Executive Summary

Over the past year, the ACES Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel has worked alongside the dedicated leadership and staff of USAID as they have undertaken increasingly ambitious – and inspiring – efforts to improve the way USAID operates and to save the lives of ever more mothers and children.

While maintaining a full plate of responsibilities focused on helping children and mothers thrive, the USAID team has shown an impressive willingness to engage in the Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES) process and embrace its animating principle that saving a greater number of lives depends on fundamental revision to practices. In doing so, USAID has demonstrated a commitment to achieving the near-term global health targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which come due on December 31, 2015, and the longer-term objective of bringing an end to preventable child and maternal deaths.

The ACES Project began in July 2013 and quickly adopted a two-pronged approach:

- Through the end of November 2013, with the generous support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the consulting firm Oliver Wyman assisted the Advisory Panel and USAID in its analysis of near term and long-term potential process improvements to maximize value for money in USAID programming. This resulted in a set of ten proposed changes and transformation pathways to USAID’s contracting processes.
- Beginning in January 2014, USAID began a process to ensure that its current Mission plans for ending preventable child and maternal deaths were as efficient and effective as possible. The ambitious country reprogramming approach, called a “Framework for Action in 24 Countries,” reflects the significant influence of ACES and according to USAID, is likely to result in spending shifts of 30 to 50 percent on existing awards.

Should the reprogramming take place as expected and other sharpening of USAID’s strategy stay on track, USAID has reported to the Panel that between now and the end of 2015, approximately 510,000 child, newborn, and maternal lives will be saved across the 24 countries.

Accomplishing this would position USAID in a clear leadership role, as other institutions in the public and private sectors race to complete a “Lives Saved Scorecard” by the time of the 2014 UN General Assembly. These efforts are part of an unprecedented “unbreakable syndicate” working to achieve the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and save the required 2.2 million children and 100,000 mothers to achieve that target.

As USAID and the other global health donors that comprise the syndicate strive to reach the health MDGs, the Advisory Panel – consistent with Oliver Wyman’s recommendations - hopes that all donors increasingly look to measure return on investment in all strategies, programs, and specific awards. Such return on investment (ROI) analysis should include metrics that measure health impact and efficiency and that are jointly developed with partners ahead of investment.

Further, while the Panel encourages USAID and other donors to enhance their investments toward MDG achievement and beyond, it is also expected that countries benefiting from USAID and partner support follow a path that results in funding self-sufficiency, perhaps aligned with the set of development goals under discussion for the 2015-2030 period.
Looking toward implementation of the reprogramming as well as USAID’s effort to support MDG achievement with other global health donors and ministries of health, the ACES Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel wants to ensure that USAID’s internal arrangements are optimal for achieving success. The Panel has drawn ideas from more streamlined operational structures that exist within USAID, and strongly recommends that USAID consider following the model of its own groundbreaking President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), by establishing a “Child and Maternal Survival” Coordinator tasked with overseeing USAID’s near- and longer-term goals for lives-saved impact, as well as working to gain greater contracting and operational efficiency, and with substantially greater budgetary and approval authority. USAID should carefully consider the Coordinator’s position within the organization and ensure that he or she has close access to the Administrator for support as well as tight linkages to the Global Health Bureau and Missions to align strategic focus and technical approach.

Such an outcomes driven, integrative, and focused organizational structure also draws on best practices from private sector product and program management, which typically emphasize collaborative development of programs, local execution, and global data capture on key performance indicators. In many cases, these practices are successful at substituting dedicated accountability for previously-diffuse responsibility.

Following the PMI model, the Advisory Panel recommends that USAID vest this Coordinator with tools that include - but are not limited to - management dashboards supported by improved data flows from country offices; a team of maternal and child health focal points placed within country missions to serve as liaisons between the Mission and counterparts in Washington; and flexible funding mechanisms to “jump-start” spending and prevent commodity shortages. As with PMI, the country government’s own scale-up plans should form the basis for USAID support.
The Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES): Memo of Recommendations to the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA)

I. Introduction

In July 2013, USAID embarked on the Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES), a comprehensive effort led by USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah to review USAID’s program designs, funding mechanisms, and cost structures and to outline opportunities for USAID to enhance spending effectiveness and efficiency. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation generously supported a team from Oliver Wyman, a leading management consulting firm, to work alongside USAID during this process to analyze current spending, benchmark against best practice, and provide a roadmap for implementation.

The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) asked the ACES Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel to review progress and make recommendations to USAID on the most critical next steps required as a result of the Oliver Wyman report.

II. Oliver Wyman-guided Management Reform Proposals

From July through November 2013, Oliver Wyman reviewed 60 vendor contracts and interviewed 25 implementing partners to identify spending trends and opportunities for enhanced efficiency. Based on its analysis, Oliver Wyman proposed ten process improvements intended to increase value for money in USAID’s award process. These recommendations focus on themes that include increased transparency to enhance and expedite decision making, improved alignment between strategy and operational practices, use of appropriate and timely metrics to monitor progress, and ensuring USAID staff have the training necessary to be successful.

The ten recommendations, in summary form, are as follows:

1. Define “what success looks like” during award design phase, including with respect to lives saved targets
2. Select most appropriate instrument (i.e., Acquisition or Assistance) and streamline timelines to enable effective award management
3. Increase financial transparency of administrative / programmatic costs
4. Begin to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes
5. Promote competition / create and compete awards that can be successfully managed by a wider variety of applicants
6. Assess and motivate partner performance using appropriate, measurable, and timely metrics that hold partners accountable for value for money results
7. Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio from planning through award management
8. Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate
9. Enable timely access to relevant, useful information
10. Streamline, standardize, and automate acquisition and assistance (A&A)

The Advisory Panel recommends that each of the process improvements outlined in the Oliver Wyman assessment be adopted in a timely and deliberate manner by USAID. The Panel has been encouraged to learn that USAID has begun to initiate or implement many of these reforms, but requests further detail on implementation progress, since this work emanates directly from the Panel’s originating purpose. An outline of what has occurred and what will occur, as well as the timeframe for implementing any management changes such as a movement to electronic reporting, is expected. USAID should also indicate which reforms (if any) might be included within the
responsibilities for a new potential child and maternal survival Coordinator (see IV, below), or might remain with the management bureau.

III. Challenges Highlighted By the Oliver Wyman Assessment and Direct Observation

While supporting the Oliver Wyman recommendations and commending USAID’s embrace of them, the Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel recognizes that there are underlying management challenges within USAID’s Global Health Bureau that appear to be limiting an effective and efficient awards process, successful implementation of contracts, and the link between strategy development and execution.

Oliver Wyman has highlighted some of these challenges in its “root cause analysis” around how awards are designed. The Oliver Wyman team notes that “staff have limited visibility into the active and historical award universe,” that there is a “limited connectivity between Global Health and M bureau to brainstorm shared services together, ensure awards are appropriately scoped, and sized,” and that “standardized mechanisms are not in place for D.C./field staff to interact around award design.” These challenges likely stem from USAID’s highly-decentralized current operating model and contribute to a fragmentation of data, decision making, and strategy development across USAID’s Global Health Bureau. Oliver Wyman commented on bureaus operating as siloes and recommended “transformation pathways,” to include cross-bureau project management offices to drive organizational and process change management and implementation. Oliver Wyman also encouraged an Awards center of excellence to serve as a resource and mechanism for value for money.

As a result of the fragmentation Oliver Wyman noted, the Global Health Bureau appears to be limited in its ability to aggregate program information across countries; restricted in its flexibility to program awards; and otherwise constrained in its ability to optimize value for money as well as impact.

IV. Proposed Coordinator Position for Child and Maternal Survival

As USAID examines these underlying management challenges, the Advisory Panel suggests that USAID consider and adopt operating approaches that exist elsewhere within its portfolio. An excellent example is the U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which vests responsibility with the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator. The Coordinator maintains a streamlined decision-making framework, all based on country plans (Malaria Operational Plans, or MOPs), which include transparent goals, targets, and indicators developed jointly with a country’s National Malaria Control Program (NMCP) and key partners.

As has been highlighted both by external evaluations and by USAID itself, PMI has made extraordinary contributions to reducing under-five mortality in all 15 original PMI focus countries and has demonstrated exceptional value for money. PMI has also been lauded for its essential role in improving coordination among global and multilateral partners and for remaining flexible and catalytic with resources. As two examples of this catalytic activity, PMI has made use of its ability to provide ‘jump-start’ funding ahead of funding allocations to quickly stand up programs and increase coverage. PMI has also made use of a Central Emergency Procurement Fund to address commodity shortages. According to an external evaluation of PMI conducted in 2011, PMI procured more than $8 million of malaria commodities in 2010, minimizing and preventing stock outs and likely saving many lives.¹

PMI has also been praised for its reprogramming flexibility, which has allowed countries to rapidly meet emergency needs or new priorities and has positioned PMI as an essential partner to countries as well as to other bilateral and multilateral funders such as the Global Fund.

The Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel recognizes that any changes to USAID’s management practices, particularly in a highly decentralized environment, pose challenges that will require considerable time and attention. The first step

would be to appoint a Coordinator dedicated to child and maternal health. The Panel thereafter recommends USAID take forward alterations on a sequenced basis, concentrating first on maternal and child health programs and functions in a handful of countries that hold the most promise of immediate lives-saved relative to the Millennium Development Goals. This approach would follow the path taken by PMI, which began with limited Round 1 programs in 2006 in three countries (Angola, Tanzania, and Uganda), expanded to seven countries in 2007, 15 countries in 2008, and 19 in 2011. Alternatively, an expedited process could be followed given existing experience.

The Panel believes that the undertaking would benefit from a close partnership with USAID’s vendors, who will provide meaningful guidance on how to responsibly roll-out such a change, and maximize its likelihood of success.

V. Critical responsibilities for the Child and Maternal Health Coordinator

If USAID chooses to move forward with establishing a Coordinator, the Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel encourages USAID to select someone with deep management experience in the public, private, or non-profit sectors as well as a thorough understanding of how USAID operates. This background will prove essential for undertaking the detailed planning required and also for leading change within USAID. While the Panel expects that USAID will rapidly develop a detailed list of responsibilities for the Coordinator, the Panel suggests that one critical capability of this Coordinator will be the authority to work closely with partners and vendors as awards are designed to define targets for impact against an agreed baseline. This suggestion builds on Oliver Wyman’s recommendation number six (noted above), but also takes as its basis a similar authority held by the Global Malaria Coordinator. Vendors and partners – with USAID oversight - would then have responsibility for tracking progress against targets at least on an annual basis. Such clear definitions and regular tracking have been instrumental in the fight against malaria under the PMI model and will help ensure that USAID’s reforms not only enhance efficiency but also impact.

The Coordinator should also have the ability to set standard and streamlined evaluation and reporting requirements structures to facilitate more rapid program implementation as well as impact assessment of these programs across awards.

USAID may also wish to charge the Coordinator with outlining next steps to harmonize efforts of global and implementing partners across the child and maternal health continuum to rapidly improve child and maternal health outcomes. To successfully manage these responsibilities, USAID should consider positioning the Coordinator within USAID in such a way to give him or her both direct access to the USAID Administrator as well as regular engagement with leadership, technical experts, and staff capacity of the Global Health Bureau and Missions.

VI. Additional work on Mission Reprogramming

The Advisory Panel has reviewed the available data and analyses emerging from the country reprogramming undertaken by USAID, which is titled, “Framework for Action in 24 Countries.” USAID completed ‘beta tests’ of efficiency and effectiveness in five countries (Bangladesh, DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal), aiming to understand how successfully USAID’s current health programs aligned with the goal of ending preventable child and maternal deaths. Building on this work, USAID has carried out similar reviews across all 24 priority countries that account for 70 percent of maternal and child deaths in the developing world. Reflecting the significant influence of the Oliver Wyman report, USAID personnel estimate that between 30 and 50 percent of the funds remaining on existing awards could be reallocated to improve outcomes.

While these results are quite encouraging, the spending shifts of existing rewards and how they will result in quantitative reprogramming remain unclear. The Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel recommends that USAID continue to sharpen its quantification of potential savings as well as its calculation of how reprogramming will translate into additional lives saved. USAID’s current lives saved analysis approach remains heavily dependent on modeling
existing approaches and intervention coverage levels against potential coverage levels drawn from idealized ‘best performer’ country contexts.

VII. Ongoing work of the ACES Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel

Administrator Shah has requested that the ACES Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel continue to support USAID leadership during the next phases of activity. The Panel will therefore remain intact to support USAID as it continues to put in place the Oliver Wyman recommendations and develop and execute the introduction of a coordinator role for child and maternal survival.

VIII. Conclusions

While the Advisory Panel remains strongly supportive of USAID’s efforts to take forward recommendations from Oliver Wyman’s vendor awards review as well as review of broader procurement and management practices, the Panel also has come to the conclusion that without substantial changes in USAID’s existing management and budgetary arrangements, the reforms and dual lives saved targets – for 2015 and 2018 – will not be achieved. The Panel strongly recommends that that the model utilized by PMI, with a coordinator empowered to make rapid decisions around budgets and programming, is key to for USAID to achieve its intended goals around child and maternal survival. This is consistent with the conclusions of the Oliver Wyman study based on deep insights from robust Acquisition and Assistance analysis, in-depth external stakeholder interviews across partners, donors, vendors and peer agencies, and benchmarking best practices beyond the development sector. These features could serve to support USAID to implement necessary changes.

The Panel would suggest that USAID develop a detailed implementation plan around any accepted recommendations. This plan should reference - but not be limited to - the following information:

- The intended sequencing of roll-out activities
- Internal USAID capacity – including capacity from both the Management Bureau and Global Health Bureau – and financial resources that will be dedicated to the efforts
- Likely risks and strategies for mitigating these risks
- Clear metrics that USAID will use to hold itself and partners accountable for any changes, especially around child and maternal lives saved targets
- How new management structures might be integrated with existing lines of authority and accountability
- Details on how key vendors as well as local NGOs will be engaged and mentored to ensure impact as well as sustainability

The Panel commends USAID for undertaking a bold self-assessment process and for its serious consideration of high-value reforms and new ways of operating.

Our observations of USAID have confirmed to the Panel that USAID staff around the world go to work each day thinking about the contributions they can make to save the life of a child or mother at risk. It has been tremendously inspiring to the Panel that these USAID staff also want to find ways to do this work better.
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Executive Summary
• Context & case for change
• Value for money framework
• Recommended actions
• Transformation pathway

Appendix
Executive summary (1 of 2)

Slide reference

• To recap, the Award Cost Efficiency Study aims to unlock value for money in USAID awards and redeploy it toward saving and improving lives.

• Today’s update comprises our recommended actions and illustrative examples for how USAID can achieve better value for money in awards.

• USAID will need to adopt value for money as a core philosophy:
  – Requires institution-wide changes in the A&A operating model (capabilities, organization, process, policy, and technology).
  – Requires USAID and its partners to be aligned on changes in the way of doing business and incentivized to achieve them.

• The prize is a very substantial recurring benefit (i.e., a return of 8-11% on the dollar) that can be plowed back into awards for greater programmatic impact and improved lives.

• Select experience of peer foreign aid and US health assistance agencies shows this is feasible.

• Value for money means:
  – Clear, measurable project objectives tied to outcomes.
  – Evaluating cost in relation to benefit.
  – Managing partner performance over the life of the award.
  – Managing awards as a portfolio to exploit synergies, partner insights, and benchmarking.
  – Institutionalizing capabilities with the right training and tools.
Executive summary (2 of 2)

• We propose USAID adopt the following 10 recommendations:

1. Define “what success looks like” during award design phase
2. Select most appropriate instrument (i.e., Acquisition or Assistance) and streamline timelines to enable effective award management
3. Increase financial transparency of administrative / programmatic costs
4. Begin to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes
5. Promote competition / create and compete awards that can be successfully managed by a wider variety of applicants
6. Assess and motivate partner performance using appropriate, measurable, and timely metrics that hold partners accountable for value for money results
7. Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio from planning through award management
8. Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate
9. Enable timely access to relevant, useful information
10. Streamline, standardize, and automate A&A processes to reduce variation and ensure it is only selectively, intentionally used

• This agenda will benefit from being managed as an Agency transformation effort
  − 5 design teams to develop new VFM A&A model
  − 4 cross-departmental operational teams to enable cultural shift, tools and training
  − Coordinated by a Transformation Management Office

• Important issues need to be addressed at the outset: (1) leadership alignment, (2) GH and M teaming, (3) USAID staff bandwidth, (4) joint collaboration with partners

• The transformation effort should be prioritized according to the ACES value for money framework, with proof of concept of core VFM principles up-front

• Workstreams can be staged for impact and criticality
The Award Cost Efficiency Study aims to increase value-for-money USAID achieves in order to redeploy dollars toward saving lives

**Ultimate objective:** Enable USAID to focus on value-for-money and ensure budget appropriations deliver maximum impact with minimum cost to save more lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Success Looks Like</th>
<th>What Success Entails</th>
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| • Identify and quantify savings that can be realized and redeployed  
  – Retrospective “deep dive” manual review of existing contracts and awards, backed by rigorous analysis  
  – Assessment of cost drivers within existing A&A process from an internal (USAID) and external (partner organization) perspective  
| • Determine the systemic changes required to install a more efficient process that will ensure USAID’s goals are more effectively realized  
  – Prospective “systemic improvement” to develop a more efficient award management process  
  – Assessment of value-for-money best practices internal and external to USAID that can be incorporated into the USAID award architecture  |
| • Provide identified list of actionable changes to assistance and acquisition that will result in reduced costs | • Provide identified list of actionable changes to policies and procedures that will enable identified reduced costs to be realized |
Previous update focused on drivers of value for money within awards, award-level savings, and preliminary A&A process changes to realize future savings.

### Drivers of value in awards

- Shared “ten value levers” that were applied to awards bottom-up (looking at individual cost elements and activities) in a systematic way

### Future cost avoidance and current savings

- Applied value levers to 50 awards in ACES’ Scope
- Identified potential future cost avoidance and current award savings

### Emerging propositions, hypotheses

- Outlined preliminary hypotheses around areas of cost inefficiency in A&A process and steps USAID can take to address them
Five ACES workstreams have converged to inform our institutional recommendations on improving value for money.

### Phase 2 Workstreams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Award Analysis</th>
<th>Portfolio-Level Award Analysis</th>
<th>Process Evaluation</th>
<th>Partner Outreach</th>
<th>Peer Development Agency Profiles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Applied 10 value levers to 60 Global Health awards</td>
<td>- Developed and tested 32 value for money hypotheses quantitatively using awards database</td>
<td>- Mapped current USAID A&amp;A process and policies</td>
<td>- Interviewed 37 individuals in 23 partner organizations to understand how A&amp;A process drives cost behavior</td>
<td>- Profiled DFID, GIZ, Sida, DANIDA, NORAD, and GFATM to identify best practices in managing value for money</td>
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<td>- Estimated current savings and potential future cost avoidance</td>
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<td>- Diagnosed 8 opportunity areas for improved cost efficiency</td>
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<td>- Gained insight from other USG agencies’ experience</td>
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<td>- Extrapolated to relevant universe of global health awards</td>
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<td>- Identified 8 opportunities to improve cost efficiency</td>
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### Final Recommendations

- How to achieve better **value-for-money** (i.e., unlock and redeploy its resources)
- **Specific actions** underpinning each recommendation with examples
- How to **operationalize recommendations**
**CASE FOR CHANGE**

Momentum is building around the need to achieve greater programmatic impact for money spent within global health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Competition</th>
<th>USAID Reality</th>
<th>Innovation / Enablement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USG budget deficit</strong> and <strong>sequestration</strong> are creating an environment of funding scarcity in the USG</td>
<td>Given the volume of money it controls, <strong>USAID can have significant impact by unlocking funds</strong> to be redeployed for programmatic purposes</td>
<td>New methods of data collection (e.g., mobile technology) are <strong>enabling access to higher quality, more “real time” data</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Competitive pressure</strong> is increasing as <strong>donors</strong> increasingly demonstrate value for money</td>
<td>Given its monopsony status, <strong>USAID can drive change within the partner community</strong></td>
<td>Field of “innovative financing” is growing, with <strong>new performance incentive systems</strong> being piloted by donors and organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global health organization base is expanding</strong>, increasing USAID choice of partners and driving <strong>need for more rigorous evaluation criteria</strong></td>
<td>Given its large size, USAID can <strong>drive change within broader global health community</strong></td>
<td>Donors and organizations becoming <strong>increasingly experienced in articulating expected impact and outcomes of global health projects</strong>, and managing to those outcomes / impact</td>
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<td><strong>USAID partners</strong> have expressed that <strong>streamlined, alternative A&amp;A processes</strong> can drive greater value for money</td>
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USAID will rapidly need to adopt value for money as a core philosophy

Existing reforms and project initiatives are steps in the right direction

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<tr>
<th>Agency Reform Efforts</th>
<th>Targeted Initiatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recent USAID reforms have focused on improving aid effectiveness and results measurement:</td>
<td>There are focused initiatives underway to:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 2006: Implemented the “standardized program structure,” tying indicators to funding</td>
<td>• Employ innovative award designs under FOGs</td>
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<td>• June 2010: Created the Bureau for Policy Planning and Learning to centralize evaluation processes</td>
<td>• Further standardize parts of the A&amp;A process</td>
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<tr>
<td>• November 2010: Reformed the procurement system to use more local suppliers and build local capacity under Forward</td>
<td>• Move to an all-electronic award filing system, eliminating hard copy files for future awards (ASIST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reforms and innovations have improved effectiveness and efficiency in parts of the A&amp;A process</td>
<td>• Concentrate commodity purchasing to enable economies of scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• However, USAID is still not consistently aligned around or functioning to achieve maximum value-for-money</td>
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Re-orienting around value for money has the potential to unlock substantial future savings for redeployment within USAID awards, whether acquisition or assistance based.
CASE FOR CHANGE
Re-orienting around value for money requires institution-wide changes in the A&A operating model…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities &amp; Configuration</th>
<th>Process</th>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>Skills</strong> – Do staff have appropriate skills to accomplish what is expected of them?</td>
<td>• <strong>Workflow</strong> – Is the A&amp;A process clearly defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Training</strong> – Is adequate training provided to enable personnel to perform their jobs most effectively?</td>
<td>• <strong>Standardization</strong> – Does variation exist and add value within the A&amp;A process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Organizational Structure</strong> – Are appropriate staff doing the right activity at the right time and with the right people?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Technology Enablement</th>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>Policies</strong> – Are policies supportive of achieving greater value for money in procurement?</td>
<td>• <strong>Information</strong> – Is the right information being captured at the right level of granularity with the right quality?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Enforcement</strong> – Are correct policy interpretations enforced uniformly?</td>
<td>• <strong>Tools</strong> – Are the right templates / forms available to capture useful, necessary data?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>USG Policy Alignment</strong> – Are policies in line with broader USG best practices?</td>
<td>• <strong>Systems</strong> – Are the right systems in place and connected to enable efficient and effective award management?</td>
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…and alignment between USAID and its partners on the required business changes and incentives to drive the right behavior

**USAID and its partners will need to engage and adapt to achieve value for money**

- Align internally around value for money principles as the basis for engaging partners
- Establish policies and processes to drive behavior toward value for money in USAID and partners
- Engage partners to obtain feedback and create alignment (e.g., design)
- Clearly communicate and consistently enforce new policies

- Adapt behavior in response to USAID incentives
  - Partners expressed willingness to change, but rightly seek consistency in how policy is applied
  - Greater competition, with incentives linked to performance and delivery, will drive greater compliance and desired behavior
- A quarterly two-way feedback loop will establish a virtuous circle to drive cost effective program outcomes

Engage with USAID to provide feedback and expertise
CASE FOR CHANGE

Peer institutions show that value for money can be institutionalized, with significant impact

Foreign aid peer agency – select experience

- Defined value for money standards
- Instituted annual project assessments around value for money
- Halted funding to organizations not achieving value for money

National Audit Office found UK aid achieved better value for money after DFID reforms

- Completed organizational redesign (merged three German aid agencies) to enable re-orientation around “cost-effectiveness”
- Established internal “Quality Haus” to drive continuous improvement

OECD review rated new GIZ to be highly efficient and effective vs. previous structure

- Performed end-to-end process assessment to identify opportunities to improve value for money (working with CGD)
- Instituted new process for accurately tracking award performance
- Transformed funding process to ensure based on performance
- Re-engineered procurement processes to achieve significant price reductions on commodities and vehicles

New fundraising effort expected to raise 50% more than previous (in 2010)

- Launched “Health Results Innovation Trust Fund” to pilot innovative results-based financing instruments
- Overhauled training and organizational competency model to supported shift from inputs-based to outcome-based cost evaluation

Success led World Bank to commit additional $700M to HRITF in September
CASE FOR CHANGE

Likewise, US grant-making organizations have demonstrated that a streamlined, standardized assistance environment can be implemented successfully.

US organization value-for-money success *(select examples)*

- Established Scientific Management Review Board to conduct periodic reviews of organizational effectiveness
- Launched new database to improve standardization and transparency in grant searching and benchmarking
- Implemented electronic grant announcement system for researchers to learn about and apply to grants through a standardized, two phase, application process
- Launched new database to track grant performance; database made available internally to provide insight on past-performance and externally to contribute to the other research efforts

All grants now catalogued and easily searched along multiple success measures

Grant application process standardized and research performance information leveraged in multiple ways
Clear, measurable outcomes-based objectives, grounded in cost economics, are necessary to achieve greater value for money.

VFM FRAMEWORK & RECOMMENDATIONS

1 - The Core: Value for Money Table Stakes*
- *Project Scope and Objectives:* Clearly define project outcomes to measure award success
- *Cost Evaluation:* Evaluate costs in relation to programmatic outcomes

2 - Reinforcement: Continuous Improvement
- *Progress Tracking:* Establish programmatically relevant metrics to enable timely progress tracking
- *Performance Management:* Reward positive and discourage negative performance
- *Benchmarking:* Collect data to serve as benchmarks to drive continuous improvement

Ensure benchmarks are updated annually based on best in class information.

3 - Amplification: Managing the Portfolio
- *Portfolio Management:* View awards as a portfolio to facilitate synergies, partner insights, and benchmarking

4 - Enablement: Training and Tools for Implementation
- Institutionalize value for money with the right capabilities, processes, and technology

* “Know what you’re buying, and know how much it will cost.”
We recommend USAID adopt 10 improvements in its management of value for money in acquisition & assistance

1. Define “what success looks like” during award design phase
2. Select most appropriate instrument (i.e., Acquisition or Assistance) and streamline timelines to enable effective award management
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6. Assess and motivate partner performance using appropriate, measurable, and timely metrics that hold partners accountable for value for money results
7. Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio from planning through award management
8. Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate
9. Enable timely access to relevant, useful information
10. Streamline, standardize, and automate A&A processes to reduce variation and ensure it is only selectively, intentionally used
**The Core: Value for Money Table Stakes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level Recommendation</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1** Define “what success looks like” during award design phase | • Clearly describe vision for successful award outcome in RFA / RFP*  
  – Build on existing USAID framework for defining high-level health impact and supporting objectives  
  – Connect broad objectives with specific results and, where possible, activities, to enable comparison of applications/proposals  
  – USAID sets expectations but, where appropriate, partners propose activities  
  • Set quantified targets in RFA / RFP  
  – Where impractical, set sample targets for purposes of comparing applicants / respondents  
  • Ensure targets are risk-adjusted and allow for course corrections |
| **2** Select most appropriate instrument (i.e., Acquisition or Assistance) to enable effective award management | • Update and clarify instrument selection guidance, as current federal definition does not provide clear guidance in USAID context  
  • Create new selection criteria that are germane to effective award management  
  • “Level the playing field” by addressing the time disparity in making to Acquisition vs. Assistance awards  
  • Develop Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to increase collaboration between program / contracting staff in award design |

* See examples in Appendix 3
## Achieving value for money also requires an ability to select from large pool of applicants based on evaluation of proposed costs in relation to outcomes

### The Core: Value for Money Table Stakes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level Recommendation</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **3** Increase financial transparency of administrative / programmatic costs | • Clearly define indirect, administrative, and programmatic costs and require partners to use new definitions  
• Enable USAID contracting staff to assess overlap between indirect and administrative costs  
• Audit partners according to new cost definitions  
• Track administrative to programmatic cost ratios to compare applicants and assess and incentivize improvement over time |
| **4** Begin to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes | • Encourage variability in proposed costs by publishing TEC selectively  
• Collect and compare proposed budgets for all applicants / offerors  
• Applicants propose activities, resources, and associated costs to achieve award results and objectives  
  – In smaller awards, propose total award cost  
  – In uncertain or large awards, propose activity-level costs  
• USAID evaluates technical proposals and budgets in relation to activities / outcomes defined in RFA / RFP  
  – In uncertain or large awards, evaluate partners against smaller scenario  
• Rely on value for money audits to ensure adherence to proposed budgets in relation to activities / outcomes  
• Eventually, pay for outcomes |
| **5** Promote competition / create and compete awards that can be successfully managed by a wider variety of applicants | • Continue to promote full and open competition for awards when appropriate  
• Determine drivers of applicant pool size (e.g. award size, award scope, instrument type, subcontractor usage)  
• Develop and pilot practices to address each driver (e.g. smaller, focused awards) |
VFM FRAMEWORK & RECOMMENDATIONS

Ongoing partner management can reinforce value for money behavior over the life of an award; managing awards as a portfolio can maximize value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reinforcement: Continuous Improvement</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High-level Recommendation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommended Actions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Assess and incent consistent partner performance using appropriate, and timely metrics; holding partners accountable for value for money results; track quarterly, update annually | • Conduct value for money evaluations throughout life of award  
• Create a “partner report card” to track partner performance across awards  
• Tie evaluation to rewards / consequences  
  – Build legal terms into award document\(^1\) to enable scope reduction or award close-out when partner performance is below expectations  
  – Incorporate incentives at various levels, including award, USAID-review, and public level |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amplification: Managing the Portfolio</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High-level Recommendation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommended Actions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio from planning through award management | • Capture and store award attributes in a central system  
• Ensure award information is easily accessible and searchable  
• Develop dashboards to provide regular reports on USAID funding  
• Formulate checklists for portfolio management during award design and management  
• Begin with GH and expand to other bureaus over time |

Notes: 1.) Legally binding contractual agreement
To institute a value for money culture, USAID staff must be enabled with the right training, information, and process support.

