The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index
for Sub-Saharan Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Bureau for Africa
Office of Sustainable Development
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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the fifth edition of the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Index assesses key components of the sustainability of the civil society organization (CSO) sectors in twenty-five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including countries in East, West, and Southern Africa.

The CSOSI highlights both advances and setbacks in CSO sector sustainability, and allows for comparisons across countries and sub-regions over time in seven key components, or “dimensions.” The Index is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability of the CSO sector.

The Index’s methodology relies on CSO practitioners and experts who form an expert panel to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of the sustainability of the CSO sector: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The scores for each dimension are averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector in a given country. An Editorial Committee comprised of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining standards of quality and promoting cross-country comparability. The Index utilizes three overarching categories: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements publications covering other regions. The seventeenth edition of the CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which includes twenty-nine countries, was published in August 2014. An edition covering seven countries in the Middle East and North Africa was added in 2011. In addition, the Aga Khan Foundation supports the publication of CSO Sustainability Indexes covering Afghanistan and Pakistan, bringing the total number of countries covered by various editions of the Index to sixty-three.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. This publication was made possible in part by the financial support provided by the Aga Khan Foundation, specifically for the assessments of Kenya and Mali. In the Acknowledgments section on the following page, we also recognize the implementing partners in each country, who played the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would further like to express our gratitude to the CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this Index is based.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to advance their communities and their countries. In 2013, they responded to diverse national developments—rapid economic expansion, heated elections, increased citizen demands to government, humanitarian crises, and political tensions. CSOs advocated to advance democratic constitutional reform, promote peace during elections, and push back against restrictions on civil society; provided services during droughts and armed conflict; and implemented projects to promote economic and social development and empower marginalized populations.

The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa evaluates the strength and viability of the CSO sectors in twenty-five countries in East Africa, West Africa, and Southern Africa. As in 2012, ten of the twenty-five countries were in the Sustainability Impeded category, the weakest level of CSO sustainability. The other fifteen countries remained in Sustainability Evolving, the middle range of CSO sustainability. No country transitioned to a different category of sustainability in 2013 and no country reached Sustainability Enhanced, the strongest level of CSO sustainability, in any dimension.

Only three countries reported changes in their sectors’ overall viability in 2013. Sudan and Malawi demonstrated overall deterioration in the sustainability of their CSO sectors. In both countries, CSOs working on advocacy were subject to heightened state restrictions. In Sudan, CSO financial viability was affected as international organizations were forced to close after being accused of supporting the rebels and going beyond their relief work to expose human rights violations and atrocities. In Malawi, both the legal environment and CSO advocacy declined as a result of state harassment. Meanwhile, Tanzania experienced overall improvement—CSOs launched initiatives, mobilized constituencies, and garnered public support around the constitutional review process, leading to improvements in several dimensions.

Service provision and advocacy remain the strongest dimensions of CSO sustainability. CSO sectors in many of the countries studied provide a diverse range of services—from traditional services, such as health, education, and sanitation, to newer areas like legal aid and training to other sectors. During the year, CSO advocacy addressed a variety of topics, including constitutional reform, peace in the face of tense elections, anti-corruption measures, government decentralization, health, education, land and agricultural issues, and a variety of human rights issues. About one-third of the countries covered in the Index experienced improvement in advocacy in 2013, as was the case in 2012.

Financial viability remains the weakest dimension of sustainability. CSO sectors continue to rely on short-term international donor funding, while such funding continues to decline. There are some instances of government funding, philanthropy, and other local sources of support, but these sources of funding are not common across the countries covered in the Index.

Angola continues to have the weakest CSO sector. Angolan
CSOs face a difficult and unclear legal framework that gives the government wide latitude to interfere in their abilities to form and operate. Meanwhile, donor funding opportunities are declining, while local sources of funding remain scarce. Due to the lack of funding, many CSOs exist only on paper. It is estimated that less than 10 percent of the approximately 300 registered CSOs implemented projects in 2013. CSOs continue to lack internal accountability or long-term strategies. At the same time, although there is very limited civic space and CSO advocacy remains weak, Angolan CSOs launched a few impactful advocacy initiatives in 2013.

South Africa continues to have the strongest CSO sector among the surveyed countries. CSOs in South Africa generally do not report state interference or harassment. An online system for registration was introduced in 2013 to facilitate faster registration. Many CSOs build local constituencies and implement strategic planning techniques to identify and address local needs, and CSOs strive to have professional staff and internal management structures. CSOs in South Africa have diversified resources, including significant corporate support, a growing number of volunteers, international funding, individual donations, and income-generation from government-contracted projects.

CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa faced several common issues in 2013 that affected their sustainability, both positively and negatively.

• **Increasing restrictions on civic space:** Governments around the world have increasingly restricted civil society and civic space in recent years, a trend highlighted at a side event hosted by President Obama on the margins of the 68th United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2013. Sub-Saharan Africa has not been exempt from this trend. Nearly half of the countries covered by the *CSO Sustainability Index* have legal environment scores falling in the Sustainability Impeded category, with several others falling at the bottom of Sustainability Evolving. Government harassment—particularly targeting advocacy and human rights groups—is a common characteristic in these countries. Four countries—Malawi, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—reported worsening legal environments in 2013 as a result of increased government restrictions and pressure on CSOs. Even in countries with more favorable enabling environments, governments made efforts to restrict civic space in 2013. For example, in Kenya members of parliament sought to pass restrictive amendments to the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act, while in Botswana, the government prevented journalists from applying to, or affiliating with, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), which it considers an enemy of the state. In Rwanda, although the legal environment governing CSOs is fairly enabling, the political environment is still unfavorable for expressing dissent and the very few CSOs that are active in human rights have suffered from apparent government interference in their internal affairs. CSOs in many of these countries, including Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, pushed back against potentially repressive laws or regulations.

• **Violent conflict impacts CSOs’ work:** Conflicts in Nigeria, Sudan, and South Sudan restricted the work of CSOs. Violent attacks by the Boko Haram militant group in northeastern Nigeria restricted the movement of people in the region, preventing CSOs from operating freely. In response to fighting in Darfur and other regions, the Government of Sudan heightened restrictions on CSOs that were providing humanitarian assistance. In South Sudan, a political/ethnic conflict erupted towards the end of 2013, driving many CSOs to flee the country or go underground to escape targeting by security operatives. In Mali, CSOs responded to the accelerated invasion of the country by separatists and Islamist rebels and the ensuing humanitarian crisis by stepping up their constituency building, advocacy, and service provision efforts to mitigate the crisis.

• **Economic developments affect financial sustainability, service provision, and advocacy:** While several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—including DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania—experienced tremendous economic growth in 2013, income inequality, poverty, and unemployment remain pressing issues throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, thereby increasing demand for CSO services. As a result, CSOs are driven to focus on economic empowerment projects, including advocacy for more equitable income distribution, to ensure that foreign investments in national industries benefit the general population, as well as activities to promote greater transparency in profitable sectors, particularly extractive industries. Meanwhile, South Africa’s stagnant economy and Liberia’s dramatically reduced national budget weakened CSO service provision in
2013, and government overspending in Ghana and new taxes in The Gambia undermined CSO financial viability.

- **CSOs actively engage in peace and electoral issues:** In Kenya, CSOs worked with the government and private sector to prevent violence during the general elections, the first since the adoption of the 2010 constitution. CSOs in Malawi also shifted their focus to electoral issues in the run-up to the tripartite elections scheduled for 2014. In Ghana, CSOs urged the country to remain calm while the Supreme Court reviewed a petition challenging the December 2012 presidential election results. CSOs in Zimbabwe also advocated for peace during the general elections in 2013, even as harassment of CSOs increased in the run-up to the elections. In Guinea, CSOs contributed to the public dialogue to diffuse the political tension surrounding the first legislative elections in the country since 2007. In Mali, CSOs advocated to promote citizen participation in the 2013 presidential and legislative elections.

Reliable data on the size of CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa is not always available. The Mozambique, Sudan, and Zambia reports note a lack of data on the number of CSOs. In Malawi and South Africa, precise figures are not available because of a lack of coordination between the different government bodies that register CSOs. In other countries, the number of registered CSOs may be known, but these do not take into account groups operating without registration or those that remain registered despite no longer being active. For example, in Ghana, there are over 6,000 CSOs registered with the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), but only 805 renewed their operating permits in 2013, a process that should be undertaken annually.

Keeping in mind these data limitations, Angola may have the smallest active sector: while 301 CSOs are registered, it is estimated that just 10 percent implemented projects in 2013. Other countries with just hundreds of registered CSOs include Gabon, Zambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. The countries with the largest sectors include Kenya, with 30,000 registered societies, 7,200 registered NGOs, and over 300,000 community-based organizations, many of which are provisionally registered; South Africa, with over 116,000 registered CSOs; and Nigeria, with more than 63,000 registered CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

The legal environment governing CSOs remains one of the weakest dimensions of sustainability, with twelve countries in the Sustainability Impeded category, and a few more countries—Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Liberia—with scores that place them close to the Sustainability Impeded threshold.

In 2013, the legal environment deteriorated in four countries: Malawi, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, which were already in Sustainability Impeded, and Zambia, which is now approaching the Sustainability Impeded threshold. In Malawi, the relationship between the government and CSOs that work on issues of political and economic governance, policy analysis, and advocacy deteriorated in 2013, with some CSO leaders reporting confrontational calls from top government officials regarding their advocacy work. In Sudan, the government introduced new restrictions on CSO registration and operations in 2013 in response to the surge of youth demonstrations. In the run-up to the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe, the government increasingly used the Public Order and Security Act and other repressive laws, with the police charging and harassing human rights defenders and organizations engaged in voter education. In Zambia, the government increased pressure on all CSOs to register under the restrictive NGO Act, which allows the NGO Board to determine CSOs’ geographical and thematic areas of activity and cancel the registration of CSOs that act beyond those areas. Police also selectively applied the Public Order Act to shut down public meetings of CSOs that were critical of the government. Meanwhile, the legal environment in Guinea improved, as the National Service for the Regulation and Promotion of Associative Movements (SERPROMA) responsible for registering CSOs developed its capacity and reduced the occurrence of corruption in the registration process.
In a majority of countries, CSO registration is considered a burdensome process, which may involve difficult, or numerous documentation requirements, multiple application steps, lengthy delays in application decisions, the need to travel to capital cities, expensive fees, arbitrary application decisions, or unclear procedures. For example, under the new law in Rwanda, a CSO must pay several fees and submit numerous documents, including CVs and judicial records of the organization’s legal representative and deputy, as well as a letter certifying collaboration with a local district. Many CSOs were unable to adapt to the law’s new requirements by the deadline in April 2013, resulting in a dramatic reduction in the number of registered CSOs. Registration procedures also worsened in Senegal: projects proposed in registration applications must now be certified by local authorities.

The registration process improved in Burundi, Mali, and South Africa in 2013. The time required to register in Burundi was reduced; registration procedures were decentralized in Mali; and South Africa introduced an online registration system. On the other hand, registration in Sudan and Liberia became more difficult in 2013. Sudan began requiring all applications for registration or renewal of registration to be examined by security authorities; and in Liberia the merger of the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance further delayed accreditation of CSOs.

In several countries, the law allows for significant limits on CSO operations. In Tanzania, CSO operations are limited to the geographical level at which a CSO registers, meaning, for example, that CSOs registered at the district level may not work beyond the district in which they registered. In 2013, Sudan began requiring CSOs registered at the national level to receive approval from each state where they seek to work, eliminating any benefit to being a national-level organization. In Ethiopia, the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation prevents CSOs engaging in human rights and governance issues from receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources; as a result, only 4 percent of Ethiopian CSOs work in these areas. Ambiguous language in legislation in some countries also makes CSOs vulnerable to government discretion over their activities. For example, in Malawi, CSOs are prohibited from being involved in “partisan politics,” and in The Gambia the NGO Decree specifies that NGOs may only work within the framework of “stated government policy.”

In the vast majority of countries surveyed, CSOs that criticize government policy, or work on human rights and other sensitive issues, are at risk of state harassment. For example, in South Sudan, military and security agents have made arbitrary arrests and leave menacing phone messages for CSOs. State harassment worsened this year in Sudan, Angola, and Zimbabwe. In Sudan, security forces began conducting surprise inspections of CSO offices and effecting immediate decisions, including closing organizations for alleged violations. In Angola, law enforcement made more arrests, summons, and interrogations to curb civil society movements that openly criticize the government or try to organize public demonstrations. In Zimbabwe, state harassment of advocacy-oriented CSOs heightened in the run-up to the 2013 election. State harassment has led many CSOs, including those in Botswana, Malawi, and The Gambia, to engage in self-censorship.
CSOs in many countries have difficulties accessing tax exemptions, either because the process is difficult; only limited exemptions are available, such as on goods for humanitarian purposes; or only a narrow class of CSOs is eligible. For example, in Mozambique, only the 5 percent of organizations designated as public utility institutions benefit from tax exemptions. Throughout the region, CSOs are generally allowed to earn income from goods and services, but in practice seldom do so.

In most countries covered by the Index there are few, if any, lawyers specialized or trained in CSO law. Skilled lawyers tend to be limited to urban areas and are geographically or financially out of reach for most of the CSO sector.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to struggle with organizational capacity. Twelve countries remain in the Sustainability Impeded category. Uganda and South Africa are the strongest in this dimension, while Burundi is the weakest.

Tanzania and The Gambia both showed some improvement in this dimension in 2013. In Tanzania, constituency building improved as various CSOs, including organizations of persons with disabilities and professional associations, mobilized their members to comment on the draft constitution. In addition, internal governance improved following trainings on organizational development provided by local organizations. In The Gambia, strategic planning is rapidly becoming common practice among CSOs of all sizes as they increasingly recognize its importance in fundraising efforts. Organizational capacity deteriorated in Nigeria and Sudan. In Nigeria, organizational capacity deteriorated due to the loss of local CSO employees to new donor-funded programs. In Sudan, CSOs are keeping a lower profile due to the worsening economic situation in the country, the heightened restrictions on CSOs, and the withdrawal or expulsion of some international donor organizations. These factors have made it difficult for CSOs to conduct outreach to constituencies and to engage in certain types of activities in some locations.

CSOs still struggle to mobilize long-term constituencies beyond their members. For example, in the DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan, relationships with local communities generally last only for the duration of specific projects. This is in part due to the lack of stable funding for community projects, which often drives CSOs to change their focus areas—and therefore their target groups—in pursuit of donor funding.

Throughout the countries surveyed, CSOs—especially smaller, less established ones—have difficulty creating and adhering to strategic plans. For example, in Sudan only about 25 percent of CSOs are estimated to have strategic plans, and fewer than 10 percent of CSOs adhere to them. Again, this is largely due to the unreliability of funding, which causes CSOs to frequently shift their activities to meet donor priorities and access funding. In Malawi, for example, CSOs that had sought funding for HIV/AIDS programs in 2012 applied for funding
for climate change projects in 2013 due to a shift in donor funding priorities. CSOs in several countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia, improved their strategic planning in 2013, in part due to donor capacity building efforts in this area.

As in previous years, in many countries, including Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia, larger, urban-based organizations are more likely to have clearly defined management structures than smaller, rural-based organizations. Many CSOs struggle to maintain separate roles between management and governance bodies. In addition, most CSOs throughout Sub-Saharan Africa have weak boards of directors. Several countries, such as Burundi, South Sudan, Gabon, The Gambia, and Kenya, report that individuals—whether founders, executive directors, or individual chairpersons—make all organizational decisions, reducing organizational transparency and accountability.

CSOs throughout the surveyed countries find it difficult to retain qualified permanent staff due to their lack of reliable funding and inability to offer competitive salaries. Larger, urban-based organizations are more likely to have permanent staff, while smaller, rural-based organizations are more likely to rely on short-term staff or volunteers. Declines in donor funding can often lead to downsizing of staff. For example, many CSO employees in Rwanda lost their jobs after the Global Fund reduced funding in the country. In addition, many CSOs lose staff to foreign organizations that offer better salaries, a trend more pronounced in Liberia and Nigeria in 2013.

CSOs throughout Sub-Saharan Africa increasingly have access to information and communications technology (ICT), including computers, smartphones, and Internet access. However, smaller, rural-based CSOs generally have less access to these technologies than their urban counterparts, both because of a lack of financial resources and the lack of electricity and connectivity.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

Financial viability remains the weakest dimension of sustainability. Nineteen of the twenty-five countries surveyed fall into the Sustainability Impeded category. Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Angola share the worst score in this dimension. South Africa continues to have the strongest score in this dimension, although even this is in the lower half of the Sustainability Evolving category.

Financial viability improved in just one country—Guinea—in 2013. Donors pledged almost $6 billion to the post-crisis country, resulting in more funding for CSO projects, particularly in the environmental field. In addition, the government established funds dedicated to women and youth employment. Financial viability deteriorated in Ghana and Sudan in 2013. In Ghana, donor funding declined as election-related funding ceased after the 2012 general election. In addition, development partners delayed the release of grants due to uncertainty over the outcome of hearings challenging the election results. In Sudan, amid the heightened monitoring of human rights organizations, the government annulled the licenses of several organizations in 2013 on the ground that they accessed foreign funding without being registered in the country.

Project-based donor funding remains the most significant source of funding for CSOs throughout the region. In 2013, donor funding opportunities declined in several countries including Ghana, Angola, Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, placing the viability of projects and organizations at risk. In Senegal, donors increasingly intervene directly with communities or provide funding to the government, instead of working with local CSOs. Official development assistance in both Ghana and Botswana continues to decline due to their classification by the World Bank as middle-income countries. Donor funding is also hampered by legal restrictions in a few countries, such as Ethiopia and Sudan. As noted above, Ethiopian CSOs receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources cannot engage in advocacy. However, the European Commission and World Bank signed agreements with the government in 2013 that allowed their grants to be considered local funds, and therefore accessible to advocacy groups. In Sudan, donor funding is hampered by the embargo and boycott of Sudan, as well as restrictions imposed by the Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC) on CSOs receiving resources from organizations not registered...
in the country. In 2013 more foreign funding was available in South Sudan for humanitarian services due to floods and violent conflict, and in Zambia for delivery of basic services, such as food security.

Throughout the region, local resources—from individuals, businesses, or government—are scarce. In several countries, such as the DRC, South Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Malawi, poverty is cited as a reason for the lack of individual philanthropy, volunteerism, and other community support. However, in some countries, including Liberia, The Gambia, and Zimbabwe, communities regularly volunteer and provide in-kind support for community projects, such as the construction of schools and health centers. In Mali, solidarity in the face of the invasion and resulting humanitarian crises led to more in-kind donations for CSOs engaged in emergency and recovery efforts. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) remains nascent in most countries. South Africa, where CSR from the top 100 companies has reached 7.8 billion rand (approximately $733 million), is a notable exception. CSR is gradually increasing in a few countries in the region, such as Sudan, Kenya, Zambia, and Angola. For example, in Angola, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), companies in the oil sector created a working group in 2013 to coordinate their CSR activities. In most countries, the government either does not provide grants (such as in Burundi and The Gambia), or the distribution of grants is small and arbitrary (such as in Gabon, Sudan, and Tanzania). One exception is Botswana, where the government provides substantial grant support through an alcohol levy created in 2011.

CSOs generally do not receive contracts from governments and businesses. Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions in countries with more sustainable CSO sectors. For example, in Kenya, the government contracted some CSOs to conduct civic education training in advance of the March 2013 general elections; and in Nigeria, the government contracted with a CSO to train women on empowerment skills and hygiene. In addition, CSOs in Mali received more local government service contracts this year to implement activities to mitigate the security crisis. While CSOs in many countries in the region are allowed to earn income from goods and services, few CSOs take advantage of this opportunity for a variety of reasons, including low capacity, a preference for foreign funding, the belief that constituents cannot afford to pay, and a mistaken belief that the terms and conditions of donor-funded grants do not allow them to engage in such projects.

The strength of financial management within CSOs varies. Several countries, including The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, and Zimbabwe, note that larger CSOs are more likely to have sound financial management systems, while smaller CSOs lack the means to maintain such systems. In Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Africa, laws impose financial reporting requirements, which drive CSOs to maintain financial management systems. In 2013, CSOs in Burundi, Guinea, Senegal, and the DRC strengthened their financial management primarily due to pressure to meet donor reporting requirements and pass external audits.
Advocacy is one of the strongest dimensions of CSO sustainability, with only four countries—Gabon, Guinea, Angola, and Ethiopia—in the Sustainability Impeded category, though South Sudan and The Gambia also fall at the very bottom of Sustainability Evolving. The advocacy dimension showed the most movement in 2013, with nine countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone in West Africa; and Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa) reporting improvement. In most of these countries, the improvement is at least partly attributed to increased CSO collaboration with government. In several of these countries, CSOs pushed back against potentially repressive laws or regulations, including the Public Order Management Act in Uganda, restrictive amendments to the Public Benefit Organization (PBO) Act in Kenya, and the Public Order and Security Act in Zimbabwe.

Kenya reports the strongest score in advocacy and showed further improvement in 2013. During the year, Kenyan CSOs were actively involved in the government decentralization process and advocacy for greater women and youth representation in governing bodies. CSOs also successfully lobbied the parliament to reject restrictive draft amendments to the PBO Act. Meanwhile, Ethiopia remains the weakest in this dimension, as the legal environment severely restricts CSOs’ ability to engage in advocacy.

Advocacy worsened in South Sudan, and even more so in Malawi. The ethno-political conflict of 2013 led the government of South Sudan to grow even more hostile to CSOs criticizing it, causing CSOs to self-censor. Advocacy in Malawi deteriorated dramatically due to the climate of fear under the new administration. In 2013, some CSO leaders reported receiving confrontational calls from a government official reprimanding them for public comments about socioeconomic and political developments in the country.

CSOs in most of the assessed countries report some level of CSO-government cooperation through various committees and working groups, although the government might not consistently include CSOs or consider CSOs’ input. Cooperation between CSOs and government improved in several countries in 2013. In Ghana, CSO presentations on drug, tobacco, and alcohol regulation led to the establishment of parliamentary and executive committees on these issues. CSO-government cooperation also improved in Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. However, the level of cooperation between CSOs and government often depends on the issues CSOs address. For example, in countries including Angola, Gabon, and Rwanda, civil society is more likely to engage with government on social service issues than human rights issues.

CSOs in the region continue to launch broad-based advocacy campaigns and form coalitions, though the success of these efforts may be limited due to ineffective advocacy skills, insufficient resources to monitor and respond to government decisions, or political environments that are not receptive to CSO input. Despite the lack of financial resources and difficult legal environments, CSOs in Angola, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Zambia increased their advocacy activity in 2013. For example, in Liberia, CSOs built nationwide public awareness around the draft Oil Law to ensure that the oil sector’s activities reflect the public interest. In Guinea, CSOs heightened awareness of the international rights of persons with disabilities. In addition, the CSO Publish What You Pay worked on transparency in the extractive industries and successfully prompted the government to publish all of its mining contracts online in 2013. In Angola, despite the very limited civic space, CSOs successfully pressured state institutions to release information about and launch a criminal investigation into the disappearance of two civic activists. CSOs in Sierra Leone achieved some national-level lobbying successes, including increased government funding to the health sector; enactment of the Access to Information Law; and inclusion of Women and Gender as a pillar in the country’s social and economic strategy. In Kenya, on the other hand, CSOs working in service delivery generally are reluctant to engage in advocacy because they perceive it as opposing the government and thereby damaging cooperative relations with the government, thereby negatively impacting their operations. In countries such as South Sudan and Zimbabwe, state harassment limits CSO advocacy.

CSO efforts in several countries—including Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan, Senegal, Uganda, The Gambia, Guinea, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—sought to address laws and policies affecting CSOs. For example, Ugandan CSOs lobbied the government not to implement legislation passed in 2013 that threatens civil society freedoms, including the Public Order Management Act and the Anti-Homosexuality Act. CSOs in Senegal continue to work on a new framework for regulating CSOs that would, among other things, promote a partnership relationship between CSOs and the state. However, in many countries, advocacy addressing the legal environment for CSOs is limited due to other advocacy priorities or perceived lack of ability to influence CSO law.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

Service provision remains the strongest dimension of sustainability, with only four countries—Gabon, Guinea, Sudan, and Angola—in the Sustainability Impeded category. South Africa has the strongest score in this dimension, while Angola has the weakest. There was little movement in this dimension in 2013: only Zambia demonstrated improvement and only Botswana showed some deterioration. In Zambia, national and local CSOs expanded their services in 2013 as a result of increases in funding, improvements in the road network that enabled service providers to reach more areas of the country, and the decreasing cost of Internet access and mobile communications. In Botswana, CSOs are moving away from their original missions to respond to donor priorities, and government recognition and support for CSOs has decreased.

The CSO sectors in several countries, including Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Zambia, provide a diverse range of services—from traditional areas, such as health, education, water, and sanitation, to newer areas like empowerment, governance, and even training to CSOs and other sectors. Other CSO sectors provide a more limited range of services, focusing on basic and humanitarian needs, especially where public services are insufficient. For example, most CSO programs in the DRC focus on the fight against poverty.
providing social services, basic healthcare, and education. CSOs in Mali played a key role in emergency and recovery efforts in the country in 2013, providing basic social services and emergency and humanitarian aid, as well as engaging in reconstruction and recovery, dialogue, social mediation and reconciliation, civic education, and the electoral process.

In several countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, The Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria, CSOs report employing community needs assessments, baseline surveys, and other approaches to consult their communities on needed services. CSOs in other countries, such as the DRC, Kenya, Botswana, and Mozambique, report that donor priorities—which might not reflect the needs of communities— influence the services they provide. In Ethiopia, local government authorities are responsible for ensuring that CSO projects are in line with government development strategies and the needs of the local community.

CSOs generally do not charge for the goods and services they provide, often because beneficiaries are unable to pay the market costs for services, and frequently the costs are covered by donor funding. Sometimes CSOs charge for publications or for consultancy services.

The extent of government recognition and support for CSO services varies. In a few countries, such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zambia, the government recognizes the value of CSOs in service provision, particularly where public services are inadequate, and even provides grants and contracts to CSOs to perform these services. In other countries, like The Gambia and Malawi, the government recognizes the value of CSOs, but provides little or no financing to CSOs for these services. In Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola, governments demonstrate little recognition or support of CSO service provision.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs continues to be relatively weak, with twelve countries in the Sustainability Impeded category. Another five countries—Rwanda, Nigeria, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe— have scores that place them near the Sustainability Impeded threshold. Kenya is the strongest in this dimension, while Angola is the weakest. There was little movement in this dimension this year: no country reported deterioration, while only Zambia showed some improvement. In Zambia, there was increased networking in the sector in response to the government’s heightened pressure on CSOs. For example, various networks formed to engage in the constitutional reform process.

In the vast majority of the countries covered in the Index, there are only a few CSO resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs) that serve the informational and technical needs of CSOs. In some countries, like South Sudan, The Gambia, and Ghana, no strong organizations play this role. In a number of other countries, including DRC, Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, ISOs exist, but they tend to be located in urban areas and are therefore out of reach for more remote CSOs. Online resources are gradually increasing, but problems with Internet connectivity also hinder access to resources in rural areas in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and other countries.
In at least half of the countries covered in the Index, there are some local organizations that support CSO projects with grants, mainly by subgranting international donor funding. In Nigeria and Angola, declines in donor funding led to declines in regranted international funds in 2013. In other countries, such as the DRC, Sudan, and The Gambia, there are local foundations, but they mainly implement projects directly, instead of supporting the work of CSOs. In a few countries, including Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan, no local grantmaking organizations exist.

Networking and information sharing among CSOs continue to develop in the region, especially as Internet access and online resources grow. For example, in 2013, the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO) started an email listserv for all individuals and organizations interested in gender issues. Nevertheless, coalition building and information sharing continue to be weak in a number of countries, including Angola, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Gabon, and Ghana, among others. A common hindrance to information sharing is the reluctance of CSOs to share information due to competition for funding or work in the same thematic area.

Training opportunities generally fall short of CSOs’ needs. In several countries, such as Tanzania, Uganda, Liberia, and Malawi, training for CSOs are fee-based or available only in urban areas, and thus are financially or geographically inaccessible for much of the sector. Other countries, such as Rwanda, Gabon, and Sudan, lack capable trainers or only have training in a narrow range of topics.

Throughout the region, CSO partnerships with other sectors, such as business, government, and media, are very limited, though interest in such partnerships and ad hoc collaboration continue to grow. For example, intersectoral partnerships are increasing in Tanzania, where CSOs, media, and government worked together on agricultural advancement in 2013.

PUBLIC IMAGE

Public image is one of the stronger dimensions of sustainability, with just three countries—Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola—in the Sustainability Impeded category, though several countries, including the DRC, South Sudan, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, and Malawi, fall on the cusp of Sustainability Impeded. South Africa has the best score in this dimension, while Angola has the worst.

No country showed deterioration in this dimension, while Tanzania, Ghana, and Zambia reported improvement. In Tanzania, the public’s support of CSO initiatives is on the rise, in part due to CSOs’ involvement in the constitutional review process. In Ghana, the sector’s public image improved due to CSOs’ highly visible interventions to encourage peace with regard to the Supreme Court hearing on the election petition. In Zambia, public and private media provided more coverage of CSO activities around the constitutional reform process.
The level of media coverage of CSO activities is varied. In several countries, including Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone, CSOs report generally positive coverage at national levels. CSOs in Ghana, Mali, Liberia, and Uganda received more positive coverage during the year due to their involvement in high profile issues. In Uganda, for example, CSOs received more extensive media coverage in 2013 for their engagement on national issues like oil policy and government corruption.

In other countries, such as Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Angola, and Zimbabwe, media coverage for independent CSOs is weak or negative due to the dominance of state-affiliated media or state censorship of independent media. In Ethiopia there was slight improvement in media coverage as the state ceased its campaign in the media criticizing the CSO sector. Despite this, TV channels are still state-controlled and unwilling to cover the work of CSOs, particularly projects that are critical of the government, and CSOs do not receive substantial coverage from national radios or TV channels due to the high cost of airtime. In South Sudan, following the appointment of a new Minister of Information, the government threatened media houses with closure and detained media staff, which led other media houses to self-censor. Another obstacle to media coverage in several countries, including the DRC, Tanzania, Botswana, and Malawi, is fees and other costs charged to CSOs by journalists and media houses to report on their activities. Furthermore, CSOs in much of the region lack the resources or skills to promote their work, though CSOs are increasingly using websites and social networks for outreach.

The public perception of CSOs continues to be mixed, although the public gradually is increasing its understanding and appreciation of CSOs as people become more exposed to CSOs’ work. Therefore, CSOs—especially those that provide needed services—are often most appreciated by the communities in which they work. CSOs focused on advocacy generally receive less support, although CSOs working on national issues like constitutional reform and crisis management have seen their public image rise, as was the case in Tanzania, Mali, and Zambia in 2013. In other countries, negative perceptions persist. For example, in the DRC, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, the public sees CSOs as working for their own interests, rather than the public interest.

Government perceptions are often less positive. In many countries, such as the DRC, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, and Rwanda, the government perceives CSOs working on service delivery favorably, while it is threatened by CSOs that criticize government policy or work on accountability or human rights. CSOs in Gabon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda note that CSO criticism of government policies negatively impacts government perception of CSOs. In some countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Malawi, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe, governments accuse advocacy-oriented CSOs of serving foreign interests.

An enduring obstacle to a positive public image is the lack of CSO self-regulation throughout much of the region. For example, CSO sectors typically lack codes of ethics, or have codes of ethics that are not enforced.
Few CSOs publish annual reports or they only submit them to the government or donors, thereby failing to demonstrate transparency with the public. However, self-regulation is slowly improving in Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. Kenya now has a standard-setting certification process for CSOs, based on Uganda’s quality assessment mechanism. CSOs in South Sudan have responded to demands for more transparency by allowing local communities, donors, and government to contribute to monitoring their projects.

CONCLUSION

The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index demonstrates that CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa are growing in their role as critical responders to emerging national issues and needs, through advocacy initiatives and provision of needed services. It also highlights some of the continued areas of weakness that impede long-term sustainability. Notably, in many countries in the region, CSOs—particularly those focused on advocacy and human rights— are facing increasing restrictions or threats of restrictions on their work. In addition, even the most sustainable CSO sectors continue to lack access to critical technical and financial resources, thereby undermining growth in most other dimensions of sustainability. The country reports that follow provide an in-depth look at the CSO sectors in each of the twenty-five African countries covered by this report. We hope this annual survey continues to capture useful trends for CSOs, governments, donors, and researchers supporting the advancement of CSO sectors.
### 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa

#### 2013 CSO Sustainability Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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Two major events affected Angolan society in 2013. First, in November 2013 the Attorney General’s Office announced that state security agents had killed two activists who led protests against the disappearance of former soldiers in May 2012. This announcement generated a wave of public discontent. In the face of this public anger, an affiliate of the opposition party Broad Convergence for Angola’s Salvation – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE) was killed, allegedly by soldiers of the Presidential Security Unit (USP), after distributing pamphlets calling for a protest against the killing of the two activists.

Second, a drought that started at the end of 2011 in southern Angola caused many deaths, loss of livestock,

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*Country Facts*  
**Capital:** Luanda  
**Government Type:** Republic; Multiparty Presidential Regime  
**Population:** 18,565,269  
**GDP per capita (PPP):** $6,300  
**Human Development Index:** 148

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food insecurity, and malnutrition. In response, the public mobilized support for the victims of the drought, while denouncing public institutions at the local and national levels for insufficiently addressing the drought’s effects.

Civil society played an important role in putting pressure on the Government of Angola to address both situations. CSOs publicly denounced the food security situation, which resulted in the Government of Angola (GOA) implementing a program to provide assistance to victims of the drought. CSO engagement on the first issue resulted in the Government finally confirming that the activists were killed and promising to investigate the crime.

CSO sustainability in Angola remained precarious in 2013, as funding for the sector continued to decline. Most international donors have left the country, thereby increasing the pressure on CSOs to access scarce local funds without compromising their missions. The lack of funding has also made it difficult for CSOs to retain qualified staff in sufficient numbers to meet the challenges facing their communities. Due to the lack of funding, many CSOs exist only on paper and have not implemented any projects.

