The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index
For Sub-Saharan Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Bureau for Africa
Office of Sustainable Development
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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the sixth edition of the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for Sub-Saharan Africa. This year’s Index covers civil society organizations (CSOs) in twenty-five countries across Sub-Saharan Africa. It addresses both advances and setbacks in seven key components or “dimensions” of the sustainability of the civil society sector: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image.

The Index’s methodology relies on the knowledge of CSO practitioners and researchers, who in each country form an expert panel to assess and rate these dimensions of CSO sustainability during the year. The panel agrees on a score for each dimension, which can range from 1 (most developed) to 7 (most challenged). All of the scores are then averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector of a given country. An editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards so as to allow cross-country comparisons. The Index groups all scores into three overarching categories—Sustainability Enhanced (scores from 1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7). Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The Index is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability in the CSO sector. The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements similar publications covering other regions, which include reports on twenty-nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, seven countries in the Middle East and North Africa, seven countries in Asia, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. These various editions of the CSO Sustainability Index bring to seventy the total number of countries surveyed.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are grateful to the Aga Khan Foundation, which supported the assessments of Kenya and Mali, and the implementing partners, who played the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would also like to thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this index is based.

1 The CSO Sustainability Index for Afghanistan and CSO Sustainability Index for Pakistan are made possible by the support of the Aga Khan Foundation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa offers a snapshot of seven key dimensions of the CSO sectors in twenty-five countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In many ways, the country reports reflect larger developments in the countries surveyed and across a continent experiencing great political and economic change. As CSOs pushed for citizens’ rights and provided essential services to needy populations in 2014, they responded to shifting political, economic, and social contexts that tested the strength of the CSO sector and suggested avenues for its future development.

Among the contextual issues affecting CSO performance in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, the following common themes stand out.

- **Armed conflict.** Several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be wracked by violence, terrorism, or civil war in 2014. For example, in Sudan, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced as hopes of a breakthrough in political negotiations between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) were dashed and armed conflict resumed in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan. A dire humanitarian crisis affecting more than five million people emerged in South Sudan in the wake of an extended clash between rival political and ethnic factions that broke out in December 2013. In Nigeria, Boko Haram militants abducted more than 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, while in Kenya, more than 130 people were killed in terrorist attacks, and clashes between separatists and government troops resumed in the northern regions of Mali. These and other conflicts killed or maimed thousands of people and caused extreme suffering for millions more. Yet precisely as the need for their services was most acute, CSOs sometimes found it difficult to reach affected populations because of the violence, government restrictions on movement and other freedoms, and direct threats to CSO workers.

- **Human rights.** In 2014 the space for the exercise of civic freedoms contracted in a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Uganda, a retrogressive Anti-Homosexuality Bill was signed into law and later struck down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was passed illegally without a quorum. Ethiopian journalists and opposition leaders were arrested on allegations of involvement with terrorist groups and a large number of CSOs were shut down. The National Legislative Assembly of South Sudan passed a new security bill that gives the National Security Services sweeping powers to arrest and detain suspects without warrants. In The Gambia, there were instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture of individuals with politically divergent views while amendments to the Criminal Code put heavy sentences on “aggravated homosexuality.” In Rwanda, politically motivated arrests and disappearances were reported. These and similar developments in other countries discouraged the free expression of dissident opinions and created a climate of fear and self-censorship among CSOs.

- **Elections.** National and local elections that took place throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 provided an important focal point for advocacy organizations and their activities. South African human rights and civic organizations worked with the electoral commission to plan local campaigns for voter information, registration, education, and election monitoring. A key element of these campaigns was the engagement of unemployed youth in the electoral process. In Uganda, CSOs launched the Free and Fair Elections campaign to provide an opportunity for citizens to deliberate on a wide range of constitutional and electoral reforms in the run-up to the 2016 national elections. In Mozambique, the Txeka project brought together activists during the election who sent in updates about the voting process using cell phones and the Internet. Their involvement helped identify hotspots such as voting stations that had not opened or were not functioning in accordance with the
In Tanzania, CSOs implemented voter education programs and facilitated the involvement of citizens as candidates for various positions in local government elections.

- **The Ebola epidemic.** A single case of the Ebola virus reported in Guinea in December 2013 quickly developed into the largest outbreak of the disease in history. As Ebola spread to surrounding countries, Sierra Leone and Liberia were especially hard hit. More than 27,000 cases and 11,000 deaths were recorded in those three countries alone by the time the epidemic subsided in mid-2015. As the disease spread, it quickly overwhelmed local health care capacity. Although the international community was initially slow to recognize the severity of the outbreak, it eventually responded with large infusions of equipment, medication, funding, and personnel. Local CSOs played an important supporting role in the Ebola response. In Liberia, service-providing CSOs served as conduits of information, food, and other necessities to local communities, while in Sierra Leone, advocacy CSOs conducted sensitization, disease detection, and contact-tracing campaigns. In Guinea, community-based rapid intervention groups composed of CSOs and other stakeholders conducted more than 20,000 information sessions and distributed soaps and disinfectants. At the same time, normal CSO operations in these countries were hampered temporarily by the diversion of funding or restrictions on mobility and group activities.

- **Economic transition.** The lingering effects of the 2007-2008 global economic crisis, coupled with reductions in donor funding and declining oil revenues, contributed to the spread of poverty in many countries. Rwanda and Sudan felt the pinch of international sanctions, while Angola and Nigeria suffered from the contraction of the international oil market. Residents of Ghana and The Gambia were squeezed by a rapid growth in the cost of living, while populations in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Angola experienced yet another year of economic decline. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea were devastated by the Ebola crisis, which interrupted business and killed thousands of the working-age population. These and other economic pressures intensified at the same time that many donors continued to downsize their programs in the region. As a result, CSOs in nearly all countries reported dwindling funding for their activities, and many organizations had to cut programming or even close their doors.

The overall sustainability of the majority of CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa fell within the Sustainability Evolving category in 2014. While no country transitioned to a different category of sustainability during the year, seven of the twenty-five countries surveyed reported changes in their overall sustainability scores. On the positive side, the viability of CSO sectors in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, and Uganda improved in the face of pervasive economic and political challenges. Ugandan CSOs showed increasing skill at advocacy as they successfully challenged the Anti-Homosexuality Law and launched the Free and Fair Elections campaign. Their financial viability also improved as funding from development partners at the sub-national level increased and some organizations initiated effective revenue-generating activities. In Ghana, advocacy was also particularly strong. CSOs formed a coalition that called on the government to make the process of applying for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout more transparent, and a new type of advocacy group, Occupy Ghana, emerged to carry out protest marches focused on the energy crisis, corruption, public accountability, and the government’s management of the economy. In Ethiopia, where the environment for human rights and advocacy CSOs is particularly difficult, parliament amended the so-called 30/70 rule to re-categorize some expenses as project costs, thus freeing up funds for core administrative expenses, which cannot amount to more than 30 percent of an organization’s overall budget. CSOs perceived this amendment as a positive development. Malian CSOs enjoyed an improved public image thanks to their visibility and constructive contributions during the Algiers negotiations, a process for achieving peace and reconciliation between the government and armed groups in the north of the country.
On the other hand, the CSO sectors in Rwanda, Senegal, and South Sudan experienced a decline in overall sustainability in 2014, largely because of growing political and economic pressures. Rwandan CSOs grappled with constrictions in their operating environment as well as decreased funding and the take-over of some dynamic organizations by pro-government groups. In Senegal, consultations between the government and CSOs on the legal framework broke down and reform of the law governing CSOs continued without CSO involvement. In South Sudan, a brutal civil war led to suppressed freedoms and heavy-handed government interference. Taken together, these developments were enough to damage the overall outlook for CSOs in these countries.

Data about the size of the CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa is incomplete. In many countries, official information about the number of registered entities is unreliable, contradictory, or spotty. In South Africa, for example, the number of voluntary associations is made public by registering authorities, but the number of nonprofit companies and trusts is not. Other governments release data on the number of registered organizations without indicating how many of these organizations are still active. In some countries, such as Sudan, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, official information about the number of CSOs is simply not available. While non-governmental entities may seek to estimate the size of the sector, the lack of concrete information makes accurate assessments of the sector’s impact difficult and impedes a systematic, holistic approach to its development.

Despite the lack of exact information, South Africa’s sector is clearly the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 130,000 voluntary organizations registered in 2014. Nigeria also has a very large CSO sector, with 70,000 organizations, while Angola and South Sudan have the smallest CSO sectors, with well below 500 organizations reported in each country. The number of CSOs grew most rapidly during 2014 in South Africa and Liberia, although it is too early to tell whether Liberia’s growth was due more to easier registration or increased funding from the Ebola response. South Sudan was the only country that recorded negative growth in 2014, as a result of the intense violence that broke out in that country at the end of 2013.

Legal Environment

In 2014 the legal environment was one of the most dynamic dimensions of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also one of its weakest. About half of surveyed countries recorded a change in the legal environment in 2014, with the overwhelming majority of changes negative. Thirteen countries were in the Sustainability Impeded category and four more countries were on its threshold. South Africa, Botswana, and Ghana reported the strongest scores in this dimension, largely thanks to straightforward registration procedures and a relative lack of state interference.

The two issues most frequently raised regarding the legal environment in 2014 were the restructuring of legal frameworks and state-sponsored harassment and intimidation. On the legislative front, some developments were positive. For example, in Guinea, CSOs were better able to acquire and administer certain goods and property, while in Botswana, the Legal Practitioners Act was reformed to allow CSOs to employ their own lawyers to offer legal aid services. However, in a number of countries CSOs experienced a frustrating lack of
progress on legislation geared to facilitate their operations or faced legislation that would actually make their operations more difficult. Kenya reported that the Public Benefit Organization Act, which was signed into law in January 2013 to give CSOs a more enabling environment, still was not implemented in 2014. The CSO community in The Gambia has sought for several years to transform the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Decree 81 into an act of parliament with its most draconian provisions removed, but draft legislation has yet to be brought before the National Assembly to be passed into law. In Senegal, consultations between the government and CSOs on a new legal framework broke down, and the draft law was completed by the administration without CSO participation. The draft legislation represents a possible threat to the existence of local CSOs—for example, by stipulating that they will cease to exist if they do not have an approved investment program. In South Sudan, public discussion of troubling new legislation to govern CSOs was suspended, and at the end of the year CSOs still did not know whether their comments had been incorporated into the bill.

State harassment, particularly against advocacy organizations, worsened in some half-dozen countries in 2014. In Sudan, the National Intelligence and Security Service intensified attacks on CSOs with raids, closures, and seizure of assets, while in South Sudan, CSOs active in human rights were subject to heavy-handed state interference, such as the detention of staff and confiscation of computers. In Burundi, a law on public assemblies enacted in December 2013 was used to prevent or break up rallies and demonstrations, and CSOs were accused of supporting the opposition. CSOs in Kenya contended with a new wave of warnings, arrests, and unannounced visits from government officials, while in Rwanda, several CSOs were illegally taken over by pro-government leadership. In Zambia, forty-two activists from ActionAid were arrested and beaten for wearing t-shirts that called on the government to release the draft constitution. Human rights, governance, and other advocacy CSOs in Uganda and Zimbabwe also reported varying forms of state harassment in 2014, including threats, inspections, and arrests. A number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa reported that CSOs practice self-censorship to avoid confrontation with state authorities.

In most countries the registration of CSOs remained slow and laborious. Zambia reported that registration is one of the most difficult issues facing the sector because of confusing procedures and competing registration authorities. Similarly burdensome registration processes for CSOs were common in other countries, including Rwanda, Mozambique, and Sudan. Only South Africa, Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone reported that CSO registration is a fairly straightforward process.

Organizational Capacity

The organizational capacity of CSOs remained stable in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014. Only three countries—Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Sudan—reported changes in this dimension during the year. In all three countries the change was in a negative direction and was tied to struggles with financial viability and, in South Sudan, the ongoing violence.
Attracting and retaining qualified staff was one of the greatest capacity challenges throughout the region in 2014. Although CSOs in some countries, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, have traditionally been regarded as attractive employers, decreased funding and improved employment conditions in other sectors drew away competent professionals in 2014. In South Africa, organizations engaged more part-time consultants rather than full-time staff, with the result that former staff members increasingly worked as consultants. In every country, most CSOs, other than a handful of large, well-funded organizations, find it difficult to afford to hire specialists in accounting, information technology, and other specialties. Guinea and Burundi reported that most CSOs rely on volunteer staff because of a lack of funding. Volunteerism is fairly common in some other countries as well, including The Gambia, Gabon, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Tanzania. But it is not well developed in most countries in the region, with the result that when they are not able to hire staff, CSOs may struggle to keep their doors open.

Nearly all countries reported that CSOs at the national level have strategic plans. But often these plans are required for registration or donor funding and are not well implemented, especially if dwindling resources push organizations to seek funding outside of their stated purpose. For example, in Nigeria, many CSOs at the state and local levels began to pursue donor-driven opportunities outside of their core missions, and in Rwanda, larger organizations were unable to implement strategic plans because of financial constraints and changes in donor priorities.

Weak boards are still a challenge facing CSOs throughout the region. Although in many countries organizations are required by law to have constitutions with written management structures, no country in Sub-Saharan Africa reported the existence of a strong internal governance culture. Zimbabwe’s experience is typical: most CSOs are ostensibly led by some variant of a governing body, but there is a lack of understanding of board and management roles, resulting in poor leadership and weak internal controls. To help address CSOs’ weakness in governance, the New African Research and Development Agency (NARDA) in Liberia worked with its members to clarify board roles and address other governance issues. In Zambia, codes of conduct and written operational procedures are becoming more common as CSOs are increasingly eager to demonstrate that they can self-regulate in place of government control.

Financial Viability

In 2014 financial viability remained the weakest category of CSO sustainability. About three-quarters of surveyed countries fell within the Sustainability Impeded category. Although only Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, and Sudan reported an active deterioration in this dimension during the year, significant structural shifts were evident that pose tremendous challenges for African CSOs, especially smaller organizations.

International donors are the most important source of financial support in all surveyed countries except for Angola, and nearly all countries reported that donor funding has decreased or remained stagnant in recent
Financial Viability

Years. Many countries reported that major donors are drawing back from supporting CSOs directly. For example, in Rwanda, donors are increasingly working through government institutions, and CSOs active in areas that are not government priorities, such as advocacy, have trouble tapping into funds. Ethiopian CSOs reported that regulatory restrictions on mobilizing and utilizing foreign funding, along with a tendency among donors to channel funds to organizations from their own countries, limited the funding available for domestic CSOs during the year.

In Mozambique, donors increasingly channel their funds through civil society support mechanisms and international organizations, with the result that funding reached a smaller number of CSOs in 2014, and those that received funding tended to be larger national organizations. Similarly, in Nigeria, many donors use funding baskets, which can be hard for smaller, local CSOs to access.

Moreover, local sources of funding are usually rare. Very few countries, including South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania, reported that CSOs receive significant amounts of funding from their governments, even as donors increasingly prefer to channel development assistance through governments. Across the region, corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs are modest. Although income-generating activities are legal in many countries surveyed, administrative requirements, a lack of know-how, or limited resources usually pose hurdles that keep them from being a significant source of sustenance for most organizations.

Nevertheless, in some countries CSOs are successfully exploiting new and innovative sources of financial support. For example, in Uganda—the only country that reported an improvement in financial viability in 2014—local fundraising is on the upswing. A notable instance of successful fundraising is FIDA-Uganda’s Fund a Woman, Fund a Child program, to which Ugandans can contribute monthly. In Zimbabwe, Magamba Activist Network stages hip-hop, comedy, and spoken word events on a commercial basis, while in Ghana, some community-based organizations (CBOs) have established fee-charging private schools to support their activities.

As in previous years, financial management systems are weak. Most countries report that organizations having sound financial management systems or issuing financial reports do so because donors require them and in some cases help institute them. In a vicious circle, smaller and local CSO do not have the capacity to institutionalize best practices, which can limit their eligibility for donor funds. However, steps are being taken to address this deficit in several countries. For example, in Zimbabwe, smaller CSOs that do not have sufficient expertise to meet donor requirements can be mentored by bigger organizations, and in Nigeria, large national CSOs continued intensive efforts to provide financial management training to local CSOs.

Advocacy

Advocacy was the most dynamic dimension of CSO sustainability in 2014, and along with service provision, was also the strongest dimension in the region. During the year close to half of the countries surveyed—more than in any other dimension—improved their advocacy performance. This record suggests the degree to which advocacy is a fundamental strength of Sub-Saharan African CSOs. All but four countries were ranked as Sustainability Evolving, with the rest falling into the Sustainability Impeded category.
Across the region there were numerous instances of effective advocacy and lobbying to address some of the region’s most pressing issues. In Liberia, the response to the Ebola epidemic provided an exceptionally good example of cooperation between the government and CSOs. All aspects of planning and management of the crisis were undertaken jointly, and CSOs were members of the highest decision-making body in the Ebola crisis. In Nigeria, the #BringBackOurGirls campaign organized rallies to protest the government's slow response to the abduction of more than 200 girls by Boko Haram. The campaign prompted the government to establish an information center to inform the public about its efforts to deal with the crisis. In Uganda, Chapter Four Uganda and other civil liberties advocates successfully challenged the Anti-Homosexuality Act, and the Constitutional Court struck down the law in August. In Mali, CSOs supported by many other segments of society organized a march calling for the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity and stability. In Zambia, CSO coalitions had a tremendous impact on the constitutional process as they successfully pushed for the release of the draft constitution. And in Ghana, a new type of advocacy took place as largely middle-income citizens came together in Occupy Ghana, which focused on public accountability and eventually led to government investigations of payroll fraud.

A number of countries also reported the development of increasingly productive mechanisms for CSO-government cooperation. For example, in Uganda, the government convened meetings with CSOs on oil and gas and the national ID process, while in Nigeria, public-private dialogues brought together CSOs and government to discuss the 2015 general elections, the national budget, and national security. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), communication between the government and civil society actors improved as CSOs were consulted during the development of the national budget, took part in thematic groups addressing a wide-range of issues, and launched several new advocacy campaigns, including an initiative to revise the Mining and Family Codes.

But elsewhere, mechanisms for CSO-government cooperation did not always function effectively, often because of governmental neglect or resistance. For example, in Rwanda, one of only two countries that reported a decline in advocacy in 2014 (the other was South Sudan), the Joint Action Development Forum, which ostensibly enables CSOs to participate in the planning and monitoring of district development plans, suffered from a lack of institutional support from the government. Similarly in Mozambique, most provincial development observatories still do not serve as effective mechanisms for CSO engagement. In The Gambia, the government invites CSOs to take part in policy forums to meet donor demands or its own guidelines but rarely considers issues raised by CSOs.

In other countries in the region, governments sought more actively to constrict the space for CSO engagement in advocacy. One of the most dire situations was in Ethiopia, where the small human rights sub-sector was increasingly marginalized in the face of legal curtailment of its activities and funding. In Rwanda, ministries impeded the publication of CSO findings on such issues as detention centers and human rights abuses. Even in Kenya, which has one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s highest rankings in advocacy, CSOs felt that...
the space for advocacy shrank in 2014 as some organizations received warnings not to push for increased government transparency and accountability and, at the county level, some government leaders sought to dictate the terms on which CSOs could work. However, it is worth noting that advocacy organizations in Sudan, where, despite government repression, CSOs—some of them unregistered or supported by groups working from outside of the country—were able to implement campaigns on human rights and the alignment of legislation with the constitution.

**Service Provision**

CSOs throughout Sub-Saharan Africa perform a vital function in providing services and materials to needy populations. In most countries—including wealthier countries such as South Africa—CSO activities fill in the gaps in government services, while in countries beset by extreme poverty or violence, such as South Sudan, they may take the place of them.

Throughout the region CSOs’ performance in service provision was remarkably stable in 2014, despite widespread funding declines. In some countries service provision is expanding to include non-traditional areas, such as mediation or social monitoring. For example, in Tanzania in 2014, the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) introduced a program in peace maintenance and conflict resolution to help CSOs address growing conflicts between communities, investors, farmers, and pastoralists. During the Ebola outbreak, CSOs and CBOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone conducted sensitization programs, helped with burial management, and distributed food to quarantined homes and vulnerable groups. Notably, in Liberia, the Ebola crisis revealed a major weakness in the country’s delivery of social services, and CSOs began working with the Ministry of Health to review the national health policy.

Armed conflict and violence prevented CSOs from serving some of the neediest populations in 2014 even while the need for those services intensified. Many CSOs in the northeast part of Nigeria could not operate because of security concerns, and in Mozambique, some community-based programs in areas affected by hostilities fueled by the elections were unable to provide needed services because their target groups feared instability and fled.

In contrast to the varied attitudes of authorities towards advocacy organizations, nearly all surveyed countries reported that governments generally recognize and approve of CSOs’ service-providing role. Nevertheless, the authorities rarely provide support for this purpose, and services are usually funded by international organizations instead. CSOs do not normally attempt to recoup costs by charging fees, even if it is legally permissible, either because licenses are difficult to obtain, internal management systems are not adequate to the task, international donors or the indigenous nonprofit culture do not support an income-generating approach, or beneficiaries of their programs cannot afford to pay fees.
Infrastructure

After financial viability and the legal environment, the infrastructure serving CSOs was the weakest dimension of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014. Little change was recorded in this dimension during the year, largely because minimal new funding was available for this purpose. However, a handful of moderately successful programs continued to provide modest support to the region’s CSO infrastructure.

The Gambia and Tanzania are among the few countries with a robust network of resource centers providing CSOs with information and technical assistance, usually with funding from donors. In other countries, small resource centers exist but usually provide limited services and often are not heavily used.

Local grantmaking organizations are uncommon in Sub-Saharan Africa. An exception is South Africa, where local grantmakers have long operated. Recently these grantmakers were perceived to lack a sustainable strategic thrust. To address this deficiency and allow CSOs to communicate directly with funders, the Tipfuxeni Project was launched in September 2014. In other countries, including Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, international donors support local grantmaking organizations. In Sierra Leone, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) has been a valuable grantmaking source since its local office opened in 2009.

CSO coalitions exist in many countries, especially where donors or a strong national umbrella group (such as the Association of Non-Governmental Organizations [TANGO] in The Gambia) support them. However, these coalitions often do not function effectively because of a lack of resources, management problems, and competition or indifference among members. Guinea is one of the few countries that reported improved cooperation among CSOs in 2014. In particular, trade unions in that country were increasingly effective at advancing common platforms during the year.

Many countries reported that the majority of international donors are reluctant to provide direct funding to CSOs for capacity-building support. Nevertheless, local training is usually available, although not always in local languages or outside of larger cities. Nigeria, The Gambia, and Tanzania reported particularly robust training programs.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs, government, and business are generally not strong. However, Sierra Leone reports that intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the government are extensive and in many instances represent genuine cooperation. In Ghana, CSO-media relationships are particularly fruitful, with CSOs jointly organizing public advocacy activities and live broadcasts with major media houses. The Mozambican business sector and CSOs grew closer during the year as they formed partnerships to compete for donor funds, while in Nigeria, several CSOs formed partnerships with professional associations to offer capacity-building services. Congolese CSOs are developing more public-private partnerships with local businesses, the government, and media to attain common objectives in areas such as women’s leadership and education.
In most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, CSO activities are newsworthy, and many organizations enjoy positive relations with the media. For example, Gambian CSOs enjoyed favorable media coverage from both public and private media in 2014 as they gave interviews and organized press conferences and visits to project sites for journalists. CSOs continued to use the media to advertise job vacancies, report on training workshops and annual general meetings, launch new projects, and issue press releases. State media can be unfriendly in countries where governments are hostile to or suspicious of CSOs, especially advocacy organizations. Governments in Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda, for example, seem to have an ambivalent attitude towards the CSO sector, appreciating and even publicly praising the work of service-providing organizations while castigating some advocacy CSOs as partisan or unpatriotic.

In many countries CSOs’ relationships with businesses are not strong, and the private sector can take a cautious approach to cooperating with CSOs. For example, in Zimbabwe, businesses are afraid of government reprisals if they support “anti-government” organizations, and in Zambia, companies are wary of cooperating with CSOs involved in governance issues, which have exposed companies that failed to pay taxes. In Burundi, relations between businesses and CSOs are also uncertain, especially as CSOs tend to speak out about irregularities in what some organizations consider a biased public procurement process.

The public generally has a positive opinion of CSOs, especially if they have contact with them on a community level. For example, in Liberia, positive public perceptions during the year were due in part to the cooperation of CSOs with the government and local communities in the fight against Ebola. As the Internet becomes more accessible throughout the region, many CSOs are increasingly sophisticated in their use of social media to publicize their activities. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa has begun to use social media to raise awareness of its causes and fundraising activities. Well-endowed urban organizations in particular often have strong public relations operations for disseminating information and enhancing their public image. Innovative publicity tools used by CSOs in Zimbabwe include branded materials such as mosquito nets, t-shirts, caps, umbrellas, and cups.

Except for large, well-funded organizations, most CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa do not publish annual reports. Codes of conduct and other self-regulatory mechanisms are also not widely used. One of the few countries in the region that has undertaken steps to address self-regulation on a sector-wide level is Mozambique, where CSOs have produced a code of conduct, which they are encouraging donors to adopt as part of their funding requirements. In Uganda, the Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM) presents a set of standards that organizations can meet to enhance their credibility and effectiveness.
Conclusion

The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa reflects a complex and rapidly changing region, where CSOs provide a critical foundation for democratic institutions, economic growth, and social cohesion. The sector faces daunting hurdles, especially in its financial outlook and relations with non-supportive or hostile governments. Yet thanks to the dedication of thousands of employees, volunteers, funders, and other devoted supporters of civil society, the CSO sector maintains a leadership role in realizing prospects for change and development in the region. We hope this report provides a useful record of the achievements and challenges of the CSO sector during the past year and provides some reference points for its development in the year to come.
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ANGOLA

2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Angola

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Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.8

Angola is the most rapidly urbanizing country in southern Africa and experienced the world’s highest average annual economic growth between 2001 and 2010, mainly because of revenues from oil and diamonds. In 2014 income distribution remained extremely unequal, and the country produced very little in terms of manufactured goods. The cost of living remained very high, especially in the capital city of Luanda.

Most international donors have withdrawn from Angola on the grounds that the country has experienced significant economic gains in recent years and less in need of support. However, the precipitous fall in the price of oil in 2014 had a massive effect on public spending, especially for social development. The government introduced several rounds of budget cuts and spending freezes, with more predicted to follow in 2015. As most active.

Country Facts

Capital: Luanda
Government Type: Republic; Multiparty Presidential Regime
Population: 19,088,106
GDP per capita (PPP): $7,200
Human Development Index: 149

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ANGOLA
donors who support CSOs in Angola are involved in the oil and gas industry, their incomes fell in 2014 and they have withdrawn, seriously reduced, or even canceled their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. As a result, many CSOs saw their sources of income disappear.

In 2014 a new policy for the country’s administrative divisions was introduced. Among other changes, a new layer of administrators emerged, which delayed the implementation of some activities. In addition, CSO participation in citizens’ councils (CACS) was affected, as municipalities were not yet functioning and therefore CACS activities were confined to the district level.

The first countrywide census since 1973 was taken in 2014. The event was successful and indicated the need to revise several previous “guessimates” about the country’s population. The number of inhabitants was found to be 24.3 million rather than 18 to 20 million, which meant that many previous calculations, including poverty indicators, were off by 25 to 30 percent. The census figures have implications for future CSO projects, as they can serve as a basis for improving the effectiveness of interventions.

According to a speech by the Minister of Justice at the 55th ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in April 2014, there are 301 registered CSOs in Angola, including 228 domestic and 73 international organizations. However, this number may not be accurate, as many international organizations have recently withdrawn from Angola and most national CSOs depended on foreign funding. It is estimated that fewer than 10 percent of registered CSOs implemented projects in 2014.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

The main law governing CSOs in Angola is the Associations Law (14/91), passed in 2012. The law gives significant powers, including the ability to guide local project implementation, audit CSO accounts, and control funding provided by other organizations, to the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH), which is the main body monitoring and supervising CSOs under the Ministry of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation. In 2015 a new NGO law is slated to be introduced and UTCAH will be renamed the Institute of Promotion and Coordination of Aid Communities (IPROCAC). The new law should further strengthen government control, as IPROCAC will be empowered to more closely coordinate and oversee CSO activities and guide local program implementation in consultation with relevant ministries and provincial governments.

It remains very difficult to register a CSO in Angola. Information about registration procedures is not readily available, it is not clear what documentation is needed, the law is not always followed in practice, and the Ministry of Justice and lawyers handling registrations often interpret the law differently. Moreover, obtaining mandatory documentation with approvals from various government departments can be expensive, especially for smaller organizations. As a result, smaller organizations often work under the umbrella of larger, previously registered CSOs. Three organizations—the Justice, Peace, and Democracy Association (AJPD), Institute for Democracy, and Mosaiko—are halfway through a registration process that is expected to take more than three years. In accordance with the law, their bylaws have been published in the official government gazette, yet the Ministry of Justice has not issued their certificates of incorporation, claiming that it has lost previously submitted documentation or their statutes do not accord with the law. The financial and legal consequences for these organizations are considerable, as they are not eligible for most funding without
proper registration and can be subject to other restrictions, such as a ban on their activities or difficulties in establishing partnerships.

In 2014 there were several instances in which the state sought to limit the activities of CSOs. For example, authorities summoned the Association Building Communities (ACC), an organization that monitors mineral extraction in Lubango, to testify about its activities. In Lunda Norte and Uíge, the Support to Non-State Actors Program (PAANE), an EU-funded project that promotes the participation of non-state actors in governance and the fight against poverty, was prevented by UTCAH from pursuing activities related to decentralization, presumably to avoid conflicts with central state structures. The government’s ongoing demolition of informal settlements is perceived as an intimidating display of power and thus as a subtle effort to discourage advocacy actions by CSOs. Public demonstrations are still not easy to organize, and they usually attract police attention and arrests.

Public procurement law requires that CSOs have public utility status to compete for government contracts. However, the competitive tendering procedure is unclear, and recognition of CSOs’ entitlement to compete is not uniform. As a result, CSOs usually find it difficult to obtain government contracts.

CSOs that are registered and send annual reports to UTCAH can legally qualify for tax exemptions on certain items, such as imported goods. But since the process of applying for these exemptions is complex and bureaucratic, some CSOs forego this benefit.

Generally, lawyers in Angola do not work for the CSO sector, and there are only a few lawyers in the country familiar with CSO law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

Angolan CSOs continue to have a weak culture of accountability. Most organizations do not try to mobilize constituents beyond their members. While many organizations have mission statements and strategic plans of fairly good quality, the purpose of these tools is usually to fulfill donor requirements rather than guide organizational activities. CSOs sometimes work in fields outside of their stated missions if donors make funding available.

All organizations must have bylaws to register. But in practice these internal regulations often do not function well. For example, general assemblies, ostensibly the highest decision-making bodies within organizations, often do not meet or actively contribute to the organization.

CSOs’ financial insecurity often limits their human resource capacity. CSOs struggle to hire and retain competent permanent staff, especially as many donors do not support staff development. Once employees are trained in house, companies in the oil and gas industry often poach them by offering better pay and working conditions.

Studies and mappings conducted by PAANE in the provinces of Uíge, Lunda North, and Lunda South have shown that many organizations do not have access to computers, the Internet, and other computer-based technologies. Although the situation is worse in rural areas, it persists even in peri-urban areas of Luanda. In many cases, the use of technology is limited by a lack of electricity. Normally, organizations communicate through meetings and telephone calls.
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Financial Viability in Angola

In 2014 there were not many large pools of funding available to Angolan CSOs. The country’s extremely high cost of living and complicated logistics, especially with imports, induced institutional donors, such as CARE and Oxfam Novib, to end their programs in 2014. Several embassies, including those of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, experienced a reduction or cancellation of their aid budgets during the year. Locally, many oil and gas companies, the largest domestic source of funding for CSOs, were in crisis and slashed their CSR programs. As a result, support was scarce, and most funding for CSOs in 2014 was modest, project based, and short term. Community-based organizations (CBOs) found it particularly difficult to obtain funding, and many were unable to implement activities.

Most CSOs in Angola have historically depended on a single donor for funding, but in 2014 they faced the challenge of having to diversify their sources of income because of the country’s economic difficulties. Opportunities for co-financing, cost sharing, and revenue generation were negligible to non-existent. Some CSOs, such as Development Workshop (DW), Mosaiko, and AJPD, turned to service delivery, consulting, or publication sales to ensure their financial sustainability. Among the few organizations obtaining government contracts in 2014 were Community Working for Development (OCODE), Young Football Federation of Cazenga (LIDECA), and FOJASSIDA, which obtained contracts to implement projects from the municipal administration of Cazenga, in Luanda.

Financial management capacity is undeveloped at many Angolan CSOs. This lack of capacity causes many organizations to miss out on funding opportunities. Few organizations are able to afford the cost of independent audits. It is uncommon for CSOs to make their financial records available for public inspection.

ADVOCACY: 5.6

In 2014, because there was funding available for humanitarian assistance, many CSOs switched from providing services to monitoring public policies and engaging in dialogue with the government. One instance of CSO-government cooperation was the joint effort of the National Directorate for Water and the organizations Water For All and DW to improve water provision. Some local municipal administrations regularly invite CSOs to take part in CACS—for example, by leading the organization of various platforms. However, in general CSOs find it difficult to participate in government decision making, because of a lack of skills and information and because current procedures do not allow for proactive interventions by CSOs.

Overall, CSO advocacy efforts in Angola enjoyed legitimacy and credibility in 2014. CSOs are aware that some fields of intervention are sensitive, and they chose to focus on areas in which they can have an impact, in cooperation with or under the supervision of government structures. OMUNGA, AJPD, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), DW, and Mosaiko carried out strong advocacy campaigns on such topics as water and sanitation, human rights, and land tenure during the year. They were able to strengthen their networks, attract media attention, and engage with government administrators. The CSO Education for Everybody organized the Education Network for All and conducted a weeklong event on education. FOJASSIDA held a march for people living with HIV/AIDS. The scientific research center of Junior College
John Paul II, which is part of the private Catholic University of Angola, completed a study on water and sanitation.

Nevertheless, individual organizations can lack appreciation for the importance of advocacy and CSOs’ advocacy role. Some organizations seem unaware of the value of CSOs’ efforts to push for better living conditions, pro-poor planning and budgeting, adherence to the rule of law, and other public policy issues. This can be especially true of organizations known for their technical expertise in service provision. Organizations such as ADRA and DW in Luanda have begun to offer training in lobbying and advocacy to local organizations, so they can better monitor public policies and budget implementation.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3**

CSOs provide services in a range of areas, including health and education and, to a lesser extent, governance and economic development. Specific projects include school construction, the provision of educational and hospital supplies, and the delivery of donations to poor communities.

In 2014 CSOs cut back on the provision of basic social services because of reduced donor funding and focused on public policy and advocacy instead. However, many organizations continued to provide services, especially to communities that otherwise have trouble accessing government services. For example, CSOs built, maintained, and managed water and sanitation projects and constructed daycare centers and health facilities.

Some CSOs have turned to paid service delivery to generate income and ensure their financial stability. For example, Omunga in Lobito has government contracts to provide care and support to street children. DW conducted studies on water and sanitation for the Angolan National Bank and the Ministry of Urbanism and Housing, and its staff taught at the Angolan Institute for Administrative Training (IFAL) and other schools and universities. The Women Journalists Forum received small grants and contracts to support the 2014 census with training and assistance with the reports.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8**

ADRA, Mosaiko, DW, and other organizations run libraries that provide information services for CSOs. DW also provides funding to small organizations in municipalities. In 2014 PAANE provided subsidies valued at about $1.3 million to organizations in Benguela, Uíge, and Zaire provinces.

Some thematic networks, such as the Land Network, Child Protection Network, Education Network for All, and Luanda Urban Poverty Network (LUPN), continued to operate in 2014. Among other activities, they supported CACS meetings and urban forums, where citizens, service providers, community and municipal administrators, and other CSOs and civil servants met to talk about solutions for improving living conditions. However, networks of CSOs in Angola have a tendency to run out of steam, usually because they lack funds as well as time to get together. For example, the Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations (FONGA) and the Committee of International NGOs in Angola (CONGA) are no longer considered active groups.
Many organizations offer capacity-building programs on various topics. For example, in 2014 Platform for Women organized training for journalists on decentralization, and ADRA offered CSOs training in community development. The Center for Development and Partnerships of Angola (CDPA) used to support capacity building for CSOs but this organization has now disappeared.

Some organizations, including DW, conducted provincial conferences of CSOs in 2014 to promote CSO interests, expand their networks, and formulate shared positions on poverty alleviation, access to basic services, and other topics.

The government and CSOs sometimes partner on projects of mutual interest. For example, in 2014 the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights supported the attendance of several CSO representatives at a training on human rights in Norway. There is some contact with business, although cooperation slowed in 2014 because of the economic crisis. In a joint activity involving business, CSOs, and the government, ADRA worked with the Agricultural Credit Program operated by the Commerce and Industry Bank, Women Platform for Action, and the Ministry of Family and Women Promotion on gender equity issues.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.5

CSOs benefited from more coverage by private media than state media in 2014. Although CSOs make an effort to invite media to cover events, private media are more likely to attend. State media usually ignore CSO events if no public authorities are present.

The public perceives CSOs positively. The government’s attitude towards CSO capabilities can also be positive, judging from its reliance on many organizations for information about topics of shared concern. For example, in 2014 the administrator of the National Council of Children contacted local CSOs to prepare for a trip to Cazenga municipality because they had better information than government offices. Although the government seems to value CSOs more as service providers than as agents for empowering communities, it has expressed appreciation of CSOs’ role in monitoring public policy. For example, in a speech about African human rights, the minister of justice and human rights cited Angolan organizations that have supported this cause. The government is less tolerant of unorganized civil society, such as mass demonstrations, which sometimes elicit large-scale police attention.

DW, ADRA, and Mosaiko regularly publish their annual reports on their websites and send them to interested partners and donors. ADRA and some other organizations have clear regulations about what each member of the organization may or may not post, publish, and disseminate in their annual reports and elsewhere. Individual organizations sometimes have written codes of conduct on social media use by staff.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Angola

CSO Sustainability

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded
BOTSWANA

Country Facts
Capital: Gaborone
Government Type: Parliamentary Republic
Population: 2,155,784
GDP per capita (PPP): $16,000
Human Development Index: 109

The World Bank cites Botswana as one of the world's great economic success stories, however, 40 per cent of the population still lives below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day. The major event facing Botswana in 2014 was elections that were held during the second half of the year. The main campaign issues were Botswana's high level of unemployment – still at 17 per cent despite decades of strong economic growth – and wide income inequality. Despite this, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had little problem holding onto power. Civil society was very active in raising awareness during the elections, including a wide reaching effort by the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) NGO Working Group to inform the public about the position of the various political parties on human rights.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in Botswana remained stable in 2014. Only the legal environment improved, mainly because the Legal Practitioners Act, which had previously prevented CSOs from employing lawyers, was reformed to allow CSOs to employ lawyers through Legal Aid Botswana to offer services for themselves or needy clients. Although international donors are leaving Botswana, several new sources of funding were available to CSOs in 2014, including the Environmental and Alcohol Levy Funds, as well as the
new Tobacco Levy Fund, which the CSO sector had successfully promoted. Nevertheless, most CSOs still struggle to hire highly qualified staff.

According to the Registrar of Societies, in 2013, the last year for which data is available, there were approximately 6,900 registered CSOs in Botswana. The vast majority of these organizations were sports and recreation associations, burial societies, and churches, although the number also includes charitable organizations, associations, and political parties.

The same year approximately 130 organizations were affiliated with the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO), the national umbrella body for CSOs. Affiliation with BOCONGO is open to registered organizations and is voluntary. BOCONGO members have access to decision- and policy-making forums as well as funding from donors that prefer to work with BOCONGO members.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 3.7**

CSOs in Botswana are governed by the Registrar of Societies Act. CSOs register with the Department of Civil and National Registration in the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs, and trusts may register at the district level through lawyers. Overall, the registration process is relatively straightforward. However, low literacy levels and the centralization of the registration process in the capital city of Gaborone pose obstacles to registration for some organizations. The registrar recently increased the number of members required to register a church from 100 to 250, in part because of the number of churches was growing so quickly.

The Societies Act is fairly detailed. Section 11 of the Act stipulates that an organization’s registration may be canceled when it becomes a branch or affiliate of any organization of a political nature established outside of Botswana or when it changes its purpose without following appropriate procedures.

The law allows for freedom of expression. However, CSOs often feel obliged to keep silent in policy and governmental meetings for fear of losing their funding and because of sensitivities about certain issues. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), an association for journalists, has reported that journalists continue to experience harassment while debating public interest issues and in some instances have been officially charged with sedition.

The Income Tax Act provides for tax exemptions for religious, charitable, and educational institutions of a public character and for trusts for nature conservation, scientific research, and similar public purposes. This exemption also applies to associations of individuals formed with a nonprofit aim to promote social or sporting activities. Tax exemptions for individual donors are limited. For example, the law does not allow tax receipts to be issued to individuals who make cash donations, including online. Foreign donations are exempt from taxation.

There is no law that prevents income generation by CSOs, as long as they reinvest revenue into their operations or programming. CSOs must register with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) to take part in or receive government contracts. However, in practice CSOs are unable to complete this registration, because the PPABD does not have a nonprofit category and thus its officials do not know how to register them.
There are no lawyers in Botswana who are specialists in civil society law. The Legal Practitioners Act, which previously prevented CSOs from employing lawyers, was reformed in 2014 and now allows CSOs to employ lawyers through Legal Aid Botswana to offer services to clients. Legal Aid Botswana is a parastatal organization which provides legal services to those who cannot afford private legal representation.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 4.0**

CSOs working in the capital are better able to engage their constituencies than organizations in smaller cities, as the support of international organizations makes it easier for them to reach out to the district level. For example, the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) works with conservation trusts and has good relations with its district-level constituents. In contrast, organizations working locally often have not identified their stakeholders, cannot speak to their memberships, and do not use community-based surveys for program development. In general, CSOs do not perform genuine, on-the-ground stakeholder analysis to better understand their beneficiaries’ needs and aspirations.

Most CSOs have mission and vision statements. While some international organizations have helped larger, urban-based CSOs develop strategic plans, most organizations at the district level lack strategic plans. Only a few organizations report to the public and donors about the way in which their activities relate to their strategic plans.

Most CSOs have clearly documented management systems, as the Registrar of Societies requires them for registration. However, capacity assessments conducted by BOCONGO and World University Service of Canada (WUSC) show that while these systems may exist on paper, implementation is often lacking, especially on the district level. CSOs in Botswana generally do not have proper governing boards that create policies and strategies, monitor implementation through the chief executive, and measure program impact. The roles and responsibilities of boards and executive staff are often not clearly defined, and in district-level CSOs, the executive director and board chair are often the same person. Many local CSOs do not have functioning boards.

An exception to this trend is organizations that have adopted the Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) model, which was created in 1998 by the government in cooperation with CSOs. The model specifies that conservation trusts must meet certain standards, including having a board of directors and obtaining the agreement of one-third of the village to start a trust. The process of starting a conservation trust must be reviewed by a lawyer, who verifies its feasibility through a workshop with the local community.

CSOs continue to struggle with recruiting and retaining highly qualified staff. The Alcohol Levy Fund does not give funds for management, gratuities, or medical fees, which makes it difficult for organizations to offer attractive remuneration packages to qualified technical staff. As a result, CSOs sometimes recruit unqualified personnel to meet project deadlines and produce deliverables. Some organizations are unable to qualify for international funding because they lack stability, including the ability to pay their staff. Other challenges faced by many organizations include the lack of consistent human resource policies and the retirement of older leaders, who are needed to develop the skills of the younger generation. Overall, national-level organizations are better able to retain staff than district or local organizations. They also have better access to staffing resources, such as volunteers made available through the National Internship Program, U.S. Peace Corps, and WUSC. BOCONGO sometimes provides interns to its members through the National Internship Program. A great deal of capacity-building training is available in the area of human resources, especially in Gaborone, Ngamiland, and Francistown.
Many CSOs lack adequate technological capacity. Some organizations solicit donations of second-hand laptops and the Southern African NGO Network (SANGONET) helps CSOs purchase computer software at a 90 percent discount. However, many organizations cannot afford the cost of computer maintenance, and most CSO staff use their own cell phones at work. Some CSOs successfully use Skype in their operations. A few projects, including the Maatla project, which focuses on HIV/AIDS, provide targeted support to help increase CSOs’ technological capacity.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.6**

International donors are leaving Botswana because it is now viewed as an upper middle-income country with a GDP sufficient to sustain CSOs through individual and government donations. The end of both the World Bank’s Botswana National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support (BNAPS) project and the Global Fund in 2014 left a huge funding gap for CSOs.

Funding diversification is a challenge for CSOs. Many organizations lack skills in proposal writing, especially for government grants, and in managing investment portfolios that could yield an interest on savings. CSOs continue to need support in retargeting their activities to access different funding streams without drifting from their missions. Most organizations lack a locally cultivated core of financial supporters.

Local support for CSOs in Botswana is still limited. Although many organizations receive foodstuffs and other in-kind donations, only environmental CSOs receive significant financial support from various local funds created by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. Some of these organizations also receive small sums of money from outside of Botswana. However, several new sources of support show promise of improving the local funding landscape. The Empowerment of Non-State Actors in Botswana program, co-funded by the European Union and European Development Fund, began operations in late 2014 and will make funds available to CSOs working in early childhood, cultural industries, the environment, gender, and human rights. During 2014 the Alcohol Levy Fund gave funds to a larger number of organizations, and the new Tobacco Levy Fund should also provide additional resources.

There is no national policy for corporate social responsibility (CSR). A few CSR programs exist, such as those at First National Bank and Debswana, a mining company, but they are insufficient to meet the needs of the entire CSO sector. Individual giving is not promoted, especially as individuals who make cash donations cannot receive receipts for tax purposes.

Membership-based organizations continue to collect membership fees, although the amounts are insignificant and do not aid organizational sustainability. Some CSOs, based mostly in Gaborone, earn income through government service contracts. For example, several environmental CSOs partner with the government to provide services. However, the government often expects CSO services to cost less than those of private companies because of CSOs’ non-profit status. Some organizations run curio shops and lodges, mostly in the northern part of the country.

Because of a lack of resources, many CSOs do not have qualified financial managers and rely on external accountants and bookkeepers. In some organizations, the executive directors perform the functions of financial personnel. Many CSOs do not perform financial audits and disseminate financial reports only to donors and members. A few CSOs conduct project-specific audits to comply with contractual obligations to donors and sometimes publish their audits on their websites. Organizations that accept cash donations receive qualified audit statements because the auditors cannot verify how much cash was received by the
organization. In part because of qualified audits, these organizations may find it more difficult to access funding from international donors and to raise funds online.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSOs and the government cooperate mainly through workshops, to which each party feels free to invite the other. In addition, many CSOs and government offices make referrals to each other’s programs. BOCONGO and KCS have seats on the High Level Consultative Council (HLCC), which bring together government, private sector, and CSO representatives. Some CSOs are invited to take part in high-level policy meetings, such as the National Trade Committee on Policy Negotiations, but they often chose not to participate. The government continues to maintain that it speaks to CSOs through umbrella organizations, but many CSOs are not affiliated with BOCONGO, the national umbrella body.

CSOs still do not engage in much policy-focused advocacy, as they are too consumed with financial struggles to look to advocacy and legal reform as viable and sustainable activities. Among their few activities in 2014, BOCONGO’s environmental sector office briefed the parliamentary environmental subcommittee on issues of concern to CSOs, especially the lack of support for climate change initiatives. BOCONGO also facilitated CSO contributions to the country’s climate change policy. With support from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, BOCONGO developed an NGO Poverty Eradication Strategy that defined ways for CSOs to harness opportunities to take part in the national poverty eradication program. CSOs also promoted gender-equality sensitization through activities during the Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence and the Universal Periodic Review.

CSOs were engaged in the lead up to the elections in raising awareness on issues related to human rights and the position of political parties on thirteen key human rights issues identified by the UPR NGO Working Group through a series of consultations that began in 2013. These consultations, including a civil society workshop conducted in February 2014, are part of the development of Botswana’s Comprehensive Human Rights Strategy and National Action Plan (CHR SNAP). The Working Group produced a booklet to inform voters about party commitments to human rights and to enable the public to hold parties accountable for their election promises. Members of the UPR Working Group include BOCONGO, DITSHWANELO – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Lesbians Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana (LeGaBiBo), Media Institute of Southern Africa (Botswana) and Rainbow Identity Association (RIA).

There continues to be a general discomfort among CSOs about lobbying. Although unions lobby for their members’ interests, many CSOs do not have the necessary skills for lobbying, including negotiating experience. Recent lobbying successes for CSOs include efforts related to the Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority (BOCRA) Act, the Legal Practitioners Act, and the Tobacco Levy. However, CSOs were unsuccessful in achieving the signing of the Protocol on Gender and Development of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), despite considerable investment of time and effort.

More advocacy work is needed to promote laws that would allow CSOs to raise funds from individuals. In particular, CSOs hope that the law will be reformed to allow tax deductions for online donations, which is currently not allowed.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSOs provide services mainly in health, social services, and education. In cooperation with private law companies through the government’s Legal Aid Botswana program, CSOs may employ lawyers to provide
legal aid services for themselves or to needy citizens. With the reform of the Legal Practitioners Act in 2014, CSOs are now able to offer client-based legal services support through their own organizations.

Many services provided by CSOs continue to be influenced by donor priorities. Many CSOs take on projects that are well resourced by donors but do not necessarily meet needs identified in assessments conducted by BOCONGO, WUSC, and donor agencies in target communities. In general, there is not so much a lack of CSO services as a poor distribution of services across the country, especially in hard-to-reach rural areas. CSOs do not commonly use client satisfaction surveys, and therefore it is not easy to assess whether the general public and other stakeholders are satisfied with the range and quality of services.

Generally, CSOs’ priority is to serve their membership, and they rarely go beyond members to showcase their achievements to other audiences, including the private sector.

Most CSOs do not have cost-recovery mechanisms. Many organizations would like to introduce fees for services, but because they are identified as charities, many stakeholders, from government officials to beneficiaries, would resist having to pay. In addition, clients have limited financial ability to pay for services, and fees could force beneficiaries to go without services if they could not afford them.

Although the government generally recognizes that CSOs add value through service delivery, it offers very limited funding for CSO services. Some CSOs believe that the government still doubts that they can deliver services effectively, which leads to an overall lack of trust. Support from the government usually depends on whether CSOs serve the government’s priorities. For example, during the Mogae presidency from 1998 to 2008, gender and HIV/AIDS were the focus of the government’s flagship programs, and CSOs were well resourced in these areas. The priorities of the current Khama presidency include the environment, tourism, wildlife, and poverty eradication. In 2014 CSOs focused on these areas were most likely to partner with the government to provide needed services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

There are few CSO resource centers. The CSO Emang Basadi continues to operate a resource center, but it is difficult to maintain as it does not charge fees for its services.

Among the few local grantmaking initiatives are the USAID-sponsored Maatla project and the Empowerment of Non-State Actors in Botswana program. The PSI grantmaking program has closed. There is no funding locally for re-granting in Botswana. Most income is raised internationally, and no platform exists that enables local CSOs to become donors.

Although there is no overall country network for information sharing, CSOs manage to keep one another informed. The main platform for information sharing is BOCONGO, which sponsors quarterly sector meetings. Other umbrella bodies usually send out notices of calls for proposals and other information, though such announcements can be irregular.

Training is fairly available, although it is generally from private institutions and therefore expensive. BOCONGO is slowly transitioning to a facilitation role, and its training services have grown, especially in the area of human resources. BOCONGO along with the Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NCONGO) and KCS have begun to offer more accessible trainings with accredited trainers and manuals in such areas as monitoring and evaluation, resource mobilization, governance and gender, and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming. A general CSO management course is not available. Most training materials are not available in local languages.

Intersectoral partnerships can be both formal and informal. CSO-government partnerships on gender issues coordinated by committees at the Gender Affairs Department are especially common. It is difficult for CSOs to engage with the private sector. Some commercial banks, such as Barclay’s Bank and Standard Chartered, have begun financial literacy programs for CSOs and other strategic community partners. Informal cooperation between the media and CSOs takes place mostly through event-based radio programming.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

CSOs receive some coverage in local media. However, the media have little interest in issues related to social change. Some CSOs report that media have begun to call them more often for expert opinions on various subjects. But CSOs are sometimes reluctant to engage with the media for fear their involvement will be misinterpreted. Overall, CSOs do not pro-actively engage with the media on anything other than event-based coverage. The *Daily News* has a community news section in which CSOs can advertise, but CSOs do not push to publish substantive articles. The trend of paying for media coverage continues.

Generally, the public does not have a good understanding of CSOs. Many people believe that all CSOs work only to support orphans and raise awareness of HIV/AIDS, and they cannot envision other missions unless they have had direct contact with specific organizations.

KCS has recently noted increased government engagement with CSOs. For example, government officials are more frequently requesting technical support in such areas as reporting. Attitudes towards CSOs vary from one government official to the next. Some CSOs experience negative attitudes from public servants, mainly because of the perception that CSOs misuse public funds.

CSOs continue to improve their public relations efforts. For example, some CSOs conduct media briefings about their activities or bring media along on monitoring trips.

Most CSOs have adopted codes of ethics but do not adhere to them fully.
In 2014 the political context was characterized by a strong focus on the 2015 elections. While security was fairly stable, there were incidents of assassinations and armed robberies and considerable levels of sexual and gender-based violence. Youth groups known as Imbonerakure, affiliated with the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), were also perpetrators of violence with little to no fear of legal repercussions. These youth impersonated members of the police force and initiated public disturbances, including blocking activities of opposition political parties and intimidating people to pay bribes. The end of 2014 was marked by an armed attack by an unidentified rebel group near the Democratic Republic of Congo border in the Cibitoke Province, north of the capital Bujumbura.

In 2014 the situation for CSOs in Burundi did not change significantly. There was ongoing dialogue between members of government and civil society, including a workshop to evaluate the roadmap for political parties with the support of the United Nations Mission for Burundi (BNUB).
During 2014 CSOs continued to wait for the enactment of a new law that addresses civil society. They feared that the government intended to limit the exercise of certain civil liberties, including the right to freely establish organizations without interference from the authorities.

CSOs’ organizational capacity and financial viability did not change notably and remain an everyday challenge for CSOs. However, CSOs offered services and products that largely met the needs of the local population. CSOs participated actively in advocacy, debates, consultations, and evaluations, particularly in matters of governance, in cooperation with sectoral groups and regulatory agencies. Overall, CSOs maintained a positive public image. More than 6,600 CSOs were registered in Burundi in 2014.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal environment for CSOs in Burundi deteriorated in 2014. CSOs continue to work under Decree-Law No. 1/11, established in 1992. The law regulating nonprofit organizations and associations has been under revision since 2012. The enacted version has not yet been adopted. In July, the national assembly adopted a law to control the growing number of churches and religious communities. Churches must have at least 500 members and a proper building. The Minister of the Interior intends to include a provision in the law for recording organizational leadership.

At the operational level, the 1992 law does not limit the approved range of activities. Each organization elaborates its action plan and mobilizes the necessary resources for implementing activities. Organizations have kept their autonomy over internal management. The Minister of Interior has stopped attempting to interfere with CSOs’ activities, as reported in 2013.

In 2014, as in 2013, CSOs continued to operate and work normally despite an ambiguous legal framework that allows the Minister of Interior to decide if a CSO can be part of a network. CSOs offer a range of services for their communities according to their chosen mission (e.g., local governance, health, environmental protection, networking of local producers, community development, or mutual solidarity).

By law CSOs remain protected against dissolution by the state. A CSO can be dissolved only following a judicial vote by the Administrative Court. No attempt to dissolve a CSO was known to have taken place in 2014. However, many fear the government’s tendency to make unilateral decisions or advance laws without prior and inclusive debate among concerned stakeholders. Civil society is no longer consulted in the decision-making process. Pro-government CSOs benefit from a privileged position in the media.