### Enablement: Training and tools for implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level Recommendation</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate | • Enable personnel with proper training and supportive policy, build new capabilities where needed  
• Incentivize achievement of organizational goals  
  – Communicate desired end state and metrics that will be used to measure progress  
  – Hold personnel accountable for their responsibilities  
• Institutionalize collaboration between GH and M/OAA, co-locate staff |
| Enable timely access to relevant, useful information | • Gather specific and standard information from every award  
• Enable data capture (e.g., Partner online application portal via e-forms, standardized RFA / RFP, budget, work plan templates)  
• Develop IT system that can be easily accessed, maintains data quality through use of electronic documentation, etc.  
• Create dashboards to provide relevant, timely, insightful information |
| Streamline, standardize, and automate A&A processes to reduce variation and ensure it is only selectively, intentionally used | • Minimize variation and remove non-value added activities to streamline A&A processes  
• Clearly define processes to design, solicit / compete, and manage awards  
• Where possible, utilize tools and technology to automate A&A processes  
• Enable easier training of new staff / handoff of awards when staff rotate between DC / field  
• Identify areas of variation in award process and determine need for standardization |
We’ve identified 5 key VFM implementation workstreams, supported by 4 cross-institutional functional teams and a Transformation Management Office

### Transformation workstreams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstream</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Value for Money A&amp;A Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Scope</td>
<td>Develop new, SMART project scoping – e.g., define impact, objectives, results, activities, timelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Evaluation / Assessment</td>
<td>Develop new process for proposal cost evaluation, including NICRA adjustments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Tracking</td>
<td>Develop award progress tracking system, partner reporting requirements, value for money assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Incentives</td>
<td>New performance incentive systems to reward / give consequences to partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost / Outcomes Benchmarking</td>
<td>Database of costs associated with activities and outcomes to improve value-for-money in proposal evaluation / competition and award management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross Cutting Operational Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Streamlining</td>
<td>Assess, streamline, and standardize process in support of VFM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Implement new joint VFM training curriculum and competency model for program and management personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure &amp; Competency Model</td>
<td>Assess staffing needs, determine appropriate configuration, adjust performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Management</td>
<td>Assess knowledge management needs and build supporting IM system(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transformation Management Office**  
*Measures, monitors, and reports performance of transformation*
USAID will need a strong Transformation Management Office (TMO) capability to coordinate and drive the necessary changes.

Operationalizing ACES via the TMO requires fusing institutional goals, GH Bureau and ACES capabilities:

**Steering Committee**
Oversees transformation efforts; includes senior leadership

**Transformation Management Office**

**Workstream Support Teams**
Responsibility for strategic project analysis, planning and implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Measure progress via KPIs and metrics by gathering timely and accurate information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assess impacts of critical dependencies between workstreams; tie impact to planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communicate consistent messages to relevant stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Track achievement against objectives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design &amp; Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Align implementation activities with strategic vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proactively manage risks and institute mitigation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor capacity of organizational capabilities and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sequence initiatives to optimize impact and mitigate issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure required technology is in place to support implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Create standardized templates and tools for workstreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure organizational readiness before implementation activities commence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lead development of consistent training programs and actively support cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct quality control by monitoring adherence to required processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Management and Global Health Bureaus will jointly need to drive the value for money transformation for global health awards

### Workstreams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Value for Money A&amp;A Model</th>
<th>Responsible Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Scope</td>
<td>Acquisition &amp; Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Evaluation / Assessment</td>
<td>Policy, Programs, and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy involvement from OCS, HIDN, OHS, OHA, and PRH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Tracking</td>
<td>Acquisition &amp; Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Incentives</td>
<td>Management, Policy, Budget &amp; Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost / Outcomes Benchmarking</td>
<td>Policy, Programs, and Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross Cutting Operational Support</th>
<th>Responsible Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process Streamlining</td>
<td>Acquisition &amp; Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy, Programs, and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Professional Development and Management Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure &amp; Competency Model</td>
<td>Office of the Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Management</td>
<td>Professional Development and Management Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key Questions

#### Staffing:
- How many staff exist at each level in GH and M?
- What is current staff utilization?
- Which workstream will require the heaviest / lightest lift?
- What level of effort will team members dedicate to the transformation?

#### Empowerment:
- How senior must the team be?
- How will the team turn recommendations into official policy and process?
- How will the team be enabled to enforce new value for money practices?
### Transformations Pathway

The core VFM transformation workstreams would need to focus initially on generating designs or blueprints across the recommended areas for change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Pilot / Test</th>
<th>Rollout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Identify gaps between current and future state</td>
<td>• Assess whether design can successfully bridge gap between current and desired future state</td>
<td>• Institutionalize practice across the organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine how to address via staged approach</td>
<td>• Build organizational support/buy-in</td>
<td>• Sustain change to ensure practice becomes engrained culturally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify quick wins to “clear the brush” and serve as springboards</td>
<td>• Incorporate feedback / improve to enable successful scale-up</td>
<td>• Determine if “success” metrics are maintained in expanded rollout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Selective piloting</td>
<td></td>
<td>– If not, identify causal factors and potential fixes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Key information | | | |
| • Leverage info / experience from USAID, peers, and partners | • Track “success” metrics to quantify impact of pilot | • Ensure new processes are streamlined for USAID / partners |
| • Recognize “success” metrics and how to track them | • Apply small-scale best practices already occurring within USAID | • Minimize programmatic disruptions |

| Stakeholders | | | |
| • Determine internal workflow disruption | • Receive feedback from impacted parties to identify remaining gaps between current and future state | • Bridge the gaps between current and future state to organizationally achieve value for money |
| • Consider external partner impact and response | • Understand scalability of concept through evidence-based piloting | • Create success blueprint that can be expanded to other initiatives |

| Outcome | | | |
| • Create design principles that serve as guideposts during transformation | • Identify remaining fixes that will enable expanded rollout | |
| • Designate initial area for pilot implementation | • Ensure new processes are streamlined for USAID / partners |
| • Determine whether to buy / build | • Minimize programmatic disruptions |

---

Focus of next six months:

- Piloting could begin almost in parallel, with Agency rollout and enabling infrastructure over 2-3 years.
As a next step, USAID needs to define the desired end state for each of the core VFM workstreams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design phase (next six months): Sample activities under “Project Scope” workstream</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What elements define success for an award?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What are the 5 key elements of an “award scope”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Which elements should USAID define? Which should partners define?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Within USAID, what existing frameworks inform each element?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What elements determine scope of an award?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What elements should be considered when initially scoping an award?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What logical dimensions can be used to break up awards?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– How does award scope vary by award type?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What elements develop targets for an award?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What sources inform activity-level indicators?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What sources inform quantified targets?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– How do you “risk-adjust” targets to account for potential scope change needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What new process enables this new model?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– How much time is required to develop a manageable, activity-oriented scope?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– What is the process to ensure awards are appropriately scoped?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION PATHWAY

Four key issues need to be addressed near-term to pave the way for future success

**Leadership Alignment**
- What are USAID goals around value for money?
- Is USAID willing and able to make the investment to implement a full scale transformation effort?

**GH and M Teaming**
- Will leadership hold GH and M jointly accountable to implement change?
- Can GH and M core staff (i.e., COs / AOs and CORs / AORs) work together successfully as integrated project teams?

**USAID Staff Bandwidth**
- Is USAID willing to invest staff time to support the transformation effort?

**Partner Engagement**
- Is USAID prepared to ask partners to adapt to new procurement models?
- Is USAID committed to collaboration, testing potential changes with partners and incorporating their feedback?
Prioritization of recommendations
Following the Value for Money framework developed in ACES, “core” recommendations #1-5 should be prioritized

Mapping of opportunities

ACES recommendations clusters

1. Define “what success looks like” during award design phase
   1.1 Clearly describe vision for successful award outcome in RFA/RFP
   1.2 Set quantified targets in RFA/RFP
   1.3 Ensure targets are risk-adjusted

2. Select most appropriate instrument
   2.1 Update and clarify instrument selection guidance
   2.2 Create new selection criteria germane to effective award management
   2.3 "Level the playing field" between Acquisition and Assistance
   2.4 Develop Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to increase collaboration

3. Increase financial transparency of administrative/programmatic costs
   3.1 Clearly define indirect/administrative/programmatic costs and require partners to use new definitions
   3.2 Enable USAID A&A staff to assess overlap between indirect/administrative costs
   3.3 Audit partners according to new cost definitions
   3.4 Track admin-to-program cost ratios to compare applicants and assess/incentivize improvement

4. Begin to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes
   4.1 Encourage variability in proposed costs by publishing TEC selectively
   4.2 Collect and compare proposed budgets for all applicants/offers
   4.3 Applicants to propose activities, resources, and associated costs to achieve award results and objectives
   4.4 USAID to evaluate technical proposals and budgets in relation to activities/outcomes defined in RFA/RFP
   4.5 Rely on value for money audits to ensure adherence to proposed budgets in relation to activities/outcomes
   4.6 Pay for outcomes

5. Promote competition
   5.1 Continue to promote full and open competition for awards where appropriate
   5.2 Determine drivers of applicant pool size
   5.3 Develop and pilot practices to address each driver

6. Assess and incentivize consistent partner performance
   6.1 Conduct value for money evaluations through life of award
   6.2 Create “partner report card”
   6.3 Tie evaluation to rewards/consequences

7. Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio
   7.1 Capture and store award attributes in central system
   7.2 Ensure award information is easily accessible and searchable
   7.3 Develop dashboards to provide regular reports on USAID funding
   7.4 Formulate checklists for portfolio management during award design and management beginning with GH
   7.5 Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money
   7.6 Enable personnel with proper training and support policies; build new capabilities where needed
   7.7 Institutionalize collaboration between GH and MOAA; co-locate staff
   7.8 Enable timely access to relevant, useful information
   7.9 Gather specific, standard information from every award
   7.10 Implement automated IM support

8. Streamline, standardize, and automate A&A processes
   8.1 Minimize variation and remove non-value added activities
   8.2 Define standard operating procedure in design, solicit/compete, and manage awards
   8.3 Where possible, automate A&A processes
   8.4 Enable easier training of new staff/ handoff of awards
   8.5 Identify areas of variation in award process and confirm opportunities for standardization
USAID should stage the resulting workstreams taking into account critical dependencies within clusters (e.g., design before rollout), long lead-time items (e.g., systems, personnel training), and the need to compartmentalize change (e.g., do the process re-engineering work together).

Commentary

- Begin by addressing the “core” of value for money
  - Project scope
  - Cost evaluation / assessment
- As project scopes become more defined and costs are reported in relation to outcomes, begin tracking to enable future benchmarking
- Begin enablement workstreams (e.g., process streamlining, etc.) once initial design decisions have been taken regarding value for money “core” recommendations

Potential sequencing of transformation workstreams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Scope</td>
<td>Performance Tracking</td>
<td>Cost / Outcomes Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Evaluation / Assessment</td>
<td>Performance Incentives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process Streamlining</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Structure &amp; Competency Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Value for Money A&A Model
Cross Cutting Operational Support
Appendix

Recommendations detail – illustrative examples
Recommendation 1: Define “what success looks like”
Develop SMART targets at the outset that link to Agency performance framework (applies to acquisition and assistance)

Recommended Actions

- Clearly describe vision for successful award outcome in RFA / RFP
  - Sets expectations for applicants / respondents (initially partners can help propose metrics, eventually in RFA / RFP)
  - USAID will not define everything to activity level; partners can propose activities
  - Build off existing USAID frameworks

- Connect broad objectives with specific, activity-level expectations
  - Enables comparison of applications/proposals

- Set quantified targets in RFA / RFP
  - Where not possible, could set example targets for purposes of comparing applicants / respondents

- Ensure targets are risk-adjusted and allow for course-correction should issues arise in implementation

- Institutionalize best practices
  - E.g. Utilize procurement COE

Desired end state (Assistance example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RFA</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID Generally Applies Today</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health outcomes</td>
<td>Existing strategic frameworks (e.g. USAID priorities, CDCS)</td>
<td>• Improve health of Malawians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award objectives</td>
<td>Existing reporting needs (e.g., Standardized Performance Indicators, Intermediate Results)</td>
<td>• % of children receiving Vitamin A from USG-supported programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected award results</td>
<td>Award-specific vision for “what success looks like”</td>
<td>• 40% (by year 3) and 90% (by year 5) of population within 3 km of primary care health facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award activity targets</td>
<td>Activities / deliverables required to achieve success within award</td>
<td>• 5 (by year 2) and 10 (by year 4) health facilities built; 5,000 procedures performed annually to address unmet needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RFA requests that all applicants respond to specific award outcomes and targets to better compare technical proposals and budget narratives
Recommendation 2: Select most appropriate instrument
Simplify and standardize instrument selection rules adapted to USAID environment to enable most efficient, effective award management

Recommended Actions

- **Update and clarify instrument selection guidance**
  - Current use Acquisition predicated on delivering “direct benefit or use of the Federal government”\(^1\)
  - However, as USAID focuses on activities which benefit other entities which then benefit USG, there is no clear divide between Acquisition / Assistance

- **Create new selection criteria** that are germane to effective award management
  - E.g., clarity of objectives at project outset, cost input control, applicant pool type
  - Use above criteria to automate instrument selection

- **“Level the playing field”** by equalizing time to make Acquisition and Assistance
  - PALT for competitive contract is 268 days, 150 days for competitive cooperative agreement or grant
  - Reduce delays associated with additional acquisition steps (e.g., CRB, etc.)
  - Program / technical and contracting staff should work as Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to select appropriate instrument type in award design phase

---

1. Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of Objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>Outcomes are clearly defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Over Cost Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Cost line item control (e.g. salary cap) necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired Applicant Pool</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Fee required to entice private companies with desired capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of innovation</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Approach to achieve objectives is known during design</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977
Recommendation 3: Improve admin vs. programmatic cost transparency
Clarify and standardize admin and programmatic cost definitions, and evaluate and manage applicant / partner cost ratios to improve cost efficiency

Recommended Actions

- **Clearly define** indirect, administrative, and programmatic costs and require partners to use new definitions

- **Enable USAID contracting staff to assess overlap between indirect and administrative costs**
  - Develop / provide summary of costs covered by NICRA which should not appear as administrative
  - Help partners determine how to split programmatic costs shared across awards

- **Audit partners according to new cost definitions**
  - A-133 audits assess costs within new framework of cost definitions

- **Track administrative to programmatic cost ratios** to compare applicants and assess and incentivize improvement over time
  - Within awards
  - Across the award portfolio

### Example Future Cost Definitions

#### Example Applicant Budget

Cost Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Calculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect / Overhead</strong></td>
<td>NICRA covers indirect / overhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative</strong></td>
<td>Adjust provisional rates to align with costs under new cost definitions as determined in annual audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programmatic</strong></td>
<td>Introduce new cost category in budget templates and require partners to distinguish between these and programmatic costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

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Recommendation 4: Evaluate costs in relation to outcomes (1/2)
First, collect information required to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes (both Acquisition and Assistance)

Recommended Actions

- Recommendation 1 is a pre-requisite
- Requires high level of coordination
  - Attribution must be handled through cooperation with partners
- For uncertain or large awards:
  - Provide results / activities for smaller scenario (e.g. 1 country / region) for which partners propose total costs
  - Require partners propose costs for full range of award activities (used to evaluate award performance)
- Encourage variability in proposed costs by publishing TEC selectively
- Collect and compare proposed budgets for all applicants / offerors
  - If many, only review technically viable applicants / offerors
- Rely on value for money audits to ensure adherence to proposed budgets in relation to activities / outcomes
- Pay for outcomes
  - Long-term goal is to shift away from resource level costs

Evaluating cost in relation to outcomes – initial stage

For Tightly-Scoped Awards
Partners propose costs up to award level

For Large Awards
Partners propose activity-level costs

USAID proposes activities, and partners propose the resources and costs associated with them

Results can be rolled up to objectives, and ultimately to award
Activities and associated costs can be rolled up to results
Partner proposes representative activities and associated costs
Number of activities does not need to be determined
**Recommendation 4: Evaluate costs in relation to outcomes (2/2)**

Then, assess overall value by comparing technical score with proposed costs

**Desired end state**

## Cost Evaluation: Illustrative process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Applicant A</th>
<th>Applicant B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review technical proposal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assess for technical merit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure technical approach realistic for outcomes</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assign technical score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review proposed budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• After technical review, <strong>analyze multiple proposed budgets</strong> in relation to award-specific outcomes</td>
<td>$85M</td>
<td>$60M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure budgeted costs realistic for outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assess value</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compare “value scores” (i.e. ratio of technical score to proposed costs)</td>
<td>1.06 per $1M</td>
<td>1.33 per $1M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Evaluate scores and assess whether technical weighting should increase*
Recommendation 5: Promote competition
Put new policies in place to promote greater competition – a key factor in gaining value for money

**Recommended Actions**

- **Continue to promote full and open competition** for awards when possible, per ADS 300 guidance
- **Align on factors** that drive number of applicants / respondents
- **Develop new practices / policies** to address each driver
- **Pilot / pressure test new potential practices / policies** and measure impact on competition
  - Implement those that are successful

**Potential New Competition Policies / Guidance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Size</th>
<th>Award Scope</th>
<th>Instrument Type</th>
<th>Sub-Contractor Usage</th>
<th>Applicant USAID Experience</th>
<th>Small &amp; Disvntgd. Bus. Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Reduce award size whenever possible</td>
<td>• Design awards not tailored to specific applicant strengths</td>
<td>• Select appropriate instrument to allow potential competitors to apply (e.g., if many viable applicants are private companies, select acquisition so they can earn a fee)</td>
<td>• Require applicants to provide clear explanation of sub roles; must not overlap with prime</td>
<td>• Provide support to all applicants / respondents</td>
<td>• Create additional policy that indicates awards can meet the SDB requirement by using local labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For far-reaching awards (e.g., DC-based CLWAs), compete smaller awards and require winners to work as consortium</td>
<td>• Create review step (e.g., board, team, etc.) to examine awards that are being re-competed to ensure RFA / RFP does not unfairly advantage incumbent</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Do not allow primes to apply for or conduct work in areas covered by subs for at least 2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review both acquisition &amp; assistance &gt;$25M for competition</td>
<td>• Select appropriate instrument to allow potential competitors to apply (e.g., if many viable applicants are private companies, select acquisition so they can earn a fee)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limit number of “top 20” partner subs on a project to 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Track competition** (e.g. number of applicants / respondents) to understand best practices in RFA / RFP structure, and to follow progress of competition promotion.
Recommendation 6: Assess and incent partner performance (1 of 2)

Regularly assess partner performance and value for money within USAID awards and across the relevant award portfolio (e.g., Global Health)

**Recommended Actions**

- **Establish value for money evaluation** criteria and inform partners
- **Conduct value for money evaluations throughout the award life**
  - Incorporate into annual reviews and award close-out
  - Risk adjust for situations outside partner control
- **Create a “partner report card”** incorporating performance and value for money information for a partner across their awards
- **Track partner performance** over time across awards
  - Identify award types, geographic regions, or program elements in which partner performs both well and poorly
  - Use information in selecting partners for future awards
- **Track commodity costs** to benchmark against other awards

**Example Partner Value for Money Assessments**

1. **Assess value for money at the award level**

2. **Create value for money report card at USAID level**

**Award 1**

**Proposed Budget**

**Annual Budget**

**Annual Work Plan**

**VFM Score**

**Award 2**

**Proposed Budget**

**Annual Budget**

**Annual Work Plan**

**VFM Score**

**NGO #1**

1. **Active / Past Projects**
   - Prime for Indonesian family planning award; sub for capacity building project

2. **Annual USAID Funds**
   - Other USAID
   - Global Health

3. **Strengths and Weakness**
   - Partner has had difficulty starting awards on time; frequently uses local labor to much success

4. **Outcome cost benchmarks**
   - Activity 1: $400K, 13% - On target
   - Activity 2: $650K, 17% - On target
   - Activity 3: $2.1M, 8% - Behind schedule

5. **Government Audits**
   - See Appendix E

**Frequency**

- Every 3-6 Months

**Owner**

- Global Health

**Annually**

- OAA
Recommendation 6: Assess and incent partner performance (2 of 2)
Provide rewards and consequences reflecting partner performance

**Recommended Actions**

- **Tie evaluation to rewards / consequences** to motivate partner performance
  - Vary rewards / consequences based on instrument type (acquisition vs. assistance)
- **Build legal terms into award document**\(^1\) to enable scope reduction or award close-out when partner performance is below expectations
- **Incorporate incentives on a variety of levels**, including award level, USAID-review level, and potentially beyond USAID via published reports

**Example Performance Incentives**

**Awards**

- Incorporate performance-based funding where possible
  - Incentive-based fee for acquisition
  - Fixed + variable tranches, payment-by-results or other structures in assistance
- Adjust level of AOR involvement in overseeing award per evaluation findings
- Decrease scope or, in extreme cases, close-out award if value for money not achieved

**USAID**

- Incorporate report card grades into future solicitation evaluations in a standardized fashion to incentivize continuous improvement in VFM

**Global**

- Publish partner VFM reports to increase transparency and reward top performers

---

*Notes: Legally binding contractual agreement*
Recommendation 7: Manage universe of awards as a portfolio
Aggregator and leverage information across all active awards to create award synergies, partner insights, and performance benchmarks

**Recommended Actions**

- Capture and store **award attributes in a central system**, including:
  - Attributes tracked in GLAAS (e.g. instrument, awarding office, funding sources)
  - Award objectives, metrics, performance, summary of key learnings, PAD contents, etc.
- Ensure award information is easily **accessible and searchable**
  - Database should permit cross-cutting award views (e.g. total OHA spending in Kenya)
- Develop **dashboards to provide regular reports on USAID funding**
  - Simplifies and automates portfolio review both internally and for Congressional updates
- Formulate checklist for portfolio management during award design and management
  - Reduce unnecessary duplications
  - Identify opportunities for shared services
  - Increase knowledge of partner activity to inform performance management
  - Leverage best prices for programmatic activity
- Begin with GH and expand to other bureaus over time

**Example future portfolio management checklist**

1. **Robust knowledge of current state**
   - Are similar awards being performed in the same location?
2. **Synergies**
   - Are similar services / resources being used for awards in the same locations?
3. **Partner insight**
   - Is Partner X a prime or sub for another award in the same location?
4. **Ability to benchmark**
   - Have awards with similar objectives / elements / etc. been performed?
   - Have we compared the costs for specific activities in similar awards?
Recommendation 8: Enable organizational performance (1/2)
Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide proper career incentives

Recommended Actions

- **Enable personnel** to meet organizational goals with proper training and supportive policy
  - Build new capabilities (e.g., hire new types of personnel) if needed
- **Hold personnel accountable** for their responsibilities
  - **Communicate the desired end state** and metrics that will be used to measure progress, on an Agency level, and performance, on a personnel level
- **Incentivize achievement** of organizational goals
- **Institutionalize collaboration** between GH and M/OAA
- **Leadership** needs to communicate the importance of value for money in the context of development

Example: Joint Training & Performance Management Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO / AO</th>
<th>COR / AOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td><strong>Staff Configuration</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Value for money curriculum:  
  - Cost evaluation in relation to outcomes  
  - High-level programmatic training (e.g. typical activities needed to achieve common objectives) | • Work together as integrated project teams (IPTs) to design, compete / solicit, and manage awards, co-locate staff in same office |
| **Performance Accountability** | **Performance Incentives** |
| • Responsible for conducting value for money assessments in solicitation / competition (not just checking for cost realism) | • Provide public recognition for utilizing best practice (e.g., best practice RFAs are highlighted in monthly M/GH newsletter) |
| • Responsible for tracking partner progress against SMART activities and outcomes, as well as costs, defined in proposal | • Incorporate into performance evaluations (AEFs) |
| • Provide public recognition for utilizing best practices | • Provide public recognition for utilizing best practices |
| • Incorporate into performance evaluations (AEFs) |
Recommendation 8: Enable organizational performance (2/2)
Cultural transformation is a critical component of enabling staff to successfully implement new value for money activities

6 dimensions to consider that enable cultural transformation:

Enterprise Toolkit & Support Roles
- Two types of toolkits: transforming the organization (e.g. via training, policy updates and communication) and managing the change associated with the new practices
- Dedicated teams that support current and new information management systems

Governance
- Ongoing review of organizational performance
- Collective responsibility
- Operational excellence a constant in VFM language

Dedicated Management Roles
- Establish a team lead for the Organizational Model and Staff Training Operational Support Workstreams
- Giving that role operational responsibilities to enable actions based on transformation performance

Leadership Competencies & Behaviors
- Leaders from GH and M understand and support the new operating model
- Leaders are comfortable with the metrics driven management approach to monitor transformation progress
- Empower leaders to guide their teams

Metrics
- Leadership to select Key Performance Indicators to monitor progress of transformation of organizational performance
- Team lead(s) for the Organizational Model and Staff Training Operational Support Workstreams responsible for reporting on metrics and empowered to make operational decisions based on reported progress

Performance Management Alignment
- Giving teeth to metrics and behaviors through linkage into the performance management methodologies (e.g. enabling team leads to make operational decisions based on reported progress)
Recommendation 9: Produce right data for right people at right time (1/2)
Gather appropriate data to enable AOs/COs and AORs/CORs to assess value for money across the award life cycle

Recommended Actions

- **Gather specific and standard information** from every award
  - Ensure information is sufficient for value for money assessments throughout award life cycle

- **Enable data capture**
  - Partner online application portal (e.g., e-forms)
  - Standardized RFA / RFP, budget, work plan templates
  - Portal for easy manual data entry

- **Develop IT system** that can be easily accessed, maintains data quality through use of electronic documentation, etc.
  - High search functionality and information usability
  - Link systems / tools through single interface covering award life cycle

- **Create dashboards** to provide relevant, timely, insightful information
  - Tailor system outputs to meet personnel needs

Example Data Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data needed</th>
<th>Award-level</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Current and prior award info, searchable by key attributes</td>
<td>• Standardized templates, i.e. performance reports</td>
<td>• Commodity price benchmarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SMART metrics and corresponding application examples</td>
<td>• Recognized areas of expertise within USAID</td>
<td>• Partner performance across USG and peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Past partner performance</td>
<td>• Identified activities that historically realize successful outcomes and value for money</td>
<td>• Similar activities (current and historical) conducted by peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Direct cost benchmarks by region / award type</td>
<td>• Instrument type guidelines</td>
<td>• Specific best practices across peer aid agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Process

- **Design**
  - Objectives
  - Size and Scope
  - Place of performance
  - Instrument type
  - Activities
  - Indicators to measure activities

- **Solicitation/Competition**
  - Compare proposals / applications in standard format
  - Determine best value for money proposal / application
  - Check costs for realism and programmatic relevance

- **Manage**
  - Progress of award toward milestones
  - Value of money based on award progress

- **VFM**
  - Success of award
  - Value for money as compared to similar awards
  - Best practices

Recommended Actions

- **Example Data Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Solicitation/Competition</th>
<th>Manage</th>
<th>VFM Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Objectives</td>
<td>• Compare proposals / applications in standard format</td>
<td>• Progress of award toward milestones</td>
<td>• Success of award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Size and Scope</td>
<td>• Determine best value for money proposal / application</td>
<td>• Value of money based on award progress</td>
<td>• Value for money as compared to similar awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Place of performance</td>
<td>• Check costs for realism and programmatic relevance</td>
<td>• Best practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendation 9: Produce right data for right people at right time (2/2)
A comprehensive system (or set of linked systems) is needed for data collection, workflow management, and reporting.

**Inputs** to a workflow driven information management system can come from USAID and Implementing Partners.

- **Offerors / Applicants**
  - RFP / RFA Template
  - Additional documents (e.g. financial history)

- **Onscreen forms**
  - Workflow driven screens: enables and ensures standard data capture

- **USAID**
  - Online via portal or remote access

- **Document repository**
  - All documentation submitted directly to USAID; CO/AO is alerted when documents come through

The system includes data and document storage that is accessible to multiple users.

- **Data storage**
  - Data is stored in a way that is easily searchable to facilitate reporting (e.g. ad hoc reporting requests take hours not days)
  - Enables robust searching ability of all information relative to awards

- **Document repository**
  - Document repository allows for final documents to be stored according to USAID standard record keeping – replaces physical file room

- **External reporting (e.g. USAspend)**
  - USAID award teams

**Benefits that enable VFM**

- **Reduction in time spent editing, searching and sharing**
  - Content entered into USAID Information Management system is stored centrally and accessible through multiple channels
  - Documents can be transferred quickly, without the need for printing or scanning

- **Enabling of parallel processing**
  - Multiple users can view applications and documents concurrently, specific documents can be checked out for editing to ensure version control

- **Elimination of manual tasks**
  - Many award tasks can be directly entered into system, eliminating the need to produce lengthy documents when templates can be created ahead of time
  - OCR\(^1\) can be used to capture data fields from paper forms, eliminating the need for manual data entry

- **Easier status checks / traceability**
  - Document repository stores all data fields filled out during award process and includes automatically updating the workflow tool that shows award status

---

1. OCR: Optical Character Recognition – common method for digitizing paper files, information from files can then be stored and searched easily

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## Recommendation 10: Streamline and standardize A&A process

Processes and tools underpinning and sustaining a value for money culture should be standardized to the extent possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
<th>Desired End State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minimize variation and remove non-value added activities to streamline A&amp;A processes</td>
<td><strong>Desired End State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clearly define processes to design, solicit / compete, and manage awards in a way that leaves very little room for interpretation</td>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where possible, utilize tools and technology to automate A&amp;A processes to decrease errors, variation, and time necessary to design, solicit / compete, manage award</td>
<td>All COR / AORs receive the same training on designing awards with SMART principles and conveying this in the RFP / RFAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assign process owners and metrics to individual transformation steps in order to monitor success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enable easier training of new staff / handoff of awards when staff rotate between DC / field</td>
<td>Based on award type and objectives, application of SMART principles can vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify areas of variation in award process, evaluate to ensure adding value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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USAID AWARD COST EFFICIENCY STUDY GLOBAL HEALTH A&A AWARD-LEVEL ANALYSES

December 6, 2013
Executive summary (1 of 2)

• Oliver Wyman applied ten ‘value levers’ to the relevant subset of A&A awards to generate cost redeployment ranges which were extended to the broader ACES award scope.

• Within the active GH award universe, ACES scope was defined as comprising 226 awards with at least 2 years remaining and $10M or more in TEC.

• Of these, 60 were selected for detailed analysis based on their representativeness of the larger ACES scope.

• During award review, value levers were applied to individual awards looking at individual cost elements and activities systematically to identify potential cost redeployment opportunities.

• Opportunities were segmented between those realizable on the active portfolio and those that will come from future awards.

• In two-thirds of awards reviewed, cost avoidance could be realized via clarified project scopes, use of cost as an evaluation criteria, and benchmarking costs.

• Cost redeployment opportunities in the 60 awards we analyzed were extended to the Global Health award universe, segmented by current ACES awards vs. future awards.

• Percentage ranges were applied by type of award (e.g., DC-based assistance) to projected future A&A Global Health obligations.

• Conservatively, we estimate $170-240M can be redeployed from active awards with Global Health programmatic focus through renegotiation with the relevant partners.

