WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP AS A ROUTE TO GREATER EMPOWERMENT
REPORT ON THE DIAMOND LEADERSHIP MODEL

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MODEL

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WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP AS A ROUTE TO GREATER EMPOWERMENT: DIAMOND MODEL REPORT
ACRONYMS

BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
DCAF  Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DLM  Diamond Leadership Model
DRG  Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
F-FDTL  Timor Leste Defense Force
GDI  Gender Development Index
GEI  Gender Empowerment Index
GII  Gender Inequality Index
IDEA  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IPU  Inter-Parliamentary Union
MSI  Management Systems International
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RESDAL  Security and Defense Network of Latin America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WiP  Women in Power
WPS  Women’s Power Score
ABSTRACT

Women are increasingly moving into political leadership. Around the world today, women are receiving appointments to executive cabinets, leading political parties, serving on the benches of high courts, and commanding security forces. However, existing cross-national research on women’s political power overwhelmingly focuses on women’s representation in national legislatures and executive ministries. In this study, we propose a model to capture women’s political leadership in a broader way: the Diamond Leadership Model (DLM). The model spans three levels of leadership (high, mid, and low) and four government sectors (legislative, executive, judicial, and security) using a weighted design. We then collect data on DLM indicators for low, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries around the world. This research demonstrates the feasibility of collecting consistent and comparable data on women’s leadership in three of the four sectors; only security sector data proved especially difficult to find. Results from the pilot study suggest that women’s representation across sectors is often highly uneven, but we do not find evidence that women are concentrated in the least prestigious positions. Of the 9 indicators with good coverage, women are best represented among appellate judges and worst among party leaders and mayors. The DLM also relates weakly to existing measures of gender equality across countries, suggesting that researchers and advocates are missing out on important variation in women’s political leadership.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Women are increasingly moving into political leadership. Today, women are receiving appointments to executive cabinets, leading political parties, serving on the benches of high courts, and commanding security forces. However, most of what we know about women’s political power is based on research about women’s representation in national legislatures, and to a lesser extent, in executive cabinets. International organizations attempting to benchmark women’s progress towards political power or create composite indices of women’s status also rely overwhelmingly on these two measures. Women’s representation in legislatures and ministries provide two important indicators of women’s political power, but should not be the only types of political leadership we try to understand.

What we know about women’s political leadership is limited by a lack of adequate cross-national data. Researchers have looked at women’s integration into a broader range of political positions and arenas (e.g., Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Donadio, Mazzotta, and Castañeda García 2010; UN Women 2011). But much of the research is limited to single case studies or small regional comparisons, or looks only at one measure of women’s political leadership at a time. Consistent and comparable indicators of women’s political empowerment across multiple areas of governance are simply not available across countries.

This project seeks to further understanding of women’s political empowerment by developing a new framework for measuring women’s political leadership called the Diamond Leadership Model (DLM). The DLM measures women’s representation using 12 indicators that span high-, mid-, and low-level positions and legislative, executive, judicial, and security sectors of governance (see Figure 1). Indicators are weighted such that higher level positions are given greater weight, and then summed to create the Women’s Power Score.
We conducted a pilot study to test the DLM, focusing on 40 countries worldwide. Countries in the pilot study are Low, Lower-Middle, or Upper-Middle Income categories (World Bank 2013), are mostly classified as “Free” or “Partly Free” by Freedom House (2013), and are drawn from Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

As a pilot study, this research demonstrates first and foremost the feasibility of collecting consistent and comparable data on women’s leadership in a broader way. With limited resources, it is possible to obtain data on the legislative sector (women party leaders, committee heads, and MPs), executive sector (cabinet ministers, sub-ministerial positions, and mayors) and the highest levels of the judiciary (constitutional judges and other high court judges). Excluding the security sector, we were able to collect 8 of the 9 indicators for 30 of 40 (75 percent) countries and all 9 indicators for 25 of 40 (63 percent) countries.

The pilot study also revealed that data on appellate judges and the security sector are more difficult to collect. Although constitutional courts and other high courts are often relatively small bodies – making it easy to find lists of their members and thus identify their sex composition – information on the lower levels of the appellate system is more difficult to come by. Data on the security sector was by far the most challenging to collect. Even with in-country data collection support, governments are sometimes unwilling to provide information on women’s share of leadership positions within the military. Statistics on women in the leadership structure of the police force are more widely available, but reporting is still spotty. Most of what is available for the security sector has been compiled by a small number of international organizations who specialize in the security sector in a particular geographic region — for example, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Africa and the Security and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL).
Methodologically, the pilot study also suggests that the Women’s Power Score (WPS) has something new to offer. The WPS relates fairly weakly to existing measures of gender equality across countries. Thus, existing measures that rely solely on women’s representation in legislatures and executive cabinets may be telling only part of the story.

The pilot study also generated substantive results about women’s political leadership. First, results from the pilot study suggest that women’s representation across governance sectors is often highly uneven. In many countries, women have made significant inroads into political leadership positions in one or two government sectors, while remaining substantially underrepresented or excluded altogether in other government sectors. Women’s representation is often the best in the judiciary and in other appointed positions. When leadership positions are filled through elections, women appear to be present in lower numbers.

Pilot study results also show that women are not always segregated into lower tier leadership positions. For example, among pilot study countries, women are better represented in committee leadership at higher levels than in national legislators overall. Across the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors, women are represented at the lowest levels among party leaders (a high-level position) and among mayors of large cities (a lower-level position).

Calculating the Women’s Power Score across countries also shows substantial cross-country variation. In no country are women represented at levels equal to men. However, the relatively high Power Scores in some countries suggests women are making progress towards equality in some parts of the world. In other places, political leadership remains men’s domain, as women are represented at very low numbers or not at all.

II. INTRODUCTION

The Women in Power (WiP) project is a learning activity supported by USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG), implemented in partnership with Management Systems International (MSI). The goal of the WiP project is to further USAID’s understanding of women’s political leadership and empowerment. The project has two main objectives: 1) mapping and assessing the Agency’s programming related to women’s political leadership; and 2) piloting a new measure of women’s leadership. This report focuses on the second of these objectives.

The research to create this report is informed primarily from six months of data collection (April – September 2014), led by Melanie Hughes, an academic who specializes in quantitative methodology. Dr. Hughes supervised two researchers, Milad Pournik and Brittany Duncan, who collected data on women’s political leadership across all formal government sectors (executive, judicial, security, and legislative). Data most often were publically available and came from government websites, but coders also drew from published reports, news articles, and correspondence with subject and country experts.

Five other research teams also conducted in-depth case studies of five of the countries: Cambodia, Georgia, Jordan, Kenya, and Mexico. Each case study team included a mix of academic expertise, USAID and/or MSI staff, and country specialists. These teams interviewed a wide range of individuals, including elected women at the national, state, and local levels; women’s groups and other officials in the political parties; parliamentary staff; women in civil society organizations; staff
at state women’s agencies; electoral judges and administrators; and academics. The case study teams collected data for this report, but the qualitative case study findings also complement the quantitative research presented here.

III. BACKGROUND

Women have made tremendous inroads into politics over the last thirty years. Gains have been particularly remarkable in the legislative sector, where gender quotas have proliferated (Dahlerup 2006; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012; Krook 2009; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Tripp and Kang 2008). However, there is evidence of advances towards gender equality in broad range of political positions. Today, women are leading countries, states and cities; national and local bureaucracies; political parties and committees; courts; and even security forces. Despite women’s greater political successes in recent years, men remain overrepresented in political leadership in all parts of the world (Gerring et al. 2014).

