FIELD GUIDE: HELPING PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This field guide is a product of USAID’s atrocity prevention team. Lawrence Woocher, a Democracy Fellow working in the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG), was the lead author. The following people contributed comments during an internal review of the publication: Bridget Basirico (CMM), Cynthia Brady (CMM), Andrea Freeman (Sudan and South Sudan Programs), Mark Goldenbaum (DRG), Joe Hewitt (CMM), David Hoffman (Central Asia Regional Mission), Summer Lopez (DRG), Anita Malley (OFDA), Bridget Moix (CMM), Andrew Solomon (DRG), Amber Ussery (PPM), and Nicole Widdersheim (DRG). The following outside experts provided input on an earlier draft: Jonas Claes (U.S. Institute of Peace), James Finkel (U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum), Naomi Kikoler (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect), Martin Mennecke (University of Southern Denmark), Paul Stares (Council on Foreign Relations), Scott Straus (University of Wisconsin), and Ekkehard Strauss (Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).

The field guide also draws on inputs from more than a dozen “listening sessions” conducted in 2013–14 with experienced USAID field staff. These interviews were designed to capture the experiences, perspectives, and insights of field personnel with experience in trying to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

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COVER IMAGES: Left: an Uzbek boy reads a book in the remains of house that burned down in the 2010 violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Photo by Mark Goldenbaum. Top right: In Kyrgyzstan, people indicated their nationality — other than Uzbek — to protect their houses from looting and burning. Photo by Nonviolent Peaceforce (Flickr: nonviolentpeaceforce). Bottom right: Images from Cambodia’s Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Photo by Karen Murphy (Flickr: nantoyara).
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Letter from the Directors

It is hard to conceive of events that contrast more dramatically with USAID’s vision of resilient, democratic societies than large-scale, systematic attacks on innocent civilians. Mass atrocities shock our collective conscience. Beyond the immense human suffering they cause, mass atrocities cause irreparable harm to the development trajectory of nations or regions and erode our collective values and security. At times they can seem so large, complex and fast-moving as to be beyond the influence of development actors like USAID. Yet, mass violence is not inevitable; to make prevention work, we must leverage all available tools—not least, those like development assistance that can be used long before the crisis breaks.

Since the 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, USAID has played a leadership role in helping improve U.S. government capabilities related to atrocity prevention. The Presidential directive declared: “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.” Since that watershed moment, the challenge to USAID and other departments and agencies has been to translate the President’s clear statement about the priority of preventing mass atrocities into practical, effective action around the world.

We are especially pleased to introduce the Field Guide on Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities jointly as directors of the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. This field guide represents the culmination of a major effort by our offices and colleagues across the Agency to explore what development assistance tools we have to help prevent, respond to, and support recovery from mass atrocities. It also seeks to differentiate approaches to this specialized issue while pointing out the consonance and linkages with USAID’s long body of work on conflict mitigation and management and human rights. Future instances of atrocities can be averted through effective conflict prevention, but conflict prevention—while a major part of an atrocity prevention strategy—is not sufficient on its own. This field guide includes the latest research, informed by our experience responding to mass atrocities over the past year in places like the Central African Republic (CAR), by “listening sessions” with current and former USAID field staff, and by consultations with external experts and partners on this subject.

We look forward to supporting our colleagues in the field in using this guide to do what we can to address the daunting challenge of mass atrocities.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APB</td>
<td>Atrocities Prevention Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPPS</td>
<td>Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRG</td>
<td>Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economy Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ERMS</td>
<td>Economic Recovery and Market Systems</td>
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<td>FSN</td>
<td>Foreign Service National</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haiti National Police</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NHRI</td>
<td>National Human Rights Institution</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>PPM</td>
<td>Office of Program, Policy, and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Presidential Study Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Reintegration Service Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RtoP</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAME</td>
<td>Tracking, Monitoring and Evaluation System (Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECC</td>
<td>Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Messaging Service</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
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Executive summary

This field guide is designed to provide USAID field staff with practical guidance on a range of issues related to preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

USAID’s commitment to helping prevent mass atrocities reflects the Agency’s mission and core values. It is also part of the comprehensive U.S. government policy on mass atrocity prevention, which President Obama announced in 2012.

Mass atrocities: Key concepts

- Mass atrocities are large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians.
- Mass atrocities vary in context, perpetrators, targeted groups, means, and motives.
- Mass atrocities and armed conflict are overlapping but distinct. Actions to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict should be a major part of an atrocity prevention strategy.

U.S. government policy and USAID’s role in preventing mass atrocities

- Through a 2011 Presidential directive, the USG has made the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide a significant priority, declaring it “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”
- Mass atrocities are antithetical to development. Neglecting risks of atrocities imperils USAID’s investments across the range of development objectives.
- Development assistance programs can help reduce risks of mass atrocities. Successful development—broadly conceived—helps inoculate countries against mass atrocities.

USAID can help address mass atrocities in four main ways:

I. Recognize and communicate: Information and analysis about mass atrocities

- Mass atrocities rarely occur without warning. To support more effective preventive action, USAID staff should contribute to reporting on incidents and trends related to atrocities.
- Scholars have identified several mass atrocity risk factors and warning signs. In general, observers should watch for developments that shift the calculus or capabilities of potential perpetrators.
- USAID staff should report atrocity-related information through standard channels. Dedicated channels for “dissent” are available in cases where standard channels are blocked.

II. Prevent: Mitigating risks and bolstering resilience

- Atrocity prevention is a goal to which numerous types of programs can contribute, not a discrete set or sector of development programs.
- One or more of four broad approaches are usually applicable to help prevent mass atrocities: (1) preventing armed conflict outbreak, (2) promoting human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance, (3) strengthening civil society, and (4) building capacity and legitimacy of weak states.
- It is critical to assess the particular context, manage potential unintended negative consequences of USAID actions, and coordinate with other USG and non-USG actors.
III. **Respond: Limit consequences of atrocities**

- Even when deliberate attacks on civilians are occurring or escalating, USAID programs can help halt the violence and minimize harm among victims.
- Four broad approaches in the response phase are: (1) supporting mitigation or resolution of armed conflict, (2) supporting and improving protection for targeted groups, (3) dissuading potential perpetrators, and (4) documenting ongoing atrocities.
- Response efforts should recognize the tension that sometimes exists between humanitarian assistance and development programs and between short-term response imperatives and long-term development priorities. Focusing on building resiliency while responding to urgent needs can help address these tensions.

IV. **Support recovery: Dealing with the aftermath of mass atrocities**

- In the aftermath of mass atrocities, USAID programs should aim both to reduce the risk of recurrence and to improve overall development prospects by addressing the challenges unique to these contexts.
- Because mass atrocities are often cyclical, most of the preventive approaches discussed above are likely to be relevant to post-atrocity contexts.
- Four approaches are especially relevant for the recovery phase: (1) supporting justice and accountability, (2) supporting healing and reconciliation, (3) supporting political transition, and (4) supporting economic recovery.

**Figure 1: Strategic approaches to addressing mass atrocities**
I. Introduction

Why this field guide?

USAID’s commitment to helping prevent mass atrocities reflects the Agency’s mission and core values. It is also part of the comprehensive U.S. Government policy on mass atrocity prevention, which President Obama announced in 2012. “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide,” the President declared, “is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.” USAID plays a critical role in translating this policy commitment into specific actions on the ground in countries across the globe.

USAID’s field guide on preventing mass atrocities is designed to provide field staff with practical guidance on a range of issues related to preventing and responding to mass atrocities. This guide unpacks critical issues for USAID officers—especially those working in high-risk environments—and provides relevant background, guidance on good practices, and illustrative programming examples. The guide also identifies other resources and offices within USAID and beyond, where field officers can seek support and more information.

The guidance presented in this publication is set on a foundation established by many years of research and experience gleaned by scholars and practitioners in the fields of conflict prevention, human rights, humanitarian protection, and transitional justice. Readers who are steeped in USAID’s policies and technical resources on these subjects will find much in this document quite familiar. Indeed, USAID’s role in helping prevent mass atrocities is neither wholly new nor completely distinct. This document seeks to bring together the best thinking from closely related domains, complemented by discussion of issues that require specialized thinking from an atrocity prevention perspective.

How to use this field guide

If you have only a few minutes …

- Read the Executive Summary.
- Scan the table of program options (Annex A).

If you have about one hour …

- Read the Executive Summary.
- Read Chapter II, which introduces and discusses key concepts, and Chapter III, which provides guidance on reporting atrocity-related information.
- Skim the other chapters and the table of program options (Annex A).

If you have more than an hour …

- Read the Executive Summary.
- Read each chapter, paying special attention to chapters that match the context where you work most closely (i.e., prevention, response, or recovery phase).
- Study the program options in Annex A that match the context where you work and/or the type of programs that you manage.

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If atrocity prevention is a development objective of your mission’s strategy and/or an explicit part of your job …

- Read the Executive Summary.
- Read each chapter, paying special attention to chapters that match the context where you work most closely.
- Study the program options in Annex A that match the context where you work and/or the type of programs that you manage.
- Contact the USAID/DCHA point of contact for atrocity prevention to discuss any questions you may have and what additional support you could use from Washington (e.g., TDY support, training, specialized assessment, assistance seeking contingency funds, designing programs to address atrocity risks).²

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² As of fall 2014, the primary point of contact on atrocity prevention in USAID/Washington is Nicole Widdersheim; Human Rights Adviser; Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance; nwiddersheim@usaid.gov, 202-712-5325.

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Fliers ask the whereabouts of those who disappeared during Guatemala’s civil war.
II. Mass atrocities: Key concepts

Key points:

- Mass atrocities are large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians.
- Mass atrocities vary in context, perpetrators, targeted groups, means, and motives.
- Mass atrocities and armed conflict are overlapping but distinct. Actions to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict should be a major part of an atrocity prevention strategy.

What are mass atrocities?

Mass atrocities are generally understood as large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians. This definition distinguishes mass atrocities from small-scale or sporadic violence, however grotesque; from accidental civilian casualties during war; and from attacks on combatants. It is also meant to distinguish mass atrocities from the types of human rights violations that are very common around the world. Mass atrocities are—thankfully—relatively rare.

Table 1: Distinguishing mass atrocities from other kinds of violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass atrocities are:</th>
<th>In contrast to:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Large-scale</td>
<td>Isolated, small-scale (e.g., individual “hate crimes”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate</td>
<td>Accidental (e.g., “collateral damage”), spontaneous riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on civilians</td>
<td>Attacks on combatants (e.g., battle between armed groups)</td>
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</table>

“Mass atrocities” is not a legal concept, but there is a strong basis for preventing mass atrocities in international law. Though not all mass atrocities necessarily fall within them, the legal categories most often associated with mass atrocities are genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes. Together, these are sometimes referred to colloquially as “atrocity crimes.”

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3 The international legal definition of genocide is in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide (http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpepg/cpepg_e.pdf); The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4884-be94-db555e530e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf) contains definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes; note that the United States has not ratified, and is not a State Party to, the that statute. Crimes against humanity were originally defined in the charter that established the Nuremberg tribunal in 1945.

4 For example, the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice (http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/c53694.htm) describes its role as advising “the Secretary of State and other elements of the United States government on the prevention of, and response to, atrocity crimes.”
In addition, at the UN World Summit in 2005, governments acknowledged that each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and that the international community, in turn, also has the responsibility to use appropriate means to do that, including, in specific and defined circumstances, to take collective action through the Security Council.

“Atrocities” and “mass atrocities”—explicitly non-legal terms—have become the main reference terms in U.S. interagency discussions, in part, to avoid the impression that specific legal criteria must be met before taking preventive action.

Varieties of mass atrocities

Mass atrocities are neither new nor confined to the past. They are not isolated to one region of the world, one type of regime, or wartime situations. When most people think about “genocide” or “mass atrocities,” they think of the Nazi extermination of millions of Jews and other groups across Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, or the mass killing of more than 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda in 1994. But most cases of mass atrocities differ significantly from these two archetypes, even as they amount to large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians. Consider just four cases:

- **Guatemala**: In the context of a long civil war in which more than 200,000 persons were killed or disappeared, the Guatemalan armed forces and associated paramilitaries systematically targeted civilians deemed to be the “internal enemy.” Victims included “men, women and children of all social strata,” and four out of five victims were Mayan. A commission on historical clarification found that between 1981 and 1983, agents of the state committed acts of genocide against the Mayan population, including massacres and destruction of Mayan villages using “scorched earth” tactics. This type of reaction to an insurgency or guerilla war—i.e., a government deliberately attacking what is perceived to be rebels’ civilian base of support—is fairly common among historical cases of mass atrocities.

- **North Korea**: A 2014 U.N. commission of inquiry found “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Many violations “entailed crimes against humanity based on state policies,” including extermination; enslavement; torture; imprisonment; rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence; persecution on political, religious, racial, and gender grounds; the forcible transfer of populations; and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation. Like most mass atrocities, those in North Korea are the result of state policies and actions. But unlike most historical cases, those in North Korea have taken place in the absence of an armed conflict. An extreme ideology lies at the base of the system of repression in North Korea; some government atrocities can also be understood as attacks on populations perceived—however perversely—as threats to the power of the leader.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo/CNDP: The National Congress for the Defense of the People—or CNDP—operated as a non-state armed group in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2006 to 2009. This group has been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, including deliberate killing of civilians and regular use of sexual violence—including gang rape—as a weapon of war. The CNDP is, in fact, one of many armed groups that have preyed on civilians in the long armed conflict in the DRC. The CNDP illustrates atrocities committed by a non-state actor within the context of an armed conflict. Some of these kinds of attacks against civilians are probably committed to extract resources to fuel the war effort, while others are targeted against populations judged to be associated with other armed groups.