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• As future awards with Global Health programmatic focus enter the portfolio, we estimate the total value to USAID to be between $12.5B and $16.5B over time assuming successful transformation –

The applicable funding baseline for determining future savings in Global Health awards depends on USAID’s assessment of “influencable spend” –

For every $1.0B in annual obligations, there should be $2.5–3.2B in total value of cost redeployment potential –

The ACES analytic approach and results are conservative – we have reason to believe the actual cost redeployment potential could be well higher based on unquantified/unquantifiable value levers, data limitations, and assumptions that were made – Additionally, ACES focused on inefficiency in program management vs. evaluating whole program effectiveness, which understates the likely savings potential – Given data limitations, ACES award-level results should be used to understand the general magnitude of potential cost redeployment and to uncover areas for further investigation –

The bottom-line: Reorienting around value for money has the power to unlock substantial future savings for redeployment within USAID… however cost redeployment hinges on USAID’s ability to transform Executive summary (2 of 2) Confidential Information Redacted.
Contents

• Workstream context
• Award-level analytic approach and results
  - Methodology overview
  - Award selection
  - Value levers application
  - Extrapolation of results

Appendices
Context: Award-level analysis workstream overview and objectives
Sixty awards were analyzed to estimate cost redeployment opportunities, both in the existing Global Health portfolio and for future awards

Supporting research
- Oliver Wyman and external best in class supply chain/sourcing practices
- Fact-based analysis of USAID award universe to elucidate and support findings

Partner outreach (lateral)
- Conduct 25 partner interviews
  - Finalize approach
- Develop learnings capture template
  - Synthesize findings

Process evaluation (top down)
- Develop process maps from:
  - Review of relevant policies and procedures
    - USAID interviews
  - Processes include: Funding, pre-solicitation, solicitation of an award, award management

Objectives
- Directionally quantify award-level potential current savings / future cost avoidance
- Estimate total savings / cost avoidance potential in GH portfolio based on individual award analysis
- Incorporate results into systemic findings, conclusions and recommendations to enhance cost-effectiveness of USAID A&A process

Award analysis (bottom up)
- Refine efficiency levers
- Finalize award scope and actual sample; extrapolation methodology
- Analyze 60 awards across Phases 1-2
  - Validate with USAID
- Capture and distill findings by lever

360° evaluation of award-level savings and future cost avoidance

Stakeholder management
- Weekly reviews with USAID working team
- Senior Leadership check-ins
  - Administrator updates
- ACES Panel presentations

60 awards were analyzed to estimate cost redeployment opportunities, both in the existing Global Health portfolio and for future awards.
Context: Global Health A&A Award-level Analyses

• Objective: This document is a compilation of the methodology and findings from the award-level analysis conducted for 60 Global Health awards as part of the Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES)

• Contents: This document outlines the approach and steps taken to conduct the award-level analysis
  – The body of the document is organized along these four steps
    - Award selection: How were the 60 awards selected from the A&A universe?
    - Value lever identification: What were the sources of value identified in awards?
    - Value lever application: How were these value levers applied to awards, and how were savings calculated?
    - Savings extrapolation: Based on the savings identified in the 60 awards, what is the total potential opportunity across the A&A universe?
  – The appendix contains supporting material, explanation of sources used, and detailed calculations / findings

• Note: The 60 award review summaries can be found in a separate companion document (“Compendium of award profiles for 60 awards reviewed”) and on the USAID O drive
Context: ACES parameters and constraints

Study parameters

Scope:
- Program management and G&A efficiencies assuming same technical content
- Bottom-up opportunities (looking at individual cost elements and activities) vs. top-down
- Selected A&A awards
  - Electronic and paper-based physical files
  - Proposed budget*
  - Additional supporting files, e.g:
    - RFA/RFP
    - negotiation documents
    - technical evaluations
    - annual budgets and work plans
  - Interviews with CO/AOs and COR/AORs

Constraints

- Award files often not complete or fully analyzable
  - E.g., missing negotiation memo, detailed budgets, TEC memo, annual work plans, etc.
  - E.g., budgets not tied to program objectives
- Actual spend vs. budget not available/not captured at budget line item level
- Sub-contractor/sub-recipient work plan and budget detail not available (~50%)
- CO/COR and AO/AOR availability limited (~66%)
- Access to NICRA accounting**
- Access to annual audits or IG reports

* Assumed to be representative of actual outlays
** Limits understanding of how NICRA funds may overlap with separate administrative and indirect budget line items
Section 2  

Award-level analytic approach and results
Methodology overview
We applied ten ‘value levers’ to the relevant subset of A&A awards to generate savings ranges which were extrapolated to the broader ACES award scope.
Award selection: How were the awards within ACES’ scope selected? Within the active GH award universe, ACES scope was defined as comprising 226 awards with at least 2 years remaining and $10M or more in TEC.

Breakdown of awards in scope
Based on selection of relevant GH awards from Global A&A system (as of July 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEC &lt;$10M</th>
<th>&lt; 2 Yr Remaining</th>
<th>Final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1B</td>
<td>$10B</td>
<td>$16B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$12B</th>
<th>$8B</th>
<th>$9B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2B</td>
<td>$7B</td>
<td>$7B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$28B

Obligated vs. Unobligated TEC

Active Awards

- $16B
- $12B
- $2B
- $8B

TEC <$10M

- $1B

< 2 Yr Remaining

- 213

Insufficient time remaining to realize savings

Final

- 226

Too small to warrant detailed review

# Awards

- 1,111

Rationale

Note: The definition of active awards and ACES Scope changed over the course of the ACES Project based on direction from USAID; upon further review GH flagged certain awards originally included as “out of scope”

Source: Extract from GLAAS (July 2013) provided by M / ACES working team, Oliver Wyman analysis

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Value levers: What were the economic principles used to identify opportunities? Ten value levers for improving the economic value of individual awards exclusive of programmatic outcome were applied to 60 awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Value lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example source of savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Detailed Definition</td>
<td>• Clear project objectives and measurable performance targets in RFPs enable cost evaluation and assessment against performance targets</td>
<td>• Adjust award scope so that costing can be more specific and measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approach Optimization</td>
<td>• Use of more innovative approaches to achieve award objectives and eliminate lower value-added activities</td>
<td>• Cost differential between original and optimized approach (e.g., use of text messaging vs. in-person survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shared Services</td>
<td>• Sharing goods/services across related awards or eliminating duplicated activities across awards (e.g., vehicles, capacity building)</td>
<td>• Satisfy both infant mortality and HIV/AIDS program objectives with single shared educational service award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Increased Competition</td>
<td>• Enhance competition throughout the award process by modifying RFP process or criteria, award size/scope/type, award scope, instrument</td>
<td>• Cost of Task Order under different IDIQ competitive scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cost Evaluation Prioritization</td>
<td>• Increased weighting and consideration of cost criteria (assuming comparable scope and technical acceptability) and cost accuracy; also value/cost tradeoffs considered at the same time</td>
<td>• Cost differential available from lowest acceptable technical bids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Optimal Cost Benchmarks</td>
<td>• Assess partner / vendor cost proposals against available global benchmarks for given commodities or services</td>
<td>• Budgeted costs vs. benchmarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Local Labor and Services</td>
<td>• Greater reliance on in-country labor/services to lower personnel-related costs</td>
<td>• Salary, fringe, travel cost differential using local vs. HQ staff for certain roles or activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Subcontractor Management</td>
<td>• Review usage of subcontractors for unwarranted prime overhead costs and to raise total overhead cost visibility associated with prime-sub relationships</td>
<td>• ‘Nested’ overheads within prime-sub contracts or assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Economies of Scale</td>
<td>• Bulk procurement of frequently purchased goods/services; annual cost/OH reductions from increased size/volume of awards</td>
<td>• Savings available from volume awards or bulk purchases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Process Optimization</td>
<td>• Improve award processes / automation to reduce overhead/administrative costs for partners / vendors</td>
<td>• Overhead cost reduction potential directly tied to award process requirements streamlining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: two additional analyses – performance-based competition and continuous improvement effect – are applied top-down based on levers identified and on empirical research

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Value lever application: How were the value levers applied?
Value levers were applied to individual awards looking at individual cost elements and activities systematically

Methodology for each value lever

What are the reasons for applying this value lever?

How do you know when to apply this lever?

How do you calculate savings for this lever?

What is the ultimate source of savings?

See appendix for description of how and how often each value lever was applied
Value lever application: How frequently were levers applied?

In two-thirds of awards reviewed, cost avoidance could be realized via clarified project scopes, use of cost as an evaluation criteria, and benchmarking costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Value lever</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>DC-Assistance (n=26)</th>
<th>DC-Acquisition (n=7)</th>
<th>Field-Assistance (n=25)</th>
<th>Field-Acquisition (n=2)</th>
<th>Total (n=60)</th>
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</table>

Note: two additional analyses – performance-based competition and continuous improvement effect – are applied top-down based on the empirical research.

Source: Award files, Oliver Wyman analysis; future potential award savings.

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**Value lever quantification: How do we think about the opportunity to redeploy funds from awards?**

We distinguished two types of costs: those realizable on the active portfolio, others that will come from future awards.

### Potential redeployment from current awards

- **Description**
  - Savings that can be generated from existing awards if certain provisions are renegotiated or recommended changes are made in ongoing award management
    - e.g., application of optimal cost benchmarks to future purchases
  - Savings range reflects likelihood of success in re-negotiation, not factoring in costs, based on OW judgment

### Potential redeployment on future awards

- **Description**
  - Future cost avoidance that will be realized if awards are made reflecting enhanced processes, capabilities and policy implementation
    - e.g., performance-based awards that encourage competition and cost evaluation

### Redeployment Potential

**Based on review of 60 awards**

#### Potential redeployment on future awards

**Description**

- Calculated as % ranges based on Award Type, then discounted for probability of success (n = 60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th>Low Range</th>
<th>High Range</th>
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<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition</td>
<td>1%*</td>
<td>2%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Assistance</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Acquisition</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Assistance</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1.7%**</td>
<td>2.3%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Calculated as % ranges based on Award Type, then discounted for probability of success (n = 60).

**Note:** 4-7% on non-commodities; 0% opportunity assumed on commodities due to lack of available information and centralized nature of commodity purchases. Actual opportunity may be greater.

**Note:** Assuming 100% success rate would make range 3%-4%.

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*Source: Oliver Wyman analysis; Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation*
Value lever quantification: What is driving the upper and lower range of redeployable funds estimates?

Cost avoidance percentages are presented as ranges for two reasons:

1. Reflects cumulative effect of uncertainty in budget data when aggregated
   - Prime is charging overhead to manage sub-contractors that have significant USAID experience
   - Data is not available to explain how prime overhead is being used and why it is needed
   - Based on other projects that eliminate prime overhead to manage subs, theorize portion or all of prime overhead could be eliminated
   - Therefore savings presented as range – i.e., portion to all of prime overhead

2. Reflects alternative, mutually exclusive scenarios
   - Multiple award recipients for similar awards operating in overlapping regions can share administrative / office costs
   - Estimate roughly 10% savings if basic support services are shared (e.g., overhead / administrative functions)
   - Estimate 50% savings if award recipients fully share offices

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Value lever quantification: What is the sensitivity of current redeployable savings estimates to our probability of success assessment?

Time remaining and justification as basis for renegotiating awards determine redeployment potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of timing</th>
<th>Effect of probability of success</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of recovery</td>
<td>Justification for savings given award data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not likely</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low probability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate probability</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong probability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

OW assessment range = $80-100M on 60 awards

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Every year, USAID obligates ~$5.1B in A&A funds; new and expiring award obligations make up 20%.

To calculate current 'realizable' savings, we apply the relevant savings range from our study sample to the award obligations within ACES' scope (dark blue).

ACES' scope is defined as A&A awards with >2 years remaining and >$10M TEC.

Note: savings range is not applied to existing award obligations outside of ACES Scope (either not enough time left or too small/dispersed) (light blue).

To calculate future 'avoidable' costs, we apply the relevant range from our study sample to new award obligations projected from FY2015 (dark grey).

Savings ranges apply to obligations by award type: DC vs Field, Acquisition vs Assistance.

Extrapolation of results: How were cost redeployment opportunities in the selection of 60 awards extended to the Global Health award universe?

% ranges by Award Type were applied to projected A&A GH obligations over the next 5 fiscal years, distinguishing current ACES awards from future awards.

Commentary

Projected global health A&A award obligations

Split between existing and future awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current awards</td>
<td>$2.4B</td>
<td>$1.4B</td>
<td>$0.6B</td>
<td>$0.5B</td>
<td>$0.3B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future awards</td>
<td>$2.7B</td>
<td>$2.7B</td>
<td>$2.5B</td>
<td>$1.6B</td>
<td>$0.7B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Future obligations, against which potential cost avoidance ranges will be applied. Total = $10.2B

Current awards outside ACES scope (n=885)

Future awards ACES scope (n=226)

---

1. Excludes PIOs, IAAs and assumes linear burn rate; for awards with less than 2 years since POP start, applied TEC/award life; for awards with more than 2 years since POP start, applied obligated funds / elapsed years; removed 9 TO's under active IDIQs.
2. Based on USAID working team experience.
3. Annual obligations for DC - Acquisition (=28%), DC - Assistance (=21%), Field - Acquisition (=10%), and Field - Assistance (=41%) based on breakdown of 1,111 active awards.

2. Based on GLAAS extract of active Global Health awards as of July 2013 provided by USAID for ACES – includes water, sanitation, and hygiene awards.
Confidential Information Redacted.
Confidential Information Redacted.
Awards with Global Health programmatic focus

Funds appropriated specifically to Global Health

Hypothetical apportionment of Global Health funding

$5.1B annual obligations

$3.8B annual appropriations

For every $1.0B in annual obligations

Note: Based on Oliver Wyman analysis; Potential cost avoidance is not inclusive of costs associated with activities to realize savings

Based on GLAAS data set provided by M Bureau of extract of GH awards

Example provided by USAID — not confirmed by Oliver Wyman

Nominal dollars

Present value dollars applying 3.0% discount rate based on OMB Circular A-94; includes a continuing value calculation

$2.0B

$1.5B

$1.0B

$0.5B

$0.0B

FY19

FY18

FY17

FY16

FY15

FY14

Annual

Cumulative

Steady state

Ongoing into the future

$12.5B – $16.5B total value of cost redeployment

$9.3B – $12.3B total value of cost redeployment

$2.5B – $3.2B Total value of cost redeployment

Extrapolation of results:

What is the impact of modifying the Global Health award funding baseline on our future redeployable savings estimates?

The applicable funding baseline for determining future savings in Global Health awards depends on USAID's assessment of “influencable spend”...
Extrapolation of results: How are the ACES analytic approach and results conservative?

Scope of award analysis

- Program management and G&A focus vs. program effectiveness
- Technical evaluation or merits out of scope
- Subset of award universe (226 largest vs. 1111 active; PIOs/IAAs excluded)

Award analysis approach: Future award potential savings

- Many levers unquantified or unquantifiable despite empirical approach
- Data limitations preventing
  - Comparison of budget to program objectives
  - Investigation of Comparison of budget with actuals
  - Comparison of NICRA with programmatic indirect costing
  - Investigation of sub-awards
- Except in case of egregious items (e.g. pool cleaner), acceptance of standard allowance costs and existing negotiated agreements (e.g. service center costs)
- Exclude commodities from empirical savings percentages, assuming that no savings opportunities exist on commodities
- Conservative empirical savings estimates to account for unique dynamics at USAID (e.g. lower percentages for performance-based competition applied to assistance awards)

Award analysis approach: Current award potential savings

- Bottom-up approach to renegotiation (individual partners and awards)
- Bottom-up approach to recovery, with realistic probability weighting
- Assume obligated is unrecoverable
- Assume current award savings on unobligated spend only
- Assume current awards cannot be recompeted (within same award)
- Assume current award savings apply to awards in ACES scope

Savings extrapolation approach

- Use % unobligated in relation to historic obligated TEC % by instrument for the current savings
- Use historic % obligated in relation to TEC by instrument for the extrapolation

Additionally, ACES is focused on inefficiency in program management vs. evaluating programmatic effectiveness – understates likely savings potential
Caveats around ACES award-level analyses
Given data limitations, award analyses should be used to understand general magnitude of potential savings / cost avoidance and areas for further exploration

Data limitations / caveats

• Budget data was used as the basis of savings / cost avoidance analysis
  – Expenditure data was not available for analysis

• Proposed budgets and annual budgets differed significantly across many dimensions
  – Programmatic relevance: Majority of budgets that provided line item detail did not link line items to activities, making it impossible to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes
  – Structure: Some workplan / annual budgets were activity-based and not broken out by line item or traditional cost categories
  – Level of detail: Some provided budgets were aggregated to a handful of broad categories, while others included detailed line items (e.g. “labor” vs. specific titles and level of effort)
  – Availability: Some budgets not available for review; others only had proposed budgets available

• Given turnover and TDY, often difficult to schedule interviews with AO/CO or AOR/CORs with sufficient context and institutional knowledge to speak to specific awards

Implications for use and interpretation of data

• The bottom-up award analysis approach allowed us to assess cost inefficiency across a selection of awards in the A&A universe

• This analysis does:
  – Offer a sense of general magnitude of the total potential savings / cost avoidance opportunity
  – Provide insight into the relative importance of specific issues / value levers
  – Provide specific award examples of broader policy / process findings in the Award Cost Efficiency Study

• However, given the data limitations, these award analyses do not, on their own, provide sufficient information to renegotiate specific awards

• Note that the savings / cost avoidance figures identified do not include the costs associated with the changes required to realize these savings
Cost redeployment hinges on USAID's ability to transform
- orienting around value for money has the power to unlock substantial future savings for redeployment within USAID awards

Context

Impact

Proof of concept

• Proof of concept pilot should focus on logical subset of programmatically-linked awards to be administered under value for money principles

• Transformation could encompass all Agency awards procurement, both DC and Field, potentially across Bureaus

• Results demonstrated on a contained scale in GH can become foundation for wider institutional rollout

• Agency-wide impact, determined by scope of change and ability to drive and sustain it

• If the proof of concept encompasses five-year awards of a specific award type amounting to $1BN obligated annually, expected future cost avoidance would be:
  - DC Acquisition - $30M-$40M, or
  - DC Assistance - $90M-$110M, or
  - Field Acquisition - $130M-$180M, or
  - Field Assistance - $100M-$140M

• Note: Estimated opportunities likely under-stated due to conservatism

• Based on 60 award files analyzed in detail, average annual cost avoidance on future awards was 8-11%

• Extending this range to 1,111 current awards with GH programmatic focus yields a total opportunity of $1.3-1.7BN over FY15-19

• Note: fewer in scope awards would translate into commensurately less cost avoidance opportunity

• From a Net Present Value standpoint, this translates into a benefit of $12.5-16.5BN over time – assuming the change is permanent

Source: Oliver Wyman Analysis; Note: Potential future savings ranges on 60 awards reviewed are cumulative 6-8%, DC Assistance 9-11%, Field Assistance 10-14%, DC Acquisition 3-4% (13-18% on non-commodities, 0% on commodities), and Field Acquisition 20-32% (replaced with 13-18% DC Acquisition non-commodity range due to small sample size (n=2) of Field Acquisition); Re-weighting of DC vs. Field and Acquisition vs. Assistance amongst the 1,111 Active awards yields a cumulative potential future savings range of 8-11%, which is applied against $5.1B in projected annual obligations in the steady state starting in FY2019

1. Present value; calculated using a 3.0% discount rate based on OMB Circular A-94; inclusive of continuing value from FY2014 onwards

2. Potential savings are not inclusive of costs associated with activities to realize savings

3. GLAAS extract of GH Awards as of July 16, 2013; note that this includes Water Supply and Sanitation Awards Award and excludes PIOs and IAAs; projected annual obligations of $5.1B

4. Based on $5.1B annual obligations and 8-11% cost avoidance; 8-11% cost avoidance is only applied to future awards and current awards expire at a rate of 20% per year, therefore $5.1B does not represent only future awards until FY2019

Confidential Information Redacted.
## Appendix contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Appendix contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a Award selection</td>
<td>• List of 60 awards analyzed&lt;br&gt;• 60 awards analyses <em>(separate document)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b Value lever identification</td>
<td>• None</td>
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<td>2 Value lever application</td>
<td>• Value lever application methodology&lt;br&gt;Empirical analysis sources&lt;br&gt;Lever application findings</td>
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<td>3 Savings extrapolation</td>
<td>• Extrapolation supporting materials&lt;br&gt;Extrapolation calculation steps</td>
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<td>CORE Group Polio Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID-674-674-00-10-10-00060</td>
<td>Building Local Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID-497-497-C-11-00001</td>
<td>IUWASH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Value lever application methodology
To understand the total potential opportunity available in the Global Health portfolio, we reviewed a selection of 60 awards to determine which levers apply

Analysis of 60 awards

- Award files
  - TEC memo
  - Neg memo
  - RFA / RFP
  - Budget narr.
  - Annual budget
  - Technical proposals
  - Annual workplans

- Interviews with available AOs/COs and AORs/CORs, negotiators, and A&A specialists & feedback on draft award summaries

- Secondary research (e.g. project and applicant / offeror websites, publicly available annual reports)

- Validation from ACES working team at USAID

Output

- Based on primary and secondary research, developed 60 award summaries that include
  - Award overview dashboards: Details from GLAAS, proposed budgets, general description of award
  - Award process overview: Notes on RFA, negotiation process and progress to date
  - Future award applicable levers and quantification of cost avoidance opportunity
  - Empirical analysis application: Rationale for quantification of savings based on empirical analysis
  - Detailed lever-specific analysis: 1-page back-up for each quantified lever
  - Next steps / areas for further exploration

Supporting information for 2: Value lever application
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 1 – Detailed definition

Highlights spend which lacks clear objectives or specific deliverables, making value assessment and cost competition challenging

Description

Rationale:

- Clear project objectives, measurable targets in initial RFP/RFAs enable cost evaluation and assessment against metrics
- Lack of detail in objectives and performance targets can lead to vague budgeting
  - Often done at the award level and not broken down into discrete deliverables
  - Proposed costs matching the published TEC exactly
- Very difficult to evaluate cost proposals in awarding phase and performance in the field during implementation without detailed objectives, timelines, deliverables and budgets

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:

- Very broad scope (e.g. improve general health system)
- Lack of quantifiable performance targets (e.g. no metrics such as “85% of children <5 yrs slept under LLIN”)
- Recipient neglects to clarify purpose for large portions of proposed budget, which seem to be used to fill gap to match TEC

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend

- Identify the spending dedicated to unclear objectives

  Example: Line item ($43.5M) in proposal stated that the exact purpose would be determined when “programmatic needs on a country level have been identified”

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity

- Savings rate based on assumption that lack of clarity leads to padding of budget
  - Creates no incentive to improve processes / reduce cost to stay competitive and limits ability to evaluate appropriateness of budgets
- Lever works with increased competition and cost evaluation prioritization to drive 15% savings based on empirical research

Step 3: Calculate savings

- Multiply applicable spend * savings opportunity (i.e., 10%)
- Empirical savings estimate of 15% is discounted to 10% to avoid double counting

Savings estimates are based on improved efficiency from greater focus on delivering for value and ability to monitor performance (incl. cost) against objectives

1 – SMART = Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 2 – Approach optimization

Identifies opportunity to deliver the same award objectives more cost effectively

**Description**

**Rationale:**

- Some types of spending may not be required to achieve programmatic objectives or may present opportunities to substitute lower-cost activities
- Identification of lower value-add activities could divert funding toward programmatic goals within the award or in other awards

**Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:**

- Significant start-up spend (e.g. office space) despite recipient managing a similar predecessor project
- Significant domestic spending for field activities (e.g. "domestic commuting" or DC office equipment)
- More resources than required to deliver on objectives (e.g. large number of staff)
- Funds spent on programmatic global-level activities that were not implemented at the field level
- Opportunities to substitute lower-cost activities to achieve programmatic goals (e.g. in-person vs. text message surveys)

**Example approach**

**Step 1: Identify applicable spend**

- Based on detailed budget information, identify budget categories not required to achieve objectives
  - *Example:* Line item indicated intent to outfit a DC office for 14-person project staff (most already employed by org), despite having a fully functional DC office – Estimated at $3K per person * 14 people = $43K

**Step 2: Determine savings opportunity**

- Identify alternative spending levels based on likely need
  - *Example:* Only 1-2 staff were not already employed by the organization
    - New office equipment / furniture likely needed for the 1-2 new staff totals $6K

**Step 3: Calculate savings**

- Subtract alternative spending levels ($6K) from applicable spend ($43K)

Savings estimates are based on elimination or substitution of budget categories which are not required, or could deliver similar programmatic value at lower cost
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 3 – Shared services
Identifies overlapping or duplicative award activity that could suggest opportunities to share goods/services and collaborate in the field

Description

Rationale:
• Many award recipients share similar programmatic goals in the same geographic area
• Inconsistent coordination can lead to duplicative activities across awards
• Lack of portfolio management across awards leads to missed opportunities to share goods/services across related awards (e.g. vehicles, office space) or to conduct services in most effective manner (e.g. shared conference for HIV/AIDS and reproductive health)

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:
• Multiple organizations based in the same location offering similar services (e.g. training events, microcredit program)
• Multiple organizations based in the same location in different office spaces

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend
• Based on detailed budget information from similar awards, identify overlapping budget categories
• Example: Two related awards budgeted project management costs ($19.6M + $22.5M) but calculated costs in different ways despite similar scopes

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity
• Identify alternative spending levels based on revised project approach utilizing shared services
• Example: One award utilizes a central project management unit (PMU) to coordinate across project partners, incremental cost per partner is $1.2M. If second award utilized the same PMU for its four partners would add $4.8M (vs. projected $22.5M budgeted)

Step 3: Calculate savings
• Subtract alternative spending levels ($4.8M) from applicable spend ($22.5M)

Savings estimates are based on reduction in duplicative spending among award recipients that is not providing increased programmatic benefit
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 4 – Increased competition
Program structure, award scope and process can impact the pool of potential awardees, reducing competitive pressure and need to differentiate on cost

Description

Rationale:
• Many savings opportunities stem from lack of number of bidders (greater competition)
• Competition is a natural way to ensure that bidders are focusing on increasing value for money
• Lack of competition places less pressure on incumbent to optimize approach, demonstrate achievement of objectives, and manage costs; and on USAID to evaluate program budgets

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:
• Very large award size
• Criteria that heavily advantages incumbents
• Short amount of time to submit bids
• Only 1-3 technically acceptable bidders

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend
• Identify whether other organizations have capacity to manage the award or subset of the award
  – If AOR/COR believed recipient / offeror is the only organization able to manage award, lever not applied
  – If the AOR/COR believed other viable competitors existed, but did not compete, the lever was applied
• Example: Increased competition could portion of total award budget ($35M)

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity
• Lever works with detailed definition and cost evaluation prioritization to drive 15% savings based on empirical research

Step 3: Calculate savings
• Multiply applicable spend * savings opportunity (i.e., 10%)
• Empirical savings estimate of 15% is discounted to 10% to avoid double counting

Savings estimates are based on improved cost proposals for the same technical value as a result of increased competition
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 5 – Cost eval. prioritization

Highlights opportunities to reprioritize cost evaluation in the partner selection process

Description

Rationale:
• Technical and cost evaluations are frequently done separately and cost evaluations are often not incorporated into the final selection process (revert back to technical evaluation)
• Additionally, most RFA/RFPs publish a specific TEC
• With cost typically not a factor in selection and stated TECs, little incentive to develop accurate, competitive cost budgets
• Propose budgets are often the published TEC, even if TEC does not reflect the likely cost of achieving award objectives
  – Examples with different amounts per cost bucket yet totals are within 0.1% of totals and with completely different cost buckets yet totals are exactly the same

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:
• Costs are defined loosely (e.g. cost defined as adherence to budget in previous awards)
• Cost is weighted very low in the evaluation process or is not a discriminating factor in evaluation process at all
• Lowest cost, technically sound proposal less than award recipient budget proposal

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend
• Lever is applicable and can be quantified if all applicant budgets (successful and unsuccessful) are available in files
• Example: Applicable spend would be the TEC of winning vendor

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity
• Identify lowest-cost proposed budget for applicant that has similar technical / programmatic capacity
• Example: Lowest cost spend would be the lowest proposed TEC for applicants that had similar technical scores to winning vendor
• In other cases where multiple applicants did not apply or non-winning bids match TEC, lever works with increased competition and cost evaluation prioritization to drive 15% savings based on empirical research

Step 3: Calculate savings
• Subtract lowest cost proposal from applicable spend to determine potential savings

Savings would be based on improved value for money from factoring costs more decisively into evaluation
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 6 – Optimal cost benchmarks

Highlights award spend not evaluated against best available cost benchmarks for goods or services

Description

Rationale:

• Budget line items not aligned with best-in-class benchmarks can indicate opportunities to improve efficiency (lower cost) while maintaining programmatic goals

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:

• Annual salary increases significantly higher than inflation rate benchmarks

• Individual budget line items (e.g. vehicles, IT, travel policies) do not seem to reflect best available benchmarks, including differences between awards for same items

• Indirect costs applied on top of each other (e.g. indirect cost rates applied to cost line items that appear to be administrative / indirect costs such as “technical support and management pool”)

• Admin costs increase over life of award with no apparent adjustment to TEC or deliverables (e.g. funds moved into spending categories that have higher indirect cost rates)

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend

• Identify applicable line item(s) where improved cost benchmarks could be applied

• Example: U.S.-based labor subject to salary inflation rates of 5% (higher than standard 3%) leads to total labor costs of $7.6M

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity

• Determine potential spend if aligned with best-in-class benchmarks

• Example: If salary set at 3%, labor costs would total $6.8M

Step 3: Calculate savings

• Subtract potential spend ($6.8M) from applicable spend ($7.6M), resulting in savings of $800K

Savings estimates are based on difference in best available benchmarks vs. award budgets for goods, services and project management

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Value lever application methodology: Value lever 7 – Local labor & services
Identifies opportunities to make better use of host country personnel and services for programmatic (capacity) development and cost avoidance

Description

Rationale:
• High utilization of DC-based staff or other non-host country staff associated with higher wages, travel cost, and allowances
• Does not develop skills in local countries as well higher associated costs

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:
• Usage of global technical or administrative staff when local labor available

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend
• If line item labor budgets available, identify potential roles which could be shifted to country
• Verify with AOR/COR that local labor is a viable alternative for required skill set (administrative and technical)
• Applicable spend includes all labor line items which could be shifted to country
• Example: Calculate total cost of global labor

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity
• Use benchmark in-country wage rates to calculate cost of local labor
• Example: Use WHO region benchmarks to calculate alternative cost (e.g. cost of health educator $8/hour in Uganda vs. $30/hour in U.S.)

