ACVFA RECOMMENDATIONS

GOVERNING JUSTLY and DEMOCRATICALLY

The Framework defines the goal of governing justly and democratically as promoting and strengthening effective democracies by moving recipient states along a continuum toward democratic consolidation. While the Framework does not say much about the continuum, experience demonstrates that there is not a single trajectory that applies to all countries or categories of countries, nor is that trajectory a linear one. The working group recognizes that while the Framework may not be very dimensional, USAID and its implementing partners of democracy and governance programs understand the need for flexibility, adaptability and dynamism. Our comments refer to the perceived rigidity of the framework.

The overarching theme of the framework is to promote, build, or consolidate democracy in its various forms. However, we must avoid the dangerous assumption of the process moving only in one direction. The reality is that along with democratic success stories there are democratic reversals in countries around the world. As semi-authoritarian regimes continue to roll back freedoms and as populists reduce the political space, we must recognize the underlying reasons for these processes and develop strategies to prevent democratic reversals.

One of the key issues to address here is the fact that democracies must deliver at all levels of society, especially for the poor. Similarly, we must understand the incentives that drive democratic reform and local as well as global trends that affect the pace of reforms. The broader point here is the need to recognize the importance of country conditions in approaching democracy building. The framework, in its design but most importantly in its application, must not be technocratic as if the same set of strategies will work across the different spectrum of countries. While key democratic governance and rule of law institutions may be very similar regardless of the country in question, strategies for building and strengthening those institutions will certainly vary. In other words, there is a key difference between what we are trying to accomplish and how it can be accomplished.
While the F staff should be applauded for its focus on attempting to achieve strategic coherence in the course of foreign assistance reform, the group expressed concern about the obvious stove-piping or compartmentalizing that the Framework appears to embrace. One cannot intervene in any one development area in isolation; economic growth or improvements in education, or gender integration, for example, are inextricably linked to democracy building. Further concerns were expressed about the stove-piping within DG programming with little or no regard for the natural linkages between and among the various program elements.

This being said, we also recognize that the needs of key beneficiaries, the poor, not be compromised or ignored if assistance requires the promotion of the rule of law and human rights, laudable goals in their own right, as preconditions to helping the poor. USAID is an agency with a long history of serving the needs of the poorest of the poor, and we seek to ensure that a clear distinction is made between the core elements of a D&G project, and a project whose primary focus is addressing the social needs of beneficiaries.

As good democratic governance is key in generating the societal pressure to reform and address key developmental issues such as corruption, more attention should also be paid to the development of political parties that focus on concrete programs and issues rather than personalities and slogans. In many cases, this involves not only technical capacity-building and knowledge sharing, but also the development of incentives to build political will to reform. Free and independent media, for example, has proven to be an effective way to create such incentives. Similarly, other ways to generate incentives to reform can include trying aid more closely to concrete commitments and development progress of countries.

Currently the framework recognizes cross-cutting functions as “program design and learning” and “personnel.” While programs must be tailored to country-specific circumstances, USAID should consider how to promote those essential governance priorities that should apply across every country, such as combating corruption and gender equality. It is widely understood, that citizen access to information, transparent procurement processes, capacity building for citizen oversight of government, etc, impact the effectiveness of assistance in all sectors.

USAID should also consider adding “donor coordination activities” as an element or sub-element of each applicable program area. A fundamental element of every USAID governance program should be coordination with other donors working in the field. Experience in recipient countries shows that recipient governments have difficulty fulfilling the sometimes different or overlapping governance programming and reporting requirements of donors working in their countries.

While USAID may in practice address this issue on an ad hoc basis, its foreign assistance framework should explicitly express its commitment to gather information about other donor activities and work to ensure complementary in programming. Such efforts will
help ensure that governance programming is effective, consistent, and comprehensive. Furthermore, USAID should join other donors in mainstreaming initiatives to facilitate the implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption and other similar initiatives into its country programs, including capacity-building for government and civil society as well as support for participation in peer review monitoring.

