforms. Additionally, these organizations can help to provide social services to victims, including emergency medical, psychological, and legal assistance.

Prior to the December 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, the National Association of Charismatic and Christian Churches (NACCC) and other CSOs organized marches and walks promoting peaceful elections. In March 2012, NACCC organized a “Peace Run” for its constituents to walk through the main streets of Accra on May 1, 2012. With funding from Department for International Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the EU, the Centre for Community Studies Action and Development and the Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights organized a march to “Promote Health Rights and Accountability in a Peaceful 2012 Election.” The National Commission for Civic Education organized public rallies for parliamentary candidates to promise peaceful election campaigns. Immediately after the polls, reports indicate that Ghana held largely peaceful and free and fair elections. While the presidential election results are being disputed, as of the time of this writing, the dispute was being waged in the courts and not the streets.

Third, social services including medical, legal, and psychological assistance should be made available to victims of electoral violence and their families. Electoral violence can bring financial and emotional costs to the victims of such acts and their families. Financial costs include medical expenses, legal fees, and mental counseling services, among others. In order to offset financial costs, state and non-state stakeholders have provided a range of victims’ services. The Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross has provided emergency medical and ambulance services to victims of electoral violence in such countries as Togo (2000), Uganda (2011), and Senegal (2012). In Kenya, UNDP is funding a post-election Violence Livelihoods Recovery Project to rebuild employment opportunities for those displaced from the 2007 violence. And in Zimbabwe, the Legal Services Foundation provides free legal assistance for those pursuing actions against perpetrators, or defense assistance for those unfairly targeted by state prosecutors. Examples of non-state stakeholders working to ease the emotional toll of electoral violence include the Counseling Services Unit of Zimbabwe, which provides psychological and medical services to victims of torture. Such services must be distinguished from legal or philanthropic compensation for death, injury, or other harm.

B. BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL CONFLICT MONITORING AND MAPPING

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL CONFLICT MONITORING AND MAPPING

The systematic monitoring of electoral conflict by state and non-state stakeholders provides documentation of incidents and offers the opportunities to analyze the incidents for conflict patterns and profiles. In some cases, this data is aggregated in database form and then developed into visual maps that demonstrate locations of such incidents. Such monitoring and mapping can provide several public benefits. First, by collecting and disseminating information on incidents, such initiatives can raise public awareness about the problem of electoral violence. Second, documenting incidents of electoral violence provides information that enforcement authorities may employ to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. However, in so doing, the safety of the victim and the monitor must be considered from a “do no harm” standpoint. And third, data on incidents can be provided to those authorities responsible for electoral security who can use this information (in some cases aggregated into map form) to inform their planning for upcoming electoral processes.

The objective of monitoring electoral conflict is to document specific incidents and identify conflict patterns to raise public awareness about these incidents and organize prevention campaigns based upon the profile of the conflict dynamics. Electoral conflict mapping is a tool of electoral conflict monitoring that provides a visual representation of the type, timing, and location of incidents. Its effectiveness is dependent upon the quality of the monitoring methodology and the verification of the incident data collected. Monitoring, documenting and mapping can contribute to the prevention of future incidents of electoral conflict, the targeting of resources in the administration of electoral security, and the investigation and prosecution of electoral crimes. The following are best practices in electoral monitoring to ensure that these objectives are met.

First, employ a tested electoral monitoring methodology that requires monitors to record (at minimum) the following information in order to develop a full picture of the incident—source of report, location of incident, type of violence and perpetrator, and victim. The purpose of monitoring is to develop effective counter-measures to prevent, manage, or mediate conflict during a current election process or to inform planning for future electoral processes. To develop such countermeasures, state and non-state stakeholders require a core set of details on each incident of electoral conflict. For example, if a monitor only records partial information of the incident, state or non-state stakeholders would be without sufficient testimony to pursue the perpetrator (as appropriate) or perhaps develop a plan to combat specific forms of violence in the future. To inform monitoring activities, stakeholders have available to them various methodologies that have been employed and tested. One methodology is that which IFES employs through their Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program. The objective of the EVER framework is to gather data to be used for education and resolution of electoral violence. The EVER methodology is shown in Annex VI.

Employing the EVER methodology, IFES teamed with a CSO in Bangladesh, Odikhar, to monitor electoral violence in the 2006 parliamentary elections. Their findings reported 110 incidents of pre-election violence injuring 336 people. Most of the incidents took place in the week before election day with a dramatic drop on election day itself. The incidents largely involved almost equal complicity between supporters of the two major political parties and only three incidents were linked to police. In terms of tactics employed by the perpetrators, physical harm and torture were reported in 49 percent of the cases, property destruction in 29 percent and group clashes in eight percent. Of the cases of physical harm, lathis, or wooden batons, were employed in 37 percent of the incidents, fist fights in 22 percent, stones in 19 percent and knives in 7 percent. There were few incidents of explosives or firearms being employed.

Another methodology that stakeholders can consider is that employed by the Election Monitoring Network (EMN), developed by EISA in partnership with the IEC in South Africa. EMN employs the
EVER methodology but includes additional queries that each monitor must answer, which enables them to propose an intervention to resolve the dispute, including: Who is the best person/organization to intervene? What if an intervention does not occur? And, what other resources are available within the community to mitigate the conflict? The objective of EMN is three-fold: 1) to ensure lives are not lost in the election process; 2) to maintain a stable context for elections to occur; and, 3) to ensure that the election process is legitimate. Stakeholders have employed this methodology to conduct domestic observation missions for a range of subsequent elections including the September 2011 elections in Zambia and the 2011 elections in Liberia, among others.