Step 3: Calculate savings
• Subtract local labor cost from applicable foreign labor spend to determine savings

Savings estimates are based on reducing personnel cost budgets associated with foreign staff within awards; also furthers USAID reform objectives
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 8 – Subcontractor mgmt

Highlights opportunities to reduce duplication in the roles and/or overhead fees associated with the use of subcontractors/subrecipients

**Description**

Rationale:
- Prime recipients often play a critical role in managing subrecipients and subcontractors
- However, prime-sub relationships are sometimes subject to double overhead charges or are not clearly defined

**Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:**
- High number of subcontractors
  - No detail on allocation of funds between subs; could indicate lack of clarity on project roles
  - Opportunity to reduce costs associated with multiple subs by utilizing shared services or reducing duplicate activities (e.g. conferences)
- Prime indirect cost rates applied to subs that have extensive experience with USAID
- High overhead rates applied to subs relative to other awards
- Unnecessary usage of subs i.e. prime has capability to complete activity

**Example approach**

**Step 1: Identify applicable spend**
- Identify redundant prime-sub fees
  - *Example: Sub charged $6.3M for subcontractor handling*
- Identify nested overhead
  - *Example: $1.4M of the $6.3M charge was based on overhead on top of subcontractor overhead*

**Step 2: Determine savings opportunity**
- Calculate alternative spending without redundant fees or activities
  - *Example: Save $1.4M if nested overhead eliminated; save $6.3M if redundant prime-sub fees eliminated*

**Step 3: Calculate savings**
- Savings opportunity equals the total cost of redundant fees or activities

Savings estimates based on reducing costs associated with charging management fees on top of overhead and inefficient spend among primes and subs (e.g. duplicated activities)
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 9 – Economies of scale
Identifies opportunities for volume discounting based on concentration of spend

Description

**Rationale:**
- Many award recipients working toward similar programmatic goals in same geographic area
- Some budget categories could benefit from aggregating demand to secure volume discounts

**Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:**
- Incumbent continues a previous project - indicates potential for economies of scale
- Opportunity for award volume discounting based on concentration of spend across several awards

Example approach

**Step 1: Identify applicable spend**
- Identify opportunities to purchase goods or services at volume discount (e.g. between awards or between partners located in similar geographic areas)

**Step 2: Determine savings opportunity**
- Calculate alternative spending with volume discounting or preferred supplier arrangements, savings range of 5 to 15%¹

**Step 3: Calculate savings**
- Calculate difference between alternative spending and current spending

Savings estimates are based on unit cost reduction for commodities (e.g. office supplies) or recurring services (e.g. travel) from volume / bulk purchasing

---

¹ Based on case studies – to be shared / discussed at future meeting
Value lever application methodology: Value lever 10 – Process optimization
Highlights opportunities to automate and improve award processes to reduce overhead / administrative costs for USAID and partners

Description

Rationale:
• Some award processes and policies can be manual and cumbersome, which can increase overhead costs for both USAID and partners
• Highly administrative processes can discourage partners from applying, reducing the competition for awards

Key indicators of potential cost efficiency:
• Multiple personnel handoffs for award process
• Applicant uses "plug figure" from USAID for some category of spend (e.g. travel); opportunity to generate cost avoidance by creating improved cost evaluation templates
• Errors in cost evaluations and budgets due to partners sending PDF of budgets vs. excel files with calculations

Example approach

Step 1: Identify applicable spend
• Identify costs that were apparently caused by inefficient processes
• Example: Duplicative line items totaling $1.4M in cost proposal were not recognized by USAID personnel reviewing cost proposal because the totals aligned with Plug Figures supplied by USAID in RFP

Step 2: Determine savings opportunity
• Determine potential savings opportunity
• Example: Total reduction opportunity relative to % of remaining TEC (~60%)

Step 3: Calculate savings
• Multiply applicable spend ($1.4M) by savings opportunity (60%), resulting in savings of $840K

Savings estimates are based on reducing administrative costs that could be achieved from a more streamlined or straight-through process
Value lever application methodology: Empirical savings

Two situations occur where value levers work together to generate savings – in these situations, savings are based on empirical research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Situation 1</strong></th>
<th><strong>Situation 2</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance-Based Competition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Continuous Improvement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applicable Value Levers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Detailed Definition, Increased Competition, Cost Evaluation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationale</strong></td>
<td>• More objective evaluation of applicant proposals / bids in relation to defined objectives and value for money&lt;br&gt;• Performance-based award management in relation to defined outcomes&lt;br&gt;• Applicants submit more cost-effective proposals&lt;br&gt;• Recipients manage award more efficiently due to threat of future competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Savings (Empirical Research)</strong></td>
<td>Up to 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Note: savings percentages were discounted for assistance and to account for potentially duplicative savings – see following page for details on how savings percentages were applied to awards)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Empirical research helps quantify the effects of competition and learning.
**Value lever application methodology: Deciding when to apply empirical savings**

There are several logical steps used to determine what, if any, empirical savings scenarios should be applied to an award.

- **Structural reason exists that no other recipient could run award well?**
  - Yes
  - No

- **Recipient has run predecessor or a similar award?**
  - Yes
  - No

- **One of Detailed Definition, Increased Competition or Cost Evaluation Prioritization levers applied?**
  - No
  - Yes

**Percentage Savings applied to Analyzable TEC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition /Assistance</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only continuous improvement levers applied</td>
<td>6% – 7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional levers applied</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage Savings applied to Analyzable TEC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition /Assistance</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only one PBC lever applied</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only two PBC levers applied</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All PBC levers applied</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All PBC levers applied with no additional savings</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ex. Award is supporting an existing framework (CGPP); recipient has a location-based resource (office space) and cannot be easily transitioned (GHFP-II); recipient is so entrenched that switching to a new partner in a successor award would significantly threaten the project (GHFP-II). These three levers are the Performance-Based Competition (PBC) signifiers.

These two levers are the Continuous Improvement signifiers.

These two levers are the Continuous Improvement signifiers.

**Source:** Oliver Wyman Analysis, Empirical Case Studies
Value lever application methodology: Deciding when to apply empirical savings

Example: Global Health Fellows Program II was a successor award; awarding it to the same prime offered a smooth transition of critical staff and office space.

- Award’s main goal was to hire fellows, and recipient was already the employer of many of those fellows. Using another partner would have caused significant upheaval for staff.
- Prime recipient was also the prime of the predecessor award.
- Approach Optimization was applied during award analysis.

### Continuous Improvement

**Percentage Savings applied to Analyzable TEC**

**Acquisition / Assistance**

- Only continuous improvement levers applied:
  - 6% – 7%
- Additional levers applied:
  - 5%
- No other levers were applied to the award

**Percentage Savings applied to Analyzable TEC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only one PBC lever applied</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All PBC levers applied with no additional savings</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver Wyman Analysis, Empirical Case Studies
Value lever application methodology: Deciding when to apply empirical savings

Example: The Palestinian Community Infrastructure Development award had few competitors, but the prime included a number of capable sub-contractors.

While the recipient had two previous awards with a similar scope, there was no reason another partner could not successfully run this award.

The levers Increased Competition and Cost Evaluation Prioritization were both applied.

Award was a cooperative agreement; two PBC levers were applied in addition to non-PBC levers.

Percentage Savings applied to Analyzable TEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition / Assistance</th>
<th>Percentage Savings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only one PBC lever applied</td>
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<tr>
<td>All PBC levers applied with no additional savings</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oliver Wyman Analysis, Empirical Case Studies
**Empirical analysis sources:** Performance-based competition
Detailed project definition / performance-based contracting, competition, and a focus on cost can deliver 15% savings / cost avoidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Context</th>
<th>Savings experience</th>
<th>Rationale for application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NNSA divided a large combined IT and cyber security contract into two distinct pieces, allowing 50 smaller businesses to compete</td>
<td>Competition led to $22 million in savings, or a 15% reduction in cost from the previous award</td>
<td>USAID also has large projects that could feasibly be restructured to allow for smaller contractors to take more manageable, discrete pieces of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In October 1994, executive officials of 27 agencies signed an OFPP-sponsored pledge to implement performance-based service contracts (PBSCs)</td>
<td>On average, contract price decreased 15% in nominal dollars after the introduction of PBSC</td>
<td>Contracts in the study ran the gamut, with nontechnical and professional and technical services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 contracts from 15 agencies were involved in a pilot study using PBSCs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed priced contracts and cost reimbursement contracts were also included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID submitted an RFP that explicitly requested offerors not to try to meet the maximum TEC</td>
<td>Final offeror budget came in at $33M, representing a savings of 15% from TEC</td>
<td>Awards varied from $.1M to $325M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost control was included in evaluation criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly recommending that the TEC not represent a benchmark to hit, using cost control as an evaluation criteria and having multiple offerors/applicants could represent best practices for USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID had five offerors, four of which were technically proficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In practice we pare down the percentage of savings per award to account for potential duplicative savings and differences between assistance and acquisition**

Empirical analysis sources: Continuous improvement
Approach optimization and continuous learning can drive 6% - 7% savings, even in situations where competition is not possible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Context</th>
<th>Savings experience</th>
<th>Rationale for application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Boeing was having difficulty meeting its goal of producing integrated</td>
<td>• Boeing achieved a cost savings of $2.3 million per interceptor, and equivalent of 6%</td>
<td>• USAID single source contractors could apply learnings from predecessor awards to achieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interceptor missiles for the DoD</td>
<td>savings across the contract</td>
<td>better cost efficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Boeing applied lean manufacturing techniques and continuous learning to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduce waste and create greater efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Geisinger, an integrated health system, continuously evaluates its care</td>
<td>• Geisinger’s Medical Home pilots, embracing the best of previous learnings, achieved</td>
<td>• With a focus on innovation, award recipients can hone their approaches, making each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>models and employs lessons learned to further innovate</td>
<td>7% total medical cost savings</td>
<td>successive award better, faster and more efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Geisinger’s Medical Home pilots are designed to deliver value by improving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>care coordination and optimizing health status for each individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7% is a ceiling, but in practice we conservatively pare down the percentage to account for potential duplicative savings

Empirical analysis sources: Enforcing competition

DOD best practices

- DOD’s **Better Buying Power** initiative requires competitive strategy at each program milestone
  - Strategy must plan improvement in competition for each component by at least 2% a year; rate for effective competition by at least 10% a year
  - Metric for evaluating competition: competitive obligated money divided by total obligated money

- DOD encourages identification of subcontractor work that can be competed separately
  - e.g. A Navy surveillance system program broke out commercial components. Lowered prices and created larger, more stable supplier base

- DOD has a “competition advocate” for Agency and each procurement activity

- **Sole-offeror process:** The DOD goes through three steps if a competitive solicitation only had one response. To date, this has effectively lowered prices
  1. **Cost/Price Analysis:** CO conducts cost reasonableness analysis
  2. **Program Office Consultation:** CO consults program office to determine whether requirements are unnecessarily restrictive; revise to promote competition
  3. **Resolicitation:** Resolicit for at least 30 additional days

Source: GAO, “Defense Contracting: Actions Needed to Increase Competition” (March 2013)

1) When more than one offer is received under a competitive solicitation
2) In June 2012, DOD codified the policy in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (the DOD equivalent to the ADS) to add the third requirement
Some opportunities are not applicable to current awards midway through the period of performance—Savings from detailed definition, cost evaluation prioritization, and increased competition only apply to future awards—Start-up spending concentrated in the first few years of the award.

The largest current award potential opportunities include:

- Approach optimization: Opportunity to readjust staffing models in workplanning process
- Optimal cost benchmarks: Opportunity to align inflation / salary escalation rates through the annual workplanning process

$L26M$ $21M$ $12M$ $7M$ $9M$ $1M$ $34M$ $26M$ $17M$ $14M$ $11M$ $2M$ $1M$ $0M$ $0M$ $0M$ $0M$ $0M$ $10M$ $20M$ $30M$ $40M$

**Lever application findings: Current awards potential savings by lever**

Some savings may be realized through existing workplan/budgeting process to ensure alignment with benchmarks and best practices.

Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross—do not reflect the cost of implementation; Applied the ratio of unobligated funds at expiration as a % of TEC (removing outliers in terms of unused TEC at expiration)

Source: Award files, program / contracting officer interviews, Oliver Wyman analysis

Does not apply after award design/solicitation phases have passed.

Supporting information for 2: Value lever application

Confidential Information Redacted.
Lever application findings: Future award potential savings by lever
Most future award potential opportunities identified in ACES will come from implementing systemic changes to drive performance-based competition

Lever quantification: Future award potential opportunities
Based on selection of 60 awards; some levers quantified in combination based on empirical research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Savings Driver</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Future award potential opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquisition (n=9)</td>
<td>Assistance (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance-Based Competition</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Subcontractor Management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Approach Optimization</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Optimal Cost Benchmarks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Shared Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Improvement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Detailed Definition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Local Labor and Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Process Optimization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economies of Scale</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Award files, program / contracting officer interviews, Oliver Wyman analysis; Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation; Applied the ratio of unobligated funds at expiration as a % of TEC (removing outliers in terms of unused TEC at expiration) and segmented by DC vs. Field, Acquisition vs. Assistance.
Lever application findings: Performance-based competition
Greatest savings come from promoting performance-based competition via defined scopes, increased competition, and systematic cost evaluation

Discussion

• Three value levers work together to drive cost avoidance – cannot achieve full benefit of performance-based competition without all three elements
  – Detailed definition enables consistent comparison across applicants / offerors
  – Increased competition allows for more diverse pool of competitors
  – Cost evaluation prioritization provides means to evaluate competitors on value

• When all three conditions exist, empirical research suggests at least 15% savings possible
  – Where applicable, savings percentages discounted to reflect unique challenges inherent in USAID Assistance awards

Number of Select 60 awards with characteristics enabling performance-based competition

• Most awards already include at least one of these elements, but few include all three conditions required to maximize value
• In total, 44 awards were missing at least one element of performance-based competition
  – If systemic changes made to enable performance-based competition, future award potential savings estimated at $246M

Source: Oliver Wyman analysis; diagram counts awards for which applicable lever was not applied; Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

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Lever application findings: Continuous improvement
For awards where competition is not feasible or desirable, empirical research indicates management based on continuous improvement can drive value

Discussion

• Some awards have structural reasons for not maximizing competition, e.g.
  – Deeply specialized knowledge or non-transferable resources in a particular org
  – Significant threat of disruption to services if competed
  – Project supporting existing framework / coalition (e.g. Core Group Polio Project)

• For awards offered to incumbent or experienced organization, empirical research indicates that continuous improvement should drive 6-7% in value

• Analysis of the Select 60 identified 9 opportunities to apply continuous improvement with $40-42M in potential savings

• Some reviewed awards have already embedded an expectation of continuous improvement in the design of the award

Continuous improvement best practices

**Field – Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract**
*Uganda IRS Phase II (AID-617-C-12-00004)*
• Recipient also held the predecessor award, in which it utilized existing infrastructure and innovative partnerships to save over $2M
• The recipient’s proposal highlights the intent to find new ways to reduce or reallocate costs

**Field – Associate Award under LWA**
*RESPOND Tanzania Project (AID-621-LA-13-00001)*
• RFA highlights cost efficiencies expected due to prime’s past experience in country
• In response, prime consolidated one of four field offices into the central office
• Equipment and supplies are being utilized from the predecessor award (trucks, computers, etc.)

**Field – Associate Award under LWA**
*ISDP (AID-668-LA-12-00003)*
• RFA sets continuous improvement expectations by requiring expats to be replaced with local labor by the end of Year 3

Note: Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation
Lever application findings: Value lever 1 – Detailed definition

While some awards included detailed metrics or targets in the RFA / RFP, over half of field and DC-based Assistance awards lacked a clearly defined scope.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Source: Oliver Wyman analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overlapping scope</td>
<td>• Scope overlaps with other awards, leading to potentially duplicative activities</td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td>3 3 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Broad scope with no defined metrics(^1)</td>
<td>• Broadly scoped objectives • RFA/RFP does not include defined metrics for success</td>
<td>$31M – $46M</td>
<td>11 1 10 22</td>
<td>Source: Oliver Wyman analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance metrics not quantified</td>
<td>• RFA/RFP includes defined metrics but does not set performance targets</td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td>5 1 3 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Quantifiable targets not linked to accountability</td>
<td>• Performance targets are quantified with unclear mechanism to ensure accountability</td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td>1 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | $31M – $46M | 42 | DC-Assistance (26) | Field-Assistance (25) | DC-Acquisition (7) | Field-Acquisition (2) |

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation.

1) Quantification of future savings based on application on five awards where impact of broad scope with no defined metrics was quantifiable.
### Lever application findings: Value lever 2 – Approach optimization

Analysis indicates opportunity to drive efficiency by ensuring alignment between RFA/RFP objectives and proposed budgets / resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>More resources than required to deliver on objectives</td>
<td>• Award uses unnecessary or duplicative resources based on the described outcomes / approach in the technical proposal</td>
<td>Labor $41M – $46M</td>
<td>3 6 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Admin $12M – $20M</td>
<td>3 2 2 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office / supply costs $4M – $4M</td>
<td>1 3 1 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Travel $8M – $16M</td>
<td>2 3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Savings identified in negotiation used to increase budget</td>
<td>• Savings applied programmatic budget with no corresponding increase in scope</td>
<td>$4M – $9M</td>
<td>4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Significant start-up spend</td>
<td>• Significant start-up spend despite recipient managing similar predecessor project</td>
<td>$1M – $1M</td>
<td>1 1 1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Global activities not implemented at field level</td>
<td>• Activities conducted at global level, then never implemented in field</td>
<td>$4M–$4M</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong> $73M – $99M</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OW Analysis

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

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Lever application findings: Value lever 3 – Shared services

Analysis indicates some opportunity to share services between awards with similar programmatic goals or locations; additional data required to quantify.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Opportunity to share services</td>
<td>• Multiple organizations based in the same location offering similar services (e.g. training events, microcredit program) or administrative costs (e.g. supplies)</td>
<td>$41M – $53M</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Opportunity to share office space</td>
<td>• Multiple organizations based in the same geographic area in different office spaces</td>
<td>$1M – $4M</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>$42M – $58M</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OW Analysis

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

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Lever application findings: Value lever 4 – Increased competition
Nearly all DC acquisition awards reviewed could increase competition, whether through a broader competitive pool or revised award scope

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Limited competition</td>
<td>• Few technically acceptable applicants, despite availability of other applicants</td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No competition</td>
<td>• Sole source environment with opportunity to compete award or portions of award</td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Derived Empirically</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OW Analysis

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

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Lever application findings: Value lever 5 – Cost evaluation prioritization

Two-thirds of reviewed awards did not weight cost in the evaluation criteria during the evaluation process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cost not weighted in evaluation criteria</td>
<td>• Cost evaluations are not incorporated into the final selection process</td>
<td><em>Derived Empirically</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Derived Empirically</em></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OW Analysis

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation.
Lever application findings: Value lever 6 – Optimal cost benchmarks
Five optimal cost benchmark sub-levers drive up to $96M in future savings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inflation / salary escalation rates above benchmarks</td>
<td>• Year-over-year cost increases pegged above inflation for USD-denominated budgets</td>
<td>$42M – $48M</td>
<td>7 4 17 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Salary / fringe above benchmarks</td>
<td>• Individuals’ salaries/fringe exceed those in comparable awards</td>
<td>$18M – $25M</td>
<td>2 1 3 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unit costs above benchmarks</td>
<td>• Individual budget line items are higher than available benchmarks</td>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>$4M – $5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>$0M – $0M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>$1M – $1M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>$1M – $1M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other (office supplies / fees)</td>
<td>$0M – $0M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Indirect cost application inconsistent with benchmarks</td>
<td>• Inconsistent application of indirect costs compared with proposed rates, bases of application, methodology</td>
<td>$15M – $15M</td>
<td>3 1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Budget exchange rate inflated TEC</td>
<td>• Exchange rate above benchmark when award created, inflating TEC</td>
<td>$0M – $0M</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$80M – $96M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OW Analysis
Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

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## Lever application findings: Value lever 7 – Local labor and services

Some opportunity exists to transition from expat/home-based staff to local labor, though lower than expected in part due to lack of detailed budgets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Replace expats with local labor</td>
<td>• Expat labor is used in field offices, but there is evidence of sufficient capacity for local labor</td>
<td>$12M – $18M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Replace home-based staff with local labor</td>
<td>• Home-based staff conduct project management, financial management, and other coordination functions which could be transitioned to local labor</td>
<td>$2M – $2M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$14M – $19M</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** OW Analysis

Note: Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation.

Confidential Information Redacted for Public Disclosure.
### Lever application findings: Value lever 8 – Subcontractor management

Lack of transparency in charges / fees and ambiguity in prime-sub roles drive opportunity to increase efficiency in subcontractor management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Redundant sub management / OH charges</td>
<td>• Prime charges sub handling fee, while sub also charges overhead fee, leading duplicative overhead charges</td>
<td>$23M – $34M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Overhead fees to manage experienced USAID contractors</td>
<td>• Partners charge sub handling fees on subs with extensive USAID experience</td>
<td>$4M – $5M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Overlapping prime-sub roles / activities</td>
<td>• Prime and subs have duplicative programmatic activities, increasing costs but not adding value</td>
<td>$6M – $10M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mismatch between proposed and actual sub role</td>
<td>• Mismatch between RFA/RFP-stated role of subs and actual budgeted or programmatic role</td>
<td>$12M – $28M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>High / unnecessary sub management-related charges</td>
<td>• Excessive fees charged for managing subs compared to benchmarked fees in similar awards</td>
<td>$2M – $38M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total: $46M – $115M</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** OW Analysis

**Note:** Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation.
**Lever application findings: Value lever 10 – Process optimization**

In some awards, internal processes contributed to delays or increased TEC; these findings are not exhaustive and likely underestimate impact within Select 60 awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sub-Lever</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Instrument selection</td>
<td>• Award could be structured as different instrument (e.g. contract instead of CA)</td>
<td>$0M – $0M</td>
<td>3 – 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lengthy steps</td>
<td>• Key steps in process (e.g. review of RFA/RFP) delayed action</td>
<td>$0M – $0M</td>
<td>1 – 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Error / oversight in budgeting process</td>
<td>• Budget errors or lack of standardization led to misrepresentation of TEC</td>
<td>$1M – $16M</td>
<td>3 – 1 1 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Future Savings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1M – $16M</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Future potential savings not discounted to reflect unobligated funds at expiration; Potential savings and cost avoidance projections are gross – do not reflect the cost of implementation

Source: OW Analysis
Extrapolation supporting materials: Award segmentation (1 of 2)
To further understand potential savings differences across awards, the 60 awards were segmented based on objectives outlined in the RFA / RFP

### Awards by type
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th># Awards Reviewed / TEC</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>20 awards $2.4B TEC</td>
<td>• Build capacity through training, tools, and facilitation of service delivery</td>
<td>• US-based NGO conducts training in Kenya to improve awareness of HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12 awards $1.4B TEC</td>
<td>• Conduct field-based work to provide direct services (e.g. medical care, vaccinations) to target populations</td>
<td>• US-based for-profit conducts insecticide activities to prevent against malaria in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to Technical Assistance</td>
<td>9 awards $0.6B TEC</td>
<td>• Transitions from service delivery to technical assistance over the life of the award (usually required by RFA)</td>
<td>• South African NGO provides clinical care and then transitions capacity to government and serves as advisors in last two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9 awards $0.8B TEC</td>
<td>• Administer sub-grants, usually to smaller field-based partners, and conduct project management</td>
<td>• US-based foundation administers global health research grants to foreign-based researchers working in concert with US-based scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4 awards $4.6B TEC</td>
<td>• Purchase commodities (e.g. medicines, contraceptives) in bulk, leveraging economies of scale</td>
<td>• US-based partnership conducts bulk purchases to fulfill materials needs across Global Health programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Services</td>
<td>4 awards $1.1B TEC</td>
<td>• Manage integrated program involving direct service delivery, technical support, and project management</td>
<td>• US-based NGO conducts high-impact MCH interventions and improves approaches to MCH issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2 awards $0.3B TEC</td>
<td>• Identifies qualified global health professionals to fill staffing needs of USAID</td>
<td>• US-based NGO identifies students and professionals with experience / interest in global health to fill USAID’s staffing needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Award files, Oliver Wyman analysis
Extrapolation supporting materials: Award segmentation (2 of 2)
Due to the large size and lower savings in commodity procurement awards, savings ranges for DC-acquisition awards are potentially underestimated.

**Award category size (TEC)**
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

Commodity procurements, considered to be cost-efficient by leveraging economies of scale, may have a disproportionate effect on DC-acquisition savings.

---

**Future Savings**
- 9 – 11%
- 8 – 9%
- 13 – 17%
- 10 – 12%
- 2 – 3%
- 15 – 17%
- 12 – 15%

**Current Savings**
- 2 – 2%
- 2 – 3%
- 3 – 4%
- 0 – 1%
- 5 – 6%
- 1 – 2%

---

1. 6-8% reflects potential savings on future awards; potential savings on currently existing awards range from 1.7% to 2.3%,
Extrapolation supporting materials: Commodities adjustment (1 of 2)
Commodities, which only appear in DC-Acquisition\(^1\), represent ~22%\(^2\) of obligations; explicitly breaking them out segments savings opportunities

Extrapolating commodities across Global Health projected obligations

1. Commodities represent 78% of analyzable TEC of DC-Acquisition awards reviewed
   - Commodities have no identified savings due to leveraging economies of scale
   - To calculate savings, the ratio of commodities in the awards reviewed (78:22) is assumed in the $1.4B projected annual obligation of DC-Acquisition
   - In this case, of $5.1B in Global Health projected obligations, $1.1B (22%) is assumed to be for commodities
   - However, actual level of commodity obligations may be different
   - Information is not readily available in Global A&A System or in awards reviewed

Implications: The total cumulative opportunity will be influenced by the actual proportion of commodities to total obligations
   - If commodities represent less than 22% of total obligations, total opportunity may be higher
   - If commodities represent more than 22% of total obligations, total opportunity may be lower

---

1. Four commodity procurement awards reviewed in Select 60 were all DC-Acquisition
2. Based on commodity procurement awards reviewed in Select 60
3. Future potential award savings
Extrapolation supporting materials: Commodities adjustment (2 of 2)
Varying the annual level of commodity obligations yields a greater range of potential cumulative savings opportunities\(^1\)

### Annual Global Health obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Health projected annual obligations</th>
<th>$B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$6B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5B</td>
<td>$1.1B 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4B</td>
<td>$0.3B 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3B</td>
<td>$1.1B 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2B</td>
<td>$0.5B 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1B</td>
<td>$2.1B 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Savings sensitivity based on varying amount of commodity obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of annual commodity obligations in the Global Health portfolio on savings</th>
<th>Cumulative savings opportunity(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.6B – 12%</td>
<td>$1.2B – $1.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.9B – 17%</td>
<td>$1.1B – $1.5B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base case: Share of commodities in DC-Acquisition</strong> $1.1B – 22%</td>
<td><strong>$1.0B – $1.4B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>awards reviewed by ACES working team</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1.4B – 27%</td>
<td>$0.9B – $1.2B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Share of commodities capped at 27% for sensitivity analysis to not exceed the total projected level of DC-acquisition obligations

---

1. Cumulative savings opportunity during the next five years, from FY2014 to FY2018
2. Commodities were identified in only DC-Acquisition awards out of the Select 60 awards reviewed
Extrapolation supporting materials: Lever quantification
Though the opportunity size for shared services and local labor and services appears low, the full potential future award opportunity is likely higher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lever</th>
<th>3 Shared services</th>
<th>7 Local labor and services</th>
<th>9 Economies of scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Findings</strong>&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>• 15 opportunities identified but not quantified</td>
<td>• 6 opportunities ($12-18M) to transition expat labor</td>
<td>• Not identified as a lever for any of the 60 analyzed awards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Driver of low future award opportunity estimates** | • Lack of cross-award data  
  – Requires visibility into awards with similar programs / geographies | • Lack of detailed budget data  
  – Requires line item budget broken out by role / title | • Lack of detailed budget data  
  • Lack of cross-award data  
  – Requires visibility into awards with similar programs / geographies |
| | • AOR/COR knowledge of local labor market  
  – For some awards, lever was not applied after officers cited lack of resource availability to transition | • Limited opportunity found in many field awards  
  – Many proposals limited expat / home-based labor to a few key personnel | • Limited opportunity found in awards  
  – Large task orders already aggregate demand for commodities |
| **Implications** | • High opportunity likely exists  
  – Requires view across awards to better assess full shared service potential | • Some opportunity likely exists  
  – Requires detailed budgets and knowledge of local resource availability to assess full potential | • Some opportunity may exist in goods not procured at an aggregate level (e.g. laptops); however, total savings opportunity likely low given small percentage of budget allocated to these items |

The opportunity for increasing use of shared services and local labor and services could be better assessed with more geographic and programmatic context

---

<sup>1</sup> Future award potential savings (OW analysis)
Savings extrapolation calculation steps: Summary
How are savings from the Select 60 translated into the total estimated savings numbers?

• **Step 1:** Estimate breakdown in current awards between ACES Scope (226), non-ACES Scope
  – Estimate yearly GH portfolio budget based on total obligation for 1,111 active awards, broken down by DC vs. Field and Acquisition vs. Assistance
  – Approximate the annual share of current award projected obligations of ACES scope awards vs. non-ACES scope awards

• **Step 2:** Calculate projected obligations for next five years based on segmentation between current (ACES vs. Non-ACES) and future
  – Estimate annual obligations for Global Health awards
  – Project the remaining obligations of current awards
  – Apply the breakdown of current awards between ACES scope and non-ACES scope
  – Calculate future as the difference between current and total projected obligations

• **Step 3:** Calculate savings percentages
  – Calculate potential future and current award opportunities for Select 60
  – Calculate savings percentages by Acquisition / Assistance and Field / DC, with commodities broken out separately (commodities only observed in DC-Acquisition awards)

• **Step 4:** Apply savings percentages to the projected obligations
  – Apply current award savings percentages to ACES scope projected obligations
  – Apply future award savings percentages to future award projected obligations
Savings extrapolation calculation steps
Step 1: Estimate breakdown in current awards between ACES Scope and non-ACES Scope

1a Estimate yearly GH portfolio budget based on total obligation for active awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Awards with &lt;2 years since POP start</th>
<th>Awards with &gt;2 years since POP start</th>
<th>Total active award obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divide TEC by total award length (years)</td>
<td>Divide obligated funds by years elapsed since award start</td>
<td>Annual total projected obligations, to be extrapolated to future years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACES Scope</td>
<td>$1.4B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>$2.7B (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ACES Scope</td>
<td>$0.4B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>$2.4B (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$1.8B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>$5.1B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1b Approximate the annual share of current award projected obligations of ACES scope awards vs. non-ACES scope awards

Share of current award projected obligations: ACES scope vs. non-ACES scope

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2014</th>
<th>FY2015</th>
<th>FY2016</th>
<th>FY2017</th>
<th>FY2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACES Scope Share</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ACES Scope Share</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

- Breakdown for Year 1 based on Step 1a
  - No ACES awards expire in the first two years
  - ACES scope only includes awards with greater than 2 years remaining
- ACES awards expire at a constant rate of 33% per year in FY2016 – FY2018
Determine mix of DC vs. Field, Acquisition vs. Assistance and commodities in projected annual obligations for Global Health programs ($5.1B)

1c

Commodities were only found in DC-Acquisition awards out of the Select 60 reviewed in step 1a.