The law on public assemblies enacted in December 2013 constitutes a major handicap for the exercise of civil rights. On March 8, 2014, the police violently broke up a peaceful International Women’s Day rally by the women’s wing of the opposition political party, United for National Progress. In June 2014 the mayor of Bujumbura prohibited a public assembly to support the release of the president of the Burundi Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Prisoners (APRODH), organized by the CSO Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (FORSC). FORSC filed a complaint against the mayor and the case is now pending in the Administrative Court. In August, the mayor of Bujumbura also prohibited a demonstration organized by civil society to advocate for an independent judicial system. Finally, CSOs were forbidden from
holding their annual meeting despite having received funding from the European Union’s Supported and Strengthened Civil Society Organizations project (OSCAR).

The Minister of the Interior continued actions against CSOs, including accusations that certain CSOs were working for the opposition. In November, a UN special rapporteur denounced the government’s attempts to turn civil society actors into political adversaries to limit their work. Parallel civil society organizations that support the government and the president’s party were created.

Although CSOs are free to express opinions over the airwaves, in the press, and in public debates, there were instances in which freedom of expression was challenged. For instance, on July 15, 2014, police prohibited the president of the Observatory for the Fight Against Corruption and Economic Malfeasance (OLUCOME) from carrying out a rally to denounce corruption and financial malpractice. African Public Radio also received verbal threats from the National Communications Council.

CSOs are allowed to generate revenues and cite membership fees, donations, consultation, and service fees among sources of revenue in their statutes. CSOs can compete for government procurements at the local and national level. However, CSOs must be registered with the Ministry of Commerce and have financial backing to apply for government contracts and only a few meet these criteria. CSOs can receive subsidies through certain health or agricultural programs.

CSOs do not benefit from tax exemption. They must pay taxes on donations and income tax. They also pay professional tax on remuneration (IPR) and the value-added tax, like all other institutions. As in 2013, only international CSOs were allowed in 2014 to sign an agreement with the Ministry of External Relations and Incorporation to benefit from tax exemptions.

Regarding local legal capacity, a slight change from 2013 is that more lawyers are working in the country and a few offer their work pro-bono to CSOs. Since the majority of them reside in Bujumbura, legal counsel is rare in rural areas, and CSOs must come to the capital to receive legal advice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9**

Organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2014. CSOs did not prioritize their tasks and some deviated from their original objectives. Some organizations were able to mobilize grassroots support with the help of personnel at the provincial and community levels.

Despite their initiatives, CSOs had limited success in establishing support groups. Some organized networks or coalitions to conduct joint actions and advocacy campaigns, such as the campaign against high prices, Coalition for Education for All Campaign, and the Do Not Touch the Arusha Accords campaign.

More CSOs are developing or adapting five-year strategic plans to guide their interventions and are putting together annual work plans. These strategic tools help organizations mobilize funding from technical and financial partners. Furthermore, the initiative to develop strategic plans more often than not comes at the request or direction of international donors.

Few CSOs have management bodies or functional administrative and financial management tools. With help from their financial and technical partners, some larger organizations hire a team of permanent technical staff, an executive secretariat, and a technical coordination team. They develop and operate administrative and
financial management tools to control the movement of funds and the production of technical and financial reports.

Despite the legal requirements, few CSOs hold regular board meetings or monitoring committee meetings, and some do not send reports as required by the Ministry of Interior. However, CSOs with more organizational and financial resources hold regular statutory and administrative meetings and transmit minutes of their general assemblies and annual progress reports to the Ministry of Interior within the legal deadline.

As in 2013, few CSOs retain qualified permanent staff and offices. Many organizations are run by their “founding” president and lack transparency or management rotation. Few organizations seek to obtain professional services. The lack of financial resources limits CSOs’ ability to recruit and retain qualified permanent staff. CSOs recruit specialized personnel if technical expertise is needed and resources are available. Most CSO staff members are unpaid volunteers with work commitments elsewhere that allow them to support themselves and their families.

Few organizations have sufficient resources to acquire or maintain modern office equipment and technology. The acquisition of this equipment would allow them to work more efficiently.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

The financial viability of CSOs remains weak, and most CSOs do not have the financial reserves to operate for longer than one year. As in 2013, the financial autonomy of CSOs remains elusive. Only 5 percent of organizations have enough funds to sustain their activities year after year. CSOs do not benefit from local financial support or state subsidies. Local sources of philanthropy are nonexistent, as the practice of philanthropic giving is uncommon in Burundi.

Resource mobilization has not changed since 2013. CSOs are aware of the constraints on resource mobilization and face long-term challenges in achieving financial independence. Striking disparities exist among CSOs. Health organizations received significant financial resources from international donors, such as The World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, while other CSOs outside the health sector continued to lack funds. The government does not issue subsidies to CSOs.

Poor communities expect to receive assistance or support from the state and CSOs, which are known as *abagiraneza* (“do-gooders”). Given that communities rely on CSOs for support, it is rare that CSOs receive individual or community donations.

CSOs have limited resources or revenue, as member contributions are insignificant. Technical and financial partners operating locally or abroad provide the necessary financing for organizations to survive. Due to the global financial crisis, CSOs face problems of long-term sustainability. Additionally, several CSOs receive financing incrementally in small amounts or sporadically for a short period of time (usually one or two years). CSOs have not developed an approach to diversifying their financing or developing durable economic partnerships with technical and financial partners.

Only a few CSOs maintain durable partnerships with technical and financial partners. Despite its goal to support and strengthen CSOs, OSCAR has not produced visible effects. CSOs can respond to government bids. However, the requirements (registration at the Ministry of Commerce and financial assets) are
restrictive, and CSOs have not yet acquired the professionalism required to respond correctly to requests for proposals (RFPs) for expert services.

As in 2013, few CSOs have established solid management systems or tools that meet current norms and standards. Only organizations that receive outside support have internal controls. These CSOs usually submit to external independent audits, as stipulated in their financing agreements, and produce annual reports. They work transparently and are developing a culture of good governance and accountability.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

In 2014 CSOs participated actively in advocacy, debates, consultations, and evaluations, particularly in matters of governance, in cooperation with sectoral groups and regulatory agencies (e.g., the Regulatory Agency for Public Procurements, or ARMP). CSOs continued to focus their work on education, health, the environment, justice, energy, land management, security, electoral processes, and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. CSOs also took part in public debates that were televised or broadcast on the radio. According to a report published by OLUCOME, 1,304 CSOs participated in advocacy actions in 2014.

Some organized networks or coalitions conducted joint actions and advocacy campaigns. For example, the campaign for the liberation of the imprisoned president of the Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Prisoners (APRODH) led to his release for medical reasons in September 2014. The president had been arrested on charges of endangering the state on May 15 after speaking on the radio about young Burundians being armed and receiving military training in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. Some of these campaigns developed impressive membership.

CSOs advocated for legal reforms to make courts more independent and for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They pursued participation in campaigns such as Justice for Ernest Manirumva (against the imprisonment of the APRODH president), Green Friday, Against High Costs of Living, and Education for All. The Association of Women Lawyers, Collective of Women Organizations in Burundi, Synergy for the Promotion and Development of Girls, and other associations advocated for gender equality in decision-making bodies, inheritance rights for women, the right to universal education, freedom from gender-based violence, land ownership, and fair agricultural policies.

CSOs made recommendations for the integration and revision of certain provisions in the constitution of Burundi, which was undergoing a review that was suspended in March 2014. Advocacy will resume when appropriate.

CSOs have not mastered advocacy techniques, and their capacity to lead effective advocacy movements remains weak. They have limited funding to monitor the government’s engagements and decision-making process. Additionally, certain civil society actors confuse activism and advocacy. Certain pro-government CSOs are counterproductive and make statements that contradict other organizations that are pointing out what is not working in the country.

CSOs are conscious that a more favorable legal and regulatory environment would reinforce their sustainability and effectiveness. No concrete change has resulted from advocacy by CSOs in favor of simplified registration procedures and the certification of nonprofit organizations.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6

Service provision remains largely the same as in 2013. Active funded CSOs provide services in numerous areas, including health, education, human rights, social assistance, hygiene, the environment, assistance to vulnerable people, and governance. In the economic domain, CSOs intervene on behalf of agricultural producers, livestock breeders, services, and artisans. Some organizations are involved in offering training for entrepreneurship and the processing or storage of food products.

CSOs provide services that, overall, respond to the needs and priorities of the population (information, training, education, communications, and basic services). However, a large majority of CSOs are limited in their organizational and operational capacity by the inadequacy of available resources compared to community needs. On the whole, the community takes part in the design, implementation, and evaluation of community projects. Citizens are represented in community councils that organize information and discussion sessions for local communities on a regular basis.

In this context, CSOs run health centers, schools, and microfinance institutions. They have contributed to the health care of the population and the rising rate of school enrollment. CSOs are particularly involved in the implementation of a medical care policy for children under five years of age and the promotion of maternal health. However, CSOs do not receive public funding and must rely on foreign donors to finance their programs.

The benefits of the CSOs’ interventions are not limited to their members. Services are offered to other groups as well. CSOs share reports with other organizations and institutions (public or semi-public, intermediary support organizations (ISOs), religious groups, associations, and universities). For greater efficiency, many organizations have worked together—at times in a consortium—to achieve better results. For example, with funds from Christian Aid, the Governmental Action Observatory (OAG) worked in a consortium with the Anglican Church and World Outreach Initiative on a project to improve governance and the quality of health services in Makamba province.

CSOs that produce publications distribute them for free. People are interested in the publications but are too poor to pay for them.

The government recognizes the value of the work of health, education, land management, and environmental CSOs for communities, in part because of its own inability to satisfy the needs of the population. The government is, however, hostile to CSOs working on governance, anti-corruption, legal, and human rights issues.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

Several partners are involved in sectors such as health, justice, education, governance, local development, and decentralization through various forms of support and multiple agencies. However, ISOs or resource centers for CSOs are still lacking, as are community foundations able to award grants. Poverty forces rural populations to rely on CSOs, in addition to the state, for support and services.
CSOs continue to share information with each other. Collectives, networks, and platforms exist, although they operate in an unclear legal framework. Journalists are organized in a press association.

CSOs come together in various partnerships to address certain problems. CSOs partner with other CSOs, the government, and the media, most notably in the health sector (for example, in the fight against HIV/AIDS and malaria, promotion of maternal health, family planning, and performance-based financing), as well as in decentralization, rural land management, citizen participation, environment (protection of watersheds and afforestation), and hygiene, sanitation, and waste collection. The benefits of these partnerships are evident in building the capacity of local staff, the quality and volume of services offered, and the increasing number of beneficiaries. There are no known existing partnerships between CSOs and the private sector.

Training opportunities exist and are offered in French and local languages. Inades-Formation provides management and financial trainings in Kirundi. The OSCAR project offers governance and institutional capacity-building training to civil society actors, and the Support Program for Integral Development and Solidarities in the Hill (ADISCO) offers training to build CSO skills in food security, the social-economic integration of youth, and advocacy.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

Overall, the public image of CSOs did not change in 2014. They are widely regarded in a positive light. However, the government sometimes makes hostile and suspicious remarks about certain human rights organizations or those that have denounced the country’s poor governance. For example, CSOs that accuse the government of falsifying and exaggerating reports on the country and its governance.

The public expresses a generally positive opinion about the actions of CSOs, but the media rarely cover their activities. Overall, coverage at both the national and local levels is positive. Some CSOs have regular media contact with large audiences. In addition, members of the media accompany CSOs in their advocacy campaigns. The media regularly invite CSO representatives to participate in radio broadcasts or televised debates on important issues that affect the population.

Unfortunately, some media are under the influence of the governing party, and they issue negative statements about leaders of some CSOs, especially those that work in governance and human rights. The question of freedom of the press remains unclear following the enactment of Law No. 1/11 in 2013, which modifies Law No. 1/025 of 2003 on regulating the press in Burundi. Media professionals considered the law to be an anti-freedom measure. They are fighting for the protection of their sources and against limitations on certain subjects, heavy fines, and modalities of attribution set by the National Council of Communication. They have filed a legal complaint in response.

In 2014 the broader public had a positive opinion of CSOs, expressing appreciation for their information provision, education, and assistance. The population appreciates work by organizations involved in the defense of human rights, as they are their main source of information on human rights issues. Human rights CSOs reported on events such as civil liberties violations, arbitrary arrests, and the assassinations of three Italian nuns. These messages are transmitted over the airwaves and the Internet. However, many people do not understand the concept of a nonprofit association.

Relations between businesses and CSOs are cautious, especially regarding public procurements. For instance, CSOs tend to speak out about irregularities in access to public procurements, particularly when businesses are awarded contracts in, what some CSOs consider, a biased contract award process. However, businesses that lose out because of biased processes appreciate the actions of CSOs in this regard.
CSOs publicize their activities via different channels (reports, public conferences, publication on websites, television, and radio broadcasts). CSOs are using new information technologies to disseminate and share information with other associations. Many CSOs maintain websites that they regularly update. Media outlets maintain good relations with CSOs.

CSOs have an ethical code originally developed by FORSC, which unfortunately is not widely known or implemented. CSOs produce and publish activity reports. Some CSOs submit to internal audits (requested by monitoring committees) and organize and hold professional retreats for self-evaluation. Those that benefit from international financing carry out management audits, which are then used to improve organizational governance and expand their credibility.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Democratic Republic of Congo

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Country Facts

Capital: Kinshasa
Government Type: Republic
Population: 77,433,744
GDP per capita (PPP): $700
Human Development Index: 186

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

The overall situation of CSOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) did not change significantly from 2013 to 2014, except in advocacy. In 2014 civil society played a more significant role in advocacy and took part in debates with the government. These advocacy efforts fostered positive reform on issues such as budget monitoring, security, decentralization and local governance, mines, and hydrocarbons.

While the legal framework continues to be favorable to CSOs, the procedures for legal registration remains centralized at the national level. Procedures are difficult and costly, especially for organizations in rural provinces. CSOs continue to encounter difficulties linked to poor internal governance and transparent management of resources. As in 2013, CSOs continued to depend heavily on external financing, and few are developing better management practices. Most CSOs find it difficult to access local financing.

At the political level, a new coalition government was put in place at the end of 2014. Members of the opposition received key positions, and the secretary-general of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo was appointed one of three vice prime ministers. Magistrates were nominated to the Constitutional Court and new members joined the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) maintained a significant peacekeeping presence in the county. In March 2014 the UN Security Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO through 2015 and authorized a troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel and 760 observers. However, the security situation in the eastern part of the country remained troubling, notably because of repeated violence against civilian populations in North Kivu. The publication of a UN report on human rights violations and summary executions carried out during Operation Likofi against the Kuluna gangs in the city of Kinshasa resulted in the expulsion of MONUSCO’s head of human rights in October.

The DRC’s economic growth rate reached approximately 8 percent in 2014, largely because of mining and petroleum revenues. This economic growth has not had a positive impact on the daily lives of citizens. In response to this reality, the government organized an international conference on inclusive growth, to take place in January 2015. In July 2014 the DRC became a signatory to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), whose standards require full disclosure of taxes and other payments to governments made by oil, gas, and mining companies.

The Ministry of Justice estimates that 22,833 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious organizations were operating in the country in 2014. This number represents a large increase from the number provided in 2013, which included only CSOs that interacted directly with the Civil Affairs Division of MONUSCO. The National Council of NGOs for Development (CNONGD) lists only CSOs working on basic community development activities. Therefore the figure presented by the ministry is considered to be the most exhaustive and inclusive estimate.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

All fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association and religion, are guaranteed by the 2006 constitution of the DRC. These freedoms are enforced under Law 004/2001 put into effect on July 20, 2001. This law establishes the general provisions applicable to nonprofit associations, public utilities, and charitable institutions. The law is favorable to CSOs.

However, despite the favorable legal framework, obtaining legal registration is centralized at the national level, with the Second Leadership of the Office of Religious Groups and Associations of the Ministry of Justice. CSOs face several challenges, including heavy bureaucracy, the inability of the Ministry of Justice to deploy around the entire national territory to inspect the operations of associations in rural areas, and higher costs of travel and lodging for rural individuals traveling to the capital.

Article 7 of Law 004/2001 includes regulations on names and statutes, headquarters, approved objectives, allowed range of activities, membership and conditions of membership, exit and exclusion of members, administrative and financial organization, asset management, dissolution of CSOs, and the means of establishing yearly accounts. The law’s prescriptions are clear and effectively prevent any state oversight and control that is not needed. In general, the law is applied consistently.

Article 20 of the Law 004/2001 on Nonprofit Organizations allows the high tribunal to dissolve a CSO if it takes on activities outside its stated objective or does not respect established laws, public order, or good
morals, or if its membership or the public ministry requests dissolution. Nonetheless, it is rare for public authorities to dissolve a CSO. In 2014 there were no known cases of government dissolution of a CSO.

The constitution and in particular Articles 24-37 guarantee freedom of expression, opinion, and association, within limits. However, human rights CSOs and associations of media professionals are often subject to harassment and arrests from central, local, and provincial governments, because of opinions expressed in their politics and action plans. The Voice of the Voiceless for Human Rights reported that the regional president of the National Farmer’s League for Human Rights (LINAPEDHO), a CSO working on human rights in Kamonia, Tshikapa district (in the Kasai Occidental province), was arrested. Two leaders of the human rights organization BWAMI MUPUTA were arrested in July 2014 on unknown charges.

CSOs pay taxes on earned income. However, CSOs that have received an inter-ministerial order from the Planning Ministry and the Finance Ministry can receive a partial or total tax exemption. This exemption is renewable every two years. Obtaining this order is not easy, because of heavy bureaucracy and the high cost of hiring ad hoc commission experts at the two ministries. Nevertheless, the procedure for obtaining the order seems to be easier and faster for religious organizations because of their credibility and durability. In 2014 the National Center for Development and Popular Participation (CENADEP) organized a workshop, during which experts of the Ministry of Finance clarified the procedure for obtaining such exemptions. The Public Spending Observatory (ODEP) benefitted from this exemption.

Tax deductions and exemptions for individuals or organizations making charitable donations do not exist. The law does not apply to fees, grants, or subsidies. According to the law, CSOs should be nonprofit. However, they are allowed to obtain revenue for services that can be used specifically for the needs of the organization. CSOs have the right to respond to calls for proposals at both the national and local levels, in line with the DRC law on public contract awards, but most CSOs lack the necessary skills and capacity to be competitive.

Lawyers who focus on CSO legal matters are concentrated in urban centers and offer services at a cost that is beyond the reach of most CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

Organizational capacity remained the same as in 2013. Although CSOs are able to build larger constituencies around project-related activities, these broader constituencies are short lived. Many CSOs based in larger cities work in partnership with local CSOs in more rural areas.

CSOs must define their mission in their statutes as required by the Law on Nonprofit Organizations. Failure to do so results in suspension. However, some CSOs deviate from their initial missions to align with donors’ priorities. Although national CSOs have developed short-, medium- and long-term strategic plans, most local CSOs struggle to adopt strategic plans. They generally work on short-term projects, which drive their strategy.

The Law on Nonprofit Organizations clearly defines management structures and requires the division of responsibilities between the board of directors and the executive of an organization. In practice, the function of these bodies is ambiguous and most CSOs do not respect the management structure. Many CSOs lack transparent management practices and good governance. However, the boards of directors of national-scope organizations function and are able to oversee the appropriation and use of funds in the organization through audits.
Most CSOs in the DRC are not able to maintain and remunerate full-time staff. Larger organizations have projects that allow them to pay their staff. Several categories of personnel exist within CSOs, including support and technical staff to work on projects. Technical staff is recruited via tenders. Except for the small number of CSOs that use volunteers at the instruction of their donors, the DRC CSOs generally have a weak culture of volunteerism.

CSOs equip themselves with materials and equipment funded through partners. Partners provide modest institutional support, which does not cover organizational needs. With the exception of some large CSOs, organizations experience difficulties in obtaining computers, Internet access, and needed financial management software. Mobile phone use is widespread and growing. Network coverage remains limited to the main towns and nearby rural areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

CSOs did not experience a significant change in their financial situation in 2014. The law allows CSOs to bid on public contract awards to access financing from local sources. However, requests for proposal are posted on the Internet and only a few organizations have Internet access. Organizations benefit from help from volunteers and sometimes receive non-financial help from local communities to implement projects. Religious groups are the most successful at mobilizing resources from their members.

Local sources of philanthropy, such as the Werrason and Olango Wosho Foundations, exist but remain small and fail to meet the needs of local communities. The philanthropic activities of certain local foundations often have a political agenda. Extractive industries are among the largest and influential businesses in the DRC, and many operate in the mineral-rich eastern regions of the country. The companies Tenke Fungurume, based in Katanga, Banro, based in Maniema, and South Kivu and Perenco-REP, based in Bas-Congo, are major mining companies operating in the DRC. These and other extractive industry companies have created independent foundations that support local community organizations. Larger international and corporate foundations, including the Vodacom Foundation, the Bralima Foundation, and the Banro Foundations, are the main sources of philanthropic giving.

Except for some organizations with a national scope, CSOs generally do not have diverse sources of financing and rely mostly on foreign sources. In short, CSOs are not self-sufficient enough to guarantee their viability even in the short-term.

CSOs have failed to cultivate loyal supporters. They rarely elaborate communication plans or share their activities with their members and target groups. They do not interact on a regular basis with their members or targeted groups and do not cultivate a local culture of philanthropy.

Some CSOs conduct revenue-generating activities, such as renting a meeting room, running a restaurant, renting accommodations and guesthouses, and operating a cyber café. Some engage in a range of economic activities to support their operations, sometimes seeking supplemental income outside of their official activities. However, these sources of funding remain too weak to guarantee the longevity of the organization.

The government and private businesses sometimes call on CSOs for services such as the rehabilitation of sanitary infrastructure, education services, and municipal clean up. Nevertheless, CSOs tend to not be competitive for these calls for proposals because they lack the capacity to comply with application procedures. The selection process often lacks transparency. CSOs have difficulty collecting membership fees. Only religious organizations receive enough member contributions to finance their activities.
The majority of CSOs have difficulty establishing solid financial management systems. Only large organizations use accounting software to guarantee better tracking and more transparent operations. Some CSOs conduct regular account audits and publish annual reports. However, these are often driven by the demands of their international donors.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

Civil society actors played a bigger advocacy role in 2014 as the government increased dialogue with CSOs. Civil society initiated new advocacy campaigns, including a campaign to revise the Mining Code and the Family Code.

Collaboration between the government and CSOs improved since the debate on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Paris Declaration on Development Effectiveness, the Cotonou Accords, the accords of the North-South Economic Partnership (APE), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Communication between CSOs and different levels of government exists and continued to improve in 2014. A collaborative framework exists for political dialogue at the national and provincial levels between different ministries and the CSOs covering 20 thematic groups. These groups include economic governance, mines and hydrocarbons, administrative governance, decentralization, political governance, justice and human rights, and gender. A general secretariat oversees the management of the thematic groups, but each group meets with its corresponding ministry.

CSOs initiated advocacy campaigns in 2014 in various sectors at the national level. These included an advocacy campaign on the revision of the Family Code, particularly the removal of parental authorization for marriage permits, and a campaign against constitutional revision and modification of the electoral law. The campaign to revise the Mining Code and Hydrocarbons Code was successfully included in the agenda of the October session of the parliament. CSOs launched a campaign against the ruling party’s efforts to modify the constitution by revising Article 220 and extending the president’s terms in office to three terms. Ultimately, the revision did not pass. The Episcopal Commission on Justice and Peace (CEJP) and Radio MAENDELEO worked with local CSOs to promote democracy and peace.

CSOs participated in the political processes. They established a collaborative framework with the National Independent Electoral Commission, collaborated with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank on the Document on the Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, and were consulted during the development of the 2014 national budget.

Congolese CSOs are lobbying to influence public policy and government action. These efforts in 2014 led to action at the national, local, and provincial levels, for example, a vote on the law governing the Economic and Social Council and the inclusion of civil society actors on the council. Lobbying also influenced the nomination of members of the Constitutional Court.

Congolese CSOs are aware that a favorable regulatory and legal framework can strengthen their effectiveness and longevity. A CSO-driven local lobbying movement exists to promote legal reforms that can benefit CSOs. Some examples include the coalition of CSOs for Public Reform and Action (CORAP), which has advocated for an electricity law; the Public Spending Observatory, which fights for transparency in public financial management; and the 24 Collective, which is promoting the adoption of a law on access to public information.
CSO service provision did not change in 2014. CSOs provide basic social services in health, education, relief, and other areas. The government and private companies sometimes asked CSOs to provide certain services, such as sanitation and rehabilitation of infrastructure on their behalf. For example, Caritas Congo paid local staff on behalf of private businesses in areas where banking is not available. Many CSOs worked in partnership with international donors and provided services under the auspices of donor programs.

The products and services furnished by CSOs do not always reflect the needs and priorities of their support groups and communities. Instead, organizations implement programs designed and funded by international donors. Nevertheless, CSO members are among the indirect beneficiaries of the products and services.

CSOs, CSO networks, or CSO platforms offer publications, workshop reports, and expert analysis. Some examples include election reports published by Act for Transparent and Calm Elections (AETA); *The Voice of the Congolese Farmer*, *The Governance Bulletin for All*, and *The Elections Chronicle*, disseminated by CENADEP; a magazine on natural resources, disseminated by Natural Resources Network (RRN); and *The Practical Guide to Citizen Control of Public Procurement*, published by the Office of Training and Research for Integral Development (BUFORDI). CSOs provide services and products in various areas but cannot recover costs because of a lack of institutional support.

Aware of both the demand of the market and the purchasing power of consumers, CSOs offer their products and services below the actual cost. CSOs sell diverse services and supply their expertise or the products of their activities, including analyses, books, juice, and agricultural products. Among the products sold and services rendered, some are produced in the context of official CSO activities and objectives, while others are not. CSOs engage in a range of economic activities to support their operations.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs, particularly concerning their support to the provision of basic social services.

CSOs are able to bid for tenders issued by Social Funds of the Republic and the Central Coordination Bureau (BCECO). However, in reality it is very difficult for CSOs to access state subsidies, although they are allowed to participate in calls for proposals and offers. An assistance framework has been established by the Government of Japan in partnership with the government. In the spirit of “matching funds,” the Government of Japan donates bags of corn flour to the DRC government, which sets a fixed sale price and distributes the bags to CSOs, which in turn sell the flour at the agreed-upon price and are allowed to keep the proceeds to fund social projects. Some CSOs that have begun to benefit from this program are the African League for the Defense of Children’s Rights (LIZADEEL) and Common Cause.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The status of CSOs in the DRC in terms of infrastructure remained the same in 2014. Congolese intermediary support organizations (ISOs) are largely based in urban locations. However, they also interact with CSOs operating in more rural locales. These ISOs offer numerous types of support (for example, access to information, technology, training, and technical assistance), and the number of CSO-support organizations and resource centers is growing. ISOs such as the Center for Studies, Documentation, and Civic Action in South Kivu, UMOJA, the African Institute for Economic and Social Development, Center of Studies for Social Action, and Training and Research Bureau for Complete Development offer
training and assistance to CSOs. The ISOs Hakizabinadam and Aprofem are focused on the promotion and defense of human rights. Maendeleo (Community Radio) and Justice and Peace work towards the promotion of peace and democracy.

CSOs are able to use the services of ISOs at below market cost. ISOs do not work on a for-profit basis and do not maintain commercial relationships with CSOs. ISOs and resource centers of religious organizations have their own sources of revenues from selling publications, hosting meetings and conferences, providing lodging, operating restaurants, and offering trainings for a fee. But other CSOs and resource centers operate with material assistance from their partners.

Foundations such as Vodacom, Mutombo Dikembe, Tenke Fungurume, Banro, Airtel, Shabani Nonda, and Perenco-Rep make grants to community organizations to respond to certain needs and local projects. Community organizations provide, for example, school kits for children whose parents have insufficient resources, school desks, public trash cans for sanitation in certain neighborhoods, and mattresses for clinics. Certain extractive industry companies have created independent foundations, which provide support to local community organizations. The Vodacom Initiative built on previous projects implemented by Caritas and Catholic Relief Services and brought mobile phone coverage to select towns in Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)-affected areas to enhance civilian protection with the support of local officials and CSOs.

Although a network specifically charged with sharing information among CSOs does not exist, CSOs share information in several ways. Within their thematic networks, CSOs share information via mailing lists, press communications, technical meetings, position papers, declarations, memoranda, and communications in the media. They also organize exchange days, or meetings for sharing information and best practices to improve interventions on the ground. Exchange days are also convened for sharing information from individuals returning from an international forum (for example, the Social Global Forum or Global Conference on Climate Change).

Several networks and platforms facilitate the circulation of information between members. These include the National Council of Non-Governmental Development Organizations (CNONGD), Natural Resources Network (RRN), Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Coalition of CSOs for the Struggle Against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (COSOC-GL), Coalition of CSOs for the Monitoring of Reforms and Public Action (CORAP), Network for the Promotion of Democracy and Economic and Social Rights (PRODDES), and Permanent Collaborative Framework for Congolese Women 7410/85206 (CAFCO). These different networks and platforms have permanent secretariats and coordination offices, through which CSO members can make their expectations known.

Training in core CSO management skills is available in all provinces of the country, as well as in urban centers. The training focuses on strategic management, accounting, financial management, proposal writing, internal governance, and project implementation and monitoring. The Center for Social Action Studies (CEPAS) and the African Institute for Economic and Social Development (INADES) offer capacity building. Teaching materials are available in French. Some training in rural locations is conducted in local languages.

Congolese CSOs are developing more public-private partnerships with local businesses, the government, and media to attain common objectives. The Congolese Association for the Environment (ACE) works with the Public Corporation for Water Distribution (REGIDESO). The Committee for Human Rights and Development (CODHOD) partners with the Office of Roads to dig and repair agricultural feeder roads. The women’s platform Common Cause works with the Ministry of Gender on a project on women’s leadership.
The African League for the Defense of Children’s Rights (LIZADEEL) pairs with the Ministry of Primary, Secondary, and Professional Teaching on free schooling and equal opportunities for girls and boys.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

It is difficult to say if Congolese CSOs receive more positive or negative coverage from the national media, because Congolese media mostly cover activities on a fee-for-coverage basis. Foreign media such as BBC, Voice of America, RFI, and TV5 report objectively on the work of certain CSOs to demonstrate the defining role of CSOs in the DRC.

For local media, nearly all official and private media coverage (radio, television, and press) is paid, including advertisements from businesses. Exceptions include Radio OKAPI, which is part of the United Nations, and a small number of community radio stations.

Members of the public do not seem to understand the concept of CSOs and do not always have a favorable public opinion of their work and roles. The public is often badly informed on the missions and roles of CSOs. Target populations frequently join and support CSO activities. However, some opinion groups decline to participate in these activities, thinking that CSOs are attempting to satisfy self-interests. Recent collaborations between CSOs and government have improved the government’s perception of CSOs and their role.

Businesses and government hold generally positive opinions of CSOs when they support their programs and actions. However, they have a poor opinion of human rights, governance, and anti-corruption CSOs, who often criticize them.

CSOs often use the media to make their activities known, but must pay for these announcements. As such, the CSOs cannot always adequately promote themselves because of limited financial means.

CSOs are developing good relationships with journalists. Some CSOs have created their own media channels to make their voices heard. Examples include Radio and TV ELIKYA, Radio and TV Sentinelle for religious organizations, and Maendeleo, Hakizabinadam, Maniema Liberte, and Radio RCK for the community radio stations. Practically all CSOs work with the listed radio stations, since these are community radio stations established generally by and for CSOs.

The civil society charter adopted in 2010 does not provide sufficient guidance on ethics for CSOs, so development-focused CSOs have created their own code of ethics. Leading CSOs regularly publish reports and transmit them to partners and members, as well as their respective boards and committees. The publication of annual reports is not only an activity undertaken by large CSOs or those with a national scope. Other organizations at the provincial or local levels also publish reports but do so less regularly than large, national-level CSOs.
With a population of more than 90 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa. It has one of the world’s fastest growing economies but is still very poor. In 2014 agriculture accounted for 47 percent of GDP and employed more than 80 percent of the population. The state remains heavily involved in most economic sectors, leaving little room for the private sector. National electronic media are owned by the government.

During 2014, 150,000 migrant workers from Ethiopia were forcibly expelled from Saudi Arabia. The event greatly affected the political image of the country and spotlighted the government’s weak policies for alleviating unemployment. Also during the year, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) faced a court challenge concerning its support for a “villagization” program in Ethiopia. The case involved allegations that DFID contributed to an involuntary resettlement program that led to human rights violations in the Gambella region. In July a British court ruled that an Ethiopian plaintiff had the legal grounds to ask for a judicial review of Britain’s development assistance to the country. Early in 2015 the court case was dropped, but DFID announced that it was withdrawing support from this program.
Generally, the human rights situation in Ethiopia continued to be troubling in 2014. In April nine journalists were arrested for allegedly using social media to incite violence and collaborating with terrorist groups to create instability in the country. In July police arrested four opposition political party figures amid allegations that they were involved with terrorist organizations. In August the Ministry of Justice charged five independent magazines and a weekly newspaper with publishing false information, inciting violence, and undermining public confidence in the government. The 2014 Freedom in the World report by Freedom House again rated Ethiopia as a “not free” country in terms of press freedom. Reporters Without Borders listed the country as an “enemy of the Internet,” and the World Justice Project ranked Ethiopia eighty-eighth out of ninety-nine countries in its Rule of Law Index for 2014.

In September the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of Ethiopia’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), despite the government’s rejection of several key recommendations, including those calling for amendment of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. CSOs interpreted the government’s position as a clear indication that it has no intention of creating an enabling environment for CSOs, particularly those working in human rights and good governance. They also anticipate that in the run-up to the national election, scheduled for May 2015, the participation of the media and CSOs will not be easy.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) accepted Ethiopia as a candidate member in March 2014. EITI had initially rejected Ethiopia’s application after international human rights groups urged the organization not to admit Ethiopia until the CSP was changed. Ethiopia now has three years to prove compliance with EITI standards, including the involvement of civil society in industry oversight.

According to the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), 3,174 CSOs were registered in Ethiopia as of December 2014. Of this number, 65 percent were Ethiopian residents’ charities; 13 percent were foreign charities, including adoption agencies; 12 percent were Ethiopian societies; 4 percent were Ethiopian charities; 4 percent were Ethiopian residents’ societies; and 2 percent were network organizations. Only 167 CSOs were newly registered during the year, compared to 298 in 2013. A study conducted by the joint European Union’s Civil Society Fund (EU-CSF II) in 2014 showed that of the total number of CSOs registered by the CSA, only 870 were operational. The rest did not have projects to implement, mainly because of a lack of funds.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

CSOs in Ethiopia are governed by the CSP. When adopted in 2009, the CSP introduced a radically changed approach to classifying and administering CSOs. The CSO community expected the law to improve their operating environment and enhance their ability to contribute to the country’s development. Instead, except in very limited functional areas, implementation of the law has been highly restrictive. For example, organizations working in the areas of human rights and good governance must be registered as Ethiopian charities and cannot access foreign funding amounting to more than 10 percent of their total income. CSOs also cannot accept funds from anonymous sources.

The Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization (known as the 30/70 rule), issued in 2011, classifies a large number of CSO expenses as administrative in nature. Their aggregate cost cannot be greater than 30 percent of an organization’s overall budget. In 2014 the CSA issued an amendment to the 30/70 rule that applies to organizations working on HIV/AIDS, persons with disabilities,
clean water, environmental protection, climate change, agricultural and construction activities, and capacity-building activities. This amendment re-categorizes some expenses, including project staff salaries, vehicles, and trainings, as project costs rather than administrative costs. Most CSOs perceived the amendment as a positive step, despite its failure to address the bulk of restrictions governing their operations.

A directive issued by the CSA in 2010 to regulate network organizations undermines their role by limiting their ability to coordinate common voices and build their members’ capacity. They now serve mostly as mechanisms for channeling funds to their members, as they may retain no more 10 percent of the funding they mobilize and must pass on the rest to members. The 2007 Electoral Law prohibits CSOs from engaging in voter education and election monitoring activities.

In 2014, under the second cycle of the UPR, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued 252 recommendations for improving human rights in Ethiopia. Thirteen of these recommendations directly addressed the laws governing CSOs. The main concern was that the CSP should be amended to ensure CSOs’ freedom of association, access to foreign funding, and freedom of operation in the areas of human rights and civic education. Unfortunately, although the Ethiopian government accepted 188 of the recommendations, it rejected all of those related to CSOs.

A large number of CSOs closed in 2014 compared to previous years. A total of 158 CSOs were shut down during the year, of which 147 were local and eleven were foreign organizations. Nineteen CSOs closed voluntarily due to the lack of funds. Another 103 organizations were closed by the CSA on the grounds that they had failed to implement projects since their founding. Nineteen CSOs—all Ethiopian societies established to promote the professional interest of their members—were deregistered on the grounds that they had mistakenly been registered or re-registered as the wrong type of organization. An additional seventeen CSOs were closed for reasons ranging from their failure to observe reporting requirements to the misappropriation of money, work outside the permitted scope of activities, and failure to fulfill project agreements.

The CSA issued a cost-sharing directive at the end of 2013 that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services. CSOs can also engage as businesses in income-generating activities, and they can agree with beneficiaries to share the cost of services and products provided certain conditions are met. For example, beneficiaries’ contributions may not be greater than 25 percent of the overall cost of the services and products provided, and organizations must give freely to individuals who cannot afford to pay the contribution.

CSOs are not legally required to pay tax on donations, but they must pay tax on other transactions involving the sale or purchase of goods and services. CSOs may import cars duty free for specific projects provided they have the permission of the CSA. CSOs are not allowed to sell any of their property without CSA permission.

There are few lawyers in Ethiopia specializing in non-profit law or providing legal services to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Constituency building is still a deficit for the majority of Ethiopian CSOs. Although their project and organizational documents identify stakeholders, including beneficiaries, most organizations do not engage in building local constituencies for their initiatives. Consequently, almost all CSOs are completely dependent on foreign aid and do not receive support from local sources.

Very few CSOs have strategic planning documents. The main reason is that all costs incurred in preparing strategic
plans, needs assessments, baseline surveys, and similar documents are considered administrative costs under the 30/70 rule and would limit the funding available to meet other administrative needs. Moreover, most CSOs do not have the technical capacity to develop strategic plans, and they usually lack the funds to hire external consultants.

CSOs are legally required to have certain internal management structures. For example, a CSO must have at least a general assembly of members, which serves as the highest body of the organization; a board of directors, in charge of supervising operations; and a secretariat, responsible for day-to-day activities. However, the way in which the general assembly and board of directors are constituted is often problematic. In many CSOs they do not operate transparently, and boards are often not committed to supporting their organization’s values and activities.

Since the adoption of the 30/70 rule, which classifies salaries as an administrative cost, attracting and retaining qualified staff is a challenge for local CSOs. A culture of volunteerism is not well developed in Ethiopia.

Most CSOs have access to the Internet and use it mainly for email. The majority of CSOs do not have websites, and those that do often do not keep them updated. Any cost related to office equipment is considered an administrative cost, and thus CSOs are obliged to buy and use cheaper equipment, which is usually of inferior quality.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

![Financial Viability in Ethiopia](chart)

The major sources of funding for CSOs in Ethiopia are USAID, DFID, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD); the embassies of Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway; and multilateral organizations such as the European Union and World Bank.

The three major grantmaking mechanisms for CSOs are EU-CSF II; the Ethiopia Social Accountability Program Phase 2 (ESAP 2), financed through the World Bank; and the Civil Society Support Program (CSSP), funded by international donors and led by Irish Aid and DFID. Although rights-based organizations, which must register as Ethiopian charities, are prohibited from receiving foreign funding amounting to more than 10 percent of their income, these agencies have developed innovative funding mechanisms to enable rights-based organizations to access their funds, either individually or in partnership. For example, ESAP 2 negotiated with the government to reclassify some of its funds as domestic. EU-CSF II is considered a domestic fund. Human rights organizations, including Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (VECOD), Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA), Human Rights Council (HRCO), Ethiopian Lawyers’ Association (ELA), and Ethiopian Elderly and Pensioners National Association (EEPNA), received EU-CSF II funding in 2014 for project implementation and basic operations.

According to Non-State Actors in Ethiopia—Update Mapping, a report compiled in 2014 by EU-CSF II and CSSP, there were a total of 2,604 CSO projects underway during the year, of which more than half were implemented by international organizations. The overwhelming majority of these projects, some of which are multi-year, were in health, education, livelihoods, agriculture, and the environment. Their total budget was estimated at $1.788 billion. Only 870 CSOs, or fewer than 30 percent of registered organizations, were involved in project implementation in 2014.

With the number of registered organizations far exceeding the number of CSOs with projects on the ground, the majority of Ethiopian CSOs face serious resource constraints. The regulatory restrictions on mobilizing and utilizing funding are the major cause of CSOs’ financial insecurity. There is also a tendency among
donors to channel funds to organizations from their own countries, which limits the funding available for domestic CSOs, particularly those operating far from Addis Ababa. A further challenge for smaller and newer organizations is that a few CSOs tend to monopolize funding, especially since donors prefer to fund project implementation rather than capacity building.

Almost all CSOs rely on foreign assistance and do not have a diversified funding base. Domestic resource mobilization remains undeveloped, mainly because of the lack of local philanthropies, weak CSO capacity, and the inability of communities to contribute to CSO initiatives. Regulatory restrictions are also a barrier to domestic resource mobilization. For example, although the law recognizes the right of CSOs to engage in income-generating and fundraising activities, they are hindered by cumbersome requirements, such as the rule that a CSO may engage in income-generating activities only if they relate to the organization’s mandate. In addition, CSOs’ business activities are not tax exempt, and CSOs cannot charge their beneficiaries more than 25 percent of the costs incurred for a product or service. To engage in fundraising, CSOs must prove that it is a last resort for obtaining funds.

There is no record of the government or businesses awarding contracts for CSO services. Only a few business organizations extend financial support to CSOs working in such areas as childcare, the environment, and the elderly.

CSOs are legally required to commission an annual audit by an external auditor and to submit the report to the CSA. Some CSOs make their audit reports available to the public in printed form, on their websites, or by other means.

**ADVOCACY: 6.1**

The contribution of CSOs to the democratization process in Ethiopia is limited. CSO engagement in dialogue with the government and the formulation of national policies is severely curtailed by the law as well as the government’s lack of interest. Relations between the government and CSOs vary depending on the type of organization. The government is comfortable working with mass-based CSOs, such as women’s associations, youth associations, trade unions, and teachers’ associations. Other types of advocacy organizations face significant constraints on their activities. Only Ethiopian charities are permitted to work on advocacy issues, including human rights, good governance, access to justice and rule of law, peace building, child rights, gender equality, and the rights people with disabilities. The number of organizations working in these areas is small because of funding constraints, other legal constraints, lack of experience, and fear of reprisal from the state. As a result, CSOs working on advocacy issues are growing more marginalized, especially because existing networks do not embrace advocacy, as the law prohibits networking between organizations allowed to receive foreign money and those that are not.

An ad hoc forum called the GO-NGO Forum was established in 2009 to facilitate a smooth working relationship between the government and CSOs at all levels. Officials from the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development chair the forum, and CSO representatives serve as its secretariat. However, the forum lacks consistency. In some regions, meetings are conducted regularly, while in other regions, meetings are not held or the forum simply does not exist. Generally, the forum lacks a clear mandate as well as an operational structure.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

CSOs provide a wide range of services. The major areas of CSO intervention are health and HIV/AIDS; women and children; education and training; and agriculture, livelihoods, and food security. CSOs are also
active in integrated development, water and sanitation, and the environment. The involvement of CSOs in the areas of governance and empowerment is insignificant.

Except for organizations established as societies to protect the interest of their members, CSOs are expected to benefit the larger community. However, as the 30/70 rule classifies any expense related to the identification of beneficiaries’ needs and priorities as an administrative cost, only organizations with generous budgets can afford to engage in such activities. In most cases, communities’ high demand for services cannot be met, given the limited capacity of CSOs.

To sell their products or services, CSOs must have a business license and permission from the CSA. These are not easy to obtain, as the requirements for obtaining a business license are cumbersome. As a result, very few CSOs are experienced at marketing their products and services.

The government does not provide contracts or grants to support the activities of CSOs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Ethiopia improved in 2014. International intermediary support organizations (ISOs) still mobilize and channel resources to local CSOs. Pact Ethiopia, WaterAid Ethiopia, Trócaire, CAFOD, Goal Ethiopia, Oxfam America, Save the Children Ethiopia, and ActionAid Ethiopia are some of the ISOs supporting and working with local CSOs. Some ISOs provide technical and financial support, while others also engage directly in project implementation. In 2014 the CSA sent letters to about thirty international ISOs warning them that all of their costs were considered administrative costs, which are limited by the 30/70 rule. In fact, there is no legislation governing international ISOs that provide support to local CSOs and do not engage directly in project implementation. But the warning letters implied that international ISOs would be shut down if they did not comply with CSA requirements. Some ISOs began considering steps such as closing their Ethiopian offices or becoming direct project implementers.

Other than through a few initiatives, such as EU-CSF II and CSSP, the majority of donors are reluctant to provide capacity-building support to local CSOs. Funding arrangements with these two initiatives can help CSOs obtain necessary equipment, such as computers, cars, and office furniture. Some ISOs provide training on project management and implementation.

The Federal Forum for Charities and Societies, which was established with the blessing of the CSA to succeed the Taskforce on Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Ethiopia, became active in 2014. This was a positive step. Despite the legal restriction on establishing network organizations that serve both charities and societies or both foreign and local CSOs, the forum is the first to bring together all kinds of organizations. The forum’s scope is both national and regional, and its focus is on legal, institutional, and operational issues of concern to the CSO sector. If the forum operates according to its stated objectives, it should be able to address some of the major issues affecting CSOs, including the legal environment.

Intersectoral partnerships are not strong. Mass-based associations, such as those working with women and youth, enjoy good relations with the government and are sometimes even viewed as being pro-party or government affiliated. The law provides special permission to mass-based associations to engage in democracy promotion and election-related activities, and they are not required to disclose their membership.
or undergo audits. However, human rights organizations, such as HRCO, which investigates human rights violations, are still struggling to find a way to collaborate with the government. On a positive note, in October 2014 the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a government institution, signed a memorandum of understanding with EWLA to implement a project on legal aid services with support from Irish Aid. This may be a first step toward better cooperation between the government and CSOs in the areas of human rights and good governance.

CSO-business partnerships remain undeveloped. Only one CSO, the Organization for Social Development, works on the issue of corporate social responsibility and lobbies the business community to support the work of grassroots CSOs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

The relationship between the media and CSOs remained a challenge in 2014, as there is no common framework, formal or informal, in which the two actors can collaborate and coordinate activities. Nevertheless, during the year the CSO sector enjoyed more positive coverage by both private and government media. For example, the *Ethiopian Herald*, a government-owned newspaper, provided fair coverage of the “NGO Good Practice Day” held in February in Addis Ababa.

The public’s views are strongly shaped by the comments of government officials, which are generally negative. The government views mass-based associations, such as those working with women and youth, as authentic CSOs, and it tolerates development and service-providing CSOs only as long as they refrain from integrating rights-based elements into their projects. The government regards advocacy efforts as political activities and thus as against its interests. Although there have been some changes in tone recently, policy makers and high-level officials often criticize CSOs as rent seekers who have no role in the development of the country, including the democratization process. Lower-level government officials sometimes recognize the contribution of CSOs in social services provision. The business community perceives CSOs as organizations receiving a great deal of money from foreign donors. However, the private sector by and large lacks a commitment to philanthropy, in part because CSOs themselves are not significantly engaged in cultivating public awareness and domestic resource mobilization.

To strengthen CSO-media relations, the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) organized a daylong orientation program for journalists in December 2014. About thirty journalists took part in the program, which included discussions of the role and contribution of CSOs. CCRDA called on journalists to strengthen their relationship with the CSO sector and constructively promote it. To promote better public and government perceptions of the CSO sector, CCRDA also launched a weekly radio program highlighting CSO activities. Its “NGOs Good Practice Day” celebrated the contributions of CSOs to Ethiopia’s development. High-level government officials, including the deputy prime minister, attended the event. While noting there was room for improvement, the deputy prime minister commended CSOs for their work in health, agriculture, the environment, family planning, education, and water. Individual CSOs made efforts to heighten their visibility by using social media and fostering relationships with journalists.

Some Ethiopian residents’ charities and foreign charities, including all CCRDA members, have adopted a code of conduct. However, because of the CSA’s resistance, there is no entity charged with monitoring compliance.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Ethiopia

CSO Sustainability

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<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Enhanced</th>
<th>Evolving</th>
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Ethiopia: 5.6

- Legal Environment
- Public Image
- Organizational Capacity
- Infrastructure
- Financial Viability
- Service Provision
- Advocacy
For Gabon, 2014 was marked by a tenuous political and socioeconomic situation with near-continuous warnings of crisis from local observers. The interdependency in Gabon of politics, society, and the economy meant that political and economic uncertainty was felt in many sectors, including civil society. CSOs especially struggled because of their dual role of managing and monitoring public affairs within a context of ongoing discussions about their role in society and little to no movement on their legal and regulatory framework.

The legal environment of CSOs did not evolve, although some initiatives, such as the revision of the Law on Associations, moved forward in the early stages. The scarcity of financing and other support increased the precarious situation of CSOs at both the organizational and institutional level. Gaps in organizational capacity resulted from the dearth of funding to support medium- and long-term objectives. Funding shortfalls also meant that many CSOs were unable to adequately meet standard operational needs, such as acquiring office equipment or paying rent. CSOs attempted to set up support groups to overcome their gaps in capacity and resources. They continued to be active in networking and collaboration, thanks in large part to the commitment and conviction of the leadership at the majority of CSOs.
Despite these pitfalls, CSOs remained busy developing advocacy and lobbying initiatives based on their areas of expertise and missions. They made efforts to improve their communication tools and to improve their relationships with media outlets, in particular the private media. A notable development in 2014 was the growth of the power of unions. When the government failed to meet their demands, unions responded with strikes in the public and para-public sectors, including health, national education, forestry, customs, and mining. Because of their increasing presence and evidence of success, public perceptions of CSOs generally improved, albeit modestly. In 2014 the number of CSOs—including major trade unions in various professional sectors, associations, NGOs, and foundations—registered with the Ministry of the Interior was approximately 1,000. CSOs took part in every domain of public life across a range of sectors, including health, the environment, social and cultural issues, and education.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

In 2014 the legal environment continued to be impeded for CSOs in Gabon. Although supportive of the creation of CSOs and their right to operate freely, various laws and regulations (including Laws 35/62 of December 10, 1962, pertaining to associations, and Law 3-94 of November 21, 1994, regulating the labor code and application texts) were weak because they failed to account for the vast diversity of CSOs in Gabon. In 2014 no new legal provisions went into effect that repealed or supplemented previous provisions.

CSOs’ by-laws outline their internal management systems. Law 35-62 details the liquidation of CSOs and non-authorized activities, but with no mention of dissolution. Law 3-94 on unions outlines permitted activities and briefly discusses dissolution. While these provisions cover the government’s ability to dissolve CSOs, this power is not known to have been applied.

CSOs remained in discussion with the local representation of the UN Development Program for Gabon (PNUD) to introduce a revision of Law 35/62 that would include a CSO-favorable tax. This revised version will ultimately be proposed to the government. In late 2013 UNDP, with its interest in supporting CSOs, expressed at its annual meeting with CSOs its intention to support reforming the law. Nonetheless, this discussion around a proposed amendment to Law 36/62 has been ongoing since the closeout of the Strengthening Non-State Actors of Gabon (PROGREANE) program, funded by the European Union, with no real follow-up or substantive progress made to date.

Amid a tense and risky political, social, and economic context, the state has retained its prerogative to dissolve CSOs, even as CSOs maintain their freedom of expression. In 2014 no CSOs or unions were dissolved by the government. However, obtaining permanent registration remained difficult for CSOs working on governance issues, including human rights and anti-corruption. While such groups may be able to obtain temporary authorization, passing from temporary to permanent authorization remains problematic and in most cases registration is a lengthy and arduous, though not impossible, process.

Obtaining subsidies from the state or public authorities remained highly regulated and restricted (Article 18 of Law 35/62). Compared to 2013, state subsidies became rarer in 2014 because of ongoing political and economic crises. Other than some CSOs considered to be pro-government, most CSOs did not receive subsidies.
The question of CSO taxation in 2014 remained problematic as the Law 35/62 is silent on this issue. The General Code of Direct and Indirect Taxes allows for CSOs to benefit from exemptions on customs taxes, but there is no accompanying text on the means by which to implement the necessary procedures. Discussions of revising the Law 35/62 have emphasized the inclusion of a tax on CSOs, but fiscal questions remain a thorny issue for CSOs. For instance, while in some cases CSOs are eligible for exemptions, the procedures by which to obtain those exemptions remain unclear. Grants and subsidies to CSOs are not taxed. The law does not specify whether it is possible for CSOs to earn revenue from the provision of goods and services. In practice, CSOs respond to requests for bids and obtain contracts.

Despite CSOs’ lack of funding for legal services, a number of defense attorneys represented CSOs in court against various charges in 2014. For example, following unrest at the University of Libreville, a number of students were arrested who belonged to a student collective that called for improved university services. Following their arrests, they were defended by a group of attorneys with knowledge of pertinent legislation and the CSO environment. There are some law firms pledged to defend CSOs and human rights that house lawyers capable of serving as legal defenders when needed.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

The country’s political and socioeconomic context has a strong influence on the development of organizational capacity of CSOs. In 2014, this was particularly evident with regard to opportunities for CSOs to increase their capacity and to conduct joint advocacy campaigns and make concerted union demands. A certain level of dynamism in organizational terms persisted among CSOs, which allowed them to carry out actions even if structural capacity deficits remained (for example, if they lacked office space or equipment). The CSO landscape grew more strongly politicized, yielding such groups as Indignant Front and the Collective of CSOs for Social Development of Gabon (CODSG), which supports the Gabonese president’s Social Pact, a project he proposed in January 2014.

CSOs struggled to build constituencies and lacked resources to put into place long-term initiatives or maintain support for constituents. However, environmental CSOs were able to create networks and build local support. Union demands rose in nearly every sector, accompanied by a resurgence of strikes. The unions grew stronger as part of collectives to advance common platforms and represent all workers. One example was the alliance formed between the National Convention of Education Sector Unions (CONASYCED), a union of education-sector employees, and National Organization of Oil Employees (ONEP), a union of petroleum-sector employees.

In their various sectoral or intersectoral support groups, CSOs tried to adopt common missions articulated within constitutional texts, such as charters or memoranda of understanding. These jointly developed strategies benefitted CSOs that lacked the capacity to create such documents on their own. However, it was uncommon for these plans or the plans of individual CSOs to outline long-term objectives. Particularly for individual organizations, strategies tend to be short-term and “opportunistic” or based on published calls for proposals.

Management structures did not change substantially from 2013 to 2014. CSOs generally have a daily management team consisting of three to five people; most do not have a board of directors. A lack of financial resources makes permanent paid staff unsustainable for most organizations. Except for unions, which have true internal governance bodies, most CSOs rely on volunteers, despite potential accountability issues. Because of poorly developed internal structures within the majority of CSOs, they tend to join
together to pool their human resources, financial resources, and sometimes their infrastructure, including workspace.

Their limited financial capacity impacted CSOs’ ability to procure or maintain modern equipment and materials. For example, since monthly Internet subscription fees can be prohibitively expensive, many CSOs used cybercafés or mobile phones to connect to the Internet.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

Identifying funding sources remained difficult for most CSOs in 2014, particularly with the economic crisis in the country. Against the backdrop of political tensions, the socioeconomic environment led many businesses and private operators to consider closing their businesses, and some are in the process of downsizing because most state projects are idle or have stopped completely. The state did not always honor its contracts, and many CSOs accumulated unpaid invoices. As a result, the state struggled to provide subsidies to CSOs while working to address the financial climate for businesses, resulting in ever decreasing opportunities for CSOs to access state subsidies and funding. The rarity of external funding sources increasingly complicated the situation.

Local sources of financing issue few calls for project proposals and have limited budgets. Environmental CSOs may receive small government grants, which are not disbursed on a regular basis. Some organizations have been waiting two to three years to receive their annual grants. In 2014 this left many CSOs with insufficient resources to remain viable in the short term. Known local financing sources included the Embassy of France’s Service for Cooperation and Cultural Action (SCAC), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the EU delegation, as well as philanthropic sources such as the Red Cross, Caritas, Lion’s Club, and Rotary Club. In 2014 there were no known international calls for proposals for Gabon.

