THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

WHAT WORKS AND THE WAY AHEAD

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is an empirical study of police accountability measures within security sector reform programming. The purpose of this report is to capture the empirical evidence of what is effective at strengthening and improving police accountability and then to provide recommendations for making effective programs and activities.

There are different perspectives and cross-cutting approaches for studying police accountability and measuring programmatic effectiveness. Evaluating the effectiveness of police organizations and agencies’ accountability is complex because it includes:

- Police behaviors (individual, unit, and institutional)
- Performance outcomes/results
- Policies and procedures
- Managerial efficiencies

All four of these elements can or should be evaluated when assessing a police system’s effectiveness. In addition, one then has to review each of the four dimensions within which police accountability systems operate:

- Vertical (an institution’s internal mechanisms, processes, and procedures)
- Horizontal (the system of checks and balances across government institutions)
- External (independent organizations and groups that lie outside the official public governance system)
- From below (local and grassroots mechanisms by which communities directly interact with their local public service providers, such as the police)

This research applied these perspectives and analyzed a range of accountability programming to identify successful efforts and specific options for security sector reform practitioners. Empirical evidence has been culled from lessons learned in security sector reform, police accountability program evaluations, current criminology, and effective governance and accountability initiatives.

The empirical evidence from these various fields and disciplines clearly converge on a set of recommendations that support strategies and programs that focus on an incremental bottom-up approach in which police-civilian partnerships are the fulcrum around which accountability can be strengthened. These police-civilian partnerships at the neighborhood and community level are an example of accountability “from below” and are the most likely initiatives by which to improve police accountability. This finding is mirrored by the most recent studies in effective governance and accountability, including the 2017 World Development Report, Governance and Law.
It is critical to recognize that the increase in accountability produced by police-civilian partnerships is, typically, evaluated in terms of better safety and security, service delivery, increased police-civilian interactions, and improvements in the public’s perception of police behavior. In most instances, police-civilian partnerships do not measure police accountability according to reductions in police malfeasance and/or corruption.

Starting new police units is another promising way to increase police accountability, even if it may be a rare occurrence for a country to disband a current police unit to reconstitute it or establish one that previously did not exist. Civilian lawsuits against the police are another potential, but only if a pre-existing and functional accountability mechanism exists, independently or within the police, that can utilize the data to be derived from the law suit to change police policies and practices.

This report also indicates that there are other types of police accountability projects with less robust but still a likelihood of success. Training entire contingents of police precincts and stations together at the same time and emphasizing the importance of and training on police-civilian communication both appear to be likely to produce an increase in police accountability. Updating use of force and firearms/force continuum protocols, especially those pertaining to de-escalation, may increase police effectiveness and, therefore, accountability, while the introduction of new technologies may also be possible and effective in certain contexts. Finally, the introduction of specialized police units into high-crime and violence neighborhoods can produce results, but those units need be to highly skilled and robustly supported with.

The evidence also showed what is less likely to work. These initiatives tend to focus upon police administrative procedures and processes. Projects that look to build the institutional capacities of internal affairs units and civilian oversight complaint and review bodies are less likely to succeed. Part of the reason for their low probability of success is due to the challenges of political commitment, transferability and scalability. If these challenges can be directly addressed and overcome, the probability of their effectiveness increases significantly. There is also little evidence to suggest that criminal prosecutions of police officers deters their or their colleagues’ future misconduct.

Given the varying contexts in which programming occurs, much remains to be learned. The importance of police accountability initiatives having evaluations that are vigorous and capable of producing reliable evidence cannot be underestimated.
SECTION I
REPORT STRUCTURE

This report is an empirical study of security sector reform programming, which aims to capture current evidence of what works to strengthen and improve police accountability. This report analyzes a range of accountability programming to identify effectiveness and specific options for security sector reform practitioners.

A large body of police practice and police development literature explores accountability, listing its principles and advocating for greater accountability.\(^1\) Numerous methodologies and instruments have been proposed for undertaking police accountability assessments. An equal number of guidelines provide programmatic advice on various approaches to increase police accountability,\(^2\) one of whose manifestations of prime concern is police corruption.

There are different perspectives and cross-cutting approaches for not only studying police accountability but measuring programmatic effectiveness. Evaluating the effectiveness of police systems’ accountability is complex because it includes:

- Police behaviors (individual, unit, and institutional)
- Performance outcomes/results
- Policies and procedures
- Managerial efficiencies

In addition, one has to review each of the four dimensions within which the functional systems of police accountability operate:\(^3\)

- Vertical (an institution’s specific internal mechanisms, processes, and procedures)
- Horizontal (the overall governance system of checks and balances)
- External (independent organizations and groups that lie outside the official public governance system)\(^4\)

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\(^1\) For examples, see U.S. Department of Justice, 2001; Bayley, 1997; Manning, 1997; Stone and Ward, 2000; and Ziegler and Neild, 2002.


\(^3\) This framework has been adapted, updated and refined from DFID Practice Paper, Accountability Briefing Note. February 2008.

\(^4\) These dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Vertical, horizontal, and external fall under the “long route” to accountability and, taken together, most frequently emphasize institutional capacity building, see World Bank, *World Bank Development Report – Making Services Work for the Poor*, 2004. It should also be noted that the most recent World Bank Development Report on governance refers to and
• From below (local and grassroots mechanisms by which communities and neighborhoods directly interact with their local state public service providers, such as the police)\(^5\)

The challenge is to correlate and determine how each of these four dimensions influences each of the four elements of police effectiveness and under what circumstances.

To achieve this objective, this report has adopted a rigorous empirical approach. The arguments presented in this report focus on the statistically significant\(^6\) empirical evidence presented by contemporary criminology, as well as reliable\(^7\) and valid\(^8\) lessons learned from the long history of security sector programming in police accountability. Unless specifically identified, program evaluations whose conclusions rely solely or primarily on data from (1) program indicators that have not or cannot be verified or (2) program indicators that are predominantly or almost exclusively output measures are not considered in this report as either reliable or valid empirical evidence. Furthermore, evaluations that triangulate program data with interviews of ‘key’ interlocutors, the preponderance of whom have vested interests in program achievements, given their positions within the program and/or the institution(s) receiving donor support and whose sampling techniques and methodologies do not qualify as statistically appropriate are also deemed to be not valid nor reliable and therefore not included in the empirical evidence. Similarly, evaluations whose evidence depends upon ‘most significant change’ data are not used in this report, given that such data is subjective and incapable of being replicated. While these methods of evaluation may produce interesting conclusions, their evidence does not meet the standards of reliability or validity and are best considered of anecdotal interest.

None of the above suggests that survey data that depends upon subjective assessments and/or perceptions is, by definition, either unreliable or invalid. To the contrary, survey data can be quantitative, reliable and valid and when it is, this report has taken it into consideration. Finally, it should be noted that this report does not utilize experimental studies conducted in laboratory settings or on university students. The findings of such measures

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\(^5\) Accountability from below is, often, labeled social accountability.


\(^7\) Reliable evidence is derived from a measurement process that has internal consistency, its methods of

\(^8\) Valid evidence is derived from an assessment process that actually measures what it intends to measure and that its claims reflect reality.
studies may be intellectually informative, but how they transfer onto police officers and into development contexts is unknown and largely unstudied.

The challenge of determining whether approaches are transferable to other contexts arises when examining evidence derived from a range of environments, which is a particularly acute issue in studies of police accountability. Through this rigorous empirical lens, this report has found evidence of the type of programming that has the potential to produce effective police accountability outcomes and results in some or all contexts.

This report is divided into five sections including this introduction and the following section that discusses the various approaches to and perspectives on police accountability. The third section presents empirical evidence of police accountability drawn from contemporary criminology and lessons learned in security sector reform programming. The fourth section discusses how these empirical findings correspond to and track the evidence of what works for effective governance and accountability writ large. The fifth and last section concludes and proposes a way forward for effective police accountability in security sector reform.
Police accountability is a broad and multi-variant concept.\(^9\) A clear understanding of police accountability is crucial to capture ‘what works’ to enhance it.

There are two complementary lenses for analyzing and programming police accountability. The first concentrates on analyzing police behaviors and results. Focusing on outcomes, it is the methodology by which to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of a police accountability program. The second is a systems and functional lens which examines each of the four different types of accountability mechanisms and the procedures, and processes and the disparate actors involved in each. These two lenses and methodologies need to be brought together to understand the correlation between the approach and the outcomes on effectiveness and to design programs to achieve their intended objectives. Deploying only one of the two will lead to less than productive programming, given that they concentrate on different elements.

**MEASURING BEHAVIORAL, OUTCOMES, AND RESULTS**

Using the behavioral and results lense, police accountability refers to and encompasses, at one and the same time:

1) Police behaviors (individual, unit, and institutional)
2) Performance outcomes/results

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On its most basic level, police accountability is concerned with the private and public behaviors of individual police officers and the units to which they belong, as they interact with the residents who employ them to provide safety and security. These behaviors pertain to how the police conduct themselves and respond to calls for their service. From this perspective, police accountability is about the day-to-day behaviors and actions of the police, their practices and the policies and procedures that inform those practices. Among the more important behaviors are the soft skills of how police communicate with the public during criminal and non-criminal interactions.

The behaviors of individual police officers and their units can be measured according to their adherence to police practices, policies, and procedures. This can be viewed as a measure of police discipline. Accountability also relates to alleged police malfeasance, a police officer or unit’s alleged involvement in criminal acts, organized crime, corruption, and human rights violations. Corruption and human rights violations are critical elements of police accountability. However, for full police effectiveness, accountability is much more than and cannot be reduced to or equated to only the questions of corruption and/or human rights violations.

On another level, police accountability refers to how a country’s police and law enforcement organizations, as a whole and individually, deliver safety and security. This perspective corresponds to the aggregate performance aka effectiveness and quality of the public goods and services the police provide. Among the key issues and challenges are the extent to which that provision corresponds to the priorities and interests of the country’s residents that employ the police. From this perspective, police accountability refers to the societal results and outcomes of the practices, policies and procedures of the police and their organizations.

A fourth perspective on police accountability pertains to the efficiency of policing organizations. Police and law enforcement agencies are publicly-funded state institutions. As with all state institutions, they responsible for how they utilize the funds they are allocated in the most cost-effective and timely manner possible.