Supporting information for 3: Savings extrapolation

Global Health projected annual obligations

- **Commodities**
  - $5.1B (based on step 1a)
  - $0.3B (6%)
  - $1.1B (22%)
  - $1.1B (21%)
  - $0.5B (10%)
  - $2.1B (41%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segmentation</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC-Acquisition (Commodities)</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-Acquisition (Non-Commodities)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-Assistance</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field-Acquisition</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field-Assistance</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Commodities were identified in only DC-Acquisition awards out of the Select 60 awards reviewed.
### Savings extrapolation calculation steps

**Step 2: Calculate projected obligations for next five years based on segmentation between current (ACES vs. Non-ACES) and future**

#### 2a Estimate annual obligations of Global Health awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actuals</th>
<th>Projections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 1 FY2014</td>
<td>Year 2 FY2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected obligations</td>
<td>$5.1B</td>
<td>$5.1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Based on Step 1a</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2b Project the remaining obligations of current awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1 FY2014</th>
<th>Year 2 FY2015</th>
<th>Year 3 FY2016</th>
<th>Year 4 FY2017</th>
<th>Year 5 FY2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current award obligations</td>
<td>$5.1B * 100% = $5.1B</td>
<td>$5.1B * 80% = $4.1B</td>
<td>$5.1B * 60% = $3.1B</td>
<td>$5.1B * 40% = $2.0B</td>
<td>$5.1B * 20% = $1.0B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2c Apply the breakdown of current awards between ACES scope and non-ACES scope

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1 FY2014</th>
<th>Year 2 FY2015</th>
<th>Year 3 FY2016</th>
<th>Year 4 FY2017</th>
<th>Year 5 FY2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACES Scope</td>
<td>$5.1B * 53% = $2.7B</td>
<td>$4.1B * 66% = $2.7B</td>
<td>$3.1B * 81% = $2.5B</td>
<td>$2.0B * 77% = $1.6B</td>
<td>$1.0B * 66% = $0.7B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ACES Scope</td>
<td>$5.1B * 47% = $2.4B</td>
<td>$4.1B * 34% = $1.4B</td>
<td>$3.1B * 19% = $0.6B</td>
<td>$2.0B * 23% = $0.5B</td>
<td>$1.0B * 34% = $0.3B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2d Calculate future as the difference between total and current projected obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1 FY2014</th>
<th>Year 2 FY2015</th>
<th>Year 3 FY2016</th>
<th>Year 4 FY2017</th>
<th>Year 5 FY2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future award obligations</td>
<td>$5.1B - $5.1B = $0.0B</td>
<td>$5.1B - $4.1B = $1.0B</td>
<td>$5.1B - $3.1B = $2.0B</td>
<td>$5.1B - $2.0B = $3.1B</td>
<td>$5.1B - $1.0B = $4.1B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1) Based on ACES working team discussions on the rate of active awards that expire every year

© Oliver Wyman
Savings extrapolation calculation steps

Step 3: Calculate savings percentages

### 3a Calculate potential future and current award opportunities for Select 60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lever-Specific Savings</th>
<th>Empirically Derived Savings</th>
<th>Total Raw Savings from Select 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantified based on award files / budgets</td>
<td>Quantified based on findings from empirical research</td>
<td>Can be segmented by DC(^1) vs. Field / Acq. vs. Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current</strong></td>
<td>$81M - $111M</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future</strong></td>
<td>$287M - $450M</td>
<td>$310M - $313M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3b Calculate current and future award savings percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Awards</th>
<th>Total Raw Savings from Select 60</th>
<th>Analyzable Unobligated from Select 60</th>
<th>Current Award Potential Savings Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition (Non-Commodities)</td>
<td>$14M - $25M</td>
<td>$0.4B</td>
<td>4% - 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition (Commodities)</td>
<td>$0M - $0M</td>
<td>$1.2B</td>
<td>0% - 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Assistance</td>
<td>$48M - $58M</td>
<td>$2.4B</td>
<td>2% - 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Acquisition</td>
<td>$0M - $0M</td>
<td>$0.1B</td>
<td>0% - 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Assistance</td>
<td>$19M - $27M</td>
<td>$0.8B</td>
<td>2% - 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Current Award Potential</strong></td>
<td>$81M - $111M</td>
<td>$4.9B</td>
<td>2% - 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Awards</th>
<th>Total Raw Savings from Select 60</th>
<th>Analyzable TEC from Select 60</th>
<th>Future Award Potential Savings Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition (Non-Commodities)</td>
<td>$130M - $188M</td>
<td>$1.0B</td>
<td>13% - 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition (Commodities)</td>
<td>$0M - $0M</td>
<td>$3.7B</td>
<td>0% - 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Assistance</td>
<td>$323M - $379M</td>
<td>$3.4B</td>
<td>9% - 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Acquisition</td>
<td>$19M - $31M</td>
<td>$0.1B</td>
<td>20% - 32%(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Assistance</td>
<td>$125M - $165M</td>
<td>$1.2B</td>
<td>10% - 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Future Award Potential</strong></td>
<td>$597M - $762M</td>
<td>$9.4B</td>
<td>6% - 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. DC-Acquisition can be segmented by commodities and non-commodities (all awards reviewed with commodities were DC-Acquisition awards); no potential savings assumed on commodities; 2. Due to small sample size (n=2), DC Acquisition non-commodities future range of 13-18% used for Field Acquisition awards
Confidential Information Redacted.
USAID AWARD COST EFFICIENCY STUDY
GLOBAL HEALTH A&A AWARD PORTFOLIO-LEVEL ANALYSES
DECEMBER 6, 2013
Contents

• Document context
  • Award portfolio-level hypotheses organized by
    – ACES recommendations
    – Other study focus areas
  • Appendix
Context: Global Health portfolio-level analyses
We have conducted a series of analyses to test hypotheses generated through the award analysis, process, and partner workstreams

• Objective: To support the hypotheses generated throughout the ACES project, a series of quantitative analyses were conducted to test findings from the award analysis, process, and partner workstreams

• Data sources: Depending on data availability, portfolio-level analyses were conducted across several data sets
  – Data was based on a GH extract from USAID’s Global A&A System (GLAAS), the 60 awards reviewed, and USASpending
  – Where possible, the largest data set was used; however, a significant amount of data was available only through detailed review of 60 awards

• Contents: This document consolidates key findings from the portfolio-level analyses and are organized into categories:
  – Recommendation analyses: A series of analyses were conducted to inform and support recommendations
  – Other focus study areas: Ad-hoc analyses conducted to support working assumptions
## GH award portfolio-level hypotheses tied to recommendations and data sets (1 of 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Data set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Define “what success looks like” during award design</td>
<td>1.A Technical assistance, service delivery, and comprehensive services awards are most in need of more clearly defined project scopes</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.A Acquisition is used more frequently in field vs. DC awards due to the smaller average size of field awards, but more dollars flow through DC acquisition due to large commodity procurements</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>1,111 active awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Select most appropriate instrument (i.e., Acquisition or Assistance) to enable effective award management</td>
<td>2.B Use of assistance has been increasing relative to acquisition (by TEC, obligated funds, and number of awards)</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>1,215 awards started from FY08 to FY12 in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.C Average award size has been increasing for assistance awards relative to acquisition awards (by TEC)</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Increase financial transparency of administrative / programmatic costs</td>
<td>3.A It is difficult to discern trends in programmatic spend by award type due to non-standardized cost bucket definitions and cost reporting practices across awards</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.B Indirect costs tend to be lower for larger awards</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.C Indirect cost efficiency is greater for awards with more narrowly defined programmatic objectives (i.e., commodity procurement, grant management, etc.)</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Begin to evaluate costs in relation to outcomes</td>
<td>4.A Cost evaluation is prioritized more heavily in larger awards (by TEC)</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.B Cost evaluation is prioritized more frequently for acquisition awards than assistance awards</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GH award portfolio-level hypotheses tied to recommendations and data sets (2 of 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Data set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Opportunities to promote competition exist across award categories</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.A</td>
<td>Larger awards (by TEC) generally have fewer viable applicants</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.B</td>
<td>Awards featuring the use of subs generally have fewer applicants</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.C</td>
<td>Awards with more amorphous programmatic objectives generally rely more on subs</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.D</td>
<td>Awards that promote consortia of major partners have fewer viable applicants</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.E</td>
<td>Larger awards promote consortia of major partners more frequently compared with smaller awards</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hypotheses developed and tested via process, partner, and peer organization findings</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.A</td>
<td>Assess and motivate partner performance using appropriate, measurable, and timely metrics that hold partners accountable for value-for-money results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Awards in all categories show scope overlap</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.A</td>
<td>Broaden existing practice of managing the universe of awards as a portfolio from planning through award management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Finding</td>
<td>Data set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Equip personnel with the right skills to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate</td>
<td><em>Hypotheses developed and tested via process, partner, and peer organization findings</em></td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Enable timely access to relevant, useful information</td>
<td><em>Hypotheses developed and tested via process, partner, and peer organization findings</em></td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Streamline, standardize, and automate A&amp;A processes to reduce variation and ensure it is only selectively, intentionally used</td>
<td>10.A The length of the pre-award process from RFA issuance to period-of-performance (POP) start date varies by type of award</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.B POP start dates are concentrated around the end (September) and beginning (October) of the fiscal year</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>1,215 awards started from FY08 to FY12 in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.C The amount of TEC that is never obligated to an award is higher for DC-Assistance awards started at the end of the fiscal year</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>1,900 expired awards in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other study focus areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Area</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Data set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Savings levers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL.A</td>
<td>Value levers are more applicable to award categories with more amorphous</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>programmatic objectives (i.e. technical assistance / service delivery /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>comprehensive services)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL.B</td>
<td>Value levers apply more frequently in Assistance awards</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL.C</td>
<td>Value levers apply more frequently in larger awards based on TEC</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>60 awards reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funds obligated at expiration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO.A</td>
<td>A significant amount of funds remain unobligated at expiration, relative to</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>1,900 expired awards in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO.B</td>
<td>Larger awards have more funds unobligated at expiration, relative to TEC</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>1,900 expired awards in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO.C</td>
<td>Awards are under-obligated in the earlier portions of the period-of-</td>
<td>Refuted</td>
<td>1,900 expired awards in GLAAS database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>performance, leading to over-obligations in the latter portions of POP to</td>
<td></td>
<td>and USASpending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>utilize the available TEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothesis: Technical assistance, service delivery, and comprehensive services awards are most in need of more clearly defined project scopes

Frequency of awards with defined project scopes\(^1\) by award category\(^2\)
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Category</th>
<th># Awards</th>
<th>Project scope defined</th>
<th>Project scope not defined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance (TA)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Based on application of Detailed Definition (lever 1) in 60 awards reviewed
\(^2\) See appendix for detail on award category segmentation

Hypothesis refuted
Opportunity to define what success looks like during award design is prevalent across all award categories

1. Based on application of Detailed Definition (lever 1) in 60 awards reviewed
2. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
Hypothesis: Acquisition is used more frequently in field vs. DC awards due to the smaller average size of field awards, but more dollars flow through DC acquisition due to large commodity procurements (1 of 2)

Share of instrument type by award count at DC vs. Field for active awards (1,111)
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

**Hypothesis inconclusive**
Acquisition instruments comprise a roughly even mix of awards (by count) amongst both DC and Field awards

1. Includes GSA schedule orders, BPAs, PSCs, POs, and PCOs
2. Includes grants and fixed obligation grants

© Oliver Wyman
Hypothesis: Acquisition is used more frequently in field vs. DC awards due to the smaller average size of field awards, but more dollars flow through DC acquisition due to large commodity procurements (2 of 2)

Share of instrument type by TEC at DC vs. Field for active awards (1,111)
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

Hypothesis inconclusive
Acquisition awards comprise a greater share of DC awards relative to Field awards, primarily due to concentration of large commodity procurements amongst DC awards

1. Commodity procurements comprise 36% of DC-based awards by TEC
2. Task Orders under active IQCs removed to avoid double-counting; total ceiling of task orders considered the single TEC of the IQC and all corresponding task orders
3. Includes GSA schedule orders, BPAs, PSCs, POs, and PCOs
4. Includes grants and fixed obligation grants

© Oliver Wyman
Hypothesis: Use of assistance has been increasing relative to acquisition (by TEC, obligated funds, and number of awards) (1 of 3)

Share of TEC $ started by year based on FY2008 to FY2012 data¹
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total awards</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
<th>CPs removed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>$1.3B</td>
<td>$3.7B</td>
<td>1 ($2.7B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>$4.7B</td>
<td>$2.9B</td>
<td>2 ($0.7B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>$2.1B</td>
<td>$3.3B</td>
<td>2 ($1.0B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2011</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>$2.1B</td>
<td>$3.5B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>$0.5B</td>
<td>$3.5B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis supported
Based on TEC, the share of assistance relative to acquisition has increased annually since FY2009

1. Excludes purchase orders and grants
2. Excluded SCMS and DELIVER task orders

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Hypothesis: Use of assistance has been increasing relative to acquisition (by TEC, obligated funds, and number of awards) (2 of 3)

Share of obligated funds based on award start date for awards started from FY2008 to FY2012 data
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total awards</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
<th>CPs removed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>$1.1B</td>
<td>$2.8B</td>
<td>1 ($1.7B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>$3.3B</td>
<td>$1.9B</td>
<td>2 ($0.6B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>$1.7B</td>
<td>$2.0B</td>
<td>2 ($0.5B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2011</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>$1.3B</td>
<td>$1.8B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>$0.3B</td>
<td>$1.0B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis supported**

Based on obligated funds, the share of assistance relative to acquisition has increased annually since FY2009

1. Excludes purchase orders and grants
2. Excluded SCMS and DELIVER task orders

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Hypothesis: Use of assistance has been increasing relative to acquisition (by TEC, obligated funds, and number of awards) (3 of 3)

Share of TEC\(^1\) and awards started based on award start dates from FY2008 to FY2012
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TEC (Awards Started)</th>
<th>Assistance (Awards Started)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>25% 40%</td>
<td>75% 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>41% 62%</td>
<td>38% 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>40% 59%</td>
<td>60% 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2011</td>
<td>37% 46%</td>
<td>63% 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012</td>
<td>13% 42%</td>
<td>87% 58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis supported**

Based on number of awards, the share of assistance relative to acquisition has remained steady since FY2008; there may be other potential causes for the relative increase in TEC for assistance awards, such as average award size.

Note: Excludes purchase orders and grants; potential causes for increase by TEC but not awards started is that the President announced significant GH funding several years ago that did not materialize

1. Includes commodity procurement awards
Recommendation 2: Select most appropriate instrument

Hypothesis: Average award size has been increasing for assistance awards relative to acquisition awards (by TEC)

Average award size ($TEC) - Acquisition
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

Average award size ($TEC) - Assistance
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

Hypothesis supported
Assistance awards have increased in average size by 26% overall since FY2009, while acquisition awards have decreased in average size by 89%

Note: Analysis excludes grants and purchase orders
1. Spike in FY2009 may be caused by start of two large commodity awards

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Hypothesis: It is difficult to discern trends in programmatic spend by award type due to non-standardized cost bucket definitions and cost reporting practices across awards (1 of 2)

Budget breakdown by award category
Based on budget data for 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Category</th>
<th># Awards</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>70%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>90%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average indirect budgets range from 9% – 13% for TA / service delivery
Ratio of subs’ costs to total costs is 3.5 to 1.0; significant variation by award
Ratio of commodity costs to total costs is 4.3 to 1.0; significant variation by award

Hypothesis supported
Some trends exist in cost bucketing but there is significant variation in budgets within award categories, making it difficult to draw meaningful insights

1. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
2. Two technical assistance (TA) awards had no budget breakdown and were removed from budgetary analysis
3. Indirect costs defined as NICRA-allowable costs; does not include direct cost line items that may be indirect in nature
Hypothesis: It is difficult to discern trends in programmatic spend by award type due to non-standardized cost bucket definitions and cost reporting practices across awards (2 of 2)

Min-max range for budget categories by award category

Based on budget data for 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TA</th>
<th>Service Delivery To TA</th>
<th>Service Delivery</th>
<th>Grant Management</th>
<th>Commodity Procurement</th>
<th>Comprehensive services</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect⁢³</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subs</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Direct Costs</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials / Supplies</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards w/ detailed budget</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total awards</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis inconclusive**

Major budget variations exist within categories across individual awards, making it difficult to draw meaningful insights

---

1. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
2. For commodity procurements, commodity costs are often passed through subs, obscuring the true breakdown between budget buckets
3. Indirect costs defined as NICRA-allowable costs; does not include direct cost line items that may be indirect in nature; does not include costs that are indirect in nature for several smaller organizations that do not have NICRA agreements

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Hypothesis: Indirect costs tend to be lower for larger awards

Average programmatic spend per dollar of indirect\(^1\) spend by award size
Based on budget data for 60 awards reviewed

Hypothesis inconclusive
Removing commodity procurement awards reveals that larger awards have similar indirect costs as smaller awards, despite their ability to share more indirect costs across their activities and programs

Note: Excludes two awards with no budget data and two awards with incomplete indirect cost data
1. Indirect includes NICRA-allowable indirect costs and fees; award budgets lacked the detail to categorize line-item costs as programmatic vs. administrative

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Recommendation 3: Increase financial transparency of administrative / programmatic costs

Hypothesis: Indirect cost efficiency is greater for awards with more narrowly defined programmatic objectives (i.e., commodity procurement, grant management, etc.)

Average programmatic spend per dollar of indirect spend by award category

Based on budget data for 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Category</th>
<th>Award Count</th>
<th>Average Programmatic Spend per Dollar of Indirect Spend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$15.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$120.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: $15.66

Hypothesis supported

Indirect cost efficiency is greatest for grant management and commodity procurement awards with more narrowly defined programmatic objectives; however, significant variation does exist within award categories.

Note: Excludes two awards with no budget data and two awards with incomplete indirect cost data
1. Indirect includes NICRA-allowable indirect costs and fees; award budgets lacked the detail to categorize line-item costs as programmatic vs. administrative
2. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
Hypothesis: Cost evaluation is prioritized more heavily in larger awards (by TEC)

Frequency of cost being prioritized as an evaluation criterion by award size
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

Hypothesis refuted
As award size increases, cost evaluation being prioritized as an evaluation criterion decreases; 10% of awards reviewed with TEC over $150M prioritized cost as an evaluation criterion, compared with 52% of awards reviewed with TEC <$75M

Note: Based on application of Cost Evaluation Prioritization (lever 5) in 60 awards reviewed
Hypothesis: Cost evaluation is prioritized more frequently for acquisition awards than assistance awards

Frequency of cost being prioritized as an evaluation criterion by instrument type
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument Type</th>
<th>Cost Evaluation Prioritized</th>
<th>Cost Evaluation Not Prioritized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Awards
- Acquisition: 9
- Assistance: 51

Hypothesis refuted
Cost evaluation is prioritized more frequently for assistance awards, although there is opportunity to increase cost evaluation prioritization across both instrument types

Note: Based on application of Cost Evaluation Prioritization (lever 5) in 60 awards reviewed

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Confidential Information Redacted for Public Disclosure.
Hypothesis: Opportunities to promote competition exist across award categories

Frequency of application of Increased Competition (lever 4) sub-levers by award category\(^1\)

Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Technical Assistance (TA)</th>
<th>Service Delivery</th>
<th>Service Delivery to TA</th>
<th>Grant Management</th>
<th>Commodity Procurement</th>
<th>Comprehensive services</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited competition(^2)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No competition (^3)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total awards reviewed

- 20
- 12
- 9
- 9
- 4
- 4
- 2

1. Technical assistance and grant management awards had the greatest incidence of limited to no competition for award categories with notable sample size (n>8)
2. High levels of competition were observed in awards that transition from service delivery to technical assistance; this is primarily due to many of those awards splitting from one larger award into several smaller ones, promoting increased competition
3. Limited to no competition was observed on all commodity procurement awards reviewed; each award was relatively large, and each was a task order under an IQC

**Hypothesis supported**

Limited to no competition was observed in 40% of awards reviewed, with a relatively wide distribution across award categories

---

1. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
2. Few technically acceptable applicants, despite availability of other applicants
3. Sole source environment with opportunity to compete award or portions of award
**Hypothesis: Larger awards (by TEC) generally have fewer applicants**

**Award size vs. number of applicants**
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award size</th>
<th>Applicants</th>
<th>Award count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$75M</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75M - 150M</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150M - $300M</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$300M</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were an average of 8 applicants for the 25 awards reviewed with TEC < $75M.
Relatively larger awards had significantly fewer applicants.

**Hypothesis supported**
Relatively large awards feature less competition, removing incentive for applicants to promote value for money.
Hypthesis: Awards featuring the use of subs generally have fewer applicants

Number of subs\textsuperscript{1} vs. number of applicants
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Count</th>
<th>0 Subs</th>
<th>1-5 Subs</th>
<th>6-10 Subs</th>
<th>11-30 Subs</th>
<th>&gt;30 Subs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Award count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Applicants</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards with a relatively high number of subs generally have fewer applicants than awards with relatively fewer subs

Average: 5.3 applicants

Hypothesis supported
While competition decreases as the number of subs increases, the net effect on value for money should be considered in light of other Agency objectives such as building local capacity

---

\textsuperscript{1} “Number of subs” refers to sub-recipients, sub-grantees, and sub-contractors, and is only the number of subs for the prime recipient who ultimately won the award
Recommendation 5: Promote Competition

Hypothesis: Awards with more amorphous programmatic objectives generally rely more on subs

Number of subs\(^1\) by award category\(^2\)
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Category</th>
<th>Number of Awards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive services</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total TEC
- TA: $2.4B
- Service Delivery: $1.4B
- Service Delivery to TA: $0.6B
- Grant Management: $0.8B
- Commodity Procurement: $4.6B
- Comprehensive services: $1.1B
- Staffing: $0.3B

Hypothesis inconclusive
The variation in sub usage within award categories obscures insights connecting sub usage to specific award categories, regardless of programmatic objectives

1. Includes sub-recipients, sub-contractors, sub-grantees, and sub-consultants, and is only the number of subs for the prime recipient who ultimately won the award
2. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation

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Hypothesis: Awards that promote consortia of major partners have fewer viable applicants

Number of “Top 15 Partners”¹ acting as subs² vs. number of applicants
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award count</th>
<th>0 Top 15 Subs</th>
<th>1 Top 15 Sub</th>
<th>2 Top 15 Subs</th>
<th>3 Top 15 Subs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards with no top 15 partners acting as subs have significantly greater applicants

Average: 5.3 applicants

Hypothesis supported
As the number of “Top 15 partners”¹ acting as subs increases, the number of applicants / offerors decreases

Note: Identification of top 15 partners only for the winning applicant – no visibility into the frequency of major partners acting as subs on the non-winning application
1. Based on TEC for active awards from GLAAS extract of Global Health Awards as of July 16, 2013, start dates from 1996 – 2013; note that this includes Water Supply and Sanitation Awards
2. Includes sub-recipients, sub-contractors, sub-grantees, and sub-consultants, and is only the number of subs for the prime recipient who ultimately won the award
Hypothesis: Larger awards promote consortia between major partners more often than smaller awards

Number of “Top 15 Partners”\(^1\) acting as subs\(^2\) by award size
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

Hypothesis supported
As award size increases, the inclusion of “Top 15 partners”\(^1\) as subs increases, likely due to the complexity of such awards; higher levels of collaboration correlate with decreased competition

Note: Identification of top 15 partners only for the winning applicant – no visibility into the frequency of major partners acting as subs on the non-winning application
1. Based on TEC for active awards from GLAAS extract of Global Health Awards as of July 16, 2013, start dates from 1996 – 2013; note that this includes Water Supply and Sanitation Awards
2. Includes sub-recipients, sub-contractors, sub-grantees, and sub-consultants, and is only the number of subs for the prime recipient who ultimately won the award
Hypothesis: Awards in all categories show scope overlap

**Frequency of awards with overlapping scopes** by award category

Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Category</th>
<th># Awards</th>
<th>Overlapping Scope</th>
<th>Non-overlapping Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance (TA)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Could not evaluate – insufficient information</td>
<td>Could not evaluate – insufficient information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis inconclusive**

Could not evaluate universally due to lack of comparable award scope information; in limited sample of commodity procurement and comprehensive services awards, we found significant overlap

1. Based on application of Detailed Definition (lever 1) sub-lever “Overlapping Scope” in 60 awards reviewed
2. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation

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Confidential Information Redacted for Public Disclosure.
Hypothesis: The length of the pre-award process from RFA issuance to period-of-performance (POP) start date varies by type of award

Days Elapsed from RFA Issuance to POP Start
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed and available award documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th># Days Elapsed</th>
<th>Award Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC-Acquisition</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-Assistance</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field-Acquisition</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field-Assistance</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: 211 Days

**Hypothesis supported**
Acquisition generally takes longer from the RFP issuance to POP start than assistance, which may contribute to institutional bias toward assistance, particularly in the field.

Note: 18 awards reviewed did not contain explicit information on RFA issuance dates
Hypothesis: Period-of-performance start dates are concentrated around the end (September) and beginning (October) of the fiscal year

Average share of awards started by month based on FY2008 to FY2012 data

Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

Hypothesis supported

Award start dates are clustered in September and October around the start of new fiscal years; the large September spike in DC-Assistance may represent increased burden, overloaded processes / systems, and rushed evaluation / negotiation periods

1) Excludes purchase orders and grants

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Hypothesis: The amount of TEC that is never obligated to an award is higher for DC-Assistance awards started at the end of the fiscal year.

Funds obligated at expiration as a percentage of total TEC by award start month

Based on GLAAS extract of expired DC-Assistance GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>% of TEC obligated at expiration</th>
<th>% of TEC unobligated at expiration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historical average (outliers included)
- % of TEC obligated at expiration: 73%
- % of TEC unobligated at expiration: 27%

Sample size: Oct = 3, Nov = 0, Dec = 33, Jan = 8, Feb = 8, Mar = 6, Apr = 12, May = 3, Jun = 4, Jul = 9, Aug = 10, Sep = 100

Hypothesis supported – understanding root causes requires further investigation

The relatively low level of obligations for DC-Assistance awards started in September may relate to timing of process – a need to allocate funds at end of fiscal year may drive use of assistance (shorter PALT) and overbudgeting of TEC.

Note: Excludes grants; Represents only expired DC-Assistance awards; Start dates extend back to 1999; Obligations capped at TEC; Outliers included

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Hypothesis: Value levers are more applicable to award categories with more amorphous programmatic objectives (i.e. technical assistance / service delivery / comprehensive services)

**Frequency of lever application by award category**
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lever (Times Applied)</th>
<th>Technical Assistance (TA)</th>
<th>Service Delivery</th>
<th>Service Delivery to TA</th>
<th>Grant Management</th>
<th>Commodity Procurement</th>
<th>Comprehensive Services</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Detailed Definition (42)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Approach Optimization (28)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Shared Services (29)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Increased Competition (24)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Cost Evaluation Prioritization (41)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Optimal Cost Benchmarks (40)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Local Labor and Services (9)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Subcontractor Management (20)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economies of Scale (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Process Optimization (10)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**
- 25 - 50%
- 50 - 75%
- 75 - 100%

**Hypothesis inconclusive**

Value levers apply across categories; awards that involve a transition from Service Delivery to Technical Assistance showed the greatest concentration of “definitional” levers being applied.

Note: Does not account for application of empirical analyses (performance-based competition and continuous improvement)
1. See appendix for detail on award category segmentation
Hypothesis: Value levers apply more frequently in Assistance awards

Frequency of lever application by award type  
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lever (Times Applied)</th>
<th>DC-Acquisition</th>
<th>DC-Assistance</th>
<th>Field-Acquisition</th>
<th>Field-Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Detailed Definition (42)</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Approach Optimization (28)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Shared Services (29)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Increased Competition (24)</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Cost Evaluation Prioritization (41)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Optimal Cost Benchmarks (40)</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Local Labor and Services (9)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Subcontractor Management (20)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economies of Scale (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Process Optimization (10)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 7 26 2 25

Hypothesis refuted  
Value levers applied evenly across award types; Levers #1-6 applied more frequently in Assistance while #8 and 10 (Subcontractor Mgmt and Process Optimization) applied most frequently in Acquisition

Note: Does not account for application of empirical analyses (performance-based competition and continuous improvement)
Hypothesis: Value levers apply more frequently in larger awards based on TEC

Frequency of lever application by award size
Based on Oliver Wyman analysis of 60 awards reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lever (Times Applied)</th>
<th>TEC &lt; $75M</th>
<th>TEC $75M - $150M</th>
<th>TEC $150M - $300M</th>
<th>TEC &gt; $300M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Detailed Definition (42)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Approach Optimization (28)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Shared Services (29)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Increased Competition (24)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Cost Evaluation Prioritization (41)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Optimal Cost Benchmarks (40)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Local Labor and Services (9)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Subcontractor Management (20)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economies of Scale (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Process Optimization (10)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 25 15 14 6

Hypothesis supported
Larger awards generally show greater applicability of levers: all awards with TEC > $300M showed opportunity to increase competition, prioritize cost in evaluation process, and benchmark costs across awards.

Note: Does not account for application of empirical analyses (performance-based competition and continuous improvement)
Hypothesis: A significant amount of funds remains unobligated at expiration, relative to TEC

Unobligated vs. obligated as a percentage of total TEC by award type and origination
Based on GLAAS extract of expired GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th>Excludes Outliers</th>
<th>% of TEC unobligated at expiration</th>
<th>% of TEC obligated at expiration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC Acquisition</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Assistance</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Acquisition</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Assistance</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Several extreme outliers1, particularly in DC-based Acquisition awards, skew the % of TEC obligated at expiration
• Awards representing the top 5 percentile of the share of unobligated funds at expiration were removed to normalize
• Historically, field-based awards use nearly all of their TEC at expiration
• DC-based awards exhibited lower rates of obligated funds at expiration relative to field-based awards, particularly for acquisition awards

Hypothesis refuted

With outliers excluded, the share of obligated funds at expiration as a percent of TEC is relatively high, particularly for field-based awards

Source: GLAAS extract of Global Health Awards as of July 16, 2013, start dates from 1996 – 2013; note that this includes Water Supply and Sanitation Awards, as well as expired awards
Note: No awards are within our review scope since all are expired
Note: All grants removed to ensure exclusion of PIOs
1. Outliers were primarily DC-based IQCs/TOs with TEC of $250M to $750M with no recorded obligations; removing top 5 percentile excluded these outliers
Hypothesis: Larger awards have more funds unobligated at expiration, relative to TEC

TEC Unobligated at Expiration
Based on GLAAS extract of expired GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Size</th>
<th>% of TEC unobligated at expiration</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>TEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10M - $30M</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>$3.1 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30M - $60M</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>$2.7 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60M - $100M</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$1.4 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100M - $150M</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$1.6 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150M - $300M</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$0.8 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $300M</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2.1 B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis supported
As award size increases, the percentage of unobligated TEC at expiration also increases; seems to imply the usage or rate of subscription of larger awards may be less predictable

Note: Based on GLAAS extract of Global Health Awards as of July 16, 2013; start dates from 1996 – 2013; This analysis only includes expired awards with TEC > $10M
Note: Removed 13 DC-based acquisition awards with no usage
Hypothesis: Awards are under-obligated in the earlier portions of the period-of-performance (POP), leading to over-obligations in the latter portions of POP to use up the available TEC

**Acquisition Awards**
Based on USASpending and Global A&A system

**Assistance Awards**
Based on USASpending and Global A&A system

\[ n = 17 \quad r = .84 \]

\[ n = 25 \quad r = .70 \]

**Key**
- Trendline
- Baseline, representing 1:1 ratio of time to obligations

**Hypothesis refuted**
Rate of obligations is actually higher just after start date (start-up costs); returns to the mean over time; no “catch up” obligation observed

Note: Based on GLAAS extract of Global Health Awards as of July 16, 2013, start dates from 1996 – 2013; This analysis only includes expired awards with TEC > $10M with matching information in USASpending and GLAAS

Note: Removed mods that did not obligate funds; Time scaled as 80% of period of performance, as there were few obligations after the 80% mark due to forward-funding guidelines

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Appendix
Appendix contents

• Award segmentation

• Definition of cost buckets (relates to ACES Recommendation #3)

• Relationship between indirect costs and other cost buckets (relates to ACES Recommendation #3)

• List of major partners acting as subs in 60 awards analyzed (relates to ACES Recommendation #5)
## Award segmentation: Methodology

To enable grouping for purposes of portfolio analysis, the 60 awards analyzed were segmented by programmatic objectives and key activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th># Awards Reviewed / TEC</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>20 awards</td>
<td>• Build capacity through training, tools, and facilitation of service delivery</td>
<td>• US-based NGO conducts training in Kenya to improve awareness of HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12 awards</td>
<td>• Conduct field-based work to provide direct services (e.g. medical care, vaccinations) to target populations</td>
<td>• US-based for-profit conducts insecticide activities to prevent against malaria in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to Technical Assistance</td>
<td>9 awards</td>
<td>• Transitions from service delivery to technical assistance over the life of the award (usually required by RFA)</td>
<td>• South African NGO provides clinical care and then transitions capacity to government and serves as advisors in last two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9 awards</td>
<td>• Administer sub-grants, usually to smaller field-based partners, and conduct project management</td>
<td>• US-based foundation administers global health research grants to foreign-based researchers working in concert with US-based scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4 awards</td>
<td>• Purchase commodities (e.g. medicines, contraceptives) in bulk, leveraging economies of scale</td>
<td>• US-based partnership conducts bulk purchases to fulfill materials needs across Global Health programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Services</td>
<td>4 awards</td>
<td>• Manage integrated program involving direct service delivery, technical support, and project management</td>
<td>• US-based NGO conducts high-impact MCH interventions and improves approaches to MCH issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2 awards</td>
<td>• Identifies qualified global health professionals to fill staffing needs of USAID</td>
<td>• US-based NGO identifies students and professionals with experience / interest in global health to fill USAID’s staffing needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each category is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive; Could not extrapolate award category segmentation to ACES Scope 226 or 1,111 Active awards due to lack of information on programmatic activities in individual awards.
Award segmentation: Instrument type
The majority of awards we analyzed were for technical assistance, service delivery, or a combination of both

Award category by instrument (Count)
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument Type</th>
<th>Number of Awards</th>
<th>TEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$2.4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$1.4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$0.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$0.8B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$4.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1.1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$0.3B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Technical assistance, service delivery, or a combination of both constitute ~70% of awards reviewed.