Second, conduct electoral conflict monitoring in partnership with CSOs/FBOs in order to ensure maximum geographic coverage as well as build local capacity. Though international implementing partners can bring expertise in conflict monitoring and associated mapping (see best practice below) they lack contextual knowledge of local political and social dynamics as well as capacity to efficiently deploy throughout a given country. Working with CSOs/FBOs can enable internationally-funded monitoring efforts to ensure that as many areas of a country as feasible are monitored, as well as transfer capacity in monitoring techniques to domestic partners. Examples from Burundi and the Philippines evidence the benefits of domestic-led monitoring efforts. In 2010 in Burundi, the Peace and Justice Network (a domestic network of religious organizations) and COSOME (a Burundian CSO) partnered to perform election-violence monitoring before, during, and after election day. Five monitors were deployed in each province and two in each commune. A representative of the efforts was stationed in each local parish, and monitors sent incident reporting disaggregated by location and type of violence via short message system (SMS) to a central location in Bujumbura.

Similar efforts were found in the Philippines involving the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), which, with support from IFES prior to the 2010 elections, launched its Preventing Election Related Violence program in Sulu, an island province in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The Sulu program worked through civil society to monitor and report incidents of election-related violence and political violence more broadly. The monitoring program worked through 25 volunteers in 19 municipalities who gathered and reported on incidents of violence. These reports were then shared with a local group of ‘eminent persons’ referred to as the “Together we move forward” group (known by its acronym TSS, for its translation in Tausag to Tumikang Sama Sama). In collaboration with the Sulu Office of the Mufti, the HD Centre supported the TSS, which reviewed the group monitoring reports and collectively decided how to address reported incidents, including bringing involved parties together to dialogue and resolve disputes or reporting incidents to the police or military.

Third, ensure that those CSOs and FBOs reporting on conflict can do so via as many channels as possible. Though the use of SMS and ICT has become more widespread in recent years, access to these tools across and even within countries is uneven. As a result, initiatives designed to gather information on incidents should enable individuals to submit reports via as many means as possible, commensurate with technologies present in a given state. One example of such a balanced initiative is the Amani 108 program, implemented by Kenyan civil society activists with funding from UNDP prior to the 2010 Referendum. The program was a web-based incident monitoring initiative which integrated multiple sources of social media to provide an early warning system. Amani 108 collected Tweets marked with the hashtag #amanikenya108, as well as accepted submissions through SMS, email, a Facebook page, and the project’s webpage.

Fourth, procedures to verify the credibility of reported incidents should be imbedded into all initiatives to collect data on electoral violence. Crowdsourcing as a technique can enable state- and non-state stakeholders to receive information not otherwise available—in particular from remote areas where external actors are unable to easily reach, but where citizens may export reports via SMS. Although a high number of reports can assist authorities to respond in a timely manner, such reports must also be verified. Elections are high stakes events, which are susceptible to fraudulent activity. Supporters of one candidate, for example, could report false incidents of election violence in an effort to discredit the opposition. Implementers can verify SMS messages and Tweets through software that helps filter and verify information by triangulating and crosschecking data, therefore allowing implementers to weigh data by reliability. Examples of such platforms that could be applied to verify election-violence related incident reports include the SwiftRiver platform, which can be integrated with Ushahidi. Such a platform was used prior to the 2012 elections in Ghana, where individuals could submit reports via SMS and twitter as well as email or filling the form online (to review the map, see: http://ghvotes2012.com).

Fifth, data should be aggregated in an on-line platform that enables users to create incident maps in order to visually display the patterns of
electoral violence. Although collecting information on incidents of violence is useful and can be used to analyze trends in incident profiles, additional steps need to be taken to operationalize this information into electoral security planning tools. Various online platforms have been developed that enable users to upload crowd-sourced data onto geographical maps. One such open source mapping platform is Ushahidi, which is the Swahili word for “witness” or “testimony.” Ushahidi was first employed as a conflict mapping website to track the patterns of post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008. It has since expanded into an open source, “crowd sourcing” software, which can be applied to a country context and map the reporting of incidents. The benefit of using platforms such as Ushahidi is that the user can develop maps based on particular aspects of data entered—for example, that show only those incidents in a particular province or only those incidents involving harassment (as opposed to murder). Stakeholders can then use these maps to plan countermeasures for future electoral cycles. Annex VII shows examples of Ushahidi electoral conflict maps.

It should be noted that while many benefits exist for use of “crowd sourcing” to report electoral violence incidents, there are dangers associated with citizens using SMS to report these incidents, particularly in countries where SIM cards are registered and government authorities monitor cell phone activity. However, as SMS and ICT become increasingly prevalent in civic activism, NGOs such as MobileActive have been established to help activists and advocates navigate the risks and benefits of using these new media.37

C. BEST PRACTICES IN PREVENTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ELECTIONS (PVAWE)

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN PREVENTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ELECTIONS (PVAWE)

The objective of identifying best practices in PVAWE prevention is to recognize that women in elections may possess special vulnerabilities for violence, and programming should reflect these vulnerabilities. While previous analysis of violence against women is often focused in the home, community, and state, this Guide supports the view that elections can be considered as a fourth context because of the potentially conflictive nature of elections and the vulnerabilities of women in them. Such violence can occur in public spaces during electoral activities or as domestic abuse in private space. Women in elections can be protected and empowered through the legal framework, which assigns firm penalties for violence against women broadly and in the electoral context specifically. EMBs can play a role in prevention through electoral procedures and confidentiality in voter registration, which reduces the vulnerabilities of women to electoral violence. ICTs can also be useful to document and convey incidents of PVAWE because of the anonymity they can provide to the victim or monitor. And, public education campaigns to enhance intolerance can be conducted by CSOs, FBOs and political parties.