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10 This understanding of police accountability echoes and parallels the definition of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, see INL Guide to Police Assistance. U.S. Department of State, 2016, pp. 29-31: police “are accountable to the people for their performance. This includes the extent to which they have achieved their mission, the manner in which they perform assigned duties and responsibilities, and their general conduct on and off-duty” (p. 29). See also Louis Radelet and David Carter, who define accountability as “the quality of policing, whether the police are involved in the types of activities or programming that the public wants, whether the police are providing good ‘value for money’ in the services they provide, and whether the police are holding up their end of the social contract.” The Police and the Community, Prentice Hall, 1994, p. 529.
As they are complementary, each of these four types of police accountability results and outcomes is equally important. Police accountability programs can be designed to correspond to one or more set of results and outcomes. Along each dimension, police and their organizations must respect and adhere to the rule of law and human rights. They are held responsible by their own organization(s), other state institutions and the citizenry to whom they provide the tangible and concrete public goods and services of safety and security. Therefore, police accountability resides in the adherence to the rule of law and human rights and the ways in which police and their organizations fulfill and further those objectives in a positive way to achieve greater and better safety and security. Conversely, they are also to be held responsible if and when their behaviors, policies, procedures, and practices transgress those principles and the law.

A SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Police accountability can also be analyzed using a systems and functional schema. This approach typically identifies the different types of accountability mechanisms, procedures, and processes and the disparate actors involved in each. A systems analysis is commonly used to examine police accountability in terms of effective governance and has four dimensions:

1) Horizontal
2) Vertical
3) External
4) From below

1. Horizontal. Horizontal accountability pertains to the overall governance system of checks and balances. At the national and state level, prosecutors, parliaments, and ministries of finance and justice conduct horizontal checks on all institutions and agencies of the state, including the police. With regard to the police in particular, other ministries may also exercise horizontal accountability, such as ministries of human rights, women and children, and defense, especially if a gendarmerie exists and falls under its jurisdiction. Anti-corruption and ombudsman offices, as well as legal aid organizations, also conduct vital accountability functions and fall under this category if they are official government agencies. In some countries, city, state and national auditors check and balance state institutions and agencies as well.

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The law and its provisions serve as a horizontal accountability mechanism. In some cases, there may be a need to strengthen or tighten varying administrative codes of procedure and other legal standards. For policing, these codes and processes range from *habeus corpus* to privacy, public access to information and intimate partner violence. The rights of, as well as the ability and process by which citizens can sue state institutions and agencies, including the police, is a key horizontal mechanism as is the legislation related to civil society given its potential to function as an accountability mechanism.

At the local level, horizontal governance structures include mayors, chieftain systems, and municipal, village, and commune councils. In policing, the systems often associated with these local offices are separate and distinct from national, state or provincial police services and may also be capable of performing check and balance functions.

2. **Vertical.** Vertical accountability refers to an institution’s internal mechanisms that perform accountability functions. These include the state agency’s mission statement, its policies and procedures and its various codes of conduct. Organizational units that monitor and enforce these policies and procedures are vital including, but not limited to, policy and planning units, auditing functions and disciplinary bodies. Personnel and information management units play key roles in vertical accountability.

For the police, the ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ is the central principle around which vertical accountability revolves. This continuum is composed of the policies, rules and regulations by which police officers are authorized and mandated to engage in coercive action to fulfill their responsibilities to provide safety and security to citizens and residents. It extends to a range of operational manuals that prescribe tactical police practices and behaviors; the rules, regulations and process by which police officers are discipli ned by their own service for misconduct or malfeasance and the organizational units mandated to oversee police behavior, such as professional standards and internal affairs units. Personnel departments play a role and may also be charged with managing allegations of misconduct by police officers as they may control the information vital to these types of allegations.

3. **External.** External accountability relates to independent organizations and groups that lie outside the official public governance system and whose activities are to observe, record and report on state agency policies, tactics, operations and performance. The media is a key player. These groups also include think tanks and research centers that collate and analyze data on state activities.

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13 A further refinement would subdivide the external dimension into two: external and diagonal, in which the diagonal form of accountability refers to formal citizen engagement in the management of public entities, see Cornwall et al, 2007; Isunza Vera, 2006.
For the police, external accountability mechanisms include not only policy and research centers, but also labor relations boards, national and local bar associations, and human rights commissions and ombudsman offices that are not official government offices. External oversight systems and independent police auditors fall within this category as well. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are organized thematically such as women’s or human rights groups are key accountability actors. Police labor unions also possess accountability functions.

As already noted, the police are liable to be sued by citizens for alleged wrongdoing, given that they are a public state institution and agency. While the right to sue is a horizontal form of accountability, the exercise of that right, whether they are supported by civil society organizations, as they often are, or brought by individuals, is best considered to be an external form of accountability. This is an oft overlooked but invaluable accountability mechanism and one rich in information on police performance and behavior.

4. From below. From below is the systems approach’s fourth accountability type. This category is a much more local and grassroots mechanism than external accountability. It refers to the way in which the public goods and services provided by state institutions and agencies, including the police, are directly accountable to the needs of local communities and neighborhoods. It is also a mechanism by which the public service provided corresponds to and coincides with the actual priorities and interests of communities and neighborhoods.

Community-policing partnerships and fora fall under this category. Community safety councils do too, as well as other local police-community participation mechanisms. Organized procedures by which residents visit their police stations and record their opinions, score card mechanisms, and local audit and budgeting groups all perform accountability functions from below. Local religious, associations of local traders and merchants and other types of neighborhood groups fall under this category.
SECTION 3
WHAT WORKS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

This section is divided into three parts. The first part lays out four conceptual and practical challenges to any analysis of and recommendations on what works in police accountability. These challenges are:

- The search for reliable data and theories of change
- The use of indicators
- The transferability of lessons learned
- Scalability of police accountability programs

This section’s second and third parts present the types of programming that can increase police accountability and those that are unlikely to do so.

CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
The Search for Reliable Data and Theories of Change

Police accountability is, first and foremost, a managerial challenge that includes the means and methods by which police organizations supervise and control the behaviors of individuals and units, evaluate performance and operate efficiently. Research exists on police officer attitudes and beliefs on questions of police accountability. However, there is “little research on the organizational culture of policing” or what motivates police to comply with administrative and operational rules and regulations.

Furthermore, in 2007, the leading U.S. criminologist on police accountability, Samuel Walker, stated that empirically, “little is known about the effectiveness of [police] accountability procedures,” whether they are vertical or external mechanisms. In 2014, the same criminologist cautioned that though police accountability research is

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15 The New World, p. 22.
17 Walker, Police Accountability: Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs, National Institute of Justice, 2007, p. 3; see also Special Issue on Police Integrity.
slowly accumulating data, there continues to be an “absence of good, comprehensive data on” the various dimensions of police accountability;\(^1\) that “there has been little research on the dynamics of ensuring the continuity of reforms in policing” pertaining to accountability\(^1\) and that the ‘new approaches’ to police accountability have “never really been tried (and evaluated).”\(^2\) Consequently, it is important for programs to establish rigorous methods to evaluate police accountability initiatives so that this challenge can be mitigated in the future.

*The Use of Indicators*

There are virtually innumerable possible indicators by which to evaluate police accountability projects and programs given the various behaviors and outcomes by which to measure police accountability. Security sector programs must carefully spell out what types, characteristics and categories of police accountability they are seeking to enhance given it can take so many forms.\(^3\) Otherwise, the program may be accidentally measuring an element of accountability, but not necessarily the one the program intended to influence. To give a sense of the variety of indicators, a partial list of potential police accountability indicators includes changes in:

- Annual numbers of alleged and proven human rights violations, which can include extra-judicial killing
- Incidences and rates of grand police corruption, as defined by rates of payments made to prompt a police activity and those actively solicited by police officers while performing a police function
- Incidences and rates of petty police corruption, as defined by rates of payments made to prompt a police activity and those actively solicited by police officers while performing a police function\(^4\)
- Public perceptions of procedural justice with respect to police behavior
- Public perceptions that police and community priorities are well aligned
- Victimization rates for specific crimes, particularly those identified by affected communities and neighborhoods
- The degree to which police behavior adheres to a cogent and well-formulated ‘use of force and firearms’ policy and what occurs when behavior transgresses that protocol
- Thorough investigations of complaints against police officers lodged by members of the public and their fellow officers

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\(^1\) The New World, p. 265.
\(^2\) Ibid, p. 266.
\(^3\) Ibid, p. 267.
\(^5\) There appears to be an almost insurmountable problem in the classification of the type of corruption, as there are no means by which to tease apart whether grand or petty corruption is a ‘worse’ form of corruption with regard its effect on perceptions of state legitimacy or the economic harm they cause.
• The efficient use of budgeted state resources

Each of the indicators above is potentially a valid and important indicator of a police accountability outcome. However, each focuses on a different element of policing and is an indicator for only a narrow snapshot of police accountability. None is necessarily a better indicator of police accountability than the others, and none is incompatible with any other. Rather they complement one another.

Also, each of the potential indicators requires a different programmatic approach. Therefore, each and every police accountability program must make explicit the specific outcomes and indicators they are designed to achieve. Furthermore, these indicators need to be carefully calibrated to and be aligned with the activities being undertaken and justified by reliable and empirically valid theories of change. Having clear and appropriate indicators and systems for testing potential theories of change would help address the dearth of data on the effectiveness of police accountability programs.

Consequently, there is no single measure of police accountability by which accountability’s overall effectiveness can be evaluated. Furthermore, police accountability cannot be conflated to only questions of corruption and alleged malfeasance. In other words, a police accountability program can be effective in some elements of accountability without reducing the rate or incidence of police corruption and/or human rights violations.

Transferability of Lessons Learned

Of the empirical evidence that does exist, most of it originates from isolated projects and programs that have been conducted in western developed countries. While it may be possible to extrapolate from these examples, a key challenge is to determine what lessons and practices can be transferred from one context to another for there can be no assumption that what works in one environment can be replicated in another. A programmatic argument needs to be made in each and every instance given that each country and its police service faces disparate safety and security challenges, are embedded into political environments whose ‘rules of the game’ are not comparable and possess distinctly different resources and institutional capacities.