Including women in political decision-making positions matters. Higher levels of women’s representation in national and local legislatures is linked to increased legislative focus on health and family policy and to greater spending on social services (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012). Female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to place a high priority on traditional women’s issues such as gender equality, anti-discrimination policy, women’s reproductive health, and violence against women (for a review, see Paxton and Hughes 2013). Women’s presence also has important symbolic effects, increasing women’s political engagement, raising women’s political aspirations, enhancing their self-esteem, and changing the way men think about women’s capabilities (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003).

As recent research has shown, however, women in politics do not operate in a vacuum (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 2014; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). When women gain entry to legislatures, their presence alone does not guarantee that any broader changes will follow. Women’s ability to translate their preferences into policy can be limited by level of democracy, electoral system, presence and type of gender quotas, political party strength and ideology, and the broader configuration of power relations in society, among other factors (Paxton and Hughes 2013). Even in Argentina, which has served as a model for how to increase women’s political presence through gender quotas, the institutional and normative environment can create an unequal playing field for women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; 2014).

One constraint on women’s political influence may be their uneven levels of incorporation within a government sector. Political institutions are hierarchical structures, and women may be vertically segregated. That is, women may be concentrated in lower-level positions with less authority, continually bumping up against “glass ceilings”. For example, women may be relatively well represented in a legislative body, but men may be the ones to lead parties and head committees, making it more difficult for women to translate their policy preferences into law (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). If women are unable to advance to the highest levels of leadership, their political influence may be severely curtailed.

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Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) found that as women’s representation increased in Argentina, so did proposed legislation on a range of progressive policies of particular interest to women, including bills on violence against women, reproductive health, and sexual harassment. However, women-sponsored bills tended to lack support from party leaders and committee heads. Consequently, many bills died before reaching a vote by the full legislature.
Women’s influence may also be constrained by horizontal segregation – uneven levels of women’s representation across government sectors. That is, women may bump up against “glass walls,” keeping them confined to particular parts of the government. However, the creation, implementation, and protection of policies involves all branches of government, working in collaboration and counterbalancing one another. If women are concentrated in just one or two government sectors, their ability to effect change may be limited. For example, if women legislators successfully shepherd a bill on sexual harassment into law, inadequate implementation and enforcement by executive agencies, police, and courts could undermine the law’s effectiveness.

Generally, we know little about the vertical and horizontal segregation of women in politics across countries. Case studies sometimes profile the state of women’s political success across more than one government sector – often looking at both the legislative and executive arena. But, existing comparative research overwhelmingly focuses on women’s representation in certain positions in isolation from their success in other arenas.²

What we know about women’s vertical and horizontal segregation in politics is also limited by a lack of adequate cross-national data. International organizations collect and make available data on women’s share of seats in parliament, complemented more recently by data on women’s representation in executive cabinets and constitutional courts (IPU 2014b; World Bank 2014). But, consistent and comparable cross-national indicators of women’s political empowerment across multiple levels and sectors of governance are simply not available.

The WiP project seeks to address gaps in both knowledge and data by collecting and analyzing new data on women’s political leadership. We investigate variation in women’s leadership vertically (high- mid- and low-level positions) and horizontally (legislative, executive, judicial, and security sectors) using the Diamond Leadership Model (DLM). In the next section, we elaborate upon the DLM, describing the 12 indicators designed to measure women’s political leadership in a broad and inclusive way.

IV. THE DIAMOND LEADERSHIP MODEL

The Diamond Leadership Model (DLM) measures the prevalence of women decision-makers in three tiers of the executive, legislative, judicial, and security sectors, assigning weights for the level of their positions. In this section, we introduce the DLM, focusing first individually on the indicators that measure women’s political leadership and then how we combine these indicators to generate the Women’s Power Score.

A. The Legislative Sector

The legislative sector is the part of the government responsible for making the laws. Women’s leadership in the legislative sector is measured by three indicators:

- High: Party Leaders
- Mid: Committee Heads
- Low: National Legislators

² One exception here is research on women cabinet ministers; this research often uses measures of women’s share of legislative positions as predictor of women’s share of cabinet positions (Crase et al. 2011; Krook and O’Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999; Whisford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007).
High: Party Leaders

Political parties are gatekeepers. In almost all countries in the world, for anyone to run for office, a woman or a man, she or he must be selected and supported by a political party. Political parties, then, are largely responsible for recruiting women to run and for giving women the training and resources needed to win public office (Caul 2001; Kittilson 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Vassell 2006). Parties, too, can take steps to resist women’s inclusion, recruiting few women, offering women candidates few resources, or channeling them into unwinnable list positions or districts (Bjarnegård 2013). In some countries, political parties also have a great deal of control over legislative behavior, sometimes even directing the content of speech on the floor of the legislature (Bäck, Debus and Müller 2014).

Parties led by women may be more likely to recruit women and to give them the support they need to get elected (Paxton and Hughes 2013). Women leaders may also be more likely to institutionalize policies that give women a leg up. For example, in advanced industrial democracies, women’s participation in party leadership has been linked to the adoption of party gender quotas (Caul 2001; Kittilson 2011). How exactly women party leaders help women may vary from one type of system to another (Kunovich and Paxton 2005). But overall, empirical research generally agrees that women party leaders can play critical roles in women’s political success.

Up to date statistics on women’s share of party leadership around the world are not currently available. One global survey conducted between 1991 and 1996 put the average number of women in leadership positions (including party chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary general, and party spokesperson) at 10 percent and the median at 5 percent (IPU 1997; Kunovich and Paxton 2005). More up-to-date cross-national datasets of world leaders typically focus on heads of state, ministers, and national legislators only.

*Party Leaders* is measured as the share of major political parties in the country with a woman occupying the top party leadership position. We limit our measure to only those political parties represented in the lower house of the national legislature. Leading parties, main opposition parties, and smaller parties are given equal weight. Data are drawn primarily from the CIA Factbook, which lists party leaders, and the IPU, which provides election results at the party level (CIA 2014; IPU 2014b).

Mid: Committee Heads

Cross-national research has given scant attention to women’s headship of legislative committees. National legislatures often divide their work into legislative committees to prepare or review legislation in a particular area. Committee members often have significant influence over the legislation proposed in their committee’s area. Consequently, leading a committee can come with a great deal of power and authority in some countries.

We know very little about women as leaders of committees across countries. The route to committee leadership varies by country. In some countries, the committees themselves select their

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3 Political parties are not part of the legislative branch. But, via their participation therein, parties connect citizens to the legislature, and powerful parties can control legislative leadership and priorities.

4 Most of what we know about committees comes from Western Europe and Latin America and focuses on the distribution of women across different types of committees (e.g., Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In one study of six countries in Latin America, Roseanna Heath, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson (2005) found that women legislators were more likely to be assigned to “women’s issues” committees and social issues committees, while they were less often assigned to the so-called power committees like treasury, budget, or foreign relations. However, the extent to which gender affects committee assignment varies (Schwindt-Bayer 2010).
leadership. But often, party leaders have considerable influence. Few comparative studies have looked at female committee headship, but most of what we know comes from Latin America (Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2010) and sub-Saharan Africa (Tripp 2014). For instance, Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer (2008) found that women headed 17 percent of committees in Nicaragua, which was the highest percentage in Central America. Cross-national research has yet to investigate variation in women’s share of committee leadership around the world.