The legal environment is very difficult for CSOs, especially those focused on human rights issues. Public institutions marginalize these groups, accusing them of having external agendas and serving foreign interests.

According to a speech by the Minister of Justice at the 55th ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in April 2014, there are 301 registered CSOs in Angola, including 228 domestic and 73 international organizations. However, this number may not be accurate as many international organizations have recently withdrawn from Angola, and most national CSOs depended on foreign funding. As in 2012, it is estimated that less than 10 percent of registered CSOs implemented projects in 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. Although the government passed a new Law on Associations in 2012, many elements of the law remain unchanged. According to the new law, CSOs cannot promote policy initiatives or support or join initiatives promoted by political parties. Moreover, the law remains unclear, allowing authorities to interpret it at their discretion.

The registration procedure for CSOs is also opaque. According to the law, a CSO is registered when its bylaws are published in the Government Gazette. In practice, however, some public institutions only consider CSOs to be officially registered if they have documents from the Ministry of Justice or other relevant ministries, leaving CSOs vulnerable to the discretionary power of public institutions. For example, some public institutions consider CSOs like the Associação Justica, Paz e Democracia (AJPD), Mozaiço-Instituto para Cidadania, and Omunga to be illegal, even though they have published their bylaws in the Government Gazette.

The Technical Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UTCAH) under the Ministry of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation is responsible for coordinating humanitarian emergency aid during wartime. Though not required by the law, the Ministry requires CSOs to get authorization from UTCAH before registering. In addition, UTCAH periodically demands CSOs to submit information regarding their activities, sources of funds, number of domestic and foreign employees, and other details. CSOs must also ask UTCAH for assistance in obtaining visas for their foreign employees and tax exemptions. UTCAH may refuse to assist
CSOs in these matters if they do not respond to UTCAH’s requests for information, or if CSOs are not registered by UTCAH.

The legal environment and political context in 2013 was marked by an increase in the criminalization of civil society movements, especially those that openly criticize the actions of the government or try to promote public demonstrations. For example, some members of the self-proclaimed “revolutionary” youth group were arrested in Luanda in 2013 following a public demonstration, and members of Lunda’s Protectorate, which advocated for the region’s right to self-govern, are still imprisoned. In addition, many journalists and civic activists were summoned by the police and judicial authorities and interrogated for expressing opinions that were against government policy.

According to the law, CSOs that are registered and regularly send their reports to UTCAH may qualify for tax exemptions, but this process is so complex and bureaucratic that some CSOs prefer to forego these benefits. Companies in the oil sector are required by law to support corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects and therefore provide funding to certain CSOs, for which they receive tax deductions.

Organizations that serve public functions can apply for public utility status, which allows them to access funds from the state budget. However, the application process for public utility status is unclear and few CSOs are granted this status. Most CSOs with public utility status, including Fundação Eduardo dos Santos (FESA), Fundo Lwini, and Fundação Sindika Dokolo, are connected to members of the ruling party.

It is not common for CSOs to compete for government contracts at the local or central levels, and the legal requirements for competing are not clear. Very few CSOs can compete with private companies or international organizations in public procurements for services. CSOs are legally considered non-profit organizations, which is generally interpreted as prohibiting them from engaging in income-generating activities.

CSOs have very limited access to legal assistance because they lack funds, and few lawyers are qualified to provide such support. A few organizations working on human rights issues have received pro bono legal assistance from some lawyers.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

Angolan CSOs still have a weak culture of accountability. Many organizations are highly dependent on their leaders. Leadership transition is rare. In most CSOs, leaders exercise their mandates even after they have expired according to organizational statutes.

General assemblies, which should be the highest bodies and enable members to determine policies, do not function in most CSOs. Very few CSOs held general assembly meetings or renewed their mandates in accordance with their statutes in 2013. In addition, CSO members—especially those who are not executive officers—are generally inactive and often do not even pay membership dues. Few CSOs have policies, procedures, or appropriate internal structures to allow members to direct, track, or even monitor the organizational activities, leaving them highly dependent on their founders’ agendas. Most CSOs do not try to mobilize people beyond their members to support their causes.

Some CSOs do not have strategies that outline their broader objectives, visions, and mission statements, which makes it difficult for them to explain their goals to the public.

CSOs face major difficulties attracting and retaining staff with appropriate skills. The CSO sector is becoming less competitive in terms of salaries. As a result, qualified staff continues to leave CSOs for jobs in the public sector.
Volunteerism is low in part because the cost of living in Angola and Luanda in particular, is very high.

Many CSOs have adequate access to information technologies, including computers, the Internet, and mobile phones. However, in 2013 CSOs faced more difficulties obtaining financial resources to pay the cost of telecommunications, including Internet access and telephone lines, and the maintenance of equipment such as computers, generators, and vehicles. It is also expensive for CSOs to purchase, rent, or maintain offices. Even donors complain about the high cost of working in the country.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSO financial viability remained precarious in 2013, and several international organizations that financed the activities of Angolan CSOs—including Norwegian People’s Aid, Oxfam Novib, National Democratic Institute, and Instituto de Estudos Políticos para América Latina e África (IEPALA)—exited the country due to the high cost of operations and the difficulty of obtaining funds from other international donors to support local CSOs. In addition, Lutheran World Federation, Christian Aid, and Catholic Relief Services announced in 2013 that they will cease their activities in 2014 for the same reasons.

CSOs had difficulty getting funds from local sources, even though an increasing number of companies are interested in supporting CSO activities through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. With the support of UNDP, companies in the oil sector (including British Petroleum, Chevron, Total, Esso, Statoil, and Sonangol) and the construction sector (such as Odebrecht, Camargo Correia, and Queiros Galvão) created a working group to coordinate their CSR activities in 2013. However, these companies mainly focus on financing short-term charity projects, rather than long-term development initiatives. In addition, corporate donors make funds available in accordance with their areas of interest, generally those that serve the company and are not politically sensitive. As such, it is easier for CSOs to get support for visible projects, such as the construction of schools and other charitable work, than for human rights projects, which are less visible and not well-regarded by the government.

Though financial management is a major concern of CSOs and donors, many CSOs continue to have weak financial management systems. CSOs have difficulties attracting skilled personnel to ensure the professional management of their funds because they cannot afford to pay attractive salaries, a problem that is growing as international donor funding decreases.

**ADVOCACY: 5.6**

Despite the lack of financial resources and the difficult environment, CSO advocacy increased in 2013. More CSOs now understand that advocacy is an important tool for achieving their objectives, though they still face great difficulties in establishing relationships with state bodies.

Organizations with positions that fully align with the executive and party in power or have strong links with high government officials find it much easier to work closely with public institutions. For example, the Council of Consultation and Social Dialogue serves as an official space for consultation and dialogue at the local level, but the government chooses the civil society representatives that will participate, marginalizing CSOs that are
not considered by the GOA as government-friendly. At the national level, at least one CSO representative is a member of the Council of the Republic, which advises the President, when requested, on political issues.

At the same time, the absence of laws, rules, and clear standards of conduct for both government and CSOs hinders cooperation between the sectors. The government tends to exclude CSOs that are critical of the state from consultation opportunities, and CSOs are afraid to establish closer links with state bodies as their mutual obligations are not clear. As a result, CSOs that work on human rights such as Omunga, Mãos Livres, and AJPD are typically excluded from dialogue with state institutions. While some CSOs were more cautious advocates as a result of the increased criminalization of civil society movements, this did not have a significant impact on CSO advocacy in 2013.

The number of advocacy initiatives in 2013 was very limited, although some organizations undertook campaigns. For example, at the national level, a group of CSOs advocated for the provision of quality basic education for all children, youth, and adults as part of UNESCO’s global Education for All (EFA) initiative. Caritas of Angola and Associação Construindo Comunidades (ACC) publicly denounced the food insecurity situation in southern Angola caused by the drought. As a result, the government implemented a program to help the victims, while civil society organized a solidarity campaign to gather goods to send to the affected areas. CSOs also applied pressure on state institutions to disclose information related to the disappearance of two civic activists during protests more than a year ago. The state confirmed that the activists were killed and promised that it would investigate and prosecute the perpetrators.

At the local level, a number of CSOs, such as SOS Habitat, Omunga, and ACC advocated against the demolition of houses and illegal evictions in Luanda and Huila Provinces. As a result, the government was forced to explain its actions and suspended the land expropriations in Huila Province. In the Cazenga Municipality in Luanda, União Cristã Feminina developed and organized an education campaign against gender-based violence.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3**

Despite the ongoing reductions in funding, CSOs continued to provide relevant services to underserved communities in 2013, especially in areas such as health, education, assistance to vulnerable populations, and income-generating activities for target populations. This has been possible due to CSOs’ experience and knowledge of their communities.

In 2013, at least 150 people died in southern Angola, and many lost valuable animals due to a drought that has lasted for many years. Various CSOs and churches mobilized to raise aid and support the families affected by the drought. In addition, CSOs denounced the state for its insufficient efforts to mitigate the drought’s impact, prompting the government to initiate a relief effort with CSOs.

CSOs—including organizations such as AJPD, Mãos Livres, Acção Angolana para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA), Omunga, and Mozaiko—continued to play a key role in 2013 in promoting and defending human rights, transparency, and social monitoring. Organizations such as ADRA, Mozaiko, and Development Workshop (DW) disseminated research on education, transparency, rural development, human rights, and governance to better inform the public and the government about the state of these issues in the communities.

With the exception of CSOs with public utility status, the government does not recognize the importance and relevance of the services that CSOs provide, nor do they provide support for these services.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8

Although CSO infrastructure did not change significantly in 2013, the decline in funding reduced CSOs’ opportunities to access training programs. The Support to Non-State Actors Program financed by the European Union (EU) and the capacity building program implemented by World Learning with funding from USAID were essentially the only active programs in 2013. Both had very limited reach and carried out initiatives sporadically.

Some CSOs such as DW, ADRA, and Mozaiko make their documentation, information centers, and equipment available to their counterparts, thereby lowering the operating costs for other organizations. However, such initiatives do not meet the overall demand by CSOs for space, equipment, and training.

In 2013, the shortage of funding opportunities reduced re-granting programs run by DW, ADRA, and other organizations that benefit small CSOs and other community-based organizations.

Although CSOs have long recognized the importance of establishing partnerships to maximize resources, skills, and experiences and achieve common objectives, there was little coalition building or coordination among CSOs in 2013. While rare, there were a few examples of CSOs working jointly on issues. For example, ADRA and Observatório Político Social de Angola (OPSA) took a joint stand against the minimal allocations for education, health, and social protection in the national budget. Human rights organizations have also taken joint positions on various human rights issues, including opposing the arbitrary eviction of communities and supporting a law against domestic violence. In some cases, donors required CSO partnerships as a pre-condition for accessing funds. For example, in 2013 Mãos Livres, ADRA, AJPD, Plataforma das Mulheres em Ação, and Forum da Mulheres Jornalistas implemented joint human rights initiatives around the use of a common fund financed by Norwegian People’s Aid.

As foreign funding decreases, there is growing awareness among CSOs of the importance of partnerships with private and public sector institutions to ensure the sustainability of their activities. Private companies finance an increasing number of projects. For example, in 2013 Statoil, a Norwegian oil company, financed the construction of water systems in rural areas. In addition, BP financed a microcredit project for small-scale farmers.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.5

In general, a significant part of Angolan society continues to perceive CSOs as important institutions, though for varying reasons. For some people, CSOs are useful because they provide services to people in need, especially in remote areas out of government reach. For others, CSOs have been instrumental in protecting and promoting human rights. Government authorities control the public media stations, which tend to emphasize the actions of CSOs that support the policies of the government and ruling party. The public media portrays such CSOs as useful charitable agencies. On the other hand, the state-controlled media provides negative coverage of organizations focused on human rights. In turn, private media tends to provide more positive coverage of human rights CSOs and less attention to pro-government CSOs. Throughout 2013, both human rights and service providing CSOs were also well-represented via the private radio station LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial); Voice of America; and Radio Eclesia, a private radio station owned by the Catholic Church.
Many CSOs claim to lack the financial and human resources needed to invest in communication strategies. In most cases, CSOs do not even take full advantage of social networks such as Facebook to promote their actions and causes.

CSOs lack a sector-wide code of conduct. The lack of self-regulation mechanisms in the sector allows political parties and the government to use CSOs in ways that undermine their image. For example, some government-friendly CSOs have allowed the ruling party to use service provision to needy communities as an opportunity to promote the government (i.e., by handing out t-shirts and flags).
**BOTSWANA**

**Country Facts**
- **Capital:** Gaborone
- **Government Type:** Parliamentary Republic
- **Population:** 2,127,825
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $16,400
- **Human Development Index:** 119

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2

One hundred thirty organizations are affiliated with the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO), the national umbrella body for NGOs tasked with coordinating the NGO movement in Botswana and facilitating the establishment of an enabling environment for NGO work. Affiliation with BOCONGO is voluntary, but members must first be legally registered with the Registrar of Societies, the government body within the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs which is responsible for registering societies. BOCONGO gives organizations access to decision-making and policy-making forums; coordination under the NGO Secretariat, a body within BOCONGO which advocates on behalf of BOCONGO members; and increased access to funding from donors that prefer to work with BOCONGO members. According to the Registrar of Societies, in 2013 there were 433 charitable organizations; 198 cultural associations; eighty-seven farmers associations; 154 professional associations; 1,615 sports and recreation associations; sixty-eight women’s associations; 1,556 burial societies; 1,017 miscellaneous associations; fifteen political parties; and 1,772 churches.
CSOs continue to find registration difficult. In 2013, the NGO Council, an advisory body to the government consisting of NGO, government, and private sector representatives that is tasked with strengthening the relationship between CSOs and government and monitoring the implementation of the NGO Policy, was launched in Botswana. However, due to a history of limited government transparency, CSOs are suspicious of the policy’s ultimate purpose. CSOs continue to depend on international donor funding, and CSOs are generally only sustainable on a short-term basis. CSO advocacy is limited. CSOs often find it difficult to gain access to government officials or have their input genuinely considered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.8**

CSO registration is governed by the Registration of Societies Act. CSOs register with the Department of Civil and National Registration, which is housed within the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs. The registration process is generally considered unwelcoming to new organizations, and it has become more difficult to register and operate a CSO in Botswana. Many CSOs and their affiliates lack understanding of the registration process, and the process of developing an organizational constitution is cumbersome. Official government bodies rarely assist organizations with the registration process.

The government denies registration if it considers a CSO to be a national threat or suspects that it supports illegal groups in the country. Some CSOs, such as LEGABIBO (a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender [LGBT] movement) and SISONKE (a movement supporting sex workers), have not been able to register due to the nature of their work. These organizations continued to operate and attract donor funding through registered organizations, as unregistered CSOs cannot open bank accounts, rent space, or otherwise operate. The Botswana Khwedom Council, which advocates for indigenous people’s rights in Botswana, was finally able to register in 2013 after several years of trying.

Rural CSOs travel to urban areas to register, as they are not aware that they can register at local government offices that provide one-stop shop services to communities. The registration of trusts and foundations was suspended from 2012 to 2013, but has now started again, though most CSOs are unaware of this.

No law fully protects CSOs against unwanted state interference, allowing the government to have some control over CSO operations. For example, CSOs in the disability sector reported administrative interference in their special needs schools in 2013. Government officials conducted spot checks at the schools without prior appointments or authorization by the school boards or organizations running the school. The law guarantees freedom of communication and expression. However, this freedom is often limited, and many CSOs—especially ones that receive government funding—practice self-censorship. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), a journalist association, has experienced government intimidation. The organization is perceived as an enemy of the state, and the government prevents journalists from applying to or affiliating with MISA or actively participating in MISA events. Local police generally do not harass CSOs.

In 2013, the NGO Council was officially launched to implement the NGO Policy and thereby improve communications and relations between civil society and the national government. However, due to a history of limited government transparency, CSOs are suspicious of its ultimate purpose. There are few examples of
concrete and substantive partnerships between the government and CSOs, and many in civil society feel that the government actively works against them.

CSOs can claim a refund for Value-Added Tax annually on donor funding. However, not all organizations are aware of their eligibility for this refund. Corporations do not receive tax deductions for providing donations to CSOs, which discourages the development of corporate philanthropy. The Sports Act includes the potential for a tax rebate for those who give to sports-related organizations, but this does not include the vast majority of the country’s CSOs.

There is no legislation regulating income generation by CSOs. CSOs are not prevented from generating income as long as they reinvest any revenue into their operations or programming. However, there is no clear policy or guideline regarding government sub-contracting, and sub-contracting is not always transparent. Registration with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) is required in order to be considered for government contracts. In addition, CSOs conducting capacity building or training are required to get accreditation through the Botswana Qualifications Authority (BQA), which is a cumbersome and time-consuming process.

CSOs often employ the services of legal professionals. However, lawyers are not widely available in all areas of the country. Even when legal counsel is available, many CSOs cannot afford these services, although in most cases it is provided at a reduced fee.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

Organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2013.

CSOs in Botswana continually strive to identify and build local constituencies for their initiatives. CSOs attempt to build both formal constituencies with government representatives, donors, media, and beneficiaries, as well as informal constituencies within the public. However, many CSOs either find it difficult to identify particular target audiences beyond their immediate beneficiaries or do not understand the importance of building wider support bases. Rural CSOs generally serve their local communities, but lack an understanding of how to channel their communities’ support. Competition for organizational funding also often undermines efforts to build support among similar organizations.

Many organizations lack the capacity to implement the skills learned through trainings because of insufficient interest in applying the trainings, failure to retain trained employees, or lack of time to consider improvements to organizational capacity while managing daily operations.

Most CSOs have clearly defined mission statements, although they do not always adhere to them. In some cases, CSOs divert from their missions in response to donor demands and the availability of funding. For the most part, CSOs engage in strategic planning on an ad hoc basis, without concrete implementation, monitoring, or evaluation plans. CSOs generally have difficulty implementing their plans because of inadequate resources.

A minority of CSOs effectively employ good corporate governance practices. Although many CSOs have clearly defined and well-documented management structures, including clear distinctions between the roles and responsibilities of the organization’s management and boards, these structures are generally not implemented. Boards are powerful and often breach the limitations of their power. In addition, some boards are not transparent. Many CSOs do not plan adequately for the resignation or retirement of board members or senior administrators. In some cases, these individuals have misused funds, leaving the remaining staff and board members to deal with the repercussions.
Many CSOs employ staff, but some cannot afford full-time employees. CSOs experience a significant degree of staff turnover, which affects productivity and forces many CSOs to use outside professional services. In many CSOs, human resources departments are non-existent or ineffective. As a result, job responsibilities are undefined and staff are poorly trained. Volunteers are difficult to find and retain.

Technical resources are available to most CSOs, but are often underutilized or not used at all because CSOs lack the necessary technical and management skills. In addition, some CSO equipment is outdated and needs repair. Organizations in remote areas of the country do not have the same access to ICT services and Internet as those in larger cities and urban centers.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.6**

Funding diversification continues to challenge many CSOs, and CSOs are generally only sustainable on a short-term basis.

CSOs in Botswana receive limited local support. Development aid from international donors is the single greatest source of revenue for CSOs. However, donors have curtailed their support in Botswana as the World Bank considers it an upper-middle-income country. In addition, some donors have withdrawn their support because recipients of foreign aid have failed to fully and accurately account for their spending. In some cases, the national government competes with CSOs for international development partners and financial donors. If funding from the primary international donors were to end, most CSOs in Botswana would close.

Some corporations, including Letshego, First National Bank (FNB), and Choppies Super Stores, donate to CSOs, but they are inundated with applications due to the lack of other donors. The Presidential Housing Appeal, which is managed by the Office of the President, continues to persuade many private sector companies to donate houses to homeless families. As a result, however, these businesses have reduced their support for other social needs and services provided by CSOs.

The government provides support to CSOs through an alcohol levy created in 2011 to combat alcohol abuse. This mechanism has provided funding to BOCONGO, the Botswana Substance Abuse Support Network (BOSASNet), and other organizations. Grants range from 10,000 pula (approximately $1,100) to 1 million pula (approximately $112,500). The national government sub-contracts some CSOs to provide services. For example, the Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Program (BOCAIP) implements a tuberculosis program for the Ministry of Health. The government also subsidizes interns for both private and not-for-profit organizations.

The NGO Council is expected to distribute approximately $10.72 million in funding to support civil society capacity strengthening programs in Botswana. Although this support was announced in 2011, no funds had been disseminated to NGOs by the end of 2013.

CSOs continue to engage in fundraising activities, although the funds raised are often limited. Successful fundraising depends in part on an organization’s image. For example, one women’s equality organization has difficulty fundraising as some members of the public accuse its members of being “home wreckers.” Similarly, CSOs working on sensitive or controversial issues may be perceived as enemies of the state. On the other hand, CSOs affiliated with prominent individuals—such as the Lady Khama Charitable Trust, which was established in honor of the country’s First Lady—are more successful at fundraising.

Membership-based organizations continue to collect dues, but these are a negligible source of revenue. Few CSOs engage in income-generating activities, as some CSOs mistakenly believe that the terms and conditions of their donor-funded grants do not allow them to engage in such projects.
CSOs’ financial control measures and accounting systems are generally inadequate. For example, when the Women’s CSO Coalition was dissolved several years ago, there was no clear record regarding its funding history. Some CSOs have financial management systems in place, but a lack of resources prevents them from engaging independent audits. The widespread belief that CSOs abuse their financial resources—intentionally or not—has taken a toll on the sector, with some donors pulling out of the country.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSOs do not engage much in shaping policy as they are generally too focused on their day-to-day survival to work on advocacy and legal reform. Those CSOs that attempt to advocate are challenged by an environment that is not politically or socially conducive to their advocacy efforts. CSOs often find it difficult to gain access to and communicate with government officials or the government fails to consider CSO input. For example, despite consultation with CSOs on education reform, policy makers built too many schools, sacrificing quality for quantity.

CSOs that do engage in advocacy and lobbying generally do so independently of other organizations, diminishing their chances of achieving legal reform. However, in 2013 there were several issue-based campaigns, including CSOs advocating for Botswana to sign the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Gender and Development.

CSOs are rarely able to influence the policymaking and political processes in the country. Lobbying platforms such as parliamentary committees exist, but CSOs are unaware of them or do not know how to take advantage of them. Although there were some successes in the past, CSOs continue to be uncomfortable with lobbying, and some CSOs state that lobbying efforts have receded in the past few years. CSO professionals lack access to training on effective lobbying strategies.

The role of CSOs and their influence on public affairs is greater at the district level than at the national level. CSOs play an important role at the district level in managing activities and working with other organizations to plan programs. For example, the District Multi-Sectoral AIDS Committees include CSOs in the program planning process.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSO service provision deteriorated slightly in 2013 as a result of decreasing government recognition of and support for CSOs. The primary services that CSOs provide are health, social, and educational services. The legal clinic at the University of Botswana provides access to legal services for many CSOs. The government introduced a pilot project to provide legal aid to individuals through CSOs in 2013, which has since been made into a full-fledged program. No CSOs focus on economic reforms, and few focus on democracy and election observation. Other gaps also exist, especially advocacy efforts and initiatives for sexual minorities, women, and youth. CSOs provide goods and services to a wide range of constituencies and clients. CSOs provide many of the services most needed by the communities in which they operate; however, more and more CSOs are moving away from their original missions in response to donor priorities. CSOs do not sufficiently engage in research to ascertain the true needs of particular communities in order to make programming more efficient.
CSOs continue to be dependent on donor funding for service delivery. However, the amount of donor funding is often less than the actual costs of services. Additionally, it is often difficult to charge clients for services, as many lack sufficient financial resources. A lack of statistical data in the country makes it nearly impossible for CSOs to forecast how many people will use a particular service, making it difficult to determine the appropriate level of investment.

Government recognition of and support for CSOs has decreased since 2012. There are few advocates for CSOs within governmental ranks, and government funding is minimal. However, in 2013, the government signed MOUs with some CSOs in the disability sector to allow them to run schools providing special education.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

There continues to be a lack of well-organized and adequately maintained resource centers that provide information services and research materials to the public, academia, and CSOs in Botswana. Some organizations, such as Emang Basadi, Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (NCONGO) and Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives (TOCaDI), operate resource centers, however, other organizations that used to perform these functions, like Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), no longer operate. Moreover, a predominately oral—rather than written—culture and illiteracy in some areas hinder the dissemination of helpful materials, digitization of information, and access to technology. Resource centers do not currently charge fees for the services they provide.

Botswana has several local grantmaking organizations, including Lady Khama Charitable Trust, Masiela Trust, Masire Foundation, FNB Foundation, Barclays Foundation, and Botswana National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support (BNAPS). Many of these organizations only support projects and do not provide funding for core costs. Additionally, most grantmaking organizations are government-directed, so CSOs’ needs are sometimes overlooked in favor of government initiatives.

Although there is room for improvement, CSOs often share information with one another. Coalitions such as the Botswana Network for Community-Based Organizations (BOCOBONET), BOCONGO, and BONASO all share information. In 2013, BOCONGO started an email listserv for all individuals and organizations interested in gender issues. Meetings, websites, public dialogues, and the upcoming CSO Biennial Conference coordinated by BOCONGO continue to promote cooperation among CSOs.

Training is readily available in the areas of monitoring and evaluation, resource mobilization, governance, gender, and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming, as well as in the area of leadership and management. Most of the time, however, training materials remain unused and the learning acquired through training is not effectively integrated into CSOs’ programming. As discussed above, many organizations do not implement the skills learned through trainings. In addition, not all trainings are available in local languages.

Intersectoral partnerships exist, but most are still informal, and their parameters are not well defined. There are instances of formalized partnerships between CSOs and private businesses, or with government bodies through public-private partnerships (PPPs). However, these partnerships may not be sustainable over the long term. The Biennial Conference is a potential forum for exploration and discussion of the nature and role of PPPs, including how CSOs and the private sector can mutually benefit from such partnerships.
CSOs in Botswana receive some coverage in the local media. Local radio stations often take a keen interest in CSOs’ community services, but lack a nuanced understanding of CSOs’ role in society. True investigative journalism is absent in the country, which hinders the generation of well-researched and thoughtful articles and information on CSOs. Rather than spending time reporting on CSOs’ activities, local and national media tend to latch onto controversial headlines that will improve their own viewership. For instance, CSOs like the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA), a research and advocacy organization working to promote the rights of HIV-positive individuals and sexual minorities, seem to enjoy widespread media attention only when they are challenging government decisions. Organizations like Gender Links educate media companies on responsible reporting on sensitive issues like gender-based violence and equality. So far, the media has responded positively to such initiatives. CSOs commonly pay for advertisements and newspaper coverage of their events. There was an increase in radio coverage of CSO work in 2013.

CSOs in Botswana typically dedicate very little time to promotional activities or public relations, including developing relationships with the media. CSOs with Internet access that are focused on youth engagement and youth issues are fairly adept in the use of social media.

Generally speaking, the public is not fully aware of or does not understand the purpose of CSOs. Clients appreciate CSO-provided services, but remain uninformed of their larger role in society. CSO activities and programs continue to go unnoticed.

Although the national government is supposed to work with CSOs in all sectors, it generally does not, and the government frequently overlooks the social and developmental value of CSOs for Botswana. This in turn affects the private sector’s perception of CSOs. Many businesses maintain negative perceptions of CSOs and avoid associating with them unless absolutely necessary.

Most CSOs in Botswana have adopted codes of ethics, although many organizations have yet to fully implement these codes. Many CSOs lack transparency and do not provide annual reports or hold general meetings.
Various security, political, and socioeconomic developments characterized 2013 in Burundi. Relative calm in the country was overshadowed by assaults and property damage by the Imbonerakure—the youth chapter of the ruling party, National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for Defense and Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Political debate was polarized around four major issues: the possibility of a third term for the current President of Burundi; the revision of electoral laws and regulations; the return from exile of Agathon Rwasa, former leader of the National Liberation Forces; and obstacles to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Despite polarization around these issues, political actors reached notable compromise, facilitated by the United Nations Office in Burundi, regarding revision of the Electoral Code.

A dramatic fire at Bujumbura central market in January 2013 caused a surge in prices of almost all products and services, impacting the economic well-being of Burundians. Merchants protested against the government’s slow response to the tragedy, resulting in the government’s suspension of the General Syndicate of Merchants (SYGECO) for allegedly staging the protests. Other significant events during the year include the early launch of a new education system, the Fundamental School program; the expulsion of
thousands of Burundian residents from Tanzania; and a
general assembly on employment, which recommended
revitalizing public and private sector partnerships to
promote job creation.

During this period, an umbrella organization of CSOs
addressing the high cost of living decried the adoption of a
revised budget bill establishing new taxes on goods and
services. Federal employees and executives, including
teachers and nurses, organized several strikes to express
their discontent with wage disparity and the threat of losing benefits. Freedom of the press also attracted
widespread attention after the President of the Republic enacted a new press law that many media
professionals considered restrictive.

CSOs continue to operate under Decree -Law No. 1/11 of April 18, 1992, although a proposed law on
associations was under review. Generally, CSOs and the government maintain a positive relationship, though
SYGECO and representatives of the Bujumbura Bar were harassed in 2013. CSOs continue to face
difficulties building their organizational capacities, mobilizing resources and support, and advocating with
decision makers, who they find unreceptive to proposals from non-state actors. Nonetheless, CSOs
succeeded in providing an array of services and products that respond to the needs and priorities of
communities and helped implement government programs and policies. CSOs benefit from satisfactory
media coverage, and the public appreciates the work of CSOs, though some perceive CSOs as allied with the
political opposition.

By the end of 2013, 6,054 CSOs were registered with the Ministry of the Interior, an increase from 5,279 in
2012. The CSO sector includes a variety of organizations, including human rights advocacy groups, unions,
leagues, faith-based organizations, media organizations, and development associations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.0**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. Article 32 of the Constitution of Burundi guarantees the freedoms of association and assembly, as well as the right to form associations and organizations. CSOs continue to operate under Decree -Law No. 1/11 of 1992. The registration process improved in 2013, and CSOs are now able to register within one month.

The government has been developing a proposed law on non-profit associations since 2012. If adopted, it would reduce delays in registering community associations at the commune level and allow for certain national organizations to register as public interest associations. The draft also calls for the establishment of a national consultation framework between government and civil society.

The law generally does not limit the operations or resources of CSOs. Registered associations are required to report to the Ministry of the Interior on their organization and development and may also be required to furnish supplementary information and documents within one month.

In 2013, CSOs managed to maintain their autonomy, despite attempts by the Ministry of Interior to interfere in some CSOs’ internal management. The Ministry sent inspectors to several organizations to verify their accounts and assets. The Ministry also solicited the assistance of the State Inspector General in this initiative, even though the Inspector General only inspects institutions managing public funds. The Inspector General refused to participate, and the Ministry eventually abandoned the initiative.
CSOs were not exempt in 2013 from harassment and threats. This is largely due to the fact that the government and the CNDD-FDD sometimes believe CSOs are agents of opposition parties. At the beginning of the year, the authorities temporarily suspended SYGECO for allegedly organizing protests following the fire at the central market in Bujumbura. Also in 2013, the head of the Bujumbura Bar was prevented from traveling outside the country to participate in activities with peers for allegedly making negative statements regarding security and public order.

Even though CSOs have latitude to voice their opinions in public statements and debates, government sometimes obstruct these efforts. For example, the government wrote letters to hotels emphasizing the requirement that they receive City Hall's approval to host lectures or debates. Media professionals strenuously opposed a media law enacted on June 4, 2013 for seriously restricting freedom of press, even bringing the case to the Constitutional Court.

In practice, CSOs are protected from the threat of dissolution, which can only be decided by an administrative court. No threat of dissolution was made in 2013.

CSOs do not benefit from tax exemptions or deductions. Only international organizations receive tax exemptions, and they are required to sign agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. According to this agreement, the state can grant tax exemptions on goods and services that are necessary for projects; are acquired in Burundi; and are authorized to be tax-exempt by both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance.

In general, CSOs are allowed to earn revenue for goods and services, but are not successful at doing so. They can also respond to government bids.

Few lawyers are well-versed in the law governing civil society. Such lawyers are concentrated in Bujumbura, with very few in secondary towns. Few lawyers are willing to provide free services to local CSOs, and CSOs do not seek legal counsel in part due to a lack of culture of litigation in Burundi.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9**

![Organizational Capacity in Burundi](image)

Organizational capacity remained the same as in 2012. Certain CSOs try to establish constituencies for their initiatives, but these efforts have limited results. Some CSOs have organized networks or coalitions to work towards common goals. A few of these campaigns gained public support in 2013, such as the campaign against the high cost of living; the coalition for Education for All; the Justice for Ernest Manirumva campaign; and the Don’t Interfere with the Arusha Agreements campaign, which responded to flaws in the government’s draft constitution. Many CSOs have links at regional and local levels to mobilize local populations.

Some CSOs draft strategic five-year plans through participatory processes, but most do not. Except for highly professionalized organizations, CSOs do not have statutory management bodies or administrative and financial management tools. Few CSOs hold regular meetings of their general assemblies, executive committees, boards of directors, monitoring committees, or staff. In most cases, even if a monitoring committee is set up, it performs poorly. Associations are generally run by their founders.

As in 2012, the vast majority of CSOs lack transparent management practices or even organizational documents such as statutes, rules and regulations, procedure manuals, and strategic and operational plans. The law requires CSOs to periodically submit reports on their general assemblies and annual reports of activities to the Minister of the Interior, but few CSOs comply with these requirements.
Most CSOs find it very difficult to maintain and train qualified, permanent staff due to lack of funding. A few are able to recruit personnel and sign employment contracts. If external expertise is needed and there are adequate funds, CSOs recruit specialized personnel through published calls for candidates.

Few organizations can afford offices or equipment such as computers, scanners, and Internet access.

Many organizations have no permanent staff or offices. They function poorly and lack any form of democratic governance. The permanent workers in CSOs do not have adequate professional skills, and most of the organizations lack the resources to sufficiently train them. The majority of CSOs also lack the resources to upgrade their office equipment or access the Internet. More CSOs in large urban centers have obtained access to this equipment, but others work in areas without electricity and thus cannot access the Internet.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs remain far from long-term financial autonomy. Some associations have financial resources; others do not. CSOs still depend primarily on foreign donors for funding. Local resources and membership dues are insufficient to ensure sustainability. The government does not provide grants to CSOs. Local support and local sources of philanthropy are practically nonexistent in part due to Burundi’s weak economy. In general, communities expect to receive services or products from CSOs, rather than provide them with financial assistance.