Therefore, it is imperative to ask whether U.S. managerial and police information systems can be successfully replicated, for example, in the Ukraine, South Africa, and Thailand whose norms and values as well as police management systems and procedures significantly differ from the U.S.? Can they also be effectively introduced into the Congolese, Honduran, Papua New Guinean, and Albanian contexts? The challenge of transferability also exists with regard to south-south programming. For example, as will be discussed below, a Brazilian initiative in Rio de Janeiro successfully lowered over the short-term the number of killing perpetrated by the police. Can this experience be applicable to other environments such as Liberia, Guatemala, and Kenya?
And if so, what components and elements of the Brazilian project are replicable. Similarly, are the projects that produced positive results by supporting community involvement and participation in Nepal and anecdotally in Sierra Leone transferrable to Bangladesh and Libya?

These are not easy questions to address and security sector practitioners cannot simply transfer effective police accountability endeavors from one context into another. It is necessary to specify which characteristics of an effective police accountability project can be reproduced. To begin to assess whether an effective program is applicable in other contexts, a political economy analysis must be initiated to determine:

1. At what political and police management levels does the requisite political will exist (if it exists at all)
2. Who will be the constitutive allies (civil society organizations, community/neighborhood groups, etc.) of a police accountability project and how can their support be fostered
3. Who will resist the implementation of a police accountability program and how their resistance be thwarted
4. Whether the country in which a police accountability program is to be initiated already possesses or can be supported so that it eventually does possess the requisite managerial systems, human and financial capital, technological capabilities, and norms and values that are necessary to implement innovative and potentially effective police accountability programming
5. The potential for sustainability of the police accountability program with regard to managerial systems, human and financial capital, technological capabilities, and norms and values

**Scalability of Police Accountability Programs**

In security sector reform and, in particular police programming, common reform strategies such as building model police stations and community policing pilots have produced isolated results, which have proved to be difficult to sustain and expand. Combinations of political constraints, organizational and managerial bottlenecks, budgetary restraints, and a paucity of infrastructure and training resources are frequent hurdles to scaling innovative or pilot police programming. Similar impediments apply to police accountability efforts and, therefore, it is recommended to evaluate how each of these factors will affect scalability.

**WHAT WORKS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY**

The following section summarizes what works in police accountability programming. The empirical evidence derives from actual programs and projects as well as from criminology research. Questions pertaining to how to evaluate success, transferability,
and scaling-up these projects are briefly addressed for each type of police accountability program. These approaches are outlined below in order of their potential level of effectiveness.

It must be noted that there can be no improvement in police accountability without the police being an active and committed partner. The issue is not if the police participate, but rather the level(s) of that involvement—national, state/provincial, municipal/local. It is a programmatic decision to determine the level(s) and degree of involvement of the police’s hierarchy.

Civilian-Police Partnerships

There is substantial evidence that civilian-police relationships, tools for accountability from below, are some of the most effective tools for police accountability. The following are some specific examples.

**Nepal** A United States Institute for Peace (USIP) civilian partnership program in Nepal has generated credible evidence of success. Similar to the Pakistani example below, at the heart of the Nepalese program was a series of facilitated dialogues that brought together communities and police to establish collaborative relationships. It appears that among the keys to this endeavor was a survey and mapping exercise of safety and security as it provided a solid foundation upon which the dialogues take place, enabling communities and the Nepalese police to see each other in a new and objective light. This gave each partner the ability to offer tangible solutions to mutually recognized issues. It is important to note that the dialogues focused on problem-solving, as was also the case in the Pakistani example, and from which decisions were reached and action(s) taken. This process increased trust because the police were seen to be responsive to concrete neighborhood interests and needs.

It is important to note that the project included special youth-police dialogues and the broadcasting of radio programs. The former may have been of particular significance in that USIP undertook special care to ensure the participation of a group that may have otherwise been slighted due to their unequal access to power and traditional Nepalese rules of the game. It is this type of initiative that is of importance in social accountability programming, as will be discussed below. The same pertains to the radio component as it appeared to broadcast the activities that were jointly being conducted by the police.

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23 See USIP, Evaluation of USIP’s Strengthening the Rule of Law and Security in Nepal Program.
and communities so that the local neighborhoods were made aware of the services that were being provided.

An evaluation of the program, whose findings were statistically significant, noted:

“survey respondents who were program beneficiaries were significantly more likely to interact with the police outside of reporting a crime than respondents who were not program beneficiaries (81% versus 17%). In addition to more frequent interaction with police, there is evidence suggesting that the program was effective in engendering other types of positive interaction among program beneficiaries, such the sharing of information with police and participation in police activities. Moreover, program beneficiaries saw a direct link between the dialogues and increased information sharing in their communities. When asked to identify the cause of increased information sharing with the police, 72% ... of beneficiaries referenced USIP’s dialogues.”

The increase in non-criminal interactions between police and neighborhoods is pivotal. As has already been noted, the vast majority of citizen-police interactions are of a non-criminal nature. Furthermore, increased communication by the police with citizens is one of the best methods of building community trust and confidence in the police. The more and the better the communication, the higher the level of police responsiveness and greater the public perception of the police’s legitimacy, and, ultimately accountability. This is called a ‘soft skill,’ but it cannot be underestimated.

It appears that the Nepal program achieved success on this dimension as there was

“a dramatic rise in citizen interaction with the police, doubling from 23% in 2009 to 49% in 2014. That number is considerably higher for program beneficiaries, with 81% indicating they have interacted with the police in the past three years. This stands in stark contrast to non-beneficiaries where only 17% indicated interacting with the police. Moreover, a test of significance found that the difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (64.2%) is statistically significant at a 1% level, suggesting that the program was effective in engendering interaction between citizens and the police.”

It should be noted this program did not address questions of police corruption or malfeasance, but enhanced police accountability in other areas of performance.

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24 The increase in non-criminal interactions between police and neighborhoods is pivotal because, first, the clear majority of citizen-police interactions are of a non-criminal nature and, second, increased communication by the police with citizens is one of the best methods of building community trust and confidence in the police.

25 Evaluation of USIP’s Strengthening the Rule of Law, p. 5.

26 Ibid., p. 20.
Transferability: This approach of initiating a survey and a safety and security mapping exercise upon which facilitated dialogues and problem-solving discussion are based is eminently transferrable. An effort to facilitate the participation of disenfranchised and vulnerable groups is also transferrable as is utilizing the radio as a means by which to disseminate information of greater service delivery.

Scalability: This model can be scaled-up. However, the process of working at the local neighborhood level is time consuming and slow and needs to take into account that all policing is local; the problems and issues encountered will vary from neighborhood to neighborhood and results need to be measured locally as well by the citizens and residents of neighborhoods for whom the service is provided.

Sierra Leone and Nigeria In Sierra Leone, an initiative created local policing partnership boards (LPPBs) that brought together the police and local elites, including traditional chiefs, leaders of quasi-vigilante groups and officials of secret societies to discuss local safety and security issues. The LPPBs served as community liaisons between the police and the citizenry. The LPPBs were dominated by the elites in contrast to the Nepalese example where special efforts were made to ensure that vulnerable and marginalized groups were included in the dialogue. But there is anecdotal evidence that they still contributed to the Sierra Leone police service (SLNP) being perceived as being friendlier and therefore may have contributed to crime prevention by addressing ‘low-level’ crime. This can be considered a measurable improvement in police accountability in that the police were perceived as responding to neighborhood and community safety and security priorities and delivering a desired service.

A similar claim for the improvement in police accountability is made for Nigerian programs that included community accountability fora (CAF) and community safety partnerships (CSP). Conducted in more stable areas of the country, the CSPs “provide a forum for the police to meet regularly with community and business leaders in individual police catchment areas. CSPs discuss security issues of concern to the community and generate joint solutions,” while the CAFs “provide an opportunity for community members to directly engage with the police and [other policing] groups in an open public forum to discuss issues of local concern.”

These fora provide a useful place and space for the Nigerian policing organizations in their various incarnations to meet their constituencies and to resolve local problems whether to improve the relationship between traders and the police, reduce burglary rates, introduce additional police (and police-neighborhood) patrols in high crime areas,

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28 Ibid.
or handle accusations of police extorting money. As in Sierra Leone, there is anecdotal evidence of Nigerian success, as defined by the public’s perception of increased and better public-police interaction and, therefore, enhanced safety and security service delivery. \(^{30}\) Furthermore, the Nigerian police informed program officials of its intention to roll-out CAFs and CSPs throughout the country as a principal part of the expansion of the program’s model police stations, which is another indicator of the program’s potential effectiveness. While the Sierra Leone project did not address questions of police corruption or malfeasance, the Nigerian one did with regard to petty corruption and malfeasance.

**Transferability:** The approaches are transferrable to other contexts and environments.

**Scalability:** This model can be scaled-up, though the effort will be costly, time consuming and slow. In a country whose police are challenged by severe systemic and performance deficiencies, such programming will need complementary efforts to address accountability. \(^{31}\)

**Tabula Rasa aka Blank Slate Initiatives**

Starting new police units appears to be a promising way to increase police accountability. One approach is to replace them completely from scratch, which can also be described as a form of vertical accountability in that an entire police unit is established de novo or built after a previous one has been disbanded.

This is what Pakistan and Peru did for their traffic units and, as a result, police accountability improved. In Peru, the previous traffic unit was disbanded, and a reconstituted organization was established, in which women officers constitute over 90% of the unit. \(^{32}\) A study conducted in 2010 suggested that the deployment of women has been central to the improvement in that unit’s accountability, as evidenced by a reduction in incidence of corrupt police behavior. \(^{33}\) In the Pakistan case, a Highways and Motor Police was established when none had existed previously. \(^{34}\) The Highways and Motor Police also adopted a “discussion-based system of problem solving” and had all

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\(^{30}\) Personal correspondence, June 2016.


\(^{32}\) [http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2802](http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2802); accessed July 2018. It should be noted that very few women have been promoted in managerial positions and significant percentage of women officers are frustrated by their assignments into traffic police because of their automatic assignment to the traffic police upon graduation from the police academy and their apparent inability to be transferred to other policing units after their initial assignment.