Philanthropy remains an underdeveloped concept in Gabon, despite activities that suggest otherwise. For example, some CSOs receive substantial financial support from individuals. However, quite often these individuals are politicians, and their donations are a strategy to secure support for their election. They often donate to campaigns to create awareness around health issues or to distribute health supplies. Some politicians have even created CSOs despite their substantial political party responsibilities.

In addition to joint projects, which can be funded by external sources, CSOs generated revenue through activities such as trainings, the publication of training guides, conferences with paid registrations, and consulting and other services.

Although CSOs’ statutes and internal regulatory documentation allow for the collection of membership fees and donations, the collection of these funds is rarely efficient. For example, it is illegal for union membership fees to be withdrawn directly from employee paychecks. Although individuals are free to join the trade union of their choice and to contribute to it financially, the lack of an automatic payment system can make it difficult for some unions to collect funds.

In 2014 some CSOs sought alternate funding sources by responding to rare requests for proposals issued by the government, businesses, or local institutions. But they often lacked the capacity to assemble project proposals and especially to meet eligibility criteria, which are often strict. However, there were some successful examples. For instance, Brainforest responded to calls for proposals from WWF for a case study and from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for support to a participatory mapping project it was conducting with the Department of Wildlife in the Ministry of Forests. Environment Gabon also contributed to this FAO project. Additionally, International Development Research Center (IDRC) Africa is working with the company Olam for socioeconomic studies about its concessions.
Aside from a few CSOs that have accounting and financial management systems required by donors, most organizations continued to have under-developed financial management systems. CSOs typically use only basic tools developed on Excel spreadsheets, with no procedural manuals.

**ADVOCACY: 5.0**

Despite their limited means, in 2014 CSOs participated in intense, multifaceted lobbying and advocacy work. Unions were particularly active in 2014, and other CSOs led advocacy campaigns in response to specific events. The unions grew stronger in every sector by taking part in collectives to advance common platforms and represent all workers. For example, an alliance formed between CONASYCED, a union of education-sector employees, and ONEP, a union of petroleum-sector employees. There was also a resurgence of strikes.

As another example, during the annual New York Forum Africa in Gabon, four separate agreements were signed with the intent of accelerating economic growth. The advocacy CSO Gabon Indignants staged a protest in response, stating that the forum itself was a publicity stunt and not designed substantively to address the development needs of the country.

In July 2014 the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) launched a tightly targeted advocacy campaign. The TCC is composed of representatives of the government and the private and civil society sectors. Although TCC was set up by the government of Gabon, its advocacy campaign focused on increasing the role of CSOs as part of Gabon’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) agreement with the European Union (EU). FLEGT is an EU initiative to reduce illegal logging by strengthening sustainable and legal forest management, improving governance, and promoting the trade of legally produced timber. CSOs played a key role, voiced their concerns and advocated for recommendations on the sustainable development law in August 2014.

Although divisions always exist within civil society, CSOs seemed increasingly to understand the need to network and share resources to attain their objectives in 2014. Although they are not yet fully operational, effective multi-actor coordination and discussion networks exist, through which CSOs can participate in decision-making processes. Examples include the Administrative Council for the Agency for Execution of Forest/Woods Activities, the Administrative Council for National Forestry Funds, and the Joint Thematic Group 2 on natural resources and sustainable development.

Gabon My Earth My Right (GMTMD) continued its advocacy efforts to improve the draft law on sustainable development in Gabon. This law was finally enacted in August 2014. Although it fails to address most of GMTMD’s concerns and proposals, some were at least considered, while others were changed following a National Assembly hearing attended by GMTMD representatives. This advocacy resulted in eventual changes to Article 2 of the bill, and some of the clauses that were not acceptable to GMTMD were removed in the revised version. Another advocacy campaign urged the Ministry of Forests to revise regulations to benefit grassroots communities. Although to date the government has not taken into account CSO concerns and recommendations, in 2014 several positive multi-stakeholder consultative frameworks were put in place.

Intense multi-sector trade union activity also took place in 2014 as a result of the difficult socioeconomic situation. Negotiations between unions and the government progressed, but the government was slow to implement conventions and agreements made with the unions. Consequently, unions became disillusioned and strikes increased in every sector.

The principal advocacy effort to effect regulatory change that will benefit CSOs focused on the revision of Law 35/62, an effort in which the UNDP was also engaged.
SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1

There has been little variation from year to year in the range of products and services provided by CSOs. As in 2013, in 2014 CSOs provided a range of free and fee-based services across a variety of sectors, such as education, health, community rights, natural resource management, and forestry. While there was a decline in CSOs providing services as a result of the decrease in donor funding, the quality of the products and services that remained available did not deteriorate. Additionally, CSOs produced publications and studies and advised other CSOs in government and international organizations. For example, the Forestry Ministry organized a workshop in collaboration with CSOs in Libreville in February 2014 on community rights in the forest sector. GMTMD and Client Earth also organized a workshop in May 2014 on procedural and substantive rights.

CSOs provided services such as workshops, conferences, campaigns, and trainings, which often reflected the priorities of their donors while attempting to respond to the needs and concerns of the target audiences. Communities were the ultimate beneficiaries of these activities, and CSO products and services were generally provided after evaluation of community needs. Areas of focus included improvement of living conditions (salaries, bonuses, social protection, and other benefits) and work issues (workplace safety, materials, and continuing education and training). For example, a common demand that emerged from unions in all sectors was to increase the guaranteed minimum wage and the index point.

CSOs generally require significant external funding to carry out their activities in the field and to pay their staff. Contracts typically do not permit CSOs to cover all of their costs. Unions are more successful at recovering their costs. Although they require membership fees to operate, they need little external funding to mobilize their members to support union demands and other advocacy movements.

CSOs often had to reduce the scope of their activities because the scarcity of available resources. Similarly, overall benefits from the government and other private sector actors for all sectors of CSO services and products were increasingly rare.

Although the government officially recognized the contribution of CSOs, some members did not see CSOs as partners of the government. Government subsidies were rare and distributed in a biased way. That said, the formation of the TCC was a good example of not only the government’s acknowledgement of the positive role that civil society can play, but also a proactive attempt to engage constructively with civil society.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2

In 2014 CSO infrastructure challenges persisted. In 2013 Mbandja Center, the intermediate support organization (ISO) supported by the government, showed some promise. However, as of 2014, this ISO is no longer functional. Other ISOs such as the Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation still existed, largely thanks to the political will and support of national leaders.

Some organizations, including the Red Cross, Rotary Club, Caritas, and Lion’s Club, made grants to respond to locally identified needs.

While there is room for improvement, CSOs increasingly understood the need to share information. As in 2013, confrontations and leadership battles existed, but CSOs increasingly understood the need to pool information and data. Information sharing is most often accomplished through workshops and other
meetings, both informal and informal, among coalitions of CSOs. CSOs that have the capacity to do so have also made use of websites and social networks. For example, GMTMD began to construct a website and a Facebook page.

One of the biggest infrastructure concerns was the identification of management trainers for CSOs. Some exist, but they are not well known to CSOs. Some of the larger universities, such as the Senghor University, in partnership with the Program for Central and Western Africa of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (PACO-IUCN), began to offer modules on CSO management. But the lack of financial resources hindered the ability of CSOs to access this type of training.

While there were examples of CSOs working effectively with local businesses and government, they did so within a specific framework to provide limited services. Such partnerships are insufficient to sustain organizations over the long term.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

In 2014 there were a greater number of instances in which CSOs were presented in the media as conducting activism across different sectors. Some examples of activist CSOs that were highlighted include Brainforest, Network of Free Organizations of Civil Society for Good Governance in Gabon (ROLBG), and Indignant Front. The quality of media coverage of CSOs still depended on organizations’ political positions and the political affiliation of the media outlets covering their activities.

Nonetheless, among the greater public, CSOs had a rather positive image. Commenting on advocacy campaigns and union demands, several observers of public life in Gabon observed in 2014 that CSOs increasingly represent a credible alternative to the government in advancing needed changes. Additionally, the public showed interest in CSOs’ actions, speeches, and declarations. Although the public does not completely understand the role of CSOs, there is a general understanding that civil society serves as “the voice of the voiceless.”

Freedom of expression exists across all communication channels (radio, television, print publications, and social networks), and CSOs have a strong propensity for developing social media networks. Nevertheless, access to state media remained selective in 2104, with an organization’s relationship to the party in power typically determining access.

The distinction between public announcements and advertisements from private businesses is well established, and no confusion or conflation was encountered in this area.

Beyond some divisions and suspicions, both the government and businesses increasingly perceived CSOs as partners that offer valuable expertise and with whom they should conduct dialogues. The effort of the TCC to increase the role of civil society in FLEGT negotiations was an example of partnership between the public, private, and CSO sectors.

The majority of CSOs have not mastered communication tools that could permit them to better publicize their activities and expertise. Their lack of visibility left them seeking means by which to raise awareness. A few CSOs, such as GMTMD, maintained their own websites and produced activity reports for their donors or general reports for distribution to all partners in 2014. However, this was not a standard practice across the sector.
Few CSOs have developed procedural manuals or networks that provide instructions and protocols, although some donors require that operating procedures be transparent. No formal ethical code is in place among CSOs.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.5

The year 2014 in The Gambia was characterized by controversial government actions amid dire socio-economic conditions. President Yahya Jammeh withdrew The Gambia from the British Commonwealth in October 2013 and soon after cut off diplomatic ties with The Gambia’s longstanding ally, Taiwan. Political power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the state, and the human rights situation continued to deteriorate. The space for the exercise of civil liberties grew more constrained, with instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture of political opponents, journalists, public officials, and other citizens who expressed divergent views. Amendments to the Criminal Code in October 2014 put heavy sentences on what it called “agravated homosexuality” and were widely criticized by foreign governments and human rights groups. The increasingly high cost of living, poor delivery of social services, and widespread corruption added to the country’s difficulties.

Despite these challenges, CSOs continued to provide much-needed social goods and services to people in all regions of the country. Most CSOs are headquartered in or near the capital city of Banjul, but they carry out
interventions across the country, focusing mainly on rural areas where poverty and the lack of social series are most acute. Although CSOs are not able to openly criticize the government or advocate against government actions, they enjoy stable working conditions and cordial relations with state officials for the most part.

New CSOs continued to emerge in The Gambia in 2014, mainly in the areas of education, health, community development, and agriculture. The emergence of self-help organizations is particularly notable, as communities increasingly realize that they need to address interventions by the state and the inability of CSOs to provide for all. The exact number of CSOs in The Gambia is unknown but is at least in the hundreds. The NGO Affairs Agency has 125 registered NGOs, a number that has not changed since 2012.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

CSO registration is normally an easy and straightforward process. Under the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Decree 81, the main law guiding CSO registration and operations, charitable organizations must register with the Ministry of Justice. After two years of operation, a registered charitable organization may acquire NGO status through the NGO Affairs Agency. The number of NGOs remains small, as the status conveys no real benefit. Most NGOs are larger, more established CSOs.

The NGO Decree sets forth requirements related to the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and dissolution of CSOs. For example, the decree states that CSOs must support government policy or risk being banned or de-registered. The decree also stipulates that CSOs report to the Ministry of Interior, which opens the door to micro-management and state interference in CSO operations. For example, the state may close a CSO or arrest its employees if it promotes human rights, seeks to expose government inadequacies, or empowers people to know their rights.

Not all matters of public interest can be freely addressed in The Gambia, and it is risky to express criticism of the government openly. Consequently, many CSOs engage in self-censorship to avoid confrontation with state authorities. There were no known reports of CSOs being dissolved, closed, or harassed with arbitrary arrests of any kind in 2014.

CSOs enjoy a duty waiver on goods imported into the country for development work. Funds and materials from foreign donors and the salaries of expatriate CSO staff are not taxed. Local individuals and businesses do not enjoy tax benefits for making donations to charitable organizations. As a result, the private sector has little incentive to support CSOs.

CSOs cannot engage in direct business ventures or commercial activities for the purpose of making profit. However, the NGO Decree allows CSOs to sell goods and services at non-commercial rates for the purpose of raising funds to put back into operations and programs. CSOs are not usually allowed to compete for government contracts at either the local or national level.

Local lawyers are trained in general law, including CSO issues. Legal advice for CSOs is mostly available in urban areas rather than provincial towns. Lawyers usually charge organizations for their services.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8

Despite limited financial and human resources, CSOs in The Gambia are able to build and maintain strong constituencies. For example, in the child and youth sector, the YMCA, Child Protection Association (CPA), Peace Ambassadors, Nova Scotia Gambia Association (NSGA), and National Youth Parliament (NYP) have a widespread presence. Similarly, the Gambia Committee Against Harmful Traditional Practices (GAMCOTRAP), Forum for African Women Educationalists Gambia (FAWEGAM), and Female Lawyers Association of The Gambia (FLAG) continued to expand strong national constituencies in support of women's development. Professional groups such as the Gambia Teachers Union (GTU), Gambia Bar Association (GBA), and Gambia Press Union (GPU) have also been able to build and maintain constituencies. Most of these organizations are membership-based associations with constituencies composed of professionals or individuals sharing common concerns and values. GAMCOTRAP has built a constituency based on targeted beneficiary populations who now advocate for the organization and provide it with moral and in-kind support.

CSOs usually have mission statements incorporated into their constitutions, which they carry out strictly. Most CSOs also have strategic plans, with the exception of smaller CSOs, which often lack the capacity to develop them. Organizations largely try to adhere to their strategic plans. Two organizations that developed comprehensive strategic plans in 2014 were the Education for All Network (EFANet) and GPU.

Most CSOs have clearly documented management structures, with board and staff roles and codes of conduct set forth in constitutions or board and management manuals. However, such provisions are often not fully implemented. Although board members may be selected for their expertise, they often lack the capacity to engage in effective governance. It is not uncommon for board members to interfere in management activities. In 2014 there were some reports of connivance between heads and boards of CSOs to misuse funds. A major case involved the Wuli Association for Development (WAD), whose secretary general and cashier were charged with stealing more than $100 thousand. Board members sometimes stay on the board beyond the end of their terms, because many CSOs do not have sufficient funding to organize an annual general meeting for electing new board members.

Paid staff at larger CSOs normally include an executive director, a program manager, program officers, an accountant, administrative assistants, cleaners, gardeners, and a security person. Staff at local CSOs is usually limited to an executive director, a program officer, and an accountant. More established CSOs usually also have their own information technology personnel. Working conditions and incentives vary, with more established organizations offering better pay. Employment is often short-term and is dictated by the availability of project-related funds. The new income tax regime did not change in 2014, and its impact on CSO employees remains dire. There is a high degree of voluntarism in The Gambia, which helps organizations fulfill their staffing needs. Many CSOs have personnel policies covering such issues as staff service rules, use of vehicles, financial management, procurement, and HIV/AIDS in the work place.

Well-established CSOs with a steady source of funding have basic office equipment, while smaller organizations often have limited Internet access and old equipment because of the lack of funds.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2

The funding landscape remained largely unchanged in 2014. Funding opportunities are limited, and nearly all funding comes from external sources. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is
partnering with the national government on a five-year development plan. Within this framework, a few CSOs, including the Association on Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO), GPU, and African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRs), have obtained funding to implement activities. The World Bank also provides grants to CSOs through government agencies for poverty reduction. Donors often insist on CSO participation in programs to ensure the effective delivery of services and the proper use of funds.

A number of CSOs continued to obtain short-term funding directly from international donors on their own or in partnership with other, mainly European, CSOs. ActionAid International The Gambia (AAITG) obtains funding through ActionAid International in the United Kingdom, CPA receives funding through Save The Children Sweden, and Concern Universal supports several local CSOs with funding from its UK affiliates. Some organizations are supported by U.S.-based entities such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Management Systems International (MSI). Most CSOs have a core of international supporters that provide funding for a number of years. Among these organizations are CPA, which obtains sustained funding from ECPAT International; Wonder Years Center of Excellence (WYCE), (an educational and agriculture CSO); and Friends of The Gambia and the YMCA, both of which have individual and group benefactors.

On the local level, financial support is more sporadic and limited. There are few local philanthropies, and organizations and individuals that engage in philanthropy do not usually give their funds to CSOs. The private sector usually makes major donations to government institutions rather than to CSOs, possibly to curry favor with authorities. CSOs have recently made efforts to tap into the funding potential of the private sector, mainly telecommunications companies and banks. Some funding has trickled in from the private sector, but the economic climate is not conducive at present for such relationships to develop. Few organizations are able to rely on financial support directly from their communities and constituencies, although they do provide in-kind support.

In general, CSOs do not have multiple or diverse sources of funding or sufficient resources to remain viable for the short- or medium-term.

Because CSOs are registered as not-for-profit organizations, they cannot engage in commercial activities. However, they are permitted to organize fundraising events such as musical shows and luncheons and to sell goods and services at non-commercial rates. Typically, such activities raise minimal revenues and are not sufficient to sustain an organization. Most membership organizations raise only meager funds through dues and subscriptions.

CSOs are not prohibited by law from bidding on government contracts, but the practice is not widespread. A few organizations have obtained government contracts to conduct research, build schools, and provide trainings. For example, in 2014 Future In Our Hands (FIOH) obtained contracts from the Ministry of Education to construct classroom blocks in several schools across the country.

Larger CSOs have internal controls, policies, and structures to ensure effective financial management. Many smaller organizations have limited capacity in this area. Donors may require audits as a condition of awarding funds, but audit fees are generally too high for organizations to afford, and they are therefore lax about conducting audits and preparing financial reports. Organizations that are registered as NGOs with the NGO Affairs Agency or are members of TANGO are required to submit financial reports annually, but neither body enforces this requirement.
ADVOCACY: 5.0

CSOs continue to struggle to influence and monitor public policy. Direct lines of communication ostensibly exist between CSOs and policy makers. The government seems to appreciate the expertise and perspectives that CSOs bring to policy discussions and invites them to take part in policy forums and government committees. For example, in 2014 CSOs participated in the Aid Coordination Committee at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and in the Water Sanitation Project Steering Committee at the Ministry of Fisheries and Water Resources. However, in many cases such engagement occurs merely to meet donor demands or the government’s own guidelines for CSO participation, and the issues raised by CSOs are not taken seriously.

In general, CSOs’ ability to influence policy is weak. The constraints on civil liberties have forced CSOs to avoid holding the government directly accountable. Most CSO advocacy is “soft” and directed at middle-level audiences. There is no direct reference to the government, especially at the highest levels, and sensitive human rights issues are completely avoided.

To promote CSO participation in the policy process, TANGO has sponsored an open bi-monthly forum since 2012, which brings together lawmakers, regulators, service providers, and other actors to discuss key national and development issues. In 2014 these policy dialogues addressed such topics as women’s ownership of land and capital and access to credit; the quality, cost, and availability of communications technology; and the tenth anniversary of the assassination of journalist Deyda Hydara. Several organizations also host radio talk shows that aim to influence public policy and decision making. These initiatives have helped to create an environment for open discussion and public awareness of pertinent policy and national issues.

A number of thematically focused organizations and coalitions conducted advocacy campaigns in 2014. For example, TANGO and GPU worked with other organizations to ensure that a free media is included in the post-2015 development agenda. EFANet, which brings together stakeholders in support of free basic education, conducted a series of seminars to seek community support for its objectives. Ongoing campaigns include Operation No Way Back to Europe, which discourages young people from making the deadly journey to Europe across the Sahara and Mediterranean.

CSOs’ capacity to lobby remains weak, largely because of the constrained legal and political environment.

The CSO community is aware that legal reform would enhance its work and has sought to transform the NGO Decree into an act of parliament, with its most draconian provisions removed. Since 2010 new legislation has been in draft form but has not been brought before the National Assembly to be passed into law. The draft bill carries provisions that, if enforced fully, would pose direct threats to CSOs.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

CSOs provide goods and services in almost all sectors, with the main focus on agriculture, education, health, and women’s issues. Projects commonly include building and equipping health facilities, schools, and community centers; supplying community water pumps; providing farmers with storage facilities, seeds, and tools; and providing training in such areas as soap making, new farming methods, and forest management. CSOs provide services in all regions of the country. While no concrete data is available on the volume and reach of these services, observations suggest that service provision continued to expand in 2014.
For the most part, CSOs provide goods and services that reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents. Their work is largely shaped by the high level of poverty in The Gambia and the government’s poor delivery of basic services. Communities usually appreciate the services they receive from CSOs, although they sometimes feel that they are not adequately involved in determining the need for these services. Some communities have questioned the quality of CSO engagement, not only in the design of projects but also, very importantly, in their monitoring and evaluation.

There is virtually no cost recovery for CSOs, both because most beneficiaries are unable to pay for goods and services and CSOs are prohibited from charging commercial rates. However, a few organizations pursue income-generating activities. These include CSOs that operate health and education facilities, farmers associations that sell produce, and other membership organizations involved in the making of such products as soaps and dyes.

Both national and local governments recognize the value of CSOs in the provision of goods and services but rarely provide them with grants or contracts. In 2014, organizations that successfully applied for government contracts included the Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG, for training local government authorities on budget analysis) and FIOH (for constructing classrooms).

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in The Gambia did not change significantly in 2014. TANGO, CPA, AAITG, Concern Universal, Gambia Family Planning Association (GFPA), and several other organizations operate resource centers to provide CSOs with information and technical assistance. The centers are usually libraries located within CSO offices, and they are generally open to the public. They do not offer training. For the most part, these resource centers meet local needs. Their operating revenues come largely from foreign donors rather than fees or other local sources. There are no ISOs in The Gambia.

Local grantmaking CSOs include the President Jammeh Foundation for Peace, Deyda Hydara Trust, and Rotary Club. These organizations offer direct support to students and communities and do not provide grants to CSOs.

CSOs enjoy effective channels for sharing information. For example, TANGO has created five thematic groups through which its members share information through emails, meetings, reports, and websites. Networks supporting the CSO sector include the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP Gambia), CPA, Network Against Gender-based Violence (NGBV), EFANet, and Pro-PAG. These networks conducted training workshops for their members in 2014.

Capacity building is a continuous activity in the CSO community, and local trainers are available throughout the country to conduct training in management, governance, development, and other areas. Training that targets local communities is usually free of charge and conducted in local languages, supported by illustrated training materials in the major national languages.
Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are rare but expanding. In 2014, for example, CPA and some Internet cafe operators partnered to take steps to make the Internet safer for children. The Children and Community Initiative for Development (CAID) collaborated with some telecommunications companies to promote movies about early and forced marriages. Together they produced a major film called *The Hand of Fate*, which seeks to highlight the dangers of female genital mutilation and early marriage. Relations between the media and CSOs are strong. CSO-government partnerships mainly address policy and development issues in which CSOs are involved.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

CSOs enjoy favorable media coverage from both public and private media. CSOs give interviews, organize press conferences, and organize visits to project sites and other activities for journalists. CSOs continue to use the media to advertise job vacancies, report on training workshops and annual general meetings, launch new projects, and issue press releases. Unfortunately, the media offers limited analysis of the role of CSOs, largely because of lack of capacity in the media itself.

For the most part the public has a highly positive understanding of CSOs. The strategic intervention and impact of CSOs on Gambian life can be felt in all areas, including health, education, agriculture, the environment, and community development. However, some public misconceptions about the nature of CSOs persist—for example, the belief that they serve only the interests of their managers. In 2014 the funding scandal at WAD was widely covered in the media. The scandal seems actually to have boosted public opinion of CSOs, as it was first discovered and then taken to court by AAITG.

Government perceptions of CSOs remained mixed in 2014. On one hand, the head of state and some top government officials criticized CSOs’ involvement in human rights, good governance, and government accountability, claiming that they are foreign-backed agencies bent on destabilizing the country or introducing foreign values inimical to “Gambian culture.” On the other hand, these same government functionaries praised CSOs in 2014 for their service delivery and technical competence. Although the scope and frequency of donations from the private sector remains negligible, businesses are increasingly turning to CSOs because of the huge market opportunities they offer.

CSOs still struggle to conduct effective public relations campaigns that clarify their roles and celebrate their contributions and successes. Many organizations have begun to develop their own websites and newsletters and to use social media, as they recognize the utility of these tools. However, they could take better advantage of their relationships with the media to enhance advocacy campaigns, organize press conferences, and share financial reports and audits with the public.

Most CSOs and CSO networks have codes of conduct either as part of their constitutions or as a separate document. It appears that compliance with these codes is high. Most CSOs prepare annual reports and disseminate them to partners, beneficiaries, and the general public.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for The Gambia

CSO Sustainability

- Sustainability Enhanced
- Sustainability Evolving
- Sustainability Impeded

Legal Environment
Public Image
Organizational Capacity
Infrastructure
Financial Viability
Service Provision
Advocacy

The Gambia
1
5
5.5
7
The year 2014 was one of the most economically challenging in recent memory for Ghana. While 2013 was focused on political issues, the main theme of 2014 was the country’s deteriorating economic condition. Ghana’s economy suffered drastically because of the rapid depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi against major international currencies, the increased cost of petroleum products, an energy crisis, and resulting inflationary pressures. The rationing of power to both industrial and domestic consumers created a general sense of unease among the populace. During the year, key figures in civil society, politics, and the public called on the government to halt the country’s economic decline. The government introduced several measures that yielded mixed but largely unsatisfactory outcomes, prompting it to seek a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Ghana maintained its credentials as a democratically stable country after a Supreme Court ruling upheld the election results in 2013. In 2014 recommendations for post-election reforms, the election of leaders of major political parties, and corruption cases dominated the political scene.
Despite the country’s economic downturn, the overall sustainability of CSOs improved slightly in 2014. There was modest improvement in CSO advocacy activities, aided in part by the emergence of ad hoc CSO pressure groups. The most significant of these was a group called “Occupy Ghana,” made up mainly of middle-income citizens who undertook marches and campaigns to protest the energy crisis, corruption, lack of public accountability, and the government’s management of the economy. Organizations working in the governance sector carried out public education activities focused on electoral reforms and the constitutional review process.

CSOs in Ghana continued to depend on foreign donors as their major source of funding. Their financial situation was volatile, as funding for both national and local organizations continued to dwindle. Grassroots and community-based organizations (CBOs) were hardest hit, but most CSOs found it difficult to maintain a core team of staff. Although STAR-Ghana, the major local grantmaking organization, continued to distribute funds, most went to existing projects or were awarded to only a handful of organizations.

In 2014, 239 new CSOs registered with the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), bringing the total number of registered organizations to 6,258 by the end of the year. However, the actual number of active CSOs is unclear, as only 515 organizations renewed their operating permits in 2014, compared to 805 in 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

The legal framework for CSOs in Ghana did not record any significant changes in 2014. CSOs continued to enjoy a favorable legal environment despite the absence of specific laws governing their registration and operations. Proposals for the enactment of a law to govern CSOs still have not been effected. Thus CSOs continue to register under the Company Code of 1963 (Act 179) as not-for-profit organizations limited by guarantee.

The establishment and registration of CSOs across the country remains fairly easy. CSO registration generally involves two major steps. Organizations must first register as not-for-profit business entities with the Registrar General’s Department in the Ministry of Justice and then with relevant national, regional, and district offices through the DSW. Although the DSW is the government agency charged with direct oversight of CSOs at both national and local levels, its institutional capacity is weak. Many CSOs fail to register with the DSW after receiving their business certificates from the Registrar General’s Department or fail to renew their operating permits with the DSW, as required. The DSW does not regularly monitor registered organizations to confirm that they are operating in accordance with their stated missions. While the registration process stipulates that CSOs must submit financial reports annually, most organizations do not comply with this requirement. There has been little enforcement of this provision by the government and no attempt to close down CSOs because of their non-compliance.

CSOs continue to debate, oppose, and offer constructive criticism of government policies without fear of closure or governmental crackdown. The lack of harassment helps create a favorable environment for the founding of new CSOs.

Tax exemptions are available to CSOs, mainly on some imported items. To obtain exemptions organizations must submit an application to the DSW. Many organizations are reluctant to approach the DSW for this
purpose, mostly because they have failed to register or to renew their operating permits. CSOs that do apply often do so incorrectly and their applications are rejected. Grants and other funds for CSO activities remain untaxed, but organizations must pay statutory taxes such as withholding tax, Social Security, and income taxes on behalf of service providers and employees.

CSOs’ legal status as not-for-profit bars them from engaging in profit-making commercial activities unless they register as separate entities. However, they may earn revenue through the provision of services and other activities provided it supports their operations. In most cases, CSOs can compete for government contracts. They are most competitive in the area of research and policy making, thanks to the quality and skills of their personnel.

While there are no lawyers specializing in CSO issues, a range of general legal practitioners are available. However, most non-urban CSOs cannot afford their services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

Nearly all CSOs cultivate constituencies both to implement programs and to maintain their relevance as contributors to the well-being of the communities in which they work. Large, urban CSOs create platforms and organize events to attract the participation of high-level policy makers, parliamentarians, academics, media, traditional leaders, and a largely middle-class population, who are the major consumers of their products. Some urban CSOs work with smaller, rural organizations to build constituencies through outreach activities and the provision of services to local communities. These interventions enable both urban and local CSOs to generate community interest and participation in their activities.

Both urban and rural CSOs in Ghana encounter challenges in pursuing their missions and visions. Foremost among these challenges are difficulties in retaining staff and acquiring funding for longer-term interventions, and the lack of core funding for operational overhead expenses.

As the development of strategic plans has become a major requirement for donor funding, most CSOs now have a defined agenda of activities. However, disparities are evident between larger and smaller CSOs in the quality and the scope of their plans. For larger CSOs, strategic plans have several purposes apart from funding, such as serving as a tool for measuring progress and the impact of interventions. Smaller organizations often lack professional staff to develop and track strategic plans, and they find it difficult to retain outside professionals to produce strategic plans for them. In recent years, some smaller CSOs have been able to develop strategic plans with the assistance of local experts charging reduced fees.

There were no significant changes in the management structures of CSOs in 2014. Larger, urban CSOs have stronger internal management structures than smaller, rural organizations. A similar disparity is evident in governance structures, with larger CSOs maintaining well-functioning boards to guide their operations, while smaller CSOs have boards mainly to meet registration or funding requirements. Organizations with established governance structures tend to have clearer divisions of responsibilities between boards, management, and staff. In smaller CSOs, a lack of staff sometimes leads board members to participate in programmatic activities so that projects can be completed. However, as competition for donor funds becomes more intense, some smaller CSOs now constitute boards that focus on governance and fundraising.

Because funding tends to be project based, most organizations find it difficult to recruit and retain paid professional staff. Smaller, less well-endowed organizations suffer most from high staff turnover. CSOs continue to engage the services of interns and volunteers to help with short-term program implementation.
However, the concept of volunteerism is not well understood, and individuals who volunteer are often unemployed and want to use volunteer opportunities to secure jobs or obtain financial reward. CSOs sometimes provide volunteers with stipends to cover transportation costs.

The use of equipment such as computers, printers, and scanners is increasing. Larger, urban organizations tend to have better facilities. Internet access has improved across the country, largely because of the increased availability of modems and smartphones, which most rural CSOs use to access the Internet. However, only larger CSOs have their own generators and are able to operate when electricity is cut off because of rationing. For smaller and rural organizations, the suspension of electricity from the national grid can bring all operations, including Internet access and email, to a halt.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

The financial viability of CSOs continued to decline in 2014, mainly because of their dependence on foreign donors. In particular, the funding portfolios of traditional development partners have shrunk, reducing the support available to CSOs for core funding and institutional support. Nevertheless, both large and small CSOs continue to focus their fundraising activities on calls for proposals from international organizations and diplomatic missions. Larger and urban CSOs are generally more skilled at writing proposals for funding.

Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana), a funding mechanism supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Danida, USAID, and the European Union, continues to be the most important local funding source for Ghanaian CSOs. However, STAR-Ghana does not give core funding to support administrative expenditures. Foundations set up by businesses such as telecommunications companies are the only other notable local source of small grants. For instance, the MTN Ghana Foundation and Vodafone Foundation support some projects in health and education. The public does not provide cash support because of perceptions that CSOs receive huge amounts of funding from donors. In rural communities, in-kind support such as meeting venues and communal labor is sometimes available.

Many CSOs in Ghana do not have diversified sources of funding and lack a loyal base of financial supporters that provide funding for overhead costs. Thus most organizations are not financially viable over the short or long term. This is especially true of rural and smaller organizations, which lack the personnel and organizational capacity to carry out effective fundraising activities.

Some CBOs have innovated by establishing fee-charging private schools and using part of the proceeds to support their activities. This approach is especially common in the northern part of the country, which has a high concentration of CSOs. The provision of consultancy services to the government and private sector remains a preserve of urban research and advocacy organizations, which have the requisite professional staff to undertake such activities. Some larger CSOs earn income through the sale of products, usually books, but this income does not constitute a significant proportion of their budgets. The collection of dues by member-based organizations is low for both urban and rural CSOs.

Large and urban CSOs have sound financial management systems and practices, including qualified accountants who manage their finances. CSOs are often bound by grant agreements to establish such systems and provide financial reports to their donors. There is a growing trend among both large and small CSOs that receive funding directly from donors to conduct financial audits annually.
Advocacy continues to be the most dynamic dimension of the CSO sector in Ghana, and interactions between CSOs and national and local government bodies improved in 2014. For instance, during the development of new District Medium-Term Development Plans (DMTDPs), CSOs mobilized constituents and community members to take part in consultations with district assemblies. Notable among participating organizations was the Local Governance Network (LOGNet), an umbrella organization of CSOs that works on local governance issues and helped people with disabilities engage in the DMTDP process.

Major CSO advocacy efforts were led by large urban organizations. In 2014 these efforts focused on the country’s worsening economic situation, the growth of corruption, and the dissipation of public funds through fraudulent acts and omissions. Aside from the main opposition party, CSOs were the loudest voice addressing these issues. They made policy demands, offered constructive criticism of government policies, and provided informed recommendations on the economy and the power crisis.

In a notable development in 2014, CSOs formed a coalition that called on the government to make the process of applying for the IMF bailout more transparent. With support from STAR-Ghana, the coalition was led by Penplusbytes and included IMAMI Center for Policy and Education, SEND-Ghana, Ghana Integrity Initiative, and other leading CSOs. The coalition brought together private-sector actors and other CSOs to consult with the Ministry of Finance about the implications of the IMF bailout. Media engagements focused on recommendations to ensure that the IMF bailout does not worsen unemployment and increase the cost of living.

Led by proactive CSOs, more ad hoc coalitions are being formed around major government policy initiatives. A significant event in 2014 was the formation of a new type of advocacy group, Occupy Ghana, composed largely of middle-income citizens who carried out protest marches focused on the energy crisis, corruption, public accountability, and the government’s management of the economy. The group’s activities exposed systemic weaknesses in the public payroll system, which allow funds to be siphoned off through “ghost names” or non-existent workers. In response to the scandal, the government carried out investigations into payroll fraud that led to the recovery of funds and the prosecution of some individuals.

On the political front, governance think tanks such as the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), and IMANI played leading roles in advocating for electoral reforms. Their activities included the organization of mass public education and consultative forums, in which citizens across the country examined key issues under constitutional review, such as the winner-take-all system of electoral democracy.

CSOs are able to access and make suggestions about policy documents such as budgets, parliamentary bills, committee reports, and development plans. In 2014 local CSOs continued to engage district assemblies on development issues, with some organizations using community scorecards to assess the performance of their local authorities. For instance, CDD, with the support of UNICEF, carried out a performance assessment of Ghana’s 216 district assemblies in 2014, which led to the publication of the first ranked assessment of these bodies.

CSOs also played crucial roles in influencing policy and legislation in 2014. For instance, the African Center for Energy Policy (ACEP) and the CSO Platform on Oil and Gas were among the CSOs submitting proposals to endorse a review of the Petroleum Management Revenue Management Law, Act 815, enacted in 2011. In addition, CSOs such as ACEP and IMANI called on the government to publish oil contracts and...
urged parliament to scrutinize all agreements in Ghana’s oil and gas sector. As a result of activities by gender-based advocacy groups, the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection organized a stakeholders’ validation meeting to finalize the drafting of the Affirmative Action Bill by the attorney general. The Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) and Penplusbytes played major roles in coordinating CSOs’ contributions to the preparation of the 2015 national budget.

CSO lobbying remained ineffective largely because of the country’s partisan political environment and CSOs’ lack of sophistication in this area. The concept of lobbying is not well understood, mainly because CSOs and the public at large find it difficult to differentiate between lobbying and inducement or bribery of public officials. There are still no identifiable CSO lobbying groups in the country. However, parliamentarians often use CSO research and publications as reference points during deliberations on key issues.

CSOs’ enthusiasm about the NPO law, which aims to provide a comprehensive legal framework for CSO operations in Ghana, has declined. The government has still not produced draft legislation to stimulate public and parliamentary discussion. With little to no harassment by the government, the CSO platform formed to champion this advocacy issue has been dormant for some time.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8**

CSOs in Ghana continue to provide services ranging from basic social services in water, health, education, and sanitation to research and advocacy on human rights, governance, public finance, the economy, and environmental protection. In particular, CSOs provide services in areas where the public system is in decline or that receive little government attention. For instance, CSOs are notable providers of relief items and psychological support to orphanages and detention homes for juveniles.

In rural areas, CSOs implement activities that directly respond to community needs. For example, in farming communities in the northern part of the country, CBOs and established faith-based organizations (FBOs) help mobilize resources for farmers. Larger and urban CSOs tend to focus on broader national issues, but they sometimes implement activities in selected rural areas or in communities that are particularly affected by those issues.

CSOs continue to provide goods to beneficiaries other than their members. Even though local and rural organizations typically target particular groups, their reach and impact tends to be greater. Most organizations deliver goods and services to beneficiaries only as long as funding lasts. For example, in 2014 some CSOs working on HIV/AIDS had to cut back on planned activities because of a lack of funds. Once funding for a specific project ends, CSOs usually limit their interaction with the community to opinion leaders and local officials. This trend is most pronounced among smaller CSOs.

Urban organizations make research findings available as publications or through the mass media. Earnings from the sale of publications are low. CSOs generally do not charge fees for training and other capacity-building activities.

The government does not provide grants to CSOs. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, mainly to provide consulting services in such areas as research and policymaking. Some organizations that work in infrastructure and agriculture bid on government contracts to provide services such as drilling boreholes or training farmers to use fertilizers.
There was little change in the infrastructure supporting civil society in 2014. There are still no recognizable CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) in Ghana, and the lack of national and local resource centers for CSOs remains a major impediment to accessing information, particularly for rural organizations. The World Bank’s Public Information Center and the West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI), both in Accra, are among the few places where CSOs can obtain valuable information and publications on a range of social, economic, and political topics. WACSI continues to deliver customized training, mentoring, and coaching for a broad range of CSOs, including professional associations, unions, women’s organizations, CBOs, FBOs, and youth groups.

STAR-Ghana remained the most notable source of local funding in 2014. STAR-Ghana supports CSO advocacy and watchdog activities in governance, health, education, oil and gas, and other sectors. It also provides support to strengthen parliamentary oversight committees in the national legislature. The first phase of STAR-Ghana’s grantmaking ended in 2014, and most of the projects it was funding closed by the end of the year. No new funding opportunities were advertised by STAR-Ghana in 2014.

Networks and CSO coalitions continued to champion issues of importance to the CSO sector and engage with government authorities in 2014. Some of the most vibrant coalitions include the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC), the Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation (CONIWAS), and the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health. However, most CSO coalitions and networks remain unsustainable due to funding and management challenges. Competition for scarce resources and similarities in activities often make it difficult for organizations to share information with each other. A lack of funding for overhead costs can also prompt coalition members to withdraw and focus on their own work. For instance, the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development (GAPVOD) was formed by a broad coalition of CSOs, but as most members do not pay dues, the organization must find other sources of funding so that it can take part in CSO advocacy activities.

CSOs in Ghana have access to management trainers, including practitioners from the sector as well as consultants and experts from academia and private institutions. Basic, advanced, and customized trainings are available to meet specific organizational needs. For example, WACSI organizes regular courses on resource mobilization, proposal writing, and financial management. Most training services are offered in Accra.

The government continues to recognize CSOs’ competence by awarding contracts to CSOs and inviting individuals from the sector to serve on government boards. CSOs continue to improve their partnerships with the media, with CSOs jointly organizing public advocacy activities with major media houses and arranging for events and lectures to be broadcast live. Major broadcast events in 2014 included IMANI’s and Occupy Ghana’s lectures on corruption, IDEG’s public forum on multi-party governance reform, and CDD’s Krontie ne Akwamu (“Democracy and Good Governance”) lecture on “The Paradox of Voice without Accountability.” Partnerships with local businesses are still weak, with CSOs organizing only a few joint activities with professional bodies and private firms in 2014. For instance, IDEG and a local law firm, Gyandoh Asmah & Co., cooperated on an event to inform the public about the constitutional review process and its more controversial aspects.
CSOs in Ghana enjoyed positive media coverage in 2014. Because of the country’s myriad economic challenges, CSOs’ research findings and expert opinions were in high demand. Local and international journalists continued to have good relations with reputable civil society actors and often called upon them to provide informed analysis and commentary. Major public events organized by larger CSOs in Accra were often transmitted live on radio, television, and social media. Because these events set the agenda for media discussions or served as direct responses to government policy statements, they were usually given prominent coverage. Ghana’s media continued to make a clear distinction between public service announcements and corporate advertisements in 2014.

Although the public’s understanding of CSOs is still evolving, positive media coverage helps shape the public image of CSOs in Ghana. In rural areas, CSOs that offer social services tend to be highly regarded, since people consider their activities a direct response to community needs. In urban areas, CSOs are generally perceived as well-resourced organizations with the ability to provide informed analysis and recommendations on public issues.

The government’s perception of CSOs is positive, although some officials regard CSOs as overly critical of government policies. The government continues to tap into CSO expertise during policy formulation and review. For example, in 2014, at a national economic forum at Senchi, the government invited representatives of the CSO sector to serve on committees and facilitate sessions of the forum. Although no significant engagement between CSOs and the business sector took place in 2014, the business sector’s perception of CSOs remains positive.

Well-endowed urban CSOs continue to have strong public relations and communications systems for disseminating information and enhancing their public image. Large CSOs often employ communications officers to manage publicity and public outreach. Some CSOs produce newsletters and branding souvenirs to enhance their visibility. CSOs increasingly use at least one social media platform, such as Facebook or Twitter, to share information with the public.

The CSO sector in Ghana has still not developed a code of ethics to regulate its activities, largely because of legitimacy and turf issues that make it difficult for networks of organizations to cooperate. Only the leading urban CSOs publish annual reports in printed form for dissemination to the public.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Ghana

CSO Sustainability

Ghana

Sustainability
Enhanced Evolving Impeded
Two major events took place in Guinea in 2014: the Ebola virus epidemic and the reopening of Parliament following the 2013 elections. In connection with the Ebola outbreak, Guinea has faced enormous challenges on an epidemic level and is suffering public health, social, economic and cultural consequences.

In the area of public health, the Ebola epidemic affected hundreds of families, with more than 2,000 deaths of both patients and health care providers. On the social level, a climate of mistrust has grown within previously harmonious communities. Families and friends of the deceased as well as cured victims face a stigma in their communities. The virus has also had enormous effects on the education sector. Schools were scheduled to reopen in October 2014, but did not open until January 2015. This created a burden on both students and teachers, who had less time to cover the required educational material.

Economic impacts resulted from some neighboring countries closing their borders with Guinea, some airlines suspending flights to the country and various financial and technical partners pulling out, particularly in the mining sector. This has led to a loss of trillions of Guinean francs, causing the government to lower its
The forecasted growth rate from more than 4 percent to less than 2.5 percent. Investments in certain development sectors, especially basic social sectors, decreased as a result.

Culturally, the country’s social fabric weakened in 2014. Segments of the population rejected services offered by the state and its partners to limit the epidemic. The rejection of services was partly caused by the local population’s disapproval of burying Ebola victims without observing traditional burial practices due to concerns that these traditional burial practices were considered to put the population at risk for virus transmission. The general disapproval of the required burial practice and resulting rejection of services may complicate the fight against the illness, possibly even resulting in more deaths in certain areas.

To cope with the epidemic, Guinea has benefited from social mobilization efforts both within the country and at the international community level, in particular from its financial partners.

Guinea’s Parliament reopened in 2014 and held two regular sessions with the aim of electing the National Assembly’s executive committee, which includes Presidential Movement and opposition deputies. The Republican opposition demanded that the government respect the constitution, adopt a calendar for local elections and institute a constitutional court, a court of auditors and other structures that should have been created six months after the National Assembly. Their claims created some upheaval during the assembly. Sessions officially opened and closed with votes taking place on legal projects. The government and ministries did not function efficiently in this troubled sociopolitical climate so close to the presidential elections. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) did not release the number of registered CSOs in 2014.

Despite the Ebola epidemic, the sustainability of CSOs remained largely unchanged in 2014. The legal environment improved as the duties of the National Service for the Regulation and Promotion of Associate Movements (SEPROMA) have been transferred to governors and their Cabinets for regional agreements, and to prefects and their Cabinets for prefect agreements. The CSO Code of Ethics that was developed in 2013 was publicized in 2014. International efforts to eradicate the epidemic resulted in an increase of both health supplies and monetary funds to local health organizations. However, the organizational capacity of CSOs was negatively impacted. In advocacy, CSOs still lack the necessary leadership to influence government system reforms. Service provision and infrastructure remained impeded as CSOs struggled to cover their costs and received fewer grants and government contracts. Although CSOs received more media coverage on their work to fight Ebola, the high cost of accessing media limited CSOs’ access and strained the partnership between NGOs and the media.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

Since 2005, Guinean CSOs have been evolving within a legal context established by Law 013. Law L/2005/013/AN allows CSOs to register with the National Service for the Regulation and Promotion of Associate Movements (SEPROMA) under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), which regulates and recognizes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and associations. At the regional and prefect levels, duties of the SEPROMA have been transferred to governors and their Cabinets for regional agreements, and to prefects and their Cabinets for prefect agreements. On the
sub-prefect level, state technical services and communal services support the preliminary preparation of statutes and rules within CSOs. Prefect authorities then receive these for approval, elaboration and delivery of the agreement.

Despite the heavy administrative burden, CSOs that follow the proper legal protocol tend to have no trouble obtaining registration documents from state authorities. CSOs are safe from state harassment for the most part. Abuses from local officials asking for side payments from NGOs have been reported despite the new responsibilities of the SEPROMA. Several CSOs formed in Guinea in 2014, including the Dynamic Citizen Network or the National Council of Civil Society Organizations for Good Governance.

Some CSO umbrella organizations and technical or financial partners have developed capacity-building programs to help CSOs understand how Law 013 of July 2005 protects them against expropriation, except for public utility reasons.

The CSO Code of Ethics that was developed in 2013 was publicized in 2014. NGOs and other associations have continued to have a Platform for Dialogue with the State and other Members of Civil Society (POME).

Increasingly, CSOs are taking the precautionary step of consulting law firms when they have to sign settlement agreements with the various state departments involved in their areas of intervention, or financial partners when they must sign contracts.

The legal tax framework allows the Ministry of Economy and Finance to grant exemptions and other tax benefits to CSOs and their technical and financial partners based on their programs.

Also in 2014, CSOs saw increasing ability to acquire and administer certain goods and property. Certain CSOs now have their own headquarters. The Community Development Initiatives Support Association (ADIC) opened its headquarters in the prefecture of Kankan, while the African Training and Development Center (CENAFOD) and the Benkadi association opened offices in Dabola.

CSOs can compete for government procurements. Approximately a dozen CSOs have bid for contracts from the government and its technical and financial partners for projects in response to the Ebola crisis.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

Guinean CSOs are looking for support from international institutions and multilateral cooperative organizations to fund the projects and programs they oversee, as they develop more organizational capacity. Limited funds increasingly push CSOs to reduce their number of permanent personnel, even though demand for staff remains high. Within each Guinean prefecture, at least one NGO focuses on local development, and its volunteer staff allows it to perform its tasks.

Apart from some NGOs and their umbrella organizations, few CSOs are developing strategic plans due to a lack of expertise or financial resources to hire a consultant to assist them.

Given the rigor of some financial partners, CSOs often undergo audits to substantiate their governance practices. Despite these improvements, many organizations still experience operational difficulties: Some administrative councils exist only in name, with persisting and recurring competency conflicts occurring between administrative council presidents and their executive directors when the jobs are split between more than one person.

Some CSOs, especially influential national NGOs and their umbrella structures such as CENAFOD and the National Council of Civil Society Organizations of Guinea (CNOSCG), benefit from constant technical and
financial support. They are able to use the latest technologies and communication tools to strengthen their performance. The African Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine communications cable system headed by Orange is being installed in Guinea and will soon provide access to a low-cost broadband network.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

Guinean CSOs benefit from various sources of funding, depending on the nature of their activities, areas of intervention, and priorities of partners.

In Guinea’s major cities, including the capital city of Conakry, associations actively support local development through financial resource mobilization so that civil society actors can remain in the villages. However, these sources of funding depend heavily on the will and available funds of donors and are therefore inconsistent. In each prefecture of Guinea, at least one NGO focuses on local development using a volunteer base.

In 2014, various relationships between the government and its financial partners enabled the Guinean government to benefit from several credit lines, allowing existing projects to continue.

The Ebola epidemic greatly affected conditions in 2014, spurring international efforts to eradicate the problem and donations of both health supplies and monetary funds. CSOs that previously had strong finances have increased their fundraising abilities, and those that didn’t have been trying to establish better financial footing, which financial partners often require.

The quality of financial systems, transparency, independent financial audits and publication of annual reports vary from one organization to the next based on its size, its capacities and the requirements of its financial partners. Only larger CSOs of national scope with three distinctive management structures (general assembly, board of directors and executive director) rely on specialized accountants. They are subject to external independent audits and they publish annual reports.

New mining zones opened in 2014, especially in the west and northwest regions of Guinea, enabling some CSOs to increase their revenue via the establishment of infrastructure and other service delivery activities. While some local businesses use CSOs’ services, the government very rarely asks for their services.

Despite all of this, most Guinean CSOs still need significant work to become financially solvent; those that pursue projects and programs with financial and technical partners are the most viable. Although some CSOs receive fees from their members, the fees do not cover their operating costs, and the government does not provide any financial aid to CSOs.

**ADVOCACY: 5.2**

In implementing the development process and decentralization in Guinea, national NGOs are preferred partners of many stakeholders in local communities on projects such as the Guinea Local Development Program and the Sustainable Social Development Program. Over the last four years, the Ministry of Decentralization, which supervises CSOs, has unfortunately excluded national NGOs (the Village Community Support Program [PACV] and the Local Development Program) in setting up its programs.
In terms of advocacy for policy formulation, 2014 was characterized by a dynamic presence of Guinean NGOs. The intervention of umbrella organizations such as the National Council of Civil Society Organizations, the National Platform of Citizens United for Development (PECUD), the National Coordination of Organizations Coalition of the Guinean Civil Society (CONASOG), the Coordination of Women NGOs in Guinea (COFEG) and human rights NGOs successfully supported the implementation of the Human Rights Independent National Institution, whose mission is to promote universal liberties.

Other accomplishments include:

- A civil society general assembly, with general state-sanctioned policy proposals relating to CSOs’ response capacity, especially in terms of access to government funding for their programs;
- Continued review of the mining code by NGOs operating in the sector. The principle of the “publish what you spent” CSO initiative is becoming more popular in the daily management of the sector;
- The local government’s proposals to improve the code to adapt it to local realities (the Ministry of Decentralized Communities was in charge of placing the draft law before the National Assembly);
- Proposals to reform non-formal education, which affects a large segment of the population;
- Work by CSOs to increase the funding allocated to literacy; and
- Efforts to involve public leaders in the fight against Ebola at all levels.

In 2014, CSOs also intervened in social dialogue and helped ease the political crisis when the Republican opposition declined to participate in the first session of the National Assembly. However, CSOs still lack the necessary leadership to influence government system reforms through their advocacy actions. Many campaigns launched in 2013, including Let’s Do More, and other campaigns launched by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) and the Guinean Network of Organizations for Persons with Disabilities, have yet to show results.

Some lobbying mechanisms, such as the National Day of CSOs and talks on socioeconomic and political issues, are in place and allow CSOs to participate at some levels of the government decision-making processes. Most CSOs are uneasy with the concept of lobbying as it remains mostly unknown to them.

CSOs know that a favorable legal environment could reinforce their capacity and sustainability. CSOs have created networks to influence the decision-making process around issues such as education, rights of the disabled, childhood protection, and violence against women.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

Like previous years, 2014 was a dynamic year of intervention and social mobilization for Guinean CSOs. Given the diversity of the areas of intervention of Guinean NGOs, they most often work with technical and financial partners in their areas of intervention.

From the provision of basic social services (especially health, education and water sanitation) to economic development, environmental protection and governance qualification, Guinean NGOs have proven themselves at every level.

Examples include the pursuit of their interventions in the implementation of the Small Grants Program of the Global Environment Fund United Nations Development Program’s Global Environment Facility (PPS/GEF UNDP), their work in the fight against Ebola and their formal and informal education projects and programs.

CSOs such as the CENAFOD, the Guinea Center for Research and Aid Development, CNOSCG, and the Association for the Promotion of Governance and Local Initiatives (AGIL) played an important role in the
development and implementation of informed national policies. In collaboration with UNICEF, AGIL put together a community-based Rapid Intervention against Ebola Support Groups composed of a health agent, an elected representative, a traditional communicator, a religious leader and CSO members to conduct more than 20,000 information sessions and distribute soaps and disinfectants.

Other areas that should be noted are CSOs working on governance — including CNOSCG, CENAFOD, the Community-Based Development Support Association (ADIC), etc. — and their presence in the microfinance and agriculture sectors. Several youth and women’s associations receive subsidies through special funds set up by the government.

In almost all cases, Guinean NGOs that do not have specialized training can access a service that designs training modules specific to their areas of intervention, supported by educational tools.

CSOs charge fees for their services or products. However, the fees do not cover their costs.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs in the provision of basic social services, even though it increasingly uses its own services. The government has decreased its assistance to the CSO sector and contracts CSOs less frequently to provide these services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

The presence of Guinean CSOs as intermediate support organizations (ISOs) to facilitate access to information for smaller, local structures did not change in 2014 compared to 2013.

With the exception of watchdog committees established by NGOs in the fight against Ebola, NGOs continued to build on the work they began in 2013. Among other things, they produced newsletters about CSO activities to facilitate the information flow between them, and shared periodic reports produced both at SEPRONA and within financial and technical partners and other stakeholders involved in all levels of the development process. Because of the initiative of the National Platform of Citizens United for Development (PECUD), civil society actors were able to share information more readily in 2014 through a consultation platform.

ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs for the most part. For example, the Women Self-Advancement Support Group and the Micro-Credit Institution continue to provide services to women, youth and other associations to the satisfaction of the beneficiaries. This is particularly true in major cities and some secondary towns. The services focus on agriculture, livestock, crafts and more, and their services range from support to training, management, and grant development.

Guinean CSOs have helped implement infrastructure throughout the country, covering an array of needs that include schools, health posts and health centers, boreholes, improved wells and maintenance of rural roads.

As in the past, many CSOs (e.g., CENAFOD and the International Trade Centre for Development [CECIDE]) continue to provide training in areas that relate to both the structure and functioning of NGOs, such as accounting, financial management, and funding techniques.

Some NGOs, such as IKRA N'KO (Coordination and Impulse Association of the N’ko Language), edit and publish their learning materials in the N’ko alphabet; others that operate in heavily Muslim areas (the most common religion in Guinea) are translated into Arabic.
Tensions among some CSOs have decreased. Some NGOs worked together to implement projects and programs, to the satisfaction of sponsors and beneficiaries. An example of such a partnership is the PECUD Initiative for Guinean CSOs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

Public Image in Guinea

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Although CSOs received more media coverage on their work to fight Ebola, the high cost of accessing the media still limited CSOs’ access and strained the partnership between NGOs and the media to some degree. Although news agencies exist, many CSOs’ limited financial means complicate their efforts to receive coverage.

However, CSOs who developed partnerships with the media have often benefited from the analysis, criticism and suggestions received from that coverage. CENAFOD, Guinea Television and Radio (RTG) and private radio stations partnered to broadcast information to fight Ebola. The CNOSC and local media broadcast civil education programs. The national Confederation of Farmer Organizations also partnered with local media to raise awareness of better crop management practices.