• Kyrgyzstan: In 2010, following an overthrow of the government, a series of attacks in southern Kyrgyzstan targeting ethnic Uzbeks led to nearly 500 deaths, widespread destruction of property, and some 400,000 persons displaced from their homes. Though often described as “ethnic riots,” there are indications that supporters of the deposed government helped spark the violence by mobilizing youth gangs and stoking existing disputes between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. This illustrates a rare, but not unprecedented, type of atrocities event—i.e., those committed by non-state actors outside of an armed conflict. As in Kyrgyzstan, these types of atrocities are normally at a lower scale than those that involve the state or occur during an ongoing armed conflict.

These and other historical cases show variation across mass atrocities in multiple respects:

• Context: Mass atrocities can take place during armed conflicts (more often historically, as in Guatemala and the DRC) and in the absence of armed conflict (less often historically, as in North Korea and Kyrgyzstan).

• Perpetrators: States or their agents can be perpetrators, as can non-state organizations such as rebel groups or informal militias. State-perpetrated mass atrocities have been the more common type historically—about twice as frequent over the last 25 years. This distinction, however, should not be taken as a rigid dividing line. In only the rarest cases do atrocities reach a massive scale without the active or passive support of the state—even when atrocities are committed by non-state actors.

• Targeted groups: In some cases, groups are targeted based on national, religious, racial, ethnic, or other group affiliation. In others, they may be targeted for their political views or perceived association with armed actors. Often, these kinds of perceived group identification will coincide. Targeting based on sex is also a common phenomenon—e.g., widespread use of sexual violence against women as a deliberate tactic, or targeted attacks on men and boys of “fighting” age.
• **Means:** The means and methods of attacking civilians can include systematic forced labor and displacement, as in Cambodia and Bosnia; burning of homes and villages, as in Darfur; shelling, aerial bombardment, and use of chemical weapons, as in Syria; and widespread use of small arms and light weapons, as in the DRC.

• **Motives:** Motives are heterogeneous, even within a single episode of mass atrocities, across individuals, and over time. Some prominent historical perpetrators were motivated by extremist ideologies and visions of radical transformation of society (e.g., Nazi Germany or Khmer Rouge). In most contemporary cases, perpetrators appear to have been motivated by a “strategic logic,” notably a desire to acquire or retain political power (e.g., Darfur, Sri Lanka, and Syria). Motives are grounded in the history and context of specific countries. The propensity to see political competition in existential terms, for example, tends to be greater in countries with a history of mass atrocities and genocide, feeding cycles of retaliatory violence.

It should be noted, further, that analysis of past cases may not fully capture future patterns of mass atrocities. Changing global dynamics, new ideologies, and new technologies could produce large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians that do not resemble any past case. The diversity in the nature of mass atrocities—across cases and over time—is one challenge to understanding them fully and designing action to prevent them.

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**Box 1: Mass atrocity situations change over time: Illustration from Syria**

In 2011, atrocities in Syria were initially one-sided (government-perpetrated) attacks on civilian protesters, committed before there was an organized armed rebellion. As the situation evolved, some groups opposing the government took up arms and the crisis attracted armed groups from across the region. Government-perpetrated atrocities continued into the period of major armed conflict. Some anti-government armed groups have committed atrocities in this period.

Thus, what began as a situation of one-sided, government-perpetrated attacks on civilians in a non-armed conflict context became a complex armed conflict in which multiple conflicting parties—government and non-state—have committed atrocities against civilians, even while “the Syrian government remains responsible for the majority of the civilian casualties.”

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How do mass atrocities relate to armed conflict?

Development professionals often ask about the relationship between mass atrocities and violent conflict. After all, some might say, wars are nasty and civilians inevitably suffer horribly in conflict situations. Is a focus on mass atrocities really necessary—or helpful—given that we already have tools for assessing and programming in conflict environments?

Analysis of the relationship between violent conflict, mass atrocities, and strategies aimed at their prevention reveals a few key insights:

- **Mass atrocities and violent conflict are overlapping but distinct.** Conceptually, we understand mass atrocities to refer generally to large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians. Violent conflict, by contrast, is the use of armed force between two or more parties to resolve competing interests. Empirically, most instances of mass atrocities have occurred during a violent conflict, yet most violent conflicts have not included mass atrocities, and mass atrocities have taken place in the absence of armed conflict. Normatively, we seek to prevent any and all instances of mass atrocities, whereas armed conflict can be justifiable in certain circumstances (e.g., self-defense).

- **Strategies and tools to prevent violent conflict and those to prevent mass atrocities also overlap significantly, but not entirely.** Since most atrocities occur in conflict situations, preventing the outbreak of violent conflict should be a major element of an atrocity prevention strategy. Overlap in the strategies and tools used
to prevent violent conflict vs. those used to prevent mass atrocities is generally very high for “upstream” prevention strategies that aim to strengthen societal resilience against future threats of violence. Where violence appears more imminent, there may be more divergence in preventive measures used. For example, atrocity prevention strategies might use tools that are rarely associated with conflict prevention, such as physical protection for vulnerable groups or support for high-level criminal prosecution.

- Atrocity prevention strategies should always be informed by analysis of conflict dynamics and the potential for external action to exacerbate conflict (e.g., by being perceived as favoring one group over another).

**Box 2: Research findings on the relationship between violent conflict and mass atrocities**

- Since 1945, two-thirds of episodes of mass killing (defined in the study as a minimum of 5,000 civilians killed intentionally) occurred within the context of an armed conflict. Between 1980 and 2010, that figure was 85 percent.⁶

- “Episodes of [political] instability that include large-scale, violent conflict between the state and an organized challenger are more than 16 times as likely to produce mass-killing events (defined in the study as a minimum of 1,000 intentional noncombatant deaths caused by state agents) as episodes that only involve an adverse regime change.”⁷

The variation across cases, the evolution within cases, and the considerable overlap with violent conflict should not obscure the clarity of the core concept of mass atrocities. Whatever their exact form, large-scale and deliberate campaigns of violence against civilians are mass atrocities. The global community has unequivocally rejected mass atrocities, yet they continue to occur. The next chapter addresses the U.S. Government’s policy response to this challenge and USAID’s role in it.

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III. U.S. Government policy and USAID’s role in preventing mass atrocities

Key points:

- Through a 2011 Presidential directive, the USG has made the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide a significant priority, declaring it “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”

- Mass atrocities are antithetical to development. Neglecting risks of atrocities imperils USAID’s investments across the range of development objectives.

- Development assistance programs can help reduce risks of mass atrocities. Successful development—broadly conceived—helps inoculate countries against mass atrocities.

Policy priority, high-level interagency body

For decades, USAID has worked in countries experiencing violent conflict, provided support for human rights, and delivered life-saving assistance to populations suffering from man-made humanitarian catastrophes. The U.S. Government more broadly has long been a vocal advocate for human rights around the world. The U.S. has been a party to the Genocide Convention since 1988, has routinely included language on human rights in its National Security Strategy, and has supported the “responsibility to protect” since its adoption at the 2005 World Summit.

Yet, until 2011, the USG had not developed a specific, government-wide policy on the prevention of the most extreme forms of human rights violations—mass atrocities and genocide. President Obama issued a Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD–10) in 2011. The directive was noteworthy in three main respects:

- For the first time, a President declared, “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.” This explicit statement of priority frames debate on specific country cases, in particular, by making clear that threats of mass atrocities are sufficient to justify USG interest and action, even in the apparent absence of other national interests.

- It established a high-level interagency body—the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB)—“to coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide.” Interagency discussions in the APB sometimes lead to queries or requests to country teams, including USAID field officers. The APB is also a venue that USAID can use to raise issues from the field that merit interagency discussion. See Box 4 for more information on the APB structure and process.

- It triggered an intensive interagency review—in which USAID participated with more than a dozen departments and agencies—to propose how the new APB should work and to examine relevant agency policies, tools, and capabilities; training needs; and opportunities for working with international partners.
Box 3: Why preventing mass atrocities is a USG priority
Excerpt from the Presidential Study Directive

“Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States. Our security is affected when masses of civilians are slaughtered, refugees flow across borders, and murderers wreak havoc on regional stability and livelihoods. America’s reputation suffers, and our ability to bring about change is constrained, when we are perceived as idle in the face of mass atrocities and genocide. Unfortunately, history has taught us that our pursuit of a world where states do not systematically slaughter civilians will not come to fruition without concerted and coordinated effort.”

— Presidential Study Directive 10; August 4, 2011

Box 4: Fast facts: USAID and the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB)

- The APB meets monthly and as necessary to respond to crises. APB meetings are chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) senior director for multilateral affairs and human rights.
- Participating departments/agencies reflect a broad range of capabilities within the USG, namely, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, the Joint Staff, USAID, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Vice President.
- The NSC staff convenes working-level meetings called the “sub-APB” in support of the APB.
- When the APB engages in depth on a particular country, meetings may be co-convened by the regional directorate at the NSC to ensure coordination with country-focused or regional interagency processes.
- DCHA Bureau leadership has represented USAID on the APB since 2013. The deputy administrator represented the Agency from the APB’s inception until his departure.
- DCHA/DRG and DCHA/CMM provide core staff support for the Agency’s participation in the APB. Nicole Widdersheim in DCHA/DRG is USAID’s main point of contact.
How USAID’s work relates to mass atrocities and their prevention

Mass atrocities as threat to development

USAID has defined development as “the process of expanding opportunity—the opportunity to pursue a life that is secure and in which basic needs are met; the opportunity to create, innovate, and learn; and the opportunity to build a better future for one’s family and community.” In this light, mass atrocities represent the antithesis of development. Concretely, mass atrocities negate specific development gains—in economic growth, health, infrastructure, etc.—and impede long-term development prospects. Like war, which has been called “development in reverse,” mass atrocities destroy human and physical capital, cause mass displacement and humanitarian emergencies, and disrupt productive social and economic activity across all domains.

Box 5: The toll of mass atrocities: Illustrative data

- Tens of millions of civilians have lost their lives in the last century in episodes of mass killings. The two worst refugee crises in the past 20 years were triggered by mass atrocities—the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the mass atrocities in Syria since 2011.
- Syria lost 35 years of development gains between 2011 and 2013 as a result of the violence, destruction, and displacement.
- Rwanda’s economy collapsed with the 1994 genocide—GDP fell by more 60 percent from 1993 to 1994.
- Negative economic effects have been substantial even in cases where mass atrocity crises were contained at lower levels, such as post-electoral crises in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Kenya’s per capita GDP is estimated to have shrunk by 5 percent from 2007–2011 as a result of the crisis and Cote d’Ivoire’s GDP shrunk by 6 percent in 2011.

Even more than armed conflicts generally, large-scale and systematic campaigns of violence against a country’s own civilians have profound and long-lasting consequences on all aspects of societies. Experiencing the widespread, deliberate targeting of civilians is uniquely traumatizing to individuals and societies and can lead to cycles of violence and atrocities committed out of a desire for retribution or revenge as seen, for example, in Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC. The challenge of reintegrating former combatants, to cite one aspect, is all the more difficult when former combatants have killed and maimed their own neighbors, not just opposing soldiers. Numerous USAID officials have reported that societal traumas resulting from mass atrocities continue to affect a country’s development prospects decades later.

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13 World Bank statistics.
Development assistance and risks of mass atrocities

After devastating conflicts in the 1990s—particularly the 1994 genocide in Rwanda—the development and humanitarian community was forced to face a painful reality: Despite the best intentions, “poorly designed international assistance can inadvertently create or exacerbate social cleavages, thereby contributing to the development of atrocity crimes.”16 As summarized by Peter Uvin regarding the case of Rwanda, “The process of development and the international aid given to promote it interacted with the forces of exclusion, inequality, pauperization, racism, and oppression that laid the groundwork for the 1994 genocide.”17 This realization led practitioners to commit to be guided by the “do no harm” principle, as manifested in the growth of conflict sensitivity guidelines, peace and conflict impact assessments, and human rights safeguards.

If misguided development assistance can increase the risk of mass atrocities, there is a more encouraging side of the connection between development and mass atrocities: Mass atrocities are extremely unlikely to occur in countries with legitimate and effective governments, healthy economies with broad-based growth, and strong civil societies. In other words, successful development—broadly conceived—helps inoculate countries against mass atrocities. It is true that mass atrocities have been committed in all parts of the world, including in highly industrialized and relatively wealthy countries. But in general, countries with poor development indicators,

such as high infant mortality rates, weak and unaccountable governments, and poor integration into the global economic system, are more likely to experience mass atrocities.

Much of USAID’s work in promoting traditional development goals can contribute to reducing risks of mass atrocities. However, considering USAID’s work through an “atrocity prevention lens” can help focus attention on the most critical issues. Specifically, USAID can help address mass atrocities in four main ways:

1. **Recognize and communicate** about risks of mass atrocities, to inform both the Agency’s own programs and broader USG action.
2. **Help prevent** mass atrocities by mitigating risks and bolstering resilience to shocks that could lead to mass atrocities.
3. **Respond** to escalating atrocity situations with life-saving humanitarian assistance as well as programs to help halt spiraling violence.
4. **Support recovery** from mass violence through programs focused on promoting justice and accountability, rebuilding social cohesion, supporting political transition and economic recovery.