\(^{33}\) *Ibid.* This analysis makes no assumption that women are inherently less susceptible to corruption and misconduct than are men, see Anne Marie Goetz. *Political Cleaners: How Women are the New Anti-Corruption Force. Does the Evidence Wash?* *Development and Change.* Vol. 38, 2007.

its officers trained together.35 Both of these elements seem to be crucial variables for successful police accountability programming, as will be discussed below in further detail. These examples seem to highlight the important role of introducing new norms and values into the police.

Georgia is another example of a *tabula rasa* effort.36 The winner of a national election sought to assert his and his party’s control over the security services and reduce police corruption. Police pay was dramatically increased, and wages were deposited directly into the police officers’ individual bank accounts.37 The police were no longer allowed to collect administrative fees and fines (traffic violations, passports, driver’s license, vehicle and weapon registration, etc.) and, approximately 85% of all police officers were replaced.38 Across a range of indicators, such as rates of petty corruption and better service delivery, police accountability and performance improved. However, the cost of that strengthening was significant. Political control over the police was heightened and deeply politicized.39 In addition, certain types of human rights violations continued, and high-level corruption was left, largely, untouched or new forms emerged.

Transferability: If the opportunity exists due to the political dynamics of a country, this approach is transferrable, though it will likely be more difficult to implement the gender aspect of the Peruvian model in many locations.

Scalability: Given the opportunity, it appears that the only significant constraint to scaling up this model is political will and the capacities of the state institutions, including to police, to establish new operative units.

Whole-of-Unit Training and Scenario-Based Training

There are some specific elements that can be applied to police training efforts that have clear evidence to support their effectiveness in accountability and, as they are training initiatives, can be conceived as a vertical type of accountability.

35 Ibid, p. 34.
37 Similarly efforts to transfer police wages electronically into individual bank accounts were undertaken in both Afghanistan and Congo, but with less success in reducing police corruption. Interviews conducted 2016.
38 *Why Does Police Reform Appear to be More Successful in Georgia*, p. 6. The actual percentage of police officers removed from police payroll is debated and uncertain with other reports indicating it was upwards of 50%, see *Police Reform in Georgia*, p. 7. The traffic police unit, as in the case of Peru, was disbanded and reconstituted.
39 See *Police Reform in Georgia*. 
A police development program in Rajasthan, India concentrated on training and, more specifically, ensuring maximum training coverage. Police were trained on ‘soft skills’ such as communication, mediation, leadership, team building, etc. The percentage of personnel trained ranged from 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of the entire workforce of the station. The objective was to determine what level of coverage was needed to change police attitudes and behavior. Fifty percent improvements in the satisfaction of victims of crime was achieved, irrespective of the outcome of the police investigation, when training in the soft skills of communication reached 100% coverage. It should be noted that this finding on the efficacy of training all the officers of given precinct is consistent with the new training protocols of the New York City police on use of force and firearms/force continuum.

In addition, there is growing anecdotal evidence that the use of scenario-based training leads to more effective results – not surprising given that this coincides with one of the basic principles of adult education. These approaches take the training out of the classroom and into day-to-day policing practices through simulations, special institutes where skills are learned through doing, and on-the-job training. In New York City, police use scenarios as one of the principle training tools to teach its revised use of force and firearms/force continuum protocols that includes de-escalation principles, see below. In Las Vegas, the same applies to their revised training on ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ with regard to foot pursuits.

Transferability: Requiring all police personnel in a given station, precinct, or area to be trained at the same time is transferrable. New scenario-based training methodologies can also be integrated in all U.S.-sponsored police training programs in security sector reform. These training sessions need to correspond and reflect the realities that police officers will confront on patrol and when exercising their duties.

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43 A Brazilian training program that included university education failed because it did not expose officers to the concrete problems, realities, norms, and values of the neighborhoods and communities they were to police, Vincente Riccio, et, al., Professionalizing the Amazonas Military Police through Training.” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal. 14, 2013. See also Marcio Basilio. Police Training in Brasil: Rio de Janeiro in Focus. XX Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Lima 2015. It should also be noted that this author in 2004 observed what appears to be a superb policing training session in Rio de Janeiro, conducted in association with a Brazilian NGO, Viva Rio, in which experienced street police officers showed videos of on the street situations and confrontations, after which officers discussed and analyzed the practices. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence to assert the effectiveness of the training.
**Scalability:** Training based upon scenarios and ensuring that all police in a station or precinct be trained together at the same time can be scaled-up. At the same time, it must be noted that conducting such intensive training regimes is not customary in security sector reform programs and requires strong political commitment from Ministries of Interior and senior police officials.

**Communication and Soft Skills**

As suggested in the Pakistani, Nepalese, Indian, and Brazilian (which is below) examples, one of the most important skills that police need to enhance their effectiveness and accountability is an ability to communicate well with the civilians in the neighborhoods where they provide safety and security. This is a soft skill, which can take various forms. In police partnerships, it typically refers to the police’s ability to engage constructively in problem-solving dialogues and processes. In the case of India, they focused on the soft skills of mediation, conflict resolution and leadership and can be assessed in terms of public perceptions of police adhering to procedural justice standards or increases in public perceptions that their safety and security priorities align with those of the police and are being addressed.

The impact of communication on effectiveness aligns with emerging empirical evidence on the significance of procedural justice to policing. Procedural justice is the perception by an individual of the treatment, fairness he/she receives from the police officer(s) during their interaction. Procedural justice refers to the police officer’s decision-making in his/her exchange with a civilian(s) and how the ways in which those decisions are communicated with dignity, respect, and transparency to the concerned civilian(s). The greater the perceived fairness of the interaction with the police, the higher the individual’s belief in the legitimacy of the police. When people perceive the police as legitimate they are more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction and confidence in the police (both for individual officers and the institution), perceive the police as effective in their crime control efforts, be more willing to assist police, as well as be more likely to accept the manifest outcomes of an interaction with police.

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applies to virtually all forms of civilian-police interactions. In other words, communication is the key to better policing outcomes and results and, therefore, needs to be placed front and center as the pivot around which police accountability programming revolves.

*Transferability*: The centrality of communication and soft skills is transferrable to every police service.

*Scalability*: This model can be scaled-up.

**Specialized Policing Practices**

In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian police have been confronted by drugs gangs and militias who controlled neighborhoods and impeded and prevented the police from providing safety and security to the residents. In addition, the number of killings from police shootings was high. The police designed a tactic and policy around the introduction of pacifying police units (UPPs), by which to regain control of the neighborhoods. The policy had a narrow focus. It was “not designed to eradicate drug trafficking but to weaken criminal organization[s] and their dominance of the favelas.”

There have been three key planks to the policy and practice. The first was the ‘take over’ of the favelas by heavily armed specialized police units, but only after the neighborhoods had been informed that these operations were to occur. Once the neighborhoods had been stabilized by the presence of these police units, they were turned over to the UPPs, who engaged in a form of community policing, which in Brazil is called, proximity policing and resembles the Nepalese, Sierra Leonean, and Nigerian initiatives. Third, the UPPs were placed on ‘pay-for-performance’ incentive system. Originally, bonuses were paid according to the results of three indicators: homicide and other violent deaths; car theft and street robberies. Eventually, indicators regarding the reduction in killing perpetuated by police were added to the bonus scheme.

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49 Ibid., p. 13.

50 Ibid.

51 The incentives built into the Brazilian pay-for-performance scheme stand in sharp relief to a Ghanaian attempt to reduce corruption through better pay for the police. A doubling of police salaries reduced the incidence of solicited bribes by police but increased the average size of and the total amount of the bribes paid, see Jeremy Foltz and Kweku A. Opoku-Agyemang. *Do Higher Salaries Lower Petty Corruption? A Policy Experiment on West Africa’s Highways.* University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2015.
Although it lasted only for a period of six to eight years, the Rio program reduced the number of deaths caused by police action by approximately 60%, a marked improvement in one measure of police accountability. Each of the three pillars of the program were equally important to produce the result: pacification of neighborhoods by armed intervention, institution of a type of community policing by trained units and a pay-for-police-performance scheme.

**Transferability**: The Rio model is, most likely, not replicable in most developing countries, given that this tactic requires extensive managerial, information management and financial resources and police capabilities, all of which are components of vertical accountability. But the model may be transferrable to countries such as Colombia, Thailand and Pakistan whose police services parallel those in Rio de Janeiro.

**Scalability**: This model can be scaled-up, but it depends upon the size, demographics, and extent of the crime and violence challenge in the municipality or the area into which police are to be deployed.

**Use of Force and Firearms/Force Continuum**

The ‘use of force and firearms’ and, more recently, ‘the force continuum’ are the central principles with which police exercise their authority and work day-to-day. The ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ functions for the police as a foundational principle much as rules of engagement operates for the military and comprise a vertical accountability mechanism. Some evidence suggests that directed work on ‘use of force and firearms’ practices can increase certain types of police accountability. A study, which was later replicated, indicates that restrictive policies on the use of deadly force can effectively reduce the police discharge of their weapon. Restrictive policies include a series of protocols on how to handle different incidents, detailing what applications of force, weapons, and procedures can be used under what circumstances. In Las Vegas, for instance, a policy change, where a police officer involved in a foot

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52 Instance of police violence against individuals and the political repercussions that those instances unleashed, eventually undermined the effectiveness of the UPPs. It should be noted that the project had no effect on the overall murder rates in the favelas, *Killing in the Slums*, 2015, p. 6.


55 James Fyfe. Administrative Intervention on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 7 (4), 1979: 309-323. See also http://useofforceproject.org/#project, accessed July 2018, where a 2016 study concludes that “we found that police departments with policies that place clear... did not have these restrictions in place.”
pursuit is no longer allowed to be the officer physically arresting the suspect, has resulted in 50% declines in use of force reports over a two-year period.\textsuperscript{56}

A 2016 study showed that “after taking into account other factors, each additional use of force policy was associated with a 15% reduction in killings by police” (italics in the original).\textsuperscript{57} In addition, it has been found that when a supervisor or another police official is required to complete the filing and recording of use of force reports, the result is that those police services have lower use of force complaint rates than similar departments where only the involved police officer completes the necessary paperwork.\textsuperscript{58} Extrapolating this data suggests that mandatory reporting on all critical incidents could produce positive results in reducing police misconduct.