One obstacle to cross-national research on women committee leaders is that there is no known dataset of legislative committee composition or leadership that includes legislator sex. However, data are typically publicly available on legislative and party websites. We draw from those data sources extensively to measure Committee Heads, the percentage of committees in the lower or single house of the national legislature that are chaired by women. We only count permanent legislative committees, excluding any temporary or ad-hoc bodies. All permanent committees are given equal weight.

**Low: National Legislators**

Without a doubt, we know more about women’s legislative representation across countries than any other indicator. One reason is that legislatures provide a useful laboratory for the study of representative politics (Hughes 2013). Of the more than 195 countries in the world today, almost all elect a group of legislators designed to represent the people at the national level. Although legislatures vary in size, authority and prestige, women’s representation in national legislatures is a widely acceptable measure of women’s political empowerment across countries.

Historically, legislatures were not expected to look like the people they represented (Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1972; Young 1990). Few questioned that male representatives could adequately represent women and their interests. In recent decades, however, notions of representation have changed. Including women in legislatures is today considered an important component of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011). States are also vulnerable to increasing pressure from domestic and international movements, organizations, and agencies to increase women’s share of seats in national legislatures.

As of January 1, 2014, women occupied 22.2 percent of seats in national legislatures (IPU 2014b). Levels of representation were highest, on average, in the Nordic countries (42 percent), Europe and Latin America (25 percent), followed closely by Sub-Saharan Africa (23 percent). Regions stacking up less well include Asia (19 percent), the Arab States (18 percent), and especially the Pacific (13 percent) (IPU 2014b). Women’s legislative representation also varies substantially within regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, women’s representation is highest in Rwanda at 64 percent and is lowest in Comoros at 3 percent.

We know as much as we do about women’s legislative representation because the Inter-Parliamentary Union collects regular data from its members – the world’s parliaments. We make use of this data, too, measuring National Legislators as the percentage of women in the lower or single house as of January 1, 2014 (IPU 2014a).

**B. The Executive Sector**

The executive sector is the part of the government structure with authority and responsibility for administering, executing, and enforcing the law. Executive sectors in most countries include a bureaucracy that generates regulations and monitors the enforcement of existing policy. Under the
Diamond Leadership Model, women’s leadership in the executive sector is measured by three indicators:

- High: Cabinet Ministers
- Mid: Top Executive Technocrats
- Low: Mayors

**High: Cabinet Ministers**

Overall, research suggests that women may have a harder time penetrating the highest levels of leadership in the executive branch than the legislative branch (Bauer and Tremblay 2011). Robert Watson and colleagues (2005:55-56), for example, suggest that executive positions are, “the most gendered of all political offices.”

Cabinet ministers (also called cabinet secretaries) are appointed positions that advise prime ministers and presidents. Ministers are generally responsible for implementing policy, and each minister heads an area of policy, such as labor or foreign policy. Aside from the national leader, cabinet ministers are the most powerful members of the executive branch (Davis 1997). However, the role that ministers play in decision-making varies across countries. In some countries, cabinet ministers are largely advisors, whereas in other countries they set the legislative agenda. Some cabinets are made up of unelected officials; other cabinets are drawn from members of the legislature. Cabinets are also important because they can serve as vehicles to national leadership (Bauer and Tremblay 2011).

Although less developed than research on women in legislatures, there is a significant body of scholarship that has looked at women’s representation in cabinet ministries across countries (Adams and Scherpereel 2010; Bauer and Okpotor 2013; Crage et al. 2011; Krook and O’Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999; Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007). Research documents that female cabinet members are becoming more numerous. Indeed, between 1999 and 2010, the percentage of women cabinet ministers globally nearly doubled from 9 to 17 percent (Bauer and Tremblay 2011). Women are also serving in a wider array of positions – including more prestigious positions – than in times past. However, significant variation across geographic regions and countries remains (Bauer and Tremblay 2011).

The names and portfolios of cabinet ministers for every country are publically available through the Central Intelligence Agency. But, these do not identify the sex of the minister. Therefore, we draw from an aggregate measure of women’s share of cabinet ministers that is available every other year from the IPU. Cabinet Ministers is measured as the percentage of women in the executive cabinet in 2014 (IPU 2014a).

**Mid: Top Executive Technocrats**

Data on the next tier down within the executive is harder to acquire and has received less attention. However, research suggests substantial variation across countries: as of 1996, women held 9.9 percent of all sub-ministerial positions, on average, but women held at least 20 percent of such

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5 In most parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of government, ministers are selected from elected national legislators. Thus, cabinet ministers may be elected officials, but they are not elected to ministerial posts.

6 Research generally focuses on the types of cabinet positions to which women are appointed, how women are recruited to serve, and the country-level factors that predict higher levels of women’s representation (e.g., Bauer and Okpotor 2013; Crage et al. 2011; Krook and O’Brien 2012).
positions in 15 countries (Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007). But, between 1994 and 2005, women’s representation in sub-ministerial positions more than doubled from 7 to 15 percent (Mathiason and Kookhony 2006). Today, women may be well represented as deputy ministers and undersecretaries, especially in some countries. But, more recent cross-national data on women in sub-ministerial positions is not available.

*Top Executive Technocrats* is measured as women’s share of lower-level leadership in executive cabinets. This includes positions of deputy and vice minister, and permanent secretary. Typically, data were available on government websites.

**Low: Mayors from 10 Largest Cities**

The lowest tier leadership position in the executive focuses on mayors. This is the only one of the 12 indicators not at the national level and the only position in the executive sector that is often elected. Mayors sometimes play largely ceremonial roles. For example, in Mumbai, India, the mayor is largely a ceremonial position; executive power rests instead with the municipal commissioner. However, in many countries mayors have a great deal of executive authority. Indeed, in some parts of the world, serving as mayor can be a crucial launching pad for national political career (Murray 2010; Verge 2011).

Presently, there is no publically available data on mayors. However, many municipalities have websites that identify the individuals in leadership positions. Even without such websites, mayors often make public statements and thus are identified in news stories. *Mayors from 10 Largest Cities* is measured by identifying the 10 largest cities in a given country, the top executive authority in that area, his or her sex, and calculating women’s share of those positions.

**C. The Judicial Sector**

The judicial sector is the part of the government structure that interprets and applies the law and that handles the resolution of disputes. Although often overlooked by scholars of women’s political leadership, the judiciary is an important institution for women. As UN Women reports:

> Well-functioning legal and justice systems can provide a vital mechanism for women to achieve their rights. Laws and justice systems shape society, by providing accountability, by stopping the abuse of power and by creating new norms about what is acceptable. The courts have been a critical site of accountability for individual women to claim rights, and in rare cases, to affect wider change for all women through strategic litigation. (2011:9)

The UN estimates that globally women are about 27 percent of judges worldwide (UN Women 2011). However, the structure of judicial systems are highly variable, and women may be represented more or less well at different levels in different countries (Rackley 2013).

Under the Diamond Leadership Model, women’s leadership in the judicial sector is measured by three indicators:

- High: Constitutional Judges
- Mid: High Court Judges
- Low: Appeals Judges

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7 In some countries (for example, Mongolia and Nepal), mayors are selected by an elected council or board that governs the municipality.
High: Constitutional Judges

Often, the highest court of the land is a constitutional court. Such courts have the authority to rule on whether laws are in line with the constitution or whether they conflict with constitutionally established rights and freedoms. “Constitutional courts are often considered to be the most prestigious high courts because they address questions that have a significant impact on the country, and they are often staffed by well-known legal academics” (Williams and Thames 2008:454). Of high courts in OECD countries, women may be the least well represented in constitutional courts (Williams and Thames 2008).