It should be acknowledged that this division risks oversimplifying what is an overlapping, interconnected set of USAID responsibilities in complex and constantly changing environments. Countries do not proceed predictably or linearly from prevention to response to recovery phases, and the lines between these domains are inherently blurry. Nevertheless, discussing the distinctions can help elucidate USAID’s role. The next four sections address each of these areas, providing guidance and options for USAID field staff.

An unknown grave at the Kiambaa churchyard marks the remnants of post-election violence in Kenya.
IV. Recognize and communicate: Information and analysis about mass atrocities

Key points:

- Mass atrocities rarely occur without warning. To support more effective preventive action, USAID staff should contribute to reporting on incidents and trends related to atrocities.
- Scholars have identified several mass atrocity risk factors and warning signs (see Box 8). In general, observers should watch for developments that shift the calculus or capabilities of potential perpetrators.
- USAID staff should report atrocity-related information through standard channels. Dedicated channels for “dissent” are available in cases where standard channels are blocked (see p. 16).

Introduction

The prevention of mass atrocities requires taking action before atrocities begin. This, in turn, requires some ability to identify where and when civilians are at risk of mass atrocities and to diagnose the specific issues and drivers of this risk. The interagency review triggered by the Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities found that more and timelier reporting on incidents and trends related to atrocities would support more effective preventive and mitigating action.

Other parts of the U.S. Government take primary responsibility for early warning and analysis of mass atrocities. However, USAID has important roles to play—both responsive and proactive—in recognizing and communicating about potential or ongoing atrocities.

Because of its field presence and extensive interactions with local partners, USAID staff sometimes learns about atrocity-related incidents or trends the USG would otherwise miss. Relevant information could be picked up by one of USAID’s nearly 2,000 FSOs, several thousand FSNs, or many hundreds of local partners. USAID’s network of staff and partners often extends into the periphery of countries and into communities where the USG has little visibility. All USAID staff should, therefore, consider what they will do if they receive information or observe events that cause concern about actual or potential atrocities.

The Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland stands as a reminder of the possible outcome when mass atrocities go unchecked.
In addition, USAID undertakes a variety of assessment activities to inform its development and humanitarian programming. When USAID engages in assessments—particularly those focusing on conflict, humanitarian protection needs, and democracy, human rights and governance—in countries at high risk of or experiencing ongoing atrocities, these inquiries should strive to understand the issues that could drive atrocities and how they might be counteracted. To facilitate this, USAID and the State Department have developed supplemental guidance regarding mass atrocities to be used in conjunction with existing conflict assessment frameworks (see Box 6). The framework of analysis developed by the U.N. Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect can also be useful, especially as a framework for joint assessments with non-USG actors.18

**Box 6: Overview of State/USAID guidance on assessing mass atrocity issues**19

The State/USAID guidance suggests that assessment of potential or ongoing atrocities should be anchored by three questions:

- Which, if any, key actors have or might plausibly develop the motive, means, and opportunity to carry out large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians?
- Which, if any, groups of civilians are being targeted or might plausibly be targeted for deliberate attack?
- Which other actors are playing enabling, protecting, or peacebuilding roles with respect to ongoing or potential mass atrocities?

**Guidelines for reporting**

Part of USAID’s priority on preventing mass atrocities means taking responsibility for ensuring that relevant information is not neglected or blocked. This is deceptively challenging. USAID’s reporting role is secondary to its role in managing and monitoring the implementation of development and humanitarian assistance activities. Collecting and reporting certain kinds of information—or simply being perceived as doing so—has potential to make it harder to operate and manage program activities. The guidance presented here, based on input from numerous field officers, seeks to balance these interests.

**What should USAID field staff be reporting?**

- “Atrocity-related information,” as described in Box 7: In short, this refers to information on atrocities that have occurred, signs of imminent atrocities, and evidence that USAID programs are increasing the risk of atrocities. Possible warning signs of future atrocities also merit reporting (see Box 8 for a review of risk factors and warning signs).
- Many USAID staff work in countries with chronic, high-levels of violence. Reporting every incident of violence against civilians would be infeasible and probably unhelpful. Staff working in these types of contexts should always report information with serious consequences for USAID’s development.

19 The full State–USAID guidance on assessing mass atrocity issues can be obtained by contacting the USAID/Washington atrocity prevention point of contact: Nicole Widdersheim ([nwiddersheim@usaid.gov](mailto:nwiddersheim@usaid.gov)).
and humanitarian assistance activities. They should apply two additional filters to focus their reporting of atrocity-related information:

1. Signs of deviation from the baseline or what’s “normal” in the country; and
2. Incidents or trends that are unlikely to be known by other USG staff.20

Box 7: Atrocity-related information

- Primary types:
  - Incidents of deliberate attacks on civilians, including extrajudicial killing, rape, forced displacement, withholding basic means of life, and other major human rights violations;
  - Credible reports of organization, preparation, or mobilization for mass violence. For example: Arming militias; stockpiling weapons, inciting violence against civilians; forcing separation of groups; or suspending peacetime laws.
  - Evidence that USAID programs are exacerbating conflicts or human rights abuses.
- Additional types: see Box 8 for a review of other risk factors and warning signs.

How should atrocity-related information be reported?

- Use standard reporting channels:
  a. Pass it to your USAID supervisor and Mission director and discuss it with them;
  b. Pass it to the political or human rights officer at post;
  c. Request permission from your USAID supervisor to share it with desk officer, DRG and/or CMM country or regional backstop, and DRG human resources team (which staffs USAID’s role in the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board);
  d. If a relevant information sharing forum exists at the Embassy, bring it to that group.
  e. If a USAID or State country task force has been established, follow reporting guidance provided by the task force.

- If standard channels are blocked, consider:
  a. USAID’s Direct Channel (directchannel@usaid.gov), a direct line of dissent to the Administrator, open to all USAID staff. More information is available in Agency Notice 1142 (Nov. 7, 2011).
  b. State Department’s Dissent Channel, a direct line of dissent to the State Department’s director of policy planning, with protection against retaliation, open only to U.S. direct-hire employees of State and USAID. More information is available in “11 Foreign Affairs Manual 243.3 (Use of Dissent Channel).”21

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20 USAID staff may not be aware of whether information is likely to be known by other parts of the USG. In that case, USAID officers are encouraged to err on the side of sharing information (see “Operational Issues” subsection on “Dealing with uncertainty”).
21 When connected to a State or USAID computer network, you can also find information on the Dissent Channel at: http://diplopedia.state.gov/index.php?title=Dissent_Channel.
Box 8: Risk factors and warning signs of mass atrocities

The diversity and complexity of mass atrocities means that no simple checklist of warning signs can usefully be applied to all countries. Nevertheless, analysis of historical cases suggests the following (non-exhaustive) list of factors and signs that are associated with a higher risk of mass atrocities.

**Risk factors:** Risk factors tend to be slow-to-change characteristics that make states vulnerable to mass atrocities, including:

- Armed conflict (by far the strongest single risk factor)
- Autocratic regime
- History of genocide/mass atrocities
- Nonviolent antigovernment protest
- Low trade openness
- Early warning signs: Early warning signs are events that indicate that the risk of mass atrocities is increasing. They generally focus on events that change the calculus or capabilities of potential perpetrators (or reveal changes in these factors), including:
  - Signs that threat perceptions are becoming more dire and/or linked to a group of civilians (e.g., publicly calling all members of a group “enemies”);
  - Signs that extreme or exclusionary ideologies are gaining support (e.g., increase in public discourse that dehumanizes members of a group);
  - Signs of intensifying “zero sum” political conflict, especially when political affiliation aligns with other identities;
  - Evidence that impunity for human rights abuses is increasing;
  - Evidence of government’s inability or unwillingness to stop attacks on civilians.

More than risk factors, specific warning signs depend on the context—e.g., by whether or not there is an ongoing armed conflict:

- Armed conflict context:
  - Shift in battlefield dynamics leading to increased perception of threat;
  - Failure of initial attempts to quash an insurgency or resolve the conflict;
  - Increase in sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups, including security forces.

- Non-war context:
  - Change in ruling regime that empowers more radical or authoritarian leaders (e.g., a coup)
  - Failed attempt to overthrow regime;
  - Widespread stockpiling of weapons;
  - Increase in speech that reflects heightened perception among elites that a group poses a grave threat;
  - Sudden increase in various forms of gender-based violence.

**Late warning signs:** Even the most highly coordinated, large-scale campaigns of violence are ultimately a collection of individual and small-scale attacks. Late warning signs are the initial, smaller-scale deliberate attacks on civilians or evidence of organization, mobilization or preparation to commit mass violence:

- Small/medium scale attacks on civilians
- Evidence of organization/preparation/mobilization for mass violence
  - Training and arming of militias;
  - Incitement (including via “hate speech”);
  - Forced separation of groups; and
  - Suspension of peacetime laws or imposition of newly restrictive laws or policies.
Operational issues

- **Dealing with uncertainty.** In virtually any scenario a USAID officer might face, there will be significant uncertainties concerning potential or ongoing mass atrocities. USAID staff should not wait for certainty or perfect clarity before sharing potentially relevant information. Nor should USAID staff go out of their way to try to verify specific reports that are generally credible. Others are likely to be in better positions to verify, interpret, and make sense of this information, so USAID staff should err on the side of sharing.

- **Reluctance to report or receive “bad news.”** Interviews with numerous USAID field officers indicate that a culture pervading the Agency and U.S. embassies and missions abroad frowns on reporting information that conflicts with dominant narratives (e.g., the country is on the right path, the government is a strong partner, our programs are working). This is compounded by perceptions that attention from Washington can be more burdensome than helpful. A USAID staffer who chooses to report atrocity-related information should be prepared to persevere in light of these institutional and political challenges to reporting.\(^{22}\)

- **The imperative of protecting sources.** When reporting atrocity-related information—especially if it might become public—USAID staff should take extreme care not to put any individuals or groups at risk by potentially exposing them as sources of information to the U.S. government. As a rule, sources should be anonymized. In some cases, citing “a trusted USAID contact,” for example, could be sufficient protection, but in other cases this description might still enable someone (e.g., an oppressive government, if it were to obtain the information) to trace the report back to one or two groups or individuals (particularly if linked to a specific location).

- **The role of implementing partners and FSNs.** When considering the reporting of atrocity-related information, it is important to recall the different roles that members of the “USAID team” play. In particular, information sharing from non-USG actors is always voluntary, unless it is specifically required by their contract or cooperative agreement. If a USAID partner is going to be specifically directed to collect or share certain kinds of information, USAID’s communication with the partner must follow the terms of the award and should be sensitive to the realities of the local context. Humanitarian organizations in particular may be reluctant to report on atrocity-related information if doing so could be perceived as a violation of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. In addition, USAID personnel should remember that their FSN colleagues are citizens of the country that may be experiencing atrocities or identity-based conflict. In a highly polarized conflict situation, USAID field officers need to be sensitive to the way in which FSNs’ identities and place within the society may affect their access to information and assessment of the conflict.

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\(^{22}\) If USAID staff meet resistance to reporting atrocity-related information, they are encouraged to consult and refer to Agency Notice 04121 (April 23, 2012) on “Implementing Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities” and (SBU) Cable 12 STATE 47125 (April 25, 2013) regarding alert channels for information on mass atrocities against civilians.
V. Prevent: Mitigating risks and bolstering resilience

Key points:

- Atrocity prevention is a goal to which numerous types of programs can contribute, not a discrete set or sector of development programs.

- One or more of four broad approaches are usually applicable to help prevent mass atrocities: (1) preventing armed conflict outbreak, (2) promoting human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance, (3) strengthening civil society, and (4) building capacity and legitimacy of weak states.

- It is critical to assess the particular context, manage potential unintended negative consequences, and coordinate with other USG and non-USG actors.

Introduction

Where risks of mass atrocities are apparent, but before large-scale violence has broken out, USAID programs have the potential to contribute to the prevention of atrocities. There is clear consensus that prevention is where the USG as a whole and USAID in particular should focus their efforts. One of the many reasons to favor prevention is that it dovetails with the Agency’s mission statement (i.e., promoting resilient, democratic societies), the increasing focus on fragile and conflict-affected states, and the “elevation” of human rights in the 2013 USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG). Yet, it is not self-evident how to use our development assistance resources most effectively to prevent mass atrocities. “Atrocity prevention” is not a development sector or a discrete set of program options, but a goal to which many different types of programs can contribute.

Since most Agency programs take several months (at least) from inception to implementation, and the impact of these activities takes time to manifest itself fully, USAID is particularly important for so-called “upstream” prevention. This means identifying and seeking to mitigate factors associated with high risk of mass atrocities, such as the presence of armed conflict or state-led discrimination, and/or supporting country or community resilience to shocks that could lead to large-scale and deliberate violence against civilians.