In a related study, it was shown that close supervision is correlated with lower levels of use of force.\textsuperscript{59} This implies that the span of control of middle management and sergeants, when optimized, may be very important in addressing the challenge of police accountability with regard to the ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum.’ This managerial rank is all the more pivotal if mandatory reporting were to be instituted. Finally, there is further supporting evidence that the close supervision of police officers by their leadership is directly related to the quotient of force used by police officers.\textsuperscript{60}

Not all use of force by police officers is necessarily deadly. With regard to non-lethal force by police, there seems to be no comparable study that directly investigates whether restrictive policies on the use of non-lethal force reduces the overall rates of force or the incidence of excessive force by police officers.\textsuperscript{61}

Even though the evidence is inconclusive regarding police accountability and how to reduce the use of non-lethal force, data exists to suggest that a relatively new model and approach to ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ shows success on ratcheting down and de-escalating confrontations.\textsuperscript{62} Some approaches to use of force

\textsuperscript{56} PolicyLink. \textit{Limiting Police Use of Force: Promising Community-Centered Strategies}, 2014, p. 12. This protocol has been put in place because research has found that the pursuit itself seems to increase the pursuit.

\textsuperscript{57} Use of Force Project; accessed July 2018.


\textsuperscript{60} Skogan, \textit{Fairness and Effectiveness}, p. 283.

\textsuperscript{61} Walker, \textit{Police Accountability}, pp. 6-7.

lead to the police increasing the aggressiveness of their tactics in correlation with what they perceive as a lack of cooperation and resistance. The emerging approach is to train officers to act with a greater range of responses, among which is the awareness of how to de-escalate, which may imply a tactical re-positioning or withdrawal rather than the gradual increase in the application of coercive methods. In New York, this rethinking has begun with the proviso that all officers and their supervisors within an entire police squad train together on de-escalation tactics. In Dallas, de-escalation training, coupled with more stringent use of force and firearms reporting mechanisms has significantly reduced complaints against police for excessive use of force and significantly reduced incidents of police-involved shootings.

Transferability: Use of force and firearms/force continuum procedures, such as more restrictive policies that include to document ‘critical incidents’, can readily be drafted into police practices and managerial responsibilities. However, the ability of many developing countries to implement these new policies day-to-day may be limited. These initiatives tend to require increases in the number and quality of middle management, close supervision of subordinates, delegation of responsibility to subordinate police officers, and a heavy use of information management systems. It is unlikely that most fragile, failed, in conflict and post-conflict will possess the necessary capital infrastructure and capacities for these reforms. It also may be challenging to ensure the requisite norms and values are in place to facilitate the procedures.

Nevertheless, the institution of new use of force and firearms/force continuum policies remains critical and ought to be undertaken, given that it is the foundation and principle upon which all policing practices are grounded. De-escalation reform and its tactics can be more transferrable, though it may be difficult for the training to be implemented given cultural values and norms.

Scalability: De-escalation training can be readily scaled-up as can the redrafting of policies.

Early Intervention Systems

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63 Individuals who “resist” police are 181 times more likely to have force used against them by police than those who do not “resist.” Matthew Hickman, et. al. (2008). Toward a national estimate of police use of nonlethal force. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 7(4), 563-604. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2008.00528.x


65 With the notable exception of the U.K.’s police development in Malawi, it is rare to find policing programs that have provided significant and substantive support for reform of ‘use of force and firearms/force continuum’ protocols, along with the managerial systems such reforms require. Despite its centrality in policing, the topic is rarely discussed in development literature, see, for example, *Democratic Oversight of Police Services*, 2005.
There is another vertical accountability mechanism that more developed contexts may have the potential to strengthen police accountability: Early Intervention Systems (EIS). An EIS is an information management tool whose purpose is to identify police officers whose behavior is problematic so that corrective supervisory actions can be taken before disciplinary procedures would need to be implemented. This is important because “it has become a truism among police chiefs that 10 percent of their officers cause 90 percent of the problems.” In three cases studies, the introduction and implementation of EIS reduced citizen complaints and lowered the need for use of force and firearms reports.

In a longitudinal study, in which an EIS was one component of a larger police management reform, there are reductions in citizen complaints against police and incidents in which force was applied by police. While the increase in police accountability is notable, that improvement cannot be causally attributed to EIS, as it was one component in the wider reform effort. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a correlation between officers involved in shooting and those who have a higher number of negative marks in their personnel files. Once again, although the causal link cannot be established, the correlation is illustrative between officer discipline and frequency of involvement in shooting incidents. Therefore, it seems probable that including EIS within a wider program of managerial enhancements can be an effective approach to tackling police accountability.

Transferability: These projects are not likely to be transferrable to many developing countries – fragile, failed, in conflict and post-conflict. These countries lack necessary capital infrastructure and capacities to accommodate the high levels of information that will need to be processed and managed. An analysis of cultural norms is required to determine if the values embedded within EIS exist in the country in which the project is to be implemented.

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66 To identify police with problematic behaviors, EIS uses a set of indicators by which to measure and establish an agency ‘threshold’ of police behavior. Officers whose actions fall above that threshold are identified as a ‘problematic’ and a performance review is, then, undertaken and a work plan devised to ameliorate those issues.


68 Ibid, p. 3. It is true, however, that in one of the cases studied, New Orleans, subsequent changes in the EIS dramatically lowered its effectiveness.


71 To generate thresholds and ‘identify problematic’ officers, police behavior can be evaluated according to a minimum of five and as many of 25 different indicators – from, for example, use of force reports, citizen complaints to sick leave, resisting arrest reports filed, and training history, see The New World, which is beyond the capability of most police services in developing countries.
**Scalability**: If transferrable, EIS reforms are scalable.

**New Technologies**

New technologies may also promote and strengthen police accountability and are characterized as vertical accountability mechanisms. E-payments for salary and fine payments to reduce corruption and improve efficiencies and transparency show promise of being a valuable means by which to reduce corruption and, therefore, may have applicability to increase police accountability. \(^72\) An e-banking initiative was launched in Afghanistan of police officers in 2013 and, as of July 2017, approximately 70% of all Afghan police officers are enrolled and 80% paid through electronic bank transfers, which appears to have reduced the number of ‘ghost’ police in the country. \(^73\)

The use of body camera technology also shows potential. \(^74\) Four studies have shown that when police wear body cameras, the number of complaints against police officers has decreased, and one study has indicated that the wearing of body cameras also decreases the police’s use of force. \(^75\) Another and more recent study, conducted over 18-months in urban Washington, D.C., however, did not show that body cameras had “discernible impact on citizen complaints or officers’ use of force.” \(^76\) On the other hand, a Las Vegas pilot of body cameras indicated that complaints against officers and their use of force declined by 37% and 30%, respectively. \(^77\) Finally, a 2017 study conducted in the suburbs of Washington, DC. found that police officers trained in the use of body cameras experienced a “38% drop in complaints,” while other officers “experienced a 4.1% increase in citizen complaints.” \(^78\)

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\(^72\) The introduction of new technologies, not related to policing, such as biometric smart cards and e-governance, have been shown to be effective in reducing corruption. See, respectively, Karthik Muralidharan, et. al. “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.” American Economic Review, 2016. Abhijit Banerjee, et. al. “Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2016.

\(^73\) Kate Clark. Update on the Afghan Local Police: Making Sure They are Armed, Trained, Paid and Exist. *Afghan Analysts Network*, 2017. What is unknown is the long-term sustainability of the system, if and when donor support is withdrawn.


\(^76\) Bwc.thelab.dc.gov; accessed July 2018.


Lack of unanimity in findings that evaluate the introduction of new technologies is not surprising, and it is to be expected, given that the contexts, policies and methods of implementation, and management of police agencies varies tremendously.

It may also be crucial to vary the indicators by which the effectiveness body cameras are measured. For instance, it is plausible that cameras may not decrease citizen complaints or police ‘use for force.’ There may be instances where the use of body cameras increases citizen complaints against the police. Their use could potentially affect a range of indicators in how citizens and residents of selected communities perceive the police. It is plausible to believe that the use of body cameras could improve overall police performance in terms of the number of cases prosecutors accept from the police and their rate of convictions, because the existence of video evidence that could be presented in court. If this were to hold true, then body cameras, despite the costs of implementation, could be considered an efficient use of police funds, as it did in the Las Vegas pilot in terms of cost savings to investigate alleged police misconduct.

For police accountability, while new technologies such as the wearing of body cameras and e-banking are innovative approaches that hold a promise of generating effective results, caution must be exercised. New technologies are not the charmed solution for police accountability programming in a developing country context.

Transferability: While new technologies are often speedily adopted in many developing contexts, the police institutions and agencies to do so is more challenging. Therefore, projects that rely on the introduction of new technologies can be difficult to transfer to because the requisite cultural value and norms may not correspond to their implementation and necessary capital infrastructure and capacities may be deficient. The sustainability of new technology initiatives is also an open question.

Scalability: If transferrable, new technologies are likely to be scalable.

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79 One of the largest maker of body cameras for police, Axon, claims that in San Antonio, for instance, use of the cameras has reduced use of force by 42% and citizen complaints by 21% since they were first implemented in 2015. See www.insidescience.org/news/science-behind-where-police-should-place-their-body-cameras; accessed July 2018.


81 It is also plausible to believe that the use of body cameras could improve overall police performance, in terms of the number of cases prosecutors accept from the police and the rate of convictions, because of the existence of video evidence that could be presented in court. See thecrimereport.org/2017/11/29/why-police-body-cams-arent-what-they-seem-to-be; accessed July 2018. If this were to hold true, then body cameras could be considered an efficient use of police funds and would be, in that sense, an invaluable means by which to increase police accountability. See thecrimereport.org/2017/11/29/why-police-body-cams-arent-what-they-seem-to-be; accessed July 2018.

Civilian Lawsuits Against the Police

There is a unique situation when civilian lawsuits for police misconduct has proven to be an effective avenue by which to enhance police accountability. They are effective if and only if an independent police accountability mechanisms, whether within or external to the police, already exists and functions well prior to the lawsuit having been brought to court. Furthermore, the independent accountability organization must be able to access the information about police policies and behaviors that is developed from the lawsuit, possess sufficient information management capabilities to analyze and process that data and have the confidence of the police to be able to enter a dialogue with them to revise the appropriate police policies, procedures, and training processes.