The government and decentralized authorities increasingly view CSOs as key players in the Guinean development process, particularly in their involvement in the fight against Ebola in 2014. However, certain bad practices by NGOs, specifically in the management of financial resources available to them in the implementation of their projects and programs, have resulted in negative perceptions.

Although a code of conduct for NGOs exists and was validated, it has not been sufficiently publicized and most NGOs are not aware of it. Leading NGOs publish annual or biannual reports.
In 2014 Kenya was hit by terrorist attacks in Mandera, Nairobi, and Mpeketoni, which killed more than 130 people. In response to these incidents, the parliament in December quickly passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act 2014, a controversial omnibus bill that revised and strengthened existing anti-terrorism laws. Many CSO groups and foreign governments criticized the act for granting state security organs broad powers to conduct surveillance and detain and arrest people; for curtailing freedoms of speech, assembly, and association and the right to privacy guaranteed by the constitution; and for introducing harsh new penalties for vaguely defined transgressions. Opposition groups had filed suit during the last days of 2014 to repeal the act. Also in December the International Criminal Court (ICC) withdrew charges of crimes against humanity against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who was alleged to have incited violence in which 1,113 people died following the 2007 elections.

Governments of Kenya’s forty-seven new counties, formed under the 2010 constitution, were elected for the first time in 2013. In 2014 they sought significantly to improve the way in which they carry out their functions. CSOs increasingly collaborated with county governments to implement projects aimed at fortifying
their governance processes. Most development partners shifted their focus to funding both national and county governments, which resulted in decreased direct funding to CSOs. CSOs benefitting from this shift were those that provide services such as training and capacity building to the government.

CSOs were subject to worsening state interference and public perceptions in 2014. For example, organizations that viewed the candidacy of the president and vice president in the 2013 elections as unconstitutional were suspected of working against the government and lost the confidence of their constituents. Many CSOs sought to enhance their relationships with the media, which had become strained after CSOs criticized the manner in which the media covered the 2013 elections. CSOs joined the media in advocating against provisions of the Security Laws (Amendment) Act that sought to curtail media freedom.

The main regulatory body for CSOs, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Coordination Board, did not release figures on the number of registered NGOs in Kenya in 2014. In 2013 there were approximately 7,200 registered NGOs, and experts estimate that this number increased by 200 or 300 organizations in 2014. In 2013 there were also about 30,000 registered societies, non-profit companies limited by guarantee, and trusts as well as more than 300,000 community-based organizations (CBOs).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 4.1**

Overall, CSOs’ legal environment deteriorated in 2014. CSOs had hoped that the Public Benefit Organization Act (PBO Act), which was signed into law in January 2013 to provide a more enabling environment for CSOs, would finally be implemented in 2014. This did not happen, as the Minister for Devolution and Planning did not issue a commencement date for the act, which CSOs interpreted as a sign that the government was reluctant to implement the new law. CSOs continued to register as NGOs under the NGO Coordination Act, as societies under the Societies Act, as trusts under the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act, as companies with guarantees under the Companies Act, as cooperative societies under the Cooperative Societies Act, as trade unions under the Labor Relations Act, and as community-based organizations (CBOs) by meeting requirements stipulated by the Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Services.

For most organizations, registration continued to be a lengthy and uncertain process. Only CBOs were able to register without difficulty because of simple registration procedures. In 2014 the NGO Coordination Board is reported to have deregistered 302 NGOs for allegedly failing to comply with legal requirements under the NGO Coordination Act. Since these deregistrations took place without sufficient notice, CSOs saw them as a form of arbitrary interference.

Although Article 36 of the constitution guarantees that CSOs can operate free of arbitrary interference from the state, in 2014 CSOs nonetheless contended with forms of government interference. These instances were worse than in 2013 and created a rather fearful atmosphere for CSO operations. For example, several national organizations, including the Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), received telephone calls from security agents asking whether their activities were legal or warning them not to advocate for increased government transparency and accountability. The Youth Agenda (YAA) was advised by an official from the Ministry of Devolution and Planning that the government would not tolerate picketing and demonstrations as a form of advocacy. At the county level, CSOs also faced intimidation. Staff from Muslims for Human Rights, Ujamaa, and Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K) were arrested and charged with
illegal assembly when they sought to petition the Commissioner of Police in Mombasa County, and TI-K social auditors working in Wajir County were arrested on charges of incitement. The Kenya Revenue Authority performed spot checks without advance notice on some CSOs and demanded to see their financial accounts. As these spot checks had never occurred in the past, CSOs considered them a new form of government intimidation in 2014.

CSOs can apply for tax exemptions under the Income Tax Act and the Custom and Excise Act, but the application process is lengthy and few organizations attempt it. A further disincentive is that the directors of some CSOs fail to submit personal tax returns, which is a requirement for obtaining tax exemption certificates for their organizations. Individuals and corporations supporting CSOs can seek tax deductions under the Income Tax Act. However, most CSOs are unaware of this provision of the law and do not promote it to attract local donations. In 2014 the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) operated a program to raise awareness about tax issues.

CSOs may earn income from their goods and services, but most organizations do not. CSOs may compete for government contracts at the national and county levels provided they have tax exemption certificates, but as most CSOs do not apply for exemptions they do not pursue government contracts. Some organizations with tax exemption certificates have failed to receive government contracts without explanation.

CSOs are not a lucrative market for lawyers, and not many lawyers in Kenya are well versed in CSO law or take an interest in CSO work. The few lawyers who offer services to CSOs charge fees that are unaffordable for most CSOs. Organizations in semi-urban and rural areas have difficulty accessing legal services, as qualified lawyers tend to be located in urban areas.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 3.9

The establishment of county governance structures prompted many CSOs to re-direct their advocacy, service delivery, and capacity-building activities to the county level in 2014. This shift prompted these organizations more actively to build local constituencies and involve them in their activities. However, most CSOs still do not involve their constituents in the monitoring and evaluation of projects.

A significant number of CSOs have clear mission statements and strategic plans, mainly because they are donor requirements. The strategic plans are rarely implemented, however, and in 2014 many organizations coped with limited donor funding by pursuing funds for activities not envisaged in their plans.

Most CSO constitutions provide for clear internal management structures. However, in practice these structures rarely function effectively. The relationship between the board, management, and the staff can be a particular challenge. At some organizations, board members do not engage in governance or hold board meetings, as required by their constitutions. Some board members affiliate with CSOs merely to enhance their own reputations, and executive directors often control the board and its individual members.

Most CSOs have qualified staff. However, many organizations lack the funds to maintain permanent paid staff and so they engage most employees on a project-by-project basis. In 2014, because of decreasing donor funding, CSOs experienced higher staff turnover than in 2013 and found it particularly difficult to retain skilled staff, as they were attracted to work with the government or as consultants because of better pay. Most organizations lack well-developed staff management policies. A culture of volunteerism is not common in Kenya, and CSOs have rarely articulated clear volunteer policies or frameworks for engaging volunteers. The few CSOs that rely on volunteers usually do not clearly document their services.
In 2014 CSOs increasingly embraced technology but have not been able to use it fully because of limited capacity. For example, a number of CSOs have acquired laptops for their staff members, but they use them only to generate reports. Since most donors do not help CSOs acquire equipment, many organizations purchase cheaper products and do not have the funds to pay for repairs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

In 2014 the financial viability of CSOs was threatened as international donors that had been the source of most funding shifted their focus to national and county governments. In funding governments directly, donors increasingly bypassed both advocacy and service-providing CSOs. Some CSOs felt that new funding criteria set by donors were not clearly stated, and they complained that they did not receive sufficient feedback from donors when they failed to qualify for support. While some CSOs had multi-year grants, many organizations were unable to mobilize new resources because they did not have institutionalized relationships with donors and were not innovative in their approaches. For example, most CSOs wait for calls for proposals to apply for funds and then fail to engage their donors for the duration of the project. Most CSOs prefer to rely on the same donors year after year.

For the most part, CSOs in Kenya do not seek local funding from individuals and local corporations because there are no clear-cut criteria or models for pursuing such funds. CSOs largely see local fundraising as demanding work with limited guarantees of return. Theoretically, CSOs should be able to draw on volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituents, especially as the establishment of county governments has provided CSO with opportunities to mobilize constituents at the grassroots level. However, most CSO have yet fully to take advantage of this option.

With decreasing support in 2014, CSOs became increasingly aware of the need to diversify their sources of funding. The Ford Foundation trained YAA, an organization that enhances the involvement of youth in development, on the diversification of funds, and YAA included diversification as a target in its 2015 resource mobilization plan. To help improve CSOs’ fundraising capacity, KCDF helped CSOs develop proposals for grants from donors using the concept of matching grants, which is new for Kenyan CSOs. Act Change Transform (ACT!) also volunteered to help other CSOs develop fundraising proposals.

In 2014 some CSOs engaged in income-generating activities through their work with national and county governments. For example, CRECO received a contract to train members of the Makueni County Assembly, and the Centre for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance (CEDGG) provided consultancy services to the Nakuru County Assembly. A few CSOs have started to embrace other kinds of entrepreneurship. In 2014 KCDF sold T-shirts with messages promoting the rights of the boy child; CRECO rents its office equipment for a minimal fee; and Elimu Sheria leases its premises. On the other hand, in 2014 many membership CSOs were unable to collect fees from their members, who were coping with financial challenges.

Most CSOs have financial management systems in place. They usually conduct financial audits and develop financial reports, which are legally required to share with the government and will share with donors upon request but do not often share with beneficiaries. CSOs rarely conduct financial risk management audits or assess their financial institutional capacity. Some CSOs that lack sound financial management procedures are reluctant to allow contributors and supporters to verify that their use of funds is appropriate.
ADVOCACY: 3.3

CSOs continued to engage actively in advocacy in 2014. In general, advocacy tends to be carried out by CSOs working in the governance sector. CSOs in service provision remain reluctant to engage in lobbying and advocacy, as they fear they will be perceived as opposing the government and do not want to sacrifice that relationship.

In 2014 CSOs cooperated with national and county governments to develop county policy and legal frameworks and consult on county integrated development plans. For example, YAA partnered with the Ministry of Devolution and Planning on a two-day conference with the County Executive Association in Kirinyaga County to explore how the association could incorporate youth needs and perspectives into its plans and activities. The Aga Khan Development Network worked with the Kwale government through the Citizens’ Voices in Devolved Governance project to create formal mechanisms for citizen input into policy decisions via networks of CSOs. As a result of this collaboration, the Kwale county government included CSOs’ recommendations in the county budget.

In 2014 CSOs continued to carry out other advocacy and lobbying initiatives at both the national and county levels. Nationally, ACT! engaged with the Ministry of Lands to provide recommendations for the Climate Change Policy, Climate Change Bill, and Forest Management Conservation Act. The Uraia Trust and Women Empowerment Link partnered with the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) to generate a national action plan on gender equality. A CSO working group on police reforms advocated for security reforms and in December 2014 sought to challenge the Security Laws (Amendment) Act. The Two-Thirds Gender Coalition pushed for a legal framework to ensure implementation of the constitutional provision requiring that not more than two-thirds of one gender be elected to public office. The CSO Reference Group continued to advocate for implementation of the PBO Act. At the county level, the Devolution Coalition advocated for sound governance, and CSOs in Nyandarua, Embu, Kwale, and Nairobi counties mobilized their constituents to participate in county governance processes.

Despite this array of advocacy efforts, CSOs perceived that the space to carry out advocacy at the national level was shrinking in 2014 as a result of increased government harassment. At the county level, CSOs also contended with interference by some government leaders, who sought to dictate the terms on which CSOs could work in their counties. For example, TI-K social auditors in Wajir County had to contend with interference in their activities from some county leaders. In addition, some CSO advocacy coalitions at the county level were limited in their effectiveness by the lack of a proactive approach and a tendency to convene only when prompted by lead CSOs, which are usually located in Nairobi. Also constraining advocacy efforts was the tendency of some CSOs to design their advocacy initiatives too narrowly to allow for holistic or integrated interventions. In addition, CSOs sometimes design their advocacy activities to mesh with donors’ funding cycles and therefore fail to follow their initiatives through to their logical conclusion.

A large number of CSOs at the county level are unaware of the PBO Act or believe that it will curtail their operations, especially if they do not have the capacity to comply with the new law. This perspective tended to make efforts by the CSO Reference Group to push for the PBO Act’s implementation in 2014 more difficult.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

In 2014 CSOs continued to provide goods and services in such areas as food security, income generation, HIV/AIDS, health, and disaster relief. In cooperation with the government, CSOs also continued to provide services that are normally the government’s function, such as school management. During the year CSOs expanded their services, mostly at the county level. For example, in Kwale, Mombasa, and Kilifi counties, Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) created public-private partnerships for service delivery that focused on training
government employees in school improvement methodologies. Some CSOs sought to develop their service provision to respond to emerging issues in climate change, the environment, and agriculture, but these efforts are still at an early stage.

Some organizations conduct baseline surveys to document their constituents’ needs and priorities. For example, CRECO carried out a baseline survey in Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nairobi, and Muranga counties to inform the design and implementation of its Citizen Participation and Community Engage project. Not all CSOs conduct research prior to service provision, largely because they prioritize donor requirements and their own organizational objectives. For example, CSOs conducting trainings for members of county assemblies do not always assess the assemblies’ capacity prior to trainings.

Some CSO goods and services meet needs beyond those of their constituents. For example, the Federation of Women Lawyers-Kenya (FIDA-K) and the Center for Rights and Awareness conducted awareness-raising events on women’s rights that benefitted the public at large. Academics, journalists, and government officials often see CSO research as relevant to their work and request reference materials from them. Several CSOs, such as ACT!, CRECO, YAA, and FIDA-K, developed informational and educational materials that were commensurate with their constituents’ literacy level.

Most CSOs do not recover costs from their goods and services or conduct market analyses. Not only are they reluctant to charge fees to constituents who are used to receiving benefits at no cost, but they also lack useful business models for generating income. Ironically, others may profit from goods and services offered by CSOs. For example, CRECO encountered street vendors selling materials that it had distributed free of charge.

National and county governments recognize the value that CSOs add to the provision and monitoring of basic social services but make little effort to involve them. They sometimes perceive CSOs as competitors, especially insofar as they believe that CSOs attempt to usurp government roles, such as the provision of education and health services.

CSOs can legally compete for government contracts at the national and county levels. In 2014 a few CSOs successfully competed for government contracts to build the capacity of county government employees. However, CSOs are often expected to provide technical services to government officials free of charge.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6**

CSOs provide information services to other CSOs, their constituents, and members of the public, but such services are not widely used. For example, YAA operates a resource center for youth at its national office in Nairobi, which is infrequently visited. Nascent CSOs at the county level lack well-equipped resource centers because of limited funding. Most resource centers nationwide are not updated for the same reason.

CSO coalitions seek to share information with members and enhance collaboration and joint activities. In 2014 CSOs formed a coalition to respond to the Security Law (Amendment) Act, and the CSO Reference Group shared information with CSOs on the PBO Act.
Several CSOs conduct trainings for other organizations on a range of issues, including advocacy, resource mobilization, networking, and public relations. In 2014 ACT! provided training on organizational development to its sub-grantees, and the CSO Reference Group conducted capacity-building trainings on the PBO Act. With the new county governments, most CSOs began to focus their trainings at the local level. A few CSOs offer courses online, and a portal operated by the Fanikisha project has links to an array of online courses for CSOs. Some commercial courses are available but they are very expensive and unaffordable for most organizations.

CSOs engage in intersectoral partnerships with local business foundations. For example, KCDF received funds from the Safaricom Limited for its Know and Growth project, a food security program. CSOs often work with government in informal partnerships, because formal relationships require a memorandum of understanding, which involves a lengthy process. Although CSO-media relationships are weak, during the year CSOs endeavored to enhance partnerships with the media by, for example, conducting trainings for journalists and sponsoring media networking, such as the annual Independent Medico-Legal Unit cocktail.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

In 2014 CSOs endeavored with little success to improve their media coverage. A majority of CSOs do not understand how the media works and therefore do not package their information in a media-savvy manner. CSOs generally made little effort to build journalists’ capacity to report on their initiatives, and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act discouraged media coverage of CSOs, as it imposed new restrictions on freedom of speech. Although some CSOs used community radio to raise awareness on their activities, many CSO advocacy efforts at the national and county levels did not receive media coverage.

CSOs that work closely with their communities enjoy positive public perceptions. Some organizations working at the national level enjoy minimal public trust and support, mainly because of public apathy, suspicions, or misinformation. For example, there was noticeable public indifference to the failure to implement the PBO Act in 2014. A significant segment of the public perceives CSOs as lacking accountability and transparency and is hesitant to support them. CSOs such as the African Center for Open Governance, Kenya Human Rights Commission, and Kenyan section of International Commission of Jurists, which engaged in advocacy related to the ICC and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, had to contend with public perceptions that they were unpatriotic and opposed to the government’s efforts to prevent terrorism and establish a local redress mechanism for victims of post-election violence. CSOs working on these issues believe that because of these perceptions, their advocacy work has become more difficult and the government is hesitant to engage with them as robustly as in the past.

CSOs continued to grapple with negative perceptions by the national government. For example, the president held breakfast meetings with various segments of Kenyan society but did not include CSOs. CSOs perceive this snub as a sign of the president’s displeasure with them. However, some government officials, especially at the county level, expressed a positive view of CSOs in 2014, especially after collaborating on joint activities. In 2014 CSOs did not make serious efforts to present themselves as worthy partners to the private sector. Nevertheless, some businesses relied on CSO research to inform their corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects.

Many CSOs did not effectively publicize their work in 2014. Although CSOs often use their websites and social media to publicize their work, only a few organizations have sufficient resources to keep them up to date. Some CSOs publish annual reports, including on their websites, usually because of donor requirements.
However, the annual reports are not always comprehensive, thus fueling the notion that CSOs are not transparent or accountable.

CSOs have yet to fully embrace self-regulation, and they are not committed to adopting a code of ethics to demonstrate transparency in their operations. For example, CRECO developed an accountability charter but only twenty of CRECO’s 100 members have signed it.
Liberia

The Ebola outbreak dominated the news throughout Liberia in 2014. The outbreak occurred in two waves. It first surfaced in February as a cross-border incident and seemed confined. Then it occurred again in May 2014 and within a month had spread rapidly to all parts of the country. In an effort to curb the disease, a state of emergency was declared, communities were quarantined, employees were placed on involuntary leave, and schools were closed. Most organizations were forced to cut back on capacity, and the business sector shrank, with concession companies folding up, expatriate workers returning home, and most international airlines pulling out of the country. Activities in all sectors decreased considerably, as the focus of most engagement was on the Ebola response. Because of the outbreak, the government attempted to postpone mid-term elections. But this move was rejected by the legislature, with support from CSOs, out of a fear that postponing elections would render the government illegitimate.

The human casualty of the outbreak was overwhelming. By the end of the year, 8,115 cases of Ebola had been recorded nationwide, resulting in a cumulative death toll of 3,471. The outbreak was disastrous for the
country’s limited pool of health workers, most of whom worked with CSOs. A total of 370 cases of infection were recorded among healthcare workers, resulting in 178 deaths.

Overall, there was no notable improvement in CSO sustainability in 2014. No specific laws were passed regulating CSOs, and their organizational capacity remained unchanged from the previous year. In response to the Ebola outbreak, CSOs’ gradual shift in focus from relief to development work during the last few years was reversed. More donor resources accrued to the country, but there are doubts that these resources will improve the long-term viability of CSOs or the health sector. The assistance programs were mostly short term and not linked to ongoing plans for these sectors.

Ebola provided an exceptional example of cooperation between government and CSOs. Resource centers and other structures engaged in networking continued to function, but diverted their efforts towards health and sanitation awareness. The public image of CSOs did not change, and the media continued to provide good coverage to CSOs engaged in the Ebola response.

In 2014 more organizations were registered and accredited than in previous years. By the end of the year, there were 997 registered CSOs in Liberia, compared to 800 in 2013. Of registered organizations, 874 were national organizations or community-based organizations (CBOs), while 123 were international organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

The legal environment for Liberian CSOs improved somewhat in 2014, thanks mainly to a greater ease of registration. The increased number of organizations registering in 2014 can be attributed to a number of factors. First, registration is easy. Organizations can now register in one day at the Liberia Business Registry, whereas in 2013 the registration took an average of two days and before that could take up to two months. This improvement is due largely to changes in procedures and staff training at the Business Registry. In addition, rather than involving several government agencies, registration is now a one-stop process, which encourages more organizations to register. Second, registration and accreditation have become criteria for accessing donor funds, which are the main sources of support for CSOs. Third, a number of CSOs were established in response to the mounting Ebola crisis, which necessitated the involvement of non-state actors. It is too early to say whether the increased number of registrations in 2014 is the start of an ongoing trend. Most rural organizations still do not register.

There is still no specific legislation on CSOs. In the absence of legislation, the Association Law of 1977 is the only instrument for CSO registration, and the NGO Coordination Policy is the standing policy framework for accrediting and regulating their activities. This framework is administered by the Ministry of Planning, which merged with the Ministry of Finance in 2013 to form a new agency called the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. In 2014 the new ministry was fully organized and the NGO Coordination Office was re-staffed.

Although there were no reports in 2014 of state harassment aimed specifically at CSOs, several incidents contributed to a tense operating environment for CSOs. The state of emergency allowed the government to take extraordinary actions such as deploying the army and security forces to impose a nighttime curfew, close
national borders, and restrict movement to and from areas affected by Ebola. There were reports of hostile behavior by government officials towards citizens, particularly market women, who are highly mobile throughout the country. The Chronicle, a newspaper, was closed after it ran a story about the visit of a senior government official to Washington, D.C., and the matter is now in the courts. All of these incidents sent negative signals and instilled a general atmosphere of fear throughout civil society.

There is no legislation prohibiting CSOs from earning funds through income-generating activities. CSOs are also allowed to compete for government and donor contracts. Income earned from such contracts must be declared in the organization’s regular annual filing with government.

The taxation of CSOs is treated under general tax laws. CSOs are usually exempt from paying income tax on resources received in association with service provision, on the assumption that such income will be put back into the organization to enhance its capacity to render services. However, CSOs are required to withhold taxes applicable to their employees.

There was no improvement in legal services for CSOs in 2014. Liberia does not have lawyers specializing in the CSO sector. Given their lack of financial resources, CSOs do not generally retain lawyers, although when the need arises, they may retain lawyers on a case-by-case basis. A growing number of lawyers have begun to reduce their fees for CSOs, but there are no lawyers offering pro-bono services. Fortunately, legal cases involving CSOs are few.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

In 2014 CSOs continued to build local constituencies and engage communities in projects that helped meet their needs. In Garwula District, Grand Cape Mount County, the Women and Girls Agriculture Project initiated by Sustainable Livelihood Promoters Program (SLPP) brought together women and girl farmers in the district to provide them with training and advice on the production of eggs and vegetables. These farm outputs were used to generate income for the project as well as the farmers. Other CSOs, such as Lutheran Development Service (LDS), Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment, and Catalyst Liberia, continued to work through community-based groups to create opportunities for local ownership and sustainable interventions. However, a lack of resources sometimes makes it difficult for CSOs to maintain regular contact with their constituencies.

CSOs continued to use strategic planning to reposition themselves and access donor resources. The Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL), once a leading health coordinating organization, underwent an institutional renewal process in 2014, in which it developed a strategic plan and revised its governance structures. On a participatory basis, and with the involvement of an external facilitator, new mission and vision statements were adopted and shared with association members. The board of directors was reconstituted, and it in turn restructured the secretariat. Based on these changes, a few of CHAL’s traditional donors and partners were re-engaged, and the association featured prominently in the Ebola response.

Aside from CHAL, active boards of directors are still not common among CSOs. Boards may exist in the articles of incorporation and in response to donor requirements, but in practice they are usually not involved in governance and tend not to differentiate their responsibilities from those of staff. The New African Research and Development Agency (NARDA), an umbrella group, is seeking to address this weakness by strengthening the internal management systems of its member organizations. As part of this ongoing initiative, NARDA is helping its members establish boards, clarify their roles and responsibilities, and address other governance and management issues.
Maintaining permanent staff is still a challenge for CSOs. The most common permanent staff positions are executive director, program officer, and accountant. These positions provide a basic management structure that donors consider a minimal requirement. Other staff members are hired on a project-by-project basis. In 2014 the Ebola response caused a shift in employment opportunities at CSOs. New jobs were created with the establishment of new organizations and the refocus of existing organizations on Ebola. Given the emergency, high-risk nature of the outbreak, Ebola response activities garnered more resources. Staff members were attracted to these better paying positions and often received specialized training. More volunteers were also available to work with the government, CSOs, and communities. But all of these positions were short-term. So far there is no exact information on the overall number of CSO staff losses to the disease.

Inadequate CSO resources generally prevent the procurement of modern office equipment. Most organizations provide staff with laptops, which may also be put to personal use. Equipment such as computers, cell phones, and modems is sometimes obtained through a specific donor-funded project. For example, in 2014 some organizations received vehicles as part of the Ebola response. However, after a project phases out, maintaining equipment and Internet subscriptions can be a challenge. Most organizations do not operate from modern office facilities or have a constant supply of utilities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

Donor funding drives the programs and operations of CSOs in Liberia. Both for regular programs and for the Ebola response, foreign donors were the principal source of funding in 2014. About $800 million from multiple sources came into the country for the emergency response, compared to $445 million in 2013. The 2014 funding was mostly channeled through international CSOs, such as the American Refugee Committee and Mercy Corps International. The international CSOs worked with county health teams and local CSOs to varying degrees. Most Liberian CSOs were sub-contractors or implementing partners for international CSOs.

Most CSO funding comes from international donors on a project-by-project basis, with a percentage of the project budget usually available for administrative expenses. In general, the Ebola response did not seem to divert funding from regular programs, although regular program activities were somewhat delayed. Some local organizations directly accessed external funding in 2014. For example, Tohde Resource Center, a CBO in the suburbs of Monrovia, concluded a direct funding arrangement with partners in Germany to provide livelihood assistance to adolescent girls and young mothers. Another organization operated by a member of the legislature raised funds to provide urgently needed ambulance services in Monrovia. The success of this service garnered international attention and was duplicated in neighboring Sierra Leone.

Local funding is generally lacking. However, in the wake of the national health emergency, generous donations were forthcoming from local corporations and business associations, such as the Rotary Club, Fulah Community, Lebanese Community, and Liberia Business Association. For the most part, these donations were in kind and directed to the government rather than organizations delivering services.

Despite the level of resources flowing to the country in 2014, the financial viability of most local organizations remained doubtful. CSOs typically do not have diversified sources of funding. When their only source of funding runs out, such as at the termination of a project, it is very unlikely that organizations can continue to offer services. At the end of December 2014, Ebola response programs were still ongoing, and it was too early to judge the impact of their eventual discontinuation.
CSOs are not prohibited by law from pursuing income-generating activities. However, because they generally see themselves as not-for-profit organizations and income may be misconstrued as profit, many CSOs shy away from pursuing income-generating activities or are reluctant to discuss such activities. CSOs are able to obtain contracts from the government for service delivery.

Over the years, CSOs have made incremental efforts to establish financial management systems. However, in 2014 no major improvements were recorded, as most organizations reverted to an emergency mode of operation. Typically, CSOs do not publish annual reports or financial statements, except to comply with donor requirements. CSOs generally continue to be reluctant to discuss their finances.

**ADVOCACY: 3.9**

The Ebola response provided an exceptionally good example of cooperation between government and CSOs. All aspects of planning and management of the country’s response to the crisis were undertaken jointly. CSOs were members of the Incident Management System, the highest decision-making body in the Ebola crisis, and also took part in working committees on such topics as contact tracing, case management, psycho-social needs, body management (burials), and social mobilization.

CSOs also took part in an appeal to the president not to extend the state of emergency imposed after the Ebola outbreak. CSOs and other stakeholders in the health sector argued that the state of emergency was not necessary because most if not all of the measures needed to fight Ebola were available under existing public health laws. The state of emergency was lifted in November. In addition, national CSOs such as The Talking Drum, Liberia Media Action Group, Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL), and NARDA organized meetings with leaders and members of the legislature to convince them of the merits of holding elections despite the Ebola crisis.

CSOs had a slot on the Liberia Development Agenda, a forum set up by the government to steer the national strategy for development. They also participated in a nationwide citizen awareness initiative to raise ordinary Liberians’ awareness of the government’s development plans. CSOs have continued to serve on the Open Budget Initiative with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

Some coalitions of CSOs engaging in advocacy either intensified their networking or shifted their institutional focus in 2014. A number of sector working groups were established to promote and streamline activities in their area of involvement. For example, the Liberia Education Sector Cluster consulted with the Ministry of Education on the need for a holistic post-Ebola plan for the sector. Within this context, a concept for school safety zones developed by a cluster member was adopted by most other members as a comprehensive approach for instituting safety in schools.

Because lobbying is easily misconstrued in Liberia as giving money to public officials for a service, CSOs are reluctant to be seen as engaging in lobbying, and their lobbying efforts tend to be unstructured and ad hoc. However, in 2014 CSOs continued to work with the national legislature on issues that benefit the general population, including passage of the Decent Work Bill, which sets a threshold for wages for unskilled and skilled workers, and the Code of Ethics Bill, which sets standards for ethical conduct in government. The National Integrity Forum, a group of Liberian CSOs and government organizations, were prominent advocates for passage of the latter bill.

No effort was made in 2014 to advocate for legal reform specific to CSOs.
Goods and services provided by CSOs are limited to basic social services in such areas as health, education, relief, and sanitation. The tendency of CSOs in recent years to shift from relief to development work was reversed by the need to address the Ebola outbreak. New organizations such as Global Communities emerged to engage in unusual activities such as burial management. Local CSOs such as CHAL refocused to sensitize communities about Ebola and distribute sanitation kits to underserved communities. Other local CSOs served as contact tracers, burial managers, and caregivers or helped international CSOs manage treatment centers. CSOs—primarily international organizations such as the American Refugee Committee—took over the management of emergency treatment units (ETUs). LDS became involved in sensitization as well as the provision of food and materials and the construction of a holding unit at Phebe Hospital.

CSO coalitions were active as part of the overall effort to eradicate Ebola. The Act Liberia Forum, a coalition of faith-based CSOs, mobilized its members to implement a program of multiple interventions in counties most affected by Ebola. Through an international appeal, the forum generated approximately $1 million in resources to buy food and non-food items, provide wage incentives to health workers, and galvanize support for Ebola survivors. Although most ETUs built to treat Ebola patients are stand-alone temporary structures and are not tied in with existing facilities, the forum designed and constructed an ETU at Phebe Hospital in Bong County as a permanent facility.

The crisis revealed a major weakness in the delivery of social services in Liberia as well as wide gaps in the country’s capacity to respond to a disaster of any type. In the aftermath of the crisis, the national health policy and plans are undergoing review. It is anticipated that any revisions will have implications for the role and level of involvement of CSOs in the provision of basic social services. The review is spearheaded by the Ministry of Health and involves all stakeholders in the sector.

Ongoing arrangements for outsourcing service delivery to CSOs (mostly international CSOs), especially by the Ministry of Health, continued in 2014 under competitive procurement arrangements. These contracts are funded by donors with the objective of filling performance gaps in public services. Most organizations work with county health teams and have direct responsibility for managing clinics. For example, Mercy Corps International works with county health teams to operate facilities in River Gee County in southeastern Liberia, and Africare has a contract to run facilities in Nimba and Bong counties. These projects were not suspended because of Ebola, but because of staff losses and the closure of some facilities, they continued at reduced capacity. Organizations working in non-health areas of service delivery experienced even more pronounced reductions in capacity in 2014.

Goods and services provided in 2014 reflected communities’ needs and priorities. In particular, during the Ebola outbreak some CSOs operating in the country were allowed to move freely from one locality to another even if local populations were locked down. There were a few reported instances of community hostility to CSO interventions during the outbreak. These reactions resulted from a lack of understanding about the disease and suspicions about the intentions of the government, CSOs, and their implementing partners. CSOs engaged in community awareness and sensitization to help communities better understand and control the disease.

The effort to build cost recovery into service delivery was challenged by the return to emergency response. Six months of emergency in most parts of the country dampened the resiliency of most communities, and their ability to pay for products or contribute to the cost of services was severely constrained.
**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

Most resource centers in Liberia continued to function in 2014. Out of necessity, they converted their services from the usual sharing of information on development issues to Ebola awareness and, to a certain extent, disaster preparedness. These centers played a crucial role in alerting communities about Ebola. The resource centers run by NARDA and Development Education Network/Liberia (DEN/L) were especially involved in helping member organizations train community leaders and household members on avoiding Ebola. Among the non-Ebola-related trainings that took place in 2014, the Carter Center conducted trainings on peace building for chiefs and elders and NARDA conducted trainings for its members on reconciliation, gender mainstreaming, mentoring, mediation, and networking.

Local grantmaking and local fundraising to finance projects do not occur. However, a form of re-granting did take place in 2014 with LDS’s implementation of the ACT Appeal, which enabled health workers to receive salary incentives, which were paid through local partners such as the Lutheran Church.

CSOs in Liberia are beginning to use networks to facilitate discussion and information sharing. For example, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster became more active in response to Ebola and participated in weekly meetings with the National Ebola Task Force. Although the Education Cluster Group did not meet monthly in 2014 because of the Ebola outbreak, it continued to network online.

There were no formal intersectoral partnerships during the year. However, the fight to eradicate Ebola became a common objective of businesses, government, and CSOs, and donations by businesses and business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Liberia Business Association were channeled to communities through CSOs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6**

Active media engagements contributed to an improved public image of CSOs in 2014. Both radio and print media gave regular positive coverage to the activities of organizations involved in the fight against Ebola.

To a large extent, the public has a positive view of CSOs. This perception is due in part to the cooperation of CSOs with the government and the public in the fight against Ebola. At the local level, communities appreciated the work of most CSOs in the emergency response. A few organizations, including Médecins Sans Frontières and Samaritan’s Purse, encountered some hostility in the field, including, in one incident, vehicular damage. However, after inducing community members to change their minds, government and opinion leaders invited the organizations to return. During the election period NARDA organized trainings for its members on civic education, election monitoring, and election violence.

The perceptions of CSOs by government and businesses also improved in 2014. Thanks to their involvement in the management of treatment units and the distribution of food and supplies, CSOs were seen as effective partners in the fight against Ebola.
CSOs have not taken significant steps to measure their adherence to self-regulation and transparency. There is no evidence that any CSOs have published annual reports or made public disclosure of their accounts and activities.
MALAWI

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country Facts</th>
<th>Malawi’s first-ever tripartite elections for the president, members of parliament, and local councilors were held on May 20, 2014. Conducted according to the “winner takes all” electoral system, the elections saw the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) coming back into power with 37 percent of the vote. Questions about the legitimacy of the new government emerged, as some voters claimed that it did not have the support of the entire country, especially in the northern region, where the population supported former president Dr. Joyce Banda, who came in third. CSOs were divided on the election results. Some CSO leaders sided with losing parties that questioned the results of the elections, while others supported the Malawi Electoral Commission, which announced results that some organizations saw as a true reflection of voting patterns observed at parallel voter tabulation centers managed by CSOs. Aside from the elections, divisions among CSOs were generally not as pronounced as in 2013. The conflict in the CSO sector that emerged in late 2013 when the Civil Society Grand Coalition sought to initiate the Black Monday movement against government corruption but was not supported by all CSOs continued through the elections but then died down. However, CSOs remained divided on Cashgate, the 2013 scandal in which $60 million (or as much as $250 million, according to some reports) disappeared from government accounts.</th>
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<td><strong>Human Development Index:</strong> 174</td>
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**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.2**

![2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Malawi]

![Image: Map of Malawi]
While some CSOs demanded swift prosecution of those suspected of having looted public funds, other organizations remained silent, and it was difficult to bring the CSO sector together in a unified position on the scandal.

In response to Cashgate, the United Kingdom, European Union, Norway, and other Western donors withheld $150 million in aid. Without this assistance, the new government’s budget for 2014/2015 showed a severe deficit, spurring inflation and shrinking the government’s capacity to provide services to its citizens. While the withdrawal of donor funding affected the government’s provision of services, it did not have a direct impact on the CSO sector, mainly because the government does not provide financial support to CSOs and redirected donor funding went largely to international rather than Malawian CSOs.

The majority of CSOs in Malawi deliver services related to health, education, food, and water. Other CSOs work in human rights and governance, and many community-based organizations (CBOs) focus on orphan care and HIV/AIDS. Trade unions and faith-based organizations (FBOs) are also active. Altogether there are approximately 1,500 registered CSOs in Malawi, and many more organizations are active but not registered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act of 2000 provides explicit instructions for the registration of CSOs. However, other legal means of registering continue to function and have yet to be harmonized with the act. For example, CSOs are now required to register with the NGO Board, which was established in 2012, but CBOs and FBOs may also register with the office of the president or cabinet offices, and FBOs additionally may register with the registrar of companies. Cumbersome, multi-step registration procedures remain in place, such as the requirement that CSOs register also with the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations of Malawi (CONGOMA) and with government ministries responsible for their specific areas of intervention. In the run-up to elections in 2014, the NGO Board issued threats, which it did not follow through on, to dissolve all CSOs that had not registered with the board.

The NGO Act regulates the operations of CSOs and prohibits certain activities, such as “politicicking” and “electioneering.” The government sometimes abuses these provisions when it dislikes the activities of certain CSOs, particularly those working in human rights and governance. In past elections the government threatened to dissolve CSOs that offered civic and voter education. This did not happen in 2014, although CSOs fear that the continued existence of ambiguous terminology in the law leaves the door open to future abuse. Prior to the elections, the state used government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) to castigate the advocacy work of other CSOs. For example, when CSO members of CONGOMA staged their Black Monday civil disobedience campaign, the government ensured that the Forum for National Development (FND) had more radio and television coverage of its smaller counter-campaign, which it called White Monday. After the elections, FND, which had been supported by the outgoing People’s Party government, become noticeably less visible.

CSOs are obliged to pay taxes on income, including grant income, as well as on goods and services. CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions in specific instances, including the purchase of capital equipment such as hospital supplies, vehicles, computers, and printers. These exemptions are issued only in very exceptional cases at the discretion of the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development. In addition, service-providing CSOs in such fields as health and emergency relief may apply through the Ministry of Finance for tax waivers.
on goods and services. However, CSOs report that the application process is lengthy and ultimately frustrating, as responses are usually negative.

CSOs are legally allowed to compete for government contracts and conduct income-generating activities.

There are no lawyers in Malawi specifically trained in CSO law. CSOs depend on lawyers with general legal training, who work only in large cities and thus are usually inaccessible to organizations in more remote areas. Legal counsel is usually expensive, and only a few lawyers work pro bono.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

CSOs in Malawi continued to struggle to establish relationships with constituencies in 2014. This was especially true of organizations located in cities and lacking workers or volunteers based in the communities that they claim to serve. Only FBOs and some CSO networks have well-defined, established relationships with constituencies at the national, regional, district, and community levels. For example, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) work through church structures at all levels to reach out to a wider citizenry, and the Malawi Health Equity Network (MHEN), Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), and Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC) also have strong outreach through their membership structures. A few secular CSOs have established offices in rural areas or work with other organizations to implement community-based programs involving local constituencies. CSOs that have only a few employees or are one-man shows face particular difficulties in establishing contact with constituencies. Some organizations appear to have a presence only in the media without serving a visible constituency.

Most CSOs have mission, vision, and values statements as well as strategic plans. These documents are prerequisites for obtaining registration certificates from the NGO Board and are often also demanded by funding partners. However, for many organizations these instruments serve merely as an expression of intent and their activities are shaped more by funders’ changing agendas. Unlike in 2013, no major changes in CSO focus areas were reported in 2014.

Larger CSOs usually have clearly differentiated internal structures, with boards providing policy direction and oversight and staff engaged in day-to-day operations. It is not uncommon for smaller CSOs to have blurred internal structures, with a weak separation between boards and staff. Board members at smaller organizations are often friends of the leaders and take part in name only, with limited commitment to the governance of the organization. As a result, their organizations often fail to respond to changing contexts or experience a lack of trust from cooperating partners, since they do not comply with financial management best practices.

With the exception of a few international organizations, nearly all CSOs in Malawi hire staff only for the duration of a particular project. Longer-term financial uncertainty continues to make it difficult for CSOs to retain qualified staff. For the most part, CSOs advertise job vacancies in the print media and provide written job descriptions. Some CSOs, especially FBOs, draw on volunteers for project implementation at the community and district levels. Organizations sometimes employ accountants, though their qualifications are often weak. The use of experts in information and communications technology is limited. CSOs working in human rights and governance have recently begun to use lawyers, sometimes on a pro-bono basis, for policy audits and legal opinions.

Most organizations throughout the country have modern computers, software, cell phones, fax machines, and scanners. However, given intermittent electricity supplies and Internet services, these advances have led to limited improvement in CSOs’ organizational performance.
**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Most CSOs in Malawi obtain direct funding from development agencies, including USAID, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Irish AID, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the European Commission’s EuropeAid. In the past few years most donors have shifted their focus from human rights and governance to livelihoods and emergency relief.

After withdrawing aid from the government during the Cashgate scandal, some donors rechanneled funding to international CSOs. Because of the scandal, donors seemed reluctant to fund Malawian CSOs, both because they were suspicious of financial malpractices at all local institutions and because they did not seem to believe that local organizations had adequate human resource and management capacity. Malawian CSOs have generally faced dwindling funding opportunities since 2012, when the country’s economy deteriorated and some funders withdrew aid because of Malawi’s poor human rights record and weak governance processes or their priorities shifted to other countries.

In 2014, unlike previous election years, relatively few organizations received funding for civic and voter education. Although more than 177 CSOs, CBOs, FBOs, and drama groups were accredited by the Malawi Electoral Commission to provide civic and voter education, fewer than thirty-five of these organizations received funding, because the Electoral Commission did not receive basket funds for this purpose from the UN Development Program, as during previous elections. Among the organizations that received funding for civic and voter education or election monitoring were the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE), which was generously supported by the European Union, and some FBOs, including the Episcopal Conference of Malawi, Evangelical Association of Malawi, Muslim Association of Malawi, and Public Affairs Committee, which received support from NORAD. In addition, for the first time ever, some CBOs received funding from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to conduct issue-based civic education.

Most CSOs in Malawi receive funding from a single donor at any given time. Only a few organizations, including international CSOs, FBOs, and local CSO networks, have a diversified donor base. Malawian CSOs are seldom viable over the short term, since it is not easy for them to access state-funded projects in the absence of donor support.

CSOs are permitted by law to engage in income-generating activities, but few organizations do so, as they focus more on seeking support from donors. CSOs that successfully generate income through service provision include hospitals that are members of the Christian Hospitals Association of Malawi (CHAM), which charge fees for healthcare. Other organizations, including the Center for Social Concern (CISC) and CHRR, have constructed office buildings and rent out rooms. The Association of Christian Educators in Malawi (ACEM), MEJN, HRCC, and other CSO networks seek to generate resources through annual membership fees, although with limited success, since many of their members fail to pay.

In accordance with registration and donor requirements, CSOs usually have defined financial management systems, including trained personnel and periodic external audits. Most CBOs and unregistered CSOs perform audits only when required by their funding partners. This is especially true of organizations in rural areas, where auditing services are not readily available. Most CSOs submit financial records to their funders but do not publish annual financial statements. As in 2013, no organization published an annual report or financial statement in the print media in 2014.

**ADVOCACY: 4.5**

In 2014 CSO advocacy efforts mostly focused on the elections. CSO activities included mobilizing and monitoring voter registration, disseminating election information, and seeking to ensure a fair campaign
process. For the first time ever, Malawian and international CSOs worked with local media and the Malawi Electoral Commission to organize presidential debates, which provided a platform for presidential candidates to address key issues facing the new government.

As Malawians headed toward the polls, the CSO community was divided along political lines, with some CSO leaders clearly supporting the ruling People’s Party while others supported the opposition. In fact, tensions within the CSO community were greater than those between the government and CSOs, and they undermined the collaboration needed to mount effective CSO advocacy campaigns on national governance challenges, including Cashgate and the whereabouts of proceeds from the controversial sale of the presidential jet. For example, while some CSOs continued to support the Black Monday campaign against rampant corruption, others supported the White Monday campaign organized by FND or appeared to withdraw from national issues altogether. In March 2014 CSOs under the umbrella body CONGOMA were allowed to hold peaceful demonstrations demanding information about the sale of the jet and the speedy prosecution of Cashgate defendants.

At the national and district levels the government consulted with CSOs on human rights, governance, and service delivery issues—for example, the national budgeting process and oversight of mining activities. Some unstructured consultations also took place on development policy. In 2014 the government developed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish district-based platforms that would allow CSOs to better engage in district-specific development issues. These platforms aim to coordinate CSO efforts so as to avoid duplication of interventions. Implementation of the MOU is dependent on district-level governments, and eight out of twenty-eight districts agreed to sign the MOU in 2014.

CSO advocacy and lobbying on other issues was nearly non-existent. Campaigns to gain recognition of minority rights, transparency in extractive industries, and an amendment to the Local Government Act were undertaken, but local populations did not support these initiatives—especially regarding minority rights which remain a divisive issue. In addition, most citizens were preoccupied with the elections and paid little attention to other governance challenges. CSOs under CONGOMA issued a statement prior to the elections reminding Malawians that there were key governance issues facing the country besides the elections.

CSOs expressed concerns about the status of the NGO Act and urged parliament to reform the act so that it would be consonant with the constitution. These calls for action were mostly linked to political party platforms during the elections and were not intended for immediate action. The reform of the NGO Act also came up during the presidential debates, and the new government promised to review the act but had not done so by the end of 2014.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs in Malawi provide basic social services in many areas, including health and education, water and sanitation, orphan care, agriculture and food security, and HIV/AIDS. Public services offered by the government are often overstretched in these areas, and CSOs’ programs complement the government’s efforts. After donors suspended assistance in the aftermath of Cashgate, the government scaled back health and other services. For example, because of a lack of funding at public health facilities, there were reported drug shortages, disconnected water and electricity supplies, and grounded ambulance services. There is no evidence that CSOs were able to make up for reduced services provided by government.
Some goods and services provided by CSOs are sometimes overly concentrated in urban areas or linked to specific networks, and they may fail to reach wider audiences, especially in rural areas. For example, CSOs conducting awareness-raising conferences and workshops often limit participation to an urban, peri-urban, or district target groups without considering the benefits of including Malawians residing in rural areas. Similarly, FBOs may limit the scope of their interventions to the geographical areas in which most of their followers live.

Most CSOs provide their goods and services free of charge as a form of charitable or humanitarian work. A few CSOs in fields such as health and education charge fees for their services. For example, hospitals and health centers operating under CHAM charge fees for their services, which are more affordable than those charged by private health facilities.

The government of Malawi often acknowledges service-providing CSOs as their allies in development at the national and local levels. The government sometimes enters into contracts with CSO health facilities—for example, members of CHAM—to subsidize the cost of services in locations where the government does not operate its own facilities. From time to time the government offers subventions and grants to faith-based schools and hospitals, although it failed to honor all of its commitments in 2014 because of shrinking national revenues and changing priorities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

There are relatively few resource centers supporting CSOs in Malawi. Most of them are linked to NICE offices operating in all twenty-eight districts. However, these centers are located in district capitals and do not serve rural areas, where most CBOs are located. In addition, they tend to offer only information and newspapers and do not provide the capacity-building support that local CSOs need. Only larger urban CSOs have access to information and training on proposal development, governance, and management. In 2014 technical support was available through funders such as the Tilitonse Fund, European Union, and USAID. Donors sometimes also offer ad hoc training to their grantees through the Capacity Building Organization (CABUNGO) and the Center for Social Research at the University of Malawi. Training is available for a fee at several educational institutions, such as the government-funded Malawi Institute of Management and the Staff Training College. Both institutions offer training in English without translation into local languages.

A few local institutions provide grants to CSOs. For example, the Tilitonse Fund and National AIDS Commission re-grant donor funds to a large number of CSOs for projects in governance and HIV/AIDS. There is no evidence that local grantmaking institutions received increased funding from donors in 2014 when they suspended aid to the government.

In the past few years, many donors have begun to insist on coalitions between Malawian and international CSOs as a prerequisite for funding. These coalitions are often not inclusive of local CSOs, as only organizations with "a proven track record" are approached by international CSOs for project implementation and other collaborations. Information is minimally available through a few CSO networks, such as the Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN), Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), MEJN, PAG, and CCJP. As these networks are membership based, they also promote shared interests, such as resource mobilization, capacity building, and international representation. CONGOMA’s role ostensibly includes coordination of information sharing among CSOs, but it does not fulfill this role.

CSOs providing basic social services usually work cooperatively with the government, while organizations addressing issues of corruption, human rights, and governance often have less harmonious relations with
authorities. The Malawi Media Council and the World Bank organized joint media and CSO meetings on transparency and accountability in 2014. No CSO-business projects were reported in 2014.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

Print and electronic media gave wider coverage to CSO activities in 2014, particularly in relation to the elections and Cashgate. For the most part, CSOs and journalists collaborated effectively to highlight governance and development issues facing the country. For instance, the media invited CSO leaders from MEJN, CCJP, and the Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce to offer expert opinion on national issues. However, there were again instances in which journalists attended CSO activities only to obtain expense allowances, thereby undermining the CSO-media relationship.

The public continued to have a dual perception of CSOs as both representing citizens’ interests and promoting self-aggrandizing individuals who retain funding intended for beneficiaries. In the context of Cashgate and the elections, the government viewed CSOs as damaging the image of the ruling party to benefit the opposition. Public radio and television stations provided GONGOs with airtime during the elections to campaign for the incumbent president and portray other CSOs as campaigning against the incumbent because she was a woman. However, on the national and district levels, the government continued to view CSOs as useful partners in development projects. In 2014 the business sector saw CSOs mainly in the context of the elections and sought to ensure that organizations providing civic and voter education addressed issues important to business, so they could feed into the presidential debates.

CSOs in Malawi recognize the importance of visibility for obtaining funding and in 2014 continued to publicize their activities through newspaper inserts, websites, and social media. A few CSOs use Facebook and Twitter for their publicity. Regional CSOs dealing with issues of national interest sometimes engage the media to reach audiences beyond their immediate locations, but their efforts are usually ad hoc. CSOs often overlook the benefits of using radio and print media to publicize conferences and workshops to audiences beyond their immediate locations.

Both CONGOMA and the NGO Act offer codes of conduct that are meant to ensure transparency and accountability. However, compliance with these codes has been left to chance, as the responsible offices show little interest in monitoring their implementation. With the executive director of the Office of Registrar of NGOs now on the NGO Board, compliance with these mechanisms may be taken more seriously in the future.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Malawi

CSO Sustainability

Malawi

Sustainability

Enhanced

Evolving

Impeded
Mali

Country Facts
- Capital: Bamako
- Government Type: Republic
- Population: 16,455,903
- GDP per capita (PPP): $1,600
- Human Development Index: 176

With the support of the international community, in 2014 Mali recovered most of the territory previously occupied by armed groups. Initial negotiations took place in January 2014 to reach a political settlement to the conflict and establish a dialogue with armed groups. Led by Burkina Faso, these negotiations resulted in the preliminary agreement of Ouagadougou. Conflict broke out again in May between the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA) and government troops.

In July, a new ceasefire agreement was signed to pave the way for broader peace talks.

Subsequently, through mediation spearheaded by Algeria with support from other members of the international community, a pre-draft agreement was prepared and shared at all levels. CSOs, along with other political actors, were critical of this agreement. They found weaknesses in not only the process, but also the document’s proposals. Negotiations to settle the crisis continued through the end of 2014, with a new meeting scheduled to finalize an agreement in Algiers in early 2015.
Despite the recurrence of conflict, the state regained control of the major cities in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. By the end of 2014, only the city of Kidal and some surrounding localities remained under the influence of the MNLA and its allies, the High Council of Azawad Unit (HCUA) and the Armed Arab Movement (MAA). Relative calm allowed for the redeployment of some state officials to the northern part of the country and the return of basic social services such as electricity, food assistance, health services and education.

The year was also marked by controversial cases involving the procurement of aircraft and supplies for the Malian Armed Forces, such as clothing, bedding, camping equipment and vehicles, and spare parts. These procurements were the subject of a compliance and performance audit led by the Office of the Auditor General and the Supreme Court. The checks revealed shortcomings in the procurement process and included proposed remedies.

Corruption remains a very sensitive issue and is poorly addressed due to lack of political will, and strategies or mechanisms to implement recommendations by the government and civil society on ways to combat corruption and financial crimes.

Despite some progress, much criticism remains of the government’s ability to provide basic social services, including the selection of those public officials who lead the technical services responsible for service delivery. These critiques have impacted national opinion and significantly reduced popular support for national authorities.

Overall, the situation of CSOs has not fundamentally changed. Many associations were created as part of the resolution of the security crisis and restoration of living together. The country is recovering from the effects of the security crisis and awaits the conclusion of a peace agreement that is fair, equitable, and definitive.

The legal environment has not changed since 2013. Procedures for the registration of CSOs are relatively clear. The legislative framework vigorously promotes CSO participation in public life. However, the effectiveness of the promotion of that participation in practice is often selective and depends on the initiative and willingness of state representatives in charge of records.

Organizational capacity of CSOs did not change during 2014. Weak CSO capacity is tied to the relative scarcity of resources dedicated to development assistance. The allocation of resources in 2013 and 2014 has also tended to prioritize the northern regions of the country, due to the ongoing humanitarian and security issues. This has resulted in a decrease in available funds for organizational capacity building for CSOs in other regions.

About 1,300 CSOs are registered in Mali. This number does not include informal, traditional groups, typically mosque associations or groups that follow a particular traditional religious leader. No statistics are available on informal organizations, but it is estimated that approximately 20,000 to 40,000 of them exist.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The legal environment did not change from 2013 to 2014. No new laws have been passed for the CSO sector. Existing laws, notably Law 04-038, which regulates associations and CSOs in Mali, are clear concerning requirements for internal management, authorized activities, and financial management. This law dates to 2004 and does not constrain the registration of CSOs, which is easily done at each of the decentralized administrative levels in the country.

However, the restructuring of the Trusteeship Department, announced in the 2013 report, created a division called the Development Support Unit to the Base (CADB) in the General Management Territory.
Legal Environment in Mali

4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3

1) DGAT and its decentralized units do not have reliable information about interventions because reports are not submitted regularly and the directorate is unable to perform field missions.

2) Some CSOs take advantage of the legal framework for other commercial purposes that do not comply with existing laws. This situation perpetuates a negative perception of the efficiency of CSOs in contributing to national development.

The current legislative framework favors the participation of CSOs. This participation is often selective and depends on the willingness of bureaucrats and better monitoring by the heads of umbrella organizations. CSOs are free to operate and are not harassed by local or national authorities. Indeed, the diversity of CSOs and their groupings allows state officials to proceed in most cases to reasoned choices, based on positions put forward and defended by CSOs.

CSOs are not victims of harassment from the central or local government. They are free to operate.

The legal framework does not currently address the question of donations to CSOs, including donations from third parties. CSOs are exempt from certain taxes but must pay property and wage taxes (social security and other social benefits). They also pay a value-added tax on service provision and a tax on importing commercial vehicles. Donations by locals are very rare, and no legal texts manage donations at the national level.

Self-financing opportunities are not well understood or used by CSOs. The law does not prohibit CSOs from implementing revenue-generating activities (AGR) under the same conditions as the typical private sector firm. However, the law is strict on the use of financial resources generated within the AGR framework, which must be used exclusively to fund the CSO. This dimension of the law is poorly understood by CSOs who often believe that AGRs are completely prohibited. Other factors that contribute to few CSOs using AGRs include: reduced duration and the size of some funding (e.g., for food distribution) and the fact that some financial partners are not open to these opportunities. CSOs can apply for free and open competitive tenders. In this context, they are subject to the same taxes as any market participant.

Foundations function despite the lack of legislative texts and rules to govern them. Telecommunication companies (e.g., the Orange Foundation), certain mining companies, political groups (e.g., the Sharing Foundation and the Foundation for Childhood) and some religious associations (e.g., the AguibouSosso Foundation) commonly used this structure.