As with all development programs—and especially, those in fragile or conflict-affected states—the local context should be the starting point. The particular risk factors and potential scenarios in a given context should inform the design of prevention programs, especially since mass atrocities can arise in different contexts, result from different drivers, and take many forms. As the Albright-Cohen Genocide Prevention Task Force wrote, “Ultimately, there is no single model or checklist appropriate for every environment”; what is needed are “tailored, context-specific approaches.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 9: Types of development assistance programs suggested as most relevant to preventing mass atrocities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genocide Prevention Task Force</strong> (2008), <em>Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>- <strong>Leadership</strong>: Use “positive inducements” (e.g., grants, loans, debt relief, budgetary support, technical assistance, and equipment and training) and “negative inducements” (e.g., aid conditionality) for good leadership; build collaborative capacity (e.g., via conflict transformation programming such as the Burundi leadership training program),</td>
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<td>- <strong>Institutions</strong>: Support power sharing and democratic transition, enhance the rule of law and address impunity, reform security forces, and</td>
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<td>- <strong>Civil society</strong>: Support economic and legal empowerment, develop civil society, and support a free and responsible media.</td>
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<td><strong>Ban Ki-moon</strong> (2009), <em>Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Conflict-sensitive development analysis,</td>
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<td>- Indigenous mediation capacity,</td>
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<td>- Consensus and dialogue,</td>
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<td>- Local dispute resolution capacity, and</td>
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<td>- Capacity to replicate capacity.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stanley Foundation</strong> (2012), <em>Assisting States to Prevent Atrocities: Implications for Development Policy, Stabilization Assistance, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Rule of law, justice, and security sector,</td>
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<td>- Constitutional guarantees, political systems, power sharing, and participation, and</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Resource management and economic governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kendal Consulting</strong> (2013), <em>Denmark and the Responsibility to Protect: How Denmark Can Further Contribute to the Prevention of Mass Atrocities</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Security sector reform and</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Rule of law programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ban Ki-moon</strong> (2014), <em>Fulfilling our collective responsibility: International assistance and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Capacity building for effective, legitimate and inclusive government;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Capacity building focused on specific inhibitors of atrocity crimes: professional and accountable security sector, impartial institutions for overseeing political transitions, independent judicial and human rights institutions, capacity to assess risk and mobilize early response, local capacity to resolve conflicts, media capacity to counteract prejudice and hate speech, and capacity for effective and legitimate transitional justice; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assisting states to protect their populations: dispute resolution expertise, human rights monitoring, law enforcement and criminal investigation, protection of refugees and the internally displaced, and protection of civilians in humanitarian emergencies.24</td>
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24 The 2014 SG’s report is organized into sections on Encouragement, Capacity Building, and Assisting States to protect their populations; each section lists several priority areas. The types of international assistance that are most likely to take the form of development assistance programs are highlighted here.
Strategic approaches

Granting that the most appropriate prevention strategy will depend on the particular context, one or more of the following broad approaches should be applicable in virtually all cases:

- **Prevent armed conflict outbreak**: As discussed, violent conflict is the strongest risk factor for mass atrocities. Therefore, efforts to prevent violent conflict should be a major part of an atrocity prevention strategy, especially in countries at high risk of conflict. USAID supports various programs to help prevent the outbreak of major armed conflict, from people-to-people dialogue to community early warning–early response systems to economic projects with incentives for inter-group cooperation. It is less important to try to determine whether such activities should be called “conflict prevention” or “atrocity prevention” programs (or something else) than it is to choose and design programs that address the particular conflict dynamics.

- **Promote human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance**: Democratic, rule-bound, rights-respecting governments are very unlikely to commit or allow large-scale attacks on civilians. USAID’s 2013 DRG strategy “affirms DRG as integral to USAID’s overall development agenda.” Programs in support of human rights, rule of law, and democracy can include, for example, support for human rights defenders in autocratic environments, technical assistance to emerging democratic governments to combat impunity, and support to national human rights institutions. From an atrocity prevention perspective, however, it is important to be aware of potential unintended consequences of democratization efforts—e.g., if they cause autocrats to perceive a grave threat from a particular civilian group. These risks underscore the need for good assessment and tailoring of an assistance portfolio to the specific risks and opportunities.

- **Strengthen civil society**: In addition to its importance in virtually all aspects of development, strong civil society can be a bulwark against mass atrocities. USAID’s support for civil society—to journalists, women’s organizations, or lawyers associations, among others—could in some cases be tailored to address atrocity risks. For example, this could mean training lawyers in specialized methods for investigating atrocity crimes or supporting grassroots campaigns that counter messages of hate and dehumanization of vulnerable groups. In other cases, support to civil society might be designed to build resilience against future shocks more generally.

- **Build the effectiveness and legitimacy of weak state institutions**: Fragile states are more likely to experience political crises and conflicts that are virtually always precursors of mass atrocities. Roughly half of U.S. foreign assistance dollars go to fragile and conflict-affected states. Greater state capacity alone will not automatically reduce atrocity risks. In particular, USAID should avoid building the capacity or effectiveness of highly discriminatory government institutions. Working with host governments to build the legitimacy of state institutions should generally be a co-equal goal with improving state

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25 For USG audiences, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) has developed a range of tools that serve as useful resources for analyzing fragility as well as risk of future conflict and instability, all of which can inform country-level assessments. For additional information, contact DCHA/CMM at conflict@usaid.gov. In addition, appropriate USG personnel can consult a classified National Intelligence Estimate, “Global Risk of Mass Atrocities and Prospects for International Response,” which was prepared in response to the presidential directive on mass atrocities.

26 Each of the strategic approaches discussed subsequently—promoting human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance; strengthening civil society; and building the effectiveness and legitimacy of weak state institutions—can also contribute to the prevention of armed conflict outbreak. Thus, they could have direct and indirect effects on the risk of mass atrocities.

effectiveness. This point applies especially to the security and justice sectors, which can be bulwarks against mass atrocities when they are effective and legitimate, but instruments of atrocities when they are corrupted.

**Program options**

Follow the hyperlinks for descriptions of the program types, associated theories of change, examples where USAID has supported these types of programs, and considerations for the context in which a program type is most suitable and for effective program design and implementation.

- Support local early warning–early response systems
- Engage youth
- Support for independent media
- Support to national human rights institutions (NHRIs)
- Support to regional and national structures for prevention of mass atrocities/genocide
- Support to political processes (e.g., elections, constitutional referenda)
- Support to civil society to advocate for addressing flashpoint issues
- Support to local peace committees
- Support for local protection strategies/capacities
- Enhance communications capabilities of at-risk groups
- Promote the rule of law and access to justice
- Security sector assistance
- Support monitoring of human rights/documentation of atrocities
- Peace messaging
- Support for conflict-sensitive journalism
- Support to peace processes
- Social cohesion programs
- Engaging women and girls in peacebuilding and political processes

**Considerations**

- *Start with a “good enough” assessment.* Seeking to understand the context before designing programs is a principle of all good development practice. It is especially critical to the effectiveness of programs aiming to help prevent mass atrocities—a complex phenomenon, subject to wide variation across contexts. A thorough conflict assessment using USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0, supplemented by the State/USAID guidance on assessing atrocities, is ideal. It should be stressed that these tools are frameworks for analytic thinking, not highly prescriptive operational methodologies. The core point is to ask some key questions and be explicit about critical assumptions before jumping to select and design programs.

- *Programs should support overall strategy.* Development programs rarely affect mass atrocity risks directly. It is important, therefore, to develop a strategy that specifies the focus of action, expected
intermediate outcomes, and critical assumptions. Programs and specific activities, each of which might have its own theory of change, should be selected to help advance the overall strategy.\textsuperscript{28} The results of an assessment should be used to craft a realistic core strategic approach. For example, if the government is weak and unable to protect populations from non-state groups, a strategy might focus on building state capacity and strengthening local communities’ self-protection capacities. If, by contrast, the major threat to civilians is from abusive government security forces, a strategy might focus on mitigating local conflict dynamics to prevent armed conflict outbreak.

- \textit{Manage risks of unintended harm:} One should not assume that just because a program is designed to address atrocity risks that it is not subject to potential unintended negative consequences. Program designers and managers should make a point to ask how a program might go wrong and how these risks could be mitigated, if not completely eliminated (see Annex B for a list of resources on “do no harm” that can support this type of analysis). Some degree of risk and uncertainty is inherent to complex contexts, but that should not necessarily lead to inaction. Awareness, frequent reassessment, and prudent management of risks is the proper posture.

- \textit{Coordinate with other USG agencies and non-USG actors:} USAID is always one of many actors and frequently not the largest or most influential. To contribute to a goal as ambitious and multifaceted as preventing mass atrocities, coordination is especially important. The Atrocities Prevention Board provides a mechanism for coordinating whole-of-USG action. Formal international donor coordination mechanisms may or may not exist, depending on the country. In either case, USAID can usually increase its impact through coordinating with other development actors in efforts to prevent atrocities.\textsuperscript{29} Where a U.N. or other multilateral peacekeeping operation is deployed, it is also important to communicate regularly with these other operational actors, especially if they have a mandate to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ElenaHermosa.jpg}
\caption{Elena Hermosa/Trócaire}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Former Guatemalan President Efrain Rios Montt testifies during his 2013 trial for genocide and crimes against humanity.}

\textsuperscript{28} For more on theories of change, see \textit{Theories and indicators of change in conflict management and mitigation: concepts and primers} at: \url{http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAED180.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{29} Most major bilateral donors have signaled a commitment to preventing mass atrocities—e.g., by joining the “group of friends” of the “responsibility to protect” (RtoP), designating a focal point on RtoP within their government, and/or participating in the 2014 meeting on Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes.

\textsuperscript{30} The U.N. Secretary General’s “Human Rights Up Front” (\url{www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront}) initiative represents a series of internal reforms designed “to place the protection of human rights and of people at the heart of U.N. strategies and operational activities.” It may provide an entry point for USG engagement with U.N. entities—including its development bodies—on coordinated action to prevent or respond to mass atrocities.
VI. Respond: Limit consequences of atrocities

Key points:

- Even in situations when deliberate attacks on civilians are occurring or escalating, USAID programs can help halt the violence and minimize harm among victims.
- Four broad approaches in the response phase are: (1) supporting mitigation or resolution of armed conflict, (2) supporting and improving protection for targeted groups, (3) dissuading potential perpetrators, and (4) documenting ongoing atrocities.
- Response efforts should recognize the tension that sometimes exists between humanitarian assistance and development programs and between short-term response imperatives and long-term development priorities. Focusing on building resiliency while responding to urgent needs can help address these tensions.

Introduction

Mass atrocities are not all-or-nothing phenomena. Even the most highly coordinated, large-scale campaigns of violence are ultimately a collection of individual and small-scale attacks. Most episodes of mass atrocities play out over a period of months or years, during which time the goals and tactics of perpetrators may change. As such, even as deliberate attacks on civilians are occurring or escalating, outside actors may have options to help halt the violence and minimize harm among victims. USAID’s robust capabilities for responding to humanitarian needs during disasters are important in this context. In addition, USAID has contingency funds and mechanisms to support urgent programs outside of the humanitarian domain that could help minimize, if not completely prevent, atrocities. In some cases, it is also possible to adapt or modify ongoing programs to respond to atrocities.

Strategic approaches

USAID could take any of four broad approaches in responding to ongoing atrocity situations:

- Support mitigation or resolution of armed conflict: If atrocities are being committed in the context of an armed conflict, programs designed to de-escalate or bring the conflict to a negotiated resolution should help limit the extent of atrocities. A range of conflict mitigation programming might be available, though USAID’s options in the field tend to be constrained in situations of active violent conflict.

- Support and improve protection for targeted groups: Providing direct support to the populations that are subjected to attack, in the form of humanitarian assistance as well as support for community self-protection, can limit the negative effects of large-scale attacks on civilians and, in the best circumstances, deter future attacks. This approach does not necessarily rely on changing the dynamics of the conflict or atrocities, but can save many lives that would otherwise be lost. Such support should be tailored to the unique needs of those populations and to consider people’s differing needs and experiences based on factors such as age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability.

- Dissuade potential perpetrators: Individuals who might be mobilized to commit atrocities can be open to influence by USAID programs, even as atrocities are ongoing. For example, broad public
dissemination of messages of peace and tolerance, cash-for-work programs, and community-level social cohesion programs have been used in attempts to dissuade potential perpetrators of atrocities. These kinds of activities are most relevant when atrocities are being committed by newly mobilized or relatively informal groups, as opposed to formal security services.

- **Document atrocities:** Supporting efforts to monitor and document ongoing atrocities could help deter potential perpetrators based on fear of criminal accountability or simply via a psychological effect of feeling watched. Even if documentation fails to deter perpetrators in the midst of the crisis, establishing a pattern of systematic or widespread atrocities could spur other useful policy action, and having detailed evidence of atrocities committed should support subsequent transitional justice efforts.

**Program options**

- **Support for local protection strategies/capacities**
- **Enhance communications capabilities of at-risk groups**
- **Promote the rule of law and access to justice**
- **Support monitoring of human rights/documentation of atrocities**
- **Peace messaging**
- **Support for conflict-sensitive journalism**
- **Support to peace processes**
- **Social cohesion programs**
- **Engaging women and girls in peacebuilding and political processes**
- **Help to fill information vacuums during crises**
- **Provision of emergency humanitarian assistance**
- **Humanitarian protection programs**

**Considerations**

- **The relationship between humanitarian assistance and development programs.** Humanitarian assistance is grounded in principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Strict adherence to these principles is generally seen as critical to ensuring access to populations in need. Development programs—particularly in a context of escalating violence against civilians—might be perceived as more political or even partial among conflicting parties. When USAID supports both kinds of activities simultaneously in a given location, it can create tensions and challenges for both humanitarian and development partners. There is no simple fix, but it is important that the issues be acknowledged and discussed in an ongoing fashion.