In identifying best practices in prevention of political violence against women in elections, there is recognition that women involved in elections as public officials, election officials, candidates, or voters may be targets for electoral violence specifically because they are women. As a result, best practices must be identified to address these specific threats. PVAWE is both a subset of gender-based violence (GBV) and a distinct area of political and electoral violence. Though it can occur in the three standard contexts of violence against women - family, community, and state - PVAWE is also distinct from these contexts as elections are competitive processes that can generate conflict and expose women to violence. This form of violence can occur in either a public space, such as political rallies and polling stations, or in private spaces, such as the home. Therefore, best practices for legal and institutional reform are closely linked to GBV and domestic violence.

First, foster the passage of legislation providing firm penalties for perpetrators of GBV and PVAWE. Ideally, legislation to address PVAWE would be developed in coordination with existing GBV legislation (see Box 5 below highlighting Bolivia’s Anti-Gender Based Harassment and Violence in Politics Act). In the absence of such a legal distinction, domestic and gender-based violence laws offer a precedent for gender-sensitive electoral security legislation. For example, in countries where gender-specific legislation exists, it can be extended to include election-related gender violence, such as direct redress for cases taking the form of domestic violence. In those countries lacking such a gender-specific legal framework, the struggle to introduce such legislation will often parallel movements for domestic violence legislation, and stakeholders will benefit from coordination and mutual support.

Second, EMBs should implement electoral policies and procedures to counter PVAWE and empower women in electoral administration. EMBs may coordinate with NGOs’ initiatives to mitigate and prevent PVAWE. They may achieve this by:
• Being watchdogs against parties seeking to “gender-wash” (i.e., political marketing to deceptively promote the perception of an organization or political party as gender-sensitive);

• Enforcing gender laws and policies within their jurisdiction;

• Holding political parties to gender requirements (such as quotas on PR lists) and rapidly penalizing violations to the full extent of the law;

• Providing public recommendations from EMB legal experts and research and analysis divisions on legal reform and policy to diminish incidents of PVAWE;

• Developing gender guidelines and tools for their members and/or support the development of such guidelines for political parties and media.

Box 5 - Bolivia’s Anti-Gender Based Harassment and Violence in Politics Act

In Bolivia, the Anti-Gender Based Harassment and Violence in Politics Act was enacted to “defend and guarantee the enjoyment of political rights by female candidates - incumbent and elected - and to guarantee a legal framework and set penalties for individual and collective harassment and political violence.” The law is an exceptional example in codifying and compensating for social imbalances, as well as addressing procedural issues that may impinge on women’s rights. The law establishes penalties for perpetrators of acts of political harassment and violence against women candidates and elected and acting officials, including administrative, civil and criminal measures and may temporarily or permanently bar offenders from public office. It offers substantive definitions of key issues of harassment and violence including gender-specific elements such as exerting pressure on a female candidate’s family to prevent the candidate from partaking in their rights and duties; dictates that resignations tendered by elected women officials are valid only if the woman in question appears in person before the National Electoral Court, due to the fact that women are reported to be forced to sign resignations under duress); and, responds to the specific nature of PVAWE in Bolivia by targeting legal protection where violations are most likely to occur – in this case, at the municipal council level.

Box 6 – Grassroots ICT Movements to Prevent Violence Against Women

16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence Campaign - Based out of Rutgers University, 16 Days of Activism is an international campaign to prevent violence against women that successfully mobilizes ICT to promote broad participation. Since 1991, over 3,700 organizations in approximately 164 countries have participated in the 16 Days Campaign. The Campaign has been used as an organizing strategy by individuals and groups around the world to call for the elimination of all forms of violence against women by raising awareness about gender-based violence as a human rights issue, strengthening local work around violence against women, establishing clear links between local and international work to end violence against women, providing a forum in which organizers can develop and share strategies, creating tools to pressure governments to implement commitments to eliminate GBV and to demonstrate solidarity (www.16dayscwgl.rutgers.edu).

The “Take Back the Tech” campaign – This campaign takes place annually during the 16 Days of Activism and seeks to “take control over information and communication technologies and use them for activism to end violence against women.” The campaign calls for all citizens, especially girls and women, to take control of technology to end violence against women. The campaign is framed around 16 “daily actions” supporters are encouraged to take to recognize and act upon the links between ICTs, gender, GBV and violence prevention. These range from using internet platforms for advocacy, mapping attacks (hacking, blocking, and deletion) of the websites of women’s rights organizations, sexual rights advocates, feminist activists and bloggers, and user-friendly games to promote safety in social networks. The campaign is active in over 25 countries worldwide.

HarassMap – HarrassMap is a volunteer initiative in Egypt that integrates social media and mobile phone-based reporting into community outreach programs and a referral system for victims of sexual harassment. Victims of sexual harassment are invited to send in reports documenting the incident via SMS, online, Twitter or Facebook. Referral information is provided to each report submitted. The incidents are then verified and mapped on harassmap.org using Ushahidi and FrontlineSMS software. The mapping provides evidence of the existence of harassment to those who would deny it, and provides a disaggregated view of where the incidents are happening and what kinds of harassment are taking place.
EMBs also demonstrate leadership by ensuring gender equity within their internal structures both at the leadership level and in the employment of temporary poll workers. Indeed, without clear internal gender policies and informed and active external advocacy (i.e., simple support for non-governamental PVAVE awareness activities), EMBs may be viewed as gender-washing and thereby decrease their credibility.