Data on women’s representation in constitutional courts are available from the World Bank (2014). Constitutional Judges is measured as women’s percentage share of seats on the constitutional court (World Bank 2014). Some countries do not have a separate constitutional court. In any case, this measure focuses on the body with the power to review the constitutionality of laws or policies.

Mid: High Court Judges

Many countries have more than one high court. In addition to constitutional courts, countries often have high appellate courts, responsible for hearing appeals arising from the lower appellate levels, and high administrative courts, which have the authority to rule over questions of judicial process and court procedure. Some systems also divide high courts into those that preside over criminal matters and those that preside over civil law.

Data on women’s representation on high courts is fairly easy to access. Academic researchers Margaret Williams and Frank C. Thames have collected data on high court judges in OECD countries for 2010. Data for other countries is generally available on government websites. High Court Judges is measured as women’s percentage share of seats on supreme courts. Supreme courts are the courts of last resort or highest appeals courts for cases decided upon by lower courts. In countries with more than one high-level court, all high-level courts are considered (excluding constitutional courts).

Low: Appeals Judges

Unlike measures of constitutional and other high courts, appellate data is often more difficult to find. Women’s representation on lower-level appeals courts has not been studied across countries, and organizations have not collected these data systematically. In some countries, summary statistics were available. But, in many cases, coders had to access websites for each appellate court, find lists of judges, and identify the sex of the judges. Because appellate courts are more numerous than high courts, this was sometimes a painstaking task.

Appeals Judges is measured as women’s share of seats in all second-tier appellate courts. Appellate courts provide the first stage of appeal.

D. The Security Sector

The security sector is multifaceted, including both military forces to protect the country from external threats and police forces to enforce the laws of the land. In this study, we are interested both in the military and the police.

International attention focused on women in security forces has increased substantially over the last 15 years. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325, affirming the importance of
women’s inclusion in all aspects of the promotion of peace and security. Still, women’s movement into the security sector has been slow, even among UN peacekeeping forces, where we have systematic data (UN Peacekeeping 2014). The Security and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL) estimates that women are 4 percent of military personnel in Latin America (Donadío, Mazzotta, and Castañeda García 2010). But, there are no comparable global statistics on women’s share of the military forces. Moreover, we know very little about women’s military leadership around the world.

Similarly, we know little about women in police leadership globally. Research suggests that women police officers can help to create a justice system that is more responsive to women. For example, data on women’s share of police officers in 39 countries shows that higher percentages of women police officers are associated with higher levels of reporting of sexual assault (UN Women 2011). Indeed, victims of sexual violence – both men and women – prefer to report the crime to women police (Welch and Mason 2011). The UN estimates that women are about 9 percent of police globally (UN Women 2011). But, statistics about women in the police hierarchy are not systematically available, limiting research on potential impacts of women’s police leadership.

Under the Diamond Leadership Model, women’s leadership in the security sector is measured by three indicators:

- High: Commanders
- Mid: Mid-Level Officers
- Low: Lower-Level Officers

For feasibility and to increase comparability across countries, we limit our analysis of the military to the army only.

**High: Commanders**

*Commanders* is measured as women’s share of position in the top third of officer ranks in the army and police. Measures are calculated separately for the army and the police and then averaged together.

**Mid: Mid-Level Officers**

*Mid-Level Officers* is measured as women’s share of position in the middle third of officer ranks in the army and police. For the army, this measure sometimes includes commissioned officers, adjusted to exclude the highest ranking officers (*Commanders*).  

**Low: Lower-Level Officers**

*Lower-Level Officers* is measured as women’s share of position in the bottom third of officer ranks in the army and police. For the army, this measure sometimes includes all non-commissioned officers (NCOs).  

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8 Commissioned officers are typically responsible for leading and training enlisted soldiers and planning military actions.

9 NCOs are often enlisted military personnel who rise to leadership ranks.
E. Combining the Indicators: The Women’s Power Score

The next step is to combine the 12 indicators of the Diamond Leadership Model into the Women’s Power Score. To account for women’s representation at different levels or tiers of all four sectors of governance, we calculate weighted scores for each sector. Women’s share of positions in the top tier is weighted three times as much as women’s share of positions in the bottom tier, and women’s share of positions in the middle tier is weighted twice as much:

\[
\text{legislative} = \frac{(\text{party leaders} \times 3) + (\text{committee heads} \times 2) + (\text{national legislators})}{6}
\]

\[
\text{executive} = \frac{(\text{cabinet ministers} \times 3) + (\text{top executive technocrats} \times 2) + (\text{top 10 mayors})}{6}
\]

\[
\text{judicial} = \frac{(\text{constitutional judges} \times 3) + (\text{high court judges} \times 2) + (\text{appeal judges})}{6}
\]

\[
\text{security} = \frac{(\text{commanders} \times 3) + (\text{mid-level officers} \times 2) + (\text{low-level officers})}{6}
\]

Based on these calculations, each country will have a weighted score for each sector ranging between 0 and 100. The sum of the weighted values for each sector then yields a single score for each country: the Women’s Power Score.

\[
\text{women’s power score} = \text{legislative} + \text{executive} + \text{judicial} + \text{security}
\]

Because the Power Score is a sum of the four sectors, a country with 100 percent women in all positions would yield a maximum score of 400.

F. Conceptual Limitations

No single model can capture all aspects of women’s political leadership. Here, we highlight some of the conceptual limitations of the model in its current form. First, although the Diamond Model is designed to capture the breadth of women’s leadership across sectors of governance, we do not capture ways that women are often segregated horizontally within a government sector.10 Even when technically at the same level or rank within a hierarchy, positions with more women tend to be less prestigious.11 The Diamond Model does not capture the extent to which women are concentrated

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10 Research demonstrates that women may work predominantly in certain types of ministries, committees, courts, and units. For example, in the legislative and executive sectors, women often work in areas related to women, youth, family, social services, education, tourism, and housing (Crage et al. 2011; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor- Robinson 2005; Krook and O’Brien 2012; Zetterberg 2008). In the judicial sector, women are often better represented in administrative high courts than other types of courts (Williams and Thames 2008). And, in the security sector, women are typically better represented in medical and administrative units, leaving combat leadership to men—often because women are prevented in many countries from serving in combat missions.

11 Workplace studies suggest not only that women more often enter less prestigious positions, but also that the feminization can lead to devaluation (e.g., Levanon, England, and Allison 2009).
into less prestigious ministries, committees, courts, or units. That is, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs receives the same weight as serving as Minister of Gender Equality.

All branches of government do not have equal power, authority, and prestige. In some systems, legislatures are little more than “rubber stamps” on executive decisions, whereas in others, the executive leader is subservient to the parliament. Some countries have strong judiciaries that serve as a check on both executive and legislative power, whereas other countries have weak judiciaries. Within the same country, the relative power of government sectors may also vary over time. Executives can take steps to expand their power or can have their power curtailed by legislative or judicial action. Ideally, we would have reliable measures of the power of different sectors to use in our model. However, such data do not exist for the countries and time points in our study.