- **The relationship between short-term response programs and long-term development priorities.** There may be times when USAID uses its foreign assistance tools to respond to atrocities, but is not committed to investing seriously in long-term development activities. From a traditional development perspective, this kind of short-term engagement would raise questions about sustainability. For example, a short-term alternative livelihoods program might succeed in diverting unemployed youth away from mobilization into militias, but not lead to any sustained improvement in their economic status. Such a
program would be suspect from an economic growth perspective, but would count as a success in helping mitigate atrocities. The USG priority on preventing mass atrocities, thus, implies that the standards for evaluating foreign assistance programs designed as short-term atrocity prevention or response tools should be different from standard development programs. At the same time, USAID has pioneered an approach that focuses on building resilience to recurrent crisis even while responding to urgent needs. Adopting a resilience perspective can help manage the inherent tensions between short- and long-term imperatives and between humanitarian and development programming.

- **Accessing contingency funds.** Mounting a robust response to a situation of escalating atrocities likely will require substantial additional program funds or reprogramming of previously designed programs. With support from Congress, USAID has created several funds to help missions respond to unforeseen contingencies. These include the Complex Crises Fund, the Human Rights Grants Program, the Elections and Political Transitions Fund, and others. Each of these funds has its own specific purpose, selection criteria, and process for considering applications. Missions can find more information via links in Annex B or via their Washington counterparts.

![A soldier with the M23 rebel movement stands watch on Bunagana Hill in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in July 2012.](AL_JAHE_20120704_03519_DRC_Bunagana_Hill_M23_Soldier_082.jpg)

31 More problematic is the possibility that short-term response activities could help mitigate atrocities, but also have substantial negative impacts on a country’s development—e.g., by entrenching corrupt political leaders in the interest of short-term stability. This possibility underscores the importance of analyzing potential unintended harm at all stages, even if difficult judgment calls cannot be avoided.

32 For more information on the “resilience agenda,” see [www.usaid.gov/resilience](http://www.usaid.gov/resilience).
VII. Support recovery: Dealing with the aftermath of mass atrocities

Key points:

- USAID programs in the aftermath of mass atrocities should aim both to reduce the risk of recurrence and to improve overall development prospects by addressing the challenges unique to these contexts.

- Because mass atrocities are often cyclical, most of the preventive approaches discussed in Section V are likely to be relevant to post-atrocity contexts.

- Four approaches are especially relevant for the recovery phase: (1) supporting justice and accountability, (2) supporting healing and reconciliation, (3) supporting political transition; and (4) supporting economic recovery.

Introduction

It is frequently observed that political violence and human rights crises are more cyclical than linear. Too often, episodes of mass violence sow the seeds for their recurrence. As a result, efforts to support societies’ recovery from mass atrocities can contribute to preventing future instances of mass atrocities. Short of recurring mass violence, countries with a history of systematic atrocities tend to struggle in achieving the full range of development goals. There are also intrinsic reasons to provide assistance to countries trying to deal with traumatic histories. Truth, justice, accountability, and reconciliation are worth pursuing in their own rights.

Strategic approaches

Most, if not all, of the preventive approaches discussed in Section V are relevant to countries recovering from mass atrocities. In addition, three broad approaches are most relevant to the recovery phase after an episode of mass atrocities:

- **Support justice and accountability:** A diverse set of tools has emerged over the last two to three decades designed to address the legacy of mass human rights violations, severe repression, and civil war. These include truth telling, memorialization, prosecutions, reparations, and institutional reform, often as part of rule of law and transitional justice initiatives. USAID has actively supported these activities in numerous countries with a recent history of violent conflict and atrocities.

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34 Activities to promote justice and accountability are often perceived to be highly sensitive and sometimes in tension—at least in the near term—with interests in stability and reconciliation. At the same time, few dispute that justice and accountability are pillars of sustainable peace over the long term, especially in the aftermath of mass atrocities. This translates to challenges for development partners in timing and sequencing of support for various priorities after a mass atrocity.
• Support healing and reconciliation: In the aftermath of mass atrocities, healing is needed at individual, community, and national levels. USAID supports services for individuals who have been victims of violence—including sexual violence—and torture, and those who experience trauma after witnessing atrocities. Community- and national-level efforts toward reconciliation typically involve various kinds of dialogue and progressively building cooperation among previously conflicting parties and identity groups. Needs in terms of healing and support may vary depending on individuals’ experience of atrocities. For instance, women who experience sexual violence in a culture where this is traditionally viewed as a source of shame for the survivor of violence or her family may require distinct forms of support.

• Support political transition: Mass atrocity episodes sometimes end with a major political transition—e.g., the change in a regime, as in Rwanda, or a negotiated agreement between conflicting parties, as in Bosnia. USAID programs can support these political transitions in a variety of ways—e.g., assisting transitional governing bodies, providing technical assistance to elections, or supporting the reintegration of former combatants.

• Support economic recovery: As described above, mass atrocities often have substantial economic costs both to the communities and groups targeted and the country as a whole. In addition to the basic needs to generate income, purchase food and household supplies, and attempt to recover property losses, employment, the reconvening of trade and other economic opportunities also offer a valuable social, psychological, and symbolic demonstration that some elements of society are returning to “normal” and moving in a positive direction. Additionally, if economic gains were a motivator of the violent conflict and mass atrocities, economic recovery that is broader-reaching and sustainable while aiming to mitigate the “winner take all” configuration can help prevent a return to violence and future atrocities.

Program options

• Support to peace processes
• Social cohesion programs
• Engaging women and girls in peacebuilding and political processes
• Support to transitional justice processes
• Trauma healing
• Support for reintegration of former combatants
• Economic recovery programs
• Promote the rule of law and access to justice
• Security sector assistance

Considerations

• Assess whether USAID can have the greatest impact at the local community level, the national level, supporting regional or international processes, or some combination thereof. When governments responsible for mass atrocities remain in power, there are unlikely to be any national-level initiatives dealing with the past that are worth supporting. In these cases, USAID will probably find it more useful to support local-level activities (e.g., social cohesion programming) in hopes that they have direct impact at the community-level and/or regional or international processes (e.g., commissions of inquiry). In other
cases, high-profile national processes (e.g., national dialogue, truth and reconciliation commissions, war crimes prosecutions) merit support because of their broad reverberations across the country.

- **Look for opportunities to link community-level, national and regional/international processes.** Successful recovery after mass atrocities is more likely if transitional justice and reconciliation processes take place at multiple levels. Given their interdependence, USAID should take a comprehensive view of recovery, whatever the focus of specific activities the Agency is supporting. For example, USAID can often play a useful role by supporting community-level discussion about national or international transitional justice initiatives, and helping ensure that the results of these discussions are considered in formal processes.

- **Avoid sharp fluctuations in levels of assistance.** The immediate post-conflict period often draws in a huge influx of foreign assistance, only to see the amount of support fall off dramatically a relatively short time later, and then perhaps spike again if there is another crisis. Dealing with the aftermath of mass atrocities is necessarily a long-term process and should be driven by local people. In providing support, USAID should bear in mind the risks of overwhelming post-atrocity contexts with money- and donor-driven programs for only a short time, rather than investing in locally led efforts over the long-term.

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**At the Mununga I settlement in DRC, internally displaced persons (IDPs) seek shelter.**

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# Annex A: Table of programming options

Notes on table:

- “Context” refers to considerations for matching the type of program to a suitable context—i.e., which contextual factors make this type of program more or less likely to be effective.
- “Design” refers to insights about how the type of program can be designed and implemented most effectively.

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<td><strong>Economic recovery programs</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Support local early warning—early response systems</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>In several countries and regions, systems are being developed to collect information on potential signs of violence and channel this to local or regional actors who can engage in timely preventive or responsive action. The emphasis on local networks as primary actors—for reporting, analysis, and response—distinguishes these programs from more vertically organized early warning systems that focus on collecting information for external actors and rely on response by a centralized formal authority.</td>
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**ToC**

If information and analysis about potential violence is more effectively shared with local prevention and response actors, the “warning-response gap” will be closed.  

- OR -  

If local actors are able to gather, analyze, and share information on potential violence and are equipped with skills and resources to respond effectively and early, then communities can better prevent and mitigate violence while building resiliency.  

**Example**  

**Nigeria:** Through the Tolerance program, USAID uses a community-based approach to draw on the expertise of religious and traditional leaders, women and youth groups, government officials, and civil society to develop an early warning system, protocols, and reference materials to improve responses to outbreaks and threats of violence. USAID supports councils of religious, private sector, and civil society leaders working to address violence in their respective regions and advocate for government improvements in conflict management and mitigation efforts. (Tolerance Program factsheet, April 2013)

**Context**

- More likely to have positive impact where local conflict dynamics contribute significantly to risk of mass atrocities.  
- More likely to have positive impact where local civil society networks are strong and have at least some capacity to respond to warnings of possible atrocities.

**Design**

- Technology such as Ushahidi-style platforms can be useful, but matching the technology to the local context is paramount.  
- Response needs and capacities should be considered on the front end to avoid an overemphasis on generating warning signals without effective response.  
- Building warning-response systems on existing networks of local actors is usually most effective.  
- Ensure the participation of women and marginalized communities in designing and implementing early warning—early response systems. For more information on gender-responsive early warning, see: [www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/04EGenderResponsiveEarlyWarning.pdf](http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/04EGenderResponsiveEarlyWarning.pdf)  
- Analysis and response needs and strategies of communities will differ across contexts and should be guided by communities themselves.  
- Some early warning initiatives have focused on tracking hate speech or incitement. For more info, see “Hate Speech as Early Warning Monitoring, Intervention, and Mitigation,” in *Preventing Atrocities: Five Key Primers*. [www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers). In the same volume, see also “Case Study: EWS in Eastern DRC.”
## Prevention

### Engage youth

**Description**

Young men are the most common perpetrators of atrocities, yet young men and women are also frequently drivers of peaceful, constructive change. USAID has supported various types of programs focused on engaging youth to reduce the chance that they will commit violent acts and/or empower them as agents of positive change. These include job training and employment, constructive political participation, conflict resolution and community dialogue, and education and tolerance training (CMM toolkit, pp. 16-19).

**ToC**

If youth are less inclined to participate in atrocities (because of having alternative opportunities or because of attitudinal change), it will be more difficult for leaders to mobilize large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians.

- OR -

If youth have greater capacity and opportunities for shaping the future of their country, they will play a constructive role and help reduce risk of mass violence.

**Example**

- **Kenya:** Yes Youth Can seeks to empower youth to expand their economic opportunities and contribute to their communities, encourage youth leadership and youth voices in local and national policy dialogue, and increase youth participation in local development and peace initiatives. Through Yes Youth Can and the National Youth Bunge Association, young people aged 18–35 organize themselves into youth-run and youth-led village- and county-level bunges (Kiswahili for “parliaments”) and democratically elect leadership as representatives in national outreach activities. USAID has established Yes Youth Can in 30 of Kenya’s 47 counties, focusing on regions that have experienced high levels of violence or where threats of terrorism and extremism are prevalent. (Yes Youth Can Fact Sheet – Updated Nov. 2014; [www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/yes-youth-canmwamko-wa-vijana](http://www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/yes-youth-canmwamko-wa-vijana))


**Context**

- More likely to have impact where informal militias, gangs, or similar groups are the likely perpetrators of atrocities. Less likely to have impact where official security services are the likely perpetrators.

- More likely to have impact where mass atrocities would require mobilization of a large group of individuals who are not already engaged in violence. This will usually mean situations without an ongoing civil war.

- Youth empowerment programs have special relevance in countries with large “youth bulges” and where significant political transitions are anticipated in the near-to-medium term (e.g., emerging democracies).

**Design**

- Program activities should be tailored to an assessment of what is driving or might drive youth toward violence—e.g., lack of opportunity, lack of political voice, lack of dispute resolution skills, and/or ideology. For information on conducting youth-related assessments, see the “Guide to Cross-Sectoral Youth Assessments” ([http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADZ234.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADZ234.pdf)).

- The distinct experiences and capacities of young women should also be considered and capitalized on, and efforts to address the grievances of young men should be careful not to further marginalize young women—e.g., job creation programs tailored only to young men that may limit young women’s economic opportunities and reinforce norms used to justify inequality in this area.