The objective of identifying best practices in demobilizing youth from electoral conflict is twofold. First, youth are often economically vulnerable to recruitment by political parties and candidates to perform acts of violence. As a result, best practices directed at their demobilization are intended to reduce the vulnerability for systematic or random recruitment. Second, youth are the future electoral stakeholders, and if the norms of electoral expression are conflated with violence, then elections will remain vulnerable to violence into the foreseeable future.

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Third, conduct public education campaigns involving women CSOs and FBOs in grassroots electoral peace-building, just as with electoral violence in general, grassroots initiatives can help prevent PVAVE. For example, the Women’s Peace and Security Network is a pan-African network of women engaged in peace-building activities and mobilization of communities of interest. They recently conducted a Women and Non-Violent Elections Campaign (2011) involving peace messaging and other activities. CSOs may also initiate Political Party Gender Rankings or Report Cards. For example, the Women Advocates Research and Documentation Center in Nigeria monitors and ranks parties’ adherence to gender mandates in law and party governance.

Fourth, leverage the anonymity provided by ICT-based monitoring to encourage documenting and reporting of incidents of PVAVE. New media and technology offer opportunities for addressing this form of electoral violence. SMS, Twitter and other internet- and cellular-based tools offer both anonymity and visibility. Anonymity is a critical virtue for breaking the silence of women who are targets of intimidation. Because it is often a challenge to provide anonymity in small or insular communities, ICT and social media provide vehicles to do so. By contrast to the low profile these media provide their reporters, they equally provide high visibility, broad-based empowerment and awareness-raising of an otherwise private issue.

Second, bring youth into electoral administration. If youth are employed during the election cycle in electoral administration they may be less vulnerable to systematic or random recruitment for electoral violence. For example, in 2011 the INEC engaged the Nigeria National Youth Corps (a year-long mandatory service for Nigeria university graduates under the age of 30) to recruit young people as poll workers. However, it should be noted that while bringing youth into public service may reduce their vulnerability for recruitment into violence, in the Nigerian case, young people became the targets when polling stations were attacked in the post-election violence.

First, transfer values-based knowledge about elections and democratic governance so youth can appreciate the benefits of political processes over violence. Examples of such civic education programs include Youth Democracy Camps, 10-day programs of instruction on problem-solving skills and lessons in leadership, civic responsibility, and electoral participation organized by IFES in Kyrgyzstan; OSCE Presence Office programming on youth engagement in public affairs in Albania to encourage youth involvement in elections and governance; and the Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies’ program on civic education for youth as the country was undergoing a political crisis in 2005.

D. BEST PRACTICES IN DEMOBILIZING YOUTH FROM ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

**SUMMARY – DEMOBILIZING YOUTH FROM ELECTORAL VIOLENCE**

The objective of identifying best practices in demobilizing youth from electoral violence is to reduce their vulnerabilities for recruitment and install electoral values consistent with international norms and standards. This objective can be fulfilled through programming aimed at education, engagement, and employment. Special electoral education programs with youth audiences can provide focused civic education on democratic values and processes. The engagement of youth election work-
Third, provide alternative employment for youth during the electoral cycle. Special employment programs can be initiated around elections to engage unemployed youth in public works and other projects. These employment programs provide youth with both activity and income reducing their vulnerabilities for recruitment into violence. Such a program was implemented in Burundi where the Governor of Bujumbura Rural Province organized public works and construction jobs for youth during the 2010 elections.

E. BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA MONITORING

SUMMARY - BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA MONITORING

The objective of identifying best practices in media monitoring is to reduce the potential for rumor, misinformation, and hate speech to trigger electoral violence; and, to examine the technologies associated with documenting and reporting on electoral violence. Media monitoring can be conducted by state and non-state stakeholders. Media organizations could be requested or required to comply with a code of conduct providing guidelines on accuracy and integrity in reporting. Efforts to implement new media strategies, however, should only be used as part of a broader plan for conflict prevention and management. Implementers will also have to deal with issues of prioritizing verified information, or allowing a wider selection of data, that might not be as trustworthy. Before building a monitoring program, implementers should develop clear guidelines on what type of information will be collected, how it will be used, and how they will validate information so that fraudulent data is not included.

The objective of media monitoring is to be aware when rumor, falsehood, or hate speech are disseminated so that necessary measures can be taken to counter these messages and reduce the triggers for electoral conflict resulting from this reporting. Media organizations can play a pivotal role in electoral security as either mitigators of conflict by disseminating peace messaging as mediators who are countering provocative rumors or misinformation; or as instigators who trigger conflict by inflammatory or false reporting.

First, employ a tested media monitoring methodology and approach for elections coverage and the coverage of electoral conflict. Since the 1990s various international NGOs such as the European Institute for the Media as well as national NGOs such as the Media Monitoring Project (South Africa) have developed media monitoring methodologies. Guides published by these entities contain easy-to-follow methodologies that non-state stakeholders can use to monitor media surrounding elections.42 Methodologies include a gender dimension and evaluate the coverage of stories on women’s political participation more broadly, as well as PVAWE and politically-motivated sexual and gender-based violence. Non-state actors have employed these methodologies or variants thereof to monitor media surrounding electoral processes. For example, during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections, local human rights and media freedom organizations (in addition to intergovernmental groups) performed media monitoring. These local groups published their findings on a regular basis.

Second, develop a code of conduct for media organization to define general guidelines on publication and broadcasting protocols with specific provisions directed at the coverage of elections. Codes of conduct can put forward to media organizations and practitioners a defined set of expectations associated with their coverage of people, issues, and events. Through reducing journalistic malpractice, the potential for media to trigger violence is also reduced. International assistance in the development of such codes can establish an additional layer of accountability in their observance and enforcement. For example, in the lead-up to Malawi’s 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Malawi Electoral Commission hosted senior delegates of the country’s major media organizations to develop a “Code of Conduct for Malawi Media.” Representatives from political parties and civil society were allowed to attend and contribute to the discussions.