The private sector must be considered as an integral part of civil society. It is ironic that one of the best descriptions of what constitutes “civil society” – as incomplete as it is, in our view – comes in the section on security sector governance (Program Sub-Element 2.5.3: Civil Society Capacity to Engage the Security Sector). Perhaps there is a more appropriate and effective place for a more complete explanation of who makes up civil society, and we would hope that the private sector, including entrepreneurs and representative organizations such as voluntary business associations, would fit into that matrix. Especially with the explicit reference to “Democratic Trade Unions”, the lack of any reference to business associations, the private sector, or entrepreneurs, even if inadvertent, may lead some to believe that these groups were purposely omitted and are not integral components of civil society. We would propose the following new Sub-Element:

**Program Sub-Element 2.4.1.6: Business Associations and the Private Sector**

**Definition:** Develop and strengthen independent and democratic business associations and other private sector and professional (e.g. lawyers, accountants, engineers) organizations to promote transparent policymaking, strengthen accountability and governance, and improve standards of living. This includes, but is not limited to, protecting and promoting laws and legal environments which guarantee the rights of freedom of association and access to information; building capacity of the private sector to advocate for reform within a democratic process; promoting the understanding and use of mechanisms for transparent private sector participation in the policy process; and protecting key political and economic freedoms.

In the new framework, there is practically no mention of the very crucial role women play in democracy building and good governance. Yet increasing women’s participation and access to basic rights and promoting gender equality will further the democratic process, and are essential to good governance. There has been a rapid increase in new women’s organizations world wide, and these non-governmental organizations have increased their advocacy work. Therefore, more emphasis is needed on gender focused strategies and agency wide use of gender analysis in strategic planning. We see gender as a cross-cutting issue and one that should be considered in all the program areas, with appropriate indicators.

Among lessons from rebuilding countries, like Iraq and Afghanistan, that are emerging is the limitations of external intervention to put in place the building blocks of democratic governance. In countries with long histories of authoritarian state-society relations, the dismantling of repressive institutions, while necessary to create the space for the eventual emergence of new, more democratic forms of governance, often increases, rather than decreases instability in the short term. USAID and other donors can play an important
role in buffering that space while providing support to reformers, but the re-establishment of the social pact that underpins stability is fundamentally a process that country actors must lead and manage. Our concern with the framework is that it implies that the rebuilding process is much more amenable to a generally applicable template than experience on the ground reveals. The compartmentalization issue mentioned above applies here as well. Identifying what works requires that State and USAID do a lot more learning through analysis and research, which seem to have been dramatically reduced under the State/USAID reorganization.

In addition to the structural changes needed for governing justly and democratically, we think it important to pay attention to the policymaking process in a democratic system. Inclusive processes that recognize the roles and responsibilities of the full range of societal actors—government, NGOs, the private sector, labor, and other civil society representatives—contribute significantly to achieving stability, effective service delivery, and legitimacy. Transparent policymaking and various accountability measures are the building blocks of effective democratic governance that makes democracy work not only during but between the elections as well.

As such, transparent and inclusive policymaking is a crosscutting component in the framework, which allows for the development of sustainable democratic governance institutions. Experience with numerous USAID projects confirms the importance of recognizing and capitalizing on the synergies that can emerge between sectoral interventions and D&G. Sector-specific projects often set up structures and mechanisms that promote participation, empower citizens (especially women), realign responsibilities, and introduce new interaction patterns. It is within these structures and mechanisms that people gain the experience with democratic governance. Examples include local health committees, parent-teacher associations, natural resource community co-management councils, policy dialogue forums, contracting-out with NGOs or private enterprises for service delivery, decentralization arrangements, and so on.

The ACVFA’s Governing Justly and Democratically Working Group wishes to thank all those who submitted feedback and thoughts. While all comments were appreciated and considered, they may not have been deemed appropriate for incorporation into the final recommendations of the working group.