Commodity procurements, despite representing less than 10% of awards reviewed, have the greatest cumulative TEC in the 60 awards reviewed.

While some award types are aligned to specific instruments, others awards are a mix of acquisition and assistance.
Award segmentation: Award size by TEC
Commodity procurement comprised the greatest TEC of the awards analyzed, followed by technical assistance

Award category size (TEC)
Based on GLAAS extract of GH awards provided by M Bureau as of 07/2013 and Oliver Wyman analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># Awards</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Unobligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$0.6B</td>
<td>$1.8B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$0.4B</td>
<td>$1.0B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery to TA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$0.2B</td>
<td>$0.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$0.2B</td>
<td>$0.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Procurement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1.5B</td>
<td>$4.6B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$0.5B</td>
<td>$1.1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$0.2B</td>
<td>$0.3B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Definition of award cost buckets**

Cost buckets represent the budget segmentation most frequently observed in the 60 awards reviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost bucket</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Fees**    | • Fees only paid in acquisition awards as potential profit for the prime  
              • Fees are usually fixed; one example in 60 awards reviewed of incentive-based fee | • A US-based for-profit receives a fee equal to 5% of total incurred costs in exchange for distributing malaria medicine |
| **Indirect**| • NICRA-allowable costs not directly related to programmatic activities  
              • For awards with no NICRA, indirect costs allocated accordingly when possible based on data availability | • A US-based non-profit agrees to a NICRA rate with the USG, and then applies that rate as a ceiling on indirect costs in the budget proposal |
| **Subs**    | • Costs allocated to sub-recipients, sub-grantees, sub-contractors, and sub-consultants  
              • Generally low data availability on sub costs | • A US-based non-profit administers 82% of its award as grants to sub-grantees conducting scientific research related to global health |
| **Other Direct Costs** | • Wide-ranging programmatic costs; generally includes rent and communication, but varies significantly across awards | • A South African non-profit considers rent and conference costs as its greatest source of “Other Direct Costs” |
| **Commodities** | • Cost of contraceptives, drugs, and other goods readily available on world markets | • A US-based for-profit purchases contraceptives at the global level for USAID global health projects, leveraging economies of scale |
| **Materials / Supplies** | • Includes office supplies, medical equipment, vehicles | • An Angolan non-profit purchases office supplies and stationery for its field office |
| **Travel**  | • Costs for both domestic and international travel  
              • Includes allowances and per diems | • A US non-profit’s travel costs can be highly programmatic (visiting health care centers), but can also be applied towards conference travel |
| **Labor**   | • Salary and fringe for field office personnel, technical assistance experts, and occasionally home-office support staff | • A South African non-profit uses only local labor, and budgets varying levels of efforts across employees |
Relationship between indirect costs and other costs (1 of 2)
Indirect costs do not correlate with other cost buckets across the 60 awards analyzed; they likely have more to do with partner business specifics

**Relationship of Commodities to Indirect Costs**

- **Indirect Costs** vs. Commodity
  - $n = 4$
  - $r = -0.98$
  - 4 commodity procurement awards, which have low indirect costs relative to high commodity costs

**Relationship of Fees to Indirect Costs**

- **Indirect Costs** vs. Fees
  - $n = 8$
  - $r = 0.62$
  - 8 acquisition awards with fee data

**Relationship of Other Direct Costs to Indirect Costs**

- **Indirect Costs** vs. Other Direct Costs
  - $n = 58$
  - $r = 0.41$

**Relationship of Subs to Indirect Costs**

- **Indirect Costs** vs. Subs (Recipients, Grantees, Contractors, Consultants)
  - $n = 58$
  - $r = -0.30$

Note: Excludes two awards with no budget data
1) Indirect includes NICRA-allowable indirect costs; award budgets lacked the detail to categorize line-item costs as programmatic vs. administrative

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Relationship between indirect costs and other costs (2 of 2)
Indirect costs do not correlate with other cost buckets…(cont’d)

Relationship of Travel to Indirect Costs

![Graph showing the relationship between travel and indirect costs.](image)

\( n = 58 \)

\( r = 0.26 \)

Relationship of Labor to Indirect Costs

![Graph showing the relationship between labor and indirect costs.](image)

\( n = 58 \)

\( r = 0.05 \)

Relationship of Equipment / Materials / Supplies to Indirect Costs

![Graph showing the relationship between equipment/materials/supplies and indirect costs.](image)

\( n = 58 \)

\( r = 0.03 \)

Notes / Insights

- Based on budget data for 60 awards reviewed
- There is a positive correlation between indirect costs and fees, other direct costs, travel, labor, and equipment
  - However, there is a negative correlation between indirect costs and commodities and subs
- The strong correlation between indirect costs and commodities is due to low NICRA rates on commodities, all of which are acquisition awards
- All awards reviewed with budget information included when possible to increase sample size

Note: Excludes two awards with no budget data

1) Indirect includes NICRA-allowable indirect costs; award budgets lacked the detail to categorize line-item costs as programmatic vs. administrative

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### Note

Identification of top 15 partners only for the winning applicant – no visibility into the frequency of major partners acting as subs on the non-winning application.

1. Includes sub-recipients, sub-contractors, sub-grantees, and sub-consultants, and is only the number of subs for the prime recipient who ultimately won the award.

### Table: Partner Occurrences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Subs</th>
<th>Primes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abt Associates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemonics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EngenderHealth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHI 360</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futures Group International</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntraHealth International</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhpiego</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Snow Inc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Sciences for Health</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathfinder International</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Services International</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Triangle Institute</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Research Corp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

• Based on a thorough review of relevant A&A policies and processes, Oliver Wyman identified the following eight key cost efficiency opportunities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost efficiency opportunities identified in A&amp;A processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Portfolio management, performed on an ad hoc basis, is not standardized to produce value for money synergies across DC and field-based awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Awards commonly have insufficiently defined scopes and/or are inappropriately sized (e.g., TEC level not justified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Award objectives do not consistently embody SMART principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Optimal instrument not always selected during design to enable better value for money and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Process does not require complete or sufficient partner transparency regarding how funds are being used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Budgets evaluated separately from technical approach/criteria, then reviewed for cost realism, makes it a challenge to assess and manage value for money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Non-value added financial controls and management of assistance awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. A&amp;A processes are not standardized and consistently applied at the individual award level (both in design and in practice)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• These issues have multiple root causes: addressing them all will require changes in processes and policy guidance, staff skills, how expertise is configured in and between the relevant Bureaus (in this case, Global Health and Management), and information systems or other automated support (e.g., e-Procurement)

• Not all cost efficiency opportunities require changes to policy; in many cases, alternative policy interpretations or increasing policy compliance or standard operating procedures can improve value for money in the A&A process
Contents

• Process evaluation work stream approach and objectives

• Cost efficiency opportunities identified in the award life cycle
Section 1  Approach and objectives
Process evaluation work stream: Approach and objectives

**Supporting research**
- Oliver Wyman and external best in class supply chain/sourcing practices
- Fact-based analysis of USAID award universe to elucidate and support findings

**Partner outreach** (lateral)
- Conduct 25 partner interviews
- Finalize approach
- Develop learnings capture template
- Synthesize findings

**Stakeholder management**
- Weekly reviews with USAID working team
- Senior Leadership check-ins
- Administrator updates
- ACES Panel presentations

**Process evaluation** (top down)
- Develop process maps from:
  - Review relevant policies and procedures
  - USAID interviews
  - Processes include: Funding, pre-solicitation, solicitation of an award, award management

**Objectives**
- Create detailed 'as is' process maps and summary of applicable policies – at level required to pinpoint award efficiency issue and be able to develop recommended responses
- Identify cost efficiency opportunities with award process – provide detailed cost implications and associated root causes as they relate to process, capabilities, and technology
- Assess impact on cost for efficiency opportunities identified

**360° evaluation of award-level savings and future cost avoidance**

**Award analysis** (bottom up)
- Refine efficiency levers
- Finalize award scope and actual sample; extrapolation methodology
- Analyze 50 awards (80 total across Ph1-2)
- Validate with USAID (Phase One and Two)
- Capture and distill findings by lever
## Process evaluation work stream: Methodology
Oliver Wyman mapped the process governing an award life cycle and identified aspects of that process that are driving cost within awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Reviewed A&A policies and processes | • Review Federal and Agency policies to understand intended award process  
• Gather input from GH and M on actual award process | • Read 50+ Federal and Agency policies* to understand all factors that impact award life cycle  
• Conducted interviews with 20 A&A subject matter experts* (SMEs) in M, GH, and external  
• Codified process findings from 60+ awards to inform baseline and investigation of award life cycle |
| Identified A&A cost efficiency opportunities | • Clearly pinpoint process steps in the award life cycle that drive cost within awards | • Analyzed award life cycle to determine how decisions and activities influence award efficiency  
• Identified cost drivers via discussions with SMEs and review of 60+ awards |
| Determined root causes of cost inefficiencies | • Understand key drivers of increased cost to inform recommendations to improve value for money | • Assessed Agency capabilities, processes, and technologies to determine root causes for decreased efficiency in award life cycle |

*See appendix for detailed lists
Process evaluation work stream: Root cause categorization
Identified capability and configuration, process and policy, and technology root causes of cost inefficiency in the A&A process

Capabilities and Configuration

- **Skills** – Do staff have appropriate skills to accomplish what is expected of them?

- **Training** – Is adequate training provided to enable personnel to perform their jobs most effectively?

- **Organizational Structure** – Are staff organized in a way that allows for appropriate communication and ownership to accomplish goals?

Processes and Policies

- **Processes** – Is the A&A process clearly defined? Does variation exist?

- **Policies** – Are policies appropriate for achieving goals of value for money in procurement? Are policies interpreted and enforced uniformly?

Technology

- **Information** – Is the right information being captured at the right level of granularity, and what is the quality?

- **Tools** – Are the right templates/forms available to capture useful, necessary data?

- **Systems** – Are the right systems in place and connected appropriately to enable efficient and effective award process management?

Source: USAID interviews, USAID award review and Oliver Wyman analysis © Oliver Wyman
Section 2  Cost efficiency opportunities
Award life cycle findings
Identified eight opportunities within the award life cycle to improve cost efficiency

1. Portfolio management, while performed in general, is not being performed in a standardized way across DC and field
2. Certain awards have insufficiently defined scopes and inappropriately calibrated sizes (TEC)
3. Award objectives do not consistently embody SMART principles
4. Optimal instrument not always selected during design to enable better value for money
5. Process does not require complete partner transparency regarding how funds are being used
6. Technical approach and budget initially evaluated separately, later reviewed for cost realism, difficult to assess/manage value for money
7. Non-value added financial monitoring of assistance awards
8. A&A process on an individual award level is non-standardized (either by design or in practice)

1. More detailed view in Appendix, including funding and Field Support process; 2. Project prioritization based on expected benefits, costs, and other potential projects given total available resources and priorities; 3. SMART metrics are Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Relevant and Time-bound, aligns with Government Performance and Results Acts 1 & 2
Opportunity Definition: Non-standardized portfolio management

Inconsistent portfolio management leads to design of awards with duplicative objectives or missed opportunities for award synergy (i.e., shared services)

Current Situation

- Currently, A&A process incorporates some measures to coordinate award design across the GH portfolio in DC and missions
- Every award required to have a Project Activity Document (PAD) that captures award parameters; PAD is not stored in searchable, easy access database, per ADS 300
- A&A planning tool consolidates planned award activity and is shared within both M and GH
  - Extent to which planning tool shared with and used by staff not clear
- Individual GH offices (HIDN, OHA, PRH) in regular contact to plan and design potential future awards (i.e., identify synergy opportunities, reduce duplication) during technical meetings/conferences
  - Country teams communicate what is going on across field offices
- Some DC staff reach out to Missions to assess needs / interests on ad hoc basis, use survey results to inform award design
  - Targeted toward missions with adequate funding and associated needs
- Missions consult relevant DC office and GH Users’ Guide (which contains only global awards) during award design process and work with country teams to determine whether they should create own award or buy into an existing award – this process is not standardized

Cost Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Cost Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Duplicative programmatic activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Similar work unknowingly duplicated between awards (e.g. between mission and field, two awards operating on same location, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduced ability to share services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Difficult identify common needs / activities and share services opportunities, inhibiting ability to benefit from economies of scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Admin</td>
<td>• Potential increased administrative burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Time spent designing duplicative awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Admin</td>
<td>• Uncertain effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Root Cause Analysis: Non-standardized portfolio management

Systems to track award attributes during award design and management not comprehensive or universally used

1. Process & Policy
   • Planning delays and 1 year award design period lead to tight design timelines which discourage additional work
     – E.g., checking for overlaps with planned / active awards
   • Formalized process / incentives not in place for field to provide input to DC award designers
   • Award duplication allowed
     – At DC / field and office / bureau levels
     – Limited authority over missions regarding which awards are created
   • Formalized process / incentives not in place to identify award duplication / shared service opportunities in DC or field
     – E.g., regularly scheduled check-in among award managers to provide award status updates
   • FIFO accounting penalizes some missions buying into awards which discourages the practice

2. Capabilities & Configuration
   • Staff have limited visibility into active & historical award universe
     – Award designers / managers cannot see active / expired awards, other than in GH User’s Guide and via personal relationships
   • Lack of portfolio management training for GH and M staff to identify shared services opportunities
   • CO/AO have limited program knowledge necessary to identify shared service opportunities, even though approving award designs, making awards, and approving award activity / budgets
   • Limited connectivity between GH & M staff to brainstorm shared services together, ensure awards are appropriately scopes, and sized
   • Standardized mechanism not in place for DC / field staff to interact around award design

3. Technology Enablement
   • Multiple, non-linked tools used over award lifecycle
     – A&A Planning Tool contains useful information for award design
     – GLAAS tracks data when PALT begins
     – Field tools (if exist) do not interface with DC tools
     – PHOENIX tracks financial data
   • Available tools do not track all necessary or useful information
     – E.g., award type, programmatic objectives, regions / countries of operation, etc.
   • Tools not optimized for end users
     – E.g., improving search and reporting functions in A&A Planning Tool could drive increased uptake
   • Duplicative ad hoc tracking tools in GH and M
Opportunity Definition: Insufficiently defined award size and scope
Large and broad awards limit competition, encourage sub-contractor usage, and engender mindset of “funding abundance”

Current Situation

- **Offices reach out to missions to understand** need and try to determine the amount of field support they will use
  - Field support funding is much harder to forecast than core funds for particular awards
  - Award designers want to ensure the TEC is high enough for any countries to buy in that need to since increasing the TEC is a labor intensive process – high uncertainty leads to higher TEC
- Award **Total Estimated Cost (TEC)** driven by a hybrid of factors:
  - Size of bureau / office funding obligations in relation to number of programmatic objectives (i.e., large funding obligation but fewer needs leads to awards with larger TEC)
  - **Contracting office capacity** (i.e., lower capacity drives larger awards)
  - **Independent government cost estimate (IGCE)** calculated based on need, at an individual activity level, then summed to hit total TEC

“**The limiting factor to getting awards is capacity of M/OAA. Sometimes it makes more sense to design bigger awards than smaller, more specific awards.”**

- **Technical Office**

Cost Implications

| Program | • Decreased competition discourages value for money – offerors / applicants may not have core competencies to apply for large, multi objective awards
  | • Broad scope reduces ability to precisely compare offerors / applicants
  | • Large overall cost ceiling engenders mindset of “funding abundance” and limits budget efficiency

| USAID Admin | • Uncertain effect

| Partner Admin | • Larger awards typically funded with money from more program elements, increasing reporting requirements for partners (i.e., different M & E metrics, budget formats, etc.)
  | • Drives subcontractor usage and therefore increased overhead (in form of sub-contractor handling fee)
Root Cause Analysis: Insufficiently defined award size and scope

Planners, review boards, and missions do not have tools / guidance / incentives to design appropriately sized awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process &amp; Policy</th>
<th>Capabilities &amp; Configuration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Policy guidance regarding how to set award size and scope to achieve best value for money is not in place | • Formalized DC / Field interaction around award needs not in place   
  – Limited visibility into Mission drives AORs / CORs to design “catch all” awards for the missions to buy into  
  • AORs/CORs not armed with clear benchmarks / guidance on proper award size / scope  
  • AORs/CORs not held accountable for award buy-in / TEC obligation  
  • Missions not held accountable for expressions of interest / stated award needs   
  – E.g., if Missions express interest in buying into an award, there is no consequence if they fail to do so  
  • FIFO accounting for Mission obligations discourages buy-in to DC-based awards  
  • Staff not well trained to develop informed IGCE                                                                                   |
| • IGCE usually developed after TEC established                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| • Process step to assess award scope / mission interest in relation to overall TEC occurs in form of administrative and board reviews (e.g. BAAR, AARAD), per ADS 300  
  – Review is based on size of award which does not provide initial guidance on how to set size and scope when first designing award  
  • Once design is complete, equivalent award process length for large and small awards  
  – Large awards therefore reduce M/OAA time and effort (e.g., to issue RFPs, negotiate awards, etc.) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| • Disparate systemic tracking of helpful attributes of TEC obligation over life of award to inform TEC of future awards  
  – Tracking needed by award purpose / objectives, region, etc.; not simply acquisition / assistance or DC / field  
  • Disparate systemic tracking of objectives / scope of active awards, so new awards are made with broad scopes which inflates TEC |

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Confidential Information Redacted for Public Disclosure.
Opportunity Definition: SMART\(^1\) objectives
Non-standardized use of SMART objectives across awards limits ability to track award progress and manage value for money

Current Situation

- **Program office designs awards to achieve “intermediate results”** that directly support development objectives of a mission/bureau’s Country Development Cooperative Strategy (CDCS)\(^2\)
- **Acquisition awards should describe clear and measurable results**, per FAR 7.105, and USAID defines project specifications, per ADS 304
  - In practice, extent to which objectives are measurable varies among acquisition awards
- **Government Performance and Results Acts 1 & 2** stipulate that *individual performance, program performance and agency goals should be aligned*\(^3\)
- **ADS 201** stipulates that *intermediate results, project purposes, should be supported by measurable indicators*
  - Does not go so far as to explain they should be SMART
- **As a result, only some portion of A&A contain SMART objectives**
  - Of the 60 awards reviewed, one third contained SMART objectives

Cost Implications

**Program**

- Reduced ability to evaluate offerors/applicants against one another and on a value-for-money basis
- Decreased ability to measure progress toward objectives and overall programmatic impact
  - Limits course correcting performance over life of award
  - Limits use of performance incentives
  - Limited track record of partner effectiveness

**USAID Admin**

- Because outcomes-based monitoring not possible, instead monitor cost inputs (e.g. airfare, number of trips, personnel on trips)
- Increases time for AOs/COs to get up to speed when awards are handed off (due to high staff turnover)

**Partner Admin**

- Frequent, excessive reporting on cost inputs
- Receive redundant AO/CO requests (due to difficulty getting up to speed after handoff)

---

1. SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Relevant and Time-bound
2. Per ADS 200, 201, and 300-304
3. OMB Circulars
Root Cause Analysis: SMART\(^1\) objectives
Policies, A&A design principles, staff training, and supporting tools partially endorse use of SMART objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process &amp; Policy</th>
<th>Capabilities &amp; Configuration</th>
<th>Technology Enablement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Existing monitoring and evaluation plans (M&amp;E), performance management plans (PMP) and subsequent performance indicators(^2) are not always utilized, nor always SMART</td>
<td>• Review boards(^*) review award to ensure competition is enabled, ample opportunity for small businesses, creativity is promoted, and policy is adhered to, but do not fully, clearly stipulate that all objectives must be SMART</td>
<td>• Non-uniform, non-systemic tracking of SMART objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existing award design templates are not used uniformly by AO / CO and AOR / COR teams in designing awards</td>
<td>• AO / CO and AOR / COR staff receive limited, non-standardized, non-uniform training in development of SMART objectives</td>
<td>– List of the objectives that are included in different award types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy guidance in FAR 7, 22 CFR 226 and ADS 300, 302, 303 does not explicitly require use of SMART metrics or, for acquisition awards, clearly defines what is meant by “measurable”</td>
<td>• While they work together to design awards, AORs / CORs typically define programmatic components, and pass off to AOs / COs who review planning documents to ensure compliance with statutory and federal regulation</td>
<td>– Tracking of which objectives are met and required timelines / resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy requirements may not specifically require award funding be tied to achieving SMART objectives</td>
<td>• Limited motivation / incentives for AO / CO and AOR / COR staff to design awards with SMART objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)See Review board criteria in appendix

1. SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Relevant and Time-bound, 2. Per ADS 200 and 201
Opportunity Definition: Optimal instrument selection
Use of assistance when acquisition could be used leads to larger, less competitive awards and reduces ability to manage value for money

Current Situation

• Award designers create planning documents which should include a suggested instrument type, per ADS 300
  – Guidance regarding instrument selection provided in The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977
• Acquisition awards must describe results that are straightforward and measurable, requiring more thought and time
• Assistance awards have less specific, less measurable objectives
  – If an award has a hybrid of measurable and non-measurable objectives, it is deemed assistance
• Award designers submit planning documents to contracting office who selects instrument type based on their best judgment
  – Based on The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, CFR, FAR, and ADS 304
• Additional effort required to define acquisition award is perceived as less valuable than getting the award to the next phase (solicitation/comp)
  – Assistance awards have shorter listed PALT times, cannot be protested, and do not require the planner to objectively define all desired results
  – Cooperative Agreements, in particular, are governed by the CFR (not the FAR) which are much less specific than what is in the FAR governing contracts

Cost Implications

Program
• Limits ability to evaluate applicants on value for money basis
• Reduces USAID authority to hold award recipients accountable for achieving defined objectives
• Limits competition (i.e., preponderance of assistance discourages / limits for-profit applicants)

USAID Admin
• Uncertain effect

Partner Admin
• Cooperative agreements require more reporting than fixed-price contracts

1. Detailed design and solicitation requirements listed in Appendix
Root Cause Analysis: Optimal instrument selection
Assistance is selected over acquisition due to time pressure, need to make large obligations, and lack of training to define clear, measurable objectives

1. Process & Policy
   - Assistance awards cannot be protested, therefore reduces likelihood M/OAA will need to divert time and resources toward managing protests
   - Policy dictates that assistance awards should have realistic and measurable goals (ADS 303) but does not require objectively defined results
   - Awards that are re-procured as new instruments are not specifically checked by a review board (unless for other reasons)

2. Capabilities & Configuration
   - Focus on PALT as an efficiency metric for staff
     - PALT for Cooperative Agreement (assistance) of 150 days vs. 268 days for Definitive Contract (acquisition)
   - Typically, award design begins with sufficient time for assistance or acquisition, but back-and-forth reduces time which drives use of assistance (e.g., ASSIST and HPP)
     - By and large, GH and M/OAA utilize a “back-and-forth” vs. simultaneous award design model
     - Limited clear guidance for AORs / CORs on whether awards of a certain programmatic type (i.e., commodity procurement, grants management, etc.) should be acquisition or assistance

3. Technology Enablement
   - Award design is owned and managed by AORs / CORs and AOs / COs who determine what documents to create, what templates to use, and when to move to the next step
     - Not a “workflow driven system” (e.g., TurboTax) which guides them through the process and ensures compliance by not allowing them to move to the next step until a task is completed
   - Instrument selection not automated based on key criteria (i.e., award type / objectives, inclusion of SMART metrics)
   - Common tools used by both contract and program offices do not meet all needs of each office, leading to use of additional, non-standardized tools

1. A&A PALT times listed in Appendix

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Opportunity Definition: Limited transparency
Limited transparency in budgets and NICRA reduces ability for USAID to understand how funds are being spent and manage value for money

Current Situation

• While RFA / RFP process is standardized at a high level, offerors / applicants complete multiple forms and respond to specific AO / CO questions that are not entirely standardized or uniformly applied
• Budgets are submitted in different templates with varying levels of transparency
  – High-level cost line items are standardized, but detailed definition of what is included in each line item is not
  – Some budgets either missing information (e.g. hidden cells / worksheets) or contain hard coded cells (or are entirely in PDF) making it difficult to identify and trace errors
  – Similar lack of standardization applies for annual budgets submitted as part of award management
• AOs / COs review budgets and accept NICRA as given; do not evaluate program administrative costs to assess duplication with NICRA

Cost Implications

Program
• Lack of transparency and standardization in budget makes difficult to evaluate costs in proposal and on ongoing basis when managing award
• TEC not adjusted down when errors arise, extra funds simply reallocated to unspecified “programmatic uses” and value not clear

USAID Admin
• Increased time for contracting / program officers to review budgets submitted in new formats or with hidden / hard coded cells or PDFs
• Increased effort from AO / CO and AOR / COR staff to develop templates that meet their needs

Partner Admin
• Increased time to adjust to process / template variability across awards and varying levels of USAID staff oversight
### Root Cause Analysis: Limited transparency

Limited transparency driven by budget errors, limited use of standardized tools and templates, and NICRA reporting requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process &amp; Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Capabilities &amp; Configuration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Technology Enablement</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Existing policies not enforced regarding proper submission of forms¹ | • **High work load** limits time available for AO / CO to review budgets and locate errors  
  - E.g., Accepting Excel-based, non-standard format budgets that contain errors | • Standardized A&A tools and policy interpretations do not always meet USAID staff needs  
  - Leads to development of multiple templates and policy interpretations |
|  
  - E.g., Accepting Excel-based, non-standard format budgets that contain errors | • **AOs / COs not provided with tools** (i.e., traceable budgets) to identify errors  
  - Standard salary inflation rate, provision to fly coach vs. business, etc. | • **Standardized templates and processes not consistently used** with offerors / applicants |
| • **Limited formal cost guidelines** to reduce the number of variables AO / CO staff need to consider  
  - E.g., standard salary inflation rate, provision to fly coach vs. business, etc. | • **AOs / COs not provided with complete NICRA accounting** to ensure no overlap between NICRA costs and program administrative costs | |
| • **Standard, uniform penalty for partners to submit error-free budgets not in place** (e.g., reject proposal if errors are present) | | • **Standardized templates and processes not consistently used** with offerors / applicants |

---

¹ Per ADS 300 mandatory references for Cost Realism and Cost Analysis templates

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Opportunity Definition: Value for money evaluation criteria
Value for money evaluation not currently prioritized for Acquisition & Assistance which limits ability to achieve in awards

Current Situation

- Cost is not a routine proposal evaluation criteria
  - In analysis of 60 selected awards, cost was an evaluation criteria in 33% of cases (typically no more than 10% of total evaluation criteria)
- Total Estimated Cost (TEC) of an award is published in the RFA/RFP which causes offerors/applicants to “backfill” their proposed budget with items adding up to TEC
- Budgets are presented in various formats, non-transparent ways (i.e., PDF, hidden cells), and not at a line item level in relation to program activities
- Applicant/offeror proposed budget evaluated for “cost realism”
  - Not always compared to original IGCE
  - Not assessed for “best value”
  - Not assessed in relation to programmatic objectives
- Costs assessed on an ongoing (at least annually, in some cases quarterly or monthly) basis by AOR who is managing the award
  - Receive factor cost budgets and overall amounts to accomplish a given task/activity but very few budgets that tie activities to resources/factor costs

Cost Implications

Program
- Impossible to evaluate proposals on value for money and choose the most cost-effective partner
- Difficult to track partner progress and efficiency once award begins

USAID G&A
- Significant USAID staff time to prepare IGCE which is not actually used to evaluate value of offeror/applicant proposed budget

Partner G&A
- Invest time to create proposal budget which is not used once award is made
  - USAID often requires partners submit new budget for the year
Root Cause Analysis: Value for money evaluation criteria
Costs not reported or assessed directly in relation to programmatic outcomes, nor is cost a prioritized evaluation criteria

1 Process & Policy
- Value for money not an explicit USAID priority
  - Assessed for “cost realism” not “best value”
- Offerors / applicants not required to submit budgets that enable value for money evaluation
  - Not in standardized, traceable format
  - Costs not always framed in relation to activities and resources
- Technical and cost evaluations performed at separate times by separate parts of the organization (GH vs. M)
- Risk management not a guiding principle of award evaluation (i.e., trading superfluous technical merit for improved economics)
- Savings found during negotiation or management re-allocated to unspecified “programmatic uses”, total TEC not reduced

2 Capabilities & Configuration
- Cost evaluation and approval during award Period of Performance (POP) performed by AO / CO staff who do not have detailed programmatic knowledge
- COR / AOR staff not provided with proposed budget
  - Therefore no way to track actual cost against what was proposed / approved
- AO / CO staff not incentivized or rewarded for improving value for money within awards

3 Technology Enablement
- Standardized, detailed budget template (proposed and annual) not in place at an Agency level (i.e., standardized format, detailed descriptions of what types of costs fall into already standardized cost buckets, and definitions, etc.)
  - Challenging to compare offerors / applicants on a value for money basis
  - Challenging to evaluate ongoing award costs against other awards with similar activities, making it difficult to establish ideal cost benchmarks
- Current system to capture outlays (PHOENIX) does so at an aggregated level, not in relation to activities completed, resources required, location, etc.
- System to capture and compare budget data and spend data not in place
Opportunity Definition: Non value-added financial management of Assistance
Over-management of assistance awards, particularly on a cost input basis, drives increased USAID and partner administrative costs