To ensure compliance with the terms of the code, state stakeholders can appoint bodies with enforcement capability. EMBs can establish a unit (or assign the responsibility to an individual) charged with monitoring media reports. For example, in Guyana, in the wake of misinformation reported from national broadcasters triggering election day violence, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) established a Media Monitoring Unit. In 2001 (and again in 2011) GECOM established an independent panel - The Independent Media Monitoring and Refereeing Panel - to oversee the enforcement of the code of conduct for media organizations. The Panel is composed of a full-time chairman and two part-time members. The chair is a Caribbean national with regional media experience; the second member is a journalist from the region; and the third member is a Guyanese attorney-at-law. Panel members are approved by the media organizations and practitioners that have signed on to the code of conduct. The Panel’s responsibilities extend in time from Nomination Day through one week after the certification of election results.

In its Reducing Electoral Conflict – A Toolkit for South Africa, the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) lists the following questions which should be considered when evaluating the potential for media reporting to trigger electoral violence:

- • What history of conflict is reported?
- • Is the article biased?
- • What does the article say to set off the violence?
- • What types of violence and weapons were used?
- • Who are reported to be player in the violence?
- • How did the violence unfold over time?
- • External events and their impact on the violence?
- • How will article be received by the parties?
- • Is the article true?

The mandate of the Independent Media Monitoring and Refereeing Panel in Guyana is to:

- Monitor, analyse, and review broadcast, Internet, and print news account of the election;
- Receive complaints, communications, and other communications concerning media performance;
- Obtain documentation concerning any complaints submitted;
- Undertake an investigation of the complaints; and
- Submit findings to participating media organizations to broadcast as a kind of “name and shame” enforcement mechanism.
CONCLUSIONS

A voter education campaign in Bulgaria catches on to popular support. During local elections in October 2007, a young activist in Veliko Turnovo hands out information to encourage voting among the Roma community.

This Guide is intended to close a conceptual gap in electoral assistance programming. This program gap concerns the systematic approach to categorizing best practices in electoral security and creating an inventory of such practices that have been effective in preventing, managing, and mediating electoral conflict. The following conclusions and observations can be drawn from the assessments and desk research.

By identifying the underlying security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur, early warning signs can be identified to focus planning for program interventions. Through establishing a profile of the threats, program responses can be specifically crafted to address the conflict emerging from these threats. A history of electoral conflict can be a predictor of future electoral conflict.

Electoral conflict dynamics are complex and are shaped by varying factors. As a result, comprehensive program responses should be multi-sectoral and can involve elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, rule of law, civil society, media, women’s empowerment, and security sector programs.

In planning for electoral security interventions, the threats should be evaluated through the Electoral Cycle Approach, which divides the election into three phases: 1) pre-election; 2) election day(s); and 3) post-election. This chronological segmentation allows for the timing and duration of programming to be tailored to counter the threats existent in each phase. In addition, elections in conflictive environments must be organized through a coordinated set of electoral calendars – political, technical, and peace-building.

While perpetrators vary between elections and within different phases of a single electoral cycle, political rivals have been identified as the primary
source of electoral conflict. Youth are often engaged by political rivals as the agents of violence. In environments where youth are at risk for such recruitment, educational and employment opportunities should be intensified during elections to deter them from violence. Other perpetrators include state and proxies, such as the police and the youth wings of ruling parties, insurgents, and criminal groups.

The pre-election phase involves activities that can have either an “upstream” or “downstream” impact on the potential for electoral conflict to occur. From an “upstream” perspective, de-conflicting the electoral legal framework prevents grievances from being created as a result of unfair laws and biased regulations. “Downstream” impact interventions include establishing early mechanisms to adjudicate political rival conflict, introducing greater transparency in political finance, and training security forces in elections.

On election day, the security focus is on the polling/counting stations and the routes to them to protect voters, poll workers, observers, and media. Electoral security administration is an inter-agency task which could be coordinated as an EMB led, security force led, or mixed model of operations. Electoral security administration should be decentralized in order to be responsive to localized threats. Both civilian and security rapid response mechanisms should be established in order to deploy teams to hot spots and mediate electoral disputes or quell disturbances.

Mistrust in announced electoral results is the primary trigger for post-election conflict. Transparency and accuracy in the count as well as a results announcement plan from the EMB can dampen the motives for perpetrators to engage in such conflict.

While electoral justice must be active throughout the electoral cycle, the caseload of petitions generally peaks in the post-election phase as election results are challenged. Not dissimilar or disconnected to the tabulation and announcement triggers cited above, an effective electoral justice system can prevent post-election conflict resulting from unheard or dismissed petitions. Informal ADR mechanism can also be employed to resolve electoral disputes. There is a culture of impunity surrounding many crimes of electoral violence. This impunity results in perpetrators going free and victims suffering losses. Poll worker victims of electoral violence should receive compensation from the state for their losses. Non-state stakeholders could benefit from social services provided by CSOs or FBOs in the form of medical, legal, or counseling services.

PVAWE should be considered as a specific context of violence against women. Weak laws on women’s equality and domestic abuse may create vulnerabilities for women to be targets of violence in elections. The motives for such violence are generally to force the withdrawal of women candidates or to suppress turnout by women voters. In any case, program focus should be placed on preventing violence.