CSOs are dependent on financial and technical partners. CSOs do not have revenue streams to remain viable in the long term, especially as financing agreements increasingly only last one or two years, though they are sometimes renewed. Furthermore, CSOs’ funding streams are not diversified; typically CSOs have no strategy to access multiple sources of financing.

CSOs collect membership dues, as determined by the general assembly, but few organizations can subsist long-term on their dues. Few CSOs receive revenue from services or products due to a low level of professionalism.

Few CSOs have solid internal monitoring systems or tools. However, in most cases, organizations that benefit from external support undergo independent external audits. CSOs are typically required to produce annual financial reports for their donors, which has led some CSOs to improve their organizations, establish management tools, perform self-evaluations, and work in a more transparent manner. Over time, a few CSOs have established an internal culture of good governance and financial responsibility, subsequently increasing their credibility with partners.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

This year, civil society continued to demonstrate strong advocacy efforts. Civil society was active in national debates, notably through sectoral groups within the framework of the National Strategy for Good Governance and Fight against Corruption, the Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty, and the National Council for the Fight against AIDS. CSOs are sometimes called upon to support committees created by the government, such as committees for monitoring an initiative, or regulatory committees, such as the Regulator for Government
Contracts. CSOs also participate in donors’ coordination groups and in the monitoring of donors, such as through the Forum of Justice.

CSOs often create ad hoc coalitions around particular issues. CSOs advocate around issues such as human rights, governance, the environment, corruption, economic policy, gender equality, right to education, domestic violence, and land and agricultural policies.

The capacity of CSOs to lead sustained advocacy efforts is weak due to the lack of effective advocacy skills and insufficient resources to monitor and respond to government commitments and decisions. CSOs are also weak at lobbying due to a lack of appropriate strategies—despite some recent initiatives aimed at strengthening these skills—as well as the presence of pro-government associations established by the state to lobby in favor of government policies and actions.

CSOs proposed certain provisions during the constitutional review process, as well as provisions to regulate the National Commission for Land and Other Property and the Special Court for Land and Other Assets, but their proposals were not considered.

CSOs launched an advocacy campaign to respect the Arusha Agreements and not allow President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in 2015. The organization Word and Actions of the Awakening of Consciences and the Evolution of Mentalities (PARCEM) led a campaign for fiscal responsibility with the slogan, “Our Money, Our Rights.” However, its effectiveness has not yet been seen, and the campaign is facing resistance from politicians and other power holders.

Certain CSOs are aware that a legal and regulatory environment favorable to them would strengthen their sustainability. During the revision of the law governing nonprofits, CSOs pushed for streamlined registration and approval procedures for nonprofits, as well as decentralized registration for local organizations at the commune level.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6**

Service provision did not change in 2013. CSOs provide services predominantly in areas such as health, education, human rights, social assistance, hygiene, the environment, and aid to vulnerable populations. In the economic domain, CSOs intervene in the supervision of agricultural producers and breeders and in service and craft industries. Some are involved in entrepreneurial training and the conservation of food products.

Although CSOs provide services that respond generally to the needs and priorities of the population—including providing information, training, education, communication, and basic services—their weak organization and lack of resources limit the quantity, and at times the quality, of services and products.

CSOs offer their services to people who are not members of their organizations. Reports are shared with other organizations and institutions, including public and quasi-public institutions, national CSOs, religious groups, and universities. CSO publications are distributed free of charge because of the public’s lack of funds, as well as a lack of interest in buying books and magazines.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs in addressing the population’s needs, knowing that public services alone are not enough. CSOs support government programs and policies to deliver services. For example, certain CSOs manage health centers and participate in education efforts, contributing to the increased coverage of health care and improved literacy rates. CSOs have been particularly active in the care of children under five years old and in the promotion of maternal health.
Partnerships between local CSOs and technical and financial partners in health, environment, and governance, as well as the continued support of international development agencies such as USAID and the EU, have helped to improve the infrastructure of the CSO sector. At the same time, the CSO sector still lacks intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers, and no local grant-making organizations exist.

CSOs share information with one another, and there are some collectives, networks, and platforms. For example, there is a press club for associations of journalists and media professionals. More and more, CSOs utilize information and communications technologies (ICTs) to share information. CSOs form partnerships to address certain issues, notably in the health sector (HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal health, and family planning), governance and accountability, environment, hygiene, and sanitation.

Training opportunities for CSO management exist throughout the country. The EU project Organization of Supported and Reinforced CSOs has developed the capacities of non-state actors through training in CSO planning and management. In addition, thematic trainings have been organized at the request of beneficiaries in areas such as accounting, responding to bid offers, planning, and project preparation. Training materials are typically produced in French, but are adapted by trainers into Kirundi for certain audiences.

There are some CSO-government partnerships to raise awareness on various topics, ensure CSO participation on steering committees, or establish national strategies to address corruption and poverty. The private sector, however, does not partner with CSOs.

The public image of CSOs is generally positive, though sometimes the government considers organizations involved in human rights as allies of political opponents. The media widely reports on civil society activities, and the public demonstrates a positive view of civil society’s work.

Media coverage of CSO activities is generally satisfactory. CSOs have access to the media and are solicited for radio and television debates on various subjects. Workshops, statements, and press conferences are well-covered. Certain CSOs have even signed collaboration agreements with the media. The media supports CSOs’ reporting and publications regarding human rights violations and other social or economic facts uncovered by CSOs.

In most cases, CSOs benefit from positive coverage both at the national and local level. The media acts as an interface between CSOs and the public. Moreover, the media aids CSOs in their advocacy campaigns. Unfortunately, certain media affiliated with the party in power disparage CSOs, particularly those working in governance. The government often considers CSOs as allies of the opposition.

The public, especially those in the rural areas, has a largely positive view of CSOs, as expressed in statements on the radio or the Internet. They appreciate the role of CSOs in providing information, education, and coaching, and in promoting human rights. However, for a large number of people, the concept of civil society is still not well understood.
Relations between businesses and CSOs are weak. Businesses rarely interact with CSOs, except when CSOs address unfair access to government contracts. Businesses benefiting from these practices complain about CSOs’ denouncements of irregularities in government contracting, while businesses that see themselves as victims of these unfair practices appreciate CSOs’ advocacy.

CSOs publicize their activities through reports, speeches, website publications, and radio and television broadcasting.

There is a code of ethics for CSOs, initiated by the Civil Society Strengthening Forum (FORSC). Some CSOs publish records of their activities to satisfy the law and their internal rules, and a few submit to internal audits by monitoring committees and hold professional retreats for self-evaluation.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The overall situation for CSOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remained essentially unchanged in 2013. National and international political interventions to mitigate the security situation in the North and South Kivu provinces produced some results. This included an agreement finalized in February 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for peace, security, and cooperation for the DRC and the Great Lakes Region; Resolution 2098 for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces; a national oversight mechanism for the DRC’s commitments in the Addis Ababa agreement; and the launch of drones in the eastern part of the DRC for border surveillance.

National roundtables in 2013 also helped ease political tensions. For about a month, these forums brought together actors from the ruling party, the political opposition, and civil society to reflect on ways to restore peace and national cohesion. The forum adopted several recommendations, such as presidential pardons for certain individuals, amnesty for some political prisoners, and a new government focused on national cohesion and open to the participation of civil society actors.
The year ended with the victory of the Armed Forces of the DRC over the rebel group M23, with the support of UN Special Forces. However, the security situation remains concerning, as other national and foreign armed groups continue to be active in the country.

The DRC’s economy maintains a growth rate exceeding 7 percent. This growth, however, has not improved the living situation of most of the population. The country has among the highest levels of corruption in the world, and is among the lowest in human development indicators, according to a 2013 UNDP report. Thus large numbers of impoverished people are desperate for support and services from CSOs, which also lack sufficient resources.

The government implemented important economic measures in 2013, such as changes to the VAT threshold, a streamlined procedure for establishing businesses, efforts to build infrastructure, financial support for agricultural campaigns, and an anti-corruption pact. However, these measures have not yet had a significant effect on the general population.

Despite difficult operating conditions in 2013, CSOs held national roundtables, as well as other meetings to discuss how to increase their participation in defining development policies. Since the M23’s surrender, there has been a lull in violence in the eastern provinces, raising hopes that funders will return to this part of the country.

For provincial CSOs, the difficulty of obtaining legal status has not changed. In addition, they remain largely dependent on their Financial and Technical partners (FTPs), international organizations that support the country’s development.

According to the database published by the UN Organizations Stabilization Mission in the DRC in 2012, there are 3,042 registered CSOs in the country. At the same time, many CSOs, especially religious associations, are not registered. The National Council of Development NGOs, which listed 5,000 CSOs in 1996, initiated a study in 2013 to update the CSO database.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. Law 004/2001 outlines general provisions for nonprofit associations and public utility establishments and is generally favorable to their creation, organization, and dissolution. However, in practice, bureaucratic impediments to registration persist. Only the Ministry of Justice in Kinshasa can grant organizations legal status, internal statutes and rules must be reviewed by the supervising ministry, associated procedural costs are high, and CSOs based in the provinces need to travel to Kinshasa to submit documents to the Ministry of Justice. There is also a legal void for certain types of CSOs, such as peasant organizations and community-based organizations.

Legal provisions address issues of internal management, the scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and dissolution of CSOs, but they do not provide mechanisms for the central administration to monitor adherence to these provisions.

Dissolution remains a highly rare occurrence. Only the courts can dissolve an association at the request of its members or the public administration. Dissolution must be based on well-defined grounds provided in
Article 20 of Law 004/2001. However, the state can suspend a CSO’s activities for up to three months if the CSO is deemed to endanger public order or violate common decency.

CSOs are free to conduct their activities, though organizations that work in human rights or criticize the government may face harassment in the form of threats, arrests, intimidation, or crackdowns on public protests.

CSOs are exempt from taxes except for tax on earned income. The law also allows exemptions from customs duties and other taxes on goods and equipment. In practice, however, the procedures for accessing these exemptions are complicated, and consequently few CSOs other than religious organizations receive them. Individual and corporate donors do not receive tax deductions.

The law does not prevent CSOs from earning income on goods and services, as long as it is not the main source of income. CSOs can respond to central and local government contract offers, but they typically do not because they do not know how to respond adequately.

There are local lawyers who specialize in nonprofits, but they are concentrated in urban centers. Legal consultations are available on an as-needed basis for a fee.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

There was no significant change in the organizational capacity of CSOs in 2013. As in 2012, CSOs typically lack clear organizational structures, supportive constituencies, and strategic planning techniques.

CSOs have difficulty building constituencies beyond project beneficiaries. CSOs try to mobilize broader constituencies by collaborating with other organizations working in the same thematic areas. This strategy has had limited results, however, as these coalitions are typically temporary and project-based.

Although CSO mission statements are clearly defined in their founding documents, CSOs still shift activities to meet donor priorities and access funding. However, with the support of their local partners, national-level CSOs are beginning to carry out strategic planning for the short, medium, and long terms. Strategic planning is more difficult for small organizations, given their irregular funding streams.

A CSO’s organizational structure is defined in its statutes. National-level organizations clearly delineate the responsibilities of their executive management, general assemblies, and boards of directors. In practice, however, most CSOs have difficulty organizing their general assemblies and boards of directors due to lack of funding. In addition, directors often act in a non-transparent manner, making critical decisions without the approval of the boards of directors or general assemblies.

Only CSOs with long-term financing from their donors can employ permanent, paid staff. For certain jobs, such as accountants, program coordinators, IT staff, and bookkeepers, CSOs can hire qualified professionals under flexible contracts. Volunteer recruitment is common for executing projects and programs.

Many CSOs do not use new information and communications technologies (ICTs) due to a lack of financial resources. In general, CSOs do not have the resources to modernize their office equipment, although some are able to do so when implementing projects that include institutional support. Though mobile phones increasingly appear in large cities, they remain inaccessible to most Congolese.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6

The financial viability of CSOs remains impeded. The majority of CSOs continue to have difficulty mobilizing local resources due to a lack of knowledge, strategy, and policy. CSOs generally prioritize seeking foreign donor funding.

CSOs have some possibilities for obtaining non-financial support, such as computer equipment, school supplies, and technical assistance, but these are rare given the extreme poverty in the country. Only religious associations successfully garner the support of their members. Local sources of philanthropy are also rare, and those that exist, such as the Rotary and the Lions Club, are not well-known.

FTPs are the only significant sources of funding for CSOs, and only CSOs accessing this funding remain viable. The government made plans to fund CSOs, such as the Framework for a Dialogue of Congolese Women, but this funding never materialized.

CSOs are able to earn revenue from various services, products, or rental of assets, but rarely pursue such opportunities due to their tendency to rely on foreign financing, rather than seeking local funding opportunities.

Governments and local companies issue calls for bids for CSO services, but the procedure for responding, especially to government bids, is difficult. Furthermore, information about bids is often not published, or published late.

Although all founding documents stipulate member dues and contributions, members rarely make contributions. Aside from religious associations, such as Caritas Congo, Eglise Kimbanguiste, and Eglise de Christ au Congo, most CSOs—both in urban and rural settings—must seek outside financing.

Maintaining financial records is mandatory to access funding from FTPs. Some larger organizations keep regular records and undergo certified audits. Several CSOs, notably larger ones, have implemented reliable financial management systems. However, in most cases, CSOs’ financial management systems lack transparency, due to a lack of clear procedures or CSO leaders’ failure to follow existing procedures.

ADVOCACY: 4.4

Since 2009, communication has increased between decision makers and CSOs and has led to the development of cooperation frameworks in specific fields at the national, provincial, and local levels. This communication continues to progress. In 2013, the ruling party, the political opposition, and civil society had roundtable discussions and debates on key national issues, with the aim of restoring national cohesion. Some of these dialogues were requested or required by foreign partners as part of particular projects, such as the National Commission for Land Reform and the Commission for the Elaboration of a National Social Protection Plan, both of which were established in 2013.

In 2013, CSOs conducted advocacy campaigns through the Coalition for Monitoring of Reforms and Public Policy, the New Congolese Civil Society, and the Regional Program for Conflict Management. These campaigns led to concrete results, including civil society inclusion in the implementation of the INGA III
Hydropower Project, which includes the building of a dam and hydroelectric plant on the Congo River, and in the reform of the National Electoral Commission (CENI). The CENI now includes three members of civil society, including its president. Additionally, civil society continued in 2013 to participate in efforts to implement the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

Several coalitions lobby for the adoption of certain laws affecting civil society. For example, Collective 24 has pressured the parliament to adopt laws pertaining to access to information.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

There was no change in CSO service provision in 2013. Products and services provided by CSOs remain insufficient compared to the needs and priorities of their constituents. Almost all CSOs depend on financing from foreign partners, which determine the priorities for service provision. These priorities usually revolve around the local population’s access to social services, such as basic health care, education, and Internet access. The fight against poverty remains the highest priority for most CSO programs in the DRC. However, because poverty is so multifaceted, it is difficult for CSOs to successfully respond to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries on their own. Certain products and services go beyond basic social services, such as information dissemination, electoral and civic education, and sanitation.

CSO publications are generally offered to FTPs and network members, but are rarely available to universities, churches, and the government. Nonetheless, independent researchers and some students seek CSO publications on the subjects that interest them.

CSOs do not pay attention to possible markets for their services or the financial capacities of beneficiaries. Some CSOs charge for room rentals, catering, and cyber cafés, but at reduced rates since these services typically are financed by funders.

To a certain extent, the government recognizes the value of CSOs and offers subcontracts in particular fields, such as training, sanitation, and agriculture. These subcontracts are offered through institutions such as the Social Fund of the Republic and Central Office of Coordination, which issue calls for bids to CSOs. However, the government does not publicly identify which CSOs have won bids.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The CSO infrastructure in the country did not change significantly in 2013. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers provide information, technology, training, and technical assistance, but are available only in large urban centers. These institutions include the African Institute for Economic and Social Development, the Center for Social Action Studies, Congolese Pan-African League for Sustainable Development, and the Institute for Rural Development. These institutions also provide cyber cafés, room rentals, and libraries. The trainings they offer bolster the competencies of CSOs, notably in strategic management, accounting, financial management, and fundraising. Though training materials are often produced only in French, some training modules are produced in local languages.
Some foundations, such as Bralima and Vodacom, exist and make donations to support community actions, although these are insufficient to meet community needs. They usually act directly but sometimes work through CSOs, which promote the foundations that fund them.

CSOs share information, but generally only within thematic networks such as the National Council on NGOs, the National Human Rights Defense Organizations’ Network, the Natural Resources Network, and Publish What You Pay.

Examples of partnerships between CSOs, government, and local enterprises exist, but are limited to certain programs, such as police reform and payment to teachers in regions where there are no banks.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

As in 2012, media coverage of CSOs is limited and costly at the national level, and very weak at the local level. Local media often confuses public service announcements with advertising and charge them the same rate. The media tends only to relay information provided by CSOs, rather than analyze the information.

The public often lacks understanding of the role of CSOs, believing that they work for their own interests. Therefore, often only the beneficiaries of CSO activities support CSOs. The public’s misperception is also due to CSOs’ involvement in the peace negotiations and national dialogues in 2013. This resulted in a national unity government that included members of CSOs, thereby blurring the lines between government and CSOs.

Government and business perceptions of CSOs depend on whether a CSO works on social service issues or on human rights. CSOs working in traditional development areas are well-regarded because their activities are aligned with government interests. CSOs working on human rights condemn government abuses and thus are less favored by government and business. At the same time, government and business often turn to CSOs for their expertise and information because of their proximity to local populations.

CSOs promote their public image by publicizing certain activities, such as workshops, meetings and forums, and other important events. This promotion leads to a few informal alliances between CSOs and journalists.

On October 12, 2010, more than 200 CSOs adopted a charter for DRC’s civil society. However, the expected code of ethics has not yet been developed. Many CSOs have their own codes of conduct and ethics, but these codes are often ignored. Leading CSOs produce annual reports but submit them only to their FTPs and members.
Ethiopia

**Country Facts**

**Capital:** Addis Ababa  
**Government Type:** Federal Republic  
**Population:** 96,633,458  
**GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,300  
**Human Development Index:** 173

With a population of 96 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa and receives a significant amount of aid from donors including the United States, United Kingdom, World Bank, and European Union. Aid flows comprise approximately one-third of the national budget.

The current government has been in power since 1991, and currently there is no strong opposition party. The independence of democratic institutions, including the justice sector, remains questionable. The Anti-Terrorism Law and other legislation regulating political parties, the media, and civil society still pose severe challenges to these entities’ abilities to contribute to democratization in the country. Similarly, the protection of human rights and implementation of international human rights instruments remain a serious concern.

In 2013, the Ethiopian government submitted its second application for membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI). Ethiopia’s previous application in 2010 was rejected mainly due to the repressive provisions of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) that prevent CSOs from participating in public debate on transparency and accountability in natural resource management. Several international organizations appealed to the EITI Secretariat in 2013 to reject Ethiopia’s application until the

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**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.7**

The 2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Ethiopia

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The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa

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**2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Ethiopia**

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CSP is repealed or amended to allow the operation of independent advocacy CSOs in the country. Ethiopia’s application was still pending at the end of the year.

CSO sustainability did not change significantly in 2013. CSOs still operate under a repressive legal environment that affects their organizational capacity, financial viability, and advocacy.

According to the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), the number of CSOs registered in Ethiopia has reached 3,007, including 338 foreign charities, 366 Ethiopian societies, 130 Ethiopian resident societies, 1,939 Ethiopian resident charities, 118 Ethiopian charities, fifty-four consortiums (networks), and sixty-two adoption foreign charities. In 2013, the number of newly registered CSOs was 298, a substantial decrease from 390 in 2012. The majority of CSOs were registered in 2010 after the CSP came into effect and had to renew their licenses in 2013 in accordance with the CSP’s three-year license renewal requirement. The CSA expected to receive renewal requests from 1,804 CSOs; however, only 1,159 successfully met the renewal criteria, even though the CSA extended the renewal period. The number of active CSOs in the sector is thus expected to decrease to around 2,000.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.5**

There were no major changes in the CSO legal environment during 2013 following the death of the former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, who is believed to have been the driving force behind the CSP. The CSP continues to severely hinder the operation of human rights and advocacy CSOs, as well as network organizations. The law forbids CSOs engaging in human rights issues from accepting more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign sources and curtails the role of network organizations in voicing common concerns and pushing for policy changes. The CSA oversees implementation of the CSP and has broad power to regulate the operation of CSOs. Other regulations that govern CSOs include the Council of Ministers Charities and Societies Regulation No.168/2009 and eight directives issued by the CSA in 2011 and 2013. A new Directive on Cost Sharing was issued at the end of 2013 prohibiting CSOs from collecting more than 25 percent of a project’s total cost from beneficiaries of their services. Organizations must also obtain permission from the CSA before they seek cost share.

Under the CSP, charities and societies are required to renew their licenses every three years; accordingly, the first batch of registrants was expected to renew their licenses in 2013. CSOs must have project plans with committed budgets of at least three years in order to renew their licenses. In addition, CSOs must have signed project agreements with at least one government institution. These prerequisites are very difficult for CSOs to meet. Approximately eight associations established by private companies to defend their interests were denied renewal on the grounds that only natural persons, not legal persons, can establish CSOs. In addition, some associations were denied renewal because they need to restructure into a different form of CSO under the CSP. For example, the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA), a think tank and economic policy research institution established in 1991, was registered in 2009 as an Ethiopian resident society, allowing it to access foreign funding. Now, however, the CSA is demanding that the association restructure itself, either as a professional association or an Ethiopian society. This status would limit its access to foreign aid and result in the confiscation of its assets, as Ethiopian societies are not allowed to own assets purchased with foreign sources of funding.

Independent human rights work in the country has become almost impossible since the enforcement of the CSP. Only four percent of all CSOs are registered as Ethiopian charities and therefore eligible to work on
human rights and good governance. As the law forbids CSOs working in these areas from receiving more than ten percent of their funding from foreign sources, fewer than five organizations work explicitly on human rights issues in the country.

Around sixty-nine CSOs received warnings from the CSA in 2013, a significant decline from last year, possibly due to improved compliance with the law. Warnings were issued for various reasons including failure to meet administrative and program expenditure limits, impermissible work on advocacy issues, and delays in the submission of audit and activity reports. An organization called Love in Action Ethiopia received a warning from the CSA that its officials were exchanging emails that were impermissibly political in nature.

The CSA does not have regional offices, so CSOs must travel to Addis Ababa in order to register and renew their licenses, thereby increasing their administrative costs. This can cause problems for CSOs as the Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization (known as the 30/70 directive) limits administrative costs, which are very broadly defined to no more than 30 percent of an organization’s total budget.

Both individual and corporate donations are eligible for tax deductions, although there are strict conditions regarding the permissible amount of donations and the organizations entitled to receive such donations. CSOs pay taxes such as Value Added Tax and income tax on any transactions they make and are not exempt from paying taxes on income earned from providing services. However, they are exempt from taxes on grants. CSOs are not allowed to compete for government grants or contracts.

A CSO-related law course that started in 2010 at Addis Ababa University has helped mitigate the lack of qualified lawyers to provide advice on CSO matters. Consequently, CSOs operating in major urban areas now have improved access to legal services. However, the cost of hiring lawyers which is classified as an administrative expense hinders CSOs from seeking their services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2013. The 30/70 directive continues to challenge CSOs. Administrative costs include a wide range of expenses, such as fixed assets, audits, publication costs, office rent, vehicles, Internet fees, membership fees, monitoring and evaluation, preparation of plans and reports, and staff training. Moreover, the list of expenses classified as administrative costs makes it difficult for CSOs to spend resources on important tasks such as needs assessments, baseline surveys, monitoring and evaluation, research and publications, and organizational capacity development.

CSOs have great difficulty employing qualified staff, as salaries for nearly all staff—including directors, program and project coordinators, administration and finance officers, auditors, and treasurers—are also considered administrative costs. Furthermore, CSOs cannot engage expatriate staff without securing prior permission from the CSA. In 2013, several international organizations, including Médecins Sans Frontières Team, International Rescue Committee, and Médecins Sans Frontières Spain, received warnings for violating this regulation.

CSOs are still criticized for not having strong constituencies for their local initiatives. Most do not sufficiently engage their beneficiaries in the design and implementation of their projects. Almost all CSOs are registered as membership organizations, but they do little to expand their membership bases, which is essential to garnering support for their local initiatives.
The CSP requires CSOs to submit three-year project plans and state their objectives. The law also requires CSOs to have certain governing documents such as bylaws or rules. In addition, each CSO must have a general assembly, executive committee (board of directors), and an internal auditor. Despite this, CSOs lack accountability to their beneficiaries and are criticized for not being transparent in the administration of their budgets.

Few CSOs own their offices. The majority rent offices, which is becoming very expensive, particularly in the capital. Most CSOs have Internet access, computers, and mobile phones.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSOs continue to struggle to access financial resources. Although the law restricts access to foreign funds, CSOs remain highly dependent on foreign funding. In 2013, some big donors like the European Commission (EC), World Bank, and the multi-donor Civil Society Support Program (CSSP) issued calls for proposals to the wider civil society sector. According to separate agreements signed with the government, funds from the EC and World Bank are considered local funds, which can be accessed by advocacy organizations.

Local support is difficult for CSOs to access. Local philanthropy and volunteerism are poorly developed, and CSOs are not allowed to compete for state tenders. Although most CSOs are membership-based, only a few succeed in collecting membership fees, and in most cases the fees are nominal. Despite increased recognition of the need to raise funds locally and some successful efforts by certain CSOs, CSOs need more experience and skills in this area. Public fundraising is possible only upon permission from the CSA. To get this permission, an organization must show that this is its last resort for funding.

CSOs working on advocacy issues, such as human rights, gender equality, children’s rights, and rights for persons with disabilities struggle for survival due to the legal restrictions on foreign funding. CSOs working in these areas are required to raise more than 90 percent of their income from domestic sources, which is not feasible given the level of poverty in the country. Engaging in income-generating activities is also nearly impossible for these organizations due to the restrictive legal conditions which require that business activities be incidental to the organization’s objective. Very few service-providing CSOs engage in income-generating activities either. The Directive to Provide for Income Generating Activities by Charities and Societies (No. 07/2011) requires CSOs to use such income only for operational activities and not for administrative costs.

Prior registration with the CSA is required in order to receive foreign funds, though some regional CSOs have circumvented the CSP and accessed foreign aid without being registered by the CSA. Due to the legal restriction and the ambiguity of the law, most donors operating in the country stopped releasing funds to regional CSOs, severely challenging the viability of regional CSOs, as well as community-based organizations (CBOs).

**ADVOCACY: 6.1**

Generally, there is very limited space for CSOs to participate in policy debates. Although there are around fifty-four formal issue-based coalitions or network organizations, the Directive to Provide for the Establishment of Consortia of Charities and Societies (CSA Directive No. 1/2010) disallows them from voicing common issues and policies or building the capacity of their...
members. In addition, CSOs are not allowed to form coalitions with CSOs of a different legal status. For example, Ethiopian charities and societies cannot form coalitions with Ethiopian residents’ charities and societies or foreign charities. Furthermore, the Directive regarding administrative and project costs restricts their role to channeling funds to member organizations.

Few CSOs promote and protect human rights, as the CSP denies such CSOs access to foreign funding. Fewer than five CSOs in the country work on human rights issues, and they lack qualified staff and the infrastructure to engage actively in policy and rights issues. Nonetheless, in 2013 these organizations implemented different awareness raising activities on human and women's rights and good governance, as well as human rights investigation and reporting. In 2013, nine CSOs received warnings for impossibly engaging in advocacy-related activities such as promoting gender equality and raising awareness on harmful traditional practices including female genital mutilation.

Within the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) program, which began in 2006 with support from international development partners, the Ethiopian Social Accountability Program (ESAP) allows CSOs with special agreements with the government to work on accountability issues using foreign funding. In 2013, more than fifty-five CSOs signed grant agreements with the World Bank, which is leading the project. This is expected to be a good opportunity for the government and CSOs to build trust and work on advocacy issues.

In 2009, Ethiopia submitted its first report to the Working Group on the Universal Peer Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council. The Working Group proposed 142 recommendations to the government, including revising the CSP. The government committed itself to consider ninety-nine of the recommendations, but rejected six proposals to reform or repeal the CSP. In September 2013, Ethiopia submitted its second UPR report to the Working Group. In response, several international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and ARTICLE 19 made individual submissions to the Working Group, claiming that Ethiopia mostly failed to comply with the recommendations it accepted during the 2009 UPR to protect the rights to freedoms of expression and information, peaceful assembly, and association.

There are few formal structures that enable consultation between the government and CSOs, although two forums—the GO-NGO Forum and the Federal Forum for Charities and Societies Affairs—serve this role to some extent. The GO-NGO Forum allows regional and local government and CSO representatives to meet periodically to discuss issues of common concern. The Federal Forum for Charities and Societies Affairs was established by the CSA and CSO representatives in 2013 to replace the CSO Taskforce, which had played a critical role in voicing the concern of CSOs regarding the adoption of the CSP in 2009.

However, the existing forums have been ineffective in advocating for improvements to the legal framework governing CSOs. The government is neither open to challenges nor responsive to questions from CSOs on the laws and regulations impacting CSOs. For instance, CSOs and government had several discussions and undertook research on the impacts of the 30/70 directive, but its implementation has not changed. The Civil Society Sector Working Group, which is co-chaired by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and a representative of the donor community, continues to monitor and discuss the challenges in implementing the CSP. However, it also has been unsuccessful in influencing the government to ease restrictions on CSOs. Generally, there is very limited space for CSOs to participate in policy debates. Although there are around fifty-four formal issue-based coalitions or network organizations, they are not authorized to voice common issues and policies or to build the capacity of their members. Directives issued by the CSA restrict their role to channeling funds to member organizations.
CSOs render a wide range of services in various areas, including health care, environmental protection, education, agriculture, water, energy, and other social services. A study conducted by the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA) estimates that its 320 member CSOs implemented around 4,000 development projects valued at 12.6 billion ETB ($646,153,846) in 2013. In 2013, CSSP—a five-year program funded by multiple donors—extended more than 150 million ETB ($77 million) to sixty CSOs working on civic engagement of marginalized populations and neglected development issues. On the other hand, the number of CSOs working on governance and empowerment issues is negligible.

Local government authorities play an important role in the selection of projects by CSOs to ensure that projects are in line with government development strategies and the needs of the local community. To implement any project, a CSO must first sign a project agreement with the relevant line ministries or sector administrators. In addition, most donors require CSOs to conduct needs assessments to receive funding for projects.

The overwhelming majority of CSOs rely on donor funds to provide services, which undermines the sustainability of their services. Few organizations engage in income-generating activities, and the legal environment is not encouraging for local resource mobilization. CSOs must receive permission from the CSA and get a trade license to market publications, workshops, or expert analysis to other CSOs, academia, or government.

The government does not provide any financial support for CSO service provision, and the government competes with CSOs for support from the donor community. Some projects such as PBS are implemented jointly by the government and CSOs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The 30/70 directive continues to affect CSOs—particularly network organizations—by limiting access to CSO support services such as resource centers, technology, and training. Any expenses related to capacity development are considered administrative costs, which cannot exceed 30 percent of a CSO’s total budget. Most CSOs cannot afford to pay for capacity building training on their own. Consequently, it is very difficult for CSOs to access the necessary technology and training.

In 2013, some donor initiative programs focused on building the capacity of local charities and societies. The USAID local Civil Society Support Program provided organizational capacity support to around thirty local CSOs. CSSP has a capacity development component for CSOs, which focuses on policy- and issue-based research, communication, promotion of dialogue with government, and strengthening of organizational and management systems of CSOs. In addition, a few network organizations have resource centers for their members.

The CSP makes it impossible to establish national CSO coalitions or networks that can represent the sector as it prohibits networking among CSOs with different legal forms. As a result, there is no formal or organized body that facilitates information sharing among CSOs or promotes the interests of the sector as a whole.
Given the CSA’s warnings to CSOs regarding internal management issues, there is a pressing need for training in strategic and financial management and staff accountability. Trainings on fundraising, partnership building, and communication are also important.

Partnerships between businesses and CSOs are not well-developed in Ethiopia. Mutual misperceptions continue to hinder collaboration between media and CSOs, and the two sectors do not engage in any joint programs or initiatives.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1**

During and immediately after the adoption of the CSP in 2009, state media engaged in continuous criticism of the CSO sector to influence public perception. In 2013, the relationship between the media and CSOs improved slightly, as the state media ceased their campaign against the CSO sector. Some state media have even started reporting constructive news about CSO activities. However, the relationship between CSOs and the media is still very weak, as both sectors lack professional capacities and strategies to engage each other. TV channels are still state-controlled and unwilling to cover the work of CSOs, particularly projects that are critical of the government. Furthermore, CSOs do not receive substantial coverage from national radios or TV channels due to the high cost of airtime.

The majority of CSOs are weak in communicating their activities to the public through the media or other means. In July 2013, the EU Civil Society Fund and Atos Consulting provided a three-day training aimed at improving the relationship between media and CSOs. Although some organizations state their values and principles in their public relations materials and strategic plans, most CSOs lack the human and financial resources for extended public relations activities, particularly because these activities would be considered administrative costs. Fear of attracting adverse attention from the government also hinders CSOs from publicizing their work.

Government perception of the CSO sector is still not positive, although some government agencies—particularly at the local level—cooperate with CSOs. The government does not consider CSOs as partners in development but as gap fillers for services at best, or as agents of foreign governments or organizations at worst. The government’s perception of CSOs working in human rights and good governance is particularly negative and distrustful. The government has continued blocking the websites of certain human rights campaigners, including Ethiopian Human Rights Council, a legally registered local CSO.

The public perception of CSOs has not improved. Most citizens do not understand or recognize the role of civil society as change agents in the democratization process. The public associates CSOs mainly with aid, and CSOs are sometimes assumed to have highly paid staff, which is especially damaging to their reputation.