For the time being, no lawyers specialize in CSO support. However, lead CSOs in the sector, such as the Civil Society National Council (CNSC), the Forum of Civil Society Organizations (FORUM) and the Federation of Malian CSOs Coalitions (FECONG), as well as national collectives, thematic groups and regional associations effectively advocate for and defend CSO rights.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

The organizational capacity of CSOs did not change during 2014. Weak CSO capacity is tied to the relative scarcity of resources dedicated to development assistance. The allocation of resources in 2013 and 2014 has...
Organizational Capacity in Mali

Also tended to prioritize the northern regions of the country, due to ongoing humanitarian and security issues. These issues have resulted in decreased funding for organizational capacity building for CSOs in other regions of the country.

CSOs such as Action Mopti, the Malian Association for the Survival of the Sahel (AMSS) and the Free Association for the Promotion of Housing (ALPHALOG) have continued to mobilize support groups to deliver humanitarian assistance to displaced or left behind populations in areas affected by the crisis. This mobilization of volunteers, with the contribution of Groupe Pivot, the Strome Family Foundation and the Malian Health Protestant Association, also took place as part of the response to the Ebola outbreak that affected the country in 2014. Cross-organizational and other CSO groupings have not performed optimally in 2014 due to low performing membership. This weak functionality further resulted from a scarcity of resources dedicated to development assistance, by these few resources being directed to emergency needs in the North, and by pervasive insecurity in certain parts of the country.

Under Law 04-034 of Aug. 5, 2004, CSOs must define their missions, objectives, operations and conditions for dissolution in their statutes and regulations. These initial protocols can become more precise as CSOs develop their capacities over time. CSOs receiving subsidies are required to develop strategic plans. The Support Program for CSOs II (PAOSC II), initiated in 2013, continues to support CSOs in creating and implementing strategic plans. Some CSOs conduct annual audits and have annual technical evaluations of their programs. Many CSOs have implemented strategic planning processes that allowed them to define their mid- to long-term vision, mission and strategic objectives. However, this strategic planning process by CSOs has recently encountered difficulties related to the volatility of financial resources and the scarcity of funding sources. This has led many national CSOs, such as the Research Firm for Increasing Development Actions (GRADE), the Malian Association for the Protection and Development of the Environment in the Sahel (AMPROD Sahel) and the Malian Association for the Promotion of the Sahel (AMAPROS), to reduce the volume of their activities and staff and instead position themselves locally on some tenders. This has transformed most of the CSOs into a service delivery structure instead of an autonomous structure with a vision and predefined missions.

Almost all operational CSOs have well-defined internal management structures and follow administrative management procedure manuals for their financing and accounting. These internal management provisions define the levels of responsibility of board members and staff and allow each actor to fully play its role. At this level, the boards continue to play roles of guidance, validation, monitoring, and control. However, some boards of directors can impede transparency, particularly when one individual dominates the board. Many CSOs also use external auditors to audit management of technical teams. These management audits are also planned annually under the Law 04-038.

CSO staff receive a short- or long-term contract, as defined under Malian Law and subjected to labor inspection. The expected tasks are defined through the terms of reference. However, maintaining staff is difficult due to scarce resources, weak payrolls, and weak career paths. Rising unemployment due to the security situation in 2014 continues to drive layoffs of CSO professionals. However, some CSOs have successfully slowed down staff layoffs by shifting to new roles and activities in response to the ongoing humanitarian situation. Personnel may, at any time and according to the environment, seek opportunities for a different job. Moreover, local staff are usually employed by foreign CSOs and priced out of the local labor market. Frequently, CSOs use volunteers to execute administrative office functions. However, the consistency and quality of volunteer services often come up short.

Most large organizations have sufficient information and communication technology (ICT); however, donors shifting toward humanitarian assistance did impact CSOs not operating in that space who had difficulty maintain their ICT equipment as a result. Nonetheless, access to ICTs continues to increase, providing an invaluable resource for CSOs to reach, engage, and communicate with their constituents. The maintenance of
In general, CSOs have clear management structures and hold regular meetings of their general assemblies and boards of directors. However, some boards of directors can impede transparency, particularly when one individual dominates the board.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

The financial viability of CSOs did not improve during 2014. Funding sources remained largely the same; they include international donors, financial and technical partners, particular ministerial departments and local resources such as banks, charitable organizations, religious associations and the diaspora. In particular, ongoing program support funds for CSOs in 2014 were put in place by Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the European Union (PAOSC II), as well as World Bank programs put in place in 2014, such as the Social Net program funds and funds for reconstruction and economic recovery. Nonetheless, changes in 2014 made the existence and operation of CSOs tenuous. Changes in the international aid architecture (adoption in 2005 of the Paris Declaration on Aid Efficiency with instruments such as the Global or Sectoral Budgetary Support), scarcity of funds and weak ties to local sources or their exploitation have caused much criticism about the existence and functioning of many CSOs. Several niche philanthropic organizations operate at the local level, such as Muslim associations, non-religious associations (e.g., Lions Club, Rotary, Junior Chamber International), several mining associations, and a few rare businesses. However, their activities receive little media coverage and are not well-known.

Malian CSOs for the most part have not adopted or developed financial plans and therefore do not have viable financial strategies. The absence of common norms for determining management costs and the expenses of implementing activities and projects creates fierce cost competition between CSOs applying for the same sources of funding. Indeed, while certain CSOs assess administrative costs of approximately 10 to 15 percent for implementing projects, others take just 3 to 5 percent. In some cases, this inhibits true collaboration between CSOs and often does not translate into the delivery of higher-quality services. Indeed, a CSO implementing a project that underestimates the transaction costs involved may, at the time of project execution, make unauthorized budget adjustments.

CSOs can access tender offers from the government/bilateral and multilateral organizations and other sources such as international NGOs, think tanks and community-based organizations (CBOs). This is the case of the PAOSC II program set up in 2012 with European Union financing; the social security net program; and the reconstruction and economic recovery program also implemented in 2014, all funded by the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA). Nonetheless, these service provision projects alone are unable to secure the financial viability of CSOs for the simple reason that they are not accessible to all CSOs and their number is very limited compared to the number of CSOs in Mali (more than 1,500).

CSOs benefiting from multiyear project financing usually make use of independent providers for their annual financial audits. These audits are starting to be published on the respective CSO sites for increased accountability and credibility.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

Advocacy during 2014 focused mainly on increasing humanitarian aid, improving governance, fighting corruption, and fighting financial mismanagement. These various advocacy campaigns mobilized the population and resulted in high visibility for CSOs through press reports, press conferences facilitated by
CSOs, discussions, lectures and civic actions (e.g., protest marches and sit-ins). For example, on Sept. 25, 2014, in the midst of peace negotiations, the proposal to divide Mali in a federation or give independence to part of the territory triggered street protests by a large representation of civil society, deflecting the position of separatists.

Direct communication between CSOs and public sector representatives focused on the political-security agenda, the humanitarian agenda, and peace negotiations with armed groups.

Corruption reports (procurement records for things such as the presidential aircraft and military equipment) captured the attention of both the public and CSOs. These cases brought by national stakeholders and international financial institutions led the state to develop new measures, including an audit of the expenses of the General Auditor Office and the Court of Auditors to better inform the population. The state also took administrative measures against the individuals cited in the reports.

CSOs led advocacy to influence the choices of priority sectors (e.g., decentralization, budget monitoring, and water and sanitation) and secure funding from the Donor Conference for Development in Mali, held in Brussels in 2013. The main purpose of advocacy in 2014 was to promote greater involvement of CSOs in monitoring the implementation of the Plan for Sustainable Recovery in Mali (PRED) and in mobilizing resources for the action plan of CSOs to secure a peaceful and stable outcome and sustainable development in Mali. The Forum of CSOs, the National Council of Civil Society and the Forum of International NGOs in Mali led advocacy campaigns directed at Brussels; their intensity grew during the preparation and meetings of the Government of Mali, financial and technical partners including the World Bank, the EU Delegation in Mali, various U.N. agencies and CSOs. The result of this advocacy was twofold: 1) inclusion of CSOs in the inter-ministerial comity of monitoring actions with Brussels; and 2) trusting CSO leaders to prepare for the fifth meeting of this monitoring comity.

However, these advocacy initiatives have not consistently produced their expected results, with some results reflecting the agendas of the state and of technical and financial partners more than the independent planning of CSOs.

CSOs have not engaged in substantial discussions about improving their own effectiveness and sustainability via a national legal framework that incentivizes philanthropy and a more highly valued sense of national solidarity.

Several platforms enable CSOs to influence government decision-making, both at the sectorial level (Health Group, Education Group, the Collective of Women’s Associations, Network for Advocacy and Lobbying, Budget Monitoring Group, and the National Coalition of Agricultural Organizations) and at the national level (Forum of CSOs, the National Council of Civil Society, and the Collective of Actors for Recovery).

While CSOs take on and direct many advocacy initiatives, the results generally do not meet their ambitions and expectations. The initiatives mentioned in the 2013 report, including reform of the law on agricultural orientation, land-related regulation affecting agricultural organizations, and the creation of land-related commissions are in process of recruiting experts.

More globally, new initiatives aim to create a common voice on the crisis for Malian CSOs. In this context, CSOs have successfully participated in dialogues with the state and technical and financial partners, such as during monitoring meetings on the Brussels commitments.

The weak public image of CSOs hinders their ability to ensure that citizens truly participate in the politics to determine priority areas for action.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7

CSOs ordinarily provide routine services such as basic social services (infrastructure and advice on potable water, sanitation, hygiene, education, health and energy) and services for capacity building. CSO provision of these services in 2014 was hampered significantly by the scarcity of financial resources dedicated to these areas, the cessation of aid from some donor countries and the concentration of CSOs working to provide humanitarian assistance in regions affected by the crisis.

The most operational CSOs in this context have been the international NGOs (INGOs) that receive preference in terms of operability, technical capacity, credibility, and experience in managing emergency responses. Thus, clusters in the areas of education, health, water, sanitation, etc., have been set up and implemented through emergency actions by CSOs. These organizations quickly set up necessary logistics and participated in or activated clusters of INGOs in different areas. This is the case for Save the Children USA, CARE Mali, Helvetas, etc. Certain national CSOs, such as AMPROD SAHEL, the Malian Organization to Save the Children in the Sahel (OMAES), GREFFA, AMSS, etc., were able to contribute to emergency assistance efforts as service providers (distribution of food aid, kits for basic necessities, etc.).

Associations and religious organizations, such as the Islamic High Council and the High Council of the Sufi Community mobilized and delivered aid to affected populations, either to displaced people in the southern regions or to those stranded in the crisis regions. The volume of this assistance is nonetheless marginal compared to the overall aid delivered.

CSOs and national associations (such as water users associations, management associations for vaccination centers, and health associations) that practice cost recovery are more numerous in the sectors of health, potable water, energy, and training. Many CSOs offer training services (cultivation techniques, management of income-generating activities, and vocational training) and support (assistance with management, tool development, accounting, etc.) to people. These services are generally initiated or solicited by the beneficiary populations and correspond to their expectations.

Cost recovery is difficult in areas such as support and monitoring of rights and public policy. CSO interventions for respect of human rights, public governance and monitoring, and influence of public politics, while strongly demanded by the public, are not covered by a cost-recovery strategy.

Both the state and the public recognize the efforts of CSOs. However, this recognition is not accompanied by stronger participation or sharing in the CSO’s operating and functioning costs.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs), CSO umbrella organizations and resource centers supply CSOs around the country with information services and spaces for exchange and collaboration.

Services offered by ISOs respond generally to the expectations of CSOs, although certain needs, like access to financing, are not yet supported. Information services and capacity-building services offered by the ISOs are not conducted as fee-for-service. The CSO members of the ISOs pay an annual membership fee, which provides them access to different ISO services. The ISOs have had several discussions about instituting shared services for members (e.g., accounting and secretarial
services, thematic technical consulting for monitoring and evaluation, auditing), but many ISOs have chosen to develop their own membership to enhance their local presence and increase their chances for financing.

ISOs benefit from operating grants or program financing from technical and financial partners (e.g., European Union, USAID) interested in supporting coordination or national programs (social safety nets) through which the ISO is in charge of enforcement or monitoring of a component or of a project. Training programs are available in local languages such as Bambara.

Local donations are virtually nonexistent. However, certain local sources, generally religious or sometimes political leaders, may mobilize food and medical equipment or assist with revenue-generating activities for women’s associations.

CSOs do at times share information and collaborate. However, the scarcity of financial resources leads to a competitive environment and tends to discourage collaboration.

To strengthen CSO capacity, technical expertise is available throughout the country. However, with changes (e.g., peace negotiations, the fight against corruption, democratic governance) taking place in the institutional environment and other challenges, the need for capacity building remains.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs, research centers, private companies, banks and the public exist in the context of implementation of certain National Solidarity Funds programs. These include the social safety net program Jigisemejiri and the program of reconstruction and economic recovery. Other intersectoral partnerships are implementing large hydro-agricultural development programs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

CSOs were very visible in the media during 2014, especially in regard to their engagement in the political and security crisis. Their importance was underscored during the Algiers negotiations, the process for peace and reconciliation between the Government of Mali and armed groups in the North. CSOs, supported by religious denominations and many segments of society, organized the great Republican March on September 25, 2014, calling for the preservation of territorial integrity, the country’s stability and the preservation of the national, secular, and republican form of the State, as well as for a lasting and definitive resolution of the security crisis.

CSOs led many press conferences on their efforts to assist stakeholders toward negotiations and to improve the content of the pre-accord. National and international (Voie d’Afrique, Radio France Internationale, British Broadcasting Company) media covered CSO mobilization for peace and humanitarian action. For example, the CSO-organized march on September 25, 2014 noted above to demand peace in Mali mobilized thousands of citizens in Bamako and other major cities and received extensive media coverage both in the national press (e.g., local radios, *The Essor* and Republican newspapers) and international press (e.g., International France Radio, British Broadcasting Corporation).

Due to events like this, public perception of CSOs and their work is slightly positive. The perception of CSOs working in partnership with government improved amid the crisis, particularly in terms of wider recognition of the positive contributions of CSOs in providing services and countering youth unemployment. For example, in the context of assistance clusters, INGOs, in addition to the state’s humanitarian sector actors, have worked to increase resiliency by distributing food aid, developing mechanisms to access clean water, providing seeds and fertilizer to populations, and distributing school kits for children.

OMAES is conducting an evaluation of the Apprenticeship Program Beekunko, led by civil society. The evaluation has revealed that actors across the government, civil society, and implementing partners are
engaging proactively for the benefit of their children’s basic education success. The program’s participatory approach has incorporated all key stakeholders and all parties are working together to keep everyone informed of developments.

CSOs have adopted and apply codes of ethics. These codes also require CSOs to file annual reports and financial reports with the Support Cell for Basic Development, a government unit for monitoring CSOs.
The year 2014 was a challenging one for Mozambican CSOs. Largely peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections were held in October, and Filipe Nyusi, the candidate of the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), was elected president with 57 percent of the vote, according to official results. However, pre-election intimidation, flawed voter registration and verification, chaotic vote counting and tabulation processes, and pockets of violence during the elections were reported, and dampened credibility. Once again, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the main opposition party, hotly contested these results amid allegations of mass fraud. The political tensions and unavailability of key local government representatives during the elections contributed to a difficult working environment for CSOs. In addition, military conflicts along the Beira Corridor, which runs from the port city of Beira to the western border with Zimbabwe, impeded CSOs’ contact with displaced target groups and caused delays in project implementation.

In general, CSO advocacy work continues to be challenging because of a lack of expertise and a context that makes it difficult for local people to demand accountability from government authorities. Nevertheless, CSOs...
recorded some significant gains in advocacy in 2014. Notable efforts included CSOs’ participation in the electoral registration and observation process; the approval by parliament of the Access to Information Bill after nine years of CSO lobbying; a CSO-led process to revise Mozambique’s population policy; increased advocacy on natural resource revenues, land rights, and resettlement issues; and a strong campaign against proposed increases in the president’s and deputies’ allowances. Although the allowances law was approved by parliament and promulgated by the president in December 2014, the campaign against it and other advocacy activities demonstrated CSOs’ growing capacity to mobilize around key issues.

At the district and community level, community-based organizations (CBOs) and district platforms continued to emerge in Mozambique. Many of these new organizations focus on monitoring the quality of basic public services through the use of community scorecards and social auditing and on encouraging participatory planning and budgeting processes.

There are still no reliable official numbers on the actual number of CSOs in Mozambique. A mapping exercise carried out in late 2014 by the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC), a project of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Irish Aid, suggested that there may be as many as 15,000 formal and informal CSOs in operation across the country.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

There were no changes in the legal environment in 2014. Mozambican CSOs continue to function under the Law on Associations (Law No. 8/91). CSOs are able to acquire legal status at the national level from the Ministry of Justice, at the provincial level from the provincial governor, and at the district level from the district administrator. Registration for organizations based in the capital city of Maputo continues to be easy, but for community and district-based organizations the costs of registration are a challenge. There have been cases of organizations that focus on sensitive topics facing delayed registration. For example, the Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMBDA) is still unregistered seven years after submitting its application. On the other hand, the MASC Foundation, a local organization that is the successor to MASC, quickly obtained approval of its registration in November 2014, even though it will also deal with sensitive topics, including improved governance, social justice, and democratization.

CSOs operate for the most part without major government intrusion. In 2014 CSOs conducted a growing number of public hearings in collaboration with local governments to discuss the results of community scorecards and social auditing exercises. This development suggests that the space for critical analysis and debate of government performance is expanding. There is no record of the state dissolving a CSO for political or arbitrary reasons in 2014.

The situation regarding tax exemptions for CSOs did not change in 2014. To receive tax exemptions, a CSO must be approved as a public utility institution. It is estimated that fewer than 5 percent of organizations manage to obtain this status, because of the cumbersome approval process as well as CSOs’ lack of awareness of this possibility.
Law No. 8/91 permits CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services. However, few CSOs are aware of this possibility. CSOs are legally able to compete for government funds and contracts at both the national and local levels, but rarely do.

Legal assistance from lawyers trained in CSO issues is available but continues to be a luxury that few CSOs can afford. The free legal assistance offered by the state to citizens lacking the means to hire a lawyer is not always available to CSOs. This is especially true when politically sensitive issues are involved, such as a dispute between a CSO and a municipality or local government. Even private lawyers are often not willing to take on such cases.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

In 2014 a growing number of CBOs, district platforms, and village development organizations across the country worked to bring the voice of the rural majority to the table. Such groups have proved far more effective at building constituencies than provincial- and national-level organizations, which often do not have a permanent presence at the local level and thus have a limited mandate from local communities. For example, in the provincial development observatories, which were created by government to monitor the quality of its poverty reduction strategy, CSOs are largely represented by elite urban organizations. The observatories tend to have a limited role in decision making and monitoring and evaluation, and there is generally little follow up to the issues they discuss.

Most CSOs seek to define and stay within their missions, but their activities are strongly shaped by available funding. The only organizations that develop strategic plans are larger, well-established organizations with funding designated for that purpose. Smaller organizations usually do not have in-house technical expertise in strategic planning or the funds to hire outside consultants.

Many organizations have taken part in trainings on internal governance in recent years, but they continue to ignore provisions in their constitutions calling for regular general assembly meetings, functioning governing boards, and the active participation of members. In part these lapses are a reflection of the fact that many CSOs are one-man shows and have little contact with their members or intended beneficiaries. Such organizations lack the crucial internal checks and balances that are essential to transparent, democratic organizations.

Medium-sized and smaller organizations lacking long-term funding find it difficult to hold on to staff. Many of their employees have other full- or part-time jobs, and these organizations often function thanks to volunteers from their communities. Most full-time CSO staff members are based in urban areas and work for organizations that offer permanent contracts. A number of the elite urban organizations generally have adequate staffing and operating structure to ensure effective program and financial management, although even among the better-known, well-funded organizations, important capacity issues persist. CSOs engage paid professionals such as accountants, information technology managers, and lawyers only when they have a specific need and sufficient funds. Such services remain outside the financial reach of most CSOs.

The majority of organizations at the national and provincial levels have basic office equipment, including computers, cell phones, and Internet access. CSOs at the district level increasingly use mobile phones to access the Internet, although their use in more remote areas can be limited by lack of funding and network connectivity problems.
Small and medium-sized organizations found it increasingly difficult to secure funding in 2014. While the overall level of funds available to CSOs may not have dropped significantly, the number of funding entities has decreased. Many major donors now prefer to channel their funds through civil society support mechanisms and international organizations rather than support CSOs directly. Examples of this trend in 2014 were the decisions by donors to support the creation of the MASC Foundation and to extend the other major civil society support program, Action Program for Inclusive and Responsible Governance (AGIR), beyond its original closing date in 2014. Overall, the number of CSOs supported by donors has decreased, and the type and level of funds that they now offer are more suited to and accessible by larger, well-established CSOs. All of these trends leave smaller and medium-sized CSOs financially less secure. It should be noted, however, that MASC continues to dedicate more than 50 percent of its funds to district-based institutions, a focus that will continue in the new MASC Foundation.

Smaller CSOs typically have only one donor for short, one-year projects. Medium-sized CSOs may have two or three donors and multi-year funding, although it is usually for particular projects rather than core expenses. At the other end of the spectrum are large and successful organizations, often referred to as “donor babies,” which in 2014 had generous funding through projects or joint basket funding initiatives that financed elements of their five-year strategic plans. Examples of this type of organization include the Center for Public Integrity (CIP), Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), Parliament Juvenil, Electoral Observatory (OE), Human Rights League (LDH), and N’weti. Even these organizations do not have funds in reserve.

Very few CSOs, including well-established organizations, manage to raise funds locally. While a strong culture of helping through the donation of goods and financial support exists in Mozambique, it is usually more visible among friends or within families and religious groups. Few individuals offer financial support to CSOs. A notable exception to this rule is the Mozambican Red Cross, which successfully raises funds and donations of food and clothing as part of emergency funding appeals—for example, after the floods that affected the country in 2014. Support is also available from people who offer their time as activists and then receive small subsidies for their work.

Very few urban CSOs obtain revenue from services, products, or rent, as their support from international donors has always presumed that their focus is project implementation and non-income-generating activities rather than sustainability plans. Full payment of membership fees is a rarity for most CSOs, in part because of members’ limited income—although the fees are often minimal—and also because members are rarely involved in the work of the CSO.

CSOs are able to compete for government grants and contracts at both the local and national levels. However, it is rare for CBOs to be awarded government contracts or funds, other than from the District Development Fund (FDD), a revolving fund that lends money for income generation, food production, and job creation. Local and international businesses such as consultancy firms sometimes contract with larger, well-established CSOs to bid jointly on donor programs. For example, the Danish consultancy firm COWI works in partnership with Save the Children, Center for Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building (CESC), and N’weti to implement the Citizen Engagement Program (CEP), funded by DFID.

CSOs generally continued to improve their financial and administrative systems in 2014. This was especially true of donor-supported organizations as such improvements are often a prerequisite for funding. However, in 2014 some large CSOs were under pressure from donors to overcome repeated failures to respond to auditors’ recommendations. For example, USAID reduced its funding to OE because of issues with its
internal governance, which took the organization almost a year to correct. Its lack of in-house capacity to address critical aspects of financial reporting was also identified as a major concern.

Audits by internationally recognized firms are available in Maputo, but they are financially out of reach for CSOs and thus are performed only when international organizations or donors commission them. Services from local audit and accounting firms are generally unacceptable to donors because of their uneven quality. Audits by some international firms have been called into question, and donors sometimes rely on their own internal audit departments to audit CSO accounts.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

Communication is improving between CSOs and all levels of the government, especially about basic service delivery. CSOs’ use of such tools as community scorecards, citizen scorecards, and social audits has created opportunities for discussion with government officials about citizens’ access to water, sanitation, and a quality education. The participation of government and municipal staff in trainings on the use of these tools has also helped improve CSO-government interactions. The government increasingly recognizes the value of CSOs’ monitoring and advocacy work, and this trend is helping expand the space for critical analysis of the government’s performance.

The selection of civil society representatives in district councils continued to be problematic in 2014. CSO representatives are hand-picked by local government officials rather than through a democratic process. However, organizations working in districts of Cabo Delgado, Inhambane, and Niassa provinces have managed gradually to build the trust of local government officials and, as a result, ensure more effective CSO participation on the councils.

Development observatories had varying results from province to province in 2014. Although most provincial development observatories do not serve as an effective mechanism for CSO engagement, CSOs in the northern province of Nampula were very active in the observatory, particularly on the No to ProSavana campaign, which aims to help farmers and communities at risk of losing their lands to a large agri-business project. CSO participation in the national development observatory continued to improve in 2014 but was challenged by the lack of participation by some leading civil society actors.

CSOs formed several successful advocacy and lobbying coalitions in 2014. The most important of these focused on monitoring the 2014 elections. For example, the Txeka project brought together a number of CSOs to deploy activists during the election who sent in updates about the voting process using cell phones and the Internet. Their involvement helped identify hotspots such as voting stations that had not opened or were not functioning in accordance with the law. Another important CSO effort aimed to prevent the approval of a proposed rise in allowances for parliamentarians and the president. As a result of CSOs’ No to Legalized Robbery campaign, which included a march, press conferences, position papers, and meetings with political parties, CSOs managed to get the president to reject the original proposal, although it was eventually approved by parliament and signed into law. In addition, the Defense of Sexual and Reproductive Rights (DSR) network engaged in public marches that helped bring the attention of the parliament, international organizations such as Amnesty International, and local embassies to key issues related to women’s reproductive freedom and health.

In February 2014 the Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Affairs recognized as legitimate and reacted publicly to civil society concerns about the licensing of a proposed liquefied natural gas factory in Palma district. The Association Centro Terra Viva (CTV) and the Civil Society Platform on Natural Resources and the Extractive Industry (PSCM) offered proposals to solve the legal and procedural questions involved in the
licensing of this enterprise, which were well received by the government and may be considered in future licensing procedures. IESE and CIP also worked on research and advocacy involving the extractive industries, focusing on government contracts that extend tax exemptions to corporations.

At the policy level, the Governance and Development Institute (GDI) led an initiative that resulted in a publication entitled Proposal for Reform of the State for Good Governance. In addition, women’s organizations, under the umbrella of Forum Mulher, and research institutions, such as the Rural Development Observatory (OMR) and the Center for Research on Health and Population (CEPSA), successfully worked with the government on legal reform and strategic planning. For example, at the invitation of the Ministry of Planning and Development and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, CEPSA headed a process to revise Mozambique’s population policy.

A significant development was the passage by parliament of the Access to Information Bill in November 2014. CSOs had been pressing for the bill’s approval for more than nine years, since the Mozambican chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) facilitated a seminar that crafted the framework for the draft bill. The new law represents a crucial step forward for journalists and CSOs engaged in monitoring and governance work, as it obliges both public and private bodies to make information freely available to citizens.

CSOs are aware of the need to have a more favorable legal and regulatory framework. However, work on this topic undertaken by the Foundation for Community Development (FDC) and CESC did not advance in 2014, as they were focused instead on a CSO code of conduct.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs continued to provide a diverse range of goods and services in 2014. Most services were in the areas of agriculture, land, water and sanitation, education, and basic health care. CSOs’ work was hampered at times by military tensions and the absence of local government officials, who were involved in the national elections. For example, for some months community-based programs in small but strategically important areas affected by the conflict were unable to work with their target groups because they feared instability and fled. These services were able to resume later in the year, but threats of renewed hostilities persisted into 2015.

Smaller CBOs and informal groups such as water and natural resource committees understand the needs of the communities with which they work, as they are directly involved in their day-to-day lives. Some provincial and national organizations have limited contact with the constituencies that they claim to represent.

CSOs rarely cover the cost of their services through fees, and in fact they have little knowledge of their right to do so. Their knowledge of market demand is also very weak, and the communities in which they work with have little capacity to pay for services. Moreover, donor agencies and international organizations rarely support income-generating activities by local partners or include it as a priority area in technical assistance and training.

The government rarely offers grants or contracts to CSOs to provide basic social services. This is the result of mistrust on both sides, as well as a failure to identify and negotiate arrangements in which both sides can benefit from working together.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

There are no intermediary support organizations (ISOs) or CSO resource centers in Mozambique. CSOs mostly access information through other CSOs, donor partners, local media, networks, the Internet, and information seminars such as those sponsored by OMR, IESE, and GDI. The “information train”
implemented by the Association Sekelekani in cooperation with leading media houses and community radios was an innovative way of informing large numbers of citizens about key governance issues. In 2014 the initiative distributed thousands of free newspapers and promoted local debates about areas of concern.

Local foundations, such as FDC, and four international intermediary organizations contracted under the AGIR program—We Effect, Ibis, Diakonia, and Oxfam NOVIB—re-grant international donor funds to address a combination of donor and locally identified needs. For example, in its grantmaking FDC emphasizes support to the most vulnerable groups, such as women and children, while Ibis focuses on access to information, and We Effect is concerned with land rights and natural resources. The new MASC Foundation will focus on democratization and social justice, with particular emphasis on strengthening civil society’s capacity to engage constructively with the government, private sector, and communities.

There continues to be a growing number of geographic and thematic CSO forums and networks in Mozambique, which are often formed with the assistance of donors. However, very few of these groups function adequately, mainly because their members often fail to participate.

Many CSOs’ trainers work in Mozambique, but their quality and experience vary. CSOs based in cities often receive training as an integral part of their support from donors. Most of these trainings focus on leadership, internal governance, administration and finance, and project management. Civil society support programs such as Capable Partners (CAP), implemented by FHI 360, seek to develop core organizational systems. In 2014 three organizations graduated from the CAP program: National Association for Self-Sustained Development (ANDA), Forum of Female Associations in Zambezia (NAFEZA), and Association for Socio-Economic Development (OPHAVELA). Most training materials are produced in Portuguese.

The business sector and CSOs are growing closer as they compete in partnership for donor funds. Businesses consulted with CSOs on several topics in 2014, such as the allocation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds. However, businesses remain wary of supporting or partnering with CSOs on governance issues, for fear of entering into conflict with the government. The government tolerates CSOs, especially when they work together on projects, discuss difficulties before going public about a particular issue, or agree on win-win scenarios. CSO-government relations are less harmonious when they concern sensitive issues such as justice or corruption.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7**

CSOs in the capital city enjoyed improved media coverage of their activities in 2014. This increase in coverage was due in part to donor-funded programs on the media and investigative journalism—most notably, IREX’s Mozambique Media Strengthening Program, funded by USAID. However, many CSOs, particularly at the community and district levels, are still learning to promote their work and image effectively. There are few local media with which they can cooperate, other than community radio stations, with whom they generally enjoy good working relationships.

Nevertheless, the public’s perception of CSOs continues to be poor. Many people believe that these organizations exist for their leaders’ financial benefit and support does not reach intended recipients. Moreover, the concepts of an association and volunteerism are not well understood. The government’s

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**INFRASTRUCTURE IN MOZAMBIQUE**

- Infrastructure in Mozambique
  - 2009: 5.1
  - 2010: 5.1
  - 2011: 5.1
  - 2012: 5.1
  - 2013: 5.1
  - 2014: 5.0

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**PUBLIC IMAGE IN MOZAMBIQUE**

- Public Image in Mozambique
  - 2009: 4.9
  - 2010: 4.8
  - 2011: 4.7
  - 2012: 4.7
  - 2013: 4.7
  - 2014: 4.7
perception of CSOs is also still largely one of suspicion that CSOs’ interventions serve political or personal interests. Businesses are willing to work with CSOs on the allocation of CSR funding but avoid engaging with them on sensitive topics.

In 2014 a group of organizations led by CESC drafted a code of conduct and presented it to CSOs nationwide. In November CSOs held initial discussions with donors to encourage them to link their support to organizations’ adherence to this code. The reaction from donors was generally positive, although some said it would be difficult to include the code in their contractual agreements and in any case they did not want to “impose” a code of conduct that should be voluntary. MASC, however, offered to include the code in its contracting process. CESC and other organizations are expected to continue to disseminate the code nationwide in 2015, although this initiative will depend in part on the availability of funds.

Most CSOs produce and present annual reports to donors and, often as an afterthought, to their own members. This order of priority reflects CSOs’ dependency on donors as well as their members’ low level of participation and oversight. CSOs rarely publish their annual reports online or in local media, in part because of cost. There is no notable evidence indicating that CSOs effectively use codes of conduct.
The year 2014 was challenging for Nigerian CSOs, mainly because of the country’s economic difficulties and increasing levels of violence. The most important events included the dwindling price of oil, a major source of income for Nigeria; the abduction in Chibok, in northeastern Nigeria, of more than 270 school girls by the radical Islamic sect Boko Haram; and incessant conflicts between herders and farmers in Kano, also in the north.

These events had a significant impact on CSOs, especially those working in the northern portions of the country. Some organizations intensified their advocacy efforts, as with the #BringBackOurGirls campaign on Twitter. As the country geared up for the 2015 general elections, which show signs of becoming contentious, many CSOs began to advocate for a transparent electoral process. At the same time, because of security concerns, government forces intervened more often than in previous years to stop CSO-sponsored rallies. Increasing religious, regional, and political conflict throughout the country had a dampening effect on advocacy campaigns. Service-provision CSOs focused on providing services that better reflected the needs of their constituencies, especially those living in conflict areas.
While the legal environment remained stable, the CSO sector’s organizational capacity and financial viability declined because of low levels of staffing and the difficulty of accessing grants at state and local levels. The government continued to contract with some CSOs for research, training, and monitoring and evaluation services. Most CSOs are in need of better Internet access and, especially at the state and local levels, find it difficult to take part in training and other capacity-building opportunities. The public perception of CSOs remained positive, and relations between the media and CSOs were generally productive.

The total number of CSOs operating in Nigeria remained unknown in 2014. Many active organizations are not registered, and there is no central database tracking registered CSOs. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), which registers national CSOs, reported more than 70,000 registered organizations in 2014.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2014. The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 continues to be the main law guiding the registration and operations of CSOs. The CAC is the only institution legally mandated to register CSOs on the national level. International and national CSOs are required also to register with the National Planning Commission (NPC), and national CSOs that engage in specific issues such as youth or maternal and newborn health must register with the relevant government ministries, departments, and agencies. Other state and local CSOs register with authorities at the appropriate level. For national CSOs seeking registration with the CAC, CAMA clearly states registration requirements. At the state level there is some variation in registration procedures, and each government agency working with CSOs also has separate guidelines for CSO registration. For example, CSOs seeking registration with the federal Ministry of Women Affairs must have a record of working with women and children.

CAMA specifies procedures for CSO dissolution. The law protects organizations from arbitrary or illegitimate closure for political reasons by stipulating that only the court has the authority to dissolve a CSO on receipt of a written petition from the CSO’s governing body, two-thirds of the CSO membership, or CAC.

CSOs and their representatives operate freely within the provisions of CAMA. In 2014 the national government intervened more often than usual in CSO rallies, claiming that these gatherings could easily escalate into violent conflicts in the country’s worsening security climate. For example, the government stopped several CSO-led demonstrations that demanded the release of the girls kidnapped by Boko Haram.

CSOs are exempt from taxes on income and grants. However, certain allowable profit-making activities are subject to taxation. In 2014 the government reviewed the country’s contributory pension scheme and ruled that employers, including CSOs, must contribute the equivalent of 10 percent and employees must contribute 5 percent of their monthly salary. Previously, employers and employees each contributed 7.5 percent.

CSOs may legally earn income and compete for government contracts. However, certain procurement requirements limit the ability of CSOs at all levels to compete for government grants. For example, CSOs must submit tax exemption certificates, but to obtain them they must submit audited financial reports. As
many CSOs, especially at the state and local levels, do not have audit reports, they are unable to compete for
government contracts.

Nigeria has a number of lawyers familiar with CSO law. The Center for Social Justice (CSJ) and Media Rights
Agenda (MRA) have specialized lawyers who provide paid and pro-bono legal services to urban and rural
CSOs. Their services include facilitation of registration with the CAC and capacity building in legal affairs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.9

The organizational capacity of CSOs deteriorated in 2014, mainly because of the general paucity of funds for staff and
modern office equipment.

CSOs continued to build constituencies during the year, especially around such issues as human rights, electoral
violence, peace and security, youth, women’s empowerment, and good governance. As in 2013, many CSOs in the
northern parts of the country made efforts to involve their constituencies in peace and security efforts. For example, the
Democratic Action Group, based in Kano in northwest Nigeria, sent out short messages to the public on the
need to maintain peaceful conduct before, during, and after the elections.

CSOs at the national level usually have clearly defined missions and strategic plans. However, many CSOs at
the state and local levels have begun to pursue activities outside their core missions to make up for dwindling
funds. Such activities are usually donor-driven. For example, the Women Economic and Empowerment
Organization (WEEO), based in Katsina state, was established to advocate for a better business environment,
especially for women. However, in 2014, because of low capacity and lack of funds, the organization
implemented a health program outside of its area of focus. CSOs at the state and local level are increasingly
aware of the need for strategic plans, but many still have not managed to formulate them, largely because of a
lack of in-house capacity and a shortage of funds to hire consultants.

CSOs seeking registration at all levels are required to have boards. At large national CSOs the management
structures are usually well defined, and boards and management have separate responsibilities. For example,
the boards of CLEEN Foundation and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) approve annual
activity plans. However, the boards of several national CSOs were inactive in 2014, mainly because the
organizations could not afford to convene board meetings. At the state and local level, many CSOs provide
board members’ names to fulfill registration requirements but in practice the boards do not function.

CSO staffing has not improved since 2013 and in general is quite poor. Because of a lack of funding, most
CSOs have few permanent staff members and depend on volunteers to implement activities. In particular,
CSOs at the state and local level are usually not able to afford professional staff in information technology,
project management, accounting, or monitoring and evaluation. Large national and international CSOs are
better able to maintain permanent staff, and some organizations have instituted job descriptions and
personnel policies.

CSOs at the national level usually have modern office equipment, while local CSOs often do not have the
funding for computers or Internet access and must rely on public Internet cafés. In 2014 some local CSOs
had difficulties paying the rent for their offices, and their directors had to operate from their private
apartments. The use of mobile phones among CSOs at all levels is increasing, and many organizations now
use them to send bulk messages and access social media.
In 2014 CSOs’ financial viability continued to dwindle significantly. Many CSOs depend on support from foreign donors such as USAID, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Their growing use of donor baskets makes it increasingly difficult for local CSOs to access their funds. For example, during the preparation for elections, the European Union, UNDP, and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) contributed to a joint donor fund to support the state in the electoral process. Although some of these funds were meant for CSOs so they could implement election-related activities, for the most part only large CSOs at the national level received the funds because smaller CSOs were unable to submit the required documents such as audited financial reports for the last three years.

It is quite difficult for CSOs to attract monetary support from local sources. Among the few philanthropic organizations in Nigeria are TY Danjuma Foundation, Globacom Foundation, and MTN Foundation.

Many CSOs at the state and local level do not have diversified sources of funding. They find fundraising difficult and they have not been able to develop a loyal core of financial supporters. In 2014 many of these organizations had few to no projects to implement, which made them financially very vulnerable. A number of these CSOs closed down and others were on the verge of closing. At the national level, CSOs were more resourceful at diversifying their sources of income. Some large CSOs obtained government contracts to provide professional services in capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, research, and training. For example, the Center for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) had contracts with the Kano and Jigawa governments to train state legislators on information and communication technology and good governance. CLEEN Foundation, Center for Excellence and Leadership Development (CELD), Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), CISLAC, and ActionAid Nigeria offered paid professional services, such as training and publications, to government agencies and other CSOs. CDD rents out its hall for workshops and seminars, and other organizations also sell publications or offer consultancy services. Membership organizations such as the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) collected annual membership dues as a source of income.

CSOs’ financial management capacity remained largely the same as in 2013. In most cases, only large CSOs in major cities audit and publish their financial reports. The Central Bank of Nigeria continued to emphasize that all commercial banks in the country must ensure that so-called designated non-financial businesses and professions, including CSOs, have proper financial management systems to open bank accounts. This directive is meant to prevent the financing of terrorism. National CSOs such as CLEEN Foundation, CISLAC, CDD, and ActionAid Nigeria continued intensive efforts to provide financial management training to local CSOs. Only a handful of CSOs make their annual reports public.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy efforts faced challenges in 2014. Advocacy at the local level was almost non-existent, especially in states where there was no donor presence. Moreover, as the country became more polarized along religious, regional, and political lines, CSO advocacy efforts were caught up in the tensions. For example, the government accused CSOs advocating for improved security in the country of accepting sponsorship from the opposition. CSO advocacy in 2014 was also undermined by the division among CSOs.
themselves. On Boko Haram insurgency, for example, some CSOs argued that individuals from the north were responsible while others blamed the government for the violence. This made it difficult for CSOs across the country to speak with one voice and advocate effectively for improved security.

Although there was a general decline in advocacy successes, CSOs continued to engage in advocacy efforts in 2014. After Boko Haram insurgents abducted more than 270 girls from a secondary school in Chibok in April 2014, individuals from different CSOs came together in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign to demand the release of the girls. The group organized rallies to protest the government’s slow response to the crisis. As a result of the campaign, the government established an information center to inform the public about its efforts to curb the insurgency in the northeastern states of Nigeria. On other issues, CSOs continued to raise public concerns and express criticism. CSJ, for example, helped shape public debate on the austerity measures introduced by the federal government as a result of the dwindling price of crude oil on the international market. CSOs at the state level also engaged in a number of advocacy activities. For example, the Gender and Social Inclusion (GSI) group, composed of representatives of CSOs in Kano and the state Ministry of Justice, led an advocacy campaign that resulted in the enactment of a law on rape. The Youth Coalition Against Electoral Violence (Y-CAEV) and Human Rights Agenda Network also organized issue-based campaigns. TMG’s campaign for credible elections was notable for using social media platforms and sensitization workshops to achieve its goals.

During the year, donor organizations continued to encourage public-private dialogues, which helped shape CSO-government interactions. CDD, CISLAC, and CSJ engaged with the government on a number of important issues, including the 2015 general elections, the national budget, and national security. With support from the United Nations, the national government involved CSO experts in a series of planning meetings on the post-2015 development agenda. On the state and local level, channels of communication between CSOs and the government were open.

Lobbying is not a common practice among CSOs in Nigeria. However, CSOs did succeed in influencing some legislation in 2014, such as the amendment to the Electoral Act. At the state level, in Kano, the house of assembly publicly recognized the role of CSOs in the enactment of legislation.

CSOs are generally aware of the benefits of a favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector, but no significant effort to promote legal reforms took place in 2014.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

In 2014 CSOs continued to provide services in diverse areas, including health, child rights, and peace building. Many national and state level CSOs were engaged in election-related activities, such as sensitization workshops. State-level CSOs, especially faith-based organizations in the northeastern part of the country, helped distribute relief materials to victims of the insurgency. CSOs promoted the use of Ebola prevention products, such as sanitizers, and the League of Democratic Women (LEADS) in Kaduna ensured that internally displaced persons (IDP) camps were well equipped. However, in 2014 many CSOs in the northeast could not operate because of security concerns.

CSOs renewed efforts to provide services that reflected the needs of their constituencies. Most CSOs in northern Nigeria increased peace-building programs to help meet the security challenges affecting the region. These programs were supported by DFID through the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP). One such initiative was a series of workshops on violent conflict prevention and management, which was organized by the Vulnerable Child Support Initiative (VUCSI) in Kano for community mediators involved in resolving conflicts between farmers and herders. CSOs generally are aware of communities’ needs because
their staffs are locally based. They sometimes also conduct baseline surveys to meet donor requirements. Such surveys are usually helpful in the design and implementation of projects.

CSOs, especially at the national level, continued to share their publications with the general public, especially through libraries. For example, in 2014 CDD distributed more than 2,000 copies of such publications as “Niger-Delta Political Violence, Governance, and Corporate Responsibility in a Petro-State,” “Mapping Budgetary Processes in West Africa,” and “Resolving West African Conflicts: Early Warning, Early Response.” Notably, some CSOs have started to charge fees for their publications to offset dwindling funds. Research-based CSOs continued to share materials with academia and relevant government agencies, sometimes for a fee. These research products were usually initiated by the organizations and funded by donors.

National and state governments recognize the value of CSOs in service provision and continued to contract with CSOs for such services as research, capacity building, planning, and monitoring and evaluation. The CLEEN Foundation continued to build the capacity of police officers with trainings on human rights, community relations, and so forth. Local governments rarely provided contracts to CSOs in 2014 because of financial constraints and the influence of state governments in local decision making.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs did not change significantly in 2014. Only a few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers continue to exist in Nigeria. They are located in the major cities of Abuja, Lagos, and Port Harcourt and mainly offer training, capacity building, and information services. For the most part, these services adequately meet CSO needs. However, organizations in more remote areas often find it difficult to access the resource centers. Some resource centers earn income from the provision of services, and usually only national CSOs are able to afford their fees.

National CSOs such as CISLAC, ActionAid Nigeria, and NOIPolls re-grant international donor funds. Community foundations and ISOs do not usually re-grant locally raised funds, because such funds constitute a very small portion of their funding resources.

CSOs share information among themselves and with government agencies. CSO coalitions in areas such as human rights, good governance, youth, women’s empowerment, and gender-related issues facilitate information sharing among their members. National CSOs are more effective than local CSOs at sharing information online, as the latter often struggle with infrastructure deficiencies such as lack of Internet facilities.

CISLAC, CLEEN Foundation, CDD, ActionAid Nigeria, and the Center for Leadership Strategy and Development (Center LSD) intensified efforts to provide management training to CSOs in 2014. Individuals specialized in fundraising, proposal writing, strategic planning, and financial management also provided training to CSOs. Issue-oriented support in 2014 included TMG’s training for member organizations on the use of the Freedom of Information Act to promote good governance and the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP)’s training to help local CSOs work with local governments on security issues. The Kano Civil Society Forum (KCSF) partnered with CRD to develop a training manual on human rights to share with more than sixty CSOs. Other trainings tended to be project specific. Local CSOs usually find it difficult to attend training workshops since they typically take place in the major cities, very few are conducted free of charge, and the workshops are usually conducted in English.
The government continued to engage the services of CSOs in 2014. In the period leading up to the general elections, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) engaged many CSOs to implement election-related programs. A number of state governments, such as that of Kano State, maintain offices for CSOs’ affairs. NSRP led a project to promote collaborations among local CSOs, media, formal and informal security organizations, and traditional authorities on security and peaceful coexistence. Several CSOs established partnerships with professional associations to offer capacity building. For example, CITAD partnered with GSM Sellers and Repair Association in Kano to offer training on the use of technology in business.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

The media find CSO activities newsworthy, and CSOs enjoy positive coverage at the national, state, and local levels. CSO-media relationships continued to strengthen in 2014 thanks to donor projects that included a media component or promoted CSO-media collaboration. For example, NSRP encouraged media organizations such as Wazobia Radio and Freedom Radio to provide airtime to its grantees so they could inform the public about their activities. In addition, CSO representatives were frequently invited to discuss national issues on radio or television. In 2014 representatives of Vulnerable Child Support Initiative (VUCSI) took part in programs on Wazobia Radio about the farmer-herder conflict, and CITAD staff were on state television to discuss the development portion of the government budget. Many CSOs, including the Democratic Action Group based in Kano, made use of different media to preach peace during preparations for the 2015 general elections. CITAD invited a representative of the directorate of CSOs in Kano to discuss the state budget in a radio program known as A Kasa a Fefe (Open Budget).

The public perception of CSOs was positive in 2014. In its annual survey on perceptions in the justice sector, Justice For All (J4A) rated CSOs highly on their implementation of activities, such as public sensitization on the protection of human rights. The survey also revealed that CSOs are seen as more attentive than the government to the needs of citizens whose rights have been abused. Many CSOs, including CRD and ActionAid Nigeria, have received commendations from the communities in which they work. There is a widespread sense among the public that CSOs increasingly occupy spaces traditionally held by state actors, especially in conflict resolution, reconciliation, and mediation.

Generally, the government continued to have positive perceptions of CSOs, especially those engaged in activities that complement its efforts, such as capacity building, research, and monitoring and evaluation. However, in 2014 the government viewed CSOs that organized rallies to protest its slow response to the Boko Haram events in a negative light. The relationship between CSOs and businesses is still undeveloped, although business organizations that work closely with CSOs tend to have positive perceptions.

National CSOs continued to publicize their activities through print and electronic media and social media such as Facebook and Twitter. CSOs also use social media to engage partner organizations on national issues and advocacy campaigns. Local CSOs mainly use social media for information sharing, as many of them cannot afford the cost of print or electronic media and do not have the skills to engage media houses in disseminating information at low or no cost.

CSOs at the national level publish and distribute annual reports to other CSOs and the NPC. Small CSOs sometime prepare annual reports for internal use but usually do not publish them. Although the CSO sector does not have a general code of ethics, individual organizations often have internal principles and policies to guide their operations.
In the twenty years since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has rebuilt its social, political, and economic foundations. The country has made significant progress towards stability and security, based on its Vision 2020 program, which aims to strengthen governance, infrastructure, housing, health care, and education. Rwanda has also made strides in achieving gender equity by improving women’s access to credit, reinforcing their participation in decision making, and facilitating their access to land. The land and agriculture management sectors have grown stronger despite challenges related to the Green Revolution, which intended to boost economic growth by solving food security issues.

Nevertheless, in recent years the country’s economy has deteriorated, both because of the global financial crisis and because of economic sanctions imposed by major development partners in 2012 and 2013 amid allegations that the country was supporting the rebel group M23 in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result of these pressures, in 2014 the cost of living continued to increase and as much as 45 percent of the population was still living in poverty.
In 2014 the country’s legal and political environment increasingly restricted freedoms of expression and association and the right to information. Vision 2020 does not clearly prioritize human rights, the rule of law, and political accountability. In the country’s current political environment, public dialogue and the expression of dissenting opinions are not encouraged. During the year, political leaders, mostly from the opposition, were routinely harassed, and there were also several reported cases of politically motivated killings and disappearances. In the face of these challenges, Rwanda’s human rights sector remained weak.

Overall, CSO sustainability in Rwanda deteriorated in 2014. Although in theory the legal framework offers an enabling environment, many restrictions continued to arise in practice, and some CSOs were marginalized for political reasons. The organizational and financial capacity of Rwandan CSOs was weakened by administrative restrictions and requirements, the take-over of some dynamic organizations by pro-government leadership, and CSOs’ inability to mobilize funds from internal and external donors. CSOs involved in service delivery faced fewer limitations in their work, as the government sees them as playing a complementary role.

At the end of 2014, more than 1,500 CSOs were registered with the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) and 155 international CSOs were registered with the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration (also known as the Immigration Directorate). Most of these organizations were involved in development-related sectors, such as education, health, agriculture, and women’s empowerment. With the evolution of the country’s priorities, many CSOs that were active in fundamental freedoms, justice, and human rights have changed their focus to service delivery. In 2014 few Rwandan CSOs and only nine international organizations were active in these areas.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The Constitution of Rwanda guarantees freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Three laws enacted in 2012 govern the organization and operations of CSOs: Law No. 04/2012, which governs domestic CSOs; Law No. 5/2012, which governs international CSOs; and Law No. 06/2012, which governs faith-based organizations (FBOs). The RGB registers and monitors national CSOs, FBOs, and political parties, while the Immigration Directorate registers and monitors international CSOs.

Registration requirements are complex. Domestic CSOs must present many documents to the authorities, including authenticated statutes, an action plan with a budget, and the names and curricula vitae of the organization’s legal representative and his or her deputy. After 2012 domestic CSOs were required to harmonize their legal status, statutory texts, and operations with the new laws and present a certificate of conformity to the authorities of the districts in which they intended to operate. However, the law does not define clearly the contents of the conformity letter, the procedures for obtaining it, or the authority that can facilitate it. As a result, fulfilling this requirement can be very costly in terms of funding and time. Organizations must also sign memoranda of understanding with the relevant line ministries and align their action plans with the priorities of their operational districts before obtaining an authorization letter that allows them to implement activities. Although domestic CSOs are required to register only once, CSOs feel that these cumbersome requirements restrict the freedom of association guaranteed by Rwanda’s constitution.

The registration process for international CSOs is also very long, as they, too, must submit a large number of documents, including an action plan approved by the line ministry. Although the law states that international
CSOs may be registered for a five-year period, in practice they are obliged to register annually, as their funding is usually appropriated one year at a time and the Immigration Directorate requires that they show evidence of funding for the entire period for which they request registration.

The laws governing CSOs are clear about internal management structures, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting requirements, and the dissolution of CSOs. RGB or the Immigration Directorate may suspend a CSO indefinitely if it is believed to jeopardize public order, security, health, morals, or human rights. Although such a suspension has never occurred, these provisions provide the authorities with an opportunity to interfere in or dissolve a CSO for politically motivated or arbitrary reasons. The Immigration Directorate and relevant ministries may conduct audits of international CSOs’ activities and finances and score them on their program implementation and contribution to the country’s development. Based on this evaluation, it is possible for their registration renewals to be delayed or simply denied. Domestic CSOs are required to inform local authorities and security services in writing of plans to hold general assembly meetings. Some CSOs, particularly those that are critical of the government, must reportedly obtain prior authorization for these meetings.

After obtaining registration but before implementing activities, CSOs are required to make mandatory contributions to the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), a platform for dialogue between CSOs and the government. CSOs see this requirement as limiting their effectiveness and have discussed the issue with line ministries. It was also brought up in the 2014 report of the UN special rapporteur on freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. As a result of these interventions, the contribution is currently under review.

Because of Rwanda’s history and political situation, CSOs are generally reluctant to conduct open debates or publicly criticize the government about sensitive issues, such as human rights, democratization, and policy implementation. The few CSOs that engage in such topics expose themselves to the risk of government interference in their management or infiltration of their staff. For example, in 2014 the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) was taken over by a pro-government group when its director went on a retreat. As a result of the change in leadership, the organization lost its donors, a large number of staff resigned, and the organization’s credibility and independence were undermined. Also in 2014, the outgoing board of the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Right (LIPRODHOR), which was evicted by a reportedly pro-government group during an illegal general assembly meeting, filed a court case to contest the takeover. Their appeal was unsuccessful. The Association of Pentecostal Churches in Rwanda was affected by similar problems, and after an organizational split the original group was refused the right to register its own church. Similar events took place in more than five CSOs and churches in Rwanda between 2012 and 2014.

The law states that domestic CSOs have the right to tax exemptions. However, tax-exempt status is not automatic, and CSOs secure it only through memoranda of understanding with government ministries. Few organizations have managed to obtain these memoranda, and in practice the government seems reluctant to grant them.

CSOs are allowed to conduct commercial activities if they relate to organizational objectives. Few CSOs exercise this privilege, in part because they are financially weak and also because they must pay taxes on such income.

There are no lawyers specialized in CSO affairs in Rwanda, other than those who work with CSOs as their legal advisors or on their management teams as staff members. Professional lawyers are required to attend political ideology and civic trainings and inform the Rwanda Bar Association (RBA), an independent professional corporation, of their involvement in local political parties. They are thus unable to provide credible services to CSOs, particularly those focused on human rights. Legal services are not generally available to CSOs in rural areas.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6

The organizational capacity of Rwandan CSOs declined considerably in 2014. The main reasons for the decline were more stringent enforcement of government restrictions and regulations, the take-over of dynamic organizations, and the increased difficulty of accessing funds from internal and external donors. The lack of a culture of open debate strongly affected CSOs’ development and effectiveness by restricting their access to information and funding and limiting their ability to formulate operational strategies aimed at positive change.

The ability of CSOs to build local constituencies is varied. The most successful organizations are those whose missions depend on relationships with constituencies, such as CBOs and the Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP), which has about forty member organizations working at the community level. Other CSOs find it difficult to build relationships with constituencies because of their lack of funding and burdensome administrative requirements. For example, before implementing activities, all CSOs must request permission in writing from line ministries and district mayors. This requirement can take more than five months to fulfill for activities planned for the same year. Also impeding CSO activities is the requirement that they coordinate their operations with the government’s fiscal year, which starts on July 1.

In accordance with the new laws governing CSOs, all organizational charters must state a clear and defined vision, mission, and objectives. Some well-established CSOs have long-term strategic plans that reflect these statements, while others are financially too weak to pay a consultant to help them develop realistic plans. Some organizations, such as those involved in health, education, and agriculture, develop strategic plans that fit with government priorities, while a few other CSOs, such as the League of Human Rights in the Great Lakes Region (LDGL) and the Umbrella Organization for Rwandan Local NGOs in Development (CCOAIB), have sought to develop strong management systems by drafting long-term plans, recruiting professional staff, and mobilizing funds to implement their priorities. A common challenge for all CSOs is that they are unable to implement plans because of financial constraints and changes in donor priorities.