Current Situation

- **AORs / CORs responsible for monitoring and evaluating progress** within an award
- **However, AORs / CORs are not systemically provided with award proposal or proposed budget**
  - Prevents program officers from understanding original project approach and estimated resources / costs
- During award management phase, **AORs / CORs can request annual / quarterly reports from partner**
  - Some AORs / CORs request monthly reports
- In order to limit risk when facilitating obligations to either acquisition or assistance, AORs / CORs request prior approval for cost items in addition to what is directed by policy (e.g. 22 CFR 226.25 (d) has list of what should require approval), examples include:
  - Interviewing new personnel when changes in staff occur
  - Additional reporting requirements beyond policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Implications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program</strong></td>
<td>• Higher portion of TEC going to administrative costs rather than programmatic costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USAID G&amp;A</strong></td>
<td>• COs / AOs and CORs / AORs investigating significant time to evaluate cost line items rather than evaluating total costs against outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Partner G&A**   | • Increased administrative costs to request approvals
  - I.e., increases NICRA
  - Decreased program effectiveness
  - I.e., because formerly programmatic funds are used to cover unanticipated administrative costs that often increase over life of the award |
Root Cause Analysis: Non value-added financial management of Assistance

Limited evaluation of costs in relation to outcomes, especially for Assistance, drives focus on cost inputs to assess “value for money”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process &amp; Policy</th>
<th>Capabilities &amp; Configuration</th>
<th>Technology Enablement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limited guidance provided to AO / CO and AOR / COR staff on interpretation of 22 CFR 226 in terms of exactly what type of financial oversight is value added (i.e., travel approvals, etc.)</td>
<td>• Cost realism and cost analysis not conducted in relation to programmatic outcomes</td>
<td>• Existing budget templates do not always connect activities with budget line items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AO / CO and AOR / COR staff not incentivized to interpret 22 CFR 226 in a specific manner</td>
<td>– Costs evaluated for reasonableness, allocability, and allowability at a line item level</td>
<td>• Systemic or standardized tracking or system to store costs associated with different activities / tasks not in place to provide cost benchmarks to enable outcomes-based cost management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AOs / COs performing cost evaluation do not have sufficient programmatic knowledge</td>
<td>• Limited training or tools to enable outcomes-based cost management</td>
<td>• Informal guidance (not comprehensive, standardized) on cost benchmarks available to guide AOs / COs or AORs / CORs to evaluate activity resources and costs</td>
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<td>• Regulation 22 CFR 226.25(d) not enforced, resulting in more frequent use of prior approvals than required by policy</td>
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<td>– Examples include prior approvals for new staff (including interviews by USAID), increasing frequency of workplans / budgets (e.g. monthly or quarterly instead of annual), international travel, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Situation</td>
<td>Cost Implications</td>
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<tr>
<td>• There seems to be a semi-standardized document library to support award design</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>– E.g., template RFAs / RFPs, previous RFAs / RFPs on similar topics, questions from applicants about those RFAs / RFPs, etc.</td>
<td>• Without a historical view, decreased ability to manage a specific award for programmatic effectiveness or value for money</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>– While use of these templates is required, per ADS 300, the library is not universally used by all AORs / CORs or AOs / COs if, e.g., not relevant for that type of award</td>
<td>• Limited institutional knowledge of what awards were successful and why limits efficiency and effectiveness of new awards</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Multiple methods for storing and tracking information about an award</td>
<td>USAID G&amp;A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>– When CO / AO or COR / AOR staff depart, there does not seem to be a standard “close out” or “hand-off” process to gather key pieces of data about awards</td>
<td>• CO / AO and COR / AOR time to design awards and prepare required documentation from scratch</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Informal instead of standardized processes for handing off awards to from departed CO / AO and COR / AOR staff to new owners</td>
<td>• CO / AO and COR / AOR time to design documents, templates, and document storage systems that work for them</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• CO / AO and COR / AOR time to get up to speed on new awards (i.e., those that are passed to them from departing staff)</td>
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<td>Partner G&amp;A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Time to educate new USAID staff about award (purpose, structure, activities, etc.)</td>
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</table>
Root Cause Analysis: Non-standardized award management
USAID staff turnover at the DC and field level, as well as current process reduces continuity in award management

1. Process & Policy
   - Multiple different internal processes regarding award information management and knowledge transfer

2. Capabilities & Configuration
   - High USAID staff turnover
     - Short tours of duty (e.g., 1 – 2 year rotations for field-based staff)
     - High workload in M/OAA leads to burnout
   - Limited connectivity between GH / M staff
     - Makes it challenging for a new AO / CO or AOR / COR to get updates from existing award managers

3. Technology Enablement
   - Multiple systems exist to track award files and relevant details
     - M/OAA award file library for DC-based awards
     - Separate systems for DC and Missions
     - Non-standardized process for storing award information electronically (e.g., seems to be on P drive but not in any standard folder architecture, structure)
     - Mix of paper and electronic systems
     - Separate filing systems for M / GH
   - Systems not always linked or utilized uniformly
**Policies relevant for cost efficiency opportunities**

Addressing cost efficiency opportunities will require either a different interpretation of an existing policy or increased compliance to current policy.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 200 and 201 and 300-304 address the Results Framework and specify that awards must support this framework (via development objectives and intermediate results) however they do not provide guidance on how to reduce overlap or leverage shared services within awards; ADS 203 addresses “Portfolio Reviews” for missions, but well known tools or standard processes are not in place.</td>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 300 reference IGCE Guide and Template specifies the contents and purpose of the IGCE but process of how TEC is determined seems to be determined by funding available and bandwidth of M/OAA, then IGCE is created to fit within TEC.</td>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 201 and 203 address the Results Framework and indicators that should be used to monitor and report on performance; however, guidance, tools, and approval mechanisms are not available to support and ensure awards are designed with SMART metrics in mind.</td>
<td><strong>Assist.</strong> ADS 304, written specifically for Instrument Selection, does not provide a straight forward process to guide A/CO’s decision making process.</td>
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<td><strong>Assist.</strong></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 300, 302 and 303 reference standardized documentation for solicitation materials; however, specific tools are not available for C/ACOs to share with applicants to ensure full transparency regarding cost/budget proposal; ADS 302 and 303 also mention working with OCC to determine if indirect costs are being applied correctly.</td>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 302 (3.6.2) states the A/CO can and should provide cost information during the technical evaluation under certain circumstances</td>
<td><strong>Acq.</strong> ADS 300 address Individual Acquisition Plan template which specifies that the monitoring plan should be determined prior to solicitation but does not provide guidance for designing plan.</td>
<td><strong>Assist.</strong> ADS 300 series address A&amp;A process steps in fragmented fashion which does not provide a clear step-by-step process to ensure best practices are being used throughout the award life cycle.</td>
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<td><strong>Assist.</strong></td>
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</table>

1. Policy Map available in Appendix

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- Requires specific interpretation of policy to achieve savings
- Requires increased compliance to policy to achieve savings
- Requires both interpretation and increased compliance to policy to achieve savings
Appendix Material
Policies read for process evaluation as they apply to award cycle processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Solicit / Compete</th>
<th>Manage</th>
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<tr>
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<td>22 CFR 228: Rules for Procurement of Commodities and Services Financed by USAID</td>
<td>22 CFR 228: Rules for Procurement of Commodities and Services Financed by USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>FAR 7: Acquisition Planning</td>
<td>FAR 15.404: Contract Pricing</td>
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<td>FAR 15.605: Evaluation Factors</td>
<td>FAR 37: Service Contracting</td>
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<td>ADS 302: Acquisition</td>
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<td>ADS 304: Instrument Selection</td>
<td>ADS 304: Instrument Selection</td>
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<td>Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 (FGCAA)</td>
<td>OMB Circular A122 Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kristin Wood</td>
<td>Technical Writer (M/MPBP/POL)</td>
<td>Review understanding of ADS policies for each Focus Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Zeilinger</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/PPP)</td>
<td>Review understanding of cross-bureau funding, award processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Baltas</td>
<td>Lead Contract Specialist (M/OAA/GH)</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Bradley</td>
<td>Contract Specialist (M/OAA/GH)</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Egaas</td>
<td>Contract/Agreement Officer</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy for Field</td>
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<td>CO (Field)</td>
<td>CO (Field)</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy for Field</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moyra Cassidy</td>
<td>Policy and Procurement Advisor (GH/PPP/SAEO)</td>
<td>CO and COR perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
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<td>Jerry O’Brien*</td>
<td>Program Analyst (OST)</td>
<td>COR perspective on actual process v. policy for DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR2 (DC)</td>
<td>Contract/Agreement Officer Representative</td>
<td>COR perspective on actual process v. policy for DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mario Rocha</td>
<td>Senior Financial Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wallace “Tripp” Lloyd</td>
<td>Program Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds to awards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyman Stone</td>
<td>Consultant (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds to awards, head of Field Support</td>
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<td>Mark Walther</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Operations (M/OAA/OD)</td>
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<td>Elizabeth Fox</td>
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<td>Review process of allocating funds to awards in HIDN</td>
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<td>David Stanton</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/OHA/TLR)</td>
<td>Review process of allocating funds to awards in OHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ellen Starbird</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/PRH)</td>
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<td>External Advisor</td>
<td>InsideNGO</td>
<td>Opportunities for increased effectiveness within GH awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Advisor</td>
<td>Former OMB</td>
<td>Government organizations with similar business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*not GH but working on improving handoff between Program Office and OAA.
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Design Process

1. Project Design
   - Concept
     - Concept Paper
   - Analytic
     - PAD (includes IGCE and M&E Plan)
   - Submit to MOAA for approval

2. Design
   - 12 – 18 months

Funding

1. Operating Units

2. GH

3. MOAA

4. Review Boards / Personnel

5. Offerors / Applicants

Acquisition: The principle purpose of the funded activity is to provide something for the direct benefit or use of the Federal government.

Assistance: The principle purpose of the funded activity is to support or stimulate activities that are not for the direct benefit of the Federal government.

Assistant Administrator when TEC > $25M
Contract Review Board (CRB) when acquisition > $25M

Submit award docs to review boards if necessary

Submit award docs to review boards if necessary;
return to MOAA

Review award criteria and work to modify if necessary;
return to MOAA

Approve award for solicitation / competition

Post RFA/RFP online

Respond to RFA/RFP
Design requirements for Acquisition and Assistance
This is some difference between A&A internal requirements to prepare award for solicitation/competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisition</td>
<td>• GLAAS Requisition</td>
<td>AARAD (TEC &gt;$25M goes to AA)</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
<td>• Individual Acquisition Plan (IAP)</td>
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<td>Documentation</td>
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<td>• Choice of Instrument Justification</td>
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<td>• Statement of Work</td>
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<td>• Success Indicators to be collected and reported by Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>• IGCE</td>
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<td>• Award Requirements:</td>
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<td>• Description</td>
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<td>• Instructions to offers/applicants</td>
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<td>• Evaluation Criteria</td>
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<td>• Period of Performance</td>
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<td>• Branding and Marketing Plan</td>
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<td>• Score sheet for evaluations</td>
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<td>• Branding and Marketing Requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Required information for RFA (e.g. est # awards, financial range)</td>
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<td>• Cost Share Determination</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Substantial Involvement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADS, M/OAA/GH interviews
Design: Instrument selection details and findings

The government-wide policy that defines criteria for selecting award type is founded on the relationship between USAID and implementing partner

Criteria for selecting award type *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The principle purpose of the funded activity is to provide something for the direct benefit or use of the Federal government</td>
<td>The principle purpose of the funded activity is to support or stimulate activities that are not for the direct benefit of the Federal government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Benefit or Use Test:
- Is USAID the direct beneficiary or use of the activity?
- Is USAID providing the specifications for the project?
- Is USAID having the project completed based on its own identified needs?

Benefit or Use Test:
- Is the applicant performing the project for its own purpose?
- Is USAID merely supporting the project with financial or other assistance?
- Is the benefit to USAID incidental (i.e., do funded activities compliment USAID’s mission)?

Instrument characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost Eval</th>
<th>TEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>Obligating seller to furnish goods or services and buyer to pay for them</td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of all offerors that meet minimum criteria</td>
<td>Required to pay cost overrun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>For public purpose of support where USAID involvement is not anticipated</td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of all applicants in competitive range</td>
<td>Max amount, despite partner costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Award</td>
<td>For public purpose of support where USAID involvement is anticipated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings
- Assistance awards can be created by adding less measurable objectives to acquisition awards
- Cost is evaluated and reimbursed dependent upon the type of instrument selected

Awards can be designed to fit criteria of either type which impacts the way in which cost is evaluated and reimbursed throughout the period of performance

*Source: adapted from EPA website describing The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 (www.epa.gov/ogd/recipient/fgcaa.htm)
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Solicit / Compete Process

Operating Units

Funding

Solicit / Compete

2 yr cycle

3 - 12 months

GH

Choose TEC members → Technical Evaluation → Propose questions/comments for feedback/negotiation to M/OAA

M/OAA

Receive Applications/Proposals → Cost evaluation (realism and analysis) → Performs final review and analysis to select contractor/recipient

Review Boards

Review award criteria and work to modify if necessary; return to M/OAA

Offers/Applicants

Contract Review Board (CRB) when acquisition >$25M → Respond to questions

Administrator when TEC>$75M

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## Solicitation requirements for Acquisition and Assistance

Acquisition requires additional involvement to complete solicitation as compared to Assistance competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solicitation</strong></td>
<td>• Source Selection Plan (haven’t seen examples)</td>
<td>• Competitive Range Determination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concur with OSDBU must weigh in</td>
<td>• Cost Realism Checklist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concur with OSDBU must weigh in</td>
<td>• Cost Analysis Checklist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions Consideration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AARAD completed by TEC Chair for awards with TEC &gt;$75M, goes to Administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) Memo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiation Memo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADS, M/OAA/GH interviews
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Manage Award Process

- **Funding**
  - 2 yr cycle
  - 5 – 10 years

- **Manage Award**
  - Review and approve Partner M&E Plan and Workplan
  - Manage Performance using PPM

- **GH**
- **M/OAA**
- **Review Boards**
- **Offers / Applicants**

- Approve Obligations and Modifications
- Create M&E Plan and Workplan
- For field support buying into IDIQ, must submit budget to CO to approve
Criteria for Review
Prior to being competed, awards must be reviewed by up to 3 boards / personnel, depending on certain criteria, increases time to make an award

Acquisition and Assistance Review Requirements

---

All new awards → TEC>$25M → Assistant Administrator Review → TEC>$75M → Administrator Review

Acquisition Review Requirements

- New Sole Source contract
- New limited comp. contract
- Total Ceiling >$75M
- New IDIQ contract
- Modification to IDIQ
- Raise total ceiling by >$35M
- IDIQ Task Order
- >$50M

Assistant Administrator Review

Assistant Review

TEC>$25M → CBR Review

Assistance Review Requirements

- New Sole Source grant for CA
- New limited comp. grant or CA
- Total Ceiling >$75M
- New LWA
- Total Ceiling >$25M
- Modification to LWA
- Raise total ceiling by >$25M
- LWA or Associate extension
- Field support expected to exceed 25% of LWA ceiling
- LWA

Assistant Administrator Review → BAAR Review
Relationship between funding and award processes
The funding process intersects with the project design process when funds are “marked” to a PAD

Congressional funding process

Formulation
2 FY budgets in advance

Justification
Next FY budget

Appropriation
Executing current FY budget

Gov’t Involved Funding Action
Congress Appropriates
OMB Apportions
State/F and USAID Allots
USAID: Bureaus Allow
USAID: Operating Units Obligate

USAID systemic “tagging” of funds

USAID Funds

Pillar Bureaus (GH)
Regional Bureaus (AFR)

Distribution (PAD #)
Area
Example: 963.xxx
Element
Example: A11 / 3.1
Example: A047 / 3.1.1 (HIV/AIDS)

Commitment
Funds “set aside” for Obligation

Obligate
Promise to Pay

Disburse/Accrued
Invoiced/outstanding

Project design

Concept Stage

Concept Paper

Analytical Stage

PAD (includes IGCE and M&E Plan)

Project Authorization

Source: Mario Rocha, Senior Financial Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM), ADS 201

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Field Support process

Field Support Tasks

Mission Technical Office
- Put together mission portfolio
- Identify tech requirements for local awards
- Identify tech reqs for field support requirements
- Coordinate technical requirements for field support for Pillar Bureau AID
- Identify FS tech reqs to Mission Program Office

Mission Program Office
- Coordinate funding allowance and distribution in Phoenix to accommodate Mission field support requests

Regional Bureau Technical Office
- Enter FS requests into FS-AID database
- Enter, link and authorize sub-obligate requests in FS-AID
- Coordinate Mission request as needed

Regional Bureau Program Office
- Authorize line-by-line entries in FS-AID for Region Missions per planned FS-AID requests
- Allow and distribute funds in Phoenix to match FS-AID planned requests

Pillar Bureau Technical Team
- Coordinate tech reqs for FS with Mission Tech Office

Pillar Bureau Field Support Team
- Accept FS-AID Requests
- Coordinate workplans with Mission and Partners
- Manage AIDAs

M/OAA (Designated Obligating Official)
- Accepts requests in FS-AID
- Create GLAAS REQ for FS requests and coordinate with Office tech teams
- Validate GLAAS REQs and coordinate with Office tech teams
- Release REQ/Group REQ/REQM to OAA
- Signs award mods
- Enters transactions into GLAAS
- Forwards modification to Awardee/Partner/Cooperating Agency

When does this happen?
- Search Grant Handbook for applicable awards
- Applicable DC-based award?
- N
- Create new award
- N
- Request to obligate funding from CDR
- Y

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## Procurement Action Lead Times (per ADS 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award type</th>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Timeframe (Calendar Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>IDIQ</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (limited sources)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (compete)</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (sole source)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitization of Letter Contract</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Priced Order (task order under IQC)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>mod</td>
<td>Bilateral contract modification</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>mod</td>
<td>Administrative contract modification</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>mod</td>
<td>Unilateral Contract Modification</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative agreement</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Cooperative Agreement (compete)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative agreement</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Cooperative Agreement (Non-compete)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative agreement</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Cooperative Agreement (technical office comp)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative agreement</td>
<td>mod</td>
<td>Cooperative Agreement Modification</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Grant (compete)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Grant (non-compete)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Grant (technical office comp)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant</td>
<td>mod</td>
<td>Grant amendment</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PALT Start**: Action is entered into A&A Plan and Review System and a full GLAAS

**PALT End**: Award is given to contractor / recipient (not necessarily when POP starts)
Policies governing A&A process
The main federal policies governing A&A include the 48 CFR, 22 CFR 2 & 226, FAR 7, and FAR 15, as well as ADS.
Executive summary

Oliver Wyman's outreach to USAID partner organizations in the context of the ACES Study consisted of 23 interviews focused on cost efficiency and effectiveness practices and opportunities. Partner contacts primarily comprised non-profit organizations, which collectively account for almost 40% of active Global Health A&A award TEC.

Partners identified numerous opportunities for improved cost efficiency across the A&A process, highlighting five issues most frequently:

1. Lack of emphasis on cost competition does not incentivize value for money
2. Over-management of cost inputs rather than outcomes drives cost for partners and USAID
3. Project scope changes over the course of live awards inhibits program effectiveness and leads to wasted spend
4. Structural and financial hurdles to cross-award efficiencies inhibit sharing of services or bulk procurement
5. Inconsistency in policy interpretation and implementation creates delays and challenges in efficient award planning and management

Most of these issues add considerably to USAID staff's workload while also driving up partner NICRAs. Partner interviews indicated that these issues can be directly influenced by USAID for the most part, thereby shaping partner behavior and engendering better value for money.

Confidential Information Redacted.
Contents

1. Workstream approach
   - Overview and objectives
   - Participating organizations and interviewees
   - Results methodology

2. Results: Cost-efficiency and effectiveness opportunities highlighted by Partners

3. Prioritization: Frequency vs. impact of highlighted opportunities
Session 1  Workstream approach
Partner Outreach workstream: Approach overview and objectives

Supporting research
- Oliver Wyman and external best in class supply chain/sourcing practices
- Fact-based analysis of USAID award universe to elucidate and support findings

Process evaluation (top down)
- Develop process maps from:
  - Review of relevant policies and procedures
  - USAID interviews
  - Processes include: Funding, pre-solicitation, solicitation of an award, award management

Objectives
- Understand partners’ experience with USAID A&A processes
- Determine key process-related drivers of partner overhead cost and/or cost of complexity
- Provide a forum for partners’ input into the ACES study
- Incorporate results from outreach into systemic findings, conclusions and recommendations to enhance cost-effectiveness of USAID A&A process

Partner outreach (lateral)
- Conduct 25 partner interviews
- Finalize approach
- Develop learnings capture template
- Synthesize findings

Stakeholder management
- Weekly reviews with USAID working team
- Senior Leadership check-ins
- Administrator updates
- ACES Panel presentations

Award analysis (bottom up)
- Refine efficiency levers
- Finalize award scope and actual sample; extrapolation methodology
- Analyze 50 awards (80 total across Ph1-2)
- Validate with USAID (Phase One and Two)
- Capture and distill findings by lever

360° evaluation of award-level savings and future cost avoidance
Partner Outreach workstream: Scope
Focus on USAID acquisition and assistance experience, not on specific awards

Context and use of information

- Partners engaged with Oliver Wyman in the spirit of highlighting opportunities for efficiencies in the USAID A&A process – there was no discussion of identifying savings potential from the existing universe of awards, our bottom-up awards review, nor their individual awards under contract or agreement.
- Partners were informed that any comments would not be attributed and only shared with USAID in aggregated or non-identifiable form.
- On this basis, partners were free and forthcoming with their thoughts and suggestions for the A&A process and its mechanisms.
- The results presented in this summary are intended solely to inform A&A process and policy improvement recommendations; they would not be appropriate to be used for individual partner award discussions.

Discussion topics

- Partner experiences with USAID solicitation and award management, including:
  - Cost and overhead drivers
  - Inefficiencies or bottlenecks
  - Best practices
  - Selection and management of subcontractors
- Learnings from other donor organizations
- Suggestions for improvement
- Reactions to hypotheses for improved efficiency
- Also incorporated into analysis: documentation partner organizations had sent to USAID in previous interactions

Partner organization types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For-profit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner coalition/union</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 23

Not discussed

- Named awards or details of specific awards (unless brought up by partner)
- Individual budgets or line-items from specific awards
- Renegotiation (either as a focus of USAID or any comments about the potential processes)
Partner organizations interviewed account for about half of the awards or 45% of the TEC analyzed in ACES.

Mapping of ACES award universe to partner outreach.

Confidential Information Redacted.
Partner cost drivers are identified with reference to the A&A process stage in which they arise and reviewed based on frequency of mention and impact to USAID.

**Methodology and results overview**

**Partner Outreach results presentation**

- Highlighted partner cost efficiency opportunities were mapped according to stage of the USAID A&A process in which they arise (e.g. award design, solicitation/competition, and awards management)

- The most frequently cited cost efficiency opportunities are explored more deeply in a set of ‘dashboard’ slides which:
  - Detail the issues
  - Provide examples and/or direct quotes
  - Count the frequency with which the issue was raised (partner-initiated)
  - Provide corroborating evidence from Oliver Wyman award and fact base analyses

- “Other material drivers” are also featured and mapped to A&A process, but not expanded upon in individual dashboard slides because they were less frequently mentioned
  - Given variations in discussions and qualitative sample, cost drivers that were less frequently cited may still represent relevant cost opportunities for USAD…

- Finally, partner-highlighted cost drivers have been mapped according to frequency and perceived impact to USAID (Oliver Wyman assessment) to aid prioritization

**Sample output per major opportunity area**

- What aspects of the A&A process did partners specifically highlight as a major source of cost?
- How many partners cited this issue as a cost consideration, or not?

1. Identified cost driver
   Description of cost driver issue and impact for USAID

   - Issue & Details
   - Partner Examples
   - Supporting Data

   - Partner discussing issue

   - Quotes from partners describing examples of issue

   - Corroborating evidence from CVU analysis
     - Qualitative and quantitative evidence identified by CVU corroborating partner cost drivers as valid

- What specific examples of cost impacts did partners recount?
- What additional evidence has Oliver Wyman found that would indicate this is a viable cost efficiency concern to explore?
Session 2

Cost efficiency/effectiveness opportunities highlighted by Partners
The partner outreach converged on 8 opportunities for improved cost efficiency across USAID A&A process stages

### Findings: Partner-identified cost drivers

1. Instrument selection biases
2. Combination of tight RFP/RFA timetables and long USAID feedback delays
3. USAID practices favor the use of subcontracting arrangements
4. No incentives to compete on direct or indirect cost
5. Over-management of cost inputs rather than outcomes
6. Mid-award project scope and changes in direction
7. Structural and financial hurdles to cross-award efficiencies
8. Lack of consistency in AO/CO and AOR/COR policy interpretation
1. Instrument selection biases
Pervasive use of cooperative agreements has the effect of limiting competition and may disincentivize development of local capacity

Issue detail
- Partners report a perceived preference from USAID for issuing cooperative agreements instead of contracts driven by ease and speed of design process
- Impacts both solicitation process and ability to use local organizations
  - Can inhibit competition as for-profit organizations may be hesitant to bid on agreements due to lack of fee
  - Lack of fee incentive can inhibit ability of local organizations to build internal capacity

Partner quotes
- “Without question, we walk away from things we would have liked to bid on because they are offered as cooperative agreements instead of contracts.”
- “As a for-profit organization, we have to get permission from our board if we want to bid on a cooperative agreement.”
- “Small businesses develop by getting a little bit of profit, and they can’t do that with a cooperative agreement. At the end of the project, many just collapse.”
- “We should be encouraging development of local for-profit organizations as well as non-profits.”

Supporting data
# of Partners highlighting issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corroborating evidence:
- TEC issued per year by contracts to cooperative agreements has shifted from approximately a 40:60 ratio (2006) to 30:70 (2013) and as low as 20:80 in 2012
  - However, number of awards has maintained at an approximate 40:60 ratio of contracts to cooperative agreements
2. Combination of tight RFP/RFA response times and long USAID feedback delays

Drives up partner spend on proposal preparation and initial implementation

**Issue detail**

- Partners perceive solicitation process as filled with long stretches awaiting USAID feedback, followed by a very short period in which to respond
  - Drives up cost due to last-minute planning, e.g. hiring consultants, spending on airfare for consultations
  - Some partners suggest increased publication of draft RFAs as a way to mitigate this challenge
- Multiple rounds of negotiation drive up cost and process length
  - Delays in solicitation process lead to inefficiency
  - Delays in solicitation process cause need for new staffing approvals (because previously approved staff no longer available) or new scopes to reflect evolving country situation

**Partner quotes**

- "One solution would be to release drafts – this is done periodically, but would help drive down costs and improve the quality of the proposals."
- "The shorter period of time we have to actually prepare for something, the more resources we have to spend. Hire consultants, spend on airfare for consultations, can’t get advance tickets, etc."
- "You can have to recruit a whole new team by the time the project starts. The time doing this manifests itself in the NICRA rate."

**Supporting data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Partners highlighting issue:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identified as a cost driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Corroborating evidence:**

- Within Select 60, average time between RFP issue and award start was 159 days for DC asst., 172 days for DC acq., 229 for field asst. and 360 days for field acq.
  - ADS 300.3.5. states that PALT (which should begin prior to RFP issue date) should be 150 days for cooperative agreements and 268 days for definitive contracts
3. USAID practices favor the use of subcontracting arrangements
Becomes the default for partners; increases overhead costs and decreases competition

Issue detail

- Broad scopes of work, large project sizes, and perception of preference for certain individuals incentivize sub-contracting
  - No organizations could explain the steps involved in deciding whether to sub-contract
  - Frequently need to be pushed by AORs to use subs mentioned in application, implying unnecessary addition of subs solely to win award
- Can layer additional costs and decrease competition
  - Subcontractor handling fees do not consider sub risk profile or previous USAID experience
  - Subcontractors capable of applying as a prime do not, lowering total applications received and decreasing competitive forces

Partner quotes

“For every proposal, bidding teams start forming concurrently – it’s supposed to be a competitive process, but it’s not competition.”

“It’s really hard to manage when you have 6–12 subgroups. They all have to charge their own G&A and OH rates, process their own payrolls, separate audits, it just quadruples the cost associated with overhead.”

“How the heck do you compete against a conglomerate that’s been created by USAID? They have all the employees, all the money, and can attract everyone in that field.”

Supporting data

# of Partners highlighting issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified as a cost driver</th>
<th>Not identified as a cost driver</th>
<th>Not discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corroborating evidence:

- Analysis shows that awards featuring subs who are Top 15 partners of USAID are less competitive
  - Awards with no Top 15 subs average 7.2 applicants
  - Awards with 1-2 Top 15 subs average 2.7-2.8 applicants
  - Awards with 3 Top 15 subs average 2.0 applicants
4. No incentives to compete on direct or indirect cost
Does not reward value for money

**Issue detail**

- Partners typically budget to match TEC and not rewarded for controlling costs
  - There is no official incentive to manage overhead costs or maintain/decrease NICRA
- Most partners are open to including value for money or cost effectiveness in evaluations as long as criteria are clearly explained and do not overly weigh cost at the expense of quality
- Partners responded very positively to idea of performance-based payments and some had experience with these kinds of awards, though none had extensive experience

**Partner quotes**

- “It’s challenging to evaluate across organizations since they handle cost in different ways. I like bidding for organizations that are explicit about how they evaluate value-for-money.”
- “It’s frustrating to see NICRA and G&A for other organizations shoot up when we’ve introduced measures to keep those costs low, but we aren’t rewarded for it because value-for-money isn’t evaluated.”
- “Right now cost isn’t considered until the very end of the evaluation process. It should be tied to output requirements – for example, how much is spent in the field for a certain number of outputs or gains.”

**Supporting data**

**# of Partners highlighting issue:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Corroborating evidence:**

- Technical evaluations do not include value-for-money criteria; only the winning applicant is required to undergo a cost reasonableness assessment
5. Over-management of cost inputs rather than outcomes
Focusing on line-item approvals vs. programmatic outputs creates cost for USAID and its partners

Issue detail

- Partners cite increasing reporting and administrative burden as driving significant cost and time
  - Some partners confirmed that up to 50% of OH costs are driven by meeting USAID management requirements
- Leads to increases in both partner administrative staff and programmatic staff time spent on admin, ultimately diverting money from programmatic efforts
- Most approval areas are already covered in cost principles and often approved during initial budgeting process, leading to duplication of effort for USAID
- Examples include submissions of multiple workplans (e.g. different workplans for different funding sources), bio-data sheets, salary approvals, travel approvals, and subcontractor approvals; frequently submissions are duplicative

Partner quotes

- "The prior approval requirements for USAID are by far more burdensome than for other USG agencies or other aid organizations."
- "This adds very little value. You wind up in arguments about someone who has an established daily rate, and then there's a negotiation that goes on and on, and in the end sometimes it's upheld or cut by $5 K per year – some amount that's vastly less than the amount of time that USAID and contractors have put into discussing it."
- "We'll have to get subs approved when the organization was just approved on another project a few months ago, or submit bio-data and negotiate salaries at the start of an award that were already negotiated during solicitation."