Very few local CSOs try to work with the business community in humanitarian areas. The business community fears government repression and therefore is not comfortable supporting CSOs working in human rights.

A small number of CSOs publish annual reports, including programmatic and financial information, in hard copy or on their websites. A national code of conduct for CSOs was adopted in 2012, but the law precludes the establishment of a national body that can enforce it. In 2013, CCRDA and its members made efforts to establish a legal entity to enforce the code, but the entity still is not established.
The concept of civil society is new in Gabon and the sector has encountered enormous difficulties from the beginning. The legal context, political considerations, a lack of coherence among CSO networks, and leadership problems have all impeded the evolution of civil society in Gabon and hindered CSO sustainability.

The sustainability of Gabonese CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. No legal reforms were undertaken during the year. CSOs still face problems pertaining to their organizational capacity and sectoral infrastructure. CSOs’ survival continues to depend on their ability to obtain financing. In the face of these weaknesses, Gabonese CSOs struggle to carry out their activities. CSOs only launched a few advocacy and communication campaigns during the year.

There are currently 700 CSOs—including associations, NGOs, unions, and foundations—registered with the Ministry of the Interior in Gabon. CSOs operate in numerous fields including the environment, social and cultural issues, and education.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

The legal context in Gabon remained impeded in 2013. Two laws govern CSOs: Law 35-62 of December 10, 1962, regulating the creation of associations, and Law 3-94 of November 21, 1994, regulating the labor code of the Gabonese Republic with a set of provisions related to professional organizations, including labor unions. These laws are supposedly favorable to the creation of CSOs and recognize their right to function freely. However, the laws are weak in many respects, as they do not take into account the different types of CSOs in existence.

CSOs do not face difficulties obtaining temporary authorization receipts, but acquiring full legal status and permanent authorization receipts can be an arduous process. CSOs with mandates seen as touching on questions of governance and those deemed sensitive by the authorities (e.g., those focused on corruption, human rights, or ritual crimes) report that they have experienced delays in obtaining authorization, although there have not been any reported cases of CSOs being denied licenses. Acquiring full legal status for any type of entity in Gabon is generally a lengthy process.

CSOs’ by-laws outline their internal management systems. Law 35-62 specifies details about liquidation and non-authorized activities. Law 3-94 specifies authorized activities and expresses itself briefly on the dissolution of labor unions, but not CSOs. The state has the authority to dissolve CSOs, but has not exercised this right.

CSOs can express themselves freely on questions of public debate. They can organize press conferences, appear on radio and television, and participate in debates alongside representatives of the administration. However, CSOs that are seen as critical of the government often cannot access state-run media (though they do have better access to private, opposition-affiliated media), and the media that do cover them are increasingly threatened with suspension.

Law 35-62 allows the State to monitor associations that are deemed to be in the public interest and are subsidized by the State, but not those that are not subsidized. In principle, the monitoring is focused on CSOs’ management of received funds. However, CSOs often perceive the monitoring as a form of harassment by the central government. When a CSO takes a firm position, it can attract the anger of the administrative authorities.

The taxation of CSOs did not change in 2013. CSOs are not subject to income tax, and the law is mute on the question of taxation of CSOs. The General Code of Direct and Indirect Taxes allows for CSOs to benefit from exemptions on customs taxes, but a procedure has not yet been introduced to implement these exemptions.

The law does not specify the possibility for CSOs to earn revenue from the provision of goods and services, but in practice, CSOs do respond to requests for bids and obtain contracts.

There are no lawyers in Gabon with a perfect mastery of the laws governing CSOs. Few CSOs have legal experts on staff, nor do they have sufficient financial resources to pay for legal consultations.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5

There was no change in CSO organizational capacity in 2013. CSOs at both national and regional levels concentrate first on their organizational structures and positioning on the national stage before turning to the establishment of constituencies. Several obstacles, including conflicts of interest as well as the lack of financial resources, hinder the development of constituencies, thereby threatening the sustainability of CSOs. Labor unions have constituencies, but try to impose discipline on them and restrict their freedom by, for example, dissuading them from striking.

CSOs define their missions in their by-laws. Labor unions generally have very clear missions and strategies that are linked to a professional sector, whereas many NGOs and associations lack a clear perception of their role and mission which can reduce their effectiveness.

Few CSOs have the organizational capacity, vision, human and material resources, and will to engage in strategic planning. However, CSOs that receive money from international donors are required to integrate strategic planning techniques into their decision-making processes.

A majority of CSOs do not have clearly defined managerial structures. Many are represented by one or two individuals. Although NGOs tend to be more and more professional, and some have made efforts to recruit competent staff, in general CSOs do not maintain permanent paid staff, because of a lack of financial resources. In addition, working in CSOs is perceived as a supplementary activity founded on the principle of volunteering. Most CSO members have other primary jobs. CSOs rarely call upon specialized volunteers, such as lawyers and accountants. Known organizations generally have an average of only one or two volunteers.

Although a few CSOs have sufficient resources to modernize their equipment, the great majority operates with limited financial resources and thus functions without offices or office equipment. All CSOs have access to mobile phones, but because of very high costs, few have Internet access.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1

CSOs lack the capacity to identify funding sources and to initiate and implement projects, and do not manage funds in a transparent fashion. As a result, CSOs continue to have limited long-term sustainability.

CSOs lack knowledge about the existence of sources of financing, including small grants issued by organizations such as le Service de Coopération Culturelle et d’Action Culturelle de l’Ambassade de France (The French Embassy Service of Cultural Cooperation and Action or SCAC), the WWF, and the European Union. CSOs are also largely unaware of sources of philanthropy, such as the Red Cross, Caritas, the Lion’s Club, and the Rotary Club.

The State offers small funds, not exceeding 3 million FCFA (approximately $6,000), to a few CSOs (this number has not shifted since 2012). There are no known criteria for the distribution of these funds, and CSOs continue to perceive the allocation of these funds as arbitrary. CSOs declared to be in the public interest by the Council of Ministers receive funding from local sources. These CSOs also receive funds from certain foundations, including the Red Cross and Caritas. Other sources of funding that are available but not accessed by CSOs include state sources (subsidies from state and local public communities) and non-state...
sources (philanthropists, cooperative organizations, international institutions, regional and non-regional institutions, and churches).

CSOs do not pursue income-generating activities. CSOs are occasionally solicited for their specific expertise either by the State, the private sector, or other actors in the form of consultations on cartography or socioeconomic studies, for example. Law 35-62 allows registered associations to collect dues or contributions from its members. However, the idea of charging dues is still new to Gabonese CSOs, even for labor unions, and few NGOs collect dues, as generally their only members are their own salaried employees.

The few CSOs that function efficiently keep accounting and financial records, as required by funders. Most CSOs have very basic accounting systems, as they do not have access to accounting specialists. International funders require their grantees to undergo audits. CSOs that receive foreign funding produce annual reports of their activities, including finances.

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

The concepts of lobbying and advocacy are not well-known among CSOs. As a result, CSOs were not heavily involved in advocacy in 2013, only engaging in a few campaigns.

Government and CSOs sometimes work together according to signed protocols in the context of various donor-funded projects. However, the efficiency of this collaboration depends on who is charged with project management. According to some CSO activists, when CSOs manage projects, the collaboration tends to be more effective and visible. When the government is in charge, on the other hand, CSOs often feel that they are not well-integrated, that there is a lack of communication between partners, and that their recommendations are not taken into account.

Few organizations in Gabon engage in advocacy efforts and those advocacy efforts that do exist are not based on any true strategy. Nonetheless, some CSOs do manage with difficulty to put in place constituencies and deploy advocacy campaigns. For instance, ClientEarth and Brainforest, along with other civil society actors, are carrying out an advocacy campaign to improve the integration of the rights of community members in the new Forestry Code. Beyond providing related legal support, these organizations have facilitated workshops on the subject. The effectiveness of these advocacy campaigns, however, is unclear and CSOs are still waiting for the results of the reform of the Forestry Code.

Few CSOs are at ease with or knowledgeable about the concept of lobbying. No laws inspired or supported by CSO advocacy campaigns have yet been passed. Nonetheless, there is hope for the success of the Forestry Code reform given the forestry administration’s expressed openness on the issue.

CSOs understand that a legal context favorable to them will reinforce their efficiency and sustainability. The European Union’s Strengthening Non-State Actors in Gabon Program (PROGREANE) proposed regulations governing associations and other forms of CSOs two years ago. Unfortunately, the Ministry of the Interior, to which the proposal was referred, has not approved these regulations. An advocacy campaign among CSOs to promote legal reform exists, but internal cohesion is a major challenge.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

CSO service provision did not change significantly in 2013. Gabonese CSOs provide free and fee-based services in diverse spheres. Products and services are generally more in line with the priorities of the funders than with the legitimate needs of the Gabonese population. Occasionally, the products and services provided by CSOs reflect both the priorities of their donors as well as the needs of their communities, for example
When they deal with contemporary issues such as community rights, access to natural resources, community forests, and education and public health issues.

The services provided by CSOs frequently extend beyond their members to communities and even private businesses. Certain specialized CSOs offer their products and services, including publications, analysis, and expertise, to other CSOs, the government, and international organizations.

Almost all services provided by CSOs are free, as they receive donor funding to provide them. In some cases, CSOs receive contracts from the private sector or from the State or international institutions to carry out studies.

The government does not always have a good understanding of what CSOs can offer, believing itself to be the sole purveyor of basic social services. The immediate consequence is a lack of government funding for CSOs providing such services. However, the State increasingly recognizes the value CSOs bring to social services, which has led to the creation of some partnerships between CSOs and particular ministerial departments over the years.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

In 2013, CSOs continued to confront challenges pertaining to organization and infrastructure. At the national level, the State provides financial resources for a few ISOs, including the Mbandja Center, which is supported by the Sylvia Bongo Foundation, the Amissa Foundation, and the Omar Bongo Ondimba Foundation. However, their services are limited to Libreville and are not sufficient to address the needs of civil society. The amount of financing redistributed by ISOs to CSOs is unknown.

CSOs share information, but there are enormous gaps. Several networks have been created to facilitate information sharing. However, these networks only cover certain issue areas, and their operations are often criticized by civil society actors for not being as communicative as they should be (due sometimes to a resistance to sharing information, and sometimes simply to the fact that not all CSOs have equal access to Internet-based tools).

Internal clashes within civil society sometimes detract from the effectiveness and credibility of organizations. In July 2013, for example, competing factions within the Publiez ce que vous payez (Publish What You Pay) coalition clashed over the coalition’s leadership. A delegation from Publish What You Pay’s London office was called to Libreville to resolve the split and appoint an interim leader for the Gabon chapter.

Few trainers are competent in CSO management issues. The few training organizations that do exist are not well known to CSOs. Training is also held outside of national borders or online through the Francophone University Association. Training on accounting, financial management, and board development are offered, generally at the initiative of international partners. Training on strategic planning and fundraising is practically non-existent unless offered by international partners. Few training materials in local languages exist, except for those covering certain themes such as the fight against HIV/AIDS.

There is an awareness of the value of intersectoral partnerships. However, there are few formal or informal partnerships between CSOs and other actors (State, private sector, and universities). Those partnerships that do exist are limited to particular sectors, such as the environment or national processes on climate planning,
and they are difficult to create because of conflicts of interest and attempts to influence the State or private sector.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

There was no change in the public image of CSOs in 2013. The media coverage that a CSO receives depends on its field of work and the relationship that it has with the government. Pro-government CSOs enjoy a wide platform, whereas organizations recognized for their independence or criticism of the government have difficulty obtaining media coverage of their activities by national public channels. CSOs often appeal to private media, and CSO critics of the government receive some coverage in opposition-affiliated press.

The media’s perception of CSOs varies according to the status and positioning of the media in question. The further away a media outlet is from power, the more independence it has to give CSOs positive coverage. Unfortunately, very few private media outlets are interested in CSO activities. In general, the media recognizes the role CSOs play on the national stage, albeit in a nuanced fashion according to political/ideological slant.

For a long time, the public did not clearly understand the concept of civil society, but people are now beginning to have a better grasp of CSOs’ role in supporting the implementation of government policies. CSOs attempt to function as the “voice of the voiceless” through their condemnation of the evils that undermine society and their support for the causes of its weakest members. This proximity to the people makes CSOs accessible and generates support from the public at large when such efforts are successful. Unfortunately, such support is limited because the public fears reprisal from the authorities. For example, those from the mining or forestry communities who worked with CSOs have been visited by security forces or the local police and informed that decisions have been made and that their opinions do not matter.

In some cases, the State, the public sector (public administration and services), and businesses have a positive perception of CSOs, recognizing their work and soliciting their expertise. However, in others, they consider independent CSOs as an opposition force, impeding their actions and giving a bad image to government and business. Some CSOs are affiliated with the political opposition.

Many CSOs operate in a vacuum, and their activities are not well-known to the public. It is also frequently the case that they do not make significant efforts in terms of communication, focusing instead on consolidating existing partnerships and responding to project bids. Few CSOs have websites or produce reports of their activities, which could improve their visibility.

For the most part, codes of ethics and transparency are non-existent. Each organization develops its own internal operating and procedural documents. Certain funders require CSOs to make their operating procedures transparent.

The most well-known and visible CSOs publish annual reports to enhance their credibility and to meet donor requirements.
CSO sustainability in The Gambia was challenged by economic developments in 2013. Following the enactment of the Income and VAT Act of 2012, VAT was introduced in January 2013, increasing prices by at least 15 percent. The Act also set income tax at 35 percent. This provision was loosely enforced until January 2013, when the government contacted several CSOs and private companies to begin paying the tax. At the same time, in 2013 the government exempted several public enterprises from paying the tax because of its effect on institutional budgets and staff incomes. These difficulties were exacerbated by the increasing cost of living and poverty.

The political environment in The Gambia remains constrained. The law and state practices prevent CSOs from engaging in robust advocacy. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances of political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders continue, often carried out by agents of the National Intelligence Agency. Frequent hostile remarks by top government officials against human rights defenders, journalists, the political opposition, and CSOs have further limited the space for advocacy and engagement. Public institutions and processes are not efficient, responsive, transparent, or accountable.
Nevertheless, CSOs have made progress in their interventions and operations. Aware of the dire challenges facing communities, CSOs seek to enhance their knowledge and skills and improve their operations to better connect with and serve various populations. Similarly, CSOs have aimed to constructively engage with government institutions and development partners to address the needs of the people.

CSOs are required to register with the Ministry of Justice under the 1955 Companies Act, which identifies them as charitable organizations. There are hundreds to thousands of charitable organizations, ranging from more established CSOs to smaller community and self-help groups in villages and towns. Currently, 125 CSOs are also registered as NGOs with the NGO Affairs Agency, the same number as in 2012. There are various CSO networks, the largest of which is The Association of NGOs in The Gambia (TANGO), which includes seventy-five NGOs as members.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

NGO Decree 81, created by the military junta in 1996, guides the registration and operations of NGOs. There are several steps to registering as an NGO. First, an organization must register as a charitable organization with the Ministry of Justice. The charitable organization must operate for two years before it can seek NGO status through the NGO Affairs Agency, which it does by submitting its Ministry of Justice registration certificate, a tax identification number, a bank account, a list of board members, and financial and activity reports over the two-year period. The number of registered NGOs in the country remains small, as CSOs receive no clear benefits from the status.

The NGO Decree contains provisions that remain potentially risky for NGO operations. For example, the Decree specifies that NGOs may only work within the framework of “stated government policy” in order to promote national development objectives. It thus allows the Minister of Interior to shut down any NGO suspected of working counter to government policy.

CSOs continue to lack clear legal protection from state interference. As in 2012, CSOs and their representatives could operate freely and openly in 2013 as long as they did not raise human rights and governance issues in the country. Direct criticism of the state, especially the decisions and actions of the security and intelligence community and the president, is particularly unwelcome. Outspoken critics can be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, disappearance, or criminal charges of sedition. Hence CSOs have avoided engaging in these issues for fear of reprisals.

While arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances of political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders continue, there were no reported cases of direct state harassment of CSOs in 2013. This is in contrast to previous years when some CSOs were forced to close down or their officials were arrested or, in one case, deported.

Grants and other income received by CSOs remain untaxed. CSOs also receive tax concessions on imported goods earmarked for development work. Expatriate staff do not pay taxes on their incomes, but local staff do, and personnel taxes are high. Individuals and businesses are not eligible for tax deductions for their donations.
CSOs are legally classified as charitable organizations and thus cannot engage in commercial activities. However, the NGO Decree allows NGOs to sell goods and services at non-commercial rates for the purpose of raising funds to reinvest in their operations.

Legal advice is available throughout the country. Lawyers are familiar with CSO law from their general legal training. Although some have successfully defended CSO workers in court in the past, it continues to be difficult to obtain a lawyer with the courage to engage on controversial issues.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

CSOs continue to provide goods and services to communities, as well as various target groups like lawmakers, police, and teachers. Some CSOs provide capacity building services in business development techniques, financial management, and topics related to small businesses. Membership-based CSOs, mainly representing women, farmers, or youth, seek to build their constituencies. Some, such as the Gambia Women Finance Association (GAWFA), National Women Farmers Association (NAWFA), Peace Ambassadors Gambia, and the Association of Farmers, Educators and Teachers (AFET), have strong constituencies. The Gambia Committee Against Harmful Traditional Practices (GAMCOTRAP) is not membership-based, but has successfully built and maintained a constituency among former female circumcisers.

Developing and following strategic plans is fast becoming a common practice among CSOs of all sizes as they increasingly recognize the importance of such plans in improving their fundraising efforts. Most staff members, as well as board members and other stakeholders, engage in the development of strategic plans. Strategic plans not only guide operations and governance, but also inform decision making at all levels. These tools have helped enhance the management and performance of CSOs.

Typically, a CSO’s constitution clearly demarcates the roles and responsibilities of the management and board. Separation of powers is a requirement for registration as well as membership in certain coalitions such as TANGO. Many boards are active, ensuring periodic statutory meetings and providing oversight of the management. However, many CSOs have also raised concern about the intrusion of boards, particularly chairpersons, in internal organizational affairs that the executive director has been unable or unwilling to stop.

There continue to be huge differences in the staffing structures, working conditions, salaries, and incentives between established CSOs and smaller organizations. Staff retention is a major difficulty for CSOs due to inadequate funding, which makes it difficult for CSOs to pay competitive salaries. Most CSO funding is project-based, usually lasting from a few months to a few years. Therefore, staff turnover is high when projects end. Many CSOs depend on volunteers to carry out their activities. The hiring of interns is also common. More established CSOs utilize professional services and permanently retain lawyers, accountants, and IT services. Smaller CSOs and charities can only afford these professional services on an as needed basis. Most CSOs have basic human resource management practices.

The new income tax is having a significant impact on CSOs with paid employees: either staff incomes will drop drastically or CSOs will need to augment salaries to cover the tax. TANGO convened a forum between NGOs and The Gambia Revenue Authority to discuss this issue in 2013, and several NGOs sought tax concessions directly with the Office of the President or the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, all to no avail.

More established CSOs have modernized basic office equipment, while many smaller CSOs do not have such assets. Internet access is predominantly available within the greater Banjul area. In the provinces, connectivity...
is erratic and weak. The use of social media is high in the urban area where many people also have smartphones. Many CSOs have Facebook and Twitter accounts.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

The bulk of CSO funding comes from abroad. CSOs have limited abilities to raise funds locally because the culture of corporate and individual philanthropy is weak. In 2013, some banks approached certain CSOs with the possibility of philanthropic support. Although these conversations have not yet materialized into actual donations, this is still a positive indication of change. Communities frequently provide in-kind support to the CSOs that serve them. This support typically includes free labor and materials for the construction of community structures such as schools and health centers. The introduction of VAT increased the prices for all goods and services throughout the country, seriously eroding NGOs’ budgets and limiting their ability to provide more goods and services.

There are multiple and diverse sources of funding available to CSOs in the country, though most of these are foreign and not easily accessible because of stringent requirements. International funding sources include UN agencies and foreign embassies, such as the US, UK, and EU missions. Some CSOs have strong relationships with foreign donors. International funding levels in 2013 were about the same as in 2012. In addition, most funding is project-based, lasting up to three years, and amounting to a few tens of thousands of dollars. Given these conditions, most CSOs do not have enough resources to remain viable, and many CSOs cannot pay salaries consistently.

Most coalitions in the country require membership fees, but many members do not meet their obligations. For example, more than half of TANGO’s seventy-five member organizations owe at least two years of dues.

CSOs continue to earn minimal revenue from the sale of goods and services. The government does not provide grants to CSOs. Contracts from government and businesses are still limited and infrequent. There is, however, growing interest in partnerships between the CSO community and the private sector.

More established CSOs have financial management systems in place, but most of the smaller CSOs lack the means to establish and maintain such systems. However, these CSOs still strive to ensure that financial reporting, procurement, audit, and internal controls are in place. Many CSOs conduct independent financial audits, but because they are expensive, some organizations can only afford to have independent audits every few years. Many CSOs are starting to publish annual reports with financial information.

**ADVOCACY: 5.0**

CSOs continue to have direct lines of communication and a cordial working relationship with policy makers. The government invites CSOs to most policy forums, and several CSOs sit on government committees. For example Child Protection Alliance sits on the National Agency on Trafficking in Persons; TANGO sits on the National Population Council; the Health Education Promotion and Development Organization (HePDO) sits on the National Steering Committee on Social Protection; and Concern Universal sits on the National Disaster Management Council. CSOs participating in government policy forums not only contribute to policy ideas, but also engage in policy tracking and evaluation. However, the government does not always respond to this monitoring.
CSOs do not readily and openly address human rights and governance issues especially where they relate to the central government, as the risk of government harassment remains. However, several CSOs organize open forums around national policy and development issues, usually during celebrations of internationally recognized days. For example, the Consumer Protection Association of The Gambia partnered with TANGO in April 2013 to organize a forum on consumer justice on World Consumer Rights Day. CSOs use such events to advocate for various development issues, and human rights issues are sometimes featured prominently.

Several coalitions conducted advocacy campaigns in 2013. Women’s rights organizations launched major campaigns in the past few years in favor of a domestic violence law, which finally passed in 2013. A network focused on gender-based violence held a series of public awareness activities to highlight violence against women and girls. The network persuaded the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to establish a one-stop center for gender-based violence cases at the country’s main hospital in Banjul in 2013. The Social Protection Platform Gambia (SPPG) is at the forefront of campaigns to create a national social protection policy and agency. As a result of these efforts, the government is working towards this objective with support from UNICEF.

At the same time, CSOs in The Gambia tend to advocate in passive and non-confrontational ways. Because of the hostile legal and political environment, CSOs do not generally organize protests, engage in naming and shaming tactics, or submit demands to the government. Instead, they use meetings, seminars, and other interpersonal engagements with government to pursue their advocacy goals.

CSOs also lack capacity for lobbying, partly because the political environment and practices of the National Intelligence Agency make it dangerous for CSOs to get into direct confrontation with the government. However, the successes in advocating for the domestic violence law indicate CSOs’ potential for effective lobbying.

There is a high level of awareness among CSOs of the need for legal reforms to enhance their work and facilitate local philanthropy. However, there were no efforts in 2013 to reform the NGO Decree. TANGO held some discussions with The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a few banks on the issue of tax deductions to encourage philanthropy. Tax legislation was highlighted as a critical factor given that The Gambia has the highest total tax rate in the world. However, formal discussions crumbled due to leadership changes at The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

### SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

CSOs provide a diverse range of socioeconomic goods and services to all communities in The Gambia. Service provision continues to increase both in terms of volume and the number of beneficiaries reached. CSOs have built schools, health centers, and water pumps and have trained farmers, policy makers, security and law enforcement officers, and business operators, among others. Some CSOs train women and youth to produce goods and services, such as soap making and food processing, as a means of income generation and self-employment. Other CSOs have established skills development or training centers for young adults who did not complete formal education or have never been to school. CSOs also engage in election monitoring and observation, public awareness on climate change, tree planting, and legal aid, in addition to other diverse services to the general public, state institutions, and businesses. With support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, in 2013 CSOs increased their support to communities with mosquito nets, TB treatment, antiretroviral drugs, and other support services for victims of these diseases.
The goods and services provided by CSOs reflect the needs and priorities of constituencies and communities, which are identified through needs assessments, project evaluations, and social audit exercises. Communities value CSO services, especially given the high level of poverty and the state’s poor delivery of basic services. CSOs serve their constituencies, members, and others, and their publications are shared far and wide with various stakeholders.

CSOs do not generally charge for the services they provide. CSOs that run health facilities, operate schools, or produce processed foods charge fees, but they are below commercial rates. Funds earned are reinvested to expand or sustain service provision.

The government publicly recognizes the role and contribution of CSOs to national development and invites CSOs to participate in policy forums and various government project steering committees. However, the government generally does not provide grants or contracts to CSOs. One exception is Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG), which receives government contracts to provide training to law and policy makers on budget analysis and other areas. Similarly, Future In Our Hands (FIOH) receives contracts from the Ministry of Education to construct schools.

**INFRASCTURE: 5.4**

There are no intermediary support organizations (ISOs) in the country. Local foundations do not support CSOs; rather, they directly support schools, hospitals, and communities. The main foundation in the country is the President Jammeh Foundation for Peace, which has a major hospital and provides scholarships. The Sheikh Mass Kah Islamic Foundation runs schools and health facilities.

TANGO and Child Protection Alliance are leading networks that consistently provide relevant information to CSOs on training, funding opportunities, and partnerships. Other networks, including Pro-PAG, the Network on Gender-Based Violence, and the Gender Action Team, also facilitate information sharing among CSOs. All TANGO members belong to at least one of the five thematic groups created by TANGO. Many CSOs have improved their information gathering and dissemination by building websites, publishing newsletters, and establishing resource centers. However, some of these resource centers are not well equipped.

Capable trainers are available in all fields of CSO governance and operations. Trainers are based within CSOs, as well as in private training institutions. CSOs have also used specialized consulting firms in the area of capacity building, though few organizations can afford these services. Training on finance, project management, communications, advocacy, resource mobilization, policy analysis, and other subjects is available in all regions of the country. Trainings provided by CSOs are usually free of charge and are conducted in both English and the local languages.

Increasingly, all sectors recognize the value and contribution of CSOs and the government, private sector, and media are seeking to strengthen their relationships with CSOs. CSOs have strong partnerships with various government departments, particularly the Ministries of Health, Education, and Agriculture. Private sector partnerships with CSOs are still at a nascent stage, while media and CSO relations are quite strong. TANGO partnered with The Gambia Press Union to mark World Press Freedom Day with a street parade and a policy dialogue on freedom of expression, with the Minister of Information as the keynote speaker.
The media, both public and private, provide positive coverage of CSO activities. It is common practice for CSOs to invite the media to their activities. Usually the media responds and reports on these activities favorably, unless the topic is controversial such as human rights or female genital mutilation and cutting. CSO activities also are gaining publicity through their own community outreach activities and the use of radio and television. Many CSOs buy air time on radio and television to conduct weekly talk shows on their activities. CSOs also use the media to advertise job openings or services and to issue press releases. The Gambia has a young media in terms of knowledge and experience of practitioners. As a result, the media provides only limited analysis of the role of CSOs.

The general public continues to have a very positive perception of CSOs. The impact and contribution of CSOs in Gambian life can be felt in all sectors and regions of the country. Many Gambians obtained education through primary and secondary schools built by CSOs or obtained scholarships from CSOs for higher education.

The Gambian government and the private sector have a positive perception of CSOs, as demonstrated by the level of engagement they seek with CSOs, though the private sector has yet to provide financial support to CSOs. Government officials depend on CSOs not only as sources of information, but as advocates for issues that are too difficult politically for government officials to introduce. Government departments have also engaged CSOs for their expertise. CSOs have become major trainers for various government agencies, policy and law makers, security and law enforcement, and community development workers. At the same time, certain government departments such as the Office of the President, the Ministry of Justice, and National Intelligence Agency view CSOs—especially the ones addressing human rights and governance—as foreign agents aiming to destabilize the country.

There is a general concern that CSOs are still not fully maximizing opportunities to promote their successes. In response, in late 2012, TANGO purchased a weekly radio program on West Coast Radio, a leading private radio station, to showcase CSO work and provide a platform for policy engagement. This radio program gained momentum in 2013. Many CSOs also organize open hours to the public to showcase their activities and services, and invite the media to these events.

By and large, CSOs try to demonstrate transparency and accountability in their operations. Larger CSOs generally produce annual reports, sometimes with summaries of financial statements, which they circulate to all stakeholders. While CSOs may not have codes of ethics per se, many have bylaws, staff rules, and workplace policies on gender, children, vehicles, HIV/AIDS, and equal employment, among others.
GHANA

GHANA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

Ghana has a vibrant civil society operating at both the national and local levels. The country’s stable multi-party democracy guarantees civil and political liberties and has contributed to the growth of CSOs. Although the country has a good track record of fair and relatively peaceful elections, the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) disputed the December 2012 presidential election in which the National Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate was declared the victor. In 2013, the NPP and its candidate contested the election results in the Supreme Court. The nation waited nearly eight months for the court’s decision, which upheld the official election results. The Supreme Court hearing was broadcast live on television and radio throughout the country.

The economy in the first half of the year was affected by government overspending related to the elections and the resulting budget deficits, as well as investors’ uncertainty over the election petition’s outcome. Government activities were also stalled. For instance, opposition legislators abstained from vetting presidential nominees for ministerial positions, as well as other government business. Media attention was
also largely focused on the Supreme Court hearings related to the election results, thereby limiting coverage of other social and development issues.

The overall sustainability of CSOs remains unchanged. However, improvements were recorded in advocacy and public image, while financial viability declined. CSOs proactively promoted peace before and during the Supreme Court hearing on the election petition, urging the public to refrain from actions that would destabilize the country. The public recognized these efforts, boosting public confidence in the sector. In August, for the first time President John Mahama invited CSO representatives to deliberate on critical national development issues. Unlike 2012, when CSOs received more funding for election-related activities, financial viability declined due to general delays and declines in funding for CSO activities.

Civil society in Ghana remains diverse with a clear dichotomy between urban- and rural-based CSOs regarding funding and scope of activities. Urban-based organizations tend to have high-caliber professional and administrative staff to support operations, while rural-based organizations usually depend on their founders or directors, as well as volunteers. CSOs still depend largely on foreign donor funding for their activities. In 2013, a total of 305 new CSOs registered at the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), increasing the total from 5,714 in 2012 to 6,019 at the end of 2013. While the actual number of active CSOs remains unknown, DSW records indicate that only 805 organizations renewed their operating permits in 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

The legal environment governing CSOs in Ghana remains favorable, despite the absence of a specific law governing CSOs. CSOs are registered as not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) limited by guarantee under the Company Code of 1963 (Act 179). Attempts to create a law for NPOs have not been successful.

Registration and operation of CSOs across the country is fairly easy. The registration process clearly outlines the objectives and functions of CSOs and requires them to submit annual financial reports. Although not all CSOs submit these reports, no CSO has been closed down or stopped from operating for failure to do so. CSOs first register with the Registrar General as not-for-profit companies and later with the DSW, which has oversight responsibility for NPO operations. These mandates have not been used to inappropriately interfere with NPO operations. In the past year, however, DSW has emphasized the need for NPOs to validate their certificates of operation on an annual basis to confirm that they are still operating.

CSOs are able to debate, oppose, and offer constructive criticism of government policies without fear of closure or governmental crackdown.

CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions, mainly on imported items, if they have the relevant documentation for their imports and certificates of operation from the DSW. CSOs have limited knowledge of this possibility so few organizations take advantage of these tax exemptions. Grants and other funds received by CSOs for their activities are not taxed, but CSOs are required to pay other statutory taxes. CSOs are still barred from openly engaging in commercial activities due to their legal status as not-for-profit organizations, but are allowed to compete for government contracts which they primarily receive for consulting services in the areas of research and policy making.
There are still no lawyers specialized in CSO issues in Ghana. Instead, CSOs can access a range of general legal practitioners, as well as specialists on the Company Code, but not all CSOs can afford these services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

CSOs in Ghana have clearly stated mission and vision statements that define the scope of their activities and target groups. Thus, urban, rural, large, and small CSOs have targeted beneficiaries as their core constituencies. CSOs continue to build constituencies around their activities to secure their legitimacy.

The development of strategic plans is no longer limited to well-established CSOs in urban centers. As in 2012, donor funding requirements and the increasing development of issue-based CSO advocacy groups has prompted many smaller organizations to define and work within their mandates. However, the strategic plans of smaller CSOs usually focus on immediate activities rather than providing a programmatic outlook for the short to medium term. Funding remains a major factor in determining the strategic focus of urban- and rural-based CSOs.

There were no significant changes in the management structures of CSOs in 2013. Larger and urban-based CSOs have stronger internal management structures than smaller and rural-based organizations. While larger and urban-based CSOs have well-functioning boards and governance structures that guide their operations, smaller and rural-based CSOs have weak boards that play little or no role in organizational development. Nonetheless, most CSOs have clear divisions of responsibilities between boards, management, and staff.

The ability of CSOs to maintain permanent staff continues to be a major challenge for small and large organizations alike. CSOs generally hire paid, professional staff for the duration of specific projects due to limited core funding and their dependence on foreign funding, which is increasingly short-term and project-specific. Consequently, staff turnover remains high in both urban and rural organizations. CSOs engage the services of interns and volunteers to help implement project activities on a short-term basis. While rural CSOs often depend on volunteers and interns to support operations, the lack of adequate compensation makes it difficult for organizations to retain them after they have acquired valuable job experience.

Most CSOs continue to use information communication technology (ICT) equipment like computers, printers, and scanners, but urban-based CSOs are generally more endowed with equipment than their rural counterparts. Access to Internet facilities across the country has improved, allowing even rural CSOs to access Internet services through commercial services or their mobile phones.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

The financial viability of CSOs declined in 2013. There was less funding available to the sector compared to 2012 which saw an inflow of funds for election-related activities. In addition, development partners delayed the release of grants due to general uncertainty over the outcome of the election petition hearings. For instance, grants from Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana) for governance and access to justice projects that were supposed to begin in 2013 were delayed to 2014. Furthermore, with Ghana classified as a lower-middle income country by the World Bank, official development assistance and funding for CSOs continued to decline.
Just as in 2012, most CSOs in Ghana remain dependent on foreign funding, and there is currently no law or framework that provides incentives for the corporate sector to support the work of the CSO sector. The multi-donor funded grant-making body STAR-Ghana remains the most notable funding source for CSOs. Resources from STAR-Ghana are drawn from foreign donor missions that include USAID, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the EU, and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Funding from STAR-Ghana allows smaller and rural-based CSOs to secure funding to implement activities at the grassroots level. During 2013, STAR-Ghana disbursed over $7.5 million to about forty CSOs. Although STAR-Ghana also awarded nearly $4.2 million to CSOs to implement activities to promote access to justice for poor and marginalized groups, there were delays in actual disbursements, which affected the commencement of project implementation.