Similarly, the importance of any single position (for example, party leader or mayor) may differ across space and time. For example, some countries have weak party systems. Tens or even hundreds of parties may contest seats in an election, limiting the power and visibility of any single organization. In some countries, disaffection with political parties may mean that many or most candidates run as independents. In such cases, women’s representation among party leaders may mean something quite different than in strong party systems.

Finally, it is important to recognize that women do not form a monolithic group. Within countries, differences such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and religion not only impact women’s identities and interests, but form intersecting social hierarchies that shape women’s access to power (Glenn 1999; McCall 2001; Thornton Dill and Zambrana 2009; Weber 2001). The Women’s Power Score considers women’s representation in leadership overall and does not unpack the ways that different groups of women may have different levels of access to or representation in political leadership.

V. PILOT STUDY

In this section we introduce the pilot study, focusing on the criteria for case selection, some of the challenges to collecting data, and concessions we made over the course of the research.

A. Sample

From all countries in the world, we used three criteria to select a sample. First, consistent with much of the cross-national research on women in politics, we restrict our analysis to countries with at least 1 million population (United Nations 2013). Second, because of USAID’s particular interest in economically developing countries, we selected countries that fall into Low, Lower-Middle, or Upper-Middle Income categories (World Bank 2013). Third, we included all countries coded as “Free” or “Partly Free” by Freedom House (2013), but chose four countries coded as “Not Free” to permit select comparisons. This yielded a group of 82 countries.

Of the 82 countries originally identified, we ultimately focused our efforts on 40 of them:

- 5 countries were selected for in-depth case research (Cambodia, Georgia, Jordan, Kenya, and Mexico);
- 25 countries that fit selection criteria and are of particular interest to USAID (Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, and Ukraine);

- 6 countries that yielded data on the security sector after an initial pass through all countries (Albania, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Niger); and

- 4 countries of interest to USAID that are not free (Algeria, Iraq, Rwanda, and Yemen).

Of these 40 countries, we ultimately were able to collect satisfactory levels of data (8 of 9 indicators for the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors) for 30 countries. See Annex 1 for the data we were able to collect across all 40 countries.

Before turning to the results from our analysis, we first report some of the challenges we faced with data collection.

**B. Data Collection Challenges**

We faced some challenges that are common in cross-national data collection efforts. First, some countries do not collect official statistics, but sources are able to produce unofficial estimates. Especially in case study countries, we include data based on estimates from knowledgeable officials. In cases where estimates conflict, we chose to take an average of the estimates we received.

Second, some indicators are slightly outdated. Although we attempted to collect data that reflected the state of the indicators between 2013 and 2014, some data reflect earlier time points. This is especially the case for judicial and military data, when we often relied on estimates from news sources or published reports. Consequently, the Women’s Power Score for one country may have up-to-date data for most indicators, but slightly outdated data (3 to 4 years old) for the security sector.

Comparability presented a particular challenge for the judicial sector. Eleven of the 40 countries do not have constitutional courts, complicating comparability across cases. Where there is only one high court that handles all appellate, administrative, and constitutional decisions, the same court counts for both the high- and mid-level measure. Another concern specific to the judiciary is that in two countries in the pilot study (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Côte d’Ivoire), measures of judges include attorney generals and other public prosecutors. To the extent that women could be represented better among lawyers than judges, the statistics for these two countries could be biased.

Challenges were most numerous in the security sector. Data on women’s integration into different police ranks are generally easier to come by than comparable data on the military. Out of the 40 countries that received the greatest attention in the pilot study, we were able to code disaggregated measures of women’s leadership in the military in just 9 countries: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Guatemala, Madagascar, Mexico, and South Africa. We had greater success with the police, obtaining data by rank for all of the above except Madagascar and Mexico, but also for Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Rwanda, bringing the total number of countries with at least one branch of security sector data to 18 (of which 14 are complete across other governance sectors).

Whereas a breakdown of all military and police ranks by sex is rarely available – at least in publically available sources – many countries do report women’s share of the total military and police. However, in many countries, women in the security sector are concentrated in low prestige administrative positions or specialized gender units, positions unlikely to provide a pipeline to
leadership. Consequently, higher numbers of women in the security sector may not mean that women are making any progress in moving up the ranks of military leadership. Take Timor-Leste as an example. In 2009, women were 10 percent of the Timor Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL), a relatively high level of women in the military compared to elsewhere in the region, but there were only 2 female officers (Myrttinen 2009).

A slightly better alternative to statistics on all military personnel is to make use of aggregate measures of women as commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). When thinking about military leadership, commissioned positions such as generals, colonels, captains, and lieutenants often come to mind. Commissioned officers are the highest ranked positions and are responsible for the planning of military actions. In some countries, however, NCOs play important roles leading “on the ground” and linking enlisted soldiers to the commissioned officer corps. Although many countries make use of the distinction between commissioned and non-commissioned officers, NCOs exercise more leadership in some countries than in others (Portillo 2014).

Even when data were available disaggregated into tiers or levels, sometimes statistics were broken down into two or four different levels, making it difficult to calculate measures for the three tiers of the DLM.

C. Moving Forward

Certainly, collecting cross-national data on women’s representation in multiple sectors and levels of governance presents numerous challenges. However, many of these challenges can be overcome. In particular, for those interested in women’s leadership in the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors, a great deal of data is publically available and can be collected with minimal resources. The security sector is a different story. Even spending time in country and tapping professional networks does not ensure access to data on the military and police broken down by rank. Moreover, the data that are more often available preclude meaningful assessment of women’s security sector leadership.

With these lessons in mind, the results from the pilot study are presented below in two parts. First, we present results from the Diamond Model as originally envisioned, drawing what conclusions we can from complete and near-complete cases (see also Annex 3). Then, we present a second set of results from a revised three sector Triangle Model, excluding the security sector (see also Annex 4).

VI. DIAMOND LEADERSHIP MODEL RESULTS

A. Example Countries: Brazil, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and South Africa

Figure 2 presents DLM results from the pilot data collection for three sample countries: Brazil, Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), and South Africa. These countries represent different geographic regions, and have dissimilar demographics and histories. They also have different patterns of women’s political leadership. For example, Brazil has the lowest share of women in the national legislature (9 percent compared to 21 percent in BiH and 41 percent in South Africa), but is the only of the three countries to have elected a female national leader (Dilma Rousseff). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Brazil, BiH, and South Africa look very different from one another when assessed using the Diamond Model.
With a combined score of 51 (gender equality = 200), Brazil scores the lowest on the four-point Diamond Model scale. Brazil’s low score is driven primarily by the low levels of women’s leadership in the legislative sector. After the 2010 elections, women led none of Brazil’s 30 or so political parties, headed only 5 percent of committees, and held just 9 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, producing a weighted legislative score (3) that is the second lowest in the pilot study (only Yemen scores lower with a 0). Women’s representation was notably better in positions appointed by Dilma Rousseff, especially among cabinet ministers (26 percent), but also among top technocrats (16 percent) and constitutional judges (16 percent). However, Brazilian women again perform poorly as mayors (0 percent) and upper-tier positions in the military and police (4 percent). Overall, aside from the low legislative leadership score, women’s incorporation across sectors in Brazil is fairly balanced, with weighted scores of 18 for executive, 18 for judicial, and 12 for security.