- Care should be taken to reach beyond “grass tops.” To be credible locally, specific activities need to be driven by locals.
| **PREVENTION** | **Support for independent media** | **Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:**  
Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>USAID supports independent media-strengthening programs in more than 31 countries with an annual budget of approximately $40 million. (<a href="http://blog.usaid.gov/2014/05/why-free-media-matters/">http://blog.usaid.gov/2014/05/why-free-media-matters/</a>) These activities include financial support for reporting, content production, and broadcast capabilities such as community radios.</td>
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</table>
| **ToC** | If there is a strong and independent media in a country, the public will be more informed and able to hold the government accountable, which in turn will reduce the ability of potential perpetrators to mobilize masses to attack civilians and the ability of a government to commit atrocities without triggering a strong response.  
- OR -  
If diverse populations, including minority groups and women, have a voice and presence in all aspects of media, it is less likely to be used as a tool to instigate violence against a select part of the population. |  |
<p>| <strong>Example</strong> | Afghanistan: USAID’s Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project strives to build the capacity of local independent media through technical support, equipment upgrades, hands-on training, and business development. (November 2010–September 2013; <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/node/50036">http://www.usaid.gov/node/50036</a>) |  |
| <strong>Context</strong> | Most appropriate in countries where there is some degree of space for independent media to operate, report free of interference or reprisal (e.g., no restrictive laws on ownership, criminalization of libel, or political/oligarch control of all outlets). |  |
| <strong>Design</strong> | Design should account for how individuals actually consume information (i.e., is Internet penetration common outside the capital, are newspapers read outside of political elites, does the power supply limit electronic broadcasting consumption?). Additionally, as poor-quality reporting (e.g., one-sided or using discriminatory language against women, minority groups, etc.) can exacerbate tensions, support for journalist training should focus on ethics and conflict sensitivity where possible. Increasing the voices of diverse groups within media may also reduce the likelihood of it being used as a tool against a select part of the population. |  |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Support to national human rights institutions (NHRIs)</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, Human Rights Grants Program</th>
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<tr>
<td>National human rights institutions (NHRIs) are “state bodies with a constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights. They are part of the state apparatus and are funded by the state. However, they operate and function independently from government.” At their best, they can link government and civil society by playing roles in human rights education, complaint handling, and making recommendations on law reform. (<a href="http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/RolesTypesNHRIs.aspx">http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/RolesTypesNHRIs.aspx</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<th>ToC</th>
<th>If an NHRI is effective, it will increase public attention to human rights issues and government action to protect people from human rights violations before abuses approach the level of mass atrocities.</th>
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<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Burundi: With support from the Human Rights Grants Program (FY2012), USAID is providing core funding for the National Human Rights Commission in Burundi, specifically for staff who can do independent reporting and investigate alleged incidents of human rights abuses.</th>
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</table>

| Context | ➢ Generally more suitable for “upstream” prevention contexts.  
➢ Generally less suitable for cases in which the state is the most likely perpetrator of mass atrocities. |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Design | ➢ Careful assessment should be made of the credibility and independence of a particular NHRI. Assistance could be useful even to weak institutions, depending on the local context.  
➢ USAID support could help link NHRIs to existing early warning systems where they exist, including those designed for conflict, to strengthen national-level or subnational-level warning of atrocities. (See “The Role of National Human Rights Institutions and Paralegals in Atrocity Prevention” in Preventing Atrocities: Five Key Primers. [www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers)). |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
### Support to regional and national structures for prevention of mass atrocities/genocide

**Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:**
- Complex Crises Fund
- Human Rights Grants Program

| Description | Several countries—including Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia—have established national committees dedicated to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Where credible, they could be useful partners and provide a national platform for engaging government and civil society in advancing atrocity prevention efforts. In addition, more than 40 states have a designated national focal point on the “responsibility to protect” (RtoP). These officials work to promote RtoP and improve their government’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities at home and abroad; they meet periodically as a Global Network of R2P Focal Points. |
| ToC | If regions and countries develop credible bureaucratic structures for atrocity prevention, negative trends will be more likely to be recognized and addressed by national or local mechanisms. |
| Example | Though there is precedent for supporting regional organizations’ work on early warning and conflict prevention (e.g., the Economy Community of West African States, or ECOWAS), USAID does not appear to have provided support to date to any regional or national structures on the prevention of mass atrocities. Two examples of such networks are the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (with new national mechanisms in Argentina and Paraguay) and the Regional Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which has spurred creation of national committees in ICGLR member states. |
| Context | ➢ Generally more suitable for “upstream” prevention contexts. ➢ Generally less suitable for cases in which the state is the most likely perpetrator of mass atrocities. |
| Design | Recall that support to regional or national capacities on conflict prevention, human rights, or related issues could help mitigate atrocity risks even where they are not specifically or explicitly focused on mass atrocities. |
**Support to political processes (e.g., elections, constitutional referenda)**

**Description**
USAID provides support to a variety of political processes, including constitutional drafting committees, referenda, elections, and national dialogues. USAID support often takes the form of capacity building and technical assistance (e.g., in parallel vote tabulation), but also seeks to ensure that processes are fully inclusive (e.g., of displaced persons or ethnic minorities).

**ToC**
If political processes are perceived as inclusive and fair, it will reduce potential motives for atrocities related to political power and make it harder to mobilize large groups for violence.

**Example**

**Context**
- Generally relevant only to countries in midst of political transition or with upcoming election or referendum.
- Most likely to have positive impact where perceived political exclusion is a driver of potential atrocities or where the previous political system/constitution strongly favored one group over others.
- If the political process threatens to dislodge an autocratic regime from power, support to the process could exacerbate risks of atrocities.

**Design**
- Even purely technical activities can reduce risk of atrocities—e.g., if they increase the credibility of elections and perceptions thereof.
- Support to political processes such as elections should begin well before (ideally two to three years in advance of) election day.
- Promote active collaboration with USAID/Washington and interagency actors.
- Be flexible and innovative with approaches, partners, and mechanisms. Internal mechanisms should be in place that allow for rapid adaptation.
- Structure support for the period after the elections to ensure continuity of operations.
- Ensure that support is fostering inclusive processes, e.g., supporting the voices of women and youth within political parties, ensuring that voter registration and education drives reach diverse populations, and that voting is accessible to all.

### Support to civil society to advocate for addressing flashpoint issues

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society can be a bulwark against mass atrocities.</td>
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<table>
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<th>ToC</th>
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<tr>
<td>If civil society groups are more effective at advocating with the national government, it is more likely that issues that could fuel atrocities will be addressed.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi: USAID is supporting local civil society groups to form an advocacy coalition/campaign for a change of policy related to the national land commission, which would mitigate land conflict as a potential flashpoint for atrocities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Most relevant where the national government could take specific steps to mitigate atrocity risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Most likely to be effective where the national government shows at least some degree of responsiveness to civil society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Important to not limit civil society engagement to formal civil society organizations (CSOs), and take a broader view of civil society, including informal groups and faith-based and private sector entities; also individuals such as artists, musicians, and those with strong, but nontraditional, influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Also important to foster general role of civil society in holding government accountable, which may also help to identify and address grievances and risks without violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local peace committees refer to “committees or other structures formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim to encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding processes within its own context” (<a href="http://www.i4pinternational.org/files/207/3.+LOCAL+PEACE+COMMITTEES.pdf">www.i4pinternational.org/files/207/3.+LOCAL+PEACE+COMMITTEES.pdf</a>). They are designed to be able to address specific local conflict issues, which may vary across a country, and often are seen as complementary to national-level peace processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ToC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If local structures/mechanisms for peace are strengthened, they will be more effective at recognizing and responding to early signs of violence and the risk of mass atrocities will be reduced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenya:</strong> USAID’s Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace program strengthens the capacity of local actors and institutions in targeted counties to develop and advance sustainable peace, reconciliation, and norms of nonviolence based on justice, accountability, and equality. Focusing primarily on expanding and deepening inclusive peace networks that foster dialogue and reconciliation, the program utilizes local and village peace committees to increase knowledge and amplify peace messages. (April 2012–July 2013; <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/rift-valley-local-empowerment-peace-program">www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/rift-valley-local-empowerment-peace-program</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More likely to have positive impact where local conflict dynamics contribute significantly to risk of mass atrocities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective during transitional periods (Odendaal &amp; Olivier, p. 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most effective when they complement national peace processes/mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Design</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific kinds of support might include: (1) facilitation or mediation where it is needed from outside the local community; (2) orientation and training regarding roles/responsibilities and peacebuilding skills; and (3) connections to national peacebuilding processes (<a href="http://www.i4pinternational.org/files/207/3.+LOCAL+PEACE+COMMITTEES.pdf">www.i4pinternational.org/files/207/3.+LOCAL+PEACE+COMMITTEES.pdf</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women can often play a unique role in fostering peace at the community level, in some cases based on traditional roles as mediators, or at times because they are viewed as more neutral or less threatening or politicized actors. (See USAID’s toolkit on Women and Conflict: <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pradj133.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pradj133.pdf</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These types of interventions take time and develop at unique rates. A key design consideration is building in enough time to enable local actors to drive the process without being influenced by donor benchmarks or other external/artificial pressures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>These kinds of programs seek to improve local communities’ ability to cope with violent attacks. They are designed to be flexible so that the selection of specific activities is driven by local communities themselves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ToC</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If local communities are supported in developing strategies and building capacities for protecting themselves from potential violence, they will be more able to prevent and mitigate the consequences of any attacks.</td>
<td>Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Context | Most suitable for contexts in which local communities are relatively cohesive and atrocity threats emanate from “outsiders” or discrete armed actors (e.g., areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, in CAR). |

<p>| Design | ➢ Protection strategies may take a wide variety of forms based on context, resources, and capacities of the community. Communities should lead in defining the level of risk and approach to protection that is best suited to them. USAID should be clear and transparent with locals about what kinds of activities might fall outside of its acceptable parameters. |
|        | ➢ The success of this kind of program rests largely on identifying or developing an effective way for locals to drive the agenda. Inclusion of diverse views and community members whose voices may have been muted in the past is challenging, yet important. Ensuring that women play a meaningful role in developing and carrying out protection strategies is critical to ensuring that a broad range of needs and opportunities are identified. |
|        | ➢ Because this kind of program injects resources directly into a local community (typically in the form of small grants), it is especially important to beware of potential unintended consequences. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
<th>The observation that remote, isolated communities have been highly vulnerable to violence has led to programs focusing on communications capabilities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **ToC** | ➢ If potential victim groups have better ability to communicate, they will be more able to avoid or thwart attacks.  
- **OR** -  
➢ If communities can access and share timely and accurate information, they will be better able to avoid attacks and develop protection strategies. |
| **Context** | More relevant when vulnerable populations have relatively poor capacity to communicate among themselves and/or with other actors that could help prevent atrocities or provide direct protection. |
| **Design** | ➢ Communications capacities and needs will vary across context. Tools like radios or cell phones may need to be supplemented with megaphones, bicycle brigades, or other low-tech options in particularly remote or underdeveloped areas. In contexts with higher Internet penetration, the Information Security Coalition suite of tools for improving “digital hygiene” or tools such as FrontlineSMS might be useful. Gender differences in access to and control over communications tools should be taken into consideration in designing such programs.  
➢ Community-driven decision-making is paramount for designing protection strategies.  
➢ Note that in some instances, providing communication infrastructure may inadvertently put communities more at risk or turn them into targets because of the tools received. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Promote the rule of law and access to justice</th>
</tr>
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</table>

In short, rule of law (RoL) “usually refers to a state in which citizens, corporations, and the state itself obey the law, and the laws are derived from a democratic consensus” (RoL Strategic Framework, p. 6). Its five essential elements are order and security, legitimacy, checks and balances, fairness, and effective application. USAID RoL programs aim to reform legal frameworks and strengthen actors and institutions within and beyond the justice sector. These include, but are not limited to, the ministry of justice, judiciary, prosecutors, legal defense, investigators, civilian police, independent governmental institutions, professional associations, schools and universities, traditional authorities, legislative bodies, civil society, private sector associations, and citizens. Reforming discriminatory legal provisions and practices in particular can help foster more inclusive societies and reduce grievances. Addressing access to justice is also critical to ensure the justice system reaches all citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ToC</th>
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- OR -

- If the rule of law prevails, the state will be restrained from committing atrocities even during a crisis.

- If citizens have access to justice, they will be able to obtain remedies to rights abuses before those abuses reach a massive scale.

| Example | Kosovo: The mission of the USAID Effective Rule of Law Program is to provide assistance to the development of the rule of law in Kosovo by strengthening the independence, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness of the justice system, and bolstering confidence in the rule of law by increasing public knowledge of and participation in the justice system and justice system reforms. USAID provides technical assistance and other support to various justice sector institutions, including the judiciary, the prosecutorial system, the Office of the President, and the Ministry of Justice. The program also supports professional training and public education about the justice system. (See: [http://usaiderol.org/index.php/en/](http://usaiderol.org/index.php/en/)) |

| Context | RoL programs that focus on building institutions are generally more suitable for “upstream” prevention contexts. |

- In response to ongoing atrocities, access to justice activities could serve immediate needs of targeted or vulnerable groups and raise costs on perpetrators.


- Consider program options beyond the justice sector, since “the rule of law is an end-state, not a set of activities” (RoL Strategic Framework, p. 23).

- RoL programs should generally “include a strong component of public debate and media attention” (RoL Strategic Framework, p. 27).

- Fostering transparency in justice sector processes and institutions “can bring solutions, at least partial ones, even when underlying social and political issues remain unresolved” (RoL Strategic Framework, p. 27).

- On justice sector interventions, see “Justice Sector Interventions in Atrocity Prevention,” in Preventing Atrocities: Five Key Primers: [www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers](www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers).
Security sector assistance refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to:

- Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector;
- Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and
- Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges (White House fact sheet, April 2013).

A 2013 Presidential Policy Directive on security sector assistance reiterated USAID’s role as lead planner and implementer of development assistance, while it recognized the Department of Defense’s leadership with respect to defense priorities, and identified the departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury as presumptive implementers of security sector assistance programs.

**ToC**

- If security sector institutions are more transparent and accountable while respecting the rule of law, they are unlikely to commit mass atrocities, even in a crisis situation.
- OR -
- If the capabilities of security sector institutions are strengthened, they will be more able to address security challenges that could spark widespread instability, civil war, and mass atrocities.