It is difficult for CSOs to acquire volunteer and in-kind support for their activities mainly due to the public perception that CSOs receive huge amounts of funding from donors. On the contrary, participants in CSO activities usually expect CSOs to cover their transportation costs. There are limited local sources of philanthropy from which CSOs can access funding. Telecommunications companies have established foundations that occasionally provide small grants, but these sources are inadequate to meet the needs of CSOs and typically focus only on health and education activities.

Most CSOs in Ghana do not have a loyal base of financial supporters, and very few CSOs have the capacity to attract and manage funding from different sources. Furthermore, most of the funding raised by CSOs is project-based and therefore tends to be for short-term operations. Smaller and rural-based CSOs usually apply for funds from recognized donors through published calls for proposals. Larger and urban-based CSOs are generally more skilled at writing funding proposals.

Some large and urban organizations with the requisite professional staff earn income through consultancy services to government and private bodies, or the sale of products. For example, Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Center for Democratic Development (CDD), Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), and West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) sell publications. However, revenues from these sales do not contribute significantly to these organizations’ budgets. The collection of dues by member-based organizations remains low.

Most urban and some rural CSOs have sound financial management practices. CSOs remain bound by their grant agreements to establish such systems and provide financial reports to their donors. Increasingly, both large and small CSOs conduct regular financial audits. The publication of annual reports remains limited to urban-based and large CSOs.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy improved in 2013, as interaction between CSOs and government entities at both national and local levels increased.

In general, government agencies recognize and engage CSOs in various endeavors. Ministries recognize and maintain good relationships with CSOs working in their fields. For instance, the Ministry of Finance continues to invite inputs from CSOs during the preparation of the annual budget. The Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) continues to lead CSO participation and analysis of the annual budget statement from Ghana. Others such as the Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) also carry out regular reviews of the economy and engage government on economic forecasts. Moreover, in line with the standards set by the Open Government Initiative—an international movement to make governments more open, accountable, and responsive to their citizens—the government has complied with the requirement to fill 50 percent of its...
national steering committee with CSO representatives. In 2013, IMANI Ghana made evidenced-based presentations on pharmaceutical, tobacco, and alcohol regulation, leading to the establishment of parliamentary and executive committees on these issues. CSOs are usually able to access policy documents such as budgets and development plans and provide input. At the local level, CSOs are able to engage and work with local authorities on community development.

CSOs continued to engage in public advocacy campaigns. In 2013, the Supreme Court hearing on the election petition was a major focus of CSO interventions. CSOs mobilized and engaged in strategic advocacy for peace, targeting government, political leaders and their supporters, and the public. The National Peace Council and the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI) organized a national summit at the State Banquet Hall in Accra to promote peace before and after the Court’s decision. Following the Court’s ruling, governance-focused institutions amplified their calls for electoral reforms which were met with a positive response from the Electoral Commission. The Commission has openly invited CSOs and the public to submit recommendations for reforming electoral management.

CSOs continue to play crucial roles in influencing policy and lobbying for legislation. For instance, the Oil and Gas Platform continued its watchdog activities on the use of the country’s resources and lobbied the parliament to request the government to publish the country’s share of revenue from oil exploration. As a result, the Ministry of Finance published the oil receipts before the national budget was reviewed in the parliament. Additionally, the Oil and Gas Platform was instrumental in advocating for government funding of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee, which monitors use of the country’s oil resources. Similarly, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition and the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) both played instrumental roles in calling on the government to address allegations of corruption within the government’s youth employment programs. For instance, the GII issued public statements and provided analysis of the situation through the media. These efforts led to the abandonment of contracts and suspension of the programs in question. In addition, ISODEC was involved in the debate on utility policy, influencing the government’s decision not to re-privatize public utilities such as water and electricity.

For the first time ever, then newly elected President John Mahama invited CSOs to discuss critical policy issues facing the country. During this meeting with twenty-nine CSO leaders, the President clearly articulated measures to fight corruption, particularly corruption surrounding the government’s youth employment programs. CSO leaders also made specific demands on the President and government to build national cohesion and prosecute corrupt officials.

Issue-based CSO networks and coalitions continue to undertake advocacy initiatives on specific policy or development issues. For instance, the Women’s Manifesto Coalition and affiliated organizations actively lobbied for the passage of the Spousal Rights Law. ISODEC led CSO efforts to analyze the 2014 national budget and provided recommendations to the Ministry of Finance. CSOs at the local level participated in public hearings regarding district budgets.

CSOs’ lobbying activities remain ineffective, both because of the highly partisan political environment in the country and CSOs’ lack of sophistication in this area. CSOs generally understand the concept of lobbying. There are no recognizable lobbying groups, and CSOs find it difficult to differentiate between lobbying and inducement or bribery of public officials.

Given the absence of impediments and harassment by the government, there is no eagerness among CSOs for any new laws to regulate their operations. CSO advocacy for the enactment of an NPO Bill is steadily declining, and the government has still not produced any draft legislation to stimulate public discussions and consideration by the parliament.
CSOs in Ghana continue to provide diverse services ranging from basic social services in water, health, education, and sanitation to research and advocacy on human rights, governance, public finance, the economy, and environmental protection. The range of CSO activities reflects community and national needs. CSOs usually engage in activities based on identified policy gaps or lack of governmental leadership and support. Grassroots CSOs tend to engage in activities that directly affect the lives of people in their communities. For instance, in response to public anxiety and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the presidential election petition, civil society mobilized a peace campaign to persuade citizens to refrain from violence. This included collaboration between faith-based organizations, state agencies such as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), and civil society activists at all levels.

Research findings by CSOs are available to the public as publications or through mass media. CSOs earn income from the sale of publications and other products, but cost recovery in the sector is generally low. Very few CSOs have the capacity to provide fee-based consultancy services.

The government continues to recognize the competence and capacity of CSOs to provide services and therefore awards contracts or attracts individuals from the sector to serve on government boards and government-affiliated bodies. The government does not provide any grants to CSOs.

CSO infrastructure did not change significantly in 2013. There are still no recognizable CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs). The World Bank’s Public Information Center in Accra provides valuable information and publications to CSOs on a range of social, economic, and political issues. The West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI), also in Accra, provides information and training for CSOs and has developed an electronic database of CSOs across the country. CSOs outside of Accra struggle to access these resources.

STAR-Ghana remains the main local grant-making organization in the country. In 2013, STAR-Ghana awarded new grants to both large and grassroots CSOs across the country for activities in governance and access to justice, while ongoing projects in education, health, and oil and gas still received support.

Although some coalitions and networks have successfully engaged in advocacy, as in 2012, CSOs in Ghana did not succeed in establishing networks that effectively share information. In some parts of the country, regional networks are vibrant and disseminate information to CSOs operating in certain geographical areas. For instance, the Coalition of NGOs in the Western Region (WERENGO) mobilized resources from STAR-Ghana to implement watchdog and monitoring activities in the region. Similar networks such as the Brong Ahafo Association of NGOs (BAANGO), Ashanti Association of NGOs (ASHANGO), and a coalition of NGOs in northern Ghana continued to operate.

CSOs in Ghana can access various CSO management trainers, including practitioners in the sector, consultants, and experts from academia. Public and private institutions, mostly in the capital city, offer training services for CSOs. CSOs can access basic to advanced training, as well as training tailored to an
individual organization’s needs. WACSI offers training courses for CSOs on an annual basis in financial management, fundraising, lobbying, and advocacy, among other subjects.

CSOs generally have more productive partnerships with the media and government than with local businesses. For instance, in 2013 the massive peace campaigns by CSOs were carried out with the active support of the media, either for free or at a discounted rate.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1**

The public image of CSOs improved in 2013 due to proactive interventions by CSOs to encourage peace before and during the Supreme Court hearing on the election petition. The media provided positive coverage and analysis of these interventions, even labeling their interventions as the growth of the “peace industry.” This is an improvement from 2012, when CSOs competed with political parties for media space during the election process. The public commended CSOs for their advocacy role and peace initiatives, which helped ensure that there were no major threats to peace and security after the Supreme Court’s ruling. This public promotion of CSO work also enhanced the public’s understanding of the work of CSOs in national development. The media makes a clear distinction between public service announcements and corporate advertisements.

Generally, government perception of CSOs remains positive. However, criticism of government policies by some CSOs can taint organizations’ image among government supporters. The government relies on CSOs’ expertise in policy formulation and review. For example, while IMANI Ghana continues to be a major critic of government policies, the government regularly consults the organization on policy issues. CSOs are invited by government agencies to participate in critical policy and development discussions with donors through consultative group meetings. CSOs have a positive image with the business sector, but businesses undertake little or no significant collaboration or engagement with CSOs.

Well-endowed and urban-based CSOs continue to have strong public relations and communication structures to disseminate information and enhance their public image. For instance, urban and large CSOs increasingly employ communications officers. Local and international journalists have good relations with reputable civil society actors who serve as experts for news analysis and commentaries. Some CSOs continue to produce newsletters and branding souvenirs to enhance their image.

As in 2012, leading and urban-based CSOs publish annual reports on a regular basis. The sector has still not developed a code of ethics to regulate activities of CSOs in Ghana.
Despite political tensions, in 2013 Guinea prepared for legislative elections. With the support of the international community and national facilitators, the government and opposition parties signed an agreement scheduling the legislative elections for September 24, 2013. Despite calls for restraint and civility, violence arose between supporters of the RPG Arc-en-ciel, the party led by the president, and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, the opposition party, in Conakry and regional capitals such as N’Zérékoré and Kindia. Following the opposition’s threats to protest electoral abnormalities and further negotiations among the parties, the elections were postponed to September 28, 2013. The elections were ultimately reported to be free, transparent, and inclusive.

The political crisis had considerable effect on Guineans’ income, and violent crime in Conakry increased. Economic activity slowed, and consequently, the GDP fell by approximately $143 million. However, the government took action to stimulate the national economy, holding a forum in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates in November 2013, where investors pledged almost $6 billion to the country.
Other national developments in 2013 included a verdict on the July 19 attack on the president’s private home; protests against power cuts that caused injuries and damage in several Conakry neighborhoods; and ethnic clashes in N’Zérékoré that killed an estimated 300 people within one week.

Amid political tension and attempts to revitalize the economy, CSOs contributed to social dialogue and peace, capped by the organization of the legislative elections and the return of several financial partners, such as the United States, European Union, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The implementation of projects supported by financial partners (such as the Program for Support of Village Communities funded by the EU) and the continuation of other programs (such as the Program for Local Development in the Natural Regions of Moyenne and Haute Guinea) have served as a springboard for CSOs to provide services at all levels. This involvement also helped CSOs continue to develop their organizational capacities and roles in society.

According to a study of the Ministry of Territorial Planning and Decentralization financed by the EU and carried out by CENAFOD, there are currently 27,435 NGOs, cooperatives, and other associations working in Guinea.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

Article 10 of the Guinean constitution provides, “All citizens have the right to form associations and societies, to collectively exercise their political, economic, social or cultural rights and activities.” Although the law governing Guinean CSOs (L2005/013/July 14, 2005) derives from this provision and recognizes CSOs as full actors in the development process, the law for CSOs still suffers from a number of weaknesses, including the lack of a clear definition for CSOs that differentiates them from government entities, political parties, or other sectors; the lack of a typology for activities or services provided; and the absence of clear permission for CSOs to charge for services provided.

As of 2013, The National Service for the Regulation and Promotion of Associative Movements (SERPROMA) under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) is responsible for registering CSOs and helping CSOs gather the necessary documentation for registration. It operates at the national level through its central office; the regional level through the Regional Support Services for Communities, Cooperatives, and NGOs; and the prefecture level through the Director of Microprojects. Transferring these responsibilities to SERPROMA has reduced the occurrence of corrupt public officials inappropriately issuing approvals to CSOs.

At the same time, because official registration includes the review of CSOs’ eligibility for tax exemptions, SERPROMA heavily scrutinizes application documents and has even conducted investigations into allegations of unlawful conduct. This heavy scrutiny has made it more difficult for certain CSOs to obtain official registration.

While few law firms specialize in the laws and regulations governing CSOs, organizations make great efforts to stay informed about legal issues in order to meet the requirements of, and develop productive relations with, their financial partners.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8

While the organizational capacities of Guinean CSOs did not change significantly overall in 2013, there was some improvement in organizational capacity for those CSOs’ implementing programs supported by financial partners such as the EU. Few CSOs succeeded in 2013 to build constituencies or define strategic plans. CSOs do not have the funds to recruit permanent professional staff. CSOs supported by financial partners must have certain capacities, such as the ability to send email and generate certain project and financial management documents.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2

CSOs are largely dependent on financial partners to fund their programs and projects. The national economy was revitalized in 2013, including the mobilization of important resources from bilateral and multilateral cooperation, notably the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF. CSOs with the requisite expertise were solicited to implement some projects and programs, particularly in the environmental field, such as the Small Subsidies for the World Environment Program.

Except for a few national CSOs, Guinean CSOs have weak capacity to mobilize resources. For example, few can mobilize funds on the basis of membership dues or contributions.

It is generally difficult for CSOs to obtain government funding. However, in 2013 the government established a fund dedicated to youth employment and a fund dedicated to women, which benefit certain CSOs.

Revisions to the Mining Code have granted rebates to communities that house mining quarries. These rebates have allowed CSOs to improve their financial capabilities by providing services, including the maintenance of accounting records. Financial partners are also improving CSOs’ financial management by imposing increasingly rigorous requirements on CSOs related to project implementation and financial transparency.

ADVOCACY: 5.2

CSOs made some progress in advocacy in 2013, bolstered by the liberalization and presence of more media. Led by the Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, human rights CSOs developed a series of advocacy efforts for citizen oversight and for the government to address the concerns of civil society. They worked tirelessly to bring to light the numerous killings that occurred during opposition protests in 2013.

CSOs such as Publish What You Pay are members of the national commission for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Due to the efforts of Publish What You Pay, the ministry responsible for mines published all of the government’s mining contracts online in 2013.
Through the National Council of Civil Society in Guinea (CNOSCG), CSOs played an important role in defusing political tension surrounding the process of legislative elections by actively participating in the public dialogue.

CSOs advocating for the rights of persons with disabilities launched a major initiative in 2013. With the support of the USAID Let’s Do More project and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, the Guinean Network of Organizations for Persons with Disabilities and the National Federation of the Disabled raised awareness among their members and key government stakeholders about key international agreements and protocols on the rights of persons with disabilities. The campaign included discussion of Accord 159, which addresses professional rehabilitation and employment of persons with disabilities.

In 2013, CSOs submitted a memorandum to the government requesting the institutionalization of a fund to support CSO initiatives at the local and national levels. The government is currently reviewing the memorandum.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

There was no significant change in service provision by CSOs in 2013.

CSOs provide a wide range of services from training to research and other activities aimed at raising awareness, improving civic education, and economically empowering the population. Most of these services respond directly to the needs of the population and are often included in local development plans, even if the quality of services is sometimes less than optimal.

Compared to businesses, CSOs provide public services at modest levels. Nonetheless, the policies in effect in agriculture, local development, decentralization, mining, and other areas allow CSOs to be full partners for many services. These services are provided in some cases to entire communities, while in others cases, they are provided only to the members of the organizations providing the particular service.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

Services provided by international CSOs and CSO resource centers did not change in 2013.

CSO networks working in the same field, and sometimes even at the sub-regional level, develop fruitful partnerships and try to share experiences. Key networks include the Federation of Guinean Agricultural Producers, CNOSCG, the National Federation of Guinean Farmers, the Guinean Literacy Network, and the NGO Forum for Sustainable Development in Guinea (FONGDD). Throughout 2013, these networks addressed transitional justice and national reconciliation, distribution of agricultural inputs, advocacy for human rights, the Mining Code, citizen rights and responsibilities, and the protection and support of children. At the sub-regional level, FONGDD participated in meetings of the Network of West and Central African NGO Platforms.

Some CSOs specialize in training and are often sponsored by training organizations and financial and technical partners.
The public image of Guinean CSOs did not change in 2013. CSOs increasingly have access to the media due to the liberalization of the airwaves. However, only one private television station, Espace TV, was created in 2013. Despite the availability of media to CSOs, collaboration between the sectors remains primarily based on payment to the media for services rendered.

Local and central government view CSO activities as complementary to their own activities. In 2013, CSOs were largely seen as playing a major role in defusing the political crisis triggered by the legislative elections. Their actions included participation in the commission for monitoring the implementation of agreements between political parties, awareness raising activities for national reconciliation and citizen rights and responsibilities, and observation of the legislative elections.

Overall, the majority of the population considers CSOs useful actors in local development. However, the public sometimes expresses negative perceptions of CSOs, particularly accusing them of misusing and embezzling funds.

CSOs have adopted a sector-wide code of ethics. Furthermore, the 2013 National Day of NGOs resulted in a memorandum requesting the government to officially recognize the code. Although the government has not yet issued a formal response, this development reinforces CSOs’ growing organizational capacities and solidifies their commitment to self-regulation. At the same time, few CSOs publish reports of their activities or submit such reports to the government.
Kenyan CSOs were involved in a number of dynamic processes in 2013. CSOs, the private sector, and government agencies collaborated to prevent violence during the March 2013 general elections, the first elections held under the new 2010 constitution. Although turnout was high and the elections were largely peaceful, the results of the presidential election, which declared Uhuru Kenyatta the president-elect with 50.51 percent of the vote in the first round of elections, were challenged in the Supreme Court by Raila Odinga, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes.
CSOs advocating for reforms and constitutional accountability opposed the candidature of Kenyatta and his deputy, arguing that they did not meet the standards of leadership and integrity established in the constitution. Both men had been indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity related to their role in the 2007 post-election violence. As a result, when they were elected, many CSOs were placed on the defensive. Given their advocacy on this and other issues, many CSOs were perceived by the government as collaborating with the opposition party, thereby reinforcing the notion that CSOs are opposed to the government.

The year was also marked by a number of legal and policy developments, including the establishment of a devolved governance system as required by the 2010 constitution; passage of other legislation to implement the constitution; the initial implementation of police reforms; and the adoption of various government reports such as the final report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. CSOs carried out issue-based advocacy centering on these reforms and acted as watchdogs to ensure the implementation of the constitution.

The Public Benefit Organization (PBO) Act, which was signed into law in January 2013, seeks to provide an enabling environment for the establishment, operations, and regulation of CSOs. CSOs had great expectations that the PBO Act would improve the environment in which they operate. However, the PBO Act was not implemented during the year and members of parliament (MPs) proposed amendments to the PBO Act that would have significantly hindered CSO operations. Although the amendments were withdrawn at the end of the year, CSOs questioned the government’s political will to implement the PBO Act.

During 2013, CSOs grappled with a reduction in donor funding, which affected the sector’s organizational capacity and ability to meet its constituents’ needs. Some CSOs managed to attract funds through partnerships with the corporate sector.

Kenya has a diverse CSO sector. There are approximately 7,200 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) registered with the NGO Coordination Board, 729 of which were registered in 2013. There are also about 30,000 registered societies, which include faith-based organizations (FBOs), non-profit companies limited by guarantee, and trusts. In addition, there are over 300,000 community based organizations (CBOs), many of which operate under provisional registration while awaiting full registration. A large number of CSOs work in health, food security, and HIV/AIDS, but CSOs also work in a wide variety of fields, including human rights, gender, children, education, water, refugees, environment, and governance.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.0**

Signed into law in January, the PBO Act provides a favorable framework for the registration and deregistration of PBOs, as well as their organizational and financial management. The PBO Act defines a PBO as a voluntary or non-membership group of individuals or organizations that is autonomous, non-profit making, and non-partisan, and operates nationally or internationally. The PBO Act effectively will replace the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 as soon as the Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning officially announces its commencement date. All NGOs that were registered under the NGO Coordination Act will be deemed to be registered as PBOs on the commencement date.
Although the PBO Act was not implemented in 2013, MPs sought to amend the Act through the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill of 2013. The amendments would have allowed only 15 percent of PBOs’ budgets to come from foreign sources. PBOs would have only been able to seek more funding through federations, or groups of organizations, rather than as individual organizations registered under the Act. CSOs interpret the proposal as indicative of a lack of political will to implement the PBO Act and a sign of possible future restrictions on CSOs. The proposed amendments were withdrawn at the end of 2013.

Because the PBO Act was not operationalized in 2013, many CSOs continued to register under the NGO Coordination Act, which they perceive as a lengthy process. According to the NGO Coordination Board, even legal practitioners lack accurate information on registration procedures. As a result, CSOs do not submit the required information and documents during registration, thereby extending the registration process. Other organizations operate as societies.

While Article 36 of the constitution guarantees CSOs the ability to operate without arbitrary interference, there were a few incidences of interference in 2013. For example, a county governor interrupted a CSO’s civic education session, alleging that the CSO did not follow protocol when it invited British diplomats to the session.

CSOs are not taxed on the grants they receive. The PBO Act mandates the PBO Regulatory Authority to grant automatic tax exemptions to PBOs, but this provision was not yet implemented in 2013. Therefore, CSOs had to seek tax exemptions under the Income Tax Act and the Custom and Excise Act, which is a long and uncertain procedure. Although there are clear guidelines on customs exemptions for CSOs, government agencies make conflicting decisions in these cases. Rather than wait for exemptions, some CSOs opt to pay customs duties so they can deliver imported relief supplies to their constituents in dire need. Some CSOs such as National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K) do not seek customs exemptions as a matter of organizational policy since they perceive taxes as contributing to the economy. According to the NGO Coordination Board, customs exemptions dropped astronomically in 2013. Only four NGOs applied for customs exemptions totaling just over 1.1 million KES (about $13,000) in 2013, compared to approximately 22.3 million KES (about $260,000) in 2012. In 2013, the government introduced the Railway Development Levy under the Custom and Excise Act, which imposes a 1.5 percent customs duty on all imported goods.

The Income Tax Act allows individual and corporate donors to receive tax deductions for donations, but CSOs have not used the Act to attract local donations, primarily because they are unaware of these provisions.

CSOs are allowed to earn income on their goods and services, but they remain reluctant to charge fees because their constituents cannot afford to pay and expect them to be free. CSOs can legally compete for government contracts at the national level. However, very few CSOs have the capacity and technical skills to compete for such contracts.

Few lawyers are familiar with CSO laws. There is no curriculum on CSO laws so lawyers have to learn how to deal with the complex CSO laws through experience. Most law firms are located in the cities and are therefore difficult to access for CSOs in semi-urban and rural areas. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) is collaborating with the University of Nairobi to train lawyers on CSO laws.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

CSOs clearly identify and seek to build constituencies for their initiatives. However, because of their dependency on donor funding, many CSOs—especially small organizations—struggle between meeting donor requirements and actively building local constituencies for their initiatives. Frequently, CSOs comply with the former at the latter’s expense. Small CSOs are often unable to respond quickly to changing or emerging needs of their constituencies without donor funding. On the other hand, FBOs that have their own resources, such as NCCK, are better able to meet their constituents’ needs.
CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and mission statements. However, few CSOs implement their strategic plans because of funding difficulties. Before the March 2013 general elections, many donors froze their financial support to CSOs in order to realign their programs with the new devolved government and the legislative reforms introduced by the Commission on the Implementation of Constitution (CIC), only resuming funding in the last quarter of the year. This caused many CSOs to realign their programs and projects rather than implementing their strategic plans.

CSOs have constitutions that define their internal management structures. However, many CSOs do not have mechanisms to manage change in their structures or address conflicts. According to the NGO Coordination Board, many NGOs are unable to achieve their mandates because of inadequate organizational structures, personnel, and understanding of non-profit governance. In some cases, executive directors determine who serves as board members in order to maintain control over the board.

CSOs struggle to maintain staff on a long-term or permanent basis because of funding issues. In 2013, the election-related hiatus in funding hindered CSOs from hiring or retaining staff. In addition, many CSOs lost experienced staff during the year because they were elected or appointed to government positions after the elections. Most CSOs have human resource practices for their staff and engage volunteers. CSOs hire professional staff such as accountants on a service contract basis.

According to the NGO Coordination Board, 88 percent of NGOs that submitted annual reports in 2013 had office equipment, such as computer, printers, and photocopiers, an increase from 62 percent in 2011. Many CSOs access the Internet through smartphones and modems, which are becoming increasingly affordable even for small CSOs and CBOs operating in remote areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

Despite the election-driven suspension of donor funding, according to the NGO Coordination Board, funding in the sector increased from KES 85.9 billion (about $101 million) in 2012 to KES 94.4 billion (about $111 million) in 2013. However, the number of CSOs also grew in 2013. As a result, most CSOs experienced a decrease in funding.

Foreign donors are the primary source of funding for many CSOs. Nascent CSOs have difficulty attracting donor funding. According to the NGO Coordination Board, 450 organizations were deregistered during 2013 because they did not submit annual returns to the NGO Coordination Board, most likely indicating that they do not have sustainable short-term funding to carry out their operations.

Some CSOs have diverse sources of funding that enable them to remain viable for both the short and long terms. Local foundations and the private sector increasingly give to CSOs. For example, Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) received funds from the corporate sector and corporate foundations, notably Barclay Bank, Safaricom Foundation, and Kenya Commercial Bank Foundation. In addition, private companies, including Safaricom Limited, Kenya Commercial Bank, and Dina Gin Corporate Communication, collaborated with the Kenya Red Cross under the Concerned Kenyan Initiative to advocate for peaceful and fair elections.
Some CSOs have a core of volunteers and receive non-monetary support from communities. However, individual philanthropy has still not been fully embraced, though KCDF notably receives contributions from individuals.

Some CSOs working on HIV/AIDS and food security received government funding from the National AIDS Control Council and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries Program, Njaa Marufuku Kenya, respectively. The Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs contracted some CSOs to conduct civic education training in advance of the general election in March 2013.

Most CSOs have members, but few have clear membership outreach or philanthropy development programs. According to the NGO Coordination Board, membership fees only constituted 0.01 percent of CSOs’ overall budgets. Only a few CSOs earn revenue from services and rent to supplement their incomes. For example, NCCK has conference facilities with accommodations and a restaurant that earn income.

CSOs have policies on sound financial management, but many need to build more capacity in this area. CSOs carry out independent financial audits mainly to meet the requirements of donors and the NGO Coordination Board. CSOs increasingly publish annual reports with financial statements and share them through public forums and on their websites. This is a marked improvement from 2012, when only a few CSOs published and shared their reports. CSOs such as Act Change Transform (ACT!) and Youth Agenda widely disseminated their reports in their public forums.

**ADVOCACY: 3.3**

CSO advocacy improved in 2013. The CIC continued its efforts to develop a policy on public participation. Although the policy is not finalized, there is deep appreciation of the value of public participation.

During the year, CSOs were actively involved in the devolution process. For example, the Institute for Social Accountability (TISA) reviewed county-integrated plans, and TI-K and the Kenyan Section of International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-K) trained county assembly members and provided technical support to counties to develop standing orders for their assemblies. In addition, CSOs provided input to the County Integrated Relation Act (2013) and carried out audits of the nascent county governments. CSOs also built their capacity to comprehend devolved governance in order to effectively meet the needs of their constituents at county levels and to engage the county governments. For example, TISA built the capacity of fellow CSOs on county budget processes. CSOs actively promoted awareness among the public about the new county-level structures through trainings and civic education. In recognition of this work, the government invited them to parliamentary hearings reviewing the county governments.

CSOs conducted broad-based advocacy in 2013. Kenya’s new constitution stipulates that no more than two-thirds of any appointed or elected body can be of the same gender, and requires each of Kenya’s forty-seven counties to elect a women’s representative. The constitution also provides for the nomination of women and youth in the Senate. Since 2012, CSOs—under the leadership of Youth Agenda—advocated for women and youth representation in the National Assembly and governing bodies. However, none of the women or youth that ran for the Senate during the March 2013 general elections was elected. Despite this, as a result of continued CSO advocacy, sixteen women and two youth were nominated to the Senate in accordance with the constitution. CSOs also collaborated with the parliament to develop the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act (No. 47 of 2013), which was passed in 2013.

CSOs also formed coalitions to act as watchdogs. For example, the Usalama Forum advocated for and monitored ongoing police reforms. CSOs also coalesced through the CSO Reference Group to lobby MPs to
reject proposed amendments to the PBO Act that sought to limit the operations of CSOs. These amendments were ultimately withdrawn. The CSO Reference Group also tried to persuade the government to issue a commencement date for the PBO Act and to begin implementation of the Act in 2013, although these efforts were unsuccessful.

A few CSOs helped build the advocacy capacity of other CSOs. For example, TI-K provided technical support to Jukwaa la Katiba to complete its protracted public interest case regarding excessive MP salaries.

Only a few CSOs have the capacity to carry out long-term advocacy. For example, advocacy targeting legislation on freedom of information has been ongoing for more than ten years, and establishing a legal aid regime has taken more than twenty-five years.

Most CSOs struggle to involve their grassroots constituents in their advocacy efforts. CSOs working in service delivery generally are reluctant to engage in advocacy because they perceive it as opposing the government and thereby damaging cooperative relations with the government that enable their operations.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

CSOs provide goods and services that meet the needs of their constituents in areas such as food security, income generation, HIV/AIDS, health, and disaster relief. Some CSOs provide expert analysis. For example, CSOs working on decentralization analyzed various county integrated plans.

At the same time, the ability of CSOs to meet their constituents’ needs is influenced by donor funding priorities. In 2013, the decline in donor funding affected CSOs’ capacities to meet their constituents’ needs. CSOs rarely charge fees for their goods and services.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs in providing social services. For example, MPs whose constituents rely heavily on CSOs’ social services opposed the draft amendments to the PBO Act because the amendment might have curtailed constituents’ access to CSOs’ goods and services by placing a 15 percent cap on foreign funding to PBOs.

The government provides grants and contracts to CSOs to provide services. For example, the National AIDS Control Council partners with the National Empowerment Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS in Kenya (NEPHAK) and Kenya Network of Women with AIDS. In addition, the Kenya Forest Agencies asked CSOs to help it build its capacity in environmental conservation. However, the devolution process resulted in delays in CSO activities as they wait for county governments to be fully formed.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6**

Many CSOs make relevant information available to other CSOs, their constituents, and the public and provide technical assistance, training, and capacity building. Fanikisha, a donor-funded capacity building initiative, improved the capacity of CSOs to raise funds from diverse sources. Fanikisha also offers a portal with a list of consultants that CSOs can access for capacity building services. The Kenya Civil Society Portal for Health provides civil society-related information and the Ustadi portal provides information on food security and a directory of agricultural service providers.
Most CSOs in cities and urban areas have their own resource centers, which include physical and online resources via their websites. For example, ICJ-K, TI-K, and Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K) disseminate their publications to other CSOs during their public forums and provide publications free of charge to CSOs that visit them. International CSOs like CARE, Action Aid, the Population Council, and Plan International are mainly based in Nairobi and tend to train and share information with CSOs in cities.

CSOs share information with one another through networks, most of which are based in Nairobi. For example, the Health NGO Network shares information with CSOs working in health; Elimu Yetu Coalition shares information with CSOs focused on education; and Kenya Land Alliance shares information on land issues with CSOs.

Local CSOs sub-grant to other CSOs. For example, ACT! sub-grants donor funding to CSOs working on the environment as part of its Changeni Rasilimali and Ustadi Programs.

CSOs provide trainings, but they are not standardized and are typically for their own staff and constituents rather than other CSOs. CSOs seek training from institutions such as the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI). CSOs also have partnerships with learning institutions to provide training to their staff and constituents. For example, NCCK partners with the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, St. Paul's University, and Daystar University.

CSOs form partnerships with other sectors. For example, CSOs worked together with the mainstream media for eight months on the Uwazi peacebuilding campaign. CSOs involved in the Usalama Forum partnered with the media to carry out the Serve and Suffer campaign, which highlighted the working conditions of police officers. Elimu Yetu Coalition partnered with the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development (formerly Kenya Institute of Education) to review school curriculums.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2

CSOs enjoyed positive media coverage during the year. For example, CSOs that advocated against MPs' salaries received extensive media coverage. CSOs and the media also strengthened their collaboration by jointly advocating against the proposed amendments to the PBO Act. The media also provided coverage of CSO activities addressing human rights issues, such as campaigns against female genital mutilation. Despite these developments, most CSOs still have to pay for media coverage. Furthermore, during 2013, CSOs had to compete for media attention with the general elections and the ICC proceedings against the president and deputy president, who were charged with helping to organize deadly violence following Kenya's 2007 presidential election.

The public perception of CSOs remains favorable for organizations providing services. However, advocacy-focused CSOs that advocate for reparation and justice for victims of post-election violence (PEV) are perceived unfavorably and accused of being the driving force behind the ICC proceedings. CSOs advocating for reproductive and LGBT rights are perceived as working against African culture and morality. CSOs advocating for children's rights and the right to education continue to garner a positive public perception.

Government perception of the sector largely mirrors public perception. The government perceives CSOs that are working on service delivery such as HIV/AIDS, agri-business, and empowerment of women and children favorably since they contribute towards the overall realization of Vision 2030, the country’s national long-term development strategy. However, CSOs working on reparation and justice for victims of PEV and around the ICC proceedings are perceived unfavorably by some members of the parliament who view them as advancing the interests of western countries. Some government representatives view CSOs that opposed the candidature of the president and his deputy as opposed to the government.
CSOs have not extensively reached out to the business sector to promote their work. Therefore, the business sector tends to be skeptical of CSOs. However, a few large corporations have engaged CSOs through their corporate social responsibility projects. For example, the Equity Bank collaborated with CSOs to provide scholarships to orphans and vulnerable children under the Equity Group Foundation's Wings to Fly Scholarship Program.