Supporting data

# of Partners highlighting issue:

- Identified as a cost driver: 22
- Not identified as a cost driver: 1

Corroborating evidence:

- While some AORs believe prior approvals save money, others feel they are a waste of time and create bureaucracy, e.g. causing partners to spend time on paperwork that would otherwise be spent on implementation
6. Mid-award changes to project scope or redirection
Inhibits programmatic effectiveness and leads to wasted spend

Issue detail

• Partners report that shifting programmatic focus can bring delays and add cost
  – Leads to wasted work conducted on activities no longer needed and changed monitoring requirements

• Though some changes occur for necessary reasons (e.g. shift in host gov’t priorities or changing needs on the ground), many are perceived as unnecessary

• Two drivers causing unnecessary scope change:
  – Changing funding source bring new standardized performance indicators to be tracked that do not align with current activities
  – AOR involvement in directing programmatic activities; can be exacerbated by changing staff and thus changing priorities

Partner quotes

“The mission will say “work with kids under 5 instead of pregnant women.” Then we need to realign budgets and change workplans. That’s where we lose time, increase cost.”

“There’s lots of reworking of award direction and scope; the reworking feels endless. It ends up feeling like we spend more time dealing with budgets and workplans than with implementation.”

“There are huge cost implications if you’re shifting program focus. When USAID shifts ground from under implementer’s feet, they interfere with achievement of objectives but generate vast cost associated with adjustments.”

“Below the mods are gigantic universes of workplans and implementation plans that are being continually altered. The AOR will say “I know you planned for a training but now I want to do a seminar series” so now the implementer needs to re-tool and the work they did on the previous plan goes to waste.”

Supporting data

# of Partners highlighting issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified as a cost driver</th>
<th>Not identified as a cost driver</th>
<th>Not discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corroborating evidence:

• UMSL’s Project Scope Management guide estimates that scope changes occurring after the first 3 months of a project cost orders of magnitude more than changes in the initial phase

• Microsoft’s overview of project management lists 5 main activities and 16 sub-activities that must occur to adjust for even one change in scope
7. Structural and financial hurdles to cross-award efficiencies  
Prevents sharing of services or bulk procurement across awards

**Issue detail**

- Most partners report not sharing items or services across awards or engaging in bulk procurement either within or across organizations
- No incentive from USAID to push shared services and purchasing
- Perceived implementation hurdles:
  - Financial reporting difficulties (accounting on award-by-award basis)
  - Shared costs are not directly allocated to projects (e.g. allocated to service centers) and thus can be perceived by USAID staff as additional indirect costs
- Partners open to sharing services, though some hesitation on collaboration with competitors

**Partner quotes**

- “We procure items award-by-award because we have to keep the money distinguished. The business practices associated with good buying don’t align well with the reporting requirements.”
- “There are times when we have multiple grants in a country and we want to share to be more efficient, but it gets very difficult because USAID looks very closely at allocated direct costs.”
- “We pool accountants, drivers, and office space. We believe it lowers total costs, but the challenge is that it can look like a third indirect rate and we’re constantly having to explain the charges to the COs.”

**Supporting data**

**# of Partners highlighting issue:**

```
0  5  10  15  20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified as a cost driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not identified as a cost driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not discussed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

**Corroborating evidence:**

- GAO reports estimate that the USG is leaving $5 BN on the table every year due to lack of strategic sourcing; numerous case studies and industry practices estimate savings of 15%+ can be achieved
8. Inconsistency in AO/CO and AOR/COR policy interpretations
Creates delays and challenges in efficient award planning and management

**Issue detail**

- Partners report significant differences across missions and awards in terms of reporting requirements, level of paperwork to be submitted, and interpretation of policy
- No single point of reference across awards for partners to approach with questions or issues
- Given the high turnover and frequent rotations within USAID, many awards have officer changes mid-stream
  - The variability in policy interpretation results in changing practices mid-award, leading to unplanned delays

**Partner quotes**

- "We’ve lost qualified personnel whose daily rates, which were below the CST, weren’t approved, and then they just went to a different award being managed by a different AO, so the government still paid the same rate in the end!"
- "Different AORs and CORs are totally variable. It’s as if they’ve gone through completely different training."
- "Mission orders and AAPDs are the camel’s nose under the tent in terms of this inconsistent lack of uniform approach. The fact that it occurs so often in particular missions leads to a real area of burden and back and forth between agency and organization."
- "One mission implemented its own salary caps below the USG rates, and to get the individuals we need, we have to pay more. If other countries start implementing this rule, we just won’t work in them."

**Supporting data**

- # of Partners highlighting issue:
  - Identified as a cost driver: 18
  - Not identified as a cost driver: 5

**Corroborating evidence:**

- USAID foreign service assignments frequently last for only 1 or 2 years
- GAO reports cite high staff turnover at USAID, resulting in challenges to maintaining institutional knowledge
Other material cost drivers
Include observations on specific instrument choices and the potential for streamlining paperwork/reporting requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional issues</th>
<th>Partner quotes</th>
<th>Stage of A&amp;A process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Use of IQCs and Task Orders (perceived as costly, inefficient)</td>
<td>“IQCs are unbelievably expensive! You spend a ton on the proposal, and all you get is a license to bid on everything with a 2–3 week notice. Does the government really think they’re getting value out of that?”</td>
<td>• Design award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few fixed-price contracts (instead of cost-reimbursable)</td>
<td>“Cost reimbursement is slow, lots of back and forth and rework. Fixed price is more risk for us but I would still go after it if there were opportunities.”</td>
<td>• Design award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Paper submission requirements (in addition to digital) drive up cost</td>
<td>“No reason we should fly to Benin to deliver a proposal. That drives up NICRA.”</td>
<td>• Receive proposal/ application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Excessive auditing (over and above A133 guidance) with no risk adjustment</td>
<td>“Our non-USAID business is two and a half times as much revenue as our USAID business, but we’re documenting 40+ audits per year for USAID, and less than 5 for our other business.”</td>
<td>• Manage performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pressure from missions for partners to cover funding gaps</td>
<td>“The cost of loaning money to the USG is millions of dollars per year, but if we say no we’re marked as an unreliable partner. When the funding doesn’t come through, missions won’t admit they asked you to cover in the first place. Cost of business no one will discuss.”</td>
<td>• Approve obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Delays in NICRA finalization prevent award close-out</td>
<td>“We’ll have to wait 2–4 years to close out grants that are no longer generating NICRA, putting an OH burden on current awards, and both sides lose institutional memory to answer questions in the mean time. It’s incredibly inefficient.”</td>
<td>• Approve obligations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Session 3  Prevalence of highlighted opportunities vs. their impact for the Agency
Prioritization matrix
Award over-management, policy/scope changes, and cost-competitive hurdles appear to be the greatest opportunities for USAID based on partner input

Categorization of opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Instrument selection biases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tight RFA/RFP timelines and feedback delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Non value-added subcontracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No incentive to compete on cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Over-management of cost inputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mid-award project scope change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Inhibit cross-award efficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Inconsistency in rules interpretation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| A  | Use of IQCs and Task Orders                                                                     |
| B  | Few fixed-price contracts                                                                       |
| C  | Paper submission requirements                                                                    |
| D  | Extreme amounts of auditing                                                                     |
| E  | Pressure to cover funding gaps                                                                  |
| F  | Delays in NICRA finalization                                                                    |

Cost impact

- Over-management of award cost inputs vs. outcomes adds significant burden to USAID staff and drives up partner NICRAs – lowers award cost efficiency
- Inconsistent policy implementation and frequent changes of project direction impede project progress and add cost
- Partners confirmed they do not compete on the basis of cost today; significant savings to be achieved from increased competition and prioritizing cost evaluation in bid/offer reviews
  - Competition and attendant savings further constrained by pervasive subcontracting practices
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Contact name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Progress</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>BMGF</td>
<td>Kate Harris</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 7/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Alan Chvotkin</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 8/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Karl Hofmann</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 8/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>URC</td>
<td>Barbara Turner and Ray Justice</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 8/23</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Save the Children US</td>
<td>Hajira Sharif</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 8/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Inside NGO</td>
<td>Alison Smith</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Inside NGO</td>
<td>Thomas Dente and Bob Lloyd</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>Eric Walker</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Carol Smith</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jhpiego</td>
<td>Richard Lamporte</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/11</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>ACDI VOCA</td>
<td>Diana Esposito</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/16</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Law Practice Advising USAID Awardees</td>
<td>Scott Overall</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/16</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>Lee Zahnow</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/17</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Nancy Otterstrom</td>
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<td>Completed on 9/17</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>Kim Atsolinos</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 9/17</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Anne Sparks</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>Anna, Andrea, Helen</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Population Council</td>
<td>Alan Ring, Andrea Eschen</td>
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<td>Social Solutions Inc</td>
<td>Jenny Numar Karp</td>
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<td>Future Generations</td>
<td>Nicky Bassford, Kellen Harper, and Rebecca Vaus</td>
<td>Contacted; no response</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Andrew Herrera</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Cathy Church-Balin, Erika Wagner</td>
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<td>FHI 360</td>
<td>Manisha Bharti, Chito Padilla, Rob Murphy, Patrick Fine</td>
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<td>ABT Associates</td>
<td>Kevin Weidmann, Jay Knott</td>
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<td>Tammy Forrester, Celeste Fulgham</td>
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<td>Intrahealth International</td>
<td>Ron Geary</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Completed on 10/9</td>
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<td>Chemonics</td>
<td>Roshana Cohen</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>JSI</td>
<td>Joel Lamstein</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>EngenderHealth</td>
<td>Daniel Doucette</td>
<td>Contacted; no response</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Pathfinder International</td>
<td>Marlyn Jabaily, Bob Burns</td>
<td>Contacted; no response</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>FGI</td>
<td>Vandana Gupta</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>Dierdre Pierrotti</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>Joseph Barbarino</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>Cristiane Costa</td>
<td>Contacted; no response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Questionnaire

### Cost drivers
- What steps in the USAID A&A process are the biggest drivers of internal administrative costs? How can these be modified/streamlined to improve efficiency?
- In what way do USAID technical and/or cost requirements drive your overhead or SG&A assumptions?
- What are the main drivers of significant deviations between projected and actual costs? Are there certain costs that tend to be subject to greater deviation?

### Budgeting
- In your view, how accurate are initial resource estimates?
- What types of activities are typically easier to predict/result in more accurate illustrative budgets, vs. more difficult-to-estimate costs? How do you deal with that uncertainty during the budgeting process?
- If USAID were to issue RFPs with defined objectives but no published costs, how would this influence your proposals and budget estimates?

### Award management process/planning
- When and where do you use local versus US-based resources? What drives use of local talent?
- Do you ever research other programs in the field to identify opportunities for resource and cost sharing?
- Would it be possible to reduce costs via bulk procurement for widely used resources?
- How do you select sub-contractors (competitive process, informal, relevant considerations)? What is the process of deciding prime recipient vs. sub-contractors vs. joint coalitions?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point raised</th>
<th>Documentation provided to Oliver Wyman by USAID</th>
<th>Cost driver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logic driving current instrument choice is inconsistent with guidelines</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4</td>
<td>Instrument selection biases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request to post more draft RFAs</td>
<td>1, 6</td>
<td>Tight RFP/RFA timelines and delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive prior approvals (travel, salaries, hiring choices, subgrants)</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</td>
<td>Over-management of cost inputs rather than outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive reporting (monthly performance, frequent financial reports)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Over-management of cost inputs rather than outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of consistent or correctly applied policy</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</td>
<td>Inconsistency in policy interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard copies required for RFP responses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Paper submission requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of auditing</td>
<td>2, 5</td>
<td>Excessive auditing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidential Information Redacted.
Contents

1. List of interviewees
2. Defining Acquisition and Assistance (A&A)
3. A. The A&A award life cycle
   B. Detailed A&A process maps
   C. Supporting information management systems and tools
4. Relevant policies reviewed
5. Procurement Action Lead Times (PALT)
Section 1 List of interviewees
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Topic of Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kristin Wood</td>
<td>Technical Writer (M/MPBP/POL)</td>
<td>Review understanding of ADS policies for each Focus Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Zeilinger</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/PPP)</td>
<td>Review understanding of cross-bureau funding, award processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Baltas</td>
<td>Lead Contract Specialist (M/OAA/GH)</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Bradley</td>
<td>Contract Specialist (M/OAA/GH)</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Egaas</td>
<td>Contract/Agreement Officer</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy for Field CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO (Field)</td>
<td>Contract/Agreement Officer</td>
<td>CO perspective on actual process v. policy for Field CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyra Cassidy</td>
<td>Policy and Procurement Advisor (GH/PPP/SAEO)</td>
<td>CO and COR perspective on actual process v. policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry O'Brien*</td>
<td>Program Analyst (OST)</td>
<td>COR perspective on actual process v. policy for DC COR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR2 (DC)</td>
<td>Contract/Agreement Officer Representative</td>
<td>COR perspective on actual process v. policy for DC COR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Rocha</td>
<td>Senior Financial Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace &quot;Tripp&quot; Lloyd</td>
<td>Program Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds to awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyman Stone</td>
<td>Consultant (GH/PPP/PIBM)</td>
<td>Allocating funds to awards, head of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Walther</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Operations (M/OAA/OD)</td>
<td>Review understanding of contracting processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Fox</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/HIDN)</td>
<td>Review process of allocating funds to awards in HIDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Stanton</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/OHA/TLR)</td>
<td>Review process of allocating funds to awards in OHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Starbird</td>
<td>Office Director (GH/PRH)</td>
<td>Review process of allocating funds to awards in PRH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Advisor</td>
<td>InsideNGO</td>
<td>Opportunities for increased effectiveness within GH awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Advisor</td>
<td>Former OMB</td>
<td>Government organizations with similar business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy application and interpretation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*not GH but working on improving handoff between Program Office and OAA
Section 2  Defining Acquisition and Assistance
# ACES and Acquisition & Assistance definitions and terminology

## Defining Acquisition & Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acquisition terminology</th>
<th>Assistance terminology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Instruments</strong></td>
<td>Contracts, IDIQ, TOs</td>
<td>Cooperative Agreement, LWA, Associate, Grants,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GH Personnel</strong></td>
<td>Contract Officer Representative (COR)</td>
<td>Agreement Officer Representative (AOR)</td>
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<td><strong>M/OAA Personnel</strong></td>
<td>Contract Officer (CO)</td>
<td>Agreement Officer (AO)</td>
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<td><strong>Pre-award</strong></td>
<td>Solicitation via RFP</td>
<td>Competition via RFA</td>
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<td><strong>Respondent</strong></td>
<td>Offeror</td>
<td>Applicant</td>
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<td><strong>Cost Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of all offerors that meet minimum criteria</td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of applicants in competitive range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awardee</strong></td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subs</strong></td>
<td>Sub-contractor</td>
<td>Sub-grantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Work Plan</td>
<td>Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Criteria for selecting award type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit or Use Test</strong></td>
<td>The principle purpose of the funded activity is to provide something for the direct benefit or use of the Federal government</td>
<td>The principle purpose of the funded activity is to support or stimulate activities that are not for the direct benefit of the Federal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is USAID the direct beneficiary or use of the activity?</td>
<td>Benefit or Use Test:</td>
<td>Benefit or Use Test:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is USAID providing the specifications for the project?</td>
<td>• Is USAID merely supporting the project with financial or other assistance?</td>
<td>• Is the benefit to USAID incidental (i.e., do funded activities compliment USAID’s mission)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is USAID having the project completed based on its own identified needs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Instrument characteristics

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost Eval</th>
<th>TEC as MAX</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition</strong></td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>Obligating seller to furnish goods or services and buyer to pay for them</td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of all offerors that meet minimum criteria</td>
<td>Required to pay cost overrun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistance</strong></td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>For public purpose of support where USAID involvement is not anticipated</td>
<td>Evaluate cost proposals of all applicants in competitive range</td>
<td>Max amount, despite partner costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coop. Agr.</strong></td>
<td>For public purpose of support where USAID involvement is anticipated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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Documentation requirements for A&A: Design
Different internal requirements to be fulfilled by type of award in preparation for award solicitation/competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Both A&amp;A</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Requisition** | • GLAAS Requisition  
• Project Appraisal Document (PAD) | | • Similar plan documentation |
| • Individual Acquisition Plan (IAP) | • AARAD (TEC >$25M goes to AA) | | |
| • Branding and Marketing Plan | • Choice of Instrument Justification  
• Statement of Work  
• Success Indicators to be collected and reported by Implementing Partner  
• IGCE  
• Award Requirements:  
  – Description  
  – Instructions to offers/applicants  
  – Evaluation Criteria  
  – Period of Performance  
  – Geographic Code  
  – Eligibility Criteria  
• Market Research Documentation  
• Gender Considerations  
• Environmental Compliance  
• Score sheet for evaluations | | • Branding and Marketing Requirements  
• Required information for RFA (e.g. est # awards, financial range)  
• Cost Share Determination  
• Substantial Involvement |

Source: ADS, M/OAA/GH interviews

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Documentation requirements for A&A: Solicitation / Competition

Acquisition requires additional involvement from GH and M to complete solicitation, compared to Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Both A&amp;A</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solicitation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Source Selection Plan (haven't seen examples)</td>
<td>• Competitive Range Determination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concur with Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU)</td>
<td>• Cost Realism Checklist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cost Analysis Checklist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions Consideration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• AARAD completed by TEC Chair for awards with TEC &gt;$75M, goes to Administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) Memo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiation Memo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship between funding and award processes
The funding process intersects with the project design process when funds are “marked” to a Project Activity Document (PAD)

Congressional funding process

Formulation
2 FY budgets in advance

Justification
Next FY budget

Appropriation
Executing current FY budget

Gov’t Involved
Funding Action

Congress Appropriates

OMB Apportions

State/F and USAID Allots

USAID: Bureaus Allow

USAID: Operating Units Obligate

USAID systemic “tagging” of funds

USAID Funds

Pillar Bureaus (GH)

Regional Bureaus (AFR)

Area

Element

Distribution (PAD #)

Example: 963.xxx

Example: A11 / 3.1

Example: A047 / 3.1.1 (HIV/AIDS)

Commitment
Funds “set aside” for Obligation

Obligate
Promise to Pay

Disburse/Accrued
Invoiced/outstanding

Project design

Concept Stage

Concept Paper

Analytical Stage

PAD (includes IGCE and M&E Plan)

Project Authorization

Source: Mario Rocha, Senior Financial Manager (GH/PPP/PIBM), ADS 201

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change
Section 3.A  A&A Award Life Cycle
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Design Process

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Solicit / Compete Process

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Award Life Cycle – Detailed view: Manage Award Process

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Program Cycle, CDCS, and Project Design Frameworks

- Derived from ADS 200, 201, 203

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Congressional funding process (linear representation)

- Derived from conversations with GH/PPP/PIBM

![Diagram of the congressional funding process]

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Field Support funding process (1/3): Snapshot of full process view

- Derived from conversations with GH/PPP/PIBM

When does this happen??

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Field Support Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Technical Office</td>
<td>Put together mission portfolio, Identify tech requirements for local awards, Coordinate technical requirements for field support for Pillar Bureau/COR, Identify FS tech reqs to Mission Program Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Program Office</td>
<td>Search GH Handbook for applicable awards, Applicable DC-based award?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Bureau Technical Office</td>
<td>Validate GLAAS REQs and coordinate with Office tech teams, Release REQ/Group REQ/RESM to OAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Bureau Program Office</td>
<td>Create GLAAS REQ for FS requests and route REQ to Office GLAAS Program Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar Bureau Technical Team</td>
<td>Accept FS-AID Requests, Coordinate workplans with Mission and Partners, Manage A/As</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar Bureau Field Support Team</td>
<td>Accepts requests in FS-AID, Coordinate tech reqs for FS with Mission Tech Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar Bureau Program Team</td>
<td>Enter FS-AID into FS-AID database, Coordinate funding allowance and distribution in Phoenix to accommodate Mission field support requests, Authorize line-by-line entries in FS-AID for Region Missions per planned FS-AID requests, Allow and distribute funds in Phoenix to match FS-AID planned requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/OAA (Designated Obligating Office)</td>
<td>Signs award mods, Enters transactions into GLAAS, Forwards modification to Awardee/Partner/Cooperating Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Field Support funding process (2/3): First half of process

- **Mission Technical Office**
  - Put together mission portfolio
  - Identify tech requirements for local awards

- **Mission Program Office**
  - Enter FS requests into FS-AID database
  - Coordinate funding allowance and distribution in Phoenix to accommodate Mission field support requests

- **Regional Bureau Technical Office**
  - Enter, link and authorize sub-obligation requests in FS-AID

- **Regional Bureau Program Office**
  - Coordinate Mission request as needed
  - Authorize line by line entries in FS-AID for Region Missions per planned FS-AID requests

- **FS-AID**
  - Coordinate technical requirements for field support for Pillar Bureau A/CORS
  - Identify FS tech reqs to Mission Program Office

- **FS-AID Phoenix**
  - Allow and distribute funds in Phoenix to match FS-AID planned requests

- **GLAAS**
  - Sign award mods
  - Enters transactions into GLAAS

- **GLAAS Program Manager**
  - Validates GLAAS REQs and coordinate with Office tech teams
  - Release REQ/REQM to OAA

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Field Support funding process (3/3): Second half of process

- Pillar Bureau Technical Team
  - Coordinate tech reqs for FS with Mission Tech Office
  - Accept FS-AID Requests
  - Coordinate workplans with Mission and Partners
  - Manage A&As

- Pillar Bureau Field Support Team
  - Accepts requests in FS-AID
  - Create GLAAS REQ for FS requests and route REQ to Office GLAAS Program Manager

- Pillar Bureau Program Team
  - Validate GLAAS REQS and coordinate with Office tech teams
  - Release REQ/Group REQ/REQM to OAA

- M/OAA (Designated Obligating Official)
  - Signs award mods
  - Enters transactions into GLAAS
  - Forwards modification to Awardee/Partner/Cooperating Agency

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
A&A Planning process (1/3): Snapshot of full process view

- Derived from ADS 300, 302, 303 and conversations with M/OAA and GH

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
A&A Planning process (2/3): First half of process

- **M/OAA & M/MMBP**
  - Take snapshot of A&A Plan data every 3rd Wed of Oct, Jan, Apr, and Jul and share with sr. mgt.

- **Operating Units (Missions and Bureau/Indep. Offices)**
  - CDCS Development (every 5 years)
  - Develop A&A plan with CO (Based on CDCS, DOs, IRs)
  - Project Design Aligned to CDCS DOs and IRs
    - Conceptual Phase: Concept Paper
    - Analytic Phase: PAD
    - Approval Phase: Project Authorization
    - Submit drafts of req. docs to CO when possible
  - Update A&A Plan / spreadsheet (Continual Basis)

- **Planner / COR / AOR**
  - Develop A&A plan with OU
  - Review data in A&A planning spreadsheet

- **CO/AO**
  - Review proposed A&A Awards at concept stage that meet specific criteria

- **BAAR / CRB / AA / Admin.**
  - BAAR: Review proposed A&A Awards at concept stage that meet specific criteria
  - Must concur with acquisition strategy for all Wash. Contracts at or above $25,000
  - Procurement actions between $3,000 and $150,000 are supposed to be set aside for small business

- **Small Business Office (OSDBU)**
  - Review Acquisition Documentation when TEC > $25M
  - Confirm that procured services do not include work that must be performed by fed employees
  - Confirm Agency's ability to manage contractor up to Agency's standards
  - Submit Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions document to CO
  - Prepare written IAP for cost reim, non-compete, time & materials or labor acquisitions
  - Submit IAP to one level above CO
  - Send approved IAP and procurement request to CO
  - Approve IAP and send back to Planner
  - AA: Review AARAD when TEC >$25M (with prior clearance from Head of OU)

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
A&A Planning process (3/3): Second half of process

- **M/OAA & M/MMPBP**
  - **Operating Units (Missions and Bureau/Indep. Offices)**
    - Confirm that procured services do not include work that must be performed by fed employees
    - Confirm Agency’s ability to manage contractor up to Agency’s standards
    - Submit Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions document to CO
    - Prepare written IAP for cost reim, non-compete, time & mats or labor acquisitions
    - Submit IAP to one level above CO
    - Send approved IAP and procurement request to CO

- **Planner/ COR/ AOR**
  - Consult with COR/ AOR to confirm if listed actions can be awarded by dates indicated
  - Submit Project into GLAAS: Complete Milestone Plan
    - Select Milestone Plan Template
    - Select Start Date of Milestone Plan
    - Link Milestone Plan to Requisition
    - Enter dates as each PALT step is completed
    - Submit acquisition planning documentation to CRB / AA for review (if required)

- **CO/AO**
  - Post award online (fedbizops and GSA)
  - Receive Applications

- **BAAR / CRB / AA / Admin.**
  - CRB: Review Acquisition Documentation when TEC >$25M
  - AA: Review AARAD when TEC >$25M (with prior clearance from Head of OU)

Confidential Information Redacted for Public Disclosure.
Criteria for Review
Prior to being competed, awards must be reviewed by up to 3 boards / personnel, depending on certain criteria, increases time to make an award

Acquisition and Assistance Review Requirements

All new awards -> TEC>$25M -> Assistant Administrator Review -> TEC>$75M -> Administrator Review

Acquisition Review Requirements

- New Sole Source contract
  - TEC>$15M
- New limited comp. contract
- New IDIQ contract
  - Total Ceiling >$75M
  - BAAR Review
  - TEC>$25M
- Modification to IDIQ
  - Raise total ceiling by >$35M
- IDIQ Task Order
  - >$50M

Assistance Review Requirements

- New Sole Source grant for CA
  - TEC>$15M
  - BAAR Review
- New limited comp. grant or CA
  - TEC>$75M
- New LWA
  - Total Ceiling >$25M
- Modification to LWA
  - Raise total ceiling by >$25M
- LWA or Associate extension
  - Field support expected to exceed 25% of LWA ceiling
- LWA

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change.
Section 3.C  Mapping of A&A systems and tools
USAID Award Management Templates, Tools, and Databases (1/2)

A&A Templates
- Comp Range
- IGCE
- IAP
- Source Sel.
- TEC Eval
- AARAD
- Cost An.
- Neg Memo
- Ad hoc

GH User’s Guide

Contraceptive Funding

GLAAS

PHOENIX

AIDTRACKER

GLAAS

Spend

FS - AID

ASIST

Development Experience Clearinghouse

Interfaces not explored/unclear

Outside USAID.gov

Fedbizops.gov

A&A Planning Tool

LEGEND
- Not interfaced
- Database Storage
- Database supplement
- Knowledge Management Tools
- Regular reports
- Award templates
- Information Management Tools

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change

Not interfaced

Information Management Tools

Database supplement

Knowledge Management Tools

Regular reports

Award templates

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**USAID Award Management Templates, Tools, and Databases (2/2)**

- **Fedbizops.gov**
  - Provides Access
  - Used to generate award requisition request, track some award attributes, and manage obligations and award modifications

- **AIDTRACKER**
  - Accounting system for Field Support, not linked to specific sites of funding so it can’t be used to track where funding is going (goes through PHOENIX)
  - Agency Secure Image and Storage Tracking – USAID's standard application for electronic document management (should store files)

- **PHOENIX**
  - Accounting system used to track outlays to implementing partners

- **GLAAS**
  - Web application for Missions to manage project data: indicators, contract, and financial

- **GH User’s Guide**
  - Post RFP / RFAs, procurement management capabilities are unclear (e.g. response storage, searchability)

- **Contraceptive Funding**
  - Different than PHOENIX due to “one-to-many” relationship of the line items… must be manually input into PHOENIX

- **A&A Planning Tool**
  - Provides Access
  - Knowledge management intranet to support program office knowledge sharing about program cycle

- **Developement Experience Clearinghouse**
  - USAID's central document repository, purpose is to facilitate sharing evaluation findings; searchability is not user-friendly, standard use is unclear

- **ASIST**
  - Post RFP / RFAs, procurement management capabilities are unclear (e.g. response storage, searchability)
  - Federal templates (e.g. Small Bus. Review)
  - Ad hoc
  - FedTemplates

- **PERMNET**
  - Provides Access
  - Provides Access

- **PALT tracker**
  - USAID's standard application for electronic document management (should store files)

- **Inside.USAID.gov**
  - Ad Hoc reporting M/OAA
  - PALT tracker
  - Div. Actions
  - Mods
  - ... Ad Hoc reporting GH
  - Award financials
  - Requested reports
  - ... Standard Reporting
  - Evaluation Reports
  - Other...

Per ADS 203, program office is responsible for maintaining performance information systems but “no agency-wide system is prescribed” (3.3.1g)

Developed based on policy review and USAID staff input – further validation is required to implement change

LEGEND

- **Knowledge Management Tools**
- **Database supplement**
- **Database Storage**
- **Regular reports**
- **Award templates**
- **Information Management Tools**

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Section 4 Relevant policies reviewed
Policies governing A&A process
The main federal policies governing A&A include the 48 CFR, 22 CFR 2 & 226, FAR 7, and FAR 15, as well as ADS

- Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
  - Title 22 of CFR (22 CFR)
  - Part 226 of 22 CFR 2 (22 CFR 226)

- Acquisition
  - Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
    - Title 48 of CFR (48 CFR)
    - Ch. 7 of Title 48 CFR (48 CFR 7)

- Assistance
  - Administration of Assistance Awards to U.S. NGOs
  - OMB Circular A110 - Grants and Agreements to Non-Profits

- USAID Automated Directives System (ADS)
  - ADS 100-600

- OMB Circular
  - Instructions expected to have continuing effect of 2 yrs or more

- General guidance, best practices, reminders, and FAQs, in addition to Agency policy and regulations.
- Issued by Director of M/OAA - policies that have not been incorporated into the ADS for one reason for another
- May end up as regulation (e.g. OMB Circ A110 → 22 CFR 226)

Policies governing acquisition are highly specific, prescriptive
Policies governing assistance are vague, compared to acquisition
Policies with relevance to A&A award cycle processes that were reviewed in detail for the ACES Process Evaluation workstream include:

### Award Lifecycle Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Solicit / Compete</th>
<th>Manage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 CFR 228: Rules for Procurement of Commodities and Services Financed by USAID</td>
<td>22 CFR 228: Rules for Procurement of Commodities and Services Financed by USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>FAR 7: Acquisition Planning</td>
<td>FAR 15.404: Contract Pricing</td>
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<td>FAR 15.605: Evaluation Factors</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>FAR 37: Service Contracting</td>
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<td>ADS 303: Assistance</td>
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<td>ADS 304: Instrument Selection</td>
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</table>
Section 5  Procurement Action Lead Times
### Procurement Action Lead Times (per ADS 300)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Award type</th>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Timeframe (Calendar Days)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>IDIQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (limited sources)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (compete)</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitive Contract (sole source)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td>award</td>
<td>Definitization of Letter Contract</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>award</td>
<td>Priced Order (task order under IQC)</td>
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<td>contract</td>
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<td>Bilateral contract modification</td>
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<td>Administrative contract modification</td>
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<td>Unilateral Contract Modification</td>
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<td>Cooperative Agreement (Non-compete)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>mod</td>
<td>Grant amendment</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Taken from ADS 300 in November 2013

| **PALT Start** | Action is entered into A&A Plan and Review System and a full GLAAS request is made (all planning documentation is completed) |
| **PALT End**   | Award is given to contractor / recipient (not necessarily when POP starts) |
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