All CSOs are required by law to have written management structures and procedures. However, the leaders of some CSOs lack commitment to strengthening their organizations, while others fail to operate in an open and transparent manner. One reason for the lack of transparency is that in some local contexts, a CSO may be vulnerable to a takeover, a split, or intimidation from outsiders who seek to assume control of the organization once it has sufficient funds for its activities. For example, the crisis at LIPRODHOR began after the organization renewed its management team and mobilized funds in 2012. The organization’s funding capacity induced a group to take over the organization and terminate staff members who were connected to the former board. As a result of the takeover, LIPRODHOR’s funders canceled their partnerships, and the organization lost considerable funds.

CSO staffing is overwhelmingly shaped by the availability of funds. Most CSOs have limited financial capacity to hire qualified staff for specialized purposes, such as policy analysis, information technology, financial management, or program coordination. When finances are precarious, CSOs often dismiss all employees except one or two staff who carry out minimal services. Other CSOs rely on unpaid interns to help ensure their survival. Otherwise, there are almost no volunteers working with CSOs in Rwanda.

Financial limitations prevent most CSOs from buying modern equipment, such as computers, fax machines, and scanners. Organizations that have such equipment are usually located in urban areas. Most organizations are unable to afford rents in newly constructed buildings. Internet access is available and affordable in many areas throughout the country, and CSO staff members often use mobile phones to access Internet services. The country’s electricity infrastructure is of good quality.
The bulk of funding for CSOs comes from foreign development partners and international CSOs. Major donors include USAID, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the European Union. The sanctions imposed by some external donors in 2012 and 2013 damaged CSOs’ financial viability in 2014, since CSO projects are funded through donors’ development aid contributions. Some organizations that were unable to mobilize funds from outside Rwanda were obliged to end operations and cease to exist. In December 2014 the United States reinstated $108 million of development assistance to Rwanda, and most other donors also renewed their funding. It is expected that the resumption of aid will help CSOs implement programs and activities in the future. Nevertheless, weak management capacity continues to undermine the financial viability of most CSOs.

Donor agendas drive CSO initiatives, and all donors support the government’s priorities based on their bilateral cooperation agreements. Even before the sanctions, some donors stopped contracting with CSOs directly in favor of working with government institutions, while others significantly reduced the number of CSO programs that they support. Many donors are project oriented and do not provide long-term institutional support. In 2014 these challenges were aggravated by the cut in aid and the reorientation of governmental priorities.

CSOs involved in service delivery find it relatively easy to access funds, since their work is in line with donor and government priorities. Organizations involved in human rights, civic and electoral education, justice, and prison monitoring encounter more difficulties in acquiring funds from development partners. Moreover, even if they are successful in obtaining funding, these organizations may not be able fully to implement planned activities because of administrative requirements and restrictions. For example, LDGL and LIPRODHOR received funds to monitor detention conditions in 2010 but were unable to obtain prison visit permits before the project period ended. This environment has pushed many CSOs to shift their focus from human rights to development.

The RGB mandate states that Rwandan CSOs should receive financial support from the government as part of its strategy to empower and strengthen an independent civil society. Although political parties have received government support for decades, CSOs did not begin to benefit until 2014. Most government support came through the Joint Program on Strengthening Civil Society Organizations for Responsive and Accountable Governance in Rwanda, funded by the United Nations Development Program. Although RGB provided additional modest financial support to CSOs in 2014, in practice this duty is not fully implemented. Of 180 applications received, the government funded only eighteen short-term projects. Criticism was voiced that the allocation criteria were not clear and the only organizations receiving funds were pro-government CSOs. Some organizations are reluctant to accept RGB financing for fear that they will lose their independence.

CSOs rarely receive financial support from local communities, individuals, or philanthropic organizations, except occasional donations and awards for their achievements and activism. Citizens have been encouraged to contribute to the government’s Agaciro Development Fund, which was established in 2012 when some donors cut their aid to Rwanda. However, the use of this fund is not known. A few corporate philanthropy programs mostly support access by genocide survivors, orphans, and other vulnerable citizens to schools and health care. Few organizations have projects funded by more than one donor, and most CSOs do not have sufficient resources to remain viable over the short or long term.
CSOs are allowed to engage in commercial activities, but very few do so. Membership fees are too insignificant and irregular to be considered a viable source of income. For example, Legal Aid Forum has more than thirty-five member organizations, but only a few regularly pay their mandatory contributions. Many other members have reduced their activities because of a lack of funding or have ceased normal operations.

Financial management is still weak in many Rwandan CSOs. According to the law and their internal rules, CSOs must regularly submit mid-term and annual financial reports to the RGB or Immigration Directorate as well as to donors. Most CSOs do not fulfill this requirement. Some organizations lack the resources to hire independent auditors or consider their financial reports for internal use only.

**ADVOCACY: 3.9**

The government generally views CSOs as policy implementers and seeks to limit their ability to influence policy or shape the country’s political and legal framework. As a result, advocacy capacity within the CSO sector is weak, and CSOs often choose to pursue advocacy in less risky areas, such as agriculture and health. During the year CSOs were largely absent from public debate and seemed increasingly afraid to raise issues that might be seen as politically sensitive. For instance, in 2014 no organization engaged in discussions about the presidential term in Rwanda, a matter of widespread concern. CSO often do not publicize their findings, mainly because the government does not encourage them to release findings on matters of public concern without prior discussion with their line ministries. If a CSO’s findings are controversial, the line ministry usually rejects them, which prevents public discussion and advocacy. In 2014 CSOs monitoring detention centers and prisons, human rights, and specific human rights abuses were subject to this sort of constraint. For example, Human Rights Watch released a report on disappearances in Rwanda, and the Ministry of Justice rejected the report’s findings. This type of government reaction restricts CSOs’ space for advocating for change and discourages other CSOs from engaging in advocacy for fear of criticism from the government.

The JADF, which ostensibly enables CSOs to participate in the planning and monitoring of district development plans, suffers from a lack of institutional support from the government. In addition, it is almost exclusively opened to CSOs focused on service delivery. Organizations that align themselves with the government usually find it difficult to voice dissenting opinions on the government’s positions and priorities. For example, the government regularly invites a group of CSOs to participate in high-level meetings, such as the National Dialogue and governmental retreats, but these organizations do not exercise real influence in these forums.

CSOs’ advocacy networks are not vibrant or vocal because of the restrictive political and legal environment and the lack of solidarity and trust among CSOs. For example, in 2014 the Ministry of Justice reported that fifty-five out of seventy-three recommendations intended to improve the country’s human rights situation had been fully implemented. CSOs were expected to confirm the accuracy of this claim, but unfortunately, most of them have yet to engage in the process. Occasionally individual advocacy efforts are effective. For instance, in 2014 Maison de Droit (MDD) continued to carry out campaigns to promote decentralization and a culture of accountability among local leaders and enforce laws allowing women to access and manage land. Youth Association for Human Rights Promotion and Development (AJPRODHO) conducted a survey on youth employment and urged the government to strengthen policies to facilitate young people’s access to work.

CSOs are generally not aware that a favorable regulatory framework is important for their effectiveness and sustainability. In an environment in which freedom of expression and association are severely limited, many
CSOs are confused or find it difficult to differentiate between what is allowed and what is prohibited. There are a few ongoing discussions sponsored by local organizations such as MDD, which aim to revise more restrictive aspects of the new law. These discussions are not supported by a large number of CSOs because of their lack of independence and their poor understanding of the issues involved.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

The goods and services provided by CSOs in Rwanda are diverse. They include programs in education, health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, housing and relief, agriculture, environment, governance and accountability, and legal aid. Most CSOs provide services that reflect their missions as well as the needs of their target groups. However, their services are usually project-based and therefore implemented for a short term. In 2014 service delivery by CSOs declined both because of the ongoing global financial crisis and because of the suspension of development aid after allegations that Rwanda was involved in the crisis in eastern DRC.

The decrease in funding affected CSOs’ commitment to their constituents and their ability to identify community needs and priorities based on needs assessments. CSOs sometimes provide goods and services that reflect funding opportunities and donor and government priorities rather than their missions or constituents’ needs. For example, in 2014 CSOs began paying school fees for poor children. In effect they compensated for the government’s failure to live up to its obligations after it adopted a policy of promoting free access to schools with the support of the donor community. These payments weakened the CSOs financially and diverted them from a constructive, rights-based approach to education rooted in their stated missions.

CSOs do not engage in cost-recovery programs, both because they must pay tax on such income and because their internal management systems are not adequate to this task.

The government generally recognizes the importance of CSOs insofar as they help districts implement their plans and achieve their objectives. However, some governmental officials make it clear that they do not appreciate CSOs that they perceive as pro-opposition or whose actions are oriented towards human rights, democracy, public participation, and other politically sensitive domains.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers do not generally exist in Rwanda. CSOs access information through traditional methods, such as interviews, surveys, and face-to-face meetings. It is not easy for CSOs to obtain relevant information in a timely manner or from sources outside of government circles.

CSO coalitions are weak to non-existent in Rwanda, mainly because of funding constraints. In general, regulations that restrict debate and criticism also inhibit the development of strong structures for cooperation and advocacy. In 2014 the climate for cooperation worsened in the aftermath of CSO takeovers by pro-government groups and subsequent funding cuts by donors. Mutual trust among CSOs is lacking, and conflicts of interest arise when coalitions compete against their own members for funding. Since emails are vulnerable to government interception, CSOs share unimportant information through the Internet and otherwise engage in self-censorship.
Although international CSOs provided somewhat more support for CSO capacity building in 2014, CSOs generally do not receive much help from donors in terms of training, technology, and technical assistance. Academic and professional institutions in the capital city, Kigali, offer basic management training. Advanced specialized trainings in areas such as accounting, financial management, fundraising, and board development are unavailable unless provided by foreign consultants who charge fees. Some domestic CSOs, including Legal Aid Forum, CCOAIB, Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, and AJPRODHO, have funding from international donors to help build CSO capacity. Their programs focus on such topics as fundraising, networking, the fight against gender-based violence, rights-based advocacy, and policy implementation analysis. However, few organizations have permanent and sustainable capacity-building programs—a weakness that, over the long term, impedes the efficacy and development of CSOs.

CSOs rarely work formally in partnership with local businesses or the government. A few CSOs have developed partnerships with the media to raise awareness of governance issues. For example, in 2014 Pax Press, a journalists’ network, used its press houses to inform citizens about the governance process and debate fundamental issues of freedom and local development.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

The public image of CSOs did not change considerably in 2014. Many media organs, both government and private, cover CSO events, but few are able to offer objective analysis of the contributions they make to the country. In 2014 pro-government CSOs working on service delivery enjoyed broad coverage on radio stations, printed press, and online media. CSOs engaged in human rights and democracy were sometimes criticized for their work or associated with enemies of the country, especially by pro-government media. Although there has been no research on this topic, perceptions of CSOs by the public and the private sector seem to reflect the images purveyed by media. Because of the overall lack of dissenting voices in the media, this means that the government’s perceptions of CSOs tend to prevail. The government perceives service-delivery CSOs positively, particularly if, through JADF, they participate in implementing district activities, such as development planning and performance evaluations. The government’s view of CSOs engaged in policy analysis, monitoring, fundamental freedoms, and other sensitive issues is overwhelmingly negative.

Few CSOs in Rwanda have been able to develop long-term relationships with journalists that could result in a more positive image or more visibility of their activities. Most organizations do not have strong communication programs or strategies. Nevertheless, some CSOs cooperate productively with media practitioners on a day-to-day basis. For example, CCOAIB collaborated with Pax Press to communicate with grassroots communities. Other CSOs contract with media enterprises or pay for time. For example, they may call the media to cover one-off activities, although if journalists attend, they usually expect to be paid for their coverage of the event.

Most CSOs have adopted self-regulatory mechanisms, such as a code of ethics, but do not actively implement them. CSOs often do not make information about their operations public or easily accessible. Few organizations publish annual reports.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Rwanda

CSO Sustainability

Rwanda

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded
SENEGAL

Despite a climate of concessions in 2013, political tensions in Senegal increased in 2014. Act III of the decentralization reform had negative impacts on larger cities’ revenues. Cities like Dakar and Thies lost economic assets to various neighboring districts. The decentralization reform has prevented further urban development and is perceived as a tool to weaken the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Concurrently, the Court for the Suppression of Illicit Enrichment (CREI) investigated Karim Wade — son of and a minister under former president and PDS leader Abdoulaye Wade — and put him in preventive detention. Abdoulaye Wade has denounced his son’s arrest and radicalized the PDS and its allies. The political debate further focused on the involvement of the current president’s family members and in-laws in the governance of public life, government and public administration, and local authorities.

Political tensions did not affect stabilization in Casamance, where the peace process was consolidated. In addition, infrastructure and economic activities (agriculture, fisheries, and tourism) continue to grow in the region with support from technical and financial partners, such as the United States through the Millennium
Challenge Account. The African Development Bank has granted Senegal 19 billion CFA francs to set up large farming communities. These communities, the first of which started production in the Sédhiou region (in Casamance), promise to generate jobs for women and young people, a major challenge for the government in a context where the industrial and public sectors are unable to provide the number of jobs necessary.

Despite the establishment of social safety nets (e.g., free care for children from birth to 5 years old, universal health coverage and Family Safety scholarships to benefit 250,000 households), economic weakness could spread, especially in urban centers and outlying suburbs. The Ministry of Economy and Finance announced that the allowance scheme for civil servants needed revision as technical and financial partners found them unsustainable. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also recommended the removal of subsidies to the energy sector, which sparked the mobilization of trade unions.

The education system is still plagued with inefficiencies. The situation became particularly tense when student anger erupted at questioning over whether to follow through with the plan of providing scholarships to all students. Violence between students and police culminated in the August 14, 2014 death of a student at Cheikh Anta Diop University. The government is also unable to satisfy the demands of elementary and secondary school teachers, specifically regarding their claims for increased housing subsidies and career advancements. The government has since initiated a series of controversial university reforms, including an increase of tuition fees on academic and administrative levels.

The sustainability of civil society organizations (CSOs) continued to evolve in 2014. The legal environment worsened as the government excluded CSOs from the process of revising their legal framework. The draft decree represents a possible threat to the existence of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and more government control. CSOs had ongoing struggles in raising funds from local sources, especially given that requests for proposals published by the Senegalese state are directed more toward the private sector than the NGO sector. NGOs still lacked institutional support. Opportunities for advocacy and influence on public policies have emerged from state regulations that involve CSOs’ steering committees. Although local NGOs provide many social services and have built expertise in improving the living conditions of communities, few CSOs have become self-sustainable through the provision of services and products. CSOs maintained a positive image in rural and peri-urban areas, and benefited from a positive portrayal by local radio broadcasts.

The Ministry of Interior reported that 489 CSOs were registered as of July 15, 2015, a significant decrease from the 530 CSOs registered in 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

The legal environment of CSOs worsened in 2014. Revision of the legal framework defining the relationship between CSOs and the state continued, but NGOs were excluded from the process, even though the Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGAD) had initiated the agreement with the Senegalese president in 2013. With the breakdown of consultation and dialogue between the two parties, the reform became the prerogative of administrative technicians and was completed without NGO participation.

The draft decree establishes registration procedures and the parameters for the creation and intervention of NGOs in Senegal. This decree represents a possible threat to the existence of local NGOs. For example, chapter 4, section 19 provides that NGOs’ investment program is the basic document of NGO intervention in Senegal and that NGOs cease to exist if they do not have an approved investment program. Article 32 stipulates that NGOs must transmit quarterly activity reports to the prefect, and must participate in the
Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Security’s financing of monitoring and evaluation missions and the implementation of programs approved for investment.

The Partnership Board of Directors of the Ministry of the Interior attempted to weaken the local NGO sector and sparked a fault line between some international NGOs and the CONGAD. The board promoted the creation of a coalition of international NGOs. This coalition, which doesn’t have an official NGO accreditation, was summoned to interdepartmental review meetings to approve NGOs’ registration requests and investment programs; prior to this, CONGAD represented all NGOs. The coalition of international NGOs is positioned as a signatory to the legal framework defining the relationship between CSOs and CONGAD and the state.

Article 14, paragraph 4 of Decree No. 2010-1490 amending Decree No. 96-103 of Feb. 8, 1996, establishes procedures on the intervention of NGOs in Senegal, stating that they are subject to an annual audit by the relevant departments of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In 2014, the ministry used the decree to harass NGOs, asking them to provide information on their financing, including the origin of resources. The Ministry of the Interior threatened CONGAD because most of its member organizations refused to respond to that injunction.

The state requires NGOs to participate in the financing of monitoring and evaluation missions by the Ministry of the Interior and Security (Article 26) to implement approved investment programs. Article 38 of the draft decree provides for an NGO monitoring and evaluation (M&E) fund powered by state and NGO contributions.

Legal counsel was available in all regions of Senegal, but did not meet the needs of CSOs as the state was restricting their autonomy. Lawyers do not specialize in CSO laws. CSOs must pay for legal services. In urban centers, lawyers are starting to organize to offer assistance on civic issues. In rural areas, NGOs such as Edna Health and the Association for the Promotion of Senegalese Women (APROFES) offer mobile workshops on women’s rights.

CSOs receive tax exemptions through a two-year investment program that they must present to the Ministry of Interior before being transmitted to the Ministry of Economy and Finance for approbation. The new tax code does not allow exemption for gifts or subsidies.

NGOs can earn revenue and answer local and national government calls for bids. The Association Board for Actions (ACA) applied for and won a public contract to build the management capacity of beneficiaries of the Rural Development Support Program in Casamance (PADERCA).

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

Despite the tendency of NGOs to become more professional in the context of the financial crisis, an increasing number of organizations have been shutting down because of a lack of institutional support. Many NGOs were not able to coordinate their activities and lost many volunteers. Nonetheless, local NGOs that have survived have become stronger and are consolidating their efforts. NGOs in the North built coalitions, regrouped their resources and created new partnerships among themselves.

To ensure that their actions appropriately support the needs of communities, NGOs increasingly integrated strategic planning approaches into their management systems. Many have developed three- to five-year strategic plans.

NGOs made significant efforts in their governance structures through the regular renewal of their boards and stressing accountability and transparency in the use of funds.
CSOs can update and purchase equipment only through funding from foreign donors. These purchases are project-driven and do not respond to the needs on the ground. Most NGOs have a computer and Internet access. Mobile phones are readily available and used in projects.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs continued to struggle to raise funds from local sources. Philanthropy, sponsorship, and recovery rates of contributions of members, who are often low-income, are not sufficiently developed to support NGO activities. Most NGOs rely on local volunteers and non-monetary support from their communities. In Senegal, access to state funding remains difficult compared to countries in the sub-region, where NGOs have easy access to resources for state projects and programs. NGOs rely on funding from international donors to support their activities.

International NGOs and local NGOs are competing for funds in Senegal. The limited capacity of local NGOs restricts them from implementing national programs. For example, most USAID-funded health programs are awarded to international NGOs. The same observation can be made about the Global Fund. With the exception of the National Alliance Against AIDS (ANCS) program, which has been a principal recipient, no local NGO is a program’s primary recipient.

In a financially challenging context, NGOs have made remarkable efforts to consolidate their management systems and their compliance with administrative and financial procedures. They have proved their expertise in this area. For instance, the NGO ACA received a congratulatory letter after the audit of its management by an international firm. The ANCS, the only local NGO recipient of the Global Fund in Francophone Africa, was awarded the ISO9001 quality label by Veritas International, which notes the quality of its efforts.

Furthermore, the cost-share contribution that some partners ask of local applicant organizations is a major constraint. For example, the European Union returned funding because local NGOs could not contribute the 10 percent cost-share required to qualify for its calls for proposals.

Requests for proposals published by the Senegalese state are directed more toward the private sector than the NGO sector. The competition is not transparent, despite the existence of oversight institutions such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP). Furthermore, the government would rather create agencies, such as the Return Toward Agriculture Agency (REVA) or the National Agency to Promote Youth Employment (ANPEJ), than ask NGOs to implement programs.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

In 2014, opportunities for advocacy and influence on public policies have emerged from state regulations that involve steering committees of CSOs. For example, Human Action for Integrated Development (AHDIS) shared its evaluation of the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (SNDS) with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Parliament, and the Economic and Environmental Council, as well as with 14 regions.
The CONGAD played an active role in the reform of land-use management and fostered dialogue between the National Land Reform Commission (NWRC) that had previously restricted access to specialists and local stakeholders. This allowed the involvement of stakeholders from all parts of the country, with the support of the European Union.

Other advocacy activities promoted the right to health, education, gender equity, and equality for people living with HIV/AIDS through support from the IMF.

As a representative of CSOs, the CONGAD sits on national policy reform steering committees including the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council and advises the president and members of government in various areas (e.g., land, agriculture, research). The CONGAD and the National Council for Dialogue and Rural Cooperation (NCRC) blocked the approval process of the Integrated Development Program of Agribusiness in Senegal (PDIDAS), until the administration opened the dialogue with CSOs.

Over the last few years, CSOs led a campaign to push for the funding of sustainable development in Senegal. In 2014, the president declared agriculture a priority in generating decent jobs for young people and women. A contributing factor to this recent declaration was CSO advocacy.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

Local NGOs provide many social services and have built expertise in improving the living conditions of communities. Some of these programs such as the Program to Support Better Nutrition and Universal Healthcare (CMU) and Family Services respond to the demands of the communities. They cannot, however, ensure complete financial autonomy of these communities and few CSOs have become self-supporting through the provision of services and products.

Both the state and private organizations recognize the expertise of NGOs in certain areas, but rarely solicit them. The state does not give subventions to organizations. CSOs can receive contracts through specific programs. For example, the General Delegation on Social Protection (DGPS) is implementing an important social safety net program through the allocation of family solidarity grants, but is doing so without the involvement of NGOs.

CSOs share their publications with other actors, including members of Parliament and elected local officials, during workshops. For instance, CSOs distributed the report on their Contribution to the Post-2015 Agenda to institutions and local actors. The CONGAD published a participatory report on citizens’ views of the Government’s proposed land reform.

Although NGOs face difficulties accessing funding, they are developing alternative strategies by responding to requests for proposals to meet the needs of their constituency and support their institutional costs.

Some local NGOs, such as the Forum for Sustainable and Endogenous Development (FOODE), were selected as part of the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Project of Senegal, after a tough competition with private firms. The MCA funds program services that benefit the communities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

Financial difficulties limit the flexibility of intermediary support organizations (ISOs). They operate through selective projects following a call for proposals.
Foundations lead many charitable or resilience actions for vulnerable groups. The Sonatel Foundation provides many services and supplies in the areas of culture, education, and health. The foundation of the First Lady Serve Senegal and the Barraquer Foundation joined forces to provide free optical surgeries during the Eighth Ophthalmic Humanitarian Mission in December 2014.

Civil society actors share information through consultation and exchange mechanisms, which provide easy access to information and training of members nationally. The Senegalese Association for Research and Support for Community Development (ASRADEC), the African Network for Integrated Development (RADI), the Environment and Development Action in the Third World (EDNA), and other NGOs created a Platform of Multi-Actors in Non-formal Education (PMA / NFE) in collaboration with the Dutch International Alliance of ICCO. The forum provides technical and professional training to targeted youth along with formal and informal education, and reproductive health education.

ISOs (e.g., the CONGAD, the National Framework for Rural Consultation, the Non-State Actors platform) support local NGOs by increasing access to information and providing training and technical support. The CONGAD is creating a database of NGOs in the health sector in Senegal under the Project to Support the Governance of Health Center (PAGOSAN), financed by Belgium. This database will improve the country’s development planning instruments.

Intersectorial partnerships exist. The CONGAD’s Health, HIV, and Population Network (RESSIP) and the Ministry of Health collaborate closely on specific programs such as the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI). The CONGAD has developed partnerships with the media to promote open and fair dialogue on land reforms between various stakeholders. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria partners with the local CSO National Alliance Against AIDS to implement its programs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.7

NGOs have a positive image among the public in rural areas and peri-urban centers, where they provide many basic social services. Beneficiary communities appreciate the quality of their performance and flexibility of their interventions. Community radio stations such as Walf FM, RFM and Sud FM have a strong presence and talk favorably of NGO contributions.

In urban areas, the best-known NGOs are those involved in the promotion of human rights, good governance, and monitoring of public policies. Service NGOs in urban areas communicate little about their achievements, despite the volume and quality of their services.

Government officials have always had a mixed perception of NGOs, but were pleasantly surprised by the reassuring results of audits submitted by NGOs, as required under Decree No. 2010-1490. In this sense, the draft decree and the preamble of the proposed State-NGO Framework Convention are revealing. In the project decree report’s presentation, the Interior minister recognized that NGOs had contributed substantially to national development efforts.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Senegal

Legal Environment
Public Image
Organizational Capacity
Infrastructure
Financial Viability
Service Provision
Advocacy

CSO Sustainability

Senegal

Sustainability Enhanced
Sustainability Evolving
Sustainability Impeded
In 2014 Ebola claimed the lives of almost 3,000 Sierra Leoneans. Before the outbreak Sierra Leone had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, but the disease crippled every sector of the economy, especially as Sierra Leone was largely unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis. Economic growth contracted from 11.3 to 6.6 percent and inflation increased significantly within a short time. Food insecurity became a major problem, as the disease struck during the planting season. Maternal care services declined because of fears of contracting the virus in healthcare facilities. Poverty and inequality deepened at all levels of society.

Donors responded to the crisis by diverting some funds that had already been allocated for other purposes to support the fight against the epidemic. As a result, funding became a challenge for most CSOs. Few Sierra Leonean CSOs played a frontline role in the fight against Ebola, since the majority of them engage in advocacy work and relatively few organizations deliver humanitarian aid or other services. The role of local CSOs during the crisis was largely limited to sensitization, surveillance for the detection of possible cases, and the distribution of food items to quarantined homes and vulnerable communities. With the state of emergency curtailing free speech, freedom of assembly, and other civil liberties, the operations of CSOs
engaged in advocacy and non-emergency service delivery were cut back. Growing political polarization also made CSOs increasingly reluctant to speak out on matters of public debate, especially after some CSO representatives were called up for questioning by members of parliament.

The number of CSOs in Sierra Leone is difficult to ascertain, as organizations register with various organizations and consolidated data is not available.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

The legal environment for CSOs worsened in 2014, both prior to the epidemic and during the state of emergency. In particular, the space for the exercise of civil liberties constricted during the Ebola response, as CSOs and the media raised concerns about government accountability and abuse of power and as a result experienced increased government intrusion in their operations.

In general, the legal environment for CSO registration is favorable in Sierra Leone. The constitution guarantees freedoms of expression and association, and CSOs easily acquire legal status. Depending on its mission, location, and the proximity of an appropriate government office, a CSO can register through the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (SLANGO), the Office of the Administrator and Registrar General, a city or district council, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), or another ministry responsible for its functional area. Although the registration process could be better coordinated among state entities, CSOs continued to register without problem in 2014.

In contrast, the laws regulating CSO operations are unclear. There is no comprehensive law delineating CSOs’ role, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting requirements, or dissolution. The main regulatory framework is the Revised NGO Policy Regulations of 2009, which introduced new barriers to the operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The policy requires all NGOs to re-register annually and become members of the national governmental umbrella entity, SLANGO. It also stipulates operational requirements down to the number of staff members, the quality of office space, and signage. In 2014 the Sierra Leone parliament began to invite CSOs for questioning about issues related to their accountability. They were compelled to submit project proposals and records of financial transactions with donors, and some organizations were cautioned about their activities and their statements about the government. CSOs perceived this development as worrisome as it seemed to open the door to state interference in CSO operations. CSOs also fear that the NGO Policy as implemented by SLANGO is too weak to protect them from interference by politicians and other public officials, who might perceive them as a challenge and seek to silence them. Community based-organizations (CBOs) do not operate within the NGO Policy framework and therefore are particularly vulnerable to state interference.

Although CSOs normally play a prominent role in public debates and policy discussions, the public health emergency in 2014 constricted their space for operation. Most CSOs engaged in advocacy could not meet with their constituents because of restrictions on gatherings imposed by the state of emergency and health authorities. In addition, the growing polarization of the political environment between ruling and opposition parties prompted a few CSOs to fall silent for fear of being labeled for or against the regime. During the year the government seemed to use the crisis to engage in a systematic effort to stifle independent and neutral voices. For example, a prominent journalist was detained without trial on allegations that his popular radio program violated state-of-emergency regulations. Other journalists who raised concerns about the use of Ebola funds were detained by the police. An employee of the Center for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL) was invited by the leader of parliament for questioning because he had reported on the prolonged
detention of military personnel who had allegedly planned a coup. These developments became quite worrisome for CSOs, especially those advocating for improved government accountability.

CSOs registered with SLANGO are exempt from duties on imported goods. However, all CSOs must pay taxes on income from grants, endowments, fees, and economic activities and contribute to the pensions of staff members. Meeting these requirements became more challenging for CSOs in 2014 as their funding declined, and most organizations were in arrears on their taxes. As a result, some CSOs were threatened with legal action.

The law does not specify whether CSOs can earn income from the provision of goods and services. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts but it is difficult for them to do so as they rarely meet the criteria for submitting bids.

Few lawyers in Sierra Leone are familiar with CSO law, and most CSOs find it difficult to obtain sound legal advice and representation. Only one lawyer in the country offers pro-bono services to CSOs, human rights activists, and journalists.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8**

Most CSOs seek to identify and build local constituencies for their initiatives, as they are important for achieving project and organizational goals. In 2014 CSOs continued to build and maintain successful issue-based constituencies around elections, women’s rights, and water and sanitation. However, in the second part of the year, the state of emergency imposed as a result of the Ebola epidemic prohibited meetings of ten or more people, which prevented many CSOs from maintaining contact with their constituents.

CSOs are required to have strategic plans to register. However, these plans do not always inform decision making, and organizations often stray from their plans in their search for funding and responses to calls for proposals.

A number of organizations have internal financial controls and program monitoring systems that meet UN assessment standards. Other CSOs have very basic internal management mechanisms. While the law requires organizations to have boards, only established CSOs have functioning boards with clearly defined roles and criteria for selecting board members.

CSOs generally find it difficult to retain administrative and financial management staff, in part because donors do not directly support institution building or the retention of qualified personnel. In some organizations, staff is hired only for the duration of specific projects. In 2014, because of decreased funding during the Ebola crisis, many CSOs found it difficult to retain project-based staff. CSOs are usually unable to afford services from lawyers, technology experts, accountants, and other professionals. The use of volunteers is most common in urban settings, where young people seek work experience as they enter the job market. If CSOs are lacking funding, they usually rely on volunteers to survive.

Most CSOs in the capital city have basic equipment such as computers, printers, scanners, and cell phones. They usually do not have sufficient resources to provide field operations with similar equipment. Internet access is expensive and Internet connectivity is generally unreliable, especially in rural communities. Most CBOs do not have computers and use public Internet cafes instead.
International donors are the main source of funding for Sierra Leonean CSOs. Major donors include the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, and Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Most funding goes through international CSOs, which claim to have standardized financial management systems and serve as intermediary institutions or work with national organizations to implement programs. CSOs in urban settings sometimes access funds from donors through coalitions and partnership with CBOs. Donors are generally reluctant to fund CSOs’ administrative costs.

In the summer of 2014 CSO activities that were not directly related to the fight against Ebola were put on hold in accordance with state-of-emergency regulations. As a result, funding for these activities was suspended, and the disbursement of funds became a challenge. Some donors allowed a few organizations that already had funds to utilize them for Ebola-related activities. OSIWA provided funding to coalitions working on the Ebola response.

The Ebola crisis prompted some new philanthropic support, mostly from Sierra Leoneans in the diaspora, who, for example, provided relief items for quarantined homes. Some of these items were distributed with support from CSOs or faith-based organizations. Otherwise, local sources of funding included a few corporate philanthropies, such as those operated by mobile cellular companies, which usually support football matches and musical competitions that attract large audiences and are useful for marketing. Private-sector entities sometimes have corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, but these rarely support CSOs. Business support to advocacy organizations is limited.

There is not a culture of fundraising in Sierra Leone. Professional organizations such as the Motor Drivers Association and the Sierra Leone Teachers Union earn income by charging membership dues. A few organizations rely on the sale of agricultural products to fund interventions. For example, in 2014 the Mothers’ Club in Kenema district used the proceeds from farm sales to purchase materials to support girls’ education.

CSOs rarely receive government contracts.

Many CSOs would like to establish sound financial systems but do not have the resources to pay for accounting and auditing services or to publish annual reports. A small number of organizations, including the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD), CARL, and Society for Democratic Initiatives (SDI), have functioning financial systems that help maintain the CSO sector’s credibility for managing funds.

CSOs in Sierra Leone traditionally play a watchdog role. They see themselves as offering checks and balances to the government, and therefore they usually prefer to maintain an independent stance to avoid tainting their image with a pro-government label.

CSO-government relations are generally amicable, and in 2014 the two sectors continued to cooperate on a number of projects. Among the most important was the Open Government Partnership (OGP), begun in 2013, in which...
CSOs and the government worked closely together to develop the National Action Plan (NAP) for governance reform, which was issued in 2014. The government launched the first-ever Open Data Portal in May 2014 in fulfilment of one of the commitments of the NAP. During the discussion finding common ground for genuine engagement was not easy. Conflict resolution mechanisms were quickly instituted, but eventually “let’s proceed for love of country” became the slogan for both sides. The government and CSOs came to see the OGP process as the starting point for a permanent consultative platform, in which CSOs and government work together to institute reforms. Moreover, CSOs view the process as enabling a shift in their role from parochial to participatory, in which they can push for legal and institutional reform, demand accountability, and help citizens access information.

Another important joint project was the Agenda for Prosperity, in which implementing partners of the Enhancing the Interaction between Civil Society and the State (ENCISS) program helped shape the final version of the government's national poverty reduction strategy. A group of women’s organizations was able to ensure the inclusion in the strategy of a stand-alone pillar on gender equality and women’s empowerment. In 2014 the government also invited citizens’ groups to participate in consultations on land reform policy. CSOs continued to demand and receive permission to take part in discussions of donor basket funds, and their suggestions have formed an integral part of the final documents.

In the second half of the year, the government focused on the Ebola epidemic, and its attention to initiatives with CSOs decreased. CSO advocacy efforts also turned to Ebola, especially issues of surveillance, contact tracing, accounting for the use of funds, and the protection of rights during the state of emergency. CSOs sought to ensure that the government developed a properly structured response strategy that included community structures, efficiently managed checkpoints, and safe and dignified burials. Their efforts were poorly organized at first, but eventually CSOs were able to develop a more effective approach to advocacy on these issues. For example, women’s groups raised concerns about the number of women who were contracting the virus because of their care-giving role. They pushed for and eventually achieved gender-disaggregated data collection on patients, survivors, and victims of the disease. Towards the end of the year, as Ebola was ebbing, CSO advocacy turned to other health-related issues, such as poor service delivery, maternal health care, and the need to focus on other diseases, especially HIV/AIDS.

A number of successful issue-based coalitions continued to operate in 2014. These included the Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), the National Elections Watch, the National Coalition on Extractives (NACE), and the Freedom of Information Coalition. CSOs are able to lobby the government and parliament on critical issues and laws. However, as lobbying usually requires large expenditures on fuel, daily allowances, and other expenses, CSO lobbying activities are generally modest.

For more than seven years a group of CSOs, led by organizations in Freetown, have advocated for reforms to achieve a more straightforward, consultative, citizen-centered NGO Policy. However, because of the Ebola crisis, no direct or formal engagements on the policy took place in 2014.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

A more diverse range of CSO service provision in Sierra Leone was developing until the Ebola crisis began. Whereas in 2013 CSO activities focused mostly on civil liberties and human rights, in 2014 organizations began to work in such areas as health, education, housing, water, energy, environmental protection, and women and youth. For example, OSIWA supported a new project to offer legal services to citizens, which introduced a legal aid board and helped slum dwellers advocate for land for housing purposes. Unfortunately, the Ebola epidemic slowed down progress in achieving more extensive and effective CSO service delivery.
During the Ebola outbreak, CSOs and CBOs conducted surveillance, designed sensitization programs, and helped international agencies distribute food to quarantined homes and vulnerable groups. Two organizations, Health for All Coalition and Health Alert, were particularly helpful in disseminating information about the disease through a video documentary and radio talk shows. Their efforts demystified public rumors and fabrications about Ebola so that the health emergency could be tackled.

As most organizations are locally based, the goods and services that CSOs provide generally reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents. Community needs are assessed through participatory mechanisms and direct observation by CBO staff who live and work in their local communities.

CSOs distribute products such as advocacy and outreach materials. Some CSOs share their expertise through publications, workshops, and expert analysis of such issues as judicial performance, service delivery, and public budgeting. Publications are disseminated widely to government agencies, academia, civil society, and donors. Churches and mosques are common users of CSO products. CSOs do not recover costs from such products, as the NGO Policy is unclear as to whether CSOs may engage in profit-making activities.

The government recognizes the immense role that CSOs play in providing community services. However, CSOs rarely receive government contracts or grants for this purpose.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

There are a few CSO resource centers, mostly in Freetown, which offer reference materials as well as computers and Internet access. These centers are not widely used by CSOs and seem popular mostly with university students and foreign researchers.

OSIWA has become a valuable source of grantmaking since its local office was established in Freetown in 2009. OSIWA funds a wide range of issues, including governance, human rights, elections, media development, women's empowerment, and youth participation. ENCISS is another locally based initiative sponsored by DFID and the European Union. In 2014 ENCISS re-emerged as a local grantmaking institution and now re-grants funds to local organizations for governance, citizens’ participation, human rights, and community advocacy.

CSOs use a variety of innovative techniques to research and disseminate information. In particular, meetings and gatherings offer invaluable information-sharing opportunities. A number of coalitions, including the National Election Watch (NEW), Citizens for Constitutional Review, BAN, and NACE, use Listservs to update their memberships on issues of interest. Most CSOs believe that SLANGO, the national governmental umbrella entity, still needs to improve its coordination of information sharing among CSOs and more effectively project the image of local organizations.

CSOs have access to ongoing training in critical fields such as public financial management, elections, corruption, and transparency. These training are usually conducted by local trainers but not in local languages.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the government are extensive and in many instances represent genuine cooperation. The majority of partnerships are focused on policy formulation and implementation, although they can also involve areas such as service delivery. For example, members of the Health for All Coalition volunteer to monitor free health care offered by the government, with support from the UN, Voluntary Service Overseas and the Ministry of Health. Partnerships with the private sector are minimal.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

CSOs continued to enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels in 2014. While reporting by the print media is sometimes unfair or partisan, CSOs generally do well at engaging with radio. For CSOs the
critical challenge is money, as they must usually pay for coverage. Because investigative journalism is uncommon, the media have yet to be fully integrated as partners in CSO advocacy efforts.

The public views CSOs as highly credible at all levels. In particular, CSOs are known for their grassroots outreach programs and impact in hard-to-reach communities. The government also has a positive perception of CSOs and in many instances relies on them to contribute to the national interest and disseminate credible information. For example, during the Ebola outbreak, CSOs helped to sharpen public understanding of the disease. The business sector is still in its formative stages, and partnerships with CSOs have yet to develop. Some private-sector entities fear that CSOs will expose them, as happened in the case of mining companies that failed to make contributions to community development funds or honor their CSR pledges.

A few urban CSOs have Facebook pages but they are not widely visited. During 2014 CSO groups developed WhatsApp forums mainly to pass on urgent information about Ebola and other issues. Some CSOs disseminate information through multi-media approaches, such as radio programs and skits.

A sector-wide code of ethics does not exist in Sierra Leone. Some individual organizations have guiding principles to ensure integrity and efficiency in their operations. For example, all election observers must subscribe to a code of conduct designed by NEW. Well-established CSOs often issue reports on their activities, publicize them on the radio, online, and at community meetings, and send hard copies to government agencies, the international community, and other CSOs.
In May 2014 South Africans went to the polls to elect a new National Assembly and provincial legislatures. Despite the fact that a major faction broke away from the African National Congress (ANC), the party won its fifth consecutive victory, although without a two-thirds majority. CSOs played a formidable role in the run-up to the elections by encouraging youth voter registration, providing voter information and education, observing the elections, and monitoring the counting of ballots. At the same time, some CSOs were verbally attacked by politicians and government officials during the election process. Scandal continued to plague the ANC and roil the country in the aftermath of allegations that President Jacob Zuma had used public funds to refurbish his Nkandla homestead. Transparency International scored South Africa 42 out of a possible 100 points in its 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, a one-point decrease from 2012.

The South African economy remained stagnant in 2014. Contributing to a sub-par economic performance were lackluster foreign investment and relentless labor disputes, including a strike by 70,000 platinum workers. A lack of competitiveness continued in crucial sectors of the economy and resulted in the country’s drop from fifty-third to fifty-sixth place in the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report.
Countrywide protests over the inability of the government to deliver services continued, and CSOs filled gaps in the provision of services to the poorest members of society. Financially, CSOs remained in a precarious state as international donor agencies continued to downsize their projects and programs.

According to the Nonprofit Organizations (NPO) Directorate of the Department of Social Development (DSD), there were 130,612 registered voluntary associations in South Africa at the end of 2014, a 19 percent increase over 2013. The Department of Trade and Industry has not released figures on the number of non-profit companies and trusts. Voluntary associations typically partner locally with informal, unregistered community-based organizations (CBOs). Non-profit companies and trusts are usually based in urban areas and have a reach beyond their immediate geographic base.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

CSOs in South Africa can register as voluntary associations, trusts, or non-profit companies. Nearly 95 percent of all registered organizations are voluntary associations. Currently there are no major impediments to CSO registration. The streamlined online registration process introduced by the DSD in 2013 continues to operate efficiently. There is little state interference in the operation and administration of CSOs. In accordance with generally accepted international practices, CSOs are required by law to submit narrative and financial reports annually. However, most organizations fail to submit reports. Because of their non-compliance, 1,545 CSOs were de-registered last year.

In 2012 the DSD began a consultation process on a new legal framework for CSOs. In March 2014 the fifth draft of the NPO Policy Framework on the Amendments of the Non-Profit Organizations Act 71 of 1997 was the subject of a consultative meeting in Johannesburg involving the government and CSOs. The fifth draft of the framework incorporates many CSO viewpoints. For example, it acknowledges the importance of self-regulation and recognizes the important contribution of civil society in the delivery of social services and economic growth and stability. The draft aspires “to promote transparency and accountability” in the CSO sector “without placing onerous requirements on organizations.” The proposed framework includes a revamped NPO directorate that will operate independently of the DSD and report directly to the Minister of Social Development. Changes to the structure of the directorate will be developed through a feasibility study undertaken by internal or independent researchers. A key component of the draft is the recognition that multiple registrations and compliance mechanisms unduly burden NPOs, particularly smaller organizations, which are often unable to meet the minimum requirements. CSO commentators welcomed the move towards faster electronic registration and reporting and the admission that, because of the sector’s diversity, the current “one size fits all” regulatory approach is unsustainable.

The draft framework also proposes that a government-operated CSO tribunal and appeals process be established for dispute resolution in place of costly and time-consuming sessions in court. While the fifth draft states that “the intention is not to create a body that will continually interfere in the affairs of organizations,” CSOs expressed concerns about the make-up and impartiality of the tribunal as well as its ability to de-register organizations without a judicial process. In November 2014 the DSD advertised a tender for the preparation of a new draft of amendments to the NPO Act.

In 2014 government harassment of CSOs declined. However, parliamentarians and government officials aggressively refuted CSO criticism of government programs, sometimes allowing the criticism to become personal. Government and human rights CSOs sparred over the lack of migrant worker rights, poor public
dissemination of information, and the activities of state police and security agencies. Educational CSOs were subject to government criticism after they complained about the quality of education in public schools, the lack of textbooks, and the state of public school facilities.

The Income Tax Act provides for tax deductions for individual and corporate donors, provided they meet certain conditions. Public benefit organizations (PBOs) are entitled to tax exemptions for seventeen designated functions, but the government has been slow to implement the exemptions. Online services introduced in 2014 have streamlined the process of applying for tax exemptions, although the new system has flaws that still require attention. For example, the South Africa Revenue Service has yet to develop a system for reporting on the number of organizations registered for exemptions or the number of exemptions withdrawn. Little data is available from government sources about how well the tax exemption system benefits donors. A committee established by the government in 2013 to review the Income Tax Act has yet to produce results.

CSOs are permitted by law to earn income from the provision of goods and services, as long as their commercial activity does not exceed predefined limits. The tax authorities monitor this proportion closely.

Law students receive some training in non-profit law, and an increasing number of legal practitioners in both primary and secondary cities provide services to the CSO sector. However, it is not a core income stream for practicing lawyers. While fees can be negotiated, legal services generally remain too expensive for CSOs, which seldom budget for this expense.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

The gap in organizational capacity between larger and smaller and urban and rural CSOs continued to be evident in 2014. Larger organizations have better adapted to the new electronic filing systems. Smaller and less professional CSOs have weak internal management structures, and their boards often fail to meet regularly to provide vision, direction, or oversight. Smaller organizations also lack capacity in human resources, strategic planning, and fundraising.

Skilled management, transparency, and accountability in the CSO sector are hindered by the trend of engaging part-time consultants instead of full-time staff. This development has resulted in an increased number of former staff members now working as consultants at both large and small organizations. A recent study of the educational, training, and development needs of CSOs by the Cooperative for Research and Education (CORE) identified a short-term lack of executive directors and a longer-term shortage of program managers and communications coordinators in South Africa’s CSO sector. While volunteerism is not uncommon, the country’s high unemployment rate is pushing potential volunteers to demand market-related stipends, which neither large nor small CSOs are able to pay and donors are not willing to fund.

Mobile phone penetration has increased annually in South Africa and is now close to 100 percent. Many CSOs use mobile phones to communicate with beneficiaries in both rural and urban areas. Broadband speed and Internet penetration in South Africa are less developed, and for this reason as well as cost, Internet usage is lower than in other African countries of similar size. In comparison to international organizations working in South Africa, local CSOs have more modest offices in less affluent parts of town.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.3**

The financial viability of the CSO sector has deteriorated significantly in recent years. South Africa is now considered an upper-middle rather than lower-income country, with the result that many foreign donors overlook it as a recipient of aid. This trend is evident in reduced funding in some areas from major donors,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, and the dramatic decline of German aid programs in 2014. During the year, National Treasury officials responsible for official development assistance (ODA) confirmed that there was a marked decline from previous years in funding levels for CSOs. Fluctuations in international currencies also had a negative impact on CSO funding from foreign sources in 2014. With funding opportunities under threat, CSO leaders at many organizations fear they will have to merge with other organizations and cut back on services or else shut down. In general, local funding is still very limited compared to previous levels of foreign funding, and funding sources for South African CSOs seem to have grown less diversified than in previous years. While CSOs that work in service delivery generally find it easier to access government funding than advocacy CSOs, the decline in foreign funding has led to a sharp increase in the reliance of CSOs in all sectors on major government donor agencies, such as the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF) and the National Development Agency (NDA). In 2013-2014 NLDTF provided ZAR 2.03 billion (approximately $185 million) to support South African CSOs, a 22 percent increase over 2012-2013. NLDTF provides funds primarily for charity, sports and recreation, and arts, culture, and national heritage, while NDA’s main focus is CSO capacity building. The slow turnaround of applications for government funding has been a major challenge for CSOs. However, new amendments to the National Lotteries Act that came into effect in September 2014 allow agencies distributing NLDTF funds to be employed on longer, five-year contracts and to work full time rather than part time. In an effort to decentralize its operations and make its staff more accessible to local CSOs, the National Lotteries Board established three new provincial offices in 2013-2014 and intends to establish six more offices in 2015. While these changes should speed up the processing of CSO funding applications, many smaller and newer CSOs continue to experience difficulties in accessing NLDTF funding because of administrative constraints. In 2014 the board addressed this challenge by making provisions for smaller CSOs to apply for funding in partnership with more established organizations. Unfortunately, these provisions have indirectly caused an increase in fraudulent activity by CSOs. For example, larger organizations receiving NLDTF funding sometimes re-distribute only a portion of the funds they receive.

Fundraising remains a rare skill in the CSO sector. A small amount of earned income is generated from diverse activities, including the sale of clothing and publications, cake sales, membership fees, and the rental of space or equipment. Some CSOs also generate income from the sale of donated goods, although the Second-Hand Goods Act, passed some years ago, discourages this activity.

Financial management in South African CSOs is for the most part sound. By law CSOs are obliged to submit annual financial reports to the DSD or Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC). These financial reports have to be verified by auditors, who can provide organizations with assistance to improve their financial systems and procedures.

**ADVOCACY: 3.3**

CSOs were a critical presence during the elections in 2014. Human rights and civic organizations met with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in five national meetings in 2014 to plan local campaigns for voter information, registration, education, and election monitoring. A key element of these campaigns was the engagement of unemployed youth and students in the electoral process. More than 350,000 individuals, mainly young people, were employed by the IEC to help conduct the elections. Local and foreign observers applauded this initiative.

Several CSO coalitions continued to conduct effective advocacy campaigns in 2014. A key advocacy campaign during the year was the effort of the Right 2 Know organization to challenge the National Key
Points Act. National key points are government facilities deemed by the police or security services to be of strategic importance. Right 2 Know argued jointly with the South African History Archive (SAHA) that if an individual does not know the locations of national key points, he or she cannot be held responsible for breaking laws at those sites. The South Gauteng High Court agreed with this position in a ruling that underscored the need for transparency to prevent abuses of security policies and the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). Also in 2014, the Civil Society Network, established in 2009, continued its efforts to strengthen implementation of the PAIA by raising awareness of citizens’ right to information and promoting a culture of openness and accountability.

South African CSOs campaigned in 2014 on various international issues, such as immigration and human rights. Organizations such as Corruption Watch, Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM), and Black Sash effectively used social media in whistle-blower programs for reporting suspicious or fraudulent activities. Trade unions and CSOs successfully worked together in 2014 in relation to the Nkandla scandal concerning the use of public funds on the president’s homestead. In recent years, key trade unions have distanced themselves from the CSO sector. But after the public protector issued her final report on the Nkandla matter, many CSOs, trade unions, and political parties agreed that once the exact amount of money involved is ascertained and those responsible for the over-expenditure are held accountable, the president should personally pay back the remaining sum to the state.

CSOs are able to engage with parliament and government departments on new legislation. CSOs can participate in the review of draft legislation, and they also make use of informal opportunities to lobby and advocate for their causes. For example, in 2014 several educational CSOs worked together to ensure that new laws were passed to establish standards for school buildings.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2**

The inability of the state to deliver services has consistently led to countrywide protests year after year. In 2014 CSOs continued to fill the gaps in services delivered to the poorest members of society, particularly in the areas of food, health, welfare, and education. Most CSOs were able to maintain similar levels of service provision as in previous years, although there was growing anxiety that serious cutbacks in staff and services would soon become necessary.

Larger CSOs have better access to resources and, as a consequence, stronger capacity to organize and deliver services. For example, Gift of the Givers (GOTG), based in KwaZulu-Natal, is the largest disaster-response CSO of African origin on the African continent. Since its founding twenty years ago, it claims to have disbursed an astonishing ZAR 1 billion (approximately $91 million) in search and rescue missions, medical personnel, equipment, and supplies, and food and water to communities in forty-one countries. In 2014 GOTG was also engaged in high-profile hostage negotiations.

As CSO staff often live in the communities they serve, they understand their challenges intimately and serve as important resources. Because of their close ties to communities, CSOs are able to identify needs more readily and reach further than state organs. If a community loses faith in local authorities, it may turn to local CSOs for assistance in obtaining needed services. For example, the suburb of Lavender Hills in the Western Cape was notorious for drug-related violence. In 2014, with the help of the Democracy Development Program (DDP), a local CSO, the community engaged in an innovative visioning and capacity-building program to draw on its collective skills and resources and diminish violence and crime in the community. In this role DDP effectively served as the catalyst for community development.
Although it sometimes sees CSO service providers as competing to perform core state missions, the government is increasingly appreciative of the role that civil society plays in delivering services to poor South Africans. In April 2014 the DSD convened a summit on service delivery. CSOs attending the meeting expressed their views on the shortcomings of the government’s service delivery and grantmaking process, and in response, DSD representatives pledged to review and improve funding mechanisms.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8**

In recent decades South Africa has enjoyed the positive development of CSOs acting as resources for other organizations. Resource centers established to provide help to organizations and individuals in legal and other matters continue to be affected by declining funding levels in 2014 and in general failed to provide adequate services.

Gaps persist in CSO access to information on grantmakers and their priorities. Local grantmakers have operated for many decades, first to fight apartheid and more recently to promote nation building. However, mergers of local grantmakers in the past decade have not led to a coherent or sustainable strategic thrust. An important attempt to address this deficiency took place in September 2014 with the launch of the Tipfuxeni Project. This initiative, funded by NLDTF, is a collaboration of the government, the Southern African NGO Network (SANGONeT), and the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO). It aims to provide South African CSOs with a “user-friendly ‘one-stop’ Internet entry point to information on South African development funding issues.” While it is too soon to judge the outcome of this initiative, the project seeks to enable CSOs to communicate directly with funders and each other to enhance their fundraising efforts.

Little is known about the real size, employment conditions, salaries, and income levels of the South African CSO sector, and the importance of reliable economic data on the sector has been downplayed for years. The fifth draft of the NPO Policy Framework proposes to have the NPO Directorate conduct research on income levels and economic contributions of CSOs and make this information available to the public. However, many stakeholders see the inability of CSOs to form their own collaborative research hub as a major stumbling block in the sector’s development.

Some CSOs offer capacity-building programs in leadership development, advocacy, fundraising, board governance, and new legislation. These programs help create a collegial atmosphere that encourages networking and joint activities. However, there is a lack of accredited civil society-related courses, certificates, and degrees at public and private institutions of higher learning, and career guidance on CSO employment opportunities at the high school level is often weak. These deficiencies continue to deter young workers from seeking employment in the CSO sector. Private-sector training is expensive and often inadequate. Thus the best learning opportunities are often internships and hands-on experience.

While intersectoral partnerships are encouraged in principle, CSOs often feel that government and business officials exploit their contacts in local communities. There is little follow-through on large joint initiatives, and local communities are often disgruntled at the failure to make good on promises. A case in point in 2014 was an anti-crime and drug initiative in Eldorado Park, near Johannesburg, which was launched by the president with support from businesses and CSOs. Community members remain unhappy with this initiative as they see rampant drug abuse and crime continue.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

Both radio and television coverage of CSO activities tends to be positive. In 2014 private radio stations raised funds for deserving causes through radio marathons, and television programs alerted viewers to CSO activities. In general, the print media do not cover CSO activities extensively, perhaps because of corporate
ownership. However, 200 independent grassroots publications that are members of the Association of Independent Publishers provide good coverage of local CSO news. Unpaid public service announcements are not available to CSOs.

The public has an assortment of positive and negative perceptions of CSOs. Attitudes tend to be shaped by publicity, and in 2014 both print and electronic media reported on corruption in the CSO sector. Some television stations campaigned against fraudulent fundraising by CSOs, and some cases were publicized involving organizations that exploited child support grants or school subsidies. On the other hand, the media often publicize the complaints of animal welfare agencies and old age homes when local government officials fail to respond.

There are also mixed perceptions of CSOs in the government and business sectors. Some officials are very positive about CSOs and work well with them, while others see CSOs as interfering in their activities or competing with them. The corporate sector views sports associations as important allies and provides significant support for their activities. In contrast, both government officials and the pharmaceutical sector sometimes see health CSOs as a nuisance and distance themselves from active partnerships with them.

Some CSOs, such as Child Welfare Society, have large public followings thanks to their professional approach to the media. Other organizations are unable to dedicate resources to a media strategy or lack a media function and as a result do not receive much media attention. Recently, some CSOs, including the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), have begun to use social media to raise awareness of their causes and fundraising activities. Generally, the new generation of CSO staff is literate in using technology and social media and communicates successfully using these techniques.