Most CSOs have not invested in building their public images, but many publish communication materials through local media and directly inform the public about their projects and achievements. A few CSOs such as the ICJ-K, Youth Agenda, FIDA-K, ACT!, NCCK, and TI-K use social media and publish their annual reports, which they disseminate to their constituents and the public during their forums.

Self-regulation among CSOs is growing. In 2013, CSOs continued developing and promoting the Viwango initiative, an independent standard setting and certification process for CSOs.
In 2013, Liberia’s national budget was reduced by 17.7 percent from its 2012 levels to $553 million. This drastic reduction is attributed to the falling revenue of major public corporations, such as the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, as well as corruption and under-declaration of assets and profits. The diminished national budget has weakened the education and health fields, as public subsidies to private institutions were cut or even eliminated. As a result, some CSOs that partner with the government had to serve more people with fewer resources and draw on their own funding. Others had to reduce staff or shut down. The political environment was stable, and CSOs continued to be active advocates. CSOs advocated for a moratorium on new concessions for oil exploration by the National Oil Company of Liberia and for iron ore mining by the Lofa County government because these concessions lacked transparency and would not benefit the country. The national legislature invited CSOs to make presentations on these issues, and as a result, one iron ore concession was not awarded.

**Country Facts**
- **Capital:** Monrovia
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 3,989,703
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $700
- **Human Development Index:** 174
The overall sustainability of CSOs remained the same in 2013. However, CSOs improved their ability to mobilize communities to undertake local projects. Additionally, many CSOs now have clear visions and strategic operational plans. At the same time, local CSOs lost more staff to international organizations. Local CSOs are still donor dependent. Individual philanthropy is still rare, although communities regularly support CSOs through volunteerism. During the year, the government invited CSOs to present their views on various issues. CSOs provide a diverse range of services, and the government implicitly recognizes the value of CSOs in service provision.

In 2013, 159 new CSOs, including nine international ones, were registered. Thirty domestic CSOs and sixteen international CSOs renewed their accreditation with the NGO Coordination Unit this year. In total, there were 800 registered and active CSOs in Liberia in 2013, a significant reduction from the 1,347 in 2012. This sharp decline can be attributed to the renewed focus of the government and donors on development, rather than emergency assistance, which decreased the number of CSOs accredited during the year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

CSOs in Liberia operate under the Association Law (1977, as amended in 2002). CSO registration is not described in any legislation, but is governed by the NGO Policy issued by the Ministry of Planning in 2010. However, the Policy is still not fully implemented and is greatly affected by the frequent changes of ministers who develop their own policies or interpret existing policies differently.

CSO registration involves multiple steps: attainment of Articles of Incorporation and registration at the Liberia Business Registry; and accreditation with the NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Planning, as well as other ministries or agencies with oversight in the CSO’s field of activity. Incorporation and registration are officially the purview of various agencies. However, the Liberia Business Registry, also called the National Registry, continues to serve as a one-stop shop for these functions. Processing by the Registry takes forty-eight hours if all the required documentation is provided correctly. Incorporation and registration is done once when an organization is established but accreditation is required annually. CSOs in rural areas are largely unaware of the requirements for registration. While registration is required by law, most active CSOs do not register, mainly due to lack of organizational capacity or inability to travel to Monrovia.

The procedures for applying for accreditation by the Ministry of Planning and the relevant ministries and agencies are easy, but CSOs often experience delays in receiving their accreditation, which must be issued by the Minister of Planning. In 2013, the government merged the Ministry of Planning with the Ministry of Finance. As a result, the Minister of Finance now acts as the Minister of Planning as well. The Minister’s need to simultaneously govern two ministries has caused further delay in CSOs receiving their accreditation. The situation has also resulted in uncertainty about the NGO Coordination Unit’s placement within the merged structure. CSOs must frequently exert additional efforts, such as phone calls, visits, and monetary tips, to get their applications processed. CSOs that intend to import goods must go through an additional process to receive duty-free exemptions. This process continues to be cumbersome, especially for petroleum products.

Monitoring by the Ministry of Planning has slackened due to uncertainty in leadership, coupled with the lack of logistics and coordination. Most CSOs do not submit the annual activity reports required by the Ministry, unless pressured to do so by a donor.
CSOs and their representatives continue to have some freedom to operate, depending on the nature of their work. More sensitive areas of work, such as transparency and anti-corruption, continue to be hindered by government intimidation and harassment. For example, despite the Freedom of Information Act, CSOs find it difficult to obtain government information pertaining to their issues of concern.

CSOs do not pay corporate income tax or taxes on grants and donations received. The Revenue Law of Liberia Act (2000) mandates all CSOs to pay income taxes on staff salaries, which range from 2 percent to 35 percent of base salaries. Some local level CSOs are not aware of their tax responsibilities or claim to have difficulty filing their taxes with the government due to the lack of banks and revenue agents in their localities.

Although rare, CSOs occasionally receive government contracts. CSOs can only charge fees to recover costs.

Though there are no lawyers trained and specialized in CSO issues, efforts by the National Bar Association to increase the availability of lawyers at the county level are improving legal representation outside of Monrovia. Some CSOs can afford to pay for legal counsel, while others are able to find pro bono assistance.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

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CSOs have managed to mobilize and enable people to initiate viable projects for their communities. While there is a general tendency in Liberia to rely on the government to resolve local issues, self-help initiatives and community projects are developing due to the efforts of CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs). For example, in Bong County, Lutheran Development Service’s Farmers in School project mobilized farmers to engage in food production, preservation, and education. While CSOs are now working through community-based groups and building local constituencies, they do not have the resources to maintain these constituencies without donor support.

In 2013, more CSOs developed clear missions and strategic plans. Registered CSOs are more advanced in developing strategic plans and following them. On the other hand, CBOs do not typically go through a formal strategic planning process. Even when they do create strategic plans, CBOs have problems sticking to these plans due to unreliable funding.

Registered CSOs have boards of directors with distinct roles specified by articles of incorporation and bylaws. However, in practice, these boards are virtually non-functional. Governance structures in informal CSOs are centered on individuals, as opposed to being institutionalized.

International CSOs tend to maintain permanent staff, while their local counterparts do not. CSOs generally undertake short-term projects, so they cannot afford to hire staff on a permanent basis. Instead, they rely on short-term paid staff or volunteers. In addition, local CSOs compete for the few qualified staff in the sector. In 2013, local CSOs lost more staff to international organizations which offer higher salaries. For example, Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL), once a leading health sector CSO, lost most of its program staff to international CSOs and UN agencies.

CSOs, especially local organizations, do not have their own resources to modernize their equipment. However, with project funding, they can obtain new computers, modems, printers, and other equipment. For example, in 2013 the Sustainable Livelihood Promoters Program (SLPP) in rural western Liberia received laptops, desktops, printers, and modems. Internet access is available in most parts of Liberia.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

The financial viability of CSOs and CBOs did not change significantly in 2013. Local CSOs are still donor dependent. CSOs receive most of their funding from international sources such as USAID, Trust Africa, the National Endowment for Democracy, UNDP, and the EU. However, most local CSOs lack the capacity to compete directly for international funding. Instead, local CSOs receive donor funding through sub-grants from international CSOs. While international funding to international CSOs increased in 2013, funding levels that reached local CSOs and CBOs remained the same. In many cases, the government competes with CSOs for funding. For example, in 2013 both government and CSOs sought funding from Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA).

Individual philanthropy is still rare, although communities regularly support CSOs through volunteerism. Communities also provide in-kind support in the form of land, space, community mobilization, and storage. Corporations like Arcelor-Mittal and Chevron have provided funding and made commitments to CSOs and local communities on projects in health, water, sanitation, and the environment.

CSOs in Liberia are only engaged in the sale of goods and services in rare instances. Few CSOs have assets that they can rent.

It is rare for local CSOs to implement large government contracts. However, in view of the upcoming senate election in October 2014, the National Elections Commission contracted with CSOs like Talking Drum Studio and New Africa Research for Development Agency (NARDA) on an extensive voter education program. The government generally does not provide grants to CSOs. As a result of budget cuts, public subsidies to private institutions were cut or even eliminated in 2013. As a result, some CSOs that partner with the government had to serve more people with fewer resources and draw on their own funding, while others had to reduce staff or shut down.

Most CSOs do not have financial management systems in place, making it difficult for them to generate financial reports. The majority of CSOs only prepares reports and undergoes audits when donors require them for continued funding.

ADVOCACY: 4.0

In 2013, CSOs continued to collaborate with the government at similar levels as in 2012. There is some CSO-government communication on national issues, particularly through the national legislature, although the government sometimes ignores CSOs’ views. During the year, the government invited CSOs to present their views on various issues. For example, CSOs advocated at the national legislature for a moratorium on new concessions for oil exploration by the National Oil Company of Liberia and for iron ore mining by the Lofa County government because these concessions lacked transparency or did not benefit the country. Negotiations on one of the concessions were suspended. However, it is not clear how much these meetings affect decision-making.

CSOs have exerted enormous efforts in the formulation and public awareness of the draft Oil Law to provide a proper role for the National Oil Company of Liberia and ensure that its activities reflect the public interest. CSOs formed the Gas and Oil Coalition and have participated in the nationwide consultations launched by
legislators over the draft law, which involved discussions at town hall sessions throughout the counties with the involvement of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, members of the national legislature, local officials, and CSOs. During these discussions, the World Bank invited CSOs to a meeting to convince them to accept the draft law. However, CSOs refused because they claimed the national consultations on the draft law were not sufficient. CSOs also continued to work with the government to strengthen laws on rape and violence against women.

The Civil Society Council of Liberia is an umbrella organization that seeks to represent all CSOs in policymaking. In 2013, it held and participated in a number of consultations at the national level on constitutional review; the development of the CSO directory; and Liberia’s national development policy, Vision 2030.

Green Advocate, a local organization, continued to advocate for environmental protection, especially in the forestry and oil palm plantation sectors where businesses receive government concessions. The group was instrumental in ensuring that concession agreements with Chevron and others were audited. Green Advocate also conducted an environmental impact assessment, provided legal services to affected communities, and advocated for the rights of community dwellers in the Sime Darby concession areas in Bomi County. Recently, a group of faith-based organizations made a public commitment to advocate for climate change and environmental issues.

There were no efforts in the wider CSO sector to advocate for reforms to the legal framework pertaining to CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

CSOs provide a diverse range of services. Over the years, CSOs have responded to the shift in need from relief to development, expanding their traditional engagement in health and education to rights issues, such as transitional justice, gender-based rights, and empowerment.

In 2013, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) in partnership with the Carter Center began a program to strengthen the rule of law in rural Liberia. The Church World Service regional office collaborated with the Ministry of Education to conduct a one-day stakeholder’s consultative meeting on introducing school safe zones in Liberia.

Beneficiaries typically do not pay for services, though communities sometimes are involved in project implementation, such as a road project in the central Liberian district of Kokoya (Bong County).

The government implicitly recognizes the value of CSOs in the provision of services and considers the service provision needs raised by CSOs and CBOs. Under the Sector Pool Fund and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Ministry of Health contracts out the management of health care delivery in some counties to CSOs. In addition, the Land Commission partners with CSOs on land dispute resolution.

Despite this recognition, CSO services do not benefit from significant financial or other support from the government. Due to the drastic reduction in the national budget in 2013, CSOs implementing projects for the government had to scale down their operations. Furthermore, the government can be dismissive of findings by CSOs that are critical of the government’s performance.
The Civil Society Council of Liberia has a resource center in Monrovia that provides information to CSOs, but has limited reach outside the city. The Development Education Network/Liberia (DEN/L), Resource Center of NARDA, and the Liberia Media Center are also major resource centers. The Media Center provides media services and research on policy and development issues. DEN/L is involved in the training and development of CSOs in the country. Other resources centers also still function, but have limited capacities and reach. Resource centers are funded through projects and programs and are donor-driven. NARDA continues to serve its members through its resource center in Monrovia. NARDA’s members include thirty CSOs and about thirty affiliated rural CBOs engaged in health, education, agriculture, social services, and community development.

DEN/L, NARDA, and Liberia Media Center still provide a range of training for CSOs. For example, in 2013 NARDA organized three sets of training for its members on sustainability, monitoring and evaluation, and organizational development. This training was funded by the USAID-funded Civil Society and Media Leadership (CSML) Program, which is implemented by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). DEN/L facilitated training and mentoring in organizational development and social enterprise development, also under the CSML program. The training provided by both of these organizations was offered mostly to CSOs outside Monrovia. The West African Civil Society Institute provides training in community mobilization, financial management, and basic management for CSOs through an arrangement with Trust Africa, a grantmaking organization seeking to professionalize local CSOs in both rural and urban areas. Despite the offerings in the sector, not all CSOs can afford to participate in training. Some CSOs participate in training only when it is covered under programs with international partners. CSOs are slowly developing local expertise in some training areas, although foreign experts are still usually relied upon.

A number of umbrella networks for CSOs exist. For example, the National Integrity Forum brings together CSOs, government, media, and the private sector to fight against corruption. There are only a few grantmaking organizations in Liberia, including Trust Africa, OSIWA, Liberia Grants Solicitation and Management Program, and Liberia Education Trust (LET). Such grantmakers primarily re-grant with international funds.

The media contributes to a positive image of CSOs, and most media institutions have programs that showcase CSO activities. While in previous years CSO initiatives received negative coverage, CSOs’ efforts to improve public accountability resulted in more positive media coverage in 2013. For example, more CSOs were invited to provide opinions on issues such as human rights, the environment, governance, and policy. There was considerable media coverage of discussions surrounding the Oil Law, and radio stations throughout the country aired comments from CSOs on its development.

CSOs must pay for coverage most of the time, even when they address highly relevant issues of human rights and governance such as corruption. CSOs try to cultivate relationships with media and promote their organizations and activities through print and electronic media. CSOs are also gradually using social media.
The public has an increasingly positive view of CSOs due to their growing engagement in advocacy and outspokenness on issues of national concern. For example, CSOs like Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have gained the respect of communities over time. At the local level, community residents appreciate the work of some CSOs. However, the public thinks most CBOs are driven by funding, are ineffective, and seek relevance at the expense of the poor.

International businesses have a positive perception of CSOs and engage in various partnerships with CSOs to demonstrate their corporate social responsibility and reach local communities. For example, businesses provide materials to CSOs on credit while CSOs seek funding. Local businesses also occasionally provide support.

The government perception of the sector is mixed. The government relies on CSOs for assistance in policy formulation, but disfavors CSOs’ criticism of its implementation of policies. Government is also beginning to see CSOs more as developmental partners, especially given their assistance with providing services.

CSOs provide annual activity reports to the government and donors, but do not publish them. There is no sector-wide code of ethics for CSOs, but CSOs are required to abide by codes of ethics in sectors in which they operate. For example, the newly adopted code for teaching applies to all CSOs engaged in education.
MALAWI

In 2013, Malawians prepared for tripartite elections in which they voted for local governments, members of parliament, and the president in a single election for the first time. Elections were held in May 2014. The Malawi Electoral Commission accredited over 120 CSOs to provide civic and voter education. These CSOs thus shifted their focus from general transparency and accountability issues to electoral issues, thereby temporarily decreasing pressure on the government to increase accountability. Despite this, public corruption continued to be a topic of discussion during the year thanks to the much publicized scandal dubbed Cashgate which involved allegations of corruption, graft, and outright theft of over $250 million of public funds.

In early April 2012, then President Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika suddenly died, prompting an abrupt change in political leadership. In accordance with the Malawian constitution, his Vice President Dr. Joyce Banda replaced him. Some CSOs adopted a wait and see attitude to the operations of the Banda government, while other CSOs collaborated with the government or sought more effective means of engaging the government on social, political, and economic challenges. In 2013, it became clear that CSOs lacked common positions on
the issues confronting the country. As a result, the dialogue that started with Bingu wa Mutharika's regime on economic and political concerns completely stalled with the Banda government.

The Council for Non-Governmental Organizations of Malawi (CONGOMA), a non-governmental umbrella body of all domestic and international NGOs operating in Malawi, sought to revitalize the Civil Society Grand Coalition, a group of CSOs demanding good governance. However, few members engaged in the coalition during 2013. When the coalition sought to initiate the Black Monday Movement against rampant government corruption in December, none of the CSO leaders championed this cause or mobilized their constituents. A government-organized NGO (GONGO) called the Forum for the Development of Malawi launched the White Tuesday campaign to counter the Black Monday campaign, showing deep division in the CSO sector.

Over 600 CSOs— including a range of community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—are registered in Malawi. A more precise figure is not available because documentation on CSO registration is scattered across a number of offices and many CSOs operate without registration, despite the fact that it is legally required.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The legal enabling environment decreased slightly in 2013, primarily due to political pressure political leaders placed on civil society activists due to their advocacy efforts. Some leaders of CSOs engaged in democracy, human rights and governance efforts report that a top government official called them directly on the phone to confront them about their remarks or advocacy statements published in the media. While this does not constitute an official sanction, this form of intimidation still had a chilling effect.

CSOs in Malawi are regulated by the NGO Act of 2000. CSOs register through a multi-stage process. First, CSOs must register with CONGOMA. Then they sign memorandums of understanding (MOU) with the sector ministries responsible for the CSO’s area of intervention. Finally, they submit registration applications to the NGO Board, which was established in 2012 and started operating in early 2013 after the board members were approved by the president. Many CSO leaders find the registration process cumbersome, deliberately prolonged, and especially difficult for CBOs in rural areas. It is illegal for CSOs to operate in the country without registration, and in 2013, the NGO Board began publishing notices in the local media warning all CSOs—both local and international—to register or risk closure.

The NGO Act extensively regulates the operations of CSOs and prohibits a number of activities. The Act gives the NGO Board the authority to deregister any CSO that does not submit an annual work plan and financial audit report, or any CSO that it determines to be involved in “electioneering” and “partisan politics.” While many CSO leaders feel these are ambiguous terms that could be used to close CSOs arbitrarily, no CSOs have been de-registered since the Act was enacted.

The level of government interference in CSO operations depends on their activities. CSOs that deliver services in health, education, agricultural development, and other related sectors are typically free to operate and are treated as development partners by the government. In contrast, the relationship between the government and CSOs that work on issues of political and economic governance, policy analysis, and advocacy remained tense in 2013.
Under Malawian tax law, CSOs must pay taxes unless they are granted special exemptions. Some CSOs that engage in humanitarian relief and other charitable endeavors may apply to the Ministry of Finance for tax exemptions. However, most of these requests are denied and those that do receive exemptions typically have to wait a long time for a response. By law, CSOs can compete for government contracts, primarily those focused on education, health, and other social services. However, most CSOs working in these sectors lack the knowledge and skills to develop competitive bids. CSOs are allowed to generate income as long as this income is not distributed as profit.

There are no legal experts in Malawi that specialize in CSO law, though some constitutional lawyers understand CSO law. In the main cities, CSOs can obtain legal advice for a fee, but these services are rarely available in rural areas. In past years, lawyers provided pro bono assistance to CSOs that faced serious threats, but there were no such cases in 2013.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

CSOs often struggle to build constituencies. FBOs such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, the Church and Society of Blantyre, and the Public Affairs Committee (an interfaith organization) are the most successful in getting their constituents involved in their activities. In contrast, most secular CSOs are based in cities and only travel to their target communities periodically for specific interventions. Many CSOs find it difficult to mobilize volunteers.

Most NGOs and FBOs, as well as some CBOs, have developed missions, vision statements, and strategic plans. New strategic plans, however, are often developed only after the old ones expire. In addition, most CSOs do not adhere to their strategic plans because they lack the resources to do so. Instead, they pursue activities that align with their prospective donors’ priorities. For example, in the late 2000s many CSOs involved in governance and human rights began working on HIV/AIDS interventions due to the availability of funding for such activities. In 2013, funding for HIV/AIDS programs declined, and now CSOs are seeking funding for projects related to climate change, for which more funding has become available. CSOs still do not have funding to pursue activities to improve governance, though they feel this area is critical.

Most NGOs and FBOs have defined internal governance structures that separate roles between the board of directors and management staff. However, the boards of directors typically have little authority over corporate governance and policy. In other cases, responsibilities between the board and management are determined by personal relationships rather than official governance structures. CBOs have leadership structures, but they are not defined in detail and typically do not include a board of directors.

CSOs often struggle to retain qualified staff and frequently hire employees for specific, short-term projects. CSOs are beginning to engage lawyers, accountants, and experts in information and communication technologies (ICT) when they have donor support through specific projects with the need for this kind of expertise. CBOs largely depend on community volunteers for their operations.

CSOs based in the cities are more likely to have the resources to purchase relatively new computers, current software, cell phones, and scanners, and secure reliable Internet access. By contrast, most CSOs based in rural areas continue to use obsolete computers and have limited access to the Internet and current software programs.
CSOs continue to depend on international donors for funding, while local sources of funding remain extremely limited. With their continuing dependence on donors, CSOs struggle to diversify their sources of funding. Most CSOs depend largely on a single source of funding for projects with fixed durations.

A few local foundations such as the Press Trust and the Fattani Trust provide support to CSOs at the community level. Most Malawians are unwilling to volunteer their time or donate money to CSOs in part because of pervasive poverty, but also because of the political climate. As elections approach in 2014, it has become increasingly common for politicians to distribute gifts and handouts in exchange for political patronage, undermining the weak spirit of volunteerism and philanthropy in the country as people expect to get paid for all activities in which they participate.

Funding from membership fees is also limited. Networks and umbrella organizations charge membership fees, but member organizations often fail to pay their dues. The Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC), a local umbrella body of over seventy-seven CSOs dealing with human rights issues, devoted significant effort to collecting membership fees, but ultimately collected very little.

While CSOs are legally allowed to sell goods and services to raise funds for nonprofit purposes, this is not a common practice. Institutions such as the Center for Social Concern, the Center for Human Rights Relief and Rehabilitation, and the Episcopal Conference of Malawi have property they rent out to generate revenue for core budget support. The government sometimes provides contracts, grants, and subsidies to CSOs and FBOs that provide services in health or education.

CSOs continue to struggle to meet international standards for their financial management systems because they are unable to hire well-qualified financial managers. Though CSOs do submit to independent audits, they typically do so only to comply with donor requirements, and they rarely share the reports with their constituents. Most CSOs do not publish their annual financial statements, even though the NGO Act requires them to do so.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

CSO advocacy declined significantly in 2013. Some CSOs became completely silent after their leaders were co-opted into various government positions. Some FBOs that were vocal in the preceding years were conspicuously silent with the new administration. Direct phone calls from a top government official to some CSO leaders and the use of party agents to facilitate private meetings of CSO leaders with government representatives created fear among CSOs, leading them to abdicate their advocacy roles.

Advocacy campaigns in 2013 were generally not successful. CONGOMA led a campaign to compel the government to publish the names of individuals and companies implicated in the Cashgate scandal. In December, the Civil Society Grand Coalition called on Malawians to express their dissatisfaction with the government investigation of Cashgate by wearing black clothes every Monday. Both of these campaigns failed to mobilize citizens due to inconsistent participation and planning by CSOs, as well as the government’s divide and rule approach, including the Forum for the Development of Malawi’s efforts to launch the White Tuesday counter-campaign. Other FBOs claimed Black Monday promoted satanic worshipping, thereby
discouraging many citizens from participating. These failures marked a decline in CONGOMA’s influence, particularly in comparison to its success in 2011 in influencing the former government led by Bingu wa Mutharika.

Most CSOs that deliver social services continue to communicate and collaborate with the government at the national and local levels. At the national level, government line ministries engage with CSOs and collaborate with them on projects. However, this collaboration shifts to antagonism when CSOs demand accountability and transparency. In particular, large, typically urban-based NGOs and FBOs working on human rights and social accountability face challenges with national government structures. For example, in 2013, several CSO leaders claim to have received phone calls from a top government official, reprimanding them for public comments they made on socioeconomic and political developments in the country. At the local level, district assemblies, Area Development Committees, and Village Development Committees provide opportunities for consultation and collaboration with CSOs.

CSOs in Malawi tend to prefer advocacy campaigns with a significant media component, rather than directly lobbying for specific legislative goals. However, CSOs do occasionally engage in lobbying activities. In 2013, the Public Affairs Committee organized several national meetings with a broad range of stakeholders to discuss issues affecting the country. The committee then met separately with the president, the head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Inspector General of Police, and others to lobby on various governance issues. For example, the committee sought timely resolution and further information on the Cashgate investigations. These efforts, however, were largely unsuccessful, and the officials defended their handling of the investigations. Other coalitions lobbied for responsive mining legislation and for LGBT and minority rights in 2013.

No CSOs advocated to reform the NGO Act or for other CSO-related legal reform in 2013. This is in part because CSOs do not fully understand the NGO Act, but also because CSOs focused their efforts on other priorities during the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

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A major role of the CSO sector in Malawi has been to fill gaps in public services that the government is unable to deliver. Malawian CSOs therefore deliver a range of services in health, education, water and sanitation, food security, and HIV/AIDS. CSOs also provide other goods and services that go beyond basic social needs like civic education on economic and political issues, natural resources management, climate change and environmental issues, and social cash transfers, but the scope of these activities tends to be more limited.

The goods and services CSOs provide largely respond to the needs of the public. FBOs sometimes limit the scope of interventions to target only areas where there are many people that share their faith. CSOs often organize conferences and workshops for small groups rather than disseminating information to wider audiences via radio and print media.

Most CSOs do not charge fees for the goods and services they provide as they consider their efforts to be charity or humanitarian work. Some CSOs that deliver health and education services, such as the hospitals and health centers under the umbrella body of Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM), charge fees for their services, though they are less than the fees charged by private healthcare providers.

The government treats many CSOs engaged in service delivery as partners in development and recognizes their efforts at the national and local levels. The government provides contracts to nonprofit health providers
such as CHAM to subsidize the cost of services in places where there are no government health facilities. The
government also occasionally offers subsidies and grants to FBOs that run schools and hospitals, but has
failed to honor some of these financial commitments.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

There are few resource centers for CSOs in Malawi in comparison to the number of registered CSOs and the
demand for these centers in both urban and rural areas. Though there are national institutions that disseminate
literature on issues of governance and development, such as the National Initiative for Civic Education, organizations
that provide training and resources to local CBOs do not exist in most districts. Resource centers based in urban areas
rarely provide outreach to CSOs in rural areas. The Malawi Institute of Management and the Staff Development Center
are both based in major cities and charge fees for trainings, which further limits access for smaller CSOs,
FBOs, and CBOs. Private firms offer management training for leaders of CSOs, but they also charge fees.
Online blogs like CivSoc continue to provide space for information sharing for CSOs mainly in urban areas
with Internet access.

In 2013, the Tilitonse Fund continued to provide grants to CSOs with funding from the Norwegian, British,
and Irish governments, primarily for transparency and accountability projects. Tilitonse also provides training
and other capacity building assistance for its grantees, including needs assessments and help developing plans
and budgets in preparation for receiving grants. Another joint donor basket fund called the National AIDS
Commission supports both local and international organizations in the areas of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis. With the elections approaching in 2014, international NGOs established a funding mechanism
for organizations accredited by the Malawi Electoral Commission to provide civic and voter education.

CSO networks such as the Malawi Health Equity Network, Malawi Economic Justice Network, Civil Society
Coalition for Education, Civil Society Coalition for Agriculture, Malawi NGO Mining Platform, and the Tax
Justice Network share information internally, but do not disseminate information outside their networks.
CONGOMA and the NGO Board are supposed to help CSOs share information, but they have not fulfilled
this responsibility, both because they lack the necessary human and financial resources and have weak
strategic planning.

Since 2012, CSOs have been making formal or informal alliances and coalitions and even partnerships with
government departments and the private sector focused on specified interventions. Joint task teams dealing
with health, education, and mining issues involve relevant government departments as well as local CSOs like
the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Public Affairs Committee, Malawi Economic Justice
Network, Malawi Health Equity Network, and the Center for Social Concern.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

In 2013, CSOs’ service delivery and advocacy activities were extensively covered in both print and electronic
media. Leaders of CSOs were frequently featured in media reports analyzing allegations of government
misconduct, including the lack of transparency in the sale of the presidential jet, revelations of large scale theft
of public funds by public servants, claims that the president politicized the distribution of food to
impoverished families, and criticisms of the government’s actions in a border dispute with Tanzania.
However, this increased media coverage only involved a small group of CSO leaders, while the majority of
CSO leaders remained silent. CSOs have good relationships with many journalists and work together on
governance issues. However, CSOs are sometimes at odds with journalists who demand payment to cover
Public Image in Malawi

The government continues to recognize the role of CSOs providing services. These CSOs frequently participate in planning meetings and consultations with the government. In contrast, the government frequently propagates negative views of CSOs that advocate on economic and political governance issues, and in some cases calls on GONGOs to oppose these CSOs. For example, the Forum for the Development of Malawi’s White Tuesday Campaign was popularized on state radio and television and portrayed the CSOs involved in the Black Monday campaign as foreign agents that wanted to destabilize the government.

The public had a mixed perception of CSOs in 2013 because of the sharp decline in CSO leaders willing to speak out on economic and political governance issues. Some people believe that CSOs are better at delivering services than articulating economic and political governance challenges. Several newspaper articles and participants in call-in radio programs described local CSOs and their leaders as failures, accusing them of being silent about political and economic mismanagement and gross human rights abuses and injustices perpetrated by the government. Some in the public even suspected that CSOs were bribed by the government not to address governance issues.

CSOs in Malawi continuously seek to publicize their activities in order to garner interest from donors. In some cases, this diverts CSOs’ efforts from important work that is less visible. CSOs also collaborate with businesses to share information and hold joint advocacy sessions to inform government on contemporary economic challenges.

CSOs generally do not meet the requirement to publish annual reports, as the newly established NGO Board has not enforced or popularized this requirement. CONGOMA has a code of ethics for CSOs, but this does not influence CSOs’ practices. For example, several CSO leaders ran for seats in parliament in 2013 even though the code says they must resign from their CSO leadership positions before running for public office.
Mali

Several major events confronted Mali in 2013. First, the invasion of Mali’s territory accelerated. In January 2012, groups of Jihadists and drug traffickers allied with the rebellion in the North invaded over half of the country’s territory. In 2013, the invasion spread further, resulting in numerous victims, refugees, and internally displaced people, as well as the destruction of socioeconomic, educational, and cultural infrastructure. This crisis prompted a national and international movement to liberate the territory, and then secure and stabilize the country with the arrival of African and European troops in January 2013.

Later in the year, presidential and legislative elections were organized, signifying Mali’s return to normal governance. In July and August 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected as president. Keita’s party, Rally
for Mali, then won the majority in the National Assembly in the legislative elections in November and December 2013.

The international community contributed to consolidating peace, normalizing sociopolitical life in the country, and rebuilding areas that had suffered from the conflict. In May, donors pledged €3.5 billion at a donors’ conference in Brussels, Together for a New Mali. Support focuses on activities related to peace and the reconstruction of areas of the country suffering from food insecurity and scarcity of seeds and other imports.

Many prominent civil society actors mobilized in 2013 to mitigate the crisis. For example, the Association of Citizens of the North (COREN) advocated for the liberation of Mali and the defense of its national and territorial integrity. Associations and religious groups, such as the High Islamic Council, Protestant and Catholic churches, Ançar Dine Islamia, and Plea for Mali, organized solidarity efforts and humanitarian aid for victims of occupied zones and refugees or displaced people. While 2013 was a year of institutional and security crisis for Mali, it also allowed for the emergence and strengthening of various CSOs from the local to the international levels, and illustrated their capacity to mobilize the population to influence the management and security of the country.

In addition to the 1,254 registered CSOs in Mali, there are numerous informal, traditional groups, which are typically mosque associations or groups that follow a particular traditional religious leader. No statistics are available on informal, religiously-affiliated CSOs, but based on the assumption that each of Mali’s 13,000 villages has two or three informal CSOs, it is estimated that there are approximately 20,000 to 40,000 such CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The legal framework governing CSOs did not change in 2013, but efforts were made to inform CSOs about the legislation and its application. The laws, particularly Law 04-038 of 2004 which governs NGOs, are clear and well-detailed regarding CSOs’ internal management, authorized activities, and financial management.

In 2013, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MATCL) was restructured, which resulted in more effective processes for monitoring and regulation by government structures in several regions. The Ministry also laid out an action plan for 2013-2014, which focused on better consultation, monitoring, and regulation of CSO activities.

Registration procedures were decentralized in 2013, making it easier for CSOs to register with fewer delays. As a result, for example, prefects in rural zones and mayors of urban communes are now able to register CSOs. At the same time, the law does not provide for the creation of foundations; their creation thus continues only on the basis of case law. CSOs report few cases of administrative impediments.

CSOs receive tax exemptions for their activities, but individual donors do not receive tax deductions. The law allows for the possibility of earned income, depending on certain conditions, as detailed in Law 04-038. However, misunderstanding of the law persists among CSOs concerning fiscal opportunities, such as subsidies that are available from certain ministries, including the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of Employment and Social and Humanitarian Affairs, and the Ministry of Health and the Environment.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3

As in 2012, CSOs were able to mobilize volunteers and support groups for activities related to the security crisis, such as humanitarian aid for refugees and displaced persons, peace efforts, and raising awareness. Thematic support groups and constituencies allowed CSOs with proven experience to mobilize themselves in coordinated activities. For example, the Advocacy and Lobbying Network (RPL) led a campaign surrounding the Electoral Law, and the Coordination of Women’s Associations and Organizations (CAFO) and the Rights and Citizenship Group of Women (GP/DCF) organized campaigns to improve the participation and position of women in elections. Several peace and reconciliation campaigns were also organized.

As required by their statutes, CSOs clearly define their management structures and hold regular meetings of their general assemblies and boards of directors. However, some boards of directors can impede transparency, particularly when one individual dominates the board. To demonstrate their commitment to democratic management, the Coalition for African Debt and Development Alternatives (CAD-Mali), the Forum of CSOs (FOSC), GP/DCF, CAFO, and other large networks and collective organizations periodically change their leaders, even though this practice is not required by their statutes.

CSOs receiving subsidies are required to develop strategic plans. Strategic planning was emphasized more this year, contributing to the generation of annual CSO operating plans. In addition, the Support Program for CSOs II (PAOSC II) initiated efforts in 2013 to support some CSOs in creating and implementing strategic plans.