Non-state stakeholders, such as coalitions of CSOs and FBOs, can play mitigating roles in electoral conflict prevention and mediation through peace messaging, public campaigns, and advocacy programs. The groups may also engage in electoral conflict and media monitoring. In electoral conflict monitoring, incident reports are taken, analyzed, and mapped. ICTs can be employed to collect and convey incident reports to a central repository. Such a data platform may be employed for immediate interventions but also has value for state electoral security stakeholders in their planning and deployments for future elections. Media monitoring may also be employed to reveal sources of misinformation or hate speech that could trigger electoral conflict.

Social media is a “wild card” in electoral conflict. These technologies provide tools by which incidents of electoral violence can be documented, reported, and mapped; however, they can also be employed by perpetrators to convey messages of intimidation to both individual and group audiences.

While economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, and income inequities will remain as embedded vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur, programmatic steps can be taken to reduce the impact of these vulnerabilities on the electoral process. Programming interventions must be crafted with sensitivities to timing, duration, and stakeholder in order to address the targeted threat with a precise and comprehensive set of resolution tactics.
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<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Inter-Party Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEOC</td>
<td>Joint Election Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCC</td>
<td>Joint Security Control Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEV</td>
<td>Movement Against Electoral Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Masbate Advocates for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACCC</td>
<td>National Association of Charismatic and Christian Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGN</td>
<td>Nigerian Nairas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Private Armed Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM</td>
<td>Party Consultative Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFR</td>
<td>Political Finance Regulators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>National Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Philippine National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentoring Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Provincial Security Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVAWE</td>
<td>Political Violence Against Women in Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Message System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIDE</td>
<td>Training in Detection and Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSE</td>
<td>Supreme Electoral Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>Tumikang Sama Sama (“Together we move forward”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II - GLOSSARY OF ELECTORAL SECURITY TERMS

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** – the engagement of state, non-state, or international stakeholders in adjudicating electoral disputes outside of the formal electoral justice mechanisms.

**Contextual Vulnerabilities for Electoral Conflict** – those security, political, social, and economic factors which by themselves or collectively combine to make an election susceptible for conflict to occur.

**Electoral Conflict** – “any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse an electoral stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence the electoral process.”

**Electoral Cycle Approach** – an electoral assistance programming strategy which recognizes that different phases of the electoral process put forward different challenges and demands and assistance must be crafted to address the need framed in each Phase – pre-election, election day, and post-election.

**Electoral Justice** – “…the adjudication of civil challenges to the electoral process which can be filed by voters and political contestants. These civil challenges could concern eligibility, disenfranchisement, campaign practices, irregularities, and disputed outcomes among others.”

**Electoral Management Body** – an organization or body which has been founded for the purpose of, and is legally responsible for; managing one or more of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections, and of direct democracy instruments – such as referenda, citizens’ initiatives, and recall votes – of those that are part of the legal framework.

**Electoral Security** – “…the process of protecting electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers; electoral information such as vote results, registration data, and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centers; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption.”

**Electoral Security Administration** – a sub-practice area of Electoral Administration which concerns the planning, coordination, and implementation of enforcement measures which protect electoral stakeholders, facilities, events, and sensitive materials from harm.

**Electoral Security Stakeholders** – those state, non-state, international organization and individual actors that play some role in electoral conflict, security, or mediation.

**Intensity** – measures of the level of conflict, ranging from personal intimidation to widespread human rights abuses over the course of the electoral cycle.

**Locations** – on one level, the geographical units – regions, municipalities, or neighborhoods – where there has been an historical tendency for electoral conflict to occur; and, as a conflict venue, it is the event, facility, or residence where the conflict is carried out.

**Motives** – those factors incentivizing perpetrators to employ violence as a means to achieve a political objective.

**Perpetrators** – the leadership and their agents who carry out acts of electoral conflict and violence categorized as state and state proxies, political rivals, coalitions of opposition parties, criminals, or insurgents.

**Tactics** – the means and weaponry employed by perpetrators to intimidate, assault, displace, or murder targets of electoral violence.

**Victims** – the human, facility, event, or material targets of electoral violence.
## Table I - Electoral Conflict Mapping Links

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Election(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td><a href="http://votereport.in/">http://votereport.in/</a></td>
<td>Parliamentary, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td><a href="http://uchaguzi.co.ke">http://uchaguzi.co.ke</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2 – ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT DATABASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essex University</td>
<td><a href="http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/index.htm">http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/index.htm</a></td>
<td>Index of Electoral Malpractice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maryland</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/">http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/</a></td>
<td>Minorities at Risk Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td><a href="http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/#">http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/#</a></td>
<td>National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Texas at Austin</td>
<td><a href="http://www.strausscenter.org/scad.html">http://www.strausscenter.org/scad.html</a></td>
<td>Social Conflict in Africa Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uppsala University</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php">http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php</a></td>
<td>UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3 - KEY REPORTS AND GUIDES AVAILABLE ON-LINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International IDEA</td>
<td><a href="http://www.idea.int/elections/conflict.cfm">http://www.idea.int/elections/conflict.cfm</a></td>
<td>Elections and Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE Electoral Network</td>
<td><a href="http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/elections-and-security">http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/elections-and-security</a></td>
<td>Section on Elections and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4 - DATABASES AND DATASETS ON CONFLICT AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database/">http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database/</a></td>
<td>Armed Conflict Database (ACD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International IDEA</td>
<td><a href="http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/">http://www.idea.int/elections/ej/</a></td>
<td>Electoral Justice Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/">http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/</a></td>
<td>Datasets on organized violence and peace-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX IV - EVALUATION OF ELECTORAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS

In 2001, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE’s) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in collaboration with International IDEA published “Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections,” which details the basic components of a legal framework governing elections and the relevant minimum standards for each component. The following are the relevant Section Headings and their associated Objectives from the publication:

Structure of the Legal Framework: The legal framework should be structured so that it is readily accessible to the public, transparent, and addresses all the components of an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic elections.