With a combined score of 70, BiH scores slightly better than Brazil. But unlike in Brazil, women’s political leadership across sectors in BiH is highly unbalanced. Women are very well incorporated into the judiciary – the weighted score of 46 puts women nearly at parity with men – but poorly represented in all other sectors with weighted scores of 10 or less. Women’s leadership levels are particularly low in the army and police, where women are just 3 percent of upper tier, 6 percent of middle tier, and 5 percent of lower tier officers. Despite their differences, what Brazil and BiH do share is a complete lack of women serving as party leaders or mayors of their most populous cities.

With a combined score of 108, South Africa has among the highest scores in the pilot study, setting it apart from both Brazil and BiH. South African women are best represented as top technocrats (49 percent) and national legislators (45 percent), but they are well represented too as committee heads (38 percent) and cabinet ministers (37 percent). Unlike Brazil and BiH, South Africa has female party leaders (21 percent) and mayors (20 percent). Further, women’s representation in the highest

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12 Notably, Fortaleza, the fourth largest city in Brazil, did have a female mayor (Luizianne Lins) until 2013, but her successor was a man.
tier of the security sector (16 percent) is 4 to 5 times their levels in Brazil and BiH. It is only in the judiciary that South Africa falls behind BiH. South African women are not as well represented among constitutional judges (18 percent) and high court judges (18 percent).

Overall, the cases of Brazil, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and South Africa demonstrate substantial variation in women’s political leadership in different sectors and at different levels, both within and across countries. Success in one sector does not guarantee women success in other parts of the government, and some countries are more balanced than others. The next section focuses, in particular, on the extent to which women’s leadership is spread out across sectors.

**B. The Breadth of Women’s Political Leadership**

The breadth of women’s political leadership varies across countries. On one end of the spectrum, there are countries in which women’s leadership is limited to one sector – one point on the diamond. On the other end, there are countries in which women are leading in all four sectors – four points on the diamond. Other countries fall in the middle with women leading predominantly in two or three sectors. Figure 3 summarizes these differences using seven example countries.

As discussed, women’s political leadership across sectors in Bosnia & Herzegovina is highly unbalanced; women have made substantial inroads in the judicial sector but have had much less success elsewhere. BiH women, then, have achieved one-point leadership. India shows a similar pattern, but success for Indian women is solely in the legislative sector. India’s strong showing in the legislative sector is surprising because, with only 11 percent women in the Lok Sabha, India ranked 143rd in women’s national legislative representation in 2014. However, women’s leadership of political parties (33 percent) and committee headship (18 percent) means India scored well in the legislative sector overall (24), especially relative to the other three sectors (executive = 9, judicial = 5, police = 4). Taken together, BiH and India demonstrate that women can make considerable progress in one sector while making little progress elsewhere (see Panel A of Figure 3).

In some of the pilot study countries, women are well represented in two of the four sectors: two-point leadership. Georgia and Nigeria show this pattern, scoring 20 or more in the executive and judicial sectors while scoring 10 or less in the legislative and police sectors (see Panel B of Figure 3). Interestingly, Georgia and Nigeria have a similar pattern of strengths and weaknesses across the judicial and executive sectors as well. Both have relatively high numbers of women in the judiciary (25-42 percent) and the high- and mid-level executive sector (21-25 percent), but few, if any, women mayors of populous cities (0-10 percent). Overall, Georgia and Nigeria suggest that women’s movement into leadership in some parts of the executive and judicial sectors may go hand in hand.
In a third group of countries, women’s political leadership may be more balanced across sectors (see Panel C of Figure 3). As discussed above, in Brazil women were moderately represented in the leadership of three of the four sectors (all but the legislative sector). Albania, too, achieves three-point leadership, although progress has stalled in a different place – the security sector. Compared to Brazil, Albania is perhaps even a stronger example of three-point leadership, scoring 25 percent in the executive, 23 percent in the judicial, and 18 percent in the legislative sector, but only 8 percent in the police sector.

Finally, we return to South Africa, where progress is balanced across all four sectors (see Panel D of Figure 3). Four-point leadership is possible, though apparently rare. The main obstacle to four-point leadership is the lack of women in the security sector. Out of 16 cases with complete police data, South Africa was the only country with a weighted security score above 15 percent.

13 For the seven countries shown in Figure 3, the security sector includes only data on women in the police.
C. The Security Sector: Learning from Limited Data

As discussed above, finding data by rank for the military and the police is exceedingly difficult, and in some countries, the data simply do not exist, much less sex-disaggregated data. But before we move on to a more in-depth analysis of the legislative, executive and judicial sectors, it is important to look at the sparse data we were able to collect.

First, consider women’s outcomes in the military compared to the police. Do these two branches of the security sector even belong together? Across the 7 countries with both military and police data, women are often represented in leadership at similar levels. Indeed, the weighted scores for the military and police correlate moderately well ($r = .62$) and fall within 5 points of one another in all but 1 country. Only in South Africa is there a substantial difference between women’s incorporation into military and police leadership; women are better represented in the police (weighted score = 27) than in the military (weighted score = 11). Elsewhere, although the differences between the branches are smaller, women’s progress up the ranks of the police slightly outperforms women’s progress in the military.

Second, consider variation in women’s leadership in the security sector across countries. In general, women’s progress in this sector is fairly low. Women’s share of positions in the upper ranks of the military and police only clears the 10 percent benchmark once (South Africa). Moreover, we identified countries in nearly every geographic region where women had not yet breached the highest tier of the military. Clearly, the security data show a great deal of variation across countries, variation that future research on women’s leadership could seek to explain.

Third, consider the relationship between leadership level and women’s success. Workplace research suggests that, in general, as position prestige increases, women’s representation in the position decreases (e.g., Charles and Grusky 2004). However, for the countries in the pilot study, this tenet does not always hold true. Of the 16 countries with police data, women are best represented in the lowest tier in only 8. In 6 countries, women are best represented in the middle tier, and in 2 countries, women are best represented at the top of the police hierarchy. The 8 countries with complete military data (and with women in the military) are just as inconsistent. In 4 countries, women are best represented in the lowest tier, whereas in 4 countries women are better represented in the middle or top tiers.

VII. TRIsANGLE MODEL RESULTS

Restricting our analysis to the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors allows us to present results for a larger number of countries. We break down results by sector, level, and geographic region.

A. By Governance Sector

First, we present results broken down by sector for the 25 countries with complete data. How does women’s political leadership vary across the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors? Figure 4 presents a summary through boxplots. The bulk of scores (the 25th to 75th percentiles) are

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*14 We were able to identify the highest rank women reached in the military in several countries where disaggregated data were not fully available. We assigned zeroes to the upper tier in five countries with incomplete data on women’s incorporation into lower levels of military leadership.*
displayed as the box, with the median value as the line within the box. The “whiskers” of the boxplot extend out to capture the rest of the distribution, marking the minimum and maximum values.

**FIGURE 4. VARIATION IN WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL SECTORS**

Of the legislative, executive, and judicial sector, women are best represented in judicial leadership, with executive leadership lagging slightly behind. The median score for the judicial sector (20) and executive (18) sectors are substantially higher than the legislative sector (13). However, variation in the judicial and executive sectors is also quite high. In fact, the box (the 25th to 75th percentiles) for the judicial sector is nearly twice as large as the box for the legislative sector.

Notably, most of the judicial and executive leadership positions are appointed rather than elected. Consequently, the pilot study suggests that women may be better represented in appointed positions than in elected ones.