The unique occurrence of a pre-existing and functional accountability mechanism, as the causal variable to an improvement in accountability, will be discussed in later sections with regard to effective governance.

Transferability: This example is only transferable in countries that already have a strong and independent judiciary, as well as pre-existing and autonomous police accountability mechanisms that are well-accepted by the police.

Scalability: If transferrable, civilian lawsuits are likely to be scalable.

WHAT IS NOT LIKELY TO WORK IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

There have been two major portfolio evaluations of security sector reform that are pertinent to police accountability programming. A 2015 independent review of the United Kingdom’s portfolio, including programs that had been running for more than a decade, concluded that they had invested “in internal affairs and professional standards units for police across many of its programmes, without much evidence that this contributes to improved police behaviour.”

One of the conclusions of the 2015 assessment was that few programs, including the accountability components, “have a clear or plausible articulation of how the programme will contribute towards the stated impact, and none appear to have formally analysed or evaluated what contribution towards impact the programme did in

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fact achieve."85 A 2011 assessment of European Union (EU) programming reached a similar conclusion.86 More to the point, neither portfolio evaluation was able to identify police accountability projects that had been programmatically effective and it should be noted that the vast preponderance of police accountability projects concentrated on institutional capacity building support and activities focused primarily on internal affairs departments and external oversight/citizen complaint mechanisms.87

A case in point is a 2015 review of police accountability and reform in Kenya.88 The program was a comprehensive effort with a police accountability component being central to the initiative. Two accountability institutions were established as part of a reformed policing architecture. While there have been some achievements, there has been little overall improvement in police accountability as “survey after survey continues to rank the Kenya Police as the most corrupt institution in the country and one of the most corrupt in East Africa.”89 Among the continuing challenges is that the resources to fund and staff the reforms continue to be insufficient, as exemplified by the miniscule number of officers vetted as the law demands.90 Finally, in the Kenyan example, there has been little to no use of reliable and valid indicators by which to assess the police accountability reforms with regard to the results on “the investigation

85 Review of UK Development Assistance, p. 3. While it is possible that effective programming can exist even when activities have not been evaluated, it is significantly less probable that programs without a stated plausible understanding of how impacts will be achieved can produce their intended results.
86 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform: Final Report, 2011. It should be noted that for this review a thorough literature review was conducted of these and other program evaluations conducted by the major donors in this security sector reform.
87 A recent compilation of lessons learned on parliamentary oversight of police has been published, but, unfortunately, the case studies in the edited volume, while they lay out 'good practice,' present no empirical evidence of the effectiveness of this form of police accountability or how to undertake parliamentary reform in order to strengthen its accountability roles, see Mario Aguja and Hans Born. The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe. DCAF, 2017.
88 Kempe Hope
89 Ibid., p. 96; It should be noted that almost no “senior officers [with]… more than 15 years of police experience, [have]… received any ethics training since initial police recruit training,” Training to Curb Police Corruption, 2017, p. 6; see also, Edwin Sitienei. Appraisal of the Nature and Scope of Kenya Police Reforms between 1995 and 2013. University of Nairobi, College of Humanities and Social Sciences; accessed October 2017, http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/93860/Sitiene%20_Appraisal%20of%20the%20nature%20and%20scope%20of%20Kenya%20police%20reforms.pdf?sequence=3, where the conclusion of the thesis is that, while numerous plans and strategies have been floated, there has been little actual implementation and the underlying challenge of police accountability has not appreciably improved, particularly not with regard to police impunity. In a 2016 analysis of the reforms, the conclusion is that in spite of the new accountability institutions, the Kenyan police “the police continue to act unaccountably,” a culture of impunity remains, and Kenyan police themselves do not believe that there is an accountability problem, Mikewa Ogada, Deepening Police Reforms in Kenya post National Accord: Policy Implications. Saferworld, 2016, p. 4.
90 Ibid.
and disposition of police misconduct; merit recruitment; compliance with the code of conduct and ethics; compliance with the conflict of interest policy.”

In addition and to supplement these findings, an informal survey was conducted to determine the current police accountability thinking from within donor agencies and research institutes. Interviews were conducted with more than 15 police development practitioners whose combined years of experience totaled more than 200 years and who had worked in or are conversant with almost every major donor-supported police development program over the past 15 years. Queries were also posted on the field’s two major knowledge networks operated by the International Security Sector Advisory Team and United States Institute of Peace (USIP). While the survey may not be statistically reliable or valid, its results mirror the portfolio evaluations of DFID and the EU and clearly show that practitioners and scholars are, generally, unable to identify projects in which, as one practitioner noted, “behaviors were changed” or “success was sustainable.” Another senior official of a leading non-governmental organization (NGO) said, “We just don’t have that data and, other than good stories, cannot show we’ve bettered police accountability.” This is not a lack of evidence, but the converse: evidence that existing police accountability programs have lacked effectiveness.

The remainder of this section looks more closely at some specific types of initiatives which have not demonstrated effectiveness in police accountability.

Administrative Policies and Controls

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91 Ibid.
92 Through current and former officials, the following agencies and organizations were consulted: USAID/USA, Stabilisation Unit and DFID/UK, World Bank, United Nations Office of Drug Control, Danish Institute of International Studies, SaferWorld, African Policing Civil Oversight Forum, Overseas Development Institute, International Security Sector Advisory Team, United States Institute of Peace, Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, and Institute for Security Studies.
93 Interview conducted spring 2016 with a senior staff person of a leading international non-governmental organization (NGO). In other interviews conducted in spring 2016, practitioners with decades of experience stated that “if one really looks at [police accountability], we have not succeeded” and “beyond moving closer to getting ‘enabling platforms’ from which little was implemented… [I have] not seen a lot that was successful.”
94 It may, nevertheless, be necessary for donors to support such activities for political or other reasons, as USAID has been doing with the relevant unit of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), see USAID descriptions/accountability-strengthening-timor-leste-national-police-pntl; downloaded May 2016. The program may prove to be successful in building the capacity of the PNTL with regard to the knowledge, attitude, and skills of the unit’s personnel. The program could also enhance the unit’s managerial systems. However, the final results of its effectiveness remain to be seen. The results will help to provide more evidence beyond the validity of this theory of change or not.
The drafting and promulgation of policies, procedures, and written manuals are not in themselves effective accountability instruments.\(^5\) This is mostly due to the fact these vertical accountability initiatives often end after the introduction of new policies and procedures or that the structural, cultural, and managerial practices that present obstacles to their application are not addressed at the same time. With regard to specific police accountability practices and procedures, there seems to be a lack of research “whether one particular approach to performance evaluation (e.g., regularity of evaluations, categories of performance evaluated, type of evaluation utilized, etc.) is associated with lower levels of undesirable outcomes (use of force, citizen complaints, civil litigation) than other approaches.”\(^6\)

The exception to this rule is the institution of sound use of force and firearms/force continuum policies, procedures and regulations, particularly with regard to de-escalation. Of principal importance is to train all police on the revised use of force and firearms/force continuum policies and standards with special attention paid to de-escalation. However, it is not expected that reform of these rules and policies alone will appreciably improve police behaviors or practices, for all the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, because force and firearms/force continuum standards are central for all policing and police practices, it is good security sector reform practice to ensure that this foundation of police behavior is put in place, even if it is unlikely for actual police accountability improvements to occur.

The role of middle-management and, in the case of the police, the role of sergeants can be a pivotal element to help instill and maintain police accountability.\(^7\) In policing studies, it appears that the number of direct reports to sergeants – which in policing is called ‘span of control’ – is optimized at a ratio of no greater than 1:8 (sergeants to uniformed subordinates),\(^8\) but there is little understanding of how to improve the performance of sergeants and, therefore, how they can be best utilized to address police accountability challenges.\(^9\) Additional knowledge for how to best improve the performance of sergeants is still required.

**Internal Affairs/Professional Standards or External Civilian Oversight Bodies**

There is little information as to the effectiveness of either internal affairs/professional standards (vertical accountability) or external civilian oversight bodies (external

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\(^5\) *Police Accountability*, p. 282.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 14.


\(^9\) *The New World*, p. 56.
accountability), as methods of enhancing police accountability.\textsuperscript{100} As for internal affairs/professional standards units, there is little empirical data and no reliable theories of change to suggest “that one approach to the structure and management of internal affairs units is more effective than alternative forms in reducing citizen complaints, use of force, or other unacceptable conduct.”\textsuperscript{101} Part of the problem is that the indicators by which these units evaluate accountability – complaints, rate of resolution of complaints, and rate at which complaints are ‘sustained’ – are misleading, at best.\textsuperscript{102} For example, an increase in complaints could mean a greater level of confidence in the police to solve the problem or could mean that more incidences have occurred. This is why having an appropriate basket of indicators to evaluate effectiveness is critical to ensure all of the dynamics around these issues are understood.

The lack of evidence upon which to ground police components of security sector programming – both the absence of empirical data on how to improve accountability and the lack of history of effective programming upon which lessons learned can be grounded – does not imply that internal affairs/professional standards or external civilian oversight bodies as accountability mechanisms are unimportant or ineffective. The issue is that there is currently little programmatic evidence to guide security sector practitioners on how, effectively, to establish, structure, staff, manage and train the police and/or civilians who staff these units.\textsuperscript{103} Consequently, even though these units and systems are crucial for the establishment of contemporary police services, the

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 129. With regard specifically to external civilian oversight, “there is very little credible evidence regarding… [its] the effectiveness,”\textsuperscript{100} Skogan, Fairness and Effectiveness, p. 289; see also, Christina Murtaugh and Michael Poe Establishing an Independent Police Oversight Body. INPROL Consolidated Response (10-007) August 2010, which lays out a comprehensive list of external accountability mechanisms, accompanied by judgments of ‘good practice.’ Unfortunately, there is no empirical justification given with which to choose which mechanism or why ‘good practice’ is actually ‘good;’ see also Rachel Neild. USAID Program Brief: Anti-Corruption and Police Integrity: Security Sector Reform Program, 2007.