**Example**

**Haiti:** Utilizing exceptions to section 660(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, USAID has provided multiple types of assistance to the Haitian National Police (HNP), Haiti’s sole indigenous security force. Much of this assistance has focused on improving the HNP’s capacity and expanding its ranks, such as through providing equipment, communications support, and technical assistance. USAID also supported specialized training (including on sexual and gender-based violence) for select female police officers who work with the police special victims’ unit. (See: [www.usaid.gov/haiti/governance-rule-law-and-security](http://www.usaid.gov/haiti/governance-rule-law-and-security))

**Context**

- Generally more suitable for “upstream” prevention and recovery contexts.
- Programs that focus on building capacity of security sector institutions are most relevant to weak/fragile state contexts in which potential atrocities by non-state groups are the primary concern.

**Design**

- Program design should be informed by an assessment using the Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework.
- The involvement of multiple USG actors in security sector assistance makes interagency coordination particularly important.
- Ensuring that the security sector and associated reform efforts are inclusive of women, minority groups, and other marginalized communities is critical to ensuring the security sector is responsive to all citizens. This may include efforts both to increase the representation and influence of under-represented groups within the security sector or activities such as training that increase the ability of security sector actors to understand and fulfill their responsibilities to all citizens.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVENTION + RESPONSE</th>
<th>Support monitoring of human rights/documentation of atrocities</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, Human Rights Grants Program, OTI SWIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Human rights monitoring, fact finding, and documentation to describe investigations and ongoing tracking of violations of specific human rights, conducted variously by U.N. or regional human rights experts, national human rights institutions, or NGOs. In some cases, formal “commissions of inquiry” are mandated by political bodies such as the U.N. Documentation efforts can be undertaken in support of formal accountability processes and/or for other purposes, such as to establish a definitive record.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ToC | ➢ If human rights violations are being actively monitored and reported, it will change the calculation of potential perpetrators (simply by force of feeling watched and/or by supporting accountability), making them less likely to commit grave abuses.  
- OR -  
➢ If atrocities are documented in a rigorous and timely fashion, there is a greater chance that perpetrators will be held to account, which will in turn strengthen deterrence. | |
| Example | Sudan/Darfur: In 2004, USAID funded the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project. This was a rapid response effort, in cooperation with the Department of State, to conduct a random sample survey of more than 1,100 refugees in Eastern Chad. Statistical analysis based on these data established a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities and proved critical to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s determination that genocide was occurring and the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed militia were responsible. | }

| Context | ➢ More likely to be fully effective when potential perpetrators value reputations and where mechanisms for criminal accountability already exist.  
➢ More likely to be effective when investigators can access the territory where abuses are alleged. But could still be usefully done without access (e.g., Syria and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea commissions of inquiry). | }

| Design | ➢ Some monitoring groups (especially local NGOs) might need material/financial support and/or specific technical expertise (e.g., forensics) to carry out investigations.  
➢ In cases where formal investigations have been mandated and stood up, assistance might focus on linking this process with civil society—e.g., publicizing results.  
➢ Specific activities will differ depending on whether the information is intended for use to establish broad patterns, in which case representative sampling surveys may be sufficient, or to support individual criminal accountability, in which case evidence of specific incidents would be necessary.  
➢ Safekeeping of information from any monitoring or fact-finding effort is critical. | |
**Peace messaging**

Public communications, such as radio broadcasts, short messaging service (SMS) blasts, and even bullhorns, can be used to disseminate messages designed to persuade people to reject violence and/or counter hate speech.

- **Description**
  - If credible peace messages reach persons who might commit atrocities, their attitudes will change, making them less likely to attack civilians.
  - OR -
  - If credible peace messages influence community members with influence on persons who might commit atrocities or the community writ large, it will exert social pressure and make potential perpetrators less likely to attack civilians.

- **ToC**
  - More likely to have impact where informal militias, gangs, or similar groups are the likely perpetrators of atrocities. Less likely to have impact where official security services are the likely perpetrators.
  - More likely to have impact where mass atrocities would require mobilization of a large group of individuals who are not already engaged in violence. This will usually mean situations without an ongoing civil war.

- **Example**
  - Central African Republic: Part of USAID’s response to the escalating violence in late 2013 was support for new programs that sought to strengthen local leaders’ messaging on peace, tolerance, and non-violence. Peace messaging efforts were to be crafted and led by locals, embedded into broader peace initiatives, and conducted in a way that would strengthen the role of community peace leaders. These activities were funded from the Complex Crises Fund.

- **Design**
  - Peace messaging programs are most effective when they match: (a) influential messengers, (b) messages that are specifically tailored to the local context, (c) channels of communication that reach key audiences, and (d) create and sustain an ongoing narrative over time. It should be noted that messengers do not have to be viewed as elite or powerful to be influential. Women and youth may be powerful messengers of peace, in part because they may not be viewed as holding power and thus having vested interests in outcomes.
  - To be most credible—and limit the potential to do harm—messages should be crafted (or at least validated) by locals.

**Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:**
- Complex Crises Fund,
- Human Rights Grants Program,
- OTI SWIFT
### Support for conflict-sensitive journalism

**Description**

Recognizing that the media can play positive and/or negative roles in conflict environments, various organizations have developed approaches to ensure that journalists adopt practices that will not inflame tensions. USAID’s work in this area often includes support for training, but also monitoring.

If journalists are sensitive to their potential impact on conflict dynamics, their reports will help shape public attitudes that reject violence against civilians, and in turn make it more difficult for potential perpetrators to mobilize masses for atrocities.

**Example**

**Uganda:** As part of USAID’s Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace program (2012–2017), 28 Ugandan journalists received an intensive, three-day training on conflict-sensitive reporting with the aim to promote dialogue, integrate diverse voices in discussions of conflicts, and foster more balanced reporting in conflict engagements. The training empowered beneficiaries to use radio to promote new conflict transformation models, to highlight successes in peace building and reconciliation, and to integrate diverse voices in discussions of conflict triggers, including the perspectives of women and youth. ([www.ncscinternational.org/Highlights/Uganda-Promoting-Conflict-Sensitive-Journalism.aspx](http://www.ncscinternational.org/Highlights/Uganda-Promoting-Conflict-Sensitive-Journalism.aspx))

**Context**

Most relevant where potential atrocities are linked to an armed conflict.

**Design**

- Training programs are likely to be more effective to the extent that they reach a large number of journalists, either directly or via a “train-the-trainers” approach.
- In many cases, codes of media conduct have been useful tools. To be most effective, there should be a mechanism to ensure compliance with such a code.
- For more on media monitoring, see “Hate Speech as Early Warning Monitoring, Intervention, and Mitigation,” in *Preventing Atrocities: Five Key Primers: [www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers)*
### Description
Peace processes are “negotiation activities to resolve violent conflict, including the surrounding activities of pre-negotiation and agreement implementation. Peace processes should assist a transformation in a society’s conflict dynamics so that political, social, and economic improvements can take place in a stable and just environment. While the Department of State normally leads U.S. Government peace process initiatives at an official level, USAID is often well-positioned to play a variety of programmatic, informational, and policy roles that support these efforts.” (CMM Peace Process toolkit, p. 4; [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadr502.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadr502.pdf))

### ToC
If peace processes are successful, they can resolve armed conflicts and address underlying risks, thereby reducing the likelihood of mass atrocities.

### Example
- **Sierra Leone:** USAID funded travel for civil society representatives to participate in the Lomé peace talks between the government and rebels.
- **Kosovo/Serbia:** USAID commissioned the Knowledge–Attitudes–Practice Survey to demonstrate to parties involved in the Vienna talks that there was strong public support for negotiations as the fairest way to resolve Kosovo’s future status.

### Context
- Appropriate to situations of ongoing armed conflict, “frozen” conflicts, or others where there is a formal process of peace negotiations.
- More likely to be effective when the risk of mass atrocities is closely linked to the broader conflict dynamics.

### Design
- CMM’s Peace Process toolkit cites eight lessons learned: (1) conduct a conflict analysis, (2) coordinate with larger policy and donor communities, (3) embed security sector reform into agreements, (4) build relationships for the long-term, (5) ensure local buy-in, (6) institutionalize changes, (7) use media resources, and (8) expand programming reach.
- The U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security cites the inclusion of women’s voices in all stages of peace processes as critical to their success. USAID support in this area can include training, transportation, and support for networking and coalition-building.
- A peace process is a means, not an end in itself. It is important to watch for the possibility that atrocity risks could rise in spite of an ongoing peace process.
- Peace processes often shift and change in unanticipated ways. Support programs should be designed with this in mind, building in capacity to adapt quickly as necessary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>RECOVERY</th>
<th>Social cohesion programs</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Social cohesion refers to “behavior and attitudes within a community that reflects a propensity of community members to cooperate” (King, Samii & Stilsveit, 2010: 337). Development programs seek to promote social cohesion in multiple ways, such as dialogue, community-driven development, skills training, and social activities (e.g., sports, dance, theater).

**ToC**
If the attitudes and behavior of communities promote cooperation, the likelihood that they will target each other for attack will be reduced.

**Example**
- **Syria and Lebanon**: USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives supported a local Lebanese organization in convening a conference in 2013 to discuss local needs and potential solutions in light of massive influx of Syrian refugees. The conference trainings were designed to create and support committees of Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees and municipality representatives. ([www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/conference-promotes-social-cohesion-lebanon](http://www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/conference-promotes-social-cohesion-lebanon))
- **Sri Lanka**: In 2012 and 2013, USAID sponsored workshops focused on social accountability, good governance, and community needs for community-based organizations in northern Sri Lanka. USAID’s assistance aims to help these organizations address their needs and build bridges with counterparts in other areas of Sri Lanka, contributing to the transition to peace. ([www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/success/files/041013%20SNAPSHOT_Workshops%20Create%20Social%20Cohesion.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/success/files/041013%20SNAPSHOT_Workshops%20Create%20Social%20Cohesion.pdf))

**Context**
- More likely to be effective if conducted in a pre-crisis context.
- Also more likely to have impact where assistance creates incentives for long-term exposure, dialogue, and cooperation (i.e., “one-offs” are likely to have little impact).

**Design**
- Inter-group social cohesion—i.e., propensity to cooperate across group lines, as distinct from cooperating across individuals—is especially relevant to the risk of atrocities. However, experience suggests that promoting inter-group social cohesion is more challenging and some past efforts have had negative effects.
- Theory suggests that programs are more likely to succeed to the extent that they: (1) increase participation and ownership, (2) enhance community capacity for collective action, and (3) illustrate that participation in collective action can lead to results (King et al.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Engagement in women and girls in peacebuilding and political processes</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, Global Women’s Leadership Fund, OTI SWIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1325, the USG has adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security. USAID is investing in gender equality and women’s empowerment in crisis and conflict-affected countries to promote the rights and well-being of women and girls and to foster peaceful, resilient communities that can cope with adversity and pursue development gains. Examples of programming approaches in this area include assistance to women’s groups, network building, care to victims of gender-based violence, and skills training. (See the NAP at: [www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf); on USAID’s implementation, see: [www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID_WPS_Implementation_Report.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID_WPS_Implementation_Report.pdf))

ToC If women are engaged fully in peacebuilding and political processes, they help to expand the scope of agreements and improve the prospects for durable peace by raising issues that might otherwise be neglected, such as accountability for past abuses, support for survivors of violence, and social and economic inequalities that contribute to fragility.

Example Libya: USAID has sponsored training to help Libyan women gain positions in post-Gadhafi political institutions. Funded by USAID’s Global Women’s Leadership Fund and implemented through the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), the program included a leadership academy and follow-on support to help women secure internships in government offices where they could influence Libya’s political transition.

Context ➢ Especially relevant to situations in which formal political or peace processes could play a major role in mitigating risks of mass atrocities.  
➢ Especially relevant to situations where sexual and gender-based violence has been highly prevalent or used systematically against a certain population.  
➢ In addition to the possibility of programs focused on engaging women and girls, gender considerations should be integrated into all programs.

Design ➢ A gender analysis—required for all new projects/activities—is an important foundation for this kind of program.  
➢ Engaging women and girls is important in all phases. The most appropriate program activities will differ by phase and other contextual factors. For example, in a prevention phase, empowering women and ensuring their participation may be most valuable. Addressing the distinct needs and priorities of women and men during relief and recovery efforts, by contrast, might mean a focus on services for survivors of sexual violence and support for women’s voices in developing transitional justice processes.  
➢ Including women in peace processes requires consistent diplomatic support as well as programming such as logistical, strategic, and skill building support for participants; coordination with State Department and other interagency actors is therefore critical.
| Description | The absence of information during a crisis of conflict can fuel rumors and fear-induced attacks, limit the ability of people to reach life-saving humanitarian assistance, and reduce the extent of local participation in violence mitigation efforts. USAID has supported programs to improve basic information access by, for example, distributing wind-up radios, rebuilding community radio stations, and disseminating information on emergency relief operations. |
| ToC | ➢ If people have increased access to information during a crisis, they will be less fearful and, in turn, less likely to attack other civilians.  

- OR -  

➢ If people have information about emergency relief operations, the positive impact of this assistance will be increased, thereby saving lives that would otherwise be lost as a result of the crisis. |
| Example | **Central African Republic:** With funds from the Human Rights Grants Program (FY2014), USAID is supporting a program that aims to ease the humanitarian situation by providing affected populations with information that can protect their lives and livelihoods and to provide citizens with information and civic education to prepare for a return to constitutional order, effective government, and civil peace. Activities will include rebuilding community radio stations impacted by the violence, sustaining a network of community-based correspondents who share information from around the country, and supporting an information coordination center in Bangui that produces a variety of information products and content. |
| Context | Most relevant to situations in which communities at risk of being attacked and/or vulnerable to being mobilized to commit atrocities are isolated and lacking information. |
| Design | ➢ While addressing urgent needs as expeditiously as possible, programs should seek, as is feasible, to build a foundation for sustainable improvements in the information environment.  