**B. By Political System, Level of Freedom, and Income Group**

Although we do not have measures for the power or prestige of sectors across countries, we can compare results across countries with different political systems, levels of freedom, and economic development.

One way of gauging whether women are clustered in less powerful positions is to compare women’s leadership in parliamentary and presidential systems. On average, parliamentary systems to tend have stronger legislative branches, whereas presidential systems have stronger executive branches.

Table 1 reports the average weighted scores for the legislative and executive sectors for 25 of the pilot study countries by political system type. Countries are evenly split between systems; 12 countries have parliamentary, 11 have presidential, and 2 have semi-presidential. (The results exclude the two countries with semi-presidential systems.)
The findings are opposite to what was expected. Among the 25 countries, women are better represented in the legislative sector in parliamentary systems and in the executive sector in presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, women’s average legislative score is 19.2, nearly 7 points higher than their average legislative score in presidential systems. The gap in executive scores is narrower; women in presidential systems scores only average 5 points higher than women in parliamentary systems. Consequently, we do not find evidence of women’s leadership clustering in less powerful parts of government.

Another way to evaluate the power or prestige of political positions is to consider variation in women’s leadership by level of democracy. Generally, we can expect political leaders in most sectors of government to have greater authority in freer societies. At the same time, women’s numerical leadership may be higher in less democratic contexts. One example that fits this pattern is Rwanda, classified as Not Free (Freedom House 2013). Are women generally better represented in governments that are Not Free? Table 2, which presents variation in women’s leadership by sector in Free, Partly Free, and Not Free countries, shows that a lack of freedom does not necessarily lead to high levels of women leaders.

Although only 4 of the 25 countries are Not Free (Cambodia, Iraq, Rwanda, and Yemen), we can see that a lack of freedom is not universally good for women. Women are best represented in the legislative and executive sector in Free countries (mean weighted index score = 16.8 and 22.0, respectively), and women are best represented in the judicial sector in Partly Free countries (mean weighted index score = 21.7). Overall, however, the dominance of Partly Free countries in the Pilot Study makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between level of democracy and women’s political leadership across governance sectors.

### TABLE I. AVERAGE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE SCORES BY TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=12</td>
<td>N=11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Score</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.7)</td>
<td>(7.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Score</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.5)</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Scores are weighted index means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
A third way to think about the power of political positions across countries is to think about economic development. Political leadership in wealthier countries may come with greater control over economic resources. But for countries that have less wealth, foreign aid may be a powerful force for political change for women (Bush 2011). Table 3 summarizes variation in women’s leadership by sector in Lower Income, Lower-Middle Income, and Upper-Middle Income Countries (World Bank 2013).

Generally, women are better represented in leadership at lower levels of economic development. Lower Income countries have the highest levels of women’s leadership across all three sectors. The largest gaps across income level are in the legislative sector, where Lower Income countries score between 5 and 6 points higher than Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle countries. On the whole, the scores of Lower-Middle Income and Upper-Middle Income countries are fairly similar.

### TABLE 3. WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL SECTORS BY INCOME LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Lower-Middle</th>
<th>Upper-Middle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td>N=10</td>
<td>N=9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Score</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.5)</td>
<td>(6.9)</td>
<td>(8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Score</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.8)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Score</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.4)</td>
<td>(11.9)</td>
<td>(13.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Scores are weighted index means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
C. By Level of Political Leadership

In a different test of women’s access to more powerful and prestigious positions, we present results broken down by level or tier. We average women’s representation in all high-, mid-, and low-level positions across the legislative, executive, and judicial sectors, and we present the results in Figure 5. These results are for the 30-country sample.

**FIGURE 5. VARIATION IN WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION AT HIGH, MID AND LOW LEVELS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

![Bar chart showing variation in women's representation at high, mid, and low levels of political leadership.](image)

Figure 5 shows that women are not segregated into lower tier leadership positions. In fact, women are best represented in the middle tier leadership positions, averaging 19 percent. Representation in the upper and lower tiers is slightly lower, at 15 percent and 17 percent respectively.

We can also unpack these averages to consider women’s representation by indicator. Figure 6 displays the average share of women in each position across 30 of the pilot study countries.

**FIGURE 6. VARIATION IN WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION BY INDICATOR**

![Bar chart showing variation in women's representation by indicator.](image)

Averages aside, women’s political leadership is likely to vary considerably across countries.
D. Geographical Variation

We also are able to evaluate variation by geographic region. Figure 7 visually depicts variation in the Women’s Power Score across 25 countries with complete legislative, executive, and judicial data – the triangle model (see Annex 4 for a breakdown of each country’s score by sector). With three sectors considered, the maximum possible score is a 300; if women achieved equal representation with men on all indicators, the country would have a score of 150. In the figure, darker colors are associated with higher levels of women’s political leadership, whereas women are represented at lower levels in countries with lighter colors.

**FIGURE 7. TRIANGLE MODEL: WOMEN’S LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN 25 COUNTRIES**

Figure 7 shows that there is a great deal of variation in women’s political leadership both across and within geographic regions. Women appear to be best represented in sub-Saharan Africa: Liberia, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa all receive high scores, and none of the 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa score below a 50. On the other side of the spectrum, women are not well represented in political leadership in the Middle East. Lebanon, Iraq, and Lebanon all earn low scores. Latin America and Eastern Europe fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico; and Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Georgia all score between 50 and 75, whereas Brazil and Ukraine score slightly lower. Most countries in Asia score on the low end of the spectrum. Only in the Philippines are women represented in leadership at more moderate levels.
E. Comparison to Existing Measures

Our final set of results compares the three-point Women’s Power Score to other indexes that measure progress towards gender equality. Although we expect the WPS to correlate with other composite indexes of gender equality, we also anticipate key differences. Several of the existing global gender indexes are conceptually different because they include measures of education, health, and the labor force. Further, existing global indexes that include politics either exclusively measure women’s legislative representation (e.g., the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index) or also measure women’s executive leadership (e.g., the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index).

Figure 8 presents six scatterplots comparing the Women’s Power Score to established measures of women’s empowerment. In each scatterplot, the Power Score appears on the x-axis, and the other measures appear on the y-axis. The dots represent countries that appear in both sets of data. The top row compares the Women’s Power Score to broader indexes of women’s empowerment: A) Gender Inequality Index, B) Gender Equity Index, and C) Global Gender Gap Index. The bottom row compares the Women’s Power Score to measures of women’s empowerment in politics: D) Women Empowerment from the Gender Equity Index, E) Political Empowerment from the Global Gender Gap Index, and F) percent women in the national legislature. The scatterplots are arranged from the weakest to the strongest relationships on each row.

Panel A compares the Women’s Power Score to the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which is designed to measure the “combined loss to achievements in reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participation due to gender inequalities” (UNDP 2013). The GII has five indicators, one of which is women’s legislative representation. We would expect the women’s power score to be negatively related to gender inequality more broadly, and that is indeed what we find. However, the correlation coefficient of -.18 shows the relationship is fairly weak.15

Panel B compares the Women’s Power Score to the Gender Empowerment Index (GEI), which uses 11 indicators designed to capture progress towards gender equality across three dimensions: education, the economy, and political empowerment (Social Watch 2012). The GEI uses two of the same indicators as the Women’s Power Score: percentage of women in the national legislature and percentage of women cabinet ministers. It is not surprising, then, that the relationship between the measures is slightly higher: .48. This is a moderate correlation but still shows that the GEI and the women’s power score are distinct measures.