The Electoral System: The choice of electoral system should ensure minimum standards for democratic elections in terms of what institutions are elected, the frequency of elections, and the organization of electoral units.

The Right to Elect and be Elected: The legal framework should ensure that all citizens of the age of majority are guaranteed the right of universal and equal suffrage.

Election Commissions/Bodies: The legal framework should require that election commissions/bodies are established and operated in a manner that ensures the independent and impartial administration of elections.

Voter Registration and Registers: The legal framework should require that voter registers be maintained in a manner that is transparent, accurate, protects the right of citizens of legal age to register, and prevents the unlawful or fraudulent registration of persons.

Political Parties and Candidates: The legal framework should ensure that all political parties and candidates are able to compete in elections on the basis of equal treatment before the law.

Equal Treatment and Access to Media: The legal framework should ensure that all political parties and candidates are provided access to media and equal treatment in media owned or controlled by the state, and that no unreasonable limitations are placed on the right of political parties and candidates to free expression during election campaigns.

Campaign Finance and Expenditures: The legal framework should ensure that all political parties and candidates are treated on the basis of equal treatment before the law by legal provisions governing campaign finances and expenditures.

Observers: The legal framework should provide for observers, including domestic and foreign, and representatives of the media, political parties and candidates to ensure transparency of all electoral processes.

Balloting Procedures: The legal framework should ensure that secrecy of the vote is guaranteed, and that all votes are counted and tabulated equally, fairly, and transparently.

Transparency in Counting/Tabulation of Votes: The legal framework should ensure that all votes are counted and tabulated accurately, equally, fairly, and transparently.

Enforcement of Electoral Rights: The legal framework should provide effective mechanisms and remedies for the enforcement of electoral rights.
ANNEX V - JOINT ELECTION OPERATIONS CENTERS - CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

ELECTORAL SECURITY COORDINATION BEST PRACTICE - JOINT ELECTION OPERATIONS CENTERS

As illustrated by the cases above, coordination committees require a facility which serves as a hub for communications, command, and control. In 1996, a Joint Elections Operations Center (JECC) was established by the OSCE and international Implementation Force (IFOR) for the 1996 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JECC became an important mechanism in coordinating civilian and military activities during the election conducted that year.

Role of the JECC

Operations centers are used to provide better field coordination and information about election preparations, monitor security issues, and facilitate better civil-military partnering. In 1996, the Election Day role of the JECC was described in the security plan: “Through the Joint Elections Operations Centre, the OSCE will troubleshoot elections operations questions through liaison with OSCE Regional Centres and Field Offices, as well as the Elections Operations Room at [military] headquarters.” The basic template for these operations centers has been replicated in a number of high security elections with a peacekeeping component.

Management of the JECC

Although security forces will play a major role in election security management, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network recommends that “JOCs [Joint Operations Centers] are an initiative better taken by the election management body than by other participants.” Located in the Sarajevo headquarters of the OSCE elections division, the JECC was co-managed by a civilian and a military co-director. On the civilian side, the co-director was a representative from the electoral unit, and on the military side, the representative was from IFOR.

Participants in the JECC

Although the security concept is always contextual, it should include its plan on engaging social enforcement mechanisms under its influence for grassroots security enforcement. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network suggests an expanded list of potential participants in JECC activities to include senior election managers; security forces – national and international police and military, civil emergency and rescue services; political party agents; civil society organizations monitoring the election; conflict resolution specialists; women’s groups; and traditional leaders. Under such an arrangement, the election management body retains the management lead and receives advice from the other representative on the JECC. However, in countries with international military operations, despite the civilian nature of elections, the military can be expected to play a robust role in JECC management.

For the Afghanistan parliamentary and provincial council elections of 2005, the JECC was described in the security plan as “an inter-agency and cross-departmental mechanism that will be set up in the early stages to coordinate key aspects of the work of the JECC Secretariat in regions and provinces. The JECC will include representatives of various departments; these components will vary according to the stage of operation. Key components will be those of Field Operations, Election Support and Security. The JECC will be supplemented by representatives from Training and Public Outreach during the relevant phases of the operation.”
## ANNEX VI – IFES’S EVER METHODOLOGY

### ELECTORAL VIOLENCE EDUCATION AND RESOLUTION METHODOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Violence:</th>
<th>Polling Station, Registration Office, Election Commission Office, Other Election Office/Facility, Political Party Office, Media Office, Private Home, Street/Public Area, Vote Counting Center, Authorized Public Campaign Locations, Non-Election State Offices or Property, Other;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Violence:</td>
<td>Murder, Attempted Murder, Kidnapping or Attempted Kidnapping, Physical Harm or Torture, Sexual Assault, Threat of Physical Harm, Intimidation or Psychological Abuse, Insult/Verbal Harassment, Theft, Vandalism, Jail or Arbitrary Detention, Blackmail, Other;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim of Violence:</td>
<td>Domestic or External Agent of State, Political Party or Candidate, Election Worker, Election Monitor, Journalist and Media, Voter, Election Ballot, Material or Process, Election Office, Political Party Office, Private Property, Non-Election State Office or Property, Bystander, Other;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator of Violence:</td>
<td>Domestics or External Agent of State, Political Party or Candidate, Militia, Private Security Actor, Insurgent, Criminal Element, Other;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of Violence:</td>
<td>Number of People Killed, Number of People Wounded, Number of People Kidnapped, Voter Registration Disrupted, Interference with Voting and Voters Left Area, Disrupted Vote Count, Damage or Destruction of Election Property, Damage or Destruction of Other Property, Complaint Filed with Electoral Commission, Cancelled Election, Postponed Election, Rerun Election, Other;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX VII – USHAHIDI ELECTORAL CONFLICT MAPS