During 2013, the security crisis resulted in an increase in unemployment in the country, including layoffs of many salaried CSO professionals. At the same time, the crisis and related humanitarian and recovery efforts led several CSOs to adopt new roles, demonstrating their capacity to adapt to new situations. CSOs had to recruit personnel of varied backgrounds, such as specialists in leadership, awareness raising, community development, psychosocial management, and social mediation for new emergency programs and projects.

Volunteerism was revitalized during the year through two government programs: the Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment, and the Volunteer Corps of Mali/Ministry of Justice. In 2013, these two programs matched 3,000 youth volunteers—including 500 from the North regions—with CSOs.

Due to donors’ termination of institutional support, CSOs had difficulty maintaining their information and communications technology (ICT) equipment. However, ICT equipment remained satisfactory for most large organizations, specifically those engaged this year in humanitarian aid and recovery programs and those benefiting from service contracts with the national government, local governments, or financial and technical partners, international organizations working to support the development of the country. Access to ICTs has nearly doubled in the last three years, providing an alternative way for CSOs to reach their constituents.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

Sources of available funding to the CSO sector include certain ministerial departments; financial and technical partners and international CSOs; and local resources, such as banks, businesses, charitable organizations, foundations, religious associations, and the diaspora. CSOs do not sufficiently exploit all the financing available to them. In particular, CSOs fail to solicit funding from businesses, such
as mining and mobile phone companies, that have social responsibility funds. In general, CSOs tend not to be proactive in raising funds.

Solidarity surrounding the security crisis resulted in more in-kind donations to CSOs engaged in humanitarian and recovery efforts. Religious associations, local communities, and especially the diaspora donated clothing, tools, and other essential products. Local associations also made significant contributions of materials and labor for housing and other recovery needs for victims of the crisis.

CSOs focused more attention on developing proposals and services at the local level in 2013. For example, in 2013, CSOs with professional capacities to engage in humanitarian interventions pursued local government service contracts for implementing post-crisis activities in food security, training and raising awareness, and mediation. In addition, CSO members of agricultural production and commercialization associations—like the Association of Professional Peasant Organizations, the National Coordination of Peasant Organizations of Mali (CNOP), the Cattle-Meat Federation of Mali, and the Federation of Banana Production Organizations—can earn revenue through levies on member products. The management of community and commercial facilities was delegated in many cases to CSOs that are in contractual partnerships with local governments to manage facilities and economic infrastructure such as livestock markets, parks, boreholes, and standpipes.

Overall, however, the majority of CSOs lack fundraising strategies. They also lack traditional sponsors and supporters, aside from the few developed through funding pursuits such as events, door-to-door solicitations, and local radio appeals.

A number of management systems are in place to guarantee the transparency and regular functioning of CSOs. For example, the West African Accounting Code assists in accounting and financial reporting, while other management systems assist in the production of annual reports. CSOs continue to engage independent auditors for regular financial audits, which also bolsters financial transparency. Organizations, especially those partnered with the government or with financial and technical partners, publish financial reports for audits and dissemination.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSOs launched a number of advocacy and lobbying initiatives in 2013, including efforts resulting in a strong turnout for elections and the elaboration of a land policy.

Direct communication between CSOs and government policymakers focused on the year’s priorities. Such communication involved the elaboration of the Program for Sustainable Recovery and the validation of different development strategies and policies such as the Agricultural Development Policy, the 2013-2018 Plan for Government Action, the General Assembly on Decentralization, and the National Forum for the North regarding its plan for peace and reconciliation. CSOs also increasingly participated in decision making within public management structures in 2013 because they were invited by the government or their participation was required by financial and technical partners.

Coalitions and thematic networks for information and advocacy campaigns formed at the national and regional levels to work on several initiatives. FOSC and the National Council of Civil Society interviewed presidential candidates. Citizen’s Electoral Observation Hub and CSO networks such as the Support to Mali’s Electoral Process and RPL led activities to encourage citizen participation in elections. The Group for Budgetary Monitoring led a campaign on public finance and for CSO participation in preparing the Finance Law 2013-2014. The Association of Local Powers, women’s associations and others led activities around
peace, mediation, social dialogue, and other strategies to end the crisis. RPL and CAD-Mali organized advocacy campaigns to encourage good governance, especially around issues of corruption.

CSOs also took steps through various training programs to improve the advocacy and lobbying capacities of actors involved in preparing and implementing various campaign initiatives.

CSOs were acutely aware of the need to improve the legal environment affecting their work. CSOs therefore undertook several successful field-specific initiatives in 2013, particularly in agriculture and land regulation. These initiatives include reform of the Law on Agricultural Orientation; land-related regulation affecting agricultural organizations; and the creation of land-related commissions in Sikasso, Mopti, and Ségou.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6**

During the crisis in the North, more CSOs worked in humanitarian and advocacy work. Along with the provision of basic social services, CSOs in 2013 focused on activities related to emergency and humanitarian aid, reconstruction and recovery, dialogue, social mediation and reconciliation, education on citizenship, and participation in the electoral process. Activities focused particularly on the regions of the North and the region of Ségou. For example, religious associations, citizen groups, economic and business operators, professional associations, Education for All Coalition, GP/Santé, and CNOP mobilized to provide basic social services to address food insecurity, water, and medical needs.

Other CSO efforts varied according to government priorities, as their activities depended on solicitations from national and local government. More advanced CSO contributions centered on strategic planning, support for program implementation, production and dissemination of reports on studies or activities, and funding for emergency and food security activities.

Cost recovery is generally difficult because of the high level of poverty in Mali. It is generally practiced more by community and/or commercial facilities, as well as professional organizations in the fields of education, health, hydraulics, service, and training.

A range of state and local government actors recognize the value of CSOs in society, despite the lack of data on their impact. This recognition is demonstrated, for one, by contracting with CSOs for services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6**

In 2013, the Intermediary Support Organization and CSO resource centers increased the range and number of private training in management, information technology, accounting, project launching, marketing, and communication. The Civil Society Forum (FOSC), for example, established thematic groups around issues such as the sharing of information, experience, and best practices for CSOs.

Despite these offerings, the economic crisis has created financial difficulties for CSOs, forcing these support groups to resort to complementary activities such as consultation and research. At the same time, the political crisis gradually expanded the types of donors—including foundations, donors, citizens, and businesses—that support reconstruction and are using CSOs to channel goods and services to the population.
The national crisis fostered the emergence of collective initiatives and regional and local CSOs, which organized consultations, exchanges, and information focusing on the political context. The collective expertise of CSOs allowed them to adapt and direct training to local needs while meeting the demands of financial and technical partners and projects.

These dynamics have diversified the fields of collaboration and partnership within civil society, as well as between CSOs and key development actors at the national and regional level, namely the state, ministries, local governments, financial and technical partners and international CSOs, businesses, and the media. Examples include CNOP’s collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Development for implementing the Law of Malian Agricultural Orientation, as well as CSOs’ collaboration with the media for awareness-raising activities.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

CSOs had greater visibility in 2013 through radio and television coverage of their activities related to major events in the country. For example, media outlets such as ORTM, TM2, and Africable held roundtable discussions and debates pertaining to the security crisis, and the media extensively covered crisis-related activities of COREN and women’s and youth associations, such as the National Women’s Movement for Peace in the North.

Partnerships between CSOs and the media, such as rural radio stations, are slowly strengthening. Networks of journalists have begun to form around CSO actions focused on public finance, water, environment, and other themes.

The general public has a better understanding and positive view of certain CSOs because of their recent involvement in conflict management, assistance to internally displaced people, and emergency and humanitarian aid. However, the public perceives some CSOs as serving certain political interests.

Government and businesses also have a positive perception of CSOs. Following the security crisis and coup, the government increasingly views CSOs as partners in implementing projects and programs. At the same time, the state’s appreciation of CSOs depends on whether financial and technical partners require extensive CSO participation in governance, as well as whether CSOs conduct advocacy that, in the state’s view, aims just to highlight the state’s shortcomings. Businesses see CSOs as an opportunity for social marketing by providing them with social services at less cost.

CSOs and CSO networks typically have codes of ethics and codes for collaboration. To support their visions and missions, professional CSOs define principles and values in their strategic planning documents. However, these charters and codes are often not enforced, despite CSOs’ willingness to follow them.
MOZAMBIQUE

**Country Facts**
- **Capital:** Maputo
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 24,096,669
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,200
- **Human Development Index:** 185

**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.7**

Political and military tensions in Mozambique between the national government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) were rife in 2013. The Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) opposition party made unprecedented gains in even the most traditional Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) strongholds during municipal elections in November. At the same time, there was speculation around the selection of the FRELIMO presidential candidate for 2014 and continued disputes regarding Mozambique’s natural and mineral resources. While these conditions offered CSOs excellent opportunities to demonstrate their abilities to represent and defend the interests of Mozambique’s most vulnerable groups, few had either the professional contacts or public support needed to meet the country’s greatest challenges.

Community-based organizations (CBOs), village development organizations, locally elected committees focused on issues such as water and sanitation, and informal civil society groups continued to develop. In addition, several high-level think tanks and research institutions are starting to work together to attract other funders, increase their human resources, and interact with other leading actors in order to improve the quality of their analysis and increase their lobbying efforts.
Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2013. CSOs continue to rely completely on traditional foreign donors for funding. In many cases, donors shape CSOs’ agendas. The civil society sector has yet to see or benefit from funding from the large multinational companies implementing coal, oil, and gas projects.

There is no reliable data or estimates of the number of CSOs in the country. The most recent official statistics are from a national survey carried out by the Institute for National Statistics in 2004, which indicated 4,853 CSOs in operation. This number has likely grown.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

Most Mozambican CSOs continue to operate under the Law on Associations (Law No. 8/91). Many organizations, particularly those in rural areas, continue to have great difficulty completing the registration process, which requires traveling to the capital Maputo, which imposes significant costs on CSOs based in other parts of the country. Furthermore, the registration process can vary from district to district due to differing interpretations of the law by local officials. There have also been cases of registration delays for organizations focused on controversial issues. For example, Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities Lambda, the only CSO focused on LGBT rights in the country, remains unregistered six years after applying for registration. In addition to the Law on Associations, Law No. 2/2006 provides a simplified registration process for farmers associations at the local level.

The majority of Mozambique’s CSOs are able to operate relatively freely and address matters of public concern without significant harassment from the government. However, there are still occasional cases of conflict between CSOs and the government, particularly at the district and provincial levels. For example, in 2013, the provincial governor of the northern province of Niassa did not grant authorization to ESTAMOS to carry out the district budget tracking work that it has conducted for years with the Center for Public Integrity (CIP). However, the government did not put the refusal in writing as it knew this was a violation of citizens’ right to information. ESTAMOS also received requests for payment of taxes and a demand to register its office as government property even though it was purchased with funds from the HIV/AIDS common fund. This harassment is considered to be directly related to ESTAMOS’ advocacy work, including a campaign to get the provincial government to construct a highway linking the provincial capital of Lichinga to the district of Cuamba. A representative of Radio Catandica was arrested due to his reporting of the poor quality of seeds being sold to local farmers; he was ultimately acquitted. A representative of Centro Terra Viva (CTV) was arrested on charges of agitating the local population by disseminating information regarding the land law and citizens’ rights to resettlement if they are affected by the natural resources projects linked to the discovery of oil and gas in Cabo Delgado province. The representative of CTV was released the same day without charge.

Tax exemptions for CSOs did not change in 2013. To benefit from tax exemptions, CSOs must be approved as public utility institutions. It is estimated that less than 5 percent of organizations are registered as public utility institutions, as CSOs are not aware of this possibility and the process is very cumbersome.

CSOs are legally allowed to earn income, but all income must be used to finance organizational activities. CSOs continue to have limited access to legal assistance at the district level.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2

CSOs in Mozambique strive to establish more permanent relationships with their constituencies and to facilitate positive working relationships with local governments. Farmers associations at the community level and farmers unions at the district and provincial levels protect the rights and interests of farmers. They have very clear target groups and mandates, and their interventions are directly linked to the day-to-day work and needs of their members. CSOs also build constituencies through the use of social auditing and community score cards. Groups using these tools are gaining seats in the local and district level community consultation councils, where local governments have strongly manipulated CSO representation.

Many CSOs continue to have very general objectives and missions in order to be eligible for more funding. As a result, organizations are less committed to specific goals and constituencies, which harms their relationships with the community and affects their overall public image. Only larger organizations in the capital and at the provincial level have strategic plans, which are often developed in response to donor pressure. Organizations at the district and local levels do not have the organizational capacity or access to local technical assistance to formulate such plans.

In general, larger national and provincial-level organizations have clearly defined divisions of responsibilities between their boards of directors and staff. However, the working relationship between the organizational director and the president of the board often becomes strained when one makes decisions with little or no input from the other.

Many smaller organizations have very few active members and little or no funding to hire staff, so founders often implement projects. Due to insufficient funding and member participation, smaller organizations hold fewer general assembly meetings and only occasionally hold elections. In addition, internal monitoring councils often do not function. As a result, there is often little separation of responsibilities or transparency. Well-established organizations convene annual general assemblies, where they present the organization’s accounts and impact.

Only the most elite organizations with multi-donor funding can maintain teams of highly qualified staff. The majority of CSOs in Mozambique depend on one or two multi-purpose coordinators with a broad range of skills to keep the organizations operating. Smaller provincial, district, and community-based organizations often have informal staff members who work sporadically for small subsidies. Medium-sized and larger organizations have staff contracts, job descriptions, and personnel policies, often as a result of donor pressure. There has been a notable rise in the level of professionalism of organizations that have such policies and structures. CSOs rarely employ accountants, IT specialists, or lawyers due to a lack of funding.

The majority of CSOs at the provincial level have access to computers. However, at the district level, access is far more limited, and the computers available to CSOs are of poor quality, without updated software. Most CSOs have access to mobile phones, but these phones do not always have advanced capabilities. Internet access is still limited in many areas.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0

Access to funding continued to be constrained in 2013 for CSOs, especially smaller organizations, as bilateral donors and international aid organizations have reduced their funding. Most significantly, the National AIDS Council (CNCS), one of the key sources of funding for smaller provincial and district-level organizations, did not distribute funds in 2013.
CSOs are almost wholly dependent upon donor funding. In addition to the traditional multilateral and bilateral agencies, the main donors in Mozambique include Foundation for Community Development (FDC), Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC), Diakonia and We Effect, IBIS, Concern, ActionAid, World Vision, and Care International. Larger organizations may have funding agreements for up to three years. Provincial and local organizations rely on short-term, project-based funding. Often, CSOs’ projected budgets far exceed their actual funding, thus driving CSOs to prioritize their interventions according to donor priorities.

The little local government funding that previously existed for CSOs, such as the District Development Fund, no longer exists or is very difficult to access. Political bias, particularly by provincial governments, continues to play a role in the selection of beneficiary CSOs.

Organizations identified by donors as the most likely to impact policy on a national level have loyal financial supporters. However, such groups represent a very small percentage of the CSOs in Mozambique, comprising just thirty to forty organizations.

Philanthropy is still very weak in Mozambique, as some view CSOs as businesses, and others view them as corrupt organizations with very little transparency and organizational capacity. The social responsibility funds of the major coal, oil, and petroleum projects in Mozambique have yet to begin on any large scale.

CSOs do not earn significant income from the provision of services or from renting out their assets. Few members regularly pay membership fees, and the amount that is collected from these fees is insignificant.

The majority of organizations that receive project funding have financial management structures in place and produce financial reports. However, these financial reports are generally not made public and instead are presented primarily to donors. Some CSOs share these reports with members, but it is rare for CSOs to share them with non-members. Due to these weak systems and procedures, many CSOs prefer to manage funding from their main or provincial offices. While this entails less financial risk, it fails to build local capacity. MASC has provided training to CSOs to help them successfully manage their own financial resources.

Only the most well-established organizations undergo independent audits as part of their financial procedures. Smaller organizations with project-based funding may undergo audits, but they use local auditors who may lack professionalism and expertise. District-level and local organizations generally do not have well-defined administrative and financial systems.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

Because there are few advocacy-oriented organizations in Mozambique, the bulk of advocacy is done by the country’s think tanks and research institutions. As advocacy is not their specialty, however, efforts often fall short of the desired results. One positive development is that research-based institutions are starting to work together to attract other funders, increase their human resources, and interact with other leading actors. This has resulted in a higher level of analysis and increased lobbying efforts in the country. For example, in 2013 CIP published several reports, including one on national public expenditures during the 2012 fiscal year that showed a lack of transparency in public management; one on government arrangements with the Kenmare Moma mine, which is extracting heavy minerals in the northern province of Nampula; and comments on the draft fiscal laws regarding the country’s petroleum and mineral reservoirs.
CSOs can lobby the government through consultative bodies, including the national Development Observatory, provincial development observatories, and the joint review. The national and provincial development observatories provide the government with the opportunity to consult with donors and civil society on development actions nationwide. However, the government is not obliged to follow-up on the areas of concern raised by CSOs. District councils and community councils also have CSO members, but selection of CSO members is not transparent and is manipulated by the local government, undermining genuine CSO participation in decision making.

CSOs increasingly lobby for the improvement of basic public services. A series of district platforms located nationwide use community score cards, social audits, citizen report cards, and budget analysis. CSOs such as CTV, Justica Ambiental (JA), Organizacao Rural Mocambicana (ORAM), and Uniao Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC) work on specific issues such as environmental and land rights, while others such as Forum Mulher and Reda da Criança work to empower and protect marginalized groups in society.

There are instances in which the government and CSOs work on projects together, but these represent the exception rather than the rule. Collaborative projects are more common when CSOs display technical expertise in an area in which the government requires support. Sekelekani is working successfully with the parliament to establish a permanent space for inter-sectoral partnerships, such as those between CSOs and parliamentary committees. Forum de Terceira Idade (FTI), which defends the rights of the elderly, successfully collaborated with the national government to create legislation to protect the elderly. The law was approved in December 2013.

At the local level, the Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC) worked with CBOs at the Chai administrative post in Macomia district in the Cabo Delgado province to lobby for a facility for women in the late stages of pregnancy, to keep them from having to travel long distances between their homes and the clinic. The effort was successful, and new spaces were provided.

The wider CSO community is aware of the need to reform the legal and regulatory frameworks governing the sector, especially to improve registration processes and promote sustainability. To date, however, little has been done to bring these issues to a public forum. Though the working group on the NGO Framework and NGO Code of Conduct was reactivated in 2012, it did not make any significant progress in 2013.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs provide a diverse array of services. At the district and local levels, services primarily relate to agriculture and land. While CSOs claim to address community needs, many CSO services reflect donor priorities rather than those of their constituencies. CSOs struggle to obtain the necessary materials and to deliver services effectively due to a lack of professional expertise among organizational staff. In general, CSOs do not recover a significant percentage of their operating costs by charging service or membership fees. CSOs do not have the experience or the requisite quality of services to charge for services and CSO members do not have the financial capacity to pay membership fees, though many CSO members volunteer their time.

The national government is slowly beginning to see the value of working in coordination with CSOs to provide more efficient services. A number of organizations monitor public services, typically without the aid of government funding. The government does not provide any contracts or grants to CSOs to provide services. CSOs work with the government to identify and register families living in poverty so that they can receive direct government support.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1

CSO resource centers are still relatively rare in Mozambique, although a number of civil society initiatives offer information to their target groups. For example, Centro de Apoio à Informação e Comunicação Comunitária (CAICC) and Forum de Radios Comunitarios (FORCOM) offer regular information and training to over one hundred community radios and multimedia centers. Forum Mulher and Rede da Criança share information on women’s and children’s rights. CIP has an information service that produces and circulates job advertisements and institutional research to civil society groups, government personnel, and donors via its web page and email network.

CSOs, especially at district and community levels, have limited access to technical assistance. Such support is primarily only available for those organizations implementing donor-funded projects. Donor-funded programs such as the Swedish-funded Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR) also have specific funds for access to information initiatives.

A number of the country’s major foundations and grantmaking organizations, including FDC, MASC, AGIR, and the Citizens Engagement Program (CEP), re-grant international funds. Donors coordinate their capacity development initiatives and share information through a donor network and regular meetings.

The G20 Civil Society Forum, which was created to represent CSOs in the development observatory and other major areas, became active again in 2013. The Forum is still in the process of restructuring and determining the best ways to incentivize key players to come together. In general, information sharing is done within the context of such forums.

Training courses at the national and provincial levels are rarely offered in local languages. Although Portuguese is widely used in the government and political spheres, it is necessary to translate materials into local languages and dialects to ensure better understanding. Trainers are available at both the provincial and local levels, but many CSOs cannot afford to employ their services. Topics covered in trainings include social auditing and basic financial management.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

CSOs in Mozambique do not enjoy a significant amount of media coverage, as both national and local media are more interested in reporting on politics, sports, and business than civil society. Think tanks and research institutions in the country receive more coverage in the mainstream media, while smaller local and community media organizations still have difficulty disseminating information.

The public continues to be skeptical of CSOs, often seeing them as individuals pursuing opportunities to make revenue rather than as groups representing the interests of Mozambique’s neediest citizens. There are exceptions, however. In general, the public appreciates and supports religious-based institutions, as well as those focusing on human rights and health. Citizen score cards also help create public awareness of the challenges of service provision and enable beneficiaries and communities to more accurately evaluate their local service providers.

With the continued growth of natural and mineral resource mega-projects, collaboration between CSOs, businesses, and the government is more important than ever. Very often, Maputo-based organizations such as CTV and Sekelkani carry out initial environmental impact assessments on behalf of extraction companies, a
legally required process that includes public consultation meetings. While this process makes citizens aware of their rights, the private sector often exploits civil society’s lack of knowledge of the minimum legal requirements for public consultations on land issues. Companies often forego some requirements in order to expedite the process for obtaining operating licenses. At times, the government perceives CSOs, especially those that inform communities of their rights, as nothing more than trouble makers.

CSOs continue to struggle to promote their public image and need to understand how to relate to both the national and local media better. Community radio continues to be a key mechanism for getting information out to constituencies and for receiving public feedback. However, many stations face technical difficulties as a result of outdated equipment and lack of funding. Some CSOs use social media for public relations purposes. For example, Rádio Esperança and Rádio Catendica use Facebook to publish their governance-related investigation work and for public relations.

CSOs such as CESC and FDC continued to work on a code of conduct for the sector in 2013, but no major progress was achieved. This work is expected to be completed in 2014.
NIGERIA

Country Facts

Capital: Abuja
Government Type: Federal Republic
Population: 174,507,539
GDP per capita (PPP): $2,800
Human Development Index: 153

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

Nigeria has been a democracy since 1999 and the political environment continues to enable CSOs to operate freely within the law. During 2013, governments at all levels collaborated with CSOs in different areas, including security and women’s empowerment, suggesting that government recognition of the sector is growing. The presence of donor-supported programs in Jigawa, Enugu, and other states facilitated sustained interaction between CSOs and the state governments.

The Nigerian economy grew by over 6 percent in 2013. Despite this, the rates of poverty (69 percent) and unemployment (24 percent) remain high. As a result, some CSOs focus on empowerment programs to complement government efforts to address the high poverty rate in the country.

The continued violent attacks of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda 'awati Wal Jihad, otherwise known as Boko Haram, on schools, government establishments, and other public places in northeastern Nigeria restricted the
movement of people in the region, preventing CSOs from operating freely. The federal government of Nigeria imposed emergency rule in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, which are considered to be the group’s strongholds.

The sustainability of CSOs remained largely unchanged in 2013. The legal environment for CSOs was generally stable, except for government restrictions on some CSO-organized protests in Abuja. Organizational capacity declined slightly. Many local CSO employees were hired by donor-supported programs in 2013, leaving affected CSOs to rely on volunteers and part-time staff to implement their activities. Financial viability did not change significantly, although some CSOs strengthened their financial management systems during the year following the Central Bank of Nigeria’s issuance of a directive aimed at preventing terrorism financing and other illegal transfer of funds. CSOs continue to provide services in different areas such as the environment, human rights, and good governance.

There were more than 63,000 registered CSOs at the national level in 2013, an increase of over 6,000 over the past year. Registered CSOs include human rights groups, faith-based organizations, cultural groups, and professional organizations, among other types of organizations. The number of CSOs registered at the state and local levels continues to be uncertain, as databases for registration at these levels are not available. An unknown number of CSOs still operate without legal registration.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

There was no significant change in the overall legal environment for CSOs in 2013, although the government restricted a few public protests organized by CSOs in some parts of the country.

The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 continues to be the main law guiding the registration and operation of CSOs. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is responsible for the registration of national CSOs and for-profit organizations. The registration process can be completed within one week, but must be done in person in Abuja. International CSOs, as well as large local CSOs that employ expatriates, must also register with the National Planning Commission (NPC). CSOs at the state and local levels, including community-based organizations (CBOs), register with the appropriate authorities in their geographical areas, a process that usually takes about a month to complete. CSOs that are focused on certain issues such as police sector reform, women’s rights, and environmental issues must also register with the relevant government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs). For example, the Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) Foundation is registered with the Federal Ministry of Police Affairs.

According to CAMA, CSOs are required to submit annual reports to the CAC, but the law is poorly enforced and only an insignificant number of CSOs actually submit these reports. The law generally protects CSOs from political or arbitrary dissolution by the state. According to the Act, a CSO can only be dissolved by a court decision based upon a petition by the CSO’s governing council, the majority of the CSO’s members, or the CAC.

CSOs in Nigeria can operate freely within the law and engage in public debates of government policies. Even though people are generally allowed to protest in Nigeria, the government restricted some CSO-organized protests against government policies and actions in 2013. For example, an Anti-Corruption Day demonstration organized by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) in Abuja was
interrupted. The government stopped a few more CSO-led protests in 2013 than it did in 2012, typically justifying this with the need to maintain peace and security of lives and property.

CSOs are exempt from taxes on income and grants. However, CSOs must pay taxes if they engage in profitable activities. The Personal Income Tax Act, amended in 2011, levies Pay-As-You-Earn tax on salaries of CSO staff.

CSOs can earn income and compete for government contracts at all levels. However, certain procurement requirements, such as evidence of tax payments or submission of tax exemption certificates, remain obstacles to CSOs competing for these contracts. Many CSOs, especially at the local level, do not have tax exemption certificates because they do not know how to obtain them.

Trained lawyers in major cities are familiar with CAMA and its impact on CSO activities. Lawyers provide general services to CSOs, such as facilitating CSO registration. However, only a few large CSOs can afford their services. Pro bono services for CSO matters are not available.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8**

The organizational capacity of CSOs worsened slightly in 2013 as a result of the movement of many local CSO employees to donor-funded programs.

CSOs in Nigeria continue to intensify their efforts to build constituencies around pressing issues such as peace and security, electoral reforms, and empowerment of various groups in society.

CSOs at the national level have strategic plans, which are largely implemented. At the state and local levels, CSOs are becoming increasingly aware of the need to have strategic plans, though many still do not have them. Large CSOs based in major cities, such as ActionAid Nigeria, continue to assist small CSOs at the local level with the development of strategic plans.

National CSOs have clearly defined management structures, which enable strict compliance to annual strategic decisions by the boards of directors. State and local CSOs did not significantly improve their management structures in 2013. In these organizations, executive directors largely make organizational decisions.

National CSOs have permanent paid staff and adequate human resources practices. The decline in donor support for local CSOs in 2013 made it more difficult for many CSOs to maintain permanent paid staff. In addition, more local CSOs lost high quality employees to foreign CSOs implementing new donor-supported programs and projects, such as the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP), a program funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID). For example, in 2013, Women Environment Program (WEP) lost five of its staff to donor-funded programs, and Action Aid lost three staff. Organizations usually have fewer than twenty staff, making such losses significant. Especially at the state and local levels, CSOs continue to rely on part-time staff and volunteers to implement their activities. CSOs were able to secure the services of volunteers due to the high rate of unemployment in the country in 2013. As in 2012, only large CSOs in major cities can afford professional services like accountants, IT managers, or lawyers.

Many CSOs at the national level have modern office equipment. However, many state and local level CSOs do not have the resources to maintain modern office equipment. Many CSOs, including local CSOs, access the Internet and social media through the use of smartphones. The use of social media is more popular among national-level CSOs and advocacy focused CSOs, though state and local level CSOs are also becoming more familiar with the use of Facebook and other social media.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

CSO financial viability did not change significantly in 2013, although some CSOs strengthened their financial management systems during the year.

CSOs in the country largely depend on donor support for their activities. However, donor support for local CSOs has declined since 2012. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy stated that it had fewer grants available for Nigeria in 2013 compared to 2012, although it did not disclose the actual numbers. The British Council, Gunn
Rural Management (GRM) International, Adam Smith International, and other donors continued to contract with foreign-based organizations to implement development programs in the country.

Many CSOs do not have diversified sources of funding. Only a few local CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short term, and only some engage in membership outreach and philanthropic development programs. As in 2012, there are only fifteen to twenty philanthropic organizations in Nigeria, such as MTN Foundation, Guaranty Trust Bank, TY Danjuma Foundation, and Globacom Foundation. For example, TY Danjuma Foundation supports CSOs working in health, education, and empowerment programs. CSOs do not benefit from the distribution of oil revenues.

There was no change in CSOs’ engagement in income generating activities in 2013. Only a few CSOs, such as Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), CLEEN Foundation, and NOI Polls, supplement their income with revenue generated from services, rent, products, and assets. As in previous years, the government, particularly at the national level, provides contracts to CSOs for training, research, and capacity building. For example, in 2013, the Ministry of Women Affairs and the Ministry of Water Resources contracted with WEP to train women on empowerment skills and hygiene. Similarly, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) contracted the Center for Research and Documentation (CRD) to conduct a study on Youth Restiveness and the Electoral Process in northern Nigeria. Membership-based organizations require annual dues, but few are up-to-date with their collection.

Financial management within CSOs improved slightly in 2013. The Central Bank of Nigeria directed all commercial banks in the country to ensure that Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), which include CSOs, maintain proper financial management systems before they are allowed to have bank accounts. The purpose of this directive is to adhere to the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on preventing financing of terrorism. The directive was initially issued in August 2012, but was re-issued in February and June 2013 to extend the time that DNFBPs have to comply. The directive did not substantially impact CSO operations, as its implementation is still limited to a few large CSOs in the major cities. National CSOs such as ActionAid intensified efforts to train state and local CSOs on financial management. Only larger CSOs publish annual financial reports. State and local CSOs usually cannot afford to engage the services of professional auditors or publish their financial reports.

ADVOCACY: 3.7

CSOs in Nigeria continue to engage actively in advocacy and have gained significant recognition from the government at the national, state, and local levels. Increasing donor presence has increased interaction between local CSOs and the government in states like Benue, Enugu, Lagos, Bauchi, Sokoto, and Jigawa, as donors encourage CSO participation in development programs. In Kano, CSOs were invited for the first time to participate in public hearings at the Kano State House of Assembly to discuss bills on water resources and other issues. In Bayelsa, the Bayelsa Non-Governmental Organizations Forum (BANGOF) was invited to participate in a public budget hearing at the State House Assembly.
Other channels of communication between CSOs and the government at all levels also continue to operate. The government has CSO advisers and offices that interact with CSOs at the national level and in some states such as Kano, and the government encourages CSOs to participate in various decision-making processes.

Although lobbying is not a common practice among CSOs in Nigeria, CSOs have been able to contribute to draft legislation. In 2013, the executive arm of the federal government worked with CSOs to draft some bills that addressed climate change, administrative justice, and other issues. These bills were ultimately sent to the National Assembly.

CSOs at the national level continue to organize broad-based advocacy campaigns. During 2013, many CSOs in the country protested against a bill on early marriage, as well as public corruption. CISLAC, for example, organized an anti-corruption protest at the National Assembly in 2013. As a result, relevant committees in the National Assembly established panels to investigate corruption in public offices.

Due to low capacity, many state and local level CSOs cannot engage in effective advocacy. To address this weakness, CISLAC conducted a number of advocacy trainings for local CSOs in 2013.

There are a number of issue-based coalitions in the country, many of which were formed in previous years, such as Zero Corruption Coalition and Human Right Agenda Network. In 2013, the Zero Corruption Coalition organized several campaigns against corruption in public offices.

CSOs are aware of the benefits of having a favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector. However, CSOs did not make any significant efforts to promote legal reforms related to civil society law in 2013.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

There was no significant change in CSO service provision from 2012. In 2013, CSOs continued to provide services in education, health, environment, peace building, security, and other fields. CSOs actively provide traditional social and humanitarian services, including the construction of schools and health clinics, humanitarian support, and training and capacity building in various areas. WEP collaborated with the federal Ministry of Environment on renewable energy for use of stoves in rural areas. Growing Girls and Women in Nigeria was involved in skills building and entrepreneurial development among girls and women. CRD conducted civic and political education for citizens and their political representatives in Kano.

CSOs increasingly verify that their services meet local needs, mainly by interacting closely with community leaders and members, but also sometimes through baseline studies and needs assessments. In addition, some communities approach CSOs for assistance addressing their needs and priorities.

CSOs share their publications with the public and during seminars and workshops with other participants and CSOs. Academia and government also receive CSO publications, especially research-based publications. CSOs generally do not charge for their publications because donor grants usually cover the cost of publications. Physical projects such as construction of schools or humanitarian services are also generally donor-supported, so beneficiaries are not expected to pay for such services. However, CSOs do charge fees and recover costs when providing training and other information-based service provision without donor support.
Governments at all levels recognize the value of CSOs in service provision. The federal government and a few state governments contract with CSOs for services. The government contracts with CSOs to monitor and evaluate national progress on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to conduct training, capacity building, and research. The governments of Bauchi, Nassarawa, and Benue engage local CSOs in service delivery, such as promoting hygiene and distributing relief materials to internally displaced persons. This government engagement is partly due to pressure from donors. However, despite decentralization, local governments rarely contract with CSOs to provide services. State governments still make most contract decisions at the local level. The government rarely provides grants to CSOs for services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

![Infrastructure in Nigeria](image)

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change significantly from 2012. Only a few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSOs resource centers exist in Nigeria, and they are largely located in major cities such as Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt. This makes it difficult for state and local level CSOs in other cities to access their services, which include training, capacity building, and information related to strategic planning, fundraising, advocacy, and other areas. Resource centers earn income from services to complement their operating revenue. Many local level CSOs cannot afford the services of resource centers.