\textsuperscript{101} Police Accountability, p. 19; see also The New World, p. 127. For a recent study of the internal affairs unit in an unnamed state in Brazil, see Sandro Cabral Sérgio G. Lazzarini. Guarding the Guardians: An Analysis of Investigations against Police. Insper Working Paper, 2010, where it is concluded that “to our best knowledge there is no specific study focusing on the factors that may facilitate or thwart the effective conclusion of processes against police officers who engage in deviations” (footnote 1, p. 4). For non-scholarly reports, see Randall G. Shelden and Pavel Vasiliev. Police Use of Deadly Force. http://www.sheldensays.com/deadlyforce.htm; accessed July 2018; David Graham. What Can the U.S. do to Improve Police Accountability? There’s No Shortage of Solutions but How Effective Are They? The Atlantic, 8 March 2016; Daniel Denvir. The Elusiveness of Police Accountability. CityLab, 2 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{102} The New World, pp. 130-131. Among the challenges are that citizens frequently do not file complaints, even when they appear to be justified in doing so given the circumstances. Other issues that preclude the reliability and validity of the data include the lack of comparability across, U.S. police departments and oversight bodies; between police agencies and oversight bodies; on procedures on how to file complaints; the levels of accessibility of complaint mechanisms; and on how information is classified, archived, and reported.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 125.
current data shows that they are not, in themselves, capable of reducing police misconduct and/or malfeasance.\textsuperscript{104}

Criminal Prosecution of Police and Civil Lawsuits as Deterrence

There is also little evidence to suggest that horizontal accountability through criminal prosecutions of police officers for malfeasance deters\textsuperscript{105} their or their colleagues’ future police misconduct or malfeasance. In a similar light, there is also little evidence to indicate that civilian lawsuits against law enforcement organizations and its officers for misconduct and/or violations of civil and human rights serves as a deterrence, absent significant monetary damages paid out to complainants.\textsuperscript{106} (It is important to note that this statement does not refer to past U.S. Department of Justice consent decrees or memoranda of agreement reached between the department and municipal police departments, such as in the cases of New Orleans, Seattle, and Cincinnati. In the U.S., consent decrees are mutually binding agreements between two parties, most frequently a municipality and the Department of Justice (DOJ) on behalf of the federal government.)

However, there is a unique exception, which is not particularly applicable to a developing country context. Police reforms and improvement in their accountability have occurred from prosecutions and lawsuits when insurance companies and city managers become actively involved in the pursuit of those improvements.\textsuperscript{107} In this instance, reform does not originate within or from the police, but rather with those who control the purse strings of the police. It appears that the reason for the enhancement in accountability arises from those who control or are directly affected by municipal budgets. Nevertheless, the police are involved in the reform effort(s).

\textsuperscript{104} It should also be noted that there is no evidence to determine whether external accountability mechanisms are more or less effective than internal ones, \textit{Police Accountability}, p. 20; see also Anti-Corruption and Police Reform. \textit{Anti-Corruption Resources Centre, U4 Expert Answer}, No. 247, 2010. This suggests that the choice of which accountability mechanism to implement is more a question of ideology, politics, and the political economy analysis of where political will exists than effectiveness. Donor support for external accountability mechanisms may represent a good result in and of themselves, but the objective for doing so should not pertain to an increase in police accountability.

\textsuperscript{105} For a discussion on deterrence, see \textit{What Police Learn from Lawsuits}.


This section explores the relationship between what works in police accountability reform and what works in effective governance writ large. As discussed, the data on police accountability demonstrates that police-civilian partnerships at the neighborhood and community-level (a form of accountability from below) are the most likely to successfully enhance police accountability. This mirrors and tracks what studies of anti-corruption efforts in governance writ large have found, namely that what succeeds in effective governance and accountability is an incremental, bottom-up approach.

It is optimal if these localized effective governance programs are coordinated and integrated into national institutions. However, these linkages and coordination depend upon the pre-existence of effective governance and accountability mechanisms at the national and/or provincial level(s) before the initiation of the program. Furthermore, those mechanisms need to be relatively well-functioning before the program is launched for successful outcomes to be achieved. This rarely exists in the security sector.

A functional analysis of good and effective governance shows that national, provincial, and local efforts coordinated across all four dimensions of accountability will ensure effectiveness. While this may be generally true in effective governance writ large, the empirical evidence of what works in police accountability belies this principle. Instead, as stated above, the pre-existence of well-functioning governance and accountability mechanisms is required is also required for this coordination to be fruitful.

Various evaluations and assessments of anti-corruption programming have been conducted that suggest that the most effective strategies to promote good governance and increase accountability require alliances, mechanisms, and platforms linking state actors who are champions of change with local initiatives. These analyses argue that successful programs must weave together enhancements of the state’s various

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accountability mechanisms with local demands for more accountability. This approach worked effectively in the case of Peru when monitoring of corruption by civil society organizations in the construction of public infrastructure was combined with an pre-existing and well-functioning anti-corruption state authority responsible for auditing, evaluating, and investigating all government activities. This model also proved effective in the previously cited example of how civilian lawsuits can produce improvements in police accountability, if and only if a functional, independent accountability mechanisms exists when the lawsuit is filed.

As these examples indicate, the empirical evidence suggests that it is the existence of a well-functioning state-level accountability mechanism that enables the linkage between state, provincial and local levels to produce accountability results. Without a pre-existing and functional accountability mechanism, linkages between the different levels of state government produce few, if any, improvements in effective governance.

The reason is straightforward. As described in the World Bank Development Report (WDR): Governance and the Law, improvements in effective governance and accountability hinge upon national and provincial level state actors, institutions, organizations and agencies being committed to change existing power structures, revise asymmetrical rules of the game, reverse state capture and clientelism, and, lastly, rewrite previously negotiated political settlements. As the WDR states, improvements in effective governance and accountability “is unlikely to occur unless power actors – elites – in the country agree to that change” and “[are] likely to be effectively enforced only when they are aligned with the interests of powerful actors.”

The existence of well-functioning accountability mechanisms at the national-level is prima facie evidence of that commitment. Absent that commitment, which is exemplified by the lack of functional state-level accountability mechanisms – along the

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OECD


What Police Learn from Lawsuits.

“The bulk of the evidence suggests that the more unequal the initial distribution of assets, the better positioned the non-poor are to capture the benefits of external efforts to help the poor. Local actors may have an informational and locational advantage, but they appear to use it to the benefit of the disadvantaged only where institutions and mechanisms to ensure local accountability are robust,” Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. p. 146; see also of “local oversight is most effective when other, higher-level institutions of accountability function well and communities have the capacity to effectively monitor service providers and others in charge of public resources,” (p. 11).


World Bank, Law and Governance, 2017; see also Rachel Kleinfeld, Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: The next Generation Reform

World Bank, Law and Governance, 2017, pp. 19 and 78, respectively.
horizontal, vertical or external dimensions—change will not occur, the effective governance agenda falters and improvements in accountability wither.  

The reason for this is also straightforward and follows the logic and theoretical argument of the World Development Report 2017. Improvements in good governance and accountability can rarely be engineered by donors and the international community and the record of the international community’s anti-corruption efforts is poor and unsatisfactory. A 2011 review of anti-corruption programming goes further to claim that “there is no global success case of anti-corruption as promoted by the international anticorruption community. Successful countries followed paths of their own. Fighting corruption in societies where particularism is the norm is similar to inducing a regime change.”

118 The case of Ghana is an excellent example, in that it has taken more than 30 years for Ghana to achieve what can be called a “functionally institutionalized state,” in which the institutions of governance are capable and perceived to be legitimate, Conflict, Security and Development. World Development Report 2011, p. 10. Unfortunately, that level of institutionalized statehood has resulted in the “receptive environment” in which the civil service, political parties, the political elite, and the institutions and agencies of the state remain largely unaccountable and “petty and grand corruption is endemic.” Ivan Briscoe and Dana Goff. Protecting Politics: Detering the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties. Clingendael Institute, 2016, p. 24. See also Erik Wibbels, et al. Endline Impact Evaluation: Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms, USAID, 2018, p. iv. It should also be noted that the perception of political partisan manipulation by local state administrators rose, which may suggest there having been “sensitized” to budgetary manipulations by politicians (p. iv). In both instances, however, programmatic ‘outcomes’ hinged on perceptions.

119 It should be noted that there is little empirical evidence in the World Development Report 2017 on how, programmatically, to enhance accountability. The Report stays mostly on the conceptual, policy, and prescription level, arguing for the need to increase contestability, change elite incentives, and shift preferences and beliefs. Even as the Report notes that “the rules of the game is where the action is,” the Report provides little empirical data on how the international community can programmatically support local actors in changing those rules, (pp. 18 and 64). The argument in the World Development Report is, primarily, historical from a western and developed world context, theoretical, and/or academic, based upon experimental data and game theory. Most of empirical programmatic data presented in the World Development Report is also cited in this report. that is not also presents actual and successful good governance and accountability programs or projects. The scarcity of reliable and valid empirical data in the World Development Report about how the international community can support programming to strengthen local accountability mechanisms is telling. As one commentator noted, the World Development Report, while representing a paradigm shift, still requires to be operationalized, see Stefan Kossoff. The WDR 2017 on Governance and the Law: Can it Drive Transformation in Development Practice. Global Policy, 2017, www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/02/2017/wdr-2017-governance-and-law-can-it-drive-transformation-development-practice, accessed October 2018. Another observed that the World Development Report’s theory of change has not been elaborated but remains on the theoretical and conceptual level, Duncan Green. WDR 2017 Governance and the Law: Great Content, Terrible Comms, and a big Moral Dilemma on Rights and Democracy. From Poverty to Power, 2017, oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/wdr-2017-on-governance-and-law-great-content-terrible-comms-and-a-big-moral-dilemma-on-rights-and-democracy,

120 Independent Commission for Aid Effectiveness. DFID’s Approach to Anti-Corruption and its Impact on the Poor, 2014.


Anti-corruption and accountability programs are dependent upon the commitment and will of a country’s ruling elite. As the scholar upon whose work the World Development Report’s section on corruption is based describes