Most CSOs issue annual reports as part of their reporting requirements. Some are quite elaborate and glossy. The reports usually cover such topics as board and staff activities, program accomplishments, and donor relationships, and they may include copies of audit reports.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for South Africa

CSO Sustainability | South Africa
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal Environment |  | 7 | 5 | 3
| Public Image | 3 | 3.6 | 5 | 7
| Organizational Capacity |  | 5 | 7 | 3
| Infrastructure | 5 | 3.6 | 5 | 7
| Service Provision | 7 | 3.6 | 5 | 7
| Advocacy | 3 | 3.6 | 5 | 7

Sustainability
- Enhanced
- Evolving
- Impeded
In 2014 South Sudan continued to be affected by the intense violence that broke out in Juba on December 15, 2013, after a split in the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which pitted President Salva Kiir against his former vice president, Dr. Riek Machar. In 2014 the United Nations estimated that the fighting had displaced more than one million and caused a humanitarian crisis affecting more than five million people. Social, economic, and political conditions in the country deteriorated, and freedoms of expression, movement, association, and assembly, which are guaranteed by the transitional constitution of South Sudan, were drastically suppressed. Security operatives remained on the hunt for citizens suspected of working in opposition to the government, including journalists and CSO workers. A new National Security Services (NSS) bill passed by the National Legislative Assembly in October 2014—but still not signed into law by the president by the end of the year—gave the NSS sweeping new powers to arrest and detain suspects without warrants. The NSS and military security forces were accused by many observers of engaging in torture and extrajudicial killing and of detaining dozens of individuals, including two parliamentarians, a community leader, and a civil society activist, for long periods without charges or access to counsel. Although the
violence subsided mid-year, arbitrary arrests continued as intermittent peace negotiations in Addis Ababa bore no tangible results.

CSOs played an important role in keeping up the momentum for peace. Importantly, CSOs were allocated seven seats in the peace talks in Addis Ababa and formed thematic groups to provide information relevant to the talks. But with the space for civil society closing in 2014, they worked under threatening conditions. Ethnic targeting became the order of the day, and most of the leadership of CSOs from ethnic groups and regions affected by the fighting stayed in hiding in neighboring countries. Nearly all CSOs feared being branded by state security agents as sympathizing with the opposition or serving the interests of foreign governments or the media. It became very difficult for CSOs to distinguish between friends and enemies. As a result of the security situation, some CSOs had to close down, and others reduced their operations because of financial problems caused by the crisis.

The exact number of CSOs in South Sudan is not known. In 2014 the total number of CSOs that were members of the NGO Forum, a private umbrella body, was 193, down from more than 200 before December 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 6.4**

In 2014 CSOs in South Sudan continued to register under the 2003 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act. The registration process is both laborious and expensive. CSOs must register at the national level with the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), which is part of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. Each entity levies a fee. CSOs operating at the local level must additionally register with state and county authorities and pay related fees. These fees have continued to be inconsistent because of the multiple registration authorities and attendant corruption.

The registration process slowed drastically in 2014 as the result of the ongoing crisis. Several key personnel in the registration offices at the Ministries of Justice and Humanitarian Affairs, mostly from the Nuer group, fled or joined the opposition. Their absence made the registration of new CSOs even more difficult, especially if they were headed by Nuer, whose organizations were subject to close government scrutiny. Starting in 2014, faith-based organizations (FBOs) were required to register with the Office of the President. This provision is not prescribed in the NGO Act, and CSOs believe that it was introduced simply because the president’s former advisor on religious affairs joined the opposition.

A new draft of the NGO Bill (formerly the Voluntary and Humanitarian Organization Bill, which was renamed after CSOs expressed concern that its title was too restrictive) was released in August 2014. The new legislation is intended to replace the NGO Act. A working group of CSOs formed in 2013 to present their concerns about the bill was reconstituted in 2014 with new members, including representatives of the NGO Forum and the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS). Among the working group’s concerns are provisions that allow fines and prison terms to be imposed if an organization fails to register and mandate the creation of a coordination board to oversee CSO operations, the members of which are to include the Director General of Internal Security and the Director of the Criminal Investigations Department of the Ministry of the Interior. By the end of the year, CSOs still did not know whether the working group’s comments had been
incorporated into the bill. They no longer had a point of contact on the committee overseeing the legislation, as the chair had been relieved of her position before the third public hearing in November 2014. Discussion of the bill was suspended, leaving CSOs and the public uninformed about the results of the final reading.

The government treated CSOs with higher levels of mistrust and suspicion after the crisis of December 2013. In general, freedom of expression has been suppressed in South Sudan, and heavy-handed state control affects CSOs engaged in activism, especially human rights. For example, after questioning the government’s handling of the crisis, the director of the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Program (SSuDEMOP) was forced to leave the country because of fear of reprisals; the director of Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) was threatened with arrest if he talked publicly about rights violations; the head of South Sudan Civil Society Alliance (SSCSA) was shot by unknown gunmen; and computers belonging to employees of Justice Africa were confiscated by security agents. Under the pretext of security concerns and a desire to protect humanitarian workers, the government created “no go” areas for CSOs operating in conflict-affected areas, apparently because it suspected that CSOs’ local employees were providing information to the rebels. Ethnic hostility also led to the arrest and detention of some CSO employees. For example, because of their ethnic origin, a consultant for Christian Mission Development (CMD) was removed from a plane by security agents, and CSO staff members working in refugee camps in Maban were visited by plainclothes security personnel, which caused them to panic and flee. The government seized issues of several newspapers, ordered another newspaper to cease operations, and raided and closed a radio station for “political programming.” As a result of this increasingly repressive climate, most CSOs practiced self-censorship, and many organizations reduced their public profile because of a lack of protection. For example, the editor in chief of The Citizen, an independent newspaper, quit journalism, citing personal security concerns after allegedly receiving death threats from government agents.

The government occasionally grants tax exemptions to religious societies and CSOs providing specific goods and services, such as food or medicine. However, obtaining these exemptions usually depends on personal relationships with the responsible officials, and they are often denied. In 2014, because of limited income from oil production, the government seemed to regard CSOs as an alternate source of revenue and granted hardly any exemptions.

There is no legal provision that allows CSOs to earn income or compete for government contracts.

South Sudan still does not have lawyers trained specifically on CSO law. Most lawyers charge high fees to CSOs for writing their constitutions or memoranda of understanding and have little interest in providing pro bono services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

The violence that broke out in Juba in December 2013 had far-reaching effects on CSO operations. More than 30 percent of organizations operating in conflict areas had to close, and some organizations working in these areas lost office equipment because of looting. In Juba, Nuer-based organizations, including the South Sudan Law Society, closed and Nuer employees fled to neighboring countries or went into hiding. In addition, donors suspended development funds or redirected them to humanitarian emergency responses. Overall, about one quarter of CSOs had to close down their operations or reduce their programs because of financial constraints.

Most CSOs in South Sudan start at the grassroots level and then move to state capitals or Juba to pursue funding opportunities. In doing so they become more donor driven and less able to build and maintain strong ties with their constituencies. CSOs providing humanitarian services usually conduct needs assessments, but
these often involve little community participation. The government’s creation of “no go” areas for CSOs during the crisis further curtailed constituency building. Nevertheless, the presence of national CSOs such as Theso and HealthLink at protection of civilians (PoC) programs and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps helped create stronger community-CSO bonds.

Most CSOs have written vision and mission statements and clearly defined organizational aims. However, CSOs typically end up deviating from their original purposes because of funding opportunities. Strategic plans for short-term humanitarian interventions are in place at some CSOs, although they are usually not formalized or well documented. Few donors express interest in strategic plans.

Larger CSOs usually have defined management structures, although they may lack written policies that delegate responsibilities, especially for the handling of resources. Many organizations are “one-man shows” run by the founders or executive directors. CSOs usually have boards, but their value varies from organization to organization. Some boards help to implement projects, while others are purely ceremonial.

CSOs face a shortage of skilled personnel, and recruiting and retaining competent staff can be difficult. Short-term contracts are common, and staff turnover tends to be high once project funding dries up. Staff turnover was particularly frequent in 2014 because of the ongoing crisis. Jobs in the CSO sector are sometimes given on the basis of personal contacts rather than professional expertise, and gender balance is rarely a consideration in hiring. Job descriptions are sometimes available but are rarely up to date. CSO employees are not covered by insurance policies. A culture of volunteerism emerged during the 2014 crisis but was very limited in scope.

Most CSOs have offices equipped with computers, telephones, printers, and, if they are located in the national and county capitals, Internet access. CSOs that are unable to afford office space and information technology often access them through international CSOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

The financial situation of South Sudanese CSOs is precarious. CSOs are exclusively dependent on foreign donors for support, and most CSOs survive through subcontracts with UN agencies. In 2014 many donors changed their strategies to meet rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in South Sudan, and some set up rapid response mechanisms. CSOs had to redesign their proposals and plans to meet the funding requirements, and many organizations lost funding.

Most projects do not allow CSOs to sustain themselves over the long term. A small number of CSOs have access to longer-term funding from sources other than UN agencies. For example, local partners of Cordaid, an international organization that supports emergency and development projects, and gender mainstreaming programs, may have funding for one or more years.

Few CSOs receive funding from multiple donors. CSOs have little capacity for fundraising, other than writing donor proposals. Some organizations rely on consultants for this purpose.

South Sudan has a few local foundations that operate their own programs in such areas as food security in rural communities. They do not support CSOs. Financial support is not available from local communities, as they look to CSOs for assistance and do not expect to support them. Communities do sometimes supply in-kind support, such as volunteer labor, materials, and land. For example, in 2014 inhabitants of a small village...
in Maridi voluntarily rehabilitated a road leading to their farms as part of a CSO project, with the CSO providing food for the workers.

CSOs do not usually own property or assets that can be sources of income to support their activities. However, a few organizations take advantage of opportunities to charge for services. For example, Rural Action Against Hunger (RAAH) has tractors with which they provide services to farmers for a small fee, and the African Press Association (APO) has a tearoom and restaurant offering products at subsidized, affordable prices. A few CSOs charge annual membership fees, but these are not a significant source of income. CSOs do not receive contracts from the government or the business community.

Most CSOs have some sort of financial management system oriented to meeting donor needs. However, CSOs receiving emergency funding for their activities often find it difficult to develop professional financial management systems, since their planning and funding horizons are short-term. Larger organizations may hire external consultants to audit projects and produce quarterly or annual financial statements, and international organizations often perform audits of funds disbursed to local partners. Most organizations do not release their financial reports publicly because of security concerns. No law exists that allows the government to audit or access CSO financial statements.

ADVOCACY: 5.2

The December 2013 crisis served to widen the gap between CSOs and government. Although they had worked together productively during the referendum on independence and the transitional constitutional review in 2011, their relationship was severely undermined in 2014 because of the violence and state-sponsored harassment of CSOs. For example, the government opposed the accreditation of CSOs to participate in the Addis Ababa peace talks and did not invite CSOs to discuss the NSS Bill. Nevertheless, thanks to pressure from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and other international organizations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) accredited seven seats to CSO representatives at the peace talks, and the government allowed them to attend (although the group was later infiltrated by state-sponsored CSOs).

Because of the crisis, CSOs in South Sudan took up a strong advocacy and lobbying strategy, backed especially by CPJ in Nairobi, to pressure the government and the opposition to consider peaceful means of resolving the political crisis. CSO representatives held monthly meetings sponsored by SSuDEMOP and CEPO, at which they generated suggestions for the peace talks and cautiously discussed other issues pertaining to the current hostilities. In addition, representatives of the Troika (composed of the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway) and other dignitaries met with CSOs to discuss civil society’s position in the peace talks. CSOs also engaged with the government to allow CSO representatives in government-held territory to travel to Addis Ababa without hindrance, and they sponsored public events such as conferences and rallies to advance the peace process.

Several other successful advocacy initiatives continued in 2014. For example, CEPO, EVE Organization for Women Development, SSuDEMOP, South Sudan Women Empowerment Network (SSWEN), and other organizations cooperated in an ongoing education initiative. Other organizations, including the South Sudan NGO Forum, SSCSA, SSLS, South Sudan Women Federation, and South Sudan Women Association, also continued to advocate for the rights of vulnerable groups.

On the legislative level, an alliance of women’s groups successfully lobbied for women to have seats in legislative and executive bodies. CEPO, SSuDEMOP, CPJ, and other organizations helped to shape the new
media bill to prevent the arbitrary detention of journalists and gain the release of several detained CSO personnel. CSOs continued to raise concerns about the NSS Bill and lobby members of the national assembly to petition the president not to sign the bill into law.

The CSO working group on the NGO Bill, which was appointed by the NGO Forum, an independent coordinating body of national and international CSOs, continued to engage with the government on the draft legislation. Through the NGO Forum, CSOs are also advancing the idea that civil society should have an ex officio seat in the national assembly. This discussion started in 2013 but slowed down in 2014 because of the crisis.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

CSOs in South Sudan normally render services in health care, agriculture, and re-forestation and for vulnerable groups such as refugees and returnees, the elderly, and orphans. In 2014 the provision of services was largely confined to emergency response because of the crisis. Donors withheld development funds and rechanneled funding to rapid response funds or the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), a funding pool, to address the burgeoning humanitarian needs.

CSOs usually conduct needs assessments to help identify the necessary services, but donors generally decide how services are to be prioritized, sometimes based on other criteria. In nearly all cases, CSOs provide goods and services free of charge, as this is a condition set by donors. Ongoing informal discussions are taking place among service providers about introducing cost recovery mechanisms for health, water, and agricultural services once the emergency period is over. Some communities are already contributing to the cost of minor repairs of boreholes drilled by CSOs.

Unlike CSO advocacy organizations, which are restricted from speaking out on critical issues, CSOs that provide services are given some degree of autonomy provided they work only in humanitarian fields. But the fact that the majority of service-providing CSOs come from the warring ethnic groups has made cooperation with state agencies difficult. Nevertheless, coordination meetings about health, emergency response, and education attended by representatives of the NGO Forum and all levels of government took place more frequently in 2014 than in previous years.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs as service providers. The government’s own capacity to provide goods and services to its citizens has dwindled because of the crisis, and funds now are allocated only for staff salaries and security. The government has no funds to support CSO activities and instead views CSOs as a source of funding, insofar as they receive support directly from donors. As a result, the government is beginning to be demanding rather than supportive of CSOs and relies more heavily on service-providing CSOs to execute its programs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

The only intermediary support organization (ISO) supporting South Sudanese CSOs is the NGO Forum, which remains the most important source of information about capacity building and funding opportunities, security conditions, and humanitarian response. Justice Africa, an international CSO that supports governance, human rights,
Public Image in South Sudan

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<td>2013</td>
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and justice activities, is also an important resource for CSOs. For example, in 2014 it facilitated two CSO meetings in Nimule to discuss strategy for the Addis Ababa peace talks. USAID, through Mercy Corps, has supported the building of resource centers for CSOs in South Sudan. These facilities are intended to be used for conferences and meetings and to provide office space for CSOs. Users must pay a fee to help sustain the centers.

There are no local grantmaking organizations in South Sudan. Local foundations such as the Kiir Foundation have not yet developed the capacity to re-grant funds.

The working environment for CSOs in South Sudan is essentially divided between government-held territories and opposition-held territories, and communication between the two areas is difficult. CSOs and the government share information through workshops, reports, and field visits. A loose coalition of CSOs on women’s issues shares information on vaccinations, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) campaigns, and other events.

International CSOs offer capacity-building programs but they are expensive by local standards. The NGO Forum solicits funding for CSO capacity building from international organizations, and Justice Africa also supports CSO capacity building. RedR and Participatory Development Center (PDC), a Kenyan consultancy firm, periodically offer tailored training in financial management and governance to South Sudanese CSOs. No training materials have been translated into local languages. Training materials for the media are available in Juba only.

In 2011 the CSOs formed the Civil Society Alliance, a large umbrella organization, but in 2014 ethnic tensions in the group grew more pronounced and compromised the election of new leaders. As a result, the lobbying ability of the alliance has decreased and no new elections have been held, in violation of the organization’s mandate.

Partnerships between CSOs and the government are undeveloped. CSOs and the business community sometime collaborate on national issues. For example, in 2014 the business community responded to CSO solicitations by donating relief items for the victims of violence and supported CSOs during the peace talks—for example, by offering reduced hotel rates. The media and CSOs enjoy a cordial relationship, especially when serving public needs and collaborating to pressure the legislature to enact laws to protect citizens. In 2014 there were calls for the media and CSOs to cooperate to protect each other’s image, as both are targeted by state agents. The Association Media Development in South Sudan (ADMISS) and CEPO jointly award a training certificate in journalism.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

Government media cover CSO activities only when a high-level government official is involved. The independent media, which is viewed with hostility by the government, is sympathetic to CSOs. The majority of private print and radio talk shows cover CSO activities and offer opportunities for publicity. Their coverage is often dependent on personal relationships with journalists. Some newspapers offer subsidized pricing, and the UN-funded Radio Miraya provides free services to CSOs.

In 2014 the public had a significantly more positive perception of CSOs. The public saw that local CSOs remained with affected populations in the most difficult areas after international CSOs had fled, and perceived CSOs as representing local communities effectively in the peace negotiations. However, the public...
sometimes also believed that CSOs were government agents or privileged entities that squander funds meant for ordinary people.

The government perceived CSOs as foreign agents because of the funding they receive from foreign donors, especially donors based in the United States. CSOs advocating for peace and justice were branded by government as enemies of the people or voices of the opposition, including in speeches made by the presidential spokesperson. At the same time, the government apparently valued CSOs’ ability to mobilize communities easily and was positive about the role CSOs play in civic education.

South Sudanese CSOs are still learning to share information about their successes through public events, lectures, and other means. Because of a lack of funding, most CSOs do not advertise their activities.

Codes of conduct are regarded as an individual obligation of CSOs, and there is no sector-wide code. The publication of annual reports similarly depends on the policies and capacity of individual organizations.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4

The year 2014 began in Sudan with widespread hopes of a breakthrough in political negotiations between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). However, optimism was dashed when the Sudanese government insisted that security considerations take priority over humanitarian assistance and democratization. With the failure of negotiations, armed conflict continued in Darfur and Blue Nile and intensified in South Kordofan. Humanitarian assistance needs increased sharply, as 648,000 civilians were newly displaced, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons and other severely affected populations to more than 4.4 million. Many needy populations did not receive assistance because of the military operations and restrictions on activities of aid organizations in these regions.

In a speech in March known as the “leap speech,” President Omar al-Bashir called for an inclusive national dialogue on the country’s problems. Opposition parties set conditions for joining the dialogue, including the repeal or suspension of restrictive laws, release of political detainees, declaration of a ceasefire in war zones, and postponement of elections. The Umma Party and other major opposition parties joined the dialogue, but...
when their conditions were not met they concluded that the government lacked commitment to the effort and withdrew. The dialogue continued with only the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), its allied groups in government, and the Popular Congress Party, a large Islamist group, taking part.

The main opposition parties and armed rebel groups began negotiations, with the involvement of some civil society activists. Late in 2014 in Addis Ababa they produced the so-called “Sudan Call,” which urges the dismantling of the one-party state and its replacement with a peaceful democracy. Although seen by many analysts as a positive step toward unifying the opposition and rebel groups in a negotiated solution, the Sudan Call was received by the government with extreme hostility. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) ordered the deregistration of the Umma Party and declared the party’s head a fugitive. Two other signatories of the Sudan Call—the head of National Consensus Forces, an umbrella group of opposition parties, and the chairperson of the Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society Organizations (CSCSO)—were arrested when they returned to Sudan, along with a former NCP member who had attended the talks. Under Article 51 of the Penal Code the three men were charged with treason, which is punishable by death. CSCSO submitted a petition to the Sudan National Human Rights Commission, challenging the legitimacy of the arrests and demanding the men’s immediate release. In cooperation with other Sudanese CSOs and activists, CSCSO also solicited the support of regional and international CSOs and organized rallies during court sessions.

In the economic arena, the rising costs of war, a reduction in oil exports from South Sudan, and the tightening financial blockade of the country contributed to poor economic performance, high inflation, and depreciation of the Sudanese pound. Consumers experienced scarcity of some imported goods and decreased access to food. This dire situation put particular pressure on CSOs delivering services, especially in conflict areas where the needs were greatest.

There are no exact figures available on the size of the CSO sector. However, in 2015 an official with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the government agency charged with monitoring CSOs, publicly stated that the total number of CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) registered with HAC was about 15,000, including 4,000 in Khartoum state. Another 500-600 CSOs are probably registered as cultural groups and training institutions. The number of active organizations could be fewer than 10 percent of that figure.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

CSOs in Sudan are registered under several laws. The vast majority of organizations in Khartoum and all CSOs outside of Khartoum state are registered under the Voluntary Organizations Law (2006), which is implemented by HAC. Cultural groups register under the Cultural Groups Law (1996), implemented by the Ministry of Culture; non-profit companies register under the Companies Law, implemented by the Ministry of Trade; and training institutions register with the National Training Council.

In addition, there are unregistered but active advocacy groups in such areas as human rights, women’s rights, solidarity with political detainees, and justice for victims of atrocities committed by the state. These organizations are not registered because they consider themselves temporary or stand no chance of being
registered in the present political environment. As it is illegal to work for unregistered organizations, individuals working with them are vulnerable to arrest.

A number of changes introduced in 2013 continue to make the annual renewal of CSO registrations extremely difficult. NISS now directly supervises all renewal requests and may conduct “investigations” of CSO staff and close down or refuse to re-register organizations on this basis. This practice has spread to HAC and the cultural groups’ registrar. CSOs formed as national organizations must now register at the state level, which, though not legally justified, implies that these organizations must obtain permits and register or form branches in every state in which they operate, which can delay or hamper activities or lead to their cancellation. In addition, an organization must halt all activities until it acquires a renewal certificate.

There were CSOs closed without a reason in 2014. All organizations permanently or temporarily closed in 2014 were included on a 2013 list of organizations that the state had classified as "dangerous to security and inciting the public" and pledged to monitor closely. Other organizations experienced raids and permanent or temporary confiscation of assets, as well violations of personal privacy, such as searches of cell phones, laptops, and women’s handbags. As a result of the closures and registration problems, several additional national CSOs registered abroad in 2014, mainly in Uganda, Kenya, and Egypt. These moves complicate management and increase costs while reducing outreach to constituencies.

CSOs registered with HAC are required to sign technical agreements with HAC for each project and obtain a permit for each activity. These agreements include provisions requiring CSOs to include government institutions as beneficiaries of their activities, involve government personnel as paid employees, and pay incentives to the NISS official who “observes” them. NISS reserves the right to stop any activity without warrant or justification and on verbal instruction only.

The law does not require CSOs to pay taxes, except those included in the price of purchased goods or services, and does not allow CSOs to engage in commercial activities or investments.

Although not many CSOs have legal advisors, there are a number of activist lawyers and CSO supporters who often volunteer to give legal advice to CSOs and even represent them in courts.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

Linkages are very strong between constituencies and CSOs working on service delivery and development issues, such as microfinance, production support, and livelihoods. CBOs are particularly well connected to their constituencies. For example, beneficiaries sometimes provide non-financial support and protection to CSO staff against NISS. CSOs working on human rights, legal reform, democratic transformation, and governance labor under very difficult circumstances and face enormous restrictions that reduce their physical outreach to local communities.

Official trade unions are by and large controlled by the government and organized under an umbrella organization, the Sudan Workers Union. Because of government control of professional associations, a number of independent parallel organizations have emerged during the last few years to represent university lecturers, lawyers, medical doctors, and other professions. In 2014 a parallel organization for farmers was founded. Although officially these bodies are illegal, they gain legitimacy by representing the interests of their constituencies. For example, the official journalists’ union does not support freedom of expression, fight
against the confiscation of newspapers, or protect journalists when they are detained, taken to court, or banned from writing. Such tasks are carried out exclusively by the parallel association.

Most large CSOs have clearly stated visions and missions and technically sound strategic plans. However, these plans are undermined by the volatile political environment, lack of stable long-term funding, and intermittent disruptions by the authorities. A large number of smaller organizations have members trained in strategic planning but do not have strategic plans, in part because they do not have the financial or technical capacity to execute them. In many cases plans exist only because they are a donor requirement.

All organizations registered under the Voluntary Organizations Law or the Cultural Groups Law must have boards or executive committees, which are elected annually by the general assembly, the highest authority in the organization. All larger CSOs have full-time staff composed of at least an executive director, financial controller or accountant, and some technical personnel. CSOs with full-time staff are obliged to follow labor laws regarding contracts, job descriptions, social insurance, and so forth. Recruitment is usually competitive, with priority given to volunteers. In recent years, HAC has become a major player in CSO staff recruitment. Job applications go through HAC, and the agency sometimes exercises a veto over personnel selected for national and international organizations. In most smaller organizations, the elected executive committee or board performs management tasks and implements activities as unpaid employees. Most CSOs are not attracting new members, in part because they fear infiltration by security agents. This trend is minimizing turnover in CSO leadership and prompting youth to form new organizations. Volunteerism in Sudan has been in decline since the 1990s.

Most CSOs, including smaller organizations, have access to computers, cell phones, and the Internet. However, CSO advancement in technical areas is hampered by the absence of funds for institutional development and diminishing resources overall. Internet use is monitored by the Ministry of Communications. Some websites are blocked or tracked and it is not uncommon for the web to be switched off in conflict areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs in Sudan are heavily dependent on foreign funding. The most common area for funding is humanitarian assistance, with largely seasonal support available for election observation, peace building, and poverty alleviation. Most support comes from Western donors, although some Islamic religious and charity groups receive considerable support from the Gulf States. More than 80 percent of funding is directed to state-level activities.

![Financial Viability in Sudan](image)

INGOs working in Sudan are the main source of support for national CSOs. However, in recent years funding for INGOs has declined, largely because of the global economic crisis, competing priorities in other countries, and the Sudanese government’s discouraging policies. In 2014 the Sudanese government forced the withdrawal from Darfur of several large INGOs, including Merlin, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), and the International Red Cross. Other INGOs departed voluntarily because of the deteriorating operating environment. The ensuing decline in funding has led to a sharp drop in resources for CSO infrastructure, such as vehicles and machinery, and for development projects and institutional development. Most funding is now short term or project-by-project, and long-term partnerships are rare.
CSOs are obliged to reveal funding sources to HAC, which maintains the right of approval. Some donor organizations have indicated that certain funding recipients are imposed on them by the authorities as a condition for supporting other organizations. CSO bank accounts are sometimes frozen without the knowledge of account holders, and NISS is known to demand details about CSO accounts from the banks. In 2014 Salmah’s account at the Sudanese French Bank was frozen and later confiscated by HAC after it dissolved the organization.

A few pro-government organizations receive support from the government and private-sector entities that are responsive to government directives. These organizations include the Sanad Foundation, chaired by the president’s wife; Al-Shaheed (Martyrs), which takes care of the families of pro-government casualties in the ongoing wars; and Al Zubair Charity Organization, named after the late vice president. Such organizations also are awarded government contracts and grants, which they sometimes subcontract to other organizations founded by ministers or their families or led by pro-regime personalities.

Private-sector contributions to CSOs are extremely rare and directed mainly to activities that help companies advertise their products. For example, sports clubs and arts and music festivals receive funding from mobile phone companies. A notable exception to this trend is the Haggar Foundation, which supports education and women’s development. Local communities are too poor to support CSOs financially, but they usually make non-financial contributions such as labor, raw materials, and physical space for activities.

A few larger CSOs have more than one source of funding. But the vast majority of CSOs depend on one donor only, and most of their funding is project-specific and short term. CSOs that depend solely on foreign funding and work on infrastructure interventions find it difficult to survive without funding, even over the short term. CSOs engaged in softer interventions such as campaigns, monitoring, and consulting are sustainable over longer periods. At most small CSOs and CBOs, funding is irregular. Their activities are limited and tend to be seasonal, and they are sustained mainly with the support of larger national CSOs. The majority of smaller CSOs have limited capacity to reach out to donors or prepare competitive proposals.

Classical methods of fundraising through donations or art shows have been in decline for more than a decade and in 2014 failed to generate much money because of high overhead costs and the poor economic conditions in the country. The very few organizations that still generate resources through donations include the Women Initiatives Group (WIG), which works mainly on breast cancer; Nafir, which provides emergency support; and Shari AlHawadith Youth Group, which helps patients in hospitals obtain drugs and treatment. Donations to these groups generally target specific “humanitarian” expenditures and immediate needs.

CSOs in Sudan are not legally allowed to engage in profit-making activities. Incomes from membership fees are symbolic and insufficient to support activities.

In accordance with the law, most CSOs receiving funding have proper accounting systems, with annual externally audited reports presented to the general assembly, the authorities, and donors. Other CSOs prepare financial statements that members are entitled to check and approve. The absence of institutional support in most donor-supported projects contributes to the perpetuation of weaknesses in technical and financial systems.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

Although the space for CSOs continued to shrink in 2014, several advocacy groups implementing ongoing campaigns on such topics as female genital mutilation, HIV/AIDS, and consumer protection successfully influenced legislation and government policies during the year. Their achievements were largely due to the fact that the groups are registered and have easy access to government institutions and the media. Most other active advocacy groups are either unregistered or focus on human and civil rights issues, and their activities
elicit a repressive response from the government. As a result, they did not enjoy obvious successes in 2014, although international support and the increasing number of CSOs participating in their activities heightened the significance and visibility of their efforts. Some rights-focused campaigns organized by local CSOs were supported by groups operating from outside of the country, including Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG), African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO), and Human Rights and Development Organization (HUDO). Many of these campaigns called for aligning legislation and its implementation with the constitution. These campaigns helped raise public awareness, resulting in an increasing number of demonstrations at the community level over such issues as land policy, electricity blackouts, and water cuts.

Lobbying efforts are minimal, in part because of CSOs’ poor technical skills, the limited space for legitimate CSO activity, and the domination of one party in government and the legislature. Perhaps because of the country’s nomadic heritage, lobbying in Sudan still depends on personalities rather than institutions, and in rural areas it is structured along tribal and geographic lines. In states outside of Khartoum, lobbying is nonexistent except for a few efforts related to health and food security issues in Blue Nile and Kassala states.

CSOs’ call for amending the Voluntary Organizations Law is almost unanimous, with more than 250 organizations signing the appeal delivered to the Constitutional Court in 2006. The court has never responded to this appeal, and no other action on it was taken in 2014.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2**

The CSO sector provides extremely diversified services in such areas as economic development and livelihood support, social services, environmental conservation, social and cultural issues, human rights, governance, and democratic transformation. Many of these services are a response to community needs, especially in rural areas. For example, in regions of conflict—Darfur, South Kordfan, and Blue Nile—most CSOs support peace building and internally displaced persons, while in other areas, such as East Sudan, they focus on food security. In 2014, Nidaa and the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) implemented projects on peace building in Darfur funded by the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) and managed by UNDP.

Although most large CSOs have considerable expertise and some produce regular publications, their connection with research institutions is weak. No CSOs charge fees for services, as it would be considered a profit-making activity, which is not allowed by law.

The national government occasionally recognizes CSOs’ contributions if they support government policies in conflict zones or assist during crises such as floods and other natural hazards. Otherwise, only a few local governments in rural localities acknowledge the role of CSOs, although they are unable to fund them because of limited resources.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**
Resource centers offering access to information are limited in number and mostly concentrated in Khartoum, which reduces their usefulness to organizations located elsewhere. They do not charge fees for their services and are heavily dependent on foreign funding. In conflict areas, UN agencies support peace centers at state universities, which help upgrade the capacity of local organizations. A few academic institutions—in particular, Ahfad University for Women—also provide information and training to CSOs free of charge.

There are no local grantmaking organizations in Sudan. Several large CSOs transfer funds on behalf of international donors to smaller CSOs and CBOs, especially for activities targeting youth and women.

Information sharing among CSOs is weak, except for limited purposes within established networks and coalitions. Several networks and coalitions coordinate joint activities, but most limit their collaboration to discussion of issues of mutual concern. Some networks formed on the demand of donors have been weakened by competition among members.

CSO training is usually offered by commercial consultancy and training firms, which charge fees. CSOs sometimes receive support from international organizations to conduct trainings for other CSOs free of charge. In 2014 the number of training centers and free-lance consultants providing training to CSOs increased, in part because of the comparative ease of registering consultancy firms. Some academic institutions, such as the University of Khartoum’s Development Studies Institute, Ribat University, and the University of Medical Sciences, have developed courses targeting CSOs, although these seem conceived to generate income rather than build capacity. A number of research and training centers have emerged in recent years, including the Sudanese Studies Center, RCCSOD, and NCF. Training materials are mostly in English and may be translated and adapted to local context.

Other than the few specialized service-oriented organizations and networks, such as those working on HIV/AIDS, there are few independent advocacy organizations working in partnership with the federal government in Sudan. The relationship between service-delivery organizations and state governments is somewhat better, since their cooperation is vital to meet vast needs in the context of limited government resources.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1**

The media are heavily controlled by the government through direct ownership or ties with private owners. Although a large number of journalists cover CSO activities, they are censored by chief editors and security officials. The few independent newspapers that exist are also subject to censorship. Most independent CSO news is transmitted through the Internet, social media, and e-magazines such as Sudanese Online, Sudanile, and AlTareeq. A study sponsored by SUDIA in 2014 pointed to the gap between CSOs and the media and the need for mutual support. Out of this study a project was established to strengthen CSO-media links and facilitate coverage of CSO activities outside of Khartoum. Another new activity introduced in 2014 was a reporting system by telephone text message on issues affecting CSOs, with monthly reports disseminated through social media.
The public perceives CSO activities positively, and communities receiving social services clearly express their appreciation. Since CSOs working on rights and democratic transformation have limited contact with local communities, appreciation of their efforts is limited to intellectuals and other urban residents. The government’s attitude towards CSOs has been increasingly antagonistic since 2011. Its hostility is expressed through restrictions on movement, cancellation of activities, delays in project approval and registration renewals, and the closure of some organizations.

CSOs’ public relations outreach is hampered by limited contact with large community groups, state control of the media, and the weak technical capacity of most organizations. The electronic media are the most viable channel for public relations campaigns, but in a community with high illiteracy rates this is not always an effective option.

All CSOs by law are required to produce annual reports and audited accounts. Internal transparency is high at most organizations but less so at the public level as many CSOs try to avoid exposure. Several attempts to develop a common code of ethics have failed. However, several unregistered coalitions, such as CSCSO, have included a statement of values in their constitutions.
The year 2014 was a historic one for Tanzanians, as the Constituent Assembly deliberated on a new draft constitution. CSO representatives taking part in the deliberations advocated for a people-centered constitution with such provisions as the separation of powers and accountability from elected officials. Despite these efforts, progress toward realizing CSOs’ and citizens’ demands was uncertain because of the dominance of the ruling party and its allies, which sought to remove some of these provisions. During local government elections in 2014, CSOs played a significant role by helping educate citizens about good governance and the importance of voting for responsible leaders. CSOs also successfully mobilized candidates, particularly youth and women, to run for elected positions in local government.

During the year the economy grew by nearly 7 percent, but unemployment remained high at 12 percent. There was a strong push from the government to increase public investment in the social sectors as a means of alleviating poverty. Nevertheless, the scope of CSO services narrowed because of decreased funding from donors. Overall, collaboration between the government and CSOs was productive, especially as they worked together to formulate the national development cooperation strategy and review poverty reduction measures.
in the framework of the post-2015 development agenda. These trends suggest that the concept of civil society as “the space where we act for the common good” may be expanding.

The regulatory framework allows CSOs to operate without restriction, although some organizations engaged in policy issues reported instances of government intimidation. The year witnessed an expansion of legal aid services for CSOs, as well as improved capacity at many organizations in governance and leadership, financial management, and transparency. However, staffing remained a challenge, and some CSOs lacked the resources to employ professional staff or retain paid employees.

Throughout the year, CSOs pursued advocacy activities around common agendas, including land rights, the fight against gender-based violence, and services such as water and healthcare for the elderly. The public continued to regard CSOs as effective resources for support and advice. Cooperation between CSOs and the media was generally positive.

In 2014 1,116 new CSOs registered in Tanzania, for a total of 20,605 registered organizations by the end of the year. Most CSOs are based in urban areas, but serve rural populations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4**

The legal and regulatory framework governing CSO registration and operations has not changed in recent years. CSOs register under the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act No. 24 of 2002, Societies Act (1954), Trustees Incorporation Act (1956, amended in 2002), Companies Act, National Sports Council of Tanzania Act (1976), Cooperative Society Act (2011), Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act (1999), or Society Act No. 6 (1995), which governs CSOs in Zanzibar. The Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children oversees NGO registration, while trusts must register with the Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteehip Agency (RITA). Trade unions, employers’ associations, and federations register with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The Ministry of State President’s Office, Constitution, and Good Governance registers CSOs in Zanzibar. The process of CSO registration is still centralized and time consuming, which poses a particular challenge for rural CSOs because of their distance from Dar al Salaam. However, in 2014 the dissemination of information about CSO registration devolved to local government authorities, making it easier for CSOs in rural areas at least to access information about the registration process. The final authority for the dissolution of CSOs rests with the agency or minister under which a CSO is registered. No CSOs were dissolved in 2014.

CSOs’ compliance with the legal framework is improving as a small but growing number of CSOs submit annual activity and financial reports to their registration authorities. For example, in 2014 the Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children reported an increase in report submissions.

In principle, the law allows CSOs to operate freely. On a practical level, some government leaders fear that CSOs seek to expose their weaknesses, and they use their authority to harass and threaten organizations, especially those involved in policy debates. For example, in 2014 members of Jukwa la Katiba, an organizing platform for CSOs on the constitutional review, were prevented by the police from undertaking a public protest over the way the government was handling the review process. As a result of such treatment, some CSOs refrain from discussing issues that might cast the government in a negative light.
The taxation of CSOs remained unchanged in 2014. Grants and endowment funds are not taxed. Revenues earned from the provision of goods and services are taxed unless a CSO applies for a tax exemption. Faith-based organizations that are affiliated with churches or mosques continue to enjoy automatic tax exemptions. CSOs that deliver services such as medication, food, and donations to children do not pay value-added tax.

The government’s procurement process allows CSOs to compete for government contracts at the local and national levels. However, access to information about the tendering process remains a challenge, and CSOs rarely compete for these contracts.

At organizations such as the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), and Women’s Legal Aid Center (WLAC), the majority of staff are professional lawyers. These organizations play an important role in providing legal advice to CSOs. A number of individual lawyers also provide CSOs with pro-bono legal services. In 2014 legal education in Tanzania expanded, leading to an increase in the number of paralegal centers that provide legal aid services to citizens and communities.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

As in 2013, CSOs continued efforts to build supportive local constituencies. For example, trade unions such as the Tanzania Teachers’ Union and National Network of Farmers Groups in Tanzania (MVIWATA) developed stronger linkages with local constituents. At the same time, because the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS), a large grantmaking and capacity-building organization, supported fewer projects in 2014, some organizations experienced tensions with community members who had participated in developing project proposals and therefore expected planned activities to take place.

The majority of CSOs, especially more developed organizations, have strategic plans with clearly defined missions and visions. FCS helps some CSOs develop their strategic planning approaches through intensive training. Some CSOs use strategic plans to guide their decision making. But as most CSOs are fully dependent on donors, changes in donor priorities and funding modalities often result in the failure of organizations to implement their strategic plans.

Most established CSOs have clearly defined governance structures that delineate the roles and responsibilities of the board and the staff. FCS continued a program of intensive trainings on governance and leadership. An analysis of organizational capacity assessments of 250 CSOs conducted by FCS in 2014 revealed a general trend towards improved financial management, governance and leadership, and transparency of boards of directors.

The staffing situation for CSOs remained much as it was in 2013, with established CSOs engaging professionals such as accountants, information technology experts, program officers, and managers. These organizations usually utilize job descriptions, job contracts, and human resource manuals and offer professional development to their employees. Some CSOs obtain paid professional services from certified public accountants, lawyers, and development management consultants. Otherwise, the majority of CSOs rely on volunteers.

Most established urban CSOs have modern offices with phones, fax machines, computers, and Internet access. Many organizations now use social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Rural organizations often lack computers and smartphones. Inadequate funding, a lack of electricity, and limited know-how can further hamper CSOs’ access to the Internet and prevent them from responding to funding opportunities. The poor infrastructure also constrains donor involvement in rural areas.
In 2014 some CSOs experienced a decrease in donor funding. For example, FCS, the largest local donor, experienced a significant loss of support from donors such as the Royal Norwegian Embassy and Sweden International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The decline in funding was attributed to donors’ change of focus as well as the expiration at the end of 2013 of the memorandum of understanding between donors and FCS. As a result of the funding decrease, FCS provided grants to 350 CSOs in 2014, compared to 549 grants in 2013. Some CSOs that were unable to access funds had to close their offices, because they could not pay for administrative costs such as electricity, rent, and water.

Financial support from the government and the private sector is limited, although their appreciation for the work of CSOs continues to grow. In 2014 the Legal Aid Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice and Constitution Affairs provided grants to Action for Justice in Society (AJISO) for legal aid to prisoners and a campaign against gender-based violence in the Kilimanjaro region. Local government funds were awarded to CSOs and community based-organizations (CBOs) working at the district level to implement projects on water, the environment, and HIV/AIDS. Some CSOs access grants from microfinance institutions or the private sector, particularly mining companies, while others receive funding directly from bilateral and multilateral donors.

Community support for CSOs is fairly robust, especially in the form of in-kind support, such as materials and volunteer labor. For example, in 2014 the Tanzania Livelihood Skills Development and Advocacy Foundation (TALISDA) was able to raise about TZS 9.1 million (approximately $5,500) in cash and TZS 49.2 million (approximately $30,000) in food items for local schools from 1,820 parents and guardians in Mombo division.

Very few CSOs have multiple sources of funding. Those that do tend to be large, well-established organizations, such as the Tanzania Teachers’ Union, which derives income from grants, membership fees, and rent. Inadequate fundraising skills prevent most CSOs from diversifying their sources of income. Few CSOs have sufficient resources to remain viable for the short term.

To generate earned income, larger CSOs may undertake consultancies in such areas as research and training, resource mobilization, and monitoring and evaluation. Smaller CSOs engage in beekeeping, poultry production, tree nurseries, flower cultivation, animal husbandry, and the sale of timber. Most CSOs charge membership fees to cover smaller items in their budgets, such as rent and stationery.

Most CSOs have written financial management policies to guide the use of financial resources. Many CSOs undergo audits with external and internal auditors to ensure that they operate in a transparent manner. In 2014 FCS conducted external audits of 350 CSOs, with the majority receiving clean reports. Large CSOs that are the recipients of donor funding usually prepare financial and annual reports to share with donors, the government, and other stakeholders. A few well established CSOs, such as LHRC, Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP), and HakiElimu, post their audit reports on their websites. Smaller CSOs also prepare annual reports but few can publicize them because of inadequate finances and the lack of websites.

**ADVOCACY: 3.5**

Cooperation between CSOs and local and national governments continued to develop in a positive direction in 2014, especially for CSOs focused on particular policy issues, such as gender and the environment. For example, the Jozani Environmental Conservation Association in Zanzibar implemented a project on environmental conservation in collaboration with the Forest Department in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Also in 2014, the revolutionary government of Zanzibar collaborated with Zanzibar
Female Lawyers Association and Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) to develop a one-year campaign to fight gender-based violence.

During the 2014 local elections, CSOs implemented voter education programs that addressed such issues as the qualities of a good leader and the importance of voting. CSO programs also facilitated the involvement of citizens as candidates for various positions. For example, the Youth Development Association, a CSO based in Kigoma region, implemented a project on governance that included training sessions for 300 youth, during which they were encouraged to run for leadership positions. Eventually 112 youth took part in the 2014 elections and eighty-two of them were elected.

In 2014 several CSOs formed new issue-based coalitions for policy advocacy. For example, institutionalized CSOs such as TGNP and TAMWA worked with their partners and other like-minded organizations to form a strong coalition to combat violence against women. HakiMadini continued to bring together CSOs focused on extractive industries, particularly natural gas and mining, to advocate for the rights of small-scale miners. On the local level, TALISDA’s project to raise awareness about educational policy, school management, the role of school committees, and related topics resulted in increased community participation in educational development and appreciation for girls’ right to a quality education. The project established a school meal program in Mombo division that was supported by parents’ cash and food donations and led to improved student attendance.

There are various avenues open to CSOs to participate in the government’s decision-making process. On the district level, CSOs often take part in the Opportunities and Obstacles for Development process and mobilize communities to ensure that their needs are given priority in the government planning process. For example, in 2014, Umoja wa Vikundi vya Vijana vya Uzalishaji Mali na Uelimishaji Rika (UVUUMA) in Magu district, with support from FCS, implemented a project to advocate for the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS. As a result of this effort, their needs were included in village government budgets. In Zanzibar, CSOs were invited to participate in the development of the Local Government Act of 2014, and more than 50 percent of their proposals were adopted.

On the national level, CSOs called for a review of controversial laws such as the Marriage Act of 1971, which allows girls and boys as young as 14 to marry with a court’s permission. This review finally took place in December 2014, and its results are expected to be available in 2015. During the Constituent Assembly, CSOs organized public dialogues on specific aspects of the new constitution and provided expert advice to the assembly’s sub-committees. Representatives of disabled peoples’ organizations played a vital role in advocating for the retention in the proposed constitution of measures protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The continued availability of information in braille from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the Human Rights Commission underscores the effectiveness of CSO lobbying in this area.

Although policies such as the Joint Assistance Strategy mention CSOs as an integral part of a dialogue between the government and development partners, more work needs to be done to ensure that a broad spectrum of CSOs takes part in such consultations. Few CSOs have sufficient capacity or understanding of the regulatory framework to push for participation in this policy process.

To help create a more enabling environment for CSOs, in 2014 the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), with partners such as LHRC and the National Council of NGOs (NACONGO), undertook a sensitization program for members of parliament about restrictive aspects of the NGO Act. The two sides agreed to push the government to formulate an amendment to the act, but this effort was postponed because of the unexpectedly long session of the Constituent Assembly.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSOs continued to provide services in diverse areas, such as public education, training, health care, economic development, environmental protection, governance, and empowerment. In 2014 FCS introduced a funding program in a new thematic area—peace maintenance and conflict resolution—to help CSOs address growing conflicts between communities and investors, farmers, and pastoralists.

While services generally reflect the needs and priorities of constituencies, projects sometimes develop according to donor priorities, leading to the concentration of services in certain areas. In 2014 the size and scope of some programs was scaled back because of decreased funding from donors. Because of the unavailability of funding, some CSOs could not implement projects or were forced to scale back the services provided.

Most CSOs provide goods and services free of charge, since the ability of communities to pay for them is very low. Some CSOs market products such as publications and workshops to other CSOs, as well as to academia and churches.

The government increasingly recognizes the value of CSO efforts to offer basic social services. CSO involvement is associated with increased transparency, accountability, and the proper use of resources, according to the social accountability monitoring exercise undertaken by the Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF). In 2014, ANSAF conducted social accountability monitoring in the agricultural sector, specifically focused on the rehabilitation of a warehouse in Tandahimba district. Its findings indicated discrepancies in various planning documents, which suggested mismanagement of the project. These findings were shared with community members, who decided to restructure the project so that construction of the warehouse could be realized.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2

Several networks of resource centers serve Tanzania’s CSO communities. The regional and district networks set up by FCS, which operate around the country, continue to act as important sources of information for CSOs. These networks disseminate information, provide training and technical assistance, and represent CSOs in policy discussions. TGNP also operates district and regional resource centers for CSOs and the general public focused on gender and women’s empowerment. Legal aid organizations operate paralegal centers that serve as information centers and offer technical assistance on legal issues. The Aga Khan Foundation serves as a resource center for CSOs in Zanzibar. Some resource centers generate income by selling publications or charging for use of Internet facilities.

An increasing number of intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO networks receive funding from international donors to re-grant to local organizations. FCS remained the largest local grantmaker in 2014. In 2014 FCS disbursed TZS 8.8 billion (approximately $5.3 million) to 350 ongoing and new grantees. Its grants focused on governance and accountability, policy engagement, and CSO capacity building. Other emerging local grantmakers include the Women Fund Tanzania, which provides support to CSOs dealing with gender issues and women’s empowerment, and EQUIP-Tanzania, which funds the improvement of quality of education in primary schools.

Some CSOs have joined together in networks to distribute information related to capacity building, financial resources, and employment opportunities. The Policy Forum plays an important role in disseminating
information about policy issues, such as the government budgeting process. Other organizations, including TANGO, HakiElimu, TGNP, Twaweza, and Policy Research for Development (REPOA), make information available about civil society involvement in East Africa integration, gender issues and women’s empowerment, research, education, and governance and accountability. During the year FCS organized CSO “learning visits” that aimed to provide a platform for CSOs to strengthen their performance by sharing experiences related to project design, monitoring and evaluation, leadership, and other topics.

The CSO sector has a number of competent trainers and consultants, mostly based in big cities. In 2014 FCS offered trainings to a total of 710 CSOs in such areas as organizational development, strategic planning, and financial management. Other organizations offering training include REPOA, which offers trainings on research and budgeting; TGNP, which offers training on gender-based issues; and LHRC, which offers training on issues related to human rights. Trainings are usually supply driven in nature and shaped by funding opportunities. They are normally conducted in Kiswahili, with training materials in English.

CSOs increasingly work in partnership with the government and local communities. For example, in 2014 in the Mtwara region, when a conflict about an oil and gas project arose between the government and local residents, CSOs played a major role in resolving the tensions. CSO-business relations are also developing, albeit more slowly. The Zanzibar Business Council, which is chaired by the president of the revolutionary government, includes the Association of NGOs of Zanzibar (ANGOZA) as a member.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9**

Cooperation between CSOs and the media continued to develop in 2014, with CSOs working effectively with journalists to publicize their activities in newspapers, television, radio, and other outlets. In general, the media portrays CSOs in a positive light.

Public perceptions of CSOs also continued to improve. The public generally sees CSOs as effective partners and consults with them for support and advice. Local and central governments and businesses similarly perceive CSOs positively and interact with them frequently. For example, the Social Accountability Monitoring (SAM) and Public Expenditure Tracking (PET) exercises undertaken in 2014 enhanced trust and transparent relationships among CSOs, the government, and communities. At the local level, SAM findings are empowering the public to press for greater accountability from their elected leadership. At the national level, institutions such as the National Audit Office value the work of CSOs on SAM and PETS and use the information from these exercises as reference points during national audit deliberations.

A growing number of CSOs effectively publicize their work on their websites and in social media. CSOs also use the popular blog site Jamii Forums to post information for the public. Some CSOs produce and distribute fliers to the community during outreach campaigns. However, since the costs of publication are high and the Internet is not universally available, smaller CSOs are often unable to publicize their work. Large established CSOs with sufficient funding may have programs on television. For example, LHRC airs an educational program about human rights issues.

Few CSOs have embraced the 2008 sector-wide code of ethics. CSOs are legally required to submit annual reports to registry offices, but few organizations fulfill this requirement because they lack the capacity to prepare the reports. With the exception of well-established CSOs, such as ANSAF, HakiElimu, LHRC, TGNP, and the Tanzania Media Association, the majority of CSOs do not publicize their annual reports.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Tanzania

Legal Environment

Public Image

Organizational Capacity

Infrastructure

Financial Viability

Service Provision

Advocacy

CSO Sustainability

Tanzania

Sustainability
Enhanced
Evolving
Impeded
UGANDA

In February 2014 the president of Uganda signed into law the retrogressive Anti-Homosexuality Act, which had been passed in late 2013 by the parliament. The World Bank, along with donors such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and the United States, reacted by delaying or redirecting aid and loans to Uganda. This move benefited a number of CSOs, as some donors rechanneled funds to them. But other organizations felt severe repercussions: for example, the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) lost $6.4 million from USAID for an HIV/AIDS project and about $600,000 from the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) because of its anti-gay stance. After the law’s passage, Chapter Four Uganda and other civil liberties advocates successfully challenged the Anti-Homosexuality Act. The Constitutional Court struck down the law on August 1, 2014, on the grounds that the legislature passed it illegally without a quorum.

Although their work was made more difficult by implementation of the Public Order Management Act, Anti-Homosexuality Act, Anti-Money Laundering Act, and other constricting laws and policies, CSO advocacy efforts improved in 2014. Prominent CSO-led initiatives included the Free and Fair Elections campaign, Black Monday movement, local government scorecards, Citizen Manifesto, budget advocacy work, and public-interest litigation. CSO financial viability, infrastructure, and public image also showed modest
improvement in 2014, and a number of activities reinforced the viability of CSOs as the government’s strategic partner in the delivery of key services.

Accurate statistics on CSOs in Uganda are not readily available. In 2014 the working figure for the number of registered CSOs was 12,456, the same as in the previous year. The exact number of unregistered CSOs is not known, but many such organizations exist at the grassroots level.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2

The legal environment for CSOs in Uganda changed little in 2014. The legal framework continues to be largely restrictive, and CSO registration remains an uncertain and protracted process. The NGO Registration Board, which registers and monitors the CSO sector, exercises powers that are vague, broad, and prone to abuse. As a result, associations or groups that want to operate legally prefer to take advantage of the greater laxity in regulations governing businesses and register as not-for-profit companies rather than apply to the NGO Board.

In 2014 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the NGO Registration Board held quarterly structured dialogues with CSOs in partnership with the Uganda National NGO Forum. These dialogues aimed to improve government-CSOs relations and ameliorate threats to civil society. They seemed to help ease the relationship between CSOs, the Ministry, and the NGO Board, as there were fewer mutual accusations in the course of the year.

The process of amending the NGO Registration Act begun in 2012 remained stalled in 2014. The proposed amendment strengthens the ability of the NGO Board to deny registration arbitrarily, dissolve organizations without explanation or appeal, constrict CSO operations and activities, criminalize acts or omissions of management and staff while shielding boards of directors, and weaken CSO representation on the board itself. Even without passage, the amendment’s implications were felt as CSOs engaged in increasing self-censorship. For example, CSOs intending to work with lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) communities adopted names unrelated to their work, as the NGO Board does not register organizations working on sexual minority issues. Other CSOs were reluctant to engage in projects or activities that could prompt government backlash or they obtained registration as companies limited by guarantee rather than as CSOs. In April 2014 the Ugandan police were reported to have raided and closed down the offices of the Makerere University’s Walter Reed project on charges that it was “training youth in homosexuality.” Fortunately, these incidents did not substantially worsen CSO-government relationships overall.

CSOs working in human rights, good governance, corruption, and related areas continued to experience similar levels of harassment and intimidation as in previous years. For example, the Uganda National NGO Forum received an anonymous notice of an intention to sue for organizing and holding the Free and Fair Elections campaign. In October 2014 the police invoked the Public Order Management Act to block a prominent opposition leader from attending a meeting on elections organized by CSOs in the Masaka district.

CSOs have very few tax exemptions. Organizations can occasionally negotiate tax exemptions with the Uganda Revenue Authority. For example, the National Association of Professional Environmentalists was able to obtain exemptions in 2014. But many organizations are unaware of or fail to fulfill their tax obligations, and CSOs’ rate of non-payment of taxes is as high as 80 percent. Because of likely penalties for non-payment of taxes, most CSOs are reluctant to engage with the Uganda Revenue Authority over tax
exemptions. Beginning in 2014, the government imposed a value added tax on computers and computer accessories.

Although the legal framework does not prohibit CSOs from bidding on government contracts or engaging in other income-generating activities, the competitive environment is not favorable to the sector. Procurement requests require, without exception, valid income tax clearance certificates, annual financial data, copies of trading licenses, and bid securities. Because CSOs find it difficult to fulfill these requirements even if they have the capacity to implement the project, profit-oriented companies are usually awarded government contracts.

While there are several lawyers trained in CSO law in Uganda’s capital city, Kampala, their services can be difficult to access. They are generally more interested in helping activists in conflict with the government than in working with individual organizations or improving the legal environment. CSOs must pay for legal services, but they often do not budget for it and as a result cannot afford to pay expensive legal fees. In smaller towns, there are few lawyers familiar with CSO law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

Overall, CSOs’ organizational capacity remained the same in 2014. Although there are several capacity-building programs underway—most notably, USAID/Uganda’s Governance, Accountability, Participation, and Performance (GAPP) program, which seeks to develop citizen participation in local governance, and the NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism—some critics say that they are not informed by the country context and lack a transformative approach that breeds learning and sector-wide development.

Ugandan CSOs achieved some success in building constituency support for their initiatives in 2014, despite the constricting political and funding environment. For example, civic participation in the NGO Forum’s Free and Fair Elections Campaign was robust. In two months, fourteen regional forums were convened, with the participation of at least 3,000 political, religious, and civil leaders. Through innovative community outreach approaches, the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Uganda) also continued to build a strong constituency of women in need of free legal aid.