Panel C compares the Women’s Power Score to the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), which measures proximity to gender inequality across four dimensions: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment (World Economic Forum 2014). The political sub-index includes three components: the ratio of women to men in minister-level positions, the ratio of women to men in parliamentary positions, and the ratio of women’s to men’s years as prime minister or president during the last 50 years. Higher GGGI scores indicate lower gaps in gender equality. The correlation coefficient of .68 is in the expected direction, and the relationship here is the strongest of the broader measures of women’s empowerment. Still, the correlation is only moderately strong. Overall, women’s political leadership appears to capture something distinct from these broader measures of women’s status in society.

15 Correlation coefficients range from -1 for a strong negative association to 1 for a strong positive association, where 0 indicates no relationship between the measures whatsoever.
FIGURE 8. SCATTERPLOTS COMPARING THE TRIANGLE MODEL WOMEN’S POWER SCORE TO OTHER MEASURES OF WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

A. Gender Inequality Index (UNDP 2013)  
B. Gender Equity Index (Social Watch 2012)  
C. Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum 2014)

D. Women’s Empowerment Dimension (Social Watch 2014)  
E. Political Empowerment Sub-index (World Economic Forum 2014)  
F. Women in the Legislature (IPU 2014)
Next, we turn to narrower measures of women’s empowerment, which we might expect to more strongly relate to the WPS. Panel D compares the Women’s Power Score to the Women’s Empowerment Dimension of the GEI (Social Watch 2012). In addition to the two common indicators shared with the WPS – women as national legislators and ministers – GEI Empowerment includes measures of women as senior officials and managers and women as professional and technical workers. By looking at highly qualified jobs outside of politics, the GEI Empowerment score is again conceptually distinct from the WPS. But, the correlation is moderately strong at .46.

Panel E compares the Women’s Power Score to the Political Empowerment Sub-Index of the GGGI. As noted above, the political dimension of the GGGI includes one type of political leadership not measured by the Women’s Power Score – women’s national leadership as president or prime minister. It is interesting that the correlation between the WPS and the Political Power Sub-Index is a bit lower (.48) than the correlation involving the broader GGGI measure (.68). This comparison suggests that the Women’s Power Score is distinct from even other measures of women’s political empowerment.

Panel F compares the Women’s Power Score to the most commonly used measure of women’s political leadership: women’s share of seats in the national legislature. The correlation of .71 is positive and moderately strong. However, the two countries that score high on both measures, Rwanda and South Africa, are quite influential. Excluding these two cases brings the correlation down to a much more modest .45. This means that for those countries that score in the low or middle range on the Women’s Power Score, women’s legislative representation does not predict their score very well. Statistically speaking, once we exclude Rwanda and South Africa, women’s legislative representation explains only 20 percent in the variation in the Women’s Power Score.

In sum, the scatterplots suggest that the Women’s Power Score is related to existing measures of women’s empowerment in expected ways. As the GII decreases and as the GGGI, GEI, and women’s legislative representation increases, the Women’s Power Score increases. At the same time, however, the relationships we observe here are weak to moderate. The WPS appears to be capturing something that is not very well captured by other composite measures – general or political. By going beyond legislative and executive representation and by looking across multiple levels of leadership, the WPS offers something new to the study of women’s empowerment.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

Researchers and advocates interested in the rights, status, and outcomes of women around the world have many global measures on which to rely. Major publically available databanks hosted by international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization collectively house hundreds of indicators of women’s health, education, and workforce outcomes. This wealth of data has generated an enormous body of research on gender inequality and women’s empowerment. For those interested in inequality and empowerment in politics, however, there are just a handful of indicators. Of these, only one is both reliably collected and available for nearly every country in the world each year: the share of women in the national legislature.

There is more to women’s political empowerment than women’s legislative representation. In this report, we have introduced a new model of women’s political leadership called the Diamond Leadership Model. By including measures of women’s leadership in the legislative, executive,
judicial, and security sectors and by looking across levels within each sector, the DLM stands to provide the most inclusive conceptualization of women’s political leadership to date.

The pilot test of the DLM shows that it is relatively straightforward to collect data on women’s leadership across a much broader range of indicators that are currently available today. By focusing on some of the lowest income countries – arguably those where data is likely to be the most difficult to collect – the pilot study shows that collecting broader data on women in political across countries is feasible. In particular, measures of women’s share of party leadership, legislative committee headship, sub-ministerial positions, constitutional, and high courts are relatively easy to collect from government websites and news reports.

The pilot study also shows that there is much to learn about women’s political empowerment when we take a broader perspective. Across the 30 countries for which we collected adequate levels of data, women’s representation across sectors is often highly uneven. Women are best represented in the judiciary, suggesting women may be better incorporated into appointed leadership positions than they are into elected leadership positions. The results do not suggest, however, that women are concentrated in the least prestigious positions. Of the 12 indicators of the Diamond Leadership Model, women are best represented among appellate judges and worst among party leaders and mayors.

The particularly low performance of women among mayors suggests that more must be done to understand women’s representation in local government, particularly in the executive. Existing studies of women’s political outcomes at the local level – like at the national level – tend to focus on legislatures. We know much less about the factors that facilitate and impede women’s election or appointment to municipal executive leadership.

This study also lends credence to recent research pointing to the role that foreign aid can play in promoting women’s leadership. The poorest countries – those most in need of foreign assistance – have incorporated women into leadership in the highest numbers. That women’s representation is highest in Lower Income Countries across all three sectors of governance is an initial finding that warrants further review.

This study reveals just how difficult it is to find consistent and comparable data on women’s inclusion into the security sector. Searching for data online, contacting global partners and regional experts, and deploying in-country research teams did not produce quality and comparable data on the security sector. Although data on the police are generally easier to obtain than data on the military, statistics are most often only available in the aggregate (percent women police, percent women in the army, etc.). Without data disaggregated by leadership level, it is impossible to assess the degree to which women remain segregated at the bottom of the security sector hierarchy. Collective effort will be required to convince governments to collect data on women’s representation in their police forces and militaries and to make that data available publically.
IX. REFERENCES


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1. Haiti has no military.
* included in 30 country sample (most analyses in report)
^ included in 25 country sample (triangle model analysis)
ANNEX 2. WEIGHTED SECTOR SCORES AND WOMEN’S POWER SCORE BY COUNTRY

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* included in 30 country sample (most analyses in report)
^ included in 25 country sample (triangle model analysis)
ANNEX 3. DIAMOND LEADERSHIP MODEL FOR 14 COUNTRIES

A. 7 Countries with Complete Data (Including Security Sector)
B. 7 Countries Missing Only Police or Military Data

Mexico (55)

Bangladesh (37)

India (43)

Kenya (83)

Indonesia (42)

Nigeria (57)

Rwanda (121)
ANNEX 4. TRIANGLE LEADERSHIP MODEL FOR 25 COUNTRIES

A. Asia & the Pacific

- Bangladesh (32)
- Cambodia (37)
- Indonesia (35)
- India (39)
- Nepal (35)
- Philippines (72)
- Thailand (17)
B. Eastern Europe

Albania (66)  
Bosnia & Herzegovina (66)  
Georgia (63)  
Ukraine (46)

C. Latin America

Brazil (39)  
Colombia (61)  
Guatemala (59)  
Mexico (52)
D. Middle East and North Africa

E. Sub-Saharan Africa