### KENYA JANUARY 2007 – NOVEMBER 2008 ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE ALL CATEGORIES

![Ushahidi Kenya Map](https://example.com/ushahidi_map.png)
ANNEX VII – USHAHIDI ELECTORAL CONFLICT MAPS (CONTINUED)

GUATEMALA 2011 – ALL CATEGORIES OF ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS

GUATEMALA 2011 – INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE OR THREATS TO PREVENT VOTING
1 The four assessments were conducted by Jeff Fischer and Patrick W. Quirk of Creative Associates International, with participation by USAID colleagues Vanessa Reilly, Kenneth Barden, and Dr. Carol Sahley.

2 The Framework, developed by Creative Associates for USAID, can be found at the following link: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf


4 The four assessments were conducted by Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk of Creative Associates International, with participation by USAID colleagues Vanessa Reilly, Kenneth Barden, and Dr. Carol Sahley.


7 This diagram and description of the Electoral Cycle Approach is drawn from the European Commission and United Nations Development Programme Partnership for Electoral Assistance. The diagram can be found here: http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=125&Itemid=136&lang=en

8 As outlined by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) under Step 6 of “Managing a Mediation Process.” Additional information on constructing a peace agreement can be found at the following link: http://www.usip.org/managing-mediation-process/step-6-construct-peace-agreement


13 Ibid, 9 and 11.

14 Information about COGEL can be found at the following link: www.cogel.org

15 An overview of TIDE can be found at the following link: http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/ManualHandbook2005/TIDE_Handbook_Enforcing_Political_Finance_Laws.pdf

16 These statistics, other examples, and insights for this section are drawn from International IDEA’s Handbook on Funding Political Parties and Election Campaigns (Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA, 2003).

17 The Handbook describing this methodology can be found at the following link: http://www.soros.org/reports/monitoring-election-campaign-finance-handbook-ngos

18 Additional training curricula and materials can be found through: the OSCE’s Policing OnLine Information System (POLIS) at www.polis.osce.org. Additionally, the UN Regional Centre for Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) developed an online French-language training video on law enforcement and elections which can be located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccSCCQQ-9gs&feature=plcp, as well as a “Security Forces’ Guide on the Maintenance of Law and Order During Elections,” handbook located at http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/UNREC_-_Security_forces_guide_on_the_maintenance_of_law_and_order_during_elections.original.pdf.


20 Ibid, 18.

21 Insights drawn from the ACE Project web-site: http://www.aceproject.org

22 For the 2013 elections, the JSCCs have been renamed as Joint Peace and Security Centers. And at the time of this writing, electoral security stakeholders had initiated monthly coordination meetings focused on the upcoming election.
23 Though present for election day, the temporary staff status of PSOs (they are on temporary contracts and released following a
given election cycle) creates a lack of continuity in electoral security administration at that level.

24 Information drawn from report at the following link: http://www.integrityaction.org/sites/www.integrityaction.org/files/documents/
files/Accra%20Guiding%20Principles.pdf

25 Interview with Dorina Bekoe, Senior Research Associate, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, USIP.

26 On an as needed basis, some NGOs such as the Carter Center have engaged in electoral mediation. In addition, the UN and the
OAS have been invited to arbitrate election disputes. However, in these cases, the mediation process was largely personalistic in
nature, with high-profile figures such as President Jimmy Carter and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan leading the initiative.
While these initiatives are certainly worthwhile, they do not provide the international community with the methodologies and ap-
proaches that permit electoral mediation to be conducted by a broader array of organizations otherwise engaged in peace-building
activities. See Eugenia Zorbas and Vincent Tohbi, “Election-Related Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: The 2006 Elections in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peace-building, David Gilles,

Queens University Press, 2011), 101-102

28 Ibid.

29 Jacob Segun Olatunji, “INEC gives N28.5m to families of election violence victims,” Nigerian Tribune, November 4, 2011.


31 Nigeria represents a case where the ICC signaled that it might launch its own investigation, but eventually decided against doing
so because the national government took sufficient investigative steps.


34 Anne Gloor, Section for Peace Security, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

35 Crowdsourcing for Conflict Prevention: Building Knowledge with the UNDP and the International Peace Institute, TechChange

36 Information on this issue can be found here: http://ushahidi.com/uploads/docs/SwiftRiver_1-Pager.pdf

37 Information on this issue can be found here: http://mobileactive.org

38 “Gender-based violence includes acts of violence in the form of physical, psychological, or sexual violence against a person speci-
fically because of his or her gender.” (Center for Reproductive Rights)

39 Maria Eugenia Rojas, Interparliamentary Union. 2009.

40 The policy can be found at the following link: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/policy_planning_and_learning/documents/Youth_
in_Development_Policy.pdf

41 Example provided in adjacent text box regarding the Youth “Bunges” is described in the USAID Publication Frontlines, “In Com-

munity ‘Parliaments,’ Kenya’s Youth Find a Voice” (September/October 2012). Article can be found at the following link: http://tran-
sition.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_sep12/FL_sep12_KENYABUNGES.html

42 For a respected guide on media monitoring see the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) “Media Monitoring to Promote Demo-

cratic Elections: A Guide for Citizen Organizations,” which is available at the following link: http://www.ndi.org/node/12997.


44 Fischer, (unpublished monograph), 78.

45 Information found on the ACE Project web-site: www.aceproject.org,