National CSOs are more likely than smaller CSOs to have well-defined strategic plans, mission statements, and visions. However, as the usual motive for developing these mechanisms is to attract foreign funding, organizations’ adherence to them is doubtful. The division of responsibilities between boards of directors and staff seemed to improve in 2014. Nevertheless, a general perception persists that boards lack leadership skills, do not actively govern, and thereby undermine the internal structure and accountability of their organizations.

Donor funding for staff-related costs declined in 2014, with the result that many CSOs failed to meet their staffing needs. Depending on available funding, CSOs usually engage the services of full- and part-time staff on a contractual basis. However, short-term projects, low pay, and poor human resource practices continued to cause a high rate of staff turnover at many organizations, resulting in gaps in human resource capacity. During the year, the rate of volunteerism grew somewhat, partly because of high unemployment.

The technological infrastructure improved at many CSOs in 2014. Larger CSOs acquired new computers, furniture, and better Internet access, while smaller grassroots organizations benefited from general technological advancements in the country. However, increased Internet costs as well as a new value-added tax on computers, printers, and similar equipment meant that many sub-regional CSOs could not afford computers and computer-related services.
Financial Viability: 5.0

The financial viability of CSOs in Uganda improved modestly in 2014. There was a notable increase in funding from development partners for CSO capacity building at the sub-national level. For instance, USAID/Uganda’s GAPP program continued to offer direct support to CSOs in northern and western Uganda. In addition, some Western donors reacted to the passing of the Anti-Homosexuality Law by re-directing funding to implementing partners. However, individual organizations lost funding because of their reported anti-gay stances. For example, the IRCU lost more than $6.4 million and as a result was financially crippled and had to lay off project staff. Since IRCU is a multi-denominational organization, its funding difficulties affected governance, health, and peace-related projects of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council as well as the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, and Seventh-Day Adventist churches.

Local philanthropy in Uganda remains underdeveloped due to low incomes, the country’s weak economy, and the inability of CSOs to attract support. Faith-based CSOs are an important exception to this rule, in that they regularly receive donations from their members. In addition, several companies engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, though these usually focus on one-off events rather than sustained interventions. For instance, MTN Marathon, Kenya Commercial Bank, and Rotary Cancer Run Program supported the 2014 National CSO Fair. Some CSOs receive volunteer and in-kind support for their activities. In 2014, the Uganda National NGO Forum, for example, mobilized more than 1,000 volunteers to monitor road conditions in their communities through the Cross Roads project.

While most CSOs do not charge for their services, some organizations supplement their incomes with revenue-generating projects. A few CSOs own real estate and earn rental income, while others have radio stations and clinics where they charge small fees. Recently, FIDA-Uganda launched a fundraising initiative called Fund a Woman, Fund a Child, to which Ugandans can contribute UGX 10,000 ($3.40) per month. Investment clubs have increased in popularity as well. For example, Nafasi is a multi-purpose cooperative society launched at the 2014 annual general meeting of the National NGO Forum. The majority of CSOs do not have reserve funds, and very few organizations would be able to operate for longer than six months without additional support.

Many CSOs, especially at the sub-national level, do not maintain proper accounts, carry out timely audits, or produce or publish audited financial statements. These lapses have been exacerbated by weak oversight by the NGO Board, which has failed to enforce the submission of CSOs’ annual returns.

Advocacy: 3.5

CSO advocacy efforts made gains in 2014. CSOs continued to cooperate effectively with local government officials, with the possible exception of Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), who represent the Office of the President at the district level and often threaten CSOs or harass their staff members. At the national level, CSOs were often able to communicate directly with policy makers. For instance, the NGO Board and the Ministry of Internal Affairs showed trust in working with CSOs to convene meetings on oil and gas, the national ID process, and other topics. In addition, a new police committee charged with working with CSOs was established and presented to key CSO leaders during a breakfast meeting with the Inspector General of Police in 2014. While the committee failed to provide updates to CSOs as expected, at least there was a dramatic decrease in the incidence of break-ins at CSO offices.
In some cases, the benefit of smoother government-CSO relationships was mitigated by structural weaknesses, such as difficulty in accessing government information and a presidency that controls the formulation of major policy initiatives. Nevertheless, CSOs successfully advocated on numerous issues and participated in issue-based coalitions to achieve significant results. For example, in February 2014 CSOs launched the Free and Fair Elections campaign to provide an opportunity for citizens to deliberate on a wide range of constitutional and electoral reforms. The campaign was joined by more than 4,500 leaders and resulted in the adoption of the Uganda Citizens’ Compact on Free and Fair Elections in December. This compact will be shared widely with stakeholders in the run-up to the 2016 national elections. In another important development, Chapter Four Uganda, Human Rights Awareness, Promotion Forum, and other CSOs worked with private law firms to successfully challenge the legality of the Anti-Homosexuality Act in the Constitutional Court, which ruled that the law had been illegally passed. Protests by human rights activists in Uganda and worldwide against the Anti-Homosexuality Act helped reframe the controversy as a human rights issue.

Other highlights of 2014 included CSOs’ continued support and leadership of the Black Monday movement, which seeks to document and shame corrupt leaders and press for greater accountability. As a result of the movement, citizens have become more concerned about corruption and the government’s response to it. The Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights and Constitutional Law (CSCHRCL) stepped up advocacy efforts to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and decrease physical attacks on LGBTI people. The National Core Reference Group on Post-2015 was instrumental in raising awareness of the post-2015 development agenda, and the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group successfully campaigned against an increase of taxes on agricultural inputs in the national 2014-2015 budget.

CSO lobbying efforts have resulted in some organizations signing memoranda of understanding with the government in line with the spirit of the NGO Policy. This development has helped to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two sides, thus improving accountability and reducing potential conflict.

At the local level, CSOs mostly engage in service delivery and few organizations address structural and systematic weaknesses that have an impact on community development, especially in the areas of governance and human rights. As a result, instead of feeling empowered, many Ugandan citizens remain apathetic and uninvolved in advocacy efforts.

Many CSOs are not aware of the importance of a favorable regulatory legal framework. However, a few prominent CSOs worked to improve the legal environment in 2014. For example, the Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET), Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), FIDA Uganda, and Chapter Four Uganda filed a constitutional petition challenging provisions in the Public Order Management Act, passed in 2013. This act inhibits a free environment in which citizens can assemble and associate, which is critical for the work of CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

Overall, the performance of Ugandan CSOs in service provision did not change in 2014. CSOs continued to carry out diverse projects in good governance, health, human rights, legal aid, education, sanitation, environmental protection, and economic development. However, not all of these services were readily available because of geographical constraints and reductions in donor funding. Legal aid, good governance, and human rights services tended to be based in urban areas, while environmental protection, water, and health services were fairly available in rural areas.
In 2014 CSOs continued to implement projects that were both generally responsive to communities and reflective of donor priorities. Most CSOs endeavored to enlist community participation in their activities. However, sustained community involvement remains a challenge for projects that fail to cultivate constituencies on an ongoing basis.

CSOs continued to offer workshops, trainings, research, publications, and other products, which they shared with academia, government, media, churches, other CSOs, and the wider public. Generally, little or no charge is levied on these services, as they represent limited opportunities for cost recovery.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs, especially in the delivery of basic services in health, education, water, and sanitation. The government offers CSOs the opportunity to compete for grants and contracts. For example, the Expanding Social Protection program under the Ministry of Gender and Social Development provided grants to Development Research and Training and the Uganda National NGO Forum to monitor and popularize the Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) program.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5**

The infrastructure supporting civil society in Uganda did not show significant change in 2014. The NGO Forum continued to be the leading CSO resource center and shared information on various policy processes, such as the NGO Bill, National Development Plan II, and the government’s Vision 2040. Other resource centers include the Uganda Project Implementation and Management Center (UPIMAC), which has an online Civic Education Resource Center, and the Africa Freedom of Information Center, which promotes Ugandan citizens' right to information.

There are very few local grantmaking organizations in Uganda. However, well-established CSOs that receive grants often sub-contract activities to grassroots organizations. The Support Program for Advocacy Networks continued to support four district regional advocacy networks and thirty-five district networks in 2014, while other organizations, such as ActionAid Uganda, Forum for Women in Democracy, Uganda Women’s Network, and Action for Development, provided sub-grants to smaller organizations.

Interaction between member organizations of coalitions and networks improved and led to a number of achievements in 2014. Key coalitions include the Free and Fair Elections Coalition, which has greatly influenced the national discourse about the need for electoral reforms; the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, which steered a campaign with farmers on the removal of taxes on agricultural inputs; the Learning Agenda Platform, which engaged members of parliament, local government officials, and other stakeholders in the education sector to adopt learning as a measure of success; and the Women’s Movement, which developed the Women’s Agenda 2016. Although CSOs have no problem joining coalitions, they are often reluctant to share information because of a perceived competition for visibility and funding. In addition, up-country CSOs remained focused on their internal and financial struggles and often ignored opportunities to participate in coalitions.

In 2014 an adequate number of local CSO management trainers offered technical assistance in resource mobilization, board governance and leadership, monitoring and evaluation, information and communications technology, and other topics. The trainings usually took place in Kampala. However, the trainings failed to cover some important topics, such as fundraising, negotiation, networking, and advocacy in hostile environments. Training opportunities are often lacking in secondary cities, and few training materials are available in local languages. The USAID GAPP program identified and carried out assessments of twenty-eight local organizations to determine needed capacity-building support.
A few CSOs entered into partnerships with media, local businesses, and government in 2014. UNICEF Uganda, under its Invest in Ugandan Children project, signed an agreement with private businesses to protect Ugandan children from child labor and other abuse. In addition, some businesses supported CSO initiatives, such as the Nutrition Marathon, the 2014 National CSO Fair, and FIDA@40. The Uganda National NGO Forum, Research International, and Daily Monitor newspaper undertook an opinion poll on governance in Uganda. The Citizen’s Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda monitored the ID registration process in partnership with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Church of Uganda and Ministry of Health worked jointly on the prevention and control of malaria. The second Civil Society-Private-Public Sector Forum took place in November 2014. This intersectoral forum represents a wide range of national and international groupings and seeks to advance partnerships, shared agendas, and cooperation among the three sectors.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2

Overall, CSOs’ public image remained about the same in 2014. CSOs enjoyed a modest improvement in media coverage in 2014. Local radio stations such as Voice of Kigezi and Hope Radio in Kabale district continued to provide regular free airtime to CSOs so they could publicize their community activities. At the national level, the media provided extensive coverage of high-profile CSO activities, such as the transition debate, electoral reforms, and CSO-government relations. However, some CSO leaders argued that most of this coverage was obtained by unofficially paying journalists for their efforts.

In general, the public has a favorable view of CSOs and supports their initiatives. Although government statements about CSOs influence public perceptions, CSOs’ involvement in the Anti-Homosexuality Act and Public Order Management Act did not seem to damage their public reputation in 2014, as the public also sees and appreciates the work of CSOs in their own communities. The government accused a few CSOs that promote the rights of sexual minorities of working as agents of Western powers and seemed increasingly to regard some CSOs as trying to undermine its legitimacy. This was especially clear during the Free and Fair Elections campaign, when senior government officials responded by inviting CSO leaders to join mainstream politics if they wanted to challenge the regime. The business sector has a positive perception of CSOs, realizing that the two sectors have complementary strengths.

CSOs made progress in implementing effective public relations campaigns during the year. CSO representatives appeared more often on news and talk shows to provide analysis and opinion. Some organizations, such as the Uganda NGO Forum, Uganda Women Network, and Action Aid Uganda, continued paid advertising campaigns, and more CSOs effectively utilized social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.

In response to requests by prospective donors, an increased number of CSOs improved their accountability standards in 2014, especially in the areas of financial management and audits. There was also progress in implementing the QuAM, a self-regulatory mechanism introduced in 2006 that seeks to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of CSOs and improve the sector’s legitimacy. In 2014 the number of CSOs that were “QuAMed” increased from fifty-two to seventy-nine. National-level CSOs are generally more successful in implementing these accountability standards than community-based organizations. CSOs publishing annual reports are largely at the national level.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Uganda

CSO Sustainability

- Legal Environment
- Public Image
- Infrastructure
- Financial Viability
- Organizational Capacity
- Service Provision
- Advocacy

Uganda: 4.2

Sustainability
- Enhanced
- Evolving
- Impeded
Two momentous events occurred in Zambia during a four-day period in October 2014: the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the country’s independence and the death of President Michael Sata. In light of the anniversary, many CSOs published their reflections on the last fifty years and their hopes for the country’s development in the years ahead. However, the nation’s focus on the golden jubilee was suddenly derailed by the passing of the head of state and the subsequent presidential by-election. Anxiety emerged in the CSO sector about certain policy issues, in particular the new constitution and the controversial Non-Governmental Organizations Act No. 16 of 2009 (NGO Act). Whereas the Grand Coalition on the Constitution—a grouping of civil society alliances and opposition political parties—remained steadfast in their demand for a constitutional referendum before the 2016 general elections, other CSOs such as the Young African Leaders Alliance (YALI) sided with the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) in calling for enactment of the new constitution after the elections.

CSOs in Zambia experienced mixed fortunes in 2014. In the first half of the year, there were several instances of harassment by state agencies, including threats of arrest during advocacy outreach activities in rural communities. CSOs maintained that the NGO Act, which stipulates that the NGO Registration Board can
approve organizations’ areas of operation and advise on their activities, contradicts Articles 20 and 21 of the constitution, which guarantee freedom of association and expression. All major CSOs that refused to register under the NGO Act were notified by the government that they would be deregistered and must cease operations after a thirty-day period unless they gave reasonable cause as to why the deregistration should not take place. Later in the year, following the suspension of a CSO legal challenge to the registration requirement as well as the appointment of a new minister of justice, the government suspended its threat and resumed dialogue with CSOs on the NGO Act.

Levels of funding for CSOs in Zambia did not change much in 2014 after a drastic decline in 2013 because of donor budget cuts and the exit of some donors, including Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands. CSO groups such as the Grand Coalition on the Constitution, Civil Society Decentralization Alliance Network (DAN), and Zambia Tax Platform (ZTP) continued to cope with scarce funding by organizing joint advocacy activities.

In 2014 there was still a lack of data about the scope of organized civil society in Zambia. The only official source of information is the mapping exercise conducted by the Ministry of Community Development, Maternal and Child Health in 2012, which found that 442 organizations operate in the country. However, the mapping exercise covered only organizations narrowly defined by the NGO Act as NGOs, thereby omitting community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and community clubs. Its results remained at variance with estimates by the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), based on records from the Registrar of Societies, that 10,000 CSOs operated in Zambia as of 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

Registration continued to be the most difficult issue facing the sector. All CSOs are required to register under the 2009 NGO Act. However, CSOs had previously registered under the Societies Act or the Companies Act, and with the implementation of NGO Act it was unclear whether they could still register under these earlier laws. Much of the first half of 2014 was spent clarifying the authority of various registrars. The NGO Registrar maintained that to be recognized all CSOs had to register under the NGO Act and other agencies could no longer register CSOs. However, there were doubts as to whether the NGO Registrar had the authority to override other registration authorities, such as that of the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), which administers the Companies Act. Furthermore, CSOs that were registered under the Societies Act or Companies Act and intended to register under the NGO Act were unable to do so, as the agencies that had originally registered with them were not obliged by law to transfer documents to other registration agencies. Another problem with the registration process is that the NGO Act requires CSOs to obtain references from two government ministries, and many new CSOs do not yet have relations with ministries at the time of registration.

A low point in the registration controversy occurred when the government announced that CSOs that had not registered under the NGO Act would be deregistered after thirty days if they did not show cause as to why they should not be deregistered. In May 2014 the government also wrote to heads of foreign development agencies instructing them to withhold support from unregistered organizations. Subsequently, a group of CSOs, including ActionAid Zambia, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Council (NGOCC), Operation Young Vote (OYV), Women in
Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), Young African Leaders Alliance (YALI), Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA), and ZCSD, lodged a lawsuit to challenge the government’s actions. This move led eventually to the resumption of the dialogue between CSOs and the government about the NGO Act, on the condition that the government released a signed statement informing the public that all punitive measures related to CSO registration were suspended to allow for consultations. In addition, CSOs signed a statement stating that they agreed to discontinue their lawsuit and were not opposed to regulation and accountability. There was high optimism among CSOs when the dialogue resumed, especially as it coincided with the removal of Minister of Justice Wynter Kabimba, who was seen by CSOs as hostile on issues related to the NGO Act and the constitutional process. However, as of December 2014 the NGO Act was still in effect and the government had yet to begin the review process.

From a legal standpoint, 2014 was a particularly challenging year for advocacy CSOs. The state continued selectively to apply the archaic Public Order Act, which sets restrictive rules on public gatherings. In particular, the state denied CSOs permission to organize public meetings about constitutional reforms. Forty-two activists from ActionAid Zambia were arrested, beaten, and stripped for wearing t-shirts during a youth day parade that called on the government to release the draft constitution. Some CSOs were harassed by state agencies for undertaking community social accountability work. For example, government authorities, including the police, targeted the Eastern Province management team of the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) network, mainly because the team was vocal in pressuring the government to release the draft constitution. Another instance of intimidation involved stories in online publications about a “hit list” of CSOs and specific individuals kept by security forces. This situation improved with the arrival of the new Minister of Justice.

CSOs are required to pay VAT, income, and withholding taxes, as well as taxes on salaries, wages, and benefits. The 2013 Statutory Instrument 103, which withdrew the tax exemption for CSOs on capital goods such as motor vehicles, remained in force in 2014. This decision was justified by complaints that some CSOs, especially those affiliated with Pentecostal churches, abused the tax exemption in the importation of capital goods. Eventually in 2014 the government decided that faith-based organizations can receive tax exemptions on a case-by-case basis if they provide documentation showing that the capital goods they import are solely for charitable purposes.

CSOs in Zambia are not legally allowed to raise funds through the provision of goods and services. However, CSOs can establish subsidiary companies to generate income, including through government contracts. However, the lack of capital to start up a business makes this a difficult option for many CSOs.

Zambia does not have lawyers specifically trained in CSO law, mainly because the sector does not serve as a lucrative source of income for the profession. In 2014 it was still difficult for CSOs to find legal counsel on a pro-bono basis. Most lawyers are in private practice and charge high fees. For example, when the group of CSOs challenging the constitutionality of the NGO Act sought legal counsel, lawyers quoted fees of ZMK 120,000-250,000 (approximately $19,000-$40,000) for a year’s retainer. In addition, most lawyers are available only in major cities served by the railroad. Organizations operating at the local level find it difficult to obtain competent legal counsel and are served largely by paralegals. Women In Law in Southern Africa (WILSA) and the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) are trying to establish legal resources for CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2

A number of CSOs at both national and local levels have strong grassroots constituencies. Among the national CSOs, organizations such as ActionAid Zambia and CSPR maintain particularly strong links with rural communities. Other national CSOs find it difficult to have regular contact with rural constituencies due to dwindling resources. At the local level, women’s associations, farmers’ associations, and youth movements have especially good ties with constituencies.
Many organizations at the national and district levels have strategic plans that clearly articulate their visions and missions. Such plans are less common in CBOs. Strategic plans are often developed to meet donor requirements, and they can be overly ambitious and ignore funding needs, with the result that planned activities are never implemented. Plans are sometimes written by consultants with only minimal involvement of constituencies served by the organizations.

With the exception of CBOs, CSOs tend to have clearly defined internal management structures, with a clear division of responsibilities between boards and management. In practice, some boards engage actively in governance while others struggle to achieve an appropriate relationship with staff. Codes of conduct and written operational procedures are usually in place to guide such tasks as the recruitment of staff and the conclusion of contracts. These written procedures, which represent a modest though significant improvement in recent years, can be attributed both to donor requirements and to the threat of implementation of the NGO Act. Even though the NGO Act does not explicitly require such documentation, many CSOs have produced it to demonstrate that they can self-regulate and do not need to be regulated by the government.

Traditionally, Zambian CSOs have been attractive employers and find it easy to attract high-quality staff. However, with the change of government in 2011, employment conditions for government and private-sector employees began to improve, drawing technically competent experts away from CSOs. This trend continued in 2014. In particular, some organizations have found it difficult to attract qualified financial specialists to manage funds properly. While most large and established CSOs have adequate human resources practices, such as contracts and job descriptions, the majority of organizations lack human resource departments and support systems. All CSOs face enormous challenges in meeting staff costs. The earmark model of funding favored by donors has added to CSO staffing difficulties, as many staff members have contracts tied to the lifespan of specific projects.

Nearly all CSOs have adequate technical capacities, as considerable funding was devoted to this area in the 1990s and early 2000s. Most organizations, even in rural areas, have access to mobile phones and Internet services and use them to enhance their work. A lingering challenge for some organizations is the procurement of updated software.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

Most funding for CSOs comes from international donors. However, in 2014 several major donors, including Finland, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and USAID, continued to channel their support through private sector institutions, especially youth and women’s business clubs. This trend reduces the amount of funding directly available to CSOs. Moreover, some donors, such as Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), are changing their programs, thus eliminating the need to work through local CSO partners. Aside from programs in food and nutrition, social protection, and water and sanitation, foreign donors have generally reduced available funding, particularly to CSOs in the governance sector. Donors that continue to fund in this area have largely shifted their focus to the constitutional process, leaving very little funding for CSOs addressing other governance needs, such as elections monitoring and access to justice. Some funding agencies, such as GIZ, Irish Aid, and the Swedish Embassy, channel their support to CSOs involved in governance through an intermediary organization called the Zambia Governance Foundation.
(ZGF). This trend makes it very challenging for smaller CSOs to obtain core funding, mainly because of the need to meet laborious pre-conditions imposed by donors when applying for funds.

Few organizations raise money locally, as philanthropy has yet to take root. While some corporations, such as mining companies, have corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, they are small and mainly serve self-help rather than advocacy groups. A number of government initiatives have provided communities with seed money and loans to develop into funding sources, but such programs typically failed when participants did not pay back their loans.

CSOs display little fundraising skill or effort, aside from submitting proposals when funding opportunities arise. The only new trend in funding is joint activities by CSOs, as happened when several organizations coordinated a joint national budget submission through ZTP.

Very few CSOs have assets that can generate revenue, with the exception of NGOCC and the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), which have established a sustainable source of income in leasing real estate. In 2014 one of the few CSOs to sell products was the Society for Family Life, which sold family planning products to the government and others. On a very small scale, some CSOs raise money through consultancies with other agencies. The only other source of funding for most organizations and networks is membership fees, which yield minimal income.

Although the law is ambiguous about financial reporting, CSOs increasingly recognize that sound financial management systems are a magnet for funding. Larger organizations, such as Caritas, Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR), NGOCC, and CSPR, have well-developed financial systems and demonstrate accountability through community meetings about their programs. Other organizations produce annual audit reports, which are mainly submitted to donors rather than published publicly. Most CSOs receive qualified audit reports, meaning that their financial records are not in conformity with accepted financial accounting standards. However, they are often unable to address financial management shortcomings because of a lack of institutional capacity, including accounts personnel and defined procedures.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

In 2014 advocacy CSOs were mainly focused on the constitution. The most important development in 2014 was the formation of the Grand Coalition on the Constitution, composed of more than 300 institutions from civil society, the church, politics, and labor. Along with the Civil Society Constitution Coalition (CSCC), the Grand Coalition on the Constitution had a tremendous impact on the constitutional process, resulting in the government finally releasing the draft constitution in October 2014.

In 2014 CSOs had a mixed relationship with the government. Antagonisms continued at about the same level as in 2013 over such controversial issues as the NGO Act, the constitutional process, the removal of subsidies in agriculture, wage freezes, and the tax regime for mines, resulting in CSOs’ accusations that the government was not pro-poor. At the same time, CSOs focused on governance, such as ZTP, Caritas, CSPR, JCTR, and NGOCC, engaged actively with the parliament on a number of issues, including the national budget, the national planning and budgeting policy, and judicial reforms. Public events organized jointly by CSOs and national and local governments addressed the decentralization policy and other themes. Dialogues between CSOs and the government and private sector included consultative meetings on the implementation of the Revised Sixth National Development Plan.

CSOs in Zambia successfully worked together on a number of specific issues in 2014. An important initiative brought together organizations under ZTP and succeeded in making taxation a major issue in the presidential
election. Other successful CSO policy initiatives in 2014 included the work of the Constituency Development Fund Alliance (CDFA), Zambia Land Alliance, Paralegal Alliance Network, and CSOs working in the field of nutrition. The Tax Justice campaign, spearheaded by ActionAid Zambia in cooperation with other CSO networks, focused attention in 2014 on unethical behavior by some mining companies.

CSOs continued to lobby actively, although their efforts were at times ad hoc, and organizations sometimes held back from lobbying for fear of reprisals from politicians in the ruling PF or the threat of deregistration under the NGO Act. Despite disagreements among CSOs about the timing of enacting the new constitution, their efforts to resume a dialogue with government on the subject were successful. However, these discussions were not conclusive because of the president’s death and subsequent by-election. Other notable lobbying efforts included the campaign of the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) and other organizations on public finance management, which resulted in the revocation of two statutory instruments whose implementation had destabilized the local currency and monetary policy; and CSOs’ calls to review the Public Order Act, access to information laws, and judicial reforms to improve prisoners’ conditions, which resulted in renewed CSO-government dialogue.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

Zambia has a diverse group of CSOs providing basic social services in education, agriculture, health, and water and sanitation, as well as other fields such as empowerment. In 2014 their scope of services remained largely unchanged. The bulk of services are delivered by international organizations, with local CSOs only minimally involved.

Many organizations use participatory mechanisms such as rights-based approaches to identify community needs. Services are also shaped by the availability of funding, although larger CSOs such as ActionAid Zambia, CSPR, and NGOCC have enough leverage with international donors to determine their own programming focus. There have been cases in which services such as family planning or abortion have come into conflict with local values and been discontinued. For example, after a public debate arose over planned services to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community, the services were never implemented.

Few organizations extend services beyond their immediate constituencies. A number of organizations disseminate publications widely at exhibitions and other events, but printing is expensive and costs are rarely recouped. Only a few CSOs, such as PPAZ, Marie Stopes International, and Society for Family Life, provide goods and services on a cost-recovery basis.

The government seems comfortable working with service-delivery CSOs, because, in contrast to advocacy organizations, they are regarded as a necessity rather than a threat. The government acknowledges the role that CSOs play in development but provides them with little direct support. Only a few community-based organizations, such as those supporting orphans, vulnerable children, and women, receive government grants to deliver services. A few CSOs, such as the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ), provide services while also monitoring the government’s service provision. Other CSOs, including ActionAid Zambia, CSPR, NGOCC, Zambia Network Education Coalition (ZANEC), and Platform for Social Protection (PSP), monitor government service delivery in agriculture, education, health, and other fields.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The situation with intermediary support organizations (ISOS) and resource centers was largely unchanged in 2014. There are only a few ISOS in Zambia, including CSPR, JCTR, and Afya Mzuri. In 2014 resources for
these ISOs declined slightly. However, they continued to offer Internet and library services to both CSOs and the public. Although their services are usually free of charge, resource centers are not seen as providing up-to-date or useful information and therefore are rarely used.

The Civil Society Environment Fund (CSEF) and ZGF re-grant funds from foreign donors to local organizations. Many CSOs have complained that they are unable to obtain these funds because of difficult application requirements. Other local CSOs providing sub-grants include NGOCC, CHAZ, and Zambia Prevention, Care, and Treatment Partnership (ZPCT II).

There is no overall platform representing CSOs. The NGO Act proposed such a structure, to be called the NGO Congress, but this body met only once and the government has never allocated resources to it. Various networks provide opportunities for information-sharing among specialized groups of CSOs. These include Zambia Election Alliance (ZEA), Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG), CSPR, NGOCC, Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), and the Council of Churches Zambia (CCZ). Other coalitions yielding positive results include the Grand Coalition on the Constitution, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and grassroots movements against gender-based violence. A few coalitions have been formed with the motive of obtaining funding from donors. However, adherence to their own memoranda of understanding is often a challenge, and host organizations bemoan unfair workloads or the failure of other participants to meet their financial obligations.

The training available from ISOs is mostly in such fields as economic literacy, financial management, and organizational governance. A few dedicated individual trainers offer services in strategic planning, organizational development, advocacy, and other areas. Training usually targets only national and urban CSOs.

A few CSOs work in partnership with the private sector, mainly on service delivery. For example, in a very good model, Konkola Copper Mines works with CCZ to operate early childhood education centers in Chingola. A notable partnership with the media is ActionAid Zambia’s cooperation with a group of journalists through a bloggers’ network.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

The public image of CSO in Zambia worsened in 2014. Although CSOs still enjoy positive media coverage and are a major source of news, most of the coverage is about CSOs’ statements on partisan politics. During the year CSOs regularly held media briefings, issued press statements, and broadcast programs to publicize their work, especially on the constitution and nutrition. A number of individuals working for CSOs were given radio time, and their opinions were sometimes important news headlines.

The public’s perception of CSOs is generally good, although complaints are frequently heard that CSOs are not very forceful or are politically partisan. There is also a public perception, observable on media phone-in programs, that CSOs are led by individuals seeking political appointments. This perception grew worse in the run-up to the presidential by-election in 2014, when some women’s organizations openly supported the only female presidential candidate and other CSOs were seen as aligned with either the opposition or ruling party.
The government generally distrusts advocacy CSOs and tolerates them as a “necessary evil.” Businesses are growing more cautious in engaging with CSOs, particularly those working on governance issues, such as in the Tax Justice campaign. Both the government and businesses contend that CSOs do not always present accurate evidence in their advocacy campaigns.

CSOs generally strive to publicize their work, but it is difficult to measure the results of these efforts. CSOs rarely use the media for advertising.

CSOs have yet to develop self-regulatory mechanisms. A CSO code of conduct is still in draft form, and no agreement has been reached on a process for its implementation. In 2014 many CSOs, especially at the district level, adopted codes of conduct in an effort to demonstrate competent self-regulation. Though most CSOs produce annual financial and narrative reports, they usually share them only with their funding partners.
Country Facts
Capital: Harare
Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy
Population: 13,771,721
GDP per capita (PPP): $2,000
Human Development Index: 156

Political uncertainty, economic depression, and a continuing decline in social service delivery were the key issues confronting Zimbabwean CSOs in 2014. After the harmonized election of 2013, infighting in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by President Robert Mugabe, led to the ouster of Vice President Joice Mujuru, who was perceived by civil society and other Zimbabwe watchers as a moderate, reform-minded leader. Her ouster was accompanied by the purging of ZANU-PF through expulsions and a cabinet reshuffle. Her successor, the new first vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, is seen by many CSOs as a strong hardliner. In 2014 President Mugabe’s wife, Grace, became head of the ZANU-PF Women’s League, and Bekezela Mphoko became second vice president. Both are reputed to view civil society with disdain.

Political tensions caused the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) to undergo another split, which was echoed in increasingly fractured and fractious relations among CSOs. These fissures limited the capacity of the opposition and CSOs to influence government decision making, as the opposition platform in parliament shranked and civil society was unable to unite around a common agenda. Implementation of the new constitution was also derailed, and more than 400 pieces of legislation aimed at realigning the legal framework with the new constitution remained stalled at the end of the year.

Zimbabwe’s declining economy was beset by many challenges in 2014, including deindustrialization, limited capital expenditure, budget deficits, scarce foreign direct investment, and huge external debt. The government’s economic blueprint, The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), launched in 2013, failed to produce results in 2014. In response to the country’s continued...
economic decline, CSOs focused increasingly on social service delivery and the informal economy that operates outside of state-controlled structures. Many CSOs traditionally engaged in civic education, national advocacy campaigns, and public interest litigation began to tie their work to social service delivery and the right to basic services such as health, education, and shelter. CSOs themselves were not immune to the country’s economic challenges. Many donor countries seemed to adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards Zimbabwe in 2014, which was reflected in their stagnant or declining support for CSOs or reprioritization of the types of organizations to fund.

Relations between the government and civil society remained deeply mistrustful during the year. CSOs accused the government of authoritarianism, and the government continued to claim that CSOs peddle an imperialist agenda inimical to the national interest. The government’s position was reiterated in resolutions issued at the December 2014 ZANU-PF conference. Although some organizations made progress in reengaging with the government, most CSOs working on democracy and governance issues were still vilified as the government’s enemy. However, the year witnessed less violence directly targeting civil society and ordinary citizens, as unrest was generally linked to succession politics in the ruling party and the opposition.

According to the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO), there are 993 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Zimbabwe. Other estimates suggest there are more than 5,000 trusts and common law organizations known as universitas. There is no publicly available record of registered legal entities, but recent unconfirmed statements by government officials put the total number of CSOs operating in Zimbabwe at more than 20,000.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

CSOs in Zimbabwe register either as PVOs under the PVO Act or as trusts under the Deeds Registries Act. CSOs can also operate as common law universitas, which are organizations that exist as legal persons in accordance with common law principles. Because the PVO Board sits infrequently to process applications and its requirements for documentation are cumbersome, it is easier for an organization to register as a trust or to operate as a universitas than to register as a PVO.

The legal environment for CSO operations in Zimbabwe did not change noticeably in 2014, despite the adoption of a progressive constitution with an expanded bill of rights in 2013. Because of the government’s failure to align legislation with the new constitution, repressive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which impedes freedoms of assembly and association, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which impedes freedoms of the press and of speech, are still in force. In particular, the PVO Act continues to undermine CSO sustainability because of its burdensome registration and reporting requirements. Although some donors consider registration under the PVO Act a prerequisite for funding, it is an unattractive prospect for most CSOs.

The absence of a major political event such as elections and the focus on infighting within ZANU-PF led to a decrease in the harassment and arbitrary detention of civil society actors in 2014. Nevertheless, several notable instances occurred. In an unprecedented move, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust was compelled to divulge its funding sources and expenditures to the governmental Zimbabwe Youth Council. The organization Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) was charged under POSA with convening an illegal demonstration without police permission, and members of WOZA were arrested and later released. The peaceful anti-government protest known as Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUSS) was violently quashed by the police in October and November 2014, and its leader was arrested, brutally assaulted by the police, and hospitalized for injuries.
The government continued its efforts to neutralize, through public vilification, the influence of democracy and governance CSOs, including the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Elections Resource Center, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, and Zimbabwe Peace Project. The government also continued to promote parallel organizations for students and labor, thereby limiting the capacity of those populations to create their own legitimate organizations. District and provincial administrators increasingly demanded that organizations sign memoranda of understanding to implement activities in their jurisdictions. Although there is no legal requirement for such agreements and CSOs saw the demand as a threat to their civil liberties, some organizations complied so as to continue their programs.

PVOs are entitled to tax exemptions and waivers on import duties. Other types of organizations enjoy tax exemptions if they cooperate with PVOs or other tax-exempt entities, such as development agencies. All CSOs are allowed to earn income through the provision of goods and services.

The CSO sector benefits from the existence of legal defense funds run by organizations such as the Legal Resources Foundation, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA), and Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. These organizations have programs that offer legal education and public interest litigation on a pro-bono basis and help human rights CSOs and activists in dire legal straits because of their work. Collectively these organizations operate an expansive network of lawyers throughout the country, who are conversant with CSO law and other laws that have an impact on CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

In 2014 CSOs continued to reach out broadly to constituencies. CSOs that are active at the community level have better contact with their constituencies than national organizations, which are often accused of not representing the communities that they purport to serve or of focusing only on urban populations. National CSOs largely act as brokers of information, awareness raisers, and advocates, while CBO and emerging CSO movements are better attuned to specific challenges and aspirations within their communities. The real challenge in constituency building for Zimbabwean CSOs involves networking: both national and community-based CSOs often link horizontally with similar organizations, while vertical networking between national organizations and CBOs is less developed. However, despite limited funding and restrictive working conditions, many CSOs have expanded their reach to include people in marginalized and programmatically neglected peri-urban areas. Organizations increasingly use social media, especially on hand-held devices, to mobilize and inform their constituents.

Most organizations of all types have defined missions and visions to guide their operations. Due to limited resources from donors, however, CSOs often have to take on a broader portfolio of programs or adjust existing mission-led initiatives to compete effectively for funds. Most established PVOs and trusts updated their strategic plans after the 2013 harmonized election introduced significant socio-economic and political shifts. CBOs found it more challenging to absorb post-election changes through the structured process of a strategic review. Very few organizations have the resources to put changes in strategic planning into practice immediately.

Most CSOs in Zimbabwe are led by some variant of a board, usually referred to as advisers, trustees, or managers. However, there is a lack of understanding of the role of the board, which has led to governance challenges at some CSOs. For example, in 2014 internal disputes took a public turn at two large CSOs, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and NANGO, when their boards and staff fell out. Smaller CSOs often have boards that exist on paper but do not convene, raising serious accountability issues and sometimes allegations of the misuse of resources by staff. These governance challenges suggest that there is a capacity weakness bedeviling the vast number of CSOs, resulting in weak internal controls and poor moral leadership from the boards.
With high unemployment rates and low salaries in the public and private sectors, the CSO sector, especially international organizations, is considered a lucrative employer for qualified personnel. A number of CSO employees have benefitted from scholarships and fellowships abroad, which often lead to their recruitment by international organizations and the depletion of capacity at local CSOs. Resource constraints usually mean that CSOs offer their staff fixed-term renewable contracts. This can result in high staff turnover as employees seek better paying jobs elsewhere.

To meet the challenge of limited resources, civil society has begun to promote a volunteer culture, and some communities now offer volunteer labor and in-kind support to CSO initiatives. Volunteers often assist in community mobilization or data gathering for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Many CSOs utilize professional services in information technology, auditing, and law.

Most organizations in urban areas have standard to state-of-the-art equipment, including computers, cameras, and off-road vehicles. Smaller CBOs in some rural areas have neither electricity nor Internet access and thus cannot use computers or other equipment, even if it is donated.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Most Zimbabwean CSOs receive funding from international donors either directly or through intermediary support organizations (ISOs). This funding has consistently accounted for 80 to 100 percent of CSO budgets, feeding perceptions that CSOs serve Western agendas and impeding their development as independent, self-sustaining organizations. Overall, donor funding for CSOs was stagnant or declined in 2014. Some donors set new priorities on the types of organizations that they fund.

As a result of the adverse economic and political situation in the country, there is no systematic support for civil society from the local private sector or independent philanthropic organizations. Although some CSOs have begun to explore the possibility of working with businesses, these efforts have not been met with much interest. In particular, the private sector is reluctant to associate with CSOs working in governance and human rights, as it can lead to loss of economic benefits such as contracts from the government. State-sponsored organizations formed to displace legitimate civil society actors seem to receive government funding, although the exact source of this support is hard to discern. With Zimbabwe now in dialogue with the European Union and able to access the European Development Fund (EDF), it is possible that a formal arrangement to allow for government support of civil society will be introduced in 2015.

With the exception of larger organizations operating at the national level, most CSOs do not have diversified sources of funding. Even if an organization has multiple donors, a single donor usually contributes more than 60 percent of its budget. The resource drought has prompted some organizations to formulate longer-term financial sustainability plans that include innovative approaches to project and organizational sustainability. For example, issue-based coalitions and collaborative programming among organizations multiplied in 2014, following a model that some international donors have stated is preferable to support for single organizations. Other CSOs have developed mixed approaches to enhancing sustainability—for example, by combining charitable activities with a business on the side. Magamba Activist Network sponsors activities for youth at no cost to the beneficiaries, and as an arts and culture organization it also stages festivals and hip-hop, comedy, and spoken word events on a commercial basis. Some organizations continued to rent out conference centers and other facilities or rely on subscription fees and paid consultancies. In 2014 the Research and Advocacy Unit began to offer research services to CSOs on a paid basis, and Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ) continued to offer consultancy services on organizational development and capacity building. The Legal Resources Foundation operates a printing press as part of its business model.

Most organizations have financial management systems, as they recognize that they must demonstrate to donors that they can appropriately use and keep track of funds. Smaller CSOs that do not have sufficient
technical expertise to meet donors’ financial and project management requirements are sometimes incubated by bigger, more established organizations to obtain the required skills. A significant number of CSOs operating as PVOs and trusts conduct annual organizational audits. Some donors, such as USAID, request project-specific audits as well.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

Overall, CSO advocacy did not improve significantly in 2014, largely because of long-standing hostilities between the central government and CSOs. To a certain extent, dialogue was enhanced between CSOs and the state. For example, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition engaged with the Deputy Minister of Justice on constitutionalism; the Center for Applied Legal Research (CALR) entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Justice to provide technical assistance on implementing the new constitution; and CSOs engaged with the Ministry of Youth on natural resource governance in Chisumbanje. CSOs also reported increased cooperation with other branches of the government. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) and Oxfam cooperated on projects with the Human Rights Commission; Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and Elections Resource Center (ERC) collaborated with the Zimbabwe Election Commission; and ZLHR, traditionally seen as an enemy of the state, pursued increased dialogue with parliament and carried out capacity building activities with the judiciary, supported by the International Commission of Jurists.

Nevertheless, improved CSO-government engagement was undercut by persistent mistrust, especially after the purge in ZANU-PF, which removed government officials who had seemed open to working with civil society. Moreover, the government’s failure to implement the new constitution delayed the establishment of commissions that are important to CSOs, including a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) and Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC).

With donors urging CSOs to structure themselves as consortiums, coalitions, and networks, more joint campaigns addressed public accountability issues in 2014. For example, ZimRights spearheaded the Public Accountability Campaign (PAC) to address the hefty salaries and perks enjoyed by some public servants and heads of parastatals; the women’s movement coordinated an effective national campaign during the annual Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence; and more permanent coalitions continued to tackle a wide range of issues, including elections (ZESN), governance (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition), women’s issues (Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe), and human rights (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum). Residents’ associations also formed alliances to push for better service delivery, accountability from local authorities, and the devolution of decision making. In 2014 the Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BUPRA) mobilized residents against prepaid water meters, and the Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) set up a coalition of residents’ associations to ensure a coordinated position on social service delivery. Other CSOs focused on workers in informal sectors. For example, in 2014 the National Association of Vendors Unions in Zimbabwe (NAVUZ) helped establish an association of vendors in informal sectors, thus giving a voice at the national level to this growing community.

There has been little progress in advocacy efforts to reform the legal framework for CSOs, although a number of activities took place in 2014. For example, to counteract the challenges posed by the PVO Act, NANGO attempted to resuscitate discussion of its draft NGO Bill for Civil Society. However, this effort fell flat, as CSOs generally saw no value in subjecting themselves to government control through a legislative process and expressed a preference for self-regulation instead. Self-regulatory initiatives are still under discussion in the CSO sector.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

CSOs in Zimbabwe offer basic social services in a broad range of fields, including health, education, and food relief. In 2014 many organizations intensified their efforts in social service delivery, as government
services in water reticulation, electricity, education, refuse collection, and other areas deteriorated below acceptable standards. CSOs also continued to work on transitional justice, conflict resolution, human rights protection, research and analysis, communications, democratization, environment, and natural resources management.

CSO services and products by and large represent community needs. A substantial number of organizations in the service sectors have a presence in their communities and enjoy productive relationships with community leaders, including district administrators, chiefs, and local headmen. This capacity was best exemplified in 2014 by the operations of Care International, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, Christian Care, and other relief agencies.

The government seems to recognize the role that CSOs play in the development process, especially in service provision. Pronouncements from various government officials clearly show that this is the role they prefer CSOs to play, and during disasters or emergencies, ministry officials and local elected representatives may call publicly on CSOs to respond. However, once CSOs have provided services, these same officials are often quick to underplay CSOs’ role by claiming credit for the services themselves.

Larger international organizations have been awarded tenders by international funding agencies to help the government implement programs in food assistance, tuberculosis control, and HIV/AIDS. These interventions are often carried out in collaboration with local organizations, which have limited direct access to international tenders and government contracts.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

ISOs, such as Pact International and Hivos have established training and other programs to support CSOs in organizational development, strategic planning, project management, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation. Many donors, including USAID, made efforts in 2014 to enhance the organizational capacity of CSOs and CBOs. For example, the Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (OCAT) was used widely to identify capacity needs and offer remedial support. A new tool, the Organizational Network Analysis Tool (ONAT), was used to measure networking capacity and enhance collaboration among organizations. Generally, these programs were limited to organizations that are partners of the donors. ISOs usually meet the needs of CSOs that use them, although their concentration in the capital and major cities hinders their reach to CBOs in rural areas. ISOs derive revenue from charges for administrative costs. They often have arrangements with international donors to provide sub-grants to local organizations as part of larger CSO support programs.

A number of CSOs and CSO coalitions offer information services to the sector. For example, information on the media is available from the Media Center and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). The Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Center and Network is a valuable resource for information on women’s and gender issues. Long-term and permanent coalitions that share information with members include the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development, and ZESN.

Partnerships with business have mainly focused on social issues such as health, education, climate change, and the environment. For example, in 2014 Econet Wireless teamed with CSOs and the government to provide assistance to victims of the flooding in Tokwe Mukosi.
In general, the mainstream private media remained highly supportive of CSOs in 2014. Their positive coverage helped to raise awareness of CSO initiatives. CSOs continued to have access to and air programs on radio stations, such as the Voice of the People, SW Radio Africa (before its closure on August 10 2014), Voice of America, Star FM, and ZiFM.

In contrast, the state media in Zimbabwe vilified CSOs as foreign-funded elites. While this was not a new phenomenon, in 2014 the state media’s criticism of CSOs was perhaps worse than at any previous time, especially as it was buttressed by internal disputes at some organizations. A prominent case concerned the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, where there was an internal dispute involving allegations of financial impropriety. The public nature of this dispute, which was widely covered in state and private media, severely damaged the reputation of the organization and gave credence to claims that such cases are representative of the CSO sector as a whole.

The public is generally appreciative of the work of CSOs and often willingly participates in their programs. Organizations providing humanitarian aid and assistance in health, education, and livelihoods are generally perceived more favorably than those working on democracy, rights, and governance. The government has a love-hate relationship with CSOs; while it sees them as a threat to its power, it also appreciates some organizations, especially those that provide services. The private sector tends to watch CSOs from a distance, because it is afraid of government reprisals if it supports “anti-government” organizations.

To raise their public profile, CSOs produce materials such as mosquito nets, t-shirts, caps, umbrellas, and cups. Some organizations use social media to communicate with their constituencies and within their networks. For instance, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has accumulated nearly 100,000 likes on Facebook since 2011. Other organizations, such as ZimRights, Zimbabwe Peace Project, and Kubatana, use bulk text messaging on cell phones to reach out to members and constituents. CSOs also host events such as media briefings, press conferences, and editors’ forums to network with journalists and inform them about their activities. Some organizations employ journalists who have worked in private and state-owned media and can serve as entry points to media outlets.

Most CSOs produce and issue annual reports to inform their members about their work, fundraising activities, and finances. In 2014, CSOs renewed discussion about CSO self-regulation through the adoption of a regulatory and ethical framework. This conversation was still ongoing at the end of the year, with a small committee composed of the NANGO board, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Counseling Services Unit (CSU), and ZLHR leading the process.
2014 CSO Sustainability Scores for Zimbabwe

Legal Environment

Public Image

Organizational Capacity

Infrastructure

Financial Viability

Service Provision

Advocacy

CSO Sustainability

Zimbabwe

Sustainability

Enhanced

Evolving

Impeded
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector’s performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, the Aga Khan Foundation and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the category of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the implementing partner and local expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s score recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

I. DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs' effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.

Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector’s ability to engage in constituency building and strategic planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.
**Financial Viability**

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

**Advocacy**

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs' record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

**Service Provision**

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

**Infrastructure**

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary to provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

**Public Image**

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs’ ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media's coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs’ public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.

## II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2014 CSO (Civil Society Organization) Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa. The reporting year will cover the period of January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014.

1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8-10 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts. Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. If desired, the panel may include one representative from the USAID Mission, who would observe the process but not cast a vote on the scores. The panel members
should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

- local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
- local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business or media;
- think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users groups;
- international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
- other local partners familiar with civil society.

2. MSI recommends that the Expert Panel be primarily nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. They should also represent women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub-sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should include an equal representation of men and women. If the implementer believes that this will not be possible please explain why in a note submitted to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com) at MSI for consideration prior to undertaking the panel.

3. In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult – and more expensive if it entails arranging transportation for panelists who are based far from the capital. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels. Should the implementer wish to pursue this additional task, the methodology should be outlined and submitted to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com) at MSI for consideration and discussion prior to undertaking the regional panels.

4. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise. The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Report and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Report is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

5. MSI recommends distributing the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it is useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

6. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel. MSI requests that implementers plan to complete this meeting no later than January 15, 2015, for the 2014 exercise.

7. At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the Africa CSO Sustainability Report should be scored according to relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events in the country. They should review the previous
year’s score prior to reviewing the indicators for the current year. The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.”

8. For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every score should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

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<th>Financial Viability</th>
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9. After the panel has come to a score for each dimension, compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a lower score.

10. Note that the Sustainability Index methodology recognizes that change tends to be incremental and that most dimensions of the Index will not change radically from year to year. As a result, the Editorial Committee generally only recommends a change of .1 for modest changes in a dimension. A change of .2 is considered very significant and is recommended only for major changes in a dimension. Larger differences are generally only warranted if there are radical changes in a country’s political environment that impacted CSOs.

11. Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

12. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

13. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. that will provide feedback on recommended scores and possibly request adjustments in scores pending additional justification of scores.

14. Prepare a draft country report. The report should cover the calendar year 2014 (January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014). The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief
discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

15. In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that MSI is relying on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as it does not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel with the report. This will be for MSI's reference only and will not be made public.

16. Before finalizing your report, please ensure that it meets the following criteria:

(1) The score for each dimension must be within 0.3 of the score on the previous year's report. Please refer to the instructions for an explanation of what each 0.1 score change means.

(2) All indicators for which there were changes from the previous year are addressed in the narrative section for each dimension. (If there was no change in a specific indicator, please state “there was no change in” that indicator.)

(3) The narrative description of each dimension includes sufficient specific examples from the year covered by the report.

(4) If there are no changes in a dimension, the report must state “no events or changes in this dimension.” Do not simply copy sections from the previous year’s report.

(5) Reports must include a 1 – 2 paragraph overview of key trends in the country context that affect CSOs and their constituencies.

17. Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to Vanessa Coulomb (vcoulomb@msi-inc.com) at MSI no later than January 15, 2014 unless MSI approved a later delivery date in your work plan.

The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content.

18. Revise the report. Within 2 weeks of receiving your draft report, MSI will send you an edited version of your report that has been copy edited for grammar, style and content. As necessary, the editors will request that you revise the reports on the 5 criteria laid out in step 9. Please request any clarification needed as soon as possible, then submit your revised report within 2 weeks of receiving feedback from the editors.

19. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores, ratings, and draft country reports, and it will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.” If the EC determines that the panel’s scores or ratings are not adequately supported by the description provided in the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the description be strengthened and the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

20. Once the 2014 Africa report is approved by USAID for distribution, MSI will send you both electronic and hard copies of the final report so you can conduct outreach activities to promote its distribution in your country. Examples of such outreach activities are: a reception, a presentation of
the findings of the report, electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) posting on websites. The final public reports will be made available in English and French. Please note that it is very important that outreach activities and distribution of the final report do not begin before you receive the final report confirmation.

21. MSI is very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Report to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. MSI would appreciate if implementers would record and submit observations that may increase the usefulness of this important tool to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com). To the extent feasible, please submit observations that cover your experiences with each step outlined above.

The Role of the Editorial Committee

All country reports are reviewed and discussed by the Editorial Committee (EC) composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, D.C. This committee is chaired by a USAID representative and it includes additional USAID representatives with regional expertise. The committee also includes civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports, scores, and ratings to ensure that country report narratives are well written and compelling, and that they support the scores and ratings. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score and rating is based on sufficient evidence (i.e., systematic and widespread cases or situations) and is not based on one or two individual or random cases or situations. For example, if a country has a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that can raise funds locally from diverse sources, there would be a compelling justification for a favorable financial viability score and rating. On the other hand, if a country has only one or two CSOs with the ability to raise funds from diverse sources, a favorable financial viability score would be less justified. The EC also ensures that the rating for each dimension meets the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” so that scores and narratives accurately reflect the sustainability of civil society in each country. Finally, and most importantly, the EC considers a country’s scores and ratings in relation to the scores for other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across Sub-Saharan Africa and across other regions covered by the CSO Sustainability Index Report, including the Middle East- North Africa and Europe and Eurasia.

The USAID Chair of the EC has the final say on all scores and may contact an implementer directly to discuss a panel’s scores and to clarify items in the country report prior to finalizing the scores and country reports.

Implementers are encouraged to remind panels from the outset that the EC may ask for further clarification of scores and ratings, and may modify scores and ratings where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare its scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the EC does), there will be less of a need for the EC to adjust scores. Ensuring that the country report narrative for each dimension adequately justifies the corresponding score will also reduce the need for the EC to make adjustments or to request clarification.

III. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

DEFINITIONS:

Throughout the process of developing a country report for the CSO Sustainability Report, please use the following definitions:

Civil Society Organization (CSO): Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service
agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”4

**CSO Independence:** In many countries, government, political parties, and private companies establish and support CSOs. However, the CSO Sustainability Report includes only organizations and groups that are self-governing, with a distinct legal and/or functional identity. CSOs typically include informal non-registered groups, but to be included in the Report they must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships.

**PROCESS:**

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, and the evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

**Step 1:** Review the prior country report, taking note of each dimension score and the narrative supporting it. For the current edition of the country report, every dimension score must be within 0.3 above or below the dimension scores in the previous year’s report, and the narrative must explain how the situation has changed to justify the change in dimension score.

**Step 2:** Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

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<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
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<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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Step 3: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

Step 4: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.

Step 5: Review the country report from the previous year and compare the dimension score against the score you derived for the dimension. Make sure that the change from the previous year is within 0.3 and is justified by changes in the situation of CSOs within that dimension. Review the information on the following page about score changes and adjust dimension scores as necessary.

Step 6: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” and you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 7: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion.

SCORING SCALE:

The CSO Sustainability Report uses a seven-point scale, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. These levels are clustered into three general stages: Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7). The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1 The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2 The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3 The civil society sector’s sustainability somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4 The civil society sector’s sustainability minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5 The civil society sector’s sustainability somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6 The civil society sector’s sustainability impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7 The civil society sector’s sustainability significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.
For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look,” which is attached.

**SCORING CHANGES FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR:**

Because most change in the CSO sector is incremental, changes in dimension scores from the previous year must be within a range of 0.1 to 0.3 above or below the dimension score in the previous year. Changes in dimension scores from the previous year have the following significance:

0.1  Moderate change

0.2  Significant change

0.3  Cataclysmic and often unexpected change

**IV. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS**

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT ______**

___ **REGISTRATION.** Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

___ **OPERATION.** Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

___ **ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT.** Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

___ **LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.** Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

___ **TAXATION.** Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

___ **EARNED INCOME.** Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY ______**

___ **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.** Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

___ **STRATEGIC PLANNING.** Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

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5 Constituency building: Attempts by CSOs to get individual citizens or groups of citizens personally involved in their activities, and to ensure that their activities represent the needs and interests of these citizens.
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE. Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?

CSO STAFFING. Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff in CSOs? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT. Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

LOCAL SUPPORT. Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

DIVERSIFICATION. Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS. Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

FUNDRAISING. Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

EARNED INCOME. Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

ADVOCACY

COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES. Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

LOBBYING EFFORTS. Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM. Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc?

6 Advocacy: Attempts by CSOs to shape the public agenda, public opinion and/or legislation.
7 Lobbying: Attempts by CSOs to directly influence the legislative process.
**SERVICE PROVISION _____**

___ **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

___ **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

___ **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches or government?

___ **COST RECOVERY.** When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

___ **GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.** Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

**INFRASTRUCTURE _____**

___ **INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.** Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

___ **LOCAL GRANTMAKING ORGANIZATIONS.** Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

___ **CSO COALITIONS.** Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

___ **TRAINING.** Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

___ **INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.** Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

**PUBLIC IMAGE _____**

___ **MEDIA COVERAGE.** Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the

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8 Intermediary support organization (ISO): A place where CSOs can access training and technical support. ISOs may also provide grants. CSO resource center: A place where CSOs can access information and communications technology.
media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

___ **PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?

___ **GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

___ **PUBLIC RELATIONS.** Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

___ **SELF-REGULATION.** Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?
## ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
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### COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORES

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