“it is now widely recognized that the poor [governance and accountability] enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries is not an anomaly that can be solved simply by investing in enforcement agencies or supporting transparency initiatives or the rule of law…. [T]he configuration of organizational capabilities and powers means that informal processes of rent allocation and capture by powerful and largely informal organizations are likely to remain important for some time. In particular, informal power networks are likely to continue to distort the operation of formal institutions in these countries.” 123

A 2017 USAID-sponsored literature review amplifies this finding, concluding that, first, “the anti-corruption agenda of the last several decades has been focused on individual-level rather than system-level policies” and, second, there is a convergence of evidence that “corruption reforms fail in the long term when they are focused only on cases of individual deviance” (emphasis in original). 124 The USAID review went on to conclude that donor-supported “programs to reward good behavior or punish bad behavior eventually fail because those tasked with doing the rewarding and punishing are themselves corruptible, and programs of monitoring are only as corruption-free as the monitors themselves.” 125 What is required instead, according to the background paper on anti-corruption and accountability for the World Development Report 2017 is an “incremental bottom-up approach” that bolsters “strategies for creating localized support for the enforcement of anti-corruption.” 126

In security sector reform programming, this challenge is particularly acute and, perhaps, more so than in other sectors. 127 In part, this is because there appears to be little

123 Khan, Anti-Corruption in Adverse Contexts, p. 13.
125 Ibid.
126 Khan, Anti-Corruption in Adverse Contexts, p. 12.
127 There is some evidence that computerized integrated financial management systems that enhanced accounting and reporting procedures are associated with reductions in fraud, see Context Choices in Fighting Corruption, 2011. It should be noted, however, that there cannot be ascription of causality between the computerized systems and the reduction in fraud, given attribution and measurement issues. There is also the beginning of evidence that procurement and construction costs can fall with better monitoring and auditing of procurement officials, see Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky. “The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires.” Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 46, 2003. There is, however, a measurement problem with most donor-supported procurement reforms in that they do not evaluate their projects using non-perception data or cost-based
incentive by state actors, parliaments, and police agencies to alter existing power structures, change the asymmetrical rules of the game and oppose state capture and clientelism in ways that will positively affect police accountability outcomes. That police accountability structures, systems and mechanisms are frequently mired in a lack of capacity and deprived of resources only exacerbates the situation. The Kenyan example is a case in point. The findings of the survey conducted by author that found no practitioner able to identify successful police accountability projects is another.

Consequently, without a pre-existing and well-functioning accountability mechanism, security sector reform programs have little option but to default to social accountability mechanisms. This is precisely the incremental bottom-up approach of localized support, implicitly advocated by the World Development Report, 2017 and confirms the empirical findings of ‘what works’ in police accountability programming: the most effective programming is accountability from below and, in particular, the establishment of partnerships between the police and communities and neighborhoods are constructed.

Social accountability is how local citizen initiatives, working in partnerships with local state institutions and agencies, can better ensure that providers’ public goods and services more closely corresponds to what the local communities and neighborhoods want. It covers a cluster of specific activities including projects to increase transparency and access to public service information, improve local participation in public and social services and support community monitoring of public service providers. Police-community partnerships are social accountability programs.

analyses, which can call into question the reliability and validity of the evaluation, see Why Corruption Matters, 2015, p. 60.


129 Social accountability can be defined as an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up,” Carmen Malena, et. al. Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Social Practice. Social Development Paper No. 76. World Bank, 2004, p. 3.

130 Ana Bellver and Daniel Kaufman. Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications, Paper presented at IMF conference on transparency and integrity, 6-7 July 2005. Washington, DC: World Bank. This correlation contains numerous intermediary steps, many of which may weaken the relationship between transparency, accountability, and the eventual improvement in the provision of public goods and services, see Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability, p. 5.
Social accountability programming as a standalone project is unlikely to improve accountability. In fact, the likelihood exists that increasing information for information’s sake can further empower the elite network(s), technocrats and policy makers, thereby reinforcing the asymmetrical rules of the game, clientelism, and state capture rather than enhancing accountability. Similarly, community-driven development initiatives, whose premise is to augment community participation, if not design appropriately, often promoted greater state “capture... by local elites.”

However, when two or three social accountability mechanisms are bundled together into one program to work with local state institutions and agencies, accountability results markedly improve. When, for instance, community monitoring is combined with information on health provider performance and user’s entitlements, health services are used more frequently, and there is a marked improvement in the quality of the services provided. Services further improve when the information provided “to households

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133 Fox, Social Accountability. p. 348; see Martina Bjorkman and Jakob Svensson. When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda. Journal of European Economic Association, Vol. 8, 2011; see also “the review of the literature finds that participants in civic activities tend to be wealthier, more educated, of higher social status (by caste and ethnicity), male, and more politically connected than nonparticipants” Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. p. 5. The opportunity and marginal costs for poor and vulnerable groups to participate are high and higher than their more privileged neighbors, which reduces the likelihood of the participation of the poor and vulnerable.

and communities [is] about the quality of services in their community as well as government standards of service.”

Echoing the Nepalese police-community partnership in which the production of maps that benchmarked neighborhoods’ safety and security concerns was crucial, the key appears to be availability of “information for benchmarking of performance of local levels of government, e.g. municipalities; or across local service providers (schools; electricity and water supply), where service quality can be measured and compared” to government criteria. It is information that is usable to community and neighborhood groups working with state agencies at very localized levels that increases accountability as state institutions become more responsive to citizen concerns.

In addition to the necessity of bundling social accountability initiatives into partnerships with local state providers, numerous studies indicate the need to differentiate between communities that are relatively homogeneous and those that are heterogenous. As the World Bank Development Report 2017 argues, in communities where asymmetrical power and inequality are pronounced, social accountability programming does not produce effective governance and accountability outcomes and may only exacerbate state capture. Projects need to explicitly enhance local participation to circumvent local elites’ ability to capture the state through their asymmetrical power. For example, programming could include mandates for representational quotas for differing demographic groups such as women. It also implies, as in the dialogue components

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137 A review by the Bank Information Center and Global Witness concerning extractive industries and local communities argues that revenue data has more impact if it were made more meaningful to those at the local level, McGee, Review of Impact. p. 18.
138 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development. p. 5.
141 See Lori Beaman, et al. Women Politicians, Gender Bias, and Policy-making in Rural India UNICEF 2006, where mandated women’s membership on local village decision-making councils enabled other women to participate more in village discussions, improved school attendance and health outcomes. It also seems to be true that women in leadership positions leads to a decrease in incidents of the paying of bribes for the delivery of public service, but, also can lead to decrease in public satisfaction in the quality of the public
of the Pakistani, Nepalese, and Nigerian police-civilian partnerships, that in order to achieve effective accountability outcomes, programs need to establish “well-articulated deliberative process[es]”\(^{142}\) that counteract the tendency of elite domination to skew of outcomes in their favor.

### SECTION 5

**CONCLUSION**

This report is an empirical study of security sector reform programming. The objective of this report is to capture empirical evidence of what works to strengthen and improve police accountability and make recommend for what works to improve accountability.

To do so, this report has analyzed a range of accountability programming to identify successful efforts and specific options for security sector reform practitioners. Those programs and projects come from a diverse set of contexts that includes lessons learned in security sector reform, police accountability program evaluations, current criminology, and effective governance and accountability initiatives. It is clear that the empirical evidence from the various fields and disciplines converge on a set of recommendations that support strategies and programs that focus on an incremental bottom-up approach in which police-civilian partnerships are the fulcrum around which accountability can be strengthened.

These police-civilian partnerships at the neighborhood and community level are the most likely initiatives by which to improve police accountability. This finding is mirrored by the most recent studies in effective governance and accountability, including the 2017 World Development Report: Governance and Law. It must be noted that the increase in accountability produced by police-civilian partnerships is, typically, measured in terms of better safety and security, service delivery, increased interactions between police and civilians, and improvements in the public’s perception that the police are behaving according to the precepts of procedural justice. In these instances, police accountability is not primarily measured according to reductions in police malfeasance and/or corruption.

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\(^{142}\) Deliberative dialogues are extraordinarily intricate undertakings and cannot be ‘taught’ as if it were a skill to be learned in a classroom. Furthermore, deliberative dialogues may more readily occur when the question being discussed is a local problem, see Mansuri and Rao, *Localizing Development*. pp. 266 – 270 and 135. In one instance, it was the combination of the scorecards, making public the contrast between health worker and community perceptions of performance and facilitated dialogue between community members and the healthcare providers that was key. See McGee, *Review of Impact*. p. 12.
Starting new police units is another promising way to increase police accountability, even if it may be a rare occurrence for a country to disband a current police unit in order to reconstitute it or establish one that previously did not exist. Civilian lawsuits against the police are another potential, but only if a pre-existing and functional accountability mechanism exists that can utilize the data to be derived from the lawsuit to change police policies and practices.

As this report indicates, there are other types of police accountability projects whose likelihood of success is lower than police-civilian partnerships, but still probable. These include training entire contingents of police precincts and stations together at the same time, scenario-based training and emphasizing the importance of police-civilian communication.

This empirical evidence of this report also indicates that there are other types of police accountability projects with great promise, such as updating use of force and firearms/force continuum protocols, especially those pertaining to de-escalation. The introduction of new technologies is also promising in certain contexts. Finally, the introduction of specialized police units into neighborhoods in which there are high levels of crime and violence can produce results, but those units would need to be highly skilled and robustly supported with resources for increased police accountability to transpire.

At the other end of the spectrum of likelihood of effective programming lies initiatives that focus upon police administrative procedures and processes. Similarly, projects that look to build the institutional capacities of internal affairs units and civilian oversight complaint and review bodies are less likely to succeed. Part of the reason for this is due to the challenges of political commitment, transferability and scalability that these other police accountability projects face. If in specific contexts these challenges can be directly addressed and overcome, the empirical evidence indicates that the probability of their effectiveness increases significantly. There is also little evidence to suggest that criminal prosecutions of police officers for malfeasance deters their or their colleagues’ future police misconduct or malfeasance.

Police accountability continues to be a great challenge. The lack of data demonstrating effective programs as well as the lack of data writ large further complicates matters, but the current data in police accountability programs as well as in government effectiveness writ large provide important starting points. But it has been and remains crucial that security sector reform programs and projects build into their programs robust empirical evaluations of what is working in order to further deepen the field of knowledge.
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