➢ Having assets such as radio transmitters can make partners targets for opportunistic violence. Appropriate risk management and security protocols should be followed. |
| Description | USAID is one of the world’s largest providers of assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. This assistance typically includes life necessities including water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); food; shelter; and health services. |
| ToC | If populations affected by large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians have their immediate needs met, it will reduce the consequences of atrocities. |
| Example | **Syria:** As of May 2014, USAID had provided nearly $1 billion in funding to help those suffering inside Syria, as well as refugees and host communities in the neighboring countries. Programs have focused on food, health, WASH, and protection. Humanitarian assistance is being delivered through the United Nations, international and NGOs, and local Syrian organizations. For more, see: [www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria](http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria). |
| Context | ➢ A formal disaster declaration is required before OFDA can provide humanitarian assistance.  
➢ Most critical in cases with large populations displaced by violent attacks. |
| Design | ➢ Sensitivity to potential unintended harm is critically important, especially in conflict environments.  
➢ Adherence to humanitarian principles is critical to maintaining access and credibility, yet can be challenging when certain conflict parties deliberately attack civilian populations.  
➢ Ensure that humanitarian assistance takes into account the distinct needs of individuals based on age, sex, disability, etc. The USG’s Safe from the Start Initiative is a commitment to reduce the incidence of gender-based violence (GBV) and ensure quality services for survivors from the very onset of emergencies through timely and effective humanitarian action. See: [www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm).  
➢ IDP/refugee camps could become targets of attacks and/or perceived as safe havens for perpetrators of atrocities. |
### Humanitarian protection programs

**Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:**
International Disaster Assistance funds, OTI SWIFT

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>USAID/OFDA defines protection as activities that minimize risks for and address effects of harm, exploitation, and abuse for disaster-affected populations. Protection should be mainstreamed in all humanitarian assistance activities. It also is a distinct sector of humanitarian programming. The subsectors for protection programming are: child protection, prevention and response to GBV, psychosocial support, and protection coordination, advocacy, and information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>If, in a disaster setting, USAID can help minimize risks by mitigating threats, reducing vulnerabilities, and alleviating effects of harm, exploitation, and abuse, it will reduce the consequences of atrocities (and possibly decrease the likelihood of escalation).</td>
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<th>Example</th>
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<td>Mali: To reduce the vulnerability of children and families in Mali’s Gao and Mopti regions, one USAID/OFDA partner is establishing community-based centers that identify and assist vulnerable children and support children who remain separated from their families or were recruited by armed groups. Through this partner, USAID/OFDA is also providing services and support to women and girls affected by GBV, as well as psychosocial assistance for individuals of all ages who have experienced violence or abuse. (Protection Sector Update, October 2013; scms.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/protection_sector_update.pdf)</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Most critical in cases with large populations displaced by violent attacks.</td>
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<td>➢ More likely to be effective in preventing atrocities that are opportunistic and committed against individuals or small groups.</td>
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<td>➢ Adherence to humanitarian principles is critical to maintaining access and credibility, yet can be challenging when certain conflict parties deliberately attack civilian populations.</td>
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<td>➢ IDP/refugee camps could become targets of attacks and/or perceived as safe havens for perpetrators of atrocities.</td>
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<td>➢ Ensure that humanitarian assistance—including the design and management of refugee camps—takes into account the distinct needs of individuals based on age, sex, disability, etc. The USG’s Safe from the Start Initiative is a commitment to prevent and respond to gender-based violence in all phases of our emergency humanitarian response. See: <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm">www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c62378.htm</a>.</td>
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<td>➢ See the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Professional Standards for Protection Work. These include, for example: “Protection actors must seek to engage in dialogue with persons at risk and ensure their participation in activities directly affecting them…”</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ “Protection actors must at all times avoid action that undermines the capacity and will of primary duty bearers to fulfil their obligations.”</td>
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### Support to transitional justice processes

**Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms:**
- Complex Crises Fund,
- OTI SWIFT

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<td>Transitional justice (TJ) refers to “the full range of processes and mechanisms (judicial and non-judicial) associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Report of the UN SG on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, 2006). For more information on this subject, see “The Role of Transitional Justice in Atrocity Prevention” in <em>Preventing Atrocities: Five Key Primers</em>. <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers">www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-primers</a>.</td>
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<td>If societies acknowledge and address the legacy of past atrocities through a combination of prosecutions, reparations, truth seeking, and institutional reform, the risk that atrocities will recur will decline. This collapses several more specific ToCs that could be central to different TJ efforts, e.g.:</td>
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<td>➢ If perpetrators are held criminally accountable for atrocities committed, future potential perpetrators will be deterred, or</td>
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<td>➢ If communities see individuals being held to account, they will be less likely to turn to collective retribution against another group.</td>
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<td>➢ <strong>Cambodia:</strong> USAID has supported the Documentation Center of Cambodia to compile evidence on Khmer Rouge atrocities, provided direct support to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to pursue criminal accountability, and support for services for victims of torture and violence.</td>
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<td>➢ <strong>Guatemala:</strong> USAID provided support for exhumations of remains of conflict victims, psychosocial services to survivors and their families, and investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses.</td>
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<td>USAID support for TJ usually relies on the existence of some kind of transition or break from the past conflict or regime. It is more likely to be effective when it supports a national TJ process.</td>
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<td>➢ A wide array of activities—from prosecutions to truth seeking, from memorialization to national dialogue—could fall under the TJ rubric. The best approaches tend to be those that respond to local voices and demand for justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Men and women experience conflict differently, so transitional justice efforts must be sure to take into account the distinct needs, interests, and experiences of all. Ensuring women’s active participation in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms will help ensure they address the full range of experiences during the conflict. (See, <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2012/10/06B-Making-Transitional-Justice-Work-for-Women.pdf">www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2012/10/06B-Making-Transitional-Justice-Work-for-Women.pdf</a>)</td>
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<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ToC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
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| **Design** | - It is important to consider whether a trauma healing program intends to exert its systemic effect by reaching “more people” or “key people.” Where a large proportion of a population has experienced trauma, it can be challenging to reach all those who could benefit from these programs and selectivity in service delivery could have unintended negative effects.  
- Program designers should pay attention to the challenge of translating changes in individual attitudes to group interactions, institutions, and policies.  
- Trauma healing programs will need to be tailored to the distinct experiences and needs of people based on age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or other factors.  
- “For large group interventions including testimonials and commemoration, it is important to balance a focus on pain and suffering with hope and possibilities for a better future, in order to avoid perpetuating the wounds and making the past into a ‘chosen trauma’ that feeds continued conflict” (THINC report, p. 35). |
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<th>Recovery</th>
<th>Support for reintegration of former combatants</th>
<th>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are accepted as critical ingredients in a successful transition from war to peace. USAID is most directly involved in helping reintegrate former fighters into communities, typically through a mix of skills training, employment/livelihood opportunities, and social reintegration programs.</td>
<td><strong>Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ToC</strong></td>
<td>If former combatants are supported in becoming productive members of communities, they are less likely to return to the use of violence.</td>
<td><strong>ToC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
<td>Colombia: “Support for Legal Processing and Monitoring of Ex-Combatants: USAID provides technical, logistical and administrative assistance to the Government of Colombia’s Reintegration Service Center (RSC) Network and the Tracking, Monitoring and Evaluation System (SAME). The SAME is used to track ex-combatants and follow their progress through the reintegration process. RSCs provide access to healthcare, formal education, vocational training, income generation opportunities, and counseling services to ex-combatants and their families.” (<a href="http://bogota.usembassy.gov/usaidintdisp.html">http://bogota.usembassy.gov/usaidintdisp.html</a> [accessed Mar. 2015])</td>
<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td>➢ Most relevant following the end of an armed conflict and when large numbers of former combatants are being demobilized (as opposed to integrated into or maintained within formal security services). ➢ Reintegration programs are more likely to succeed when they build on and are coordinated with disarmament and demobilization initiatives.</td>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>➢ It is important to focus on the needs of both former combatants and the communities to which they are returning. Providing benefits (e.g., training) only to former combatants can alienate other members of communities. ➢ DDR programs often neglect to reflect the distinct needs of women, and to recognize the variety of roles they may play in conflict, including but not limited to combatants. Activities should be tailored to recognize the distinct forms of support that women may prefer/require. ➢ For information on “community-focused reintegration” programs, see: <a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf</a></td>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ RECOVERY</td>
<td>Economic recovery programs</td>
<td>Potential contingency funds and/or mechanisms: International Disaster Assistance funds, Complex Crises Fund, OTI SWIFT</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>To help communities resume economic activity and rebuild livelihoods, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) supports economic recovery and market systems (ERMS) in disaster-affected communities. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, USAID/OFDA provided nearly $42 million to support economic recovery activities in 23 countries throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as worldwide and regional interventions. “ERMS interventions strengthen key market systems and help populations restore livelihoods and purchasing power at the household, local, and regional levels.” See: <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crisis-and-conflict/responding-times-crisis/how-we-do-it/humanitarian-sectors/erm">www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crisis-and-conflict/responding-times-crisis/how-we-do-it/humanitarian-sectors/erm</a></td>
<td>In addition to OFDA, OTI routinely supports economic recovery activities in the context of political transitions and USAID missions in countries emerging from crisis or conflict often support economic growth programs.</td>
</tr>
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**ToC**
- If communities are able to resume economic activity and rebuild livelihoods, it will mitigate the consequences of mass atrocities.
- OR -
- If economic recovery programs promote equitably shared economic gains, they will reduce economic motives that could drive future atrocities, thereby reducing the chance of recurrence.

**Example**
**Yemen:** “In FY 2013, USAID/OFDA provided more than $4.8 million for ERMS activities in Yemen, focusing on the southern governorates affected by the conflict in Abyan, where the security situation had stabilized by mid-2012.” Specific activities supported included “helping to restore livelihoods by providing appropriate productive assets, such as fishing nets, wheelbarrows, and other supplies, to beneficiaries who present a viable business plan,” linking “beneficiaries with local microfinance institutions to facilitate small loans to replace lost assets,” “providing business development training and loans to vulnerable returnees and conflict-affected people—including women and youth—who want to start small businesses,” and “offering vocational training across a range of trades, such as bee-keeping, basic mechanics, and clerical services.”

**Context**
- Likely to be most acutely needed in least developed countries, where individuals and communities have less ability to cope with economic consequences of mass atrocities.
- Most needed where the conflict/crisis had severe effects on the economy, including disruption of basic livelihoods, markets and trade, and widespread destruction of critical infrastructure.
- Where economic motives were highly salient in recent atrocities, economic recovery programs that address potential economic drivers of violence should be considered.

**Design**
- Economic recovery programs should be informed by an understanding of local market-systems—e.g., through a timely analysis using the Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit (http://emma-toolkit.org/).
- The Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (www.seepnetwork.org/minimum-economic-recovery-standards-pages-10078.php) “articulate the minimum level of technical and other assistance to be provided in promoting the recovery of economies and livelihoods affected by crisis.”
Annex B: Additional resources

Assessment frameworks and early warning

USG:

USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0

State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0
http://diplopedia.state.gov/index.php?title=ICAF (only accessible on a USG network)

State Department/USAID, Atrocity Assessment Framework: Supplemental Guidance to Conflict Assessment Frameworks (working draft)
Contact Nicole Widdersheim (nwiddersheim@usaid.gov).

Non-USG:

United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes

U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Center for the Prevention of Genocide, Early Warning Project
http://www.earlywarningproject.com/

UN WOMEN, Gender-Responsive Early Warning: Overview and How-to Guide
http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/04EGenderResponsiveEarlyWarning.pdf

“Do no harm”

Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development

How To Guide to Conflict Sensitivity
http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/content/how-guide

Questions for Planning a Development Program
http://www.cdacollaborative.org/media/60819/QUESTIONS-FOR-PLANNING-ANY-DEVELOPMENT-PROJECT.pdf

Dividers and Connectors

Gender and Do No Harm

Human Rights and Do No Harm

Practical guidance and examples of monitoring indicators
Training

**USG:**

USAID University, Preventing Mass Atrocities and Genocide: Introduction to Key Concepts and U.S. Government Policy and Tools  
(Forthcoming in early 2015)


**Non-USG:**

Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, Raphael Lemkin Seminar for Genocide Prevention  

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Professional training program on the prevention of mass atrocities (offered in June 2013 and June 2014)  
[http://migs.concordia.ca/MIGSConferences.htm](http://migs.concordia.ca/MIGSConferences.htm)

United States Institute of Peace-Auschwitz Institute Course on Atrocity Prevention  
(In development – contact Jonas Claes ([jelaes@usip.org](mailto:jelaes@usip.org)) for more information.)

Contingency funds

DCHA/PPM, Complex Crises Fund  
Contact Ami Morgan ([amorgan@usaid.gov](mailto:amorgan@usaid.gov))

DCHA/DRG, Human Rights Grants Program  

DCHA/DRG, Elections and Political Transitions Fund  

DCHA/OFDA, International Disaster Assistance  

E3/GenDev, Global Women’s Leadership Fund  

USAID/Washington point of contact on atrocity prevention

DCHA/DRG: Nicole Widdersheim, Human Rights Advisor, [nwiddersheim@usaid.gov](mailto:nwiddersheim@usaid.gov), 202-712-5325