Community foundations and ISOs rarely provide grants from locally raised funds, although large CSOs at the national level such as ActionAid do re-grant international donor funds. However, due to the decline in donor support to CSOs in 2013, such organizations received less funding in grants in 2013, and thus re-granted less funding.

CSOs usually share information among themselves and with the government. Many CSOs at the national level share information online. CSO coalitions exist in various areas, such as good governance, human rights, and gender issues, and continue to facilitate information sharing among CSOs.

Several organizations, such as ActionAid and Center for Leadership Strategy and Development, continued to provide management training for CSOs in 2013. In addition, some individual consultants specialize in providing training to CSOs, mainly in the areas of fundraising, strategic planning, and financial management. Training is typically offered in the major cities, making it difficult for CSOs outside the cities to access such training. Trainings are conducted in English, and training materials are not available in local languages. Very few trainings are provided for free, so many CSOs cannot afford them. In 2013, CISLAC provided training to build the capacity of CSOs at the state and local levels to effectively engage state and local legislators on important legislative issues.

CSOs and the government, as well as other stakeholders, are aware of the need for continued collaboration to achieve common objectives. As in 2012, there were instances of CSOs working in partnership with local businesses and the government in 2013. CRD partnered with the Leather and Allied Products Manufacturers Association of Nigeria in Kano to advocate for easier registration and operating conditions for companies in the leather business. Development agencies also continued to bring the government and local CSOs together to collaborate in various areas. The DFID-supported NSRP works with the government, the media, and local CSOs to address the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

The public image of CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. CSOs continued to enjoy positive media coverage at the national and state levels. The media covers CSO activities as public service announcements
for free. Journalists consult with CSOs for information and expert analysis of national issues, and CSO representatives are invited to discuss national issues on television and radio. For example, WEP was invited to discuss the use of renewable energy in Nigeria on state television. Some newspapers have columns that discuss CSO issues generally. CSOs also make use of social media to discuss national issues.

As a result of continued positive media coverage of CSO activities, the public appreciates the role CSOs play in addressing issues of public concern. The level of public understanding of the concept of CSOs also seems to have increased slightly, as demonstrated by the positive comments that CSOs receive from the communities in which they work.

Government perception of CSOs in 2013 was generally positive, as demonstrated by the frequent collaboration between the sectors at various levels during the year. For example, the government continued to engage the services of CDD to monitor and evaluate national progress on MDGs. The business sector increasingly collaborates with CSOs on capacity building and research. For example, NOI Polls conducted some business and market surveys for clients in the business sector. The government and business sectors sometimes rely on CSOs as a source of expertise and information.

National CSOs publicize their activities through the media. CSOs continue to establish relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage. Some in the major cities have established more formal arrangements with media. For example, CRD signed a memorandum of understanding with a group of journalists in Kano, stipulating that the journalists would publicize CRD’s activities, and CRD would develop the research capacity of the journalists. Social media such as Facebook is also a powerful tool for CSOs to inform the public about their activities and national issues. National level CSOs tend to use social media more than state and local level CSOs.

National CSOs publish annual reports and are largely transparent in their operations. State and local level CSOs rarely publish their annual reports. Professional associations have codes of ethics. However, there is no sector-wide code of ethics.
RWANDA

2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Rwanda

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CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.4

Rwanda is a small, landlocked, mountainous country in East Africa with few natural resources. It is also one of the most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 11 million people living within 26,338 square kilometers. At the same time, Rwanda has achieved significant development since the 1994 genocide and has become one of the ten fastest growing countries in the world. Between 2008 and 2012, poverty was reduced from 56.7 percent to 44.9 percent. At the same time, poverty remains disproportionately a rural phenomenon. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, a common statistical measure of inequality, has doubled in the last thirty years.

Rwanda is now seeking to ensure that its socioeconomic gains are broadly shared and prevent erosion of the country's hard-won political and social stability. Rwanda's long-term development goals are embedded in its Vision 2020, which seeks to transform Rwanda from a low-income, agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy by 2020. Rwanda also has formulated a medium-term strategy, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013-2018 (EDPRS 2), which focuses on
economic transformation, rural development, youth employment, and accountable governance. CSOs aim to support these development plans to help the country achieve its goals.

CSOs in Rwanda are regulated by three new laws, which govern domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs, and religious-based organizations, respectively. While approximately 2,500 NGOs were registered under the old legal framework, only about 600 were registered under the new domestic NGO law by 2013. This indicates an increase of more than 450 registered NGOs compared to those that had registered under the new law in 2012. Many CSOs remain unregistered, but no estimate of the number of unregistered groups is available.

The capacity of Rwandan CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. Rwandan CSOs continued to work in diverse areas including the prevention of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis; education; environmental protection; youth and women’s empowerment; entrepreneurship; agriculture; peace building; and citizen participation, among many others. However, policy advocacy networks are not yet active, and advocacy strategies are not well developed. The legal environment continues to offer CSOs flexibility and freedom to operate and contribute to national development. However, CSOs in Rwanda are primarily seen as service providers, and viewed by the government as partners in implementing government policies. CSOs lack the capacity to be watchdogs and are often marginalized by the government when they criticize particular government policies. The financial viability, infrastructure, and organizational capacity of CSOs remain weak. Many CSOs still depend on donor funds, and very few have initiated commercial activities as allowed by the new legal framework.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2**

The laws governing CSOs in Rwanda are fairly enabling. A new NGO Law, No. 4/2012, was adopted in February 2012. Under this law, domestic NGOs are classified into three broad categories according to their main objectives and nature of membership: public interest organizations, which operate in various fields, including economy, social welfare, culture, science, and human rights; common interest organizations, which act in a specific domain in favor of their members; and foundations, whose purpose is either to establish a fund or to collect, manage, and use funding in support of beneficiaries. Two other new laws include Law No. 05/2012, which governs international NGOs, and Law No. 06/2012, which governs religious-based organizations.

Domestic NGOs must apply for registration at the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). Applying is free, but associated costs such as legal consultancy fees, costs for holding a general assembly, and notary fees may be a significant burden for small CSOs. An NGO must submit several documents, including organizational statutes; documentation of the organization’s head office address; the full CVs and judicial records of the organization’s legal representative and deputy; the minutes of the general assembly which appointed the legal representative and the signatures of all the members in attendance; an action plan for the fiscal year with a budget; and an original district collaboration letter. Registration is now required only once, an improvement over the annual requirement under the old law. However, NGOs are still required to annually submit action plans, reports, and fees ranging from 50,000 to 300,000 RFW (about $73 to $435) to the Joint Action Development Forums (JADFs). In some districts, some CSOs have reported that payment of these fees is required before they can obtain district collaboration letters and operate in that district.
Many CSOs, particularly those operating in the rural areas, were not able to adapt to the new law’s requirements by the deadline on April 9, 2013. Approximately 2,500 NGOs were registered under the old law, and only about 600 were registered under the new law by the end of 2013. RGB hence extended the registration period, though without official notification. The new law is still not understood by many CSOs and public officials. In partnership with ICNL, Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB) organized workshops in December 2013 for NGOs at the national and district levels to explain the new law and foster its implementation.

RGB and Migration Services—which monitors and evaluates international NGOs and their programs—continue to exert significant pressure and control on CSOs. Most CSOs are pushed to align their action plans with government priorities, even when such policies contradict CSOs’ missions. For example, some district officials pressure CSOs to allocate their funds to infrastructure, even when CSOs’ missions are in social development, governance, human rights, or capacity building. In addition to these constraints, Article 33 of the NGO Law allows the RGB to suspend an organization whose activities are aimed at jeopardizing security, public order, health, morals, or human rights. This broad language provides the RGB wide discretion to choose which activities fall under this provision. However, there were no reports of the RGB suspending a CSO in 2013.

The political environment in the country does not encourage the expression of dissent. As a result, there are very few CSOs that are active in human rights, and some of these have suffered from apparent government interference in their internal affairs. For example, there are fears that pro-government factions are taking over the leadership of independent organizations such as LIPRODHOR (Ligue Rwandaise pour la promotion et la defense des droits de l’homme).

Article 28 of the new law provides NGOs with the right to tax exemptions, but in practice NGOs are still requested to pay all taxes like any other private institution. The law states that details of which taxes will be exempted will be addressed in the tax code, providing an opportunity for dialogue between civil society and the government to address this issue. Taxes are also levied on microfinance programs and other economic activities initiated by CSOs.

CSOs can obtain general legal advice, but there are no lawyers specialized in CSO laws or issues. Legal advice is expensive for most CSOs, and few CSOs have permanent lawyers or legal advisors.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

CSOs in Rwanda seek and successfully build local constituencies for their initiatives. Many CSOs with national scope have sub-offices at district levels to be closer to their constituencies.

All CSOs have visions, missions, and objectives defined by their members, as this is required by the NGO Law. While many CSOs adhere to these missions through their strategic plans and annual action plans, some of them change directions in response to donor priorities. Even when CSOs have good strategic plans that reflect their missions, implementation is sometimes hampered by the lack of necessary funds. Many CSOs also have limited capacities to develop strategic plans and need to pay external consultants, which can be expensive.

All CSOs must have internal management structures in place to comply with the NGO Law. The roles and responsibilities of each body are laid out in each organization’s constitutions and internal rules and
regulations. Nevertheless, some CSO leaders lack the skills to conduct sound and transparent management of their organizations. CSOs produce internal audit reports, but very few share them with the public.

CSOs experience high staff turnover due to their dependence on donor funding, which is often unreliable. For example, when the Global Fund reduced the number of CSOs receiving funding from ninety to thirty in 2013, many CSO employees lost their jobs. CSOs, particularly small organizations, can afford only project-based staff, and there are few volunteers in the sector. The financial capacity of CSOs to hire professional staff, such as program managers, project coordinators, IT managers, legal advisors, or financial managers, is very limited.

CSOs continue to enhance their ICTs, and many are relatively well-equipped with modernized office equipment such as updated computers and Internet access. Many CSOs even have scanners and interactive websites. CSOs in urban areas also have access to smartphones. Some also use accounting software in their financial reporting systems such as SAGE, SAARI 100, and Quick Books. However, use of this software and social media networks is still at a nascent stage and mainly limited to large organizations, especially those based in cities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3**

Financial viability remains a significant challenge to the sustainability of most CSOs in Rwanda. Project-based donor funding remains the major—and frequently the only—source of funding for CSOs. The global economic crisis has aggravated this situation.

Donor funding opportunities further declined in 2013. Most donors reduced the number of local partners, as well their budgets. Most donors only support short-term projects, rather than large programs with long-term strategic objectives that generate sustainable impact.

CSOs receive almost no financial assistance from individuals, business communities, charity organizations, government, or foundations. In 2013, the RGB provided small grants of 4.6 million to 6 million RWF (about $6,800 to $8,700) to fourteen CSOs. These grants were used to implement projects on good governance, citizen participation, unity, and peace building. CSOs generally do not obtain contracts with businesses or government because they lack effective strategies to negotiate such partnerships. As CSO partnerships with the private sector are not yet formalized, some businesses with social responsibility initiatives prefer to provide support directly to communities, rather than channeling their financial support through CSOs.

Very few CSOs have developed effective fundraising strategies. While the new NGO law allows NGOs to conduct commercial activities and generate income to achieve their objectives, very few NGOs have begun such activities. Membership fees are still nominal and not regularly paid.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

There are some opportunities and spaces for CSOs to engage with policymakers; however, these opportunities are primarily open to CSOs focused on service delivery. CSOs are represented on various national boards and commissions, such as the National Labor Council, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program. Furthermore, since 2007, JADFs have provided CSOs with space to influence and participate in planning and monitoring district development plans. All thirty districts of Rwanda now have JADFs, which meet four times a year. Certain CSOs also represent particular development fields, such as agriculture, health, women’s empowerment, disability, and human rights, in the JADFs.
CSOs intervene in many sectors of public life, and their projects contribute to high-level government policies primarily in sectors such as agriculture, political decentralization, education, and health. For example, CSOs assisted numerous government projects supported by the Global Fund to address HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis prevention. As a result, in 2013 the Global Fund awarded the government another large grant for the following years. The Minister of Health publicly recognized CSOs’ contributions and ensured the continuity of the partnership. The use of community scorecards and report cards is helping to keep local leaders accountable.

Civil society policy engagement around the Umushyikiramo (National Dialogue), organized by the Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP), led to the state’s review of health insurance and education policy. The National Dialogue is organized annually and gathers local and national public authorities, the private sector, civil society, and the Rwandan diaspora to discuss national development progress and national issues.

Although some CSOs are able to provide input on government policies, CSOs are not encouraged or empowered to offer constructive criticism on policies related to more sensitive areas, such as human rights and political freedoms. As noted above, there are fears that pro-government factions are taking over the leadership of independent organizations such as LIPRODHOR that did speak out on these issues in 2013.

The new NGO Law provides CSOs the right to contribute to the design of national policies and legislation impacting national level NGOs; to protect and promote human rights and other national values; and to express opinions on other national policies and legislation. In addition, the new Access to Information Law is expected to ensure that public officials provide needed information to CSOs, particularly information related to public policies. CSOs have begun to try to exercise these rights. For example, CSOs like LandNet and its local partners made recommendations to the Land Law, which were presented to the parliament and later integrated into the new Land Law, No. 43/2013.

In February 2013, CSOs successfully advocated for the Ministry of Education to review its decision to reduce scholarships for public university students in the following academic year. Upon review, the government decided to provide scholarships based on “Ubudehe,” economic status categories used by the government. This decision, however, was publicly criticized because the government did not consult students and their families or other stakeholders, many of whom find these economic status categories inaccurate. After the new scholarship policy took effect in September 2013, a group of CSOs led by Association des Jeunes pour la Promotion des Droits de l’Homme (AJRPODHO) began a campaign to increase students’ awareness of the new policy. The coalition circulated a position paper; went on radio talk shows; held press conferences; and organized meetings with the Rwanda Education Board, Rwanda Patriotic Front secretariat, and the parliament. These efforts led the government to conduct an in-depth survey of the economic conditions of all students’ families. Following this evaluation, the government decided to expand its support, providing 100 percent tuition to the vast majority of students, and 50 percent support to nearly all other students.

Despite these efforts, challenges continue to hamper CSO advocacy. CSOs still lack advocacy skills and tactics, as well as the resources to carry out research for evidence-based advocacy. Furthermore, CSOs do not fully involve constituents in their efforts, and their relationships with research institutions and media houses are still weak. Very few CSOs have developed advocacy strategies and plans. In 2013 various donors, such as Norwegian People’s Aid, Trocaire, the EU, USAID, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, and the International Rescue Committee, focused on building the capacity of CSOs in policy monitoring and advocacy.

CSOs did not advocate to improve the legal environment for the CSO sector in 2013 due to lack of active interest and influence in this issue.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0

CSOs provide goods and services in diverse fields, including health, water and sanitation, education, governance, housing and relief, environment, infrastructure, handcrafts, and microfinance. The quality of services was relatively the same as in 2012. However, a decrease in donor funds led to fewer services in infrastructure and housing in 2013, in favor of social services in health, education, entrepreneurship, and citizen participation.

While these goods and services benefit CSOs’ constituencies and community members, they are provided on a small scale due to limited resources and skills. Such CSO interventions are often not sustainable due to the lack of beneficiaries and community ownership of the services.

Because CSOs can mobilize funds, primarily from the donor community, the government values CSOs as potential partners in national development in many areas, including health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, and youth and women’s empowerment. To a smaller extent, CSOs are valued for their expertise, particularly to help districts achieve performance targets outlined in annual performance contracts between the district mayor and the president. While CSO contributions to implementing government policies and programs are generally appreciated, in some instances, government authorities are suspicious of CSO activities aimed at capacity building, promotion of human rights, public participation, and government accountability.

Apart from some government contracts and foreign donor funding, CSOs do not have systems to recover costs for services. Most projects are designed to benefit the very poor, who cannot afford to pay for services.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

There are few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers in Rwanda. Means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country are limited. Only donors and umbrella organizations provide some capacity building to their partners and members. No local grantmaking organizations provide funding to CSOs.

CSO coalitions and networks and general information sharing in the sector continue to be weak. Umbrella organizations—like CCOAIB, which supports forty local CSOs intervening in rural development; Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, which gathers fifty-eight CSOs promoting social and economic development for women and girls; and Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Droits de l’Homme, which focuses on defense of human rights—actively share information with their members through regular e-mails, formal and informal meetings, field visits, seminars, and workshops. However, these umbrella groups are often criticized for not truly representing their members’ interests due to their weak internal capacities. In addition, conflicts of interest arise when they compete with their members for funding.

Civil society platforms include the RCSP, which aims to fill gaps in information sharing and protect CSOs’ interests. For example, it provided recommendations to government officials on the new Law on Access to Information. In addition, district-level civil society platforms have operated in the five districts of Rwanda since 2009, with a committee elected by CSOs and a permanent district coordinator for daily management.
They coordinate activities of CSOs at the district level, assess challenges, and propose issues that require national level advocacy. However, these platforms are still nascent.

Rwanda has few capable local CSO management trainers, and they are generally practitioners, not experts in the field. Academic institutions and donors also provide brief and stand-alone courses on CSO management, but there are no advanced courses in areas like strategic planning and management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer recruitment and management, or board development.

There are few formal intersectoral partnerships with local businesses, government, or media. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources and Rwanda Agricultural Board have contracted with Union des Cooperatives Agricoles Intégrée, Association Rurale pour le Développement Intégrée, and Centre de Services aux Cooperatives-Ugama to implement the crop intensification program. Very few CSOs have partnered with media. In 2013, PAX-Press, which unites twenty-eight media outlets, worked with three CSOs in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to promote justice and peace messages throughout the country and Great Lakes Region. Other CSOs collaborate with public and private media to cover their events.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

CSOs in Rwanda working on service delivery issues generally enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels. Such organizations have gradually tried to publicize their work through radio, magazines, newsletters, and websites. Community radios and private radios such as Isango Star, Radio 10, Radio Salus, and Radio Huguka cover CSO events at both the local and national levels. However, very few journalists analyze the role of CSOs in society because they lack clear understanding of the sector. CSOs only pay for journalists’ transportation costs to cover events, but CSOs are often required to pay fees if they seek to publish an article in a major newspaper. The situation for CSOs engaged in human rights and democracy issues is quite different as they are heavily criticized by the government-controlled media.

In 2013, some CSOs, particularly those working on service delivery, renewed partnerships with the government, which resulted in a slight improvement of the government’s perception of these organizations. For example, CSOs working in districts are encouraged to join JADF and are invited to participate in various district activities, such as the development of district development plans and evaluations of performance contracts between local governments and the president. CSOs’ representation in the National Dialogue has also raised the visibility of CSOs and led the RGB to mobilize funds to support CSOs. While there are rumors that the RGB will increase grants to CSOs, some grantees did not implement all activities or meet reporting requirements, undermining the sector’s reputation with the government. Some government officials continue to view CSOs as driven by donor interest and short-term financial gains.

CSOs in Rwanda do not properly document or share their work with the public, businesses, donors, or constituencies. CSOs are beginning to use social media, but only to communicate with colleagues, rather than promote their work among their constituents or the public. CSOs have relationships with journalists from public and private media, but they are not well established.

Few CSOs publish annual reports. Most would rather present these reports to their general assemblies, for which the media typically provides some coverage.
There is no sector-wide code of ethics. The NGO Law stipulates that NGOs must have internal organs responsible for resolving internal conflicts. However, while many CSOs have codes of ethics, very few CSOs implement them.
Political tensions in Senegal eased after the March 2012 presidential elections and continued to subside in 2013. While Senegal’s democratic system is resilient—as demonstrated by peaceful government transitions in 2000 and 2012—ongoing dysfunction plagues government reform processes. For example, while many consider the new decentralization reform “Act III” to be a positive development, the opposition views the policy as a maneuver from the ruling party to delay local elections since several elements—including the redefinition of administrative boards—will need to occur in advance of any elections. Amid these political developments, citizens launched protests in 2013 criticizing the government for youth unemployment, the high cost of living, and severe disruptions in basic services such as electricity and water.
Nonetheless, there were positive developments in governance in 2013, including the strengthening of policy-making processes though the establishment of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council and the National Office for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption. Furthermore, the president initiated an institutional reform process, including the creation of a National Commission for Institutional Reform (CNRI) and the appointment of a minister to oversee the CNRI’s work. CSOs participated in consultations throughout all administrative regions regarding the functioning of the CNRI. In addition, the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (2014-2017) was adopted in 2013, along with its implementation plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan.

The conflict in the Casamance region, ongoing since 1982 between the national army and the Movement of Casamance Democratic Forces, slowed somewhat in 2013. The former mayor of Zuiginchor and the Christian community of Sant’Egidio facilitated a new dialogue between the two sides.

Various prominent figures in the CSO sector now serve as special advisers to the government or have joined state institutions, including the Office of the President, various ministries, and the National Commission on Human Rights. Nonetheless, this has not resulted in any discernible positive impact on civil society, in part due to the greater influence of political parties, rather than individuals, on the government. In fact, state-CSO partnerships declined in 2013, largely due to the financial crisis.

The Ministry of the Interior indicates that there were 530 registered CSOs in 2013.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

Revision of the legal framework defining the relationship between CSOs and the state continued in 2013. The new framework will determine modalities and procedures for registration, CSO activities, accountability, and taxation, including possible tax exemptions. The framework introduces major innovations, including promotion of a partnership relationship between CSOs and the state, and accountability and activity alignment measures that would impact CSOs, territorial administrative services, decentralized state services, and local communities. The Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGAD) and the governor of Thies organized a workshop on the framework in September 2013. In addition, the Minister of the Interior involved CSOs in the regional governors’ conferences which focused on streamlining local development interventions and making CSOs accountable to local government through workshops and regular reports by CSOs. Meanwhile, registration procedures remain the same, with one exception. Since January 2013, projects proposed in registration applications must be certified by local authorities, and all financial agreements associated with a project must be signed in the locality where the project takes place. CSOs can function freely and express criticism of public actions, but the origin and use of their resources is monitored.

CSOs receive tax exemptions on their equipment. In addition, CONGAD convinced the Interministerial Commission of Oversight of Investment Programs, which had suspended activities in late 2010, to allow CONGAD to organize meetings to resolve issues related to exemptions. As a result of this initiative, the Minister of Economy and Finances approved tax exemption on investments for forty-seven CSOs with pending applications.
There are no laws preventing CSOs from earning revenue on goods and services. Income earned is reinvested in the support of the community. Some government calls for bids are open to CSOs, and CSOs help implement several public programs.

Legal services are available in all regions of Senegal, but these are not always accessible to CSOs. While CSOs that specialize in promoting human rights may have lawyers among their members, other CSOs must pay fees to access legal services. Certain organizations such as the Association of Women Lawyers and the African Network for Integrated Development include networks of lawyers that assist vulnerable people or communities.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

The effects of the global financial crisis remain a major constraint for CSOs working with foreign financial and technical partners in 2013. The crisis led to the closure of many CSOs and the departure of the most qualified personnel in search of better employment conditions. At the same time, it forced CSOs to develop alternative strategies to mobilize resources.

CSOs typically do not have constituencies to support their activities. Strategic planning, however, has been critical to CSOs’ resilience. It has allowed them to better articulate their visions and purposes, communicate them to partners, and raise more funds.

After ten years of financial crisis and the resulting decrease in institutional support, CSOs have adapted and developed efficient management practices. These include regular renewal of administrative boards; development of administrative and financial procedures manuals; and performance of follow-up activities, audits, and periodic evaluations. CSOs generally have a division of responsibilities between the board of directors and the staff.

CSO personnel are increasingly specialized and professional, but qualified personnel are typically concentrated in organizations offering the best working conditions and pay. CSOs’ budgets typically do not allow them to maintain professional staff, especially in between funded projects. CSOs also find it difficult to recruit volunteers, as local volunteering is rare due to the difficult socioeconomic situation in Senegal. In addition, volunteers also generate costs for CSOs, such as rent and allowances. Despite limited resources, CSOs often recruit technical experts, like directors of information technology, due to the need for visibility and data management. This is done especially by international CSOs and more rarely by local CSOs. CSOs generally only use legal services on an ad hoc basis when they are involved in litigation.

CSOs’ abilities to adapt to technical advances remain strongly related to whether they partner with international organizations. Only recipients of funds from the World Bank or bilateral cooperative agencies can regularly update their equipment, such as vehicles, and information tools, such as computers and software. Mobile telephones are largely available and used in projects. CSOs increasingly use social media.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

The global financial crisis continued to present major difficulties in 2013 for CSOs working with foreign partners. The UN and some international CSOs increasingly intervene directly with the population rather than through local CSOs, while foreign partners channel more resources to ministries rather than CSOs. As a result of these trends, CSOs
experienced a lack of funding to carry out public projects or programs during the year.

CONGAD proposed several solutions to address these funding difficulties. It asked the European Commission for a single-track financing mechanism exclusively for CSOs in the environmental field; proposed that China's development agency establish a single-track procedure for CSOs seeking grants based on a management manual proposed by CONGAD; and requested the Italian Development Cooperation and the World Bank to finance multi-actor programs covering several regions.

There were fewer opportunities for partnerships between the state and CSOs in 2013, largely due to the financial environment. In some cases, CSOs had to cease their activities or close altogether due to the lack of funds. This situation was exacerbated by the degradation of the Social Fund for Development Agency, the National Program of Rural Infrastructure, and the Fight against Poverty Program. While these programs typically allowed CSOs to manage funded activities, the reduction in funds significantly reduced these opportunities.

Nonetheless, this year, CSOs took advantage of rare partnerships with programs such as the Integrated Program for Economic and Social Development (PIDES). For example, the Action Consultation Association carried out a study for PIDES to identify needs in the region around Dakar.

Individual and corporate philanthropy are still underdeveloped in Senegal. With the support of Trust Africa, a group of researchers affiliated with the Council for the Development of Research in Social Sciences in Africa published a report in 2013 to demonstrate the lack of financial support to CSOs and the negative impact on their operational capacities.

Standards of internal self-regulation, as well as donor requirements, have led many CSOs to implement clear internal management structures and transparent financial management monitored by the boards of directors. Financial and technical partners also require CSOs to submit to audits for funds exceeding $100,000, on average.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

In 2013, alliances between CSOs and local community organizations emerged, thereby increasing advocacy. For instance, CSOs and teachers unions came together to advocate for a resolution to the university crisis and against government discretion over recruitment quotas in elementary schools. An alliance among the Cultural Association for Educational and Social Self-Promotion, Aid and Action, and the Coalition of Organizations Working Together for the Defense of Public Education (COSYDEP) played a determining role on the issue of recruitment quotas. Advocacy campaigns placed considerable focus on engaging local decision makers in a range of important initiatives such as the management of natural resources.

Several advocacy campaigns garnered notable results in 2013. For example, the Development and Migration Network (REMIDEV) worked to advance the capacities of journalists to raise awareness of the needs of migrants, including those arrested in Morocco following a protest in front of the Senegalese embassy in Rabat. REMIDEV's advocacy also targeted the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Senegalese diaspora, asking them to intervene and aid the arrested migrants. As a result of these efforts, radio stations such as Sud FM and WALF FM, as well as television channels, regularly show reports on migrants in host countries like France, Spain, and the U.S., and in transit countries like Morocco. Another success was through a CONGAD study on issues of physical security, food security, access to basic services, and employment, of which the key conclusions and recommendations proposed by CONGAD were included in a government report. Finally,
Caritas Senegal created a coalition to support a global campaign initiated by Caritas International in November 2013 to support rights to food and adequate nutrition.

Advocacy activities offered opportunities for cooperation between the state and CSOs, thus permitting CSOs to participate in decision making and influence public policy at various levels. Lobbying activities targeted the Presidency, the Prime Minister, and principal financial and technical partners, from whom CONGAD requested coordination support for reforming the state-CSO relationship.

CSOs are aware that a favorable legal and regulatory environment is necessary for their efficiency and sustainability and actively participate in CONGAD’s initiative to propose a draft CSO-state framework. State approval of the draft will be followed by advocacy calling for a law based on the developed framework.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

CSOs continued to provide high quality services in 2013, despite the struggle for resources. Notably, while the conflict in Casamance had previously pushed CSOs out of the region, in 2013, projects such as the Millennium Challenge Project permitted CSOs to execute contracts in the area. Public service missions and activities for disadvantaged communities strengthened in 2013. Along with publishing informational flyers and disseminating printed or online reports, CSOs made considerable effort in 2013 to develop partnerships with radio stations for large-scale public information and advocacy campaigns. For example, Radio Futur Media produced shows sponsored by COSYDEP to raise awareness of challenges in education.

The persistent financial crisis led CSOs to diversify their strategies for mobilizing and generating resources in order to continue their support to communities. Covering costs linked to projects remained a focus for CSOs, with progressively more attention paid to recovering costs in their collaborations.

The government, particularly the ministries, has recognized and expressed appreciation for CSO services. For example, the Minister of Health praised CSO contributions in the fight against HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and in strengthening the health system. Similar collaboration exists between the Ministry of Hydraulics and CSOs focused on access to water, and between the Ministry of Education and CSOs focused on education. CSOs such as Action and Development, Senegalese Association for Research and Support for Community Development, and Enda Popular Economy were particularly successful in implementing a government nutrition program. In the fight against poverty, CONCEPT, Human Action for Integrated Development in Senegal, and Association for Youth Promotion and Development carried out the Program for Literacy and Career Development for the Fight against Poverty, which is financed by the Islamic Development Bank to promote literacy and income generation among disadvantaged women.

Some new financial opportunities are expected for CSO service provision. The Eleventh European Development Fund—managed by the Ministry of Economy and Finances and the European Commission with the participation of prominent CSOs—anticipates calls for bids in June 2014 reserved for non-state actors in the water and sanitation fields. Bids will also be issued for non-state actors working in food security. In addition, the World Bank decided to augment financing for programs in the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, which will likely increase service contracts for recipient and sub-recipient CSOs. Finally, an extension of the government’s universal health coverage program is expected to provide new opportunities for CSOs in 2014.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

CSOs continued to face difficulties accessing functional, relevant, and sustainable support centers in 2013. Only a few resource centers exist. These include the New Field Foundation, which supports the NGO Association of Young Farmers of Oussouye in Casamance, and several German foundations (Rosa Luxembourg, Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert, and Neumann), which all support CSOs with training, public policy analysis, advocacy, and publishing. The Association for Action develops and disseminates best practices for CSO institutional development, planning, and organizational management. The Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation provides organizations with volunteers to help build skills. Africa Consultants International helps build skills in advocacy and fluency in local languages and English, and works to improve CSOs’ access to information and modern technology. CONGAD has a support office for CSOs that provides technical assistance with administrative procedures for obtaining CSO registration or approval for investment programs. Other local organizations, such as Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR), and the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, also provide services to CSOs.

To access scientific information, notably satellite data or water resource tracking, CSOs active in environmental management, flood response, or drilling can buy services from the Center for Ecology Oversight or from the General Direction for Water Resource Forecasting.

For several years, CSOs have solicited training in results-based management techniques, but without a relevant support center they can only call on private institutions, such as training schools or businesses, whose fees are too costly for most CSOs. The Rural Foundation for West Africa delivers less expensive training, but their services are not accessible to all CSOs, with registration fees averaging $1,500 per person. Organizations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation work in partnership with Oxfam and the PANOS Institute to build CSOs’ advocacy skills to promote fair and inclusive regulation of agricultural lands, with an emphasis on the rights of women and youth. The National Center for Educational Resources also provides some information to CSOs.

Partnership between CSOs and the private sector remains weak, limited essentially to joint participation in dialogue with the government on youth employment. For example, the National Forum for Youth Employment organized large consultations with private sector organizations such as the National Council of Senegalese Employers and the National Council of Management, along with unions and civil society. Though state-CSO partnerships declined in 2013, there were some notable partnerships. The Ministry of Health and Public Action has largely included CSOs in its fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and its reform of the health system. In addition, the Authority for the Regulation of Government Contracts approved a proposal from CONGAD to increase the participation of local communities in public contracts.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.7

The public and decision makers increasingly recognize CSOs due to their role in mobilizing citizens to preserve advances in democracy in the country.

The state, notably the President, has participated in a range of dialogues on planning, implementing, and evaluating public policy with civil society. The credibility and positive public image of CSOs have facilitated the representation of CSOs in the Council for Social and Environmental Economics, the
Authority for the Regulation of Government Contracts, the National Office for the Fight against Corruption, and advisory committees that oversee nearly all areas of public policy.

CSOs’ relations with the media improved in 2013. New partnerships arose to address essential issues such as health, education, and oversight of land management. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation works in partnership with Oxfam and the PANOS Institute for ownership of the key issues of CSO advocacy and initiatives for equitable and inclusive governance of land resources for agriculture with emphasis on the rights of women and youth.

In 2013, CONGAD reactivated its ethics committee, which is charged with resolving problems in the operation of member CSOs or issues between CSOs and third parties. The activities of the committee were previously suspended due to the deaths of three of its older members.
SIERRA LEONE

In 2013, the political environment in Sierra Leone continued to be favorable to CSO operations. Among the topics of national discussion during the year were the appointment of several government ministers, pending cases in court by the opposition after the 2012 national elections, and the low number of women elected to the parliament.

The number of registered CSOs is unknown due to a lack of coordination among relevant institutions. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are required to register with the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (SLANGO), though not all organizations do so. In 2013, SLANGO had 371 registered members, up from 317 in 2012. The number of community-based organizations (CBOs) is difficult to ascertain.

With limited restrictions on the operations of CSOs, it is easy for new organizations to be established. There is a growing need for CSOs to address ongoing governance challenges happening within the country.
Sierra Leone’s constitution guarantees the freedom of association. CSO registration is easy, and CSOs can even register and operate without having an official place of work. CSOs may register through a number of institutions. CSOs based in the capital must register with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), and CSOs based outside the capital must register with the local council. Organizations with sub-offices in the districts should also register with the local councils even if they are registered with MOFED. While not considered NGOs, CBOs still need to register with the local council.

The 2009 NGO Policy is the only existing legal framework for the operation of CSOs. The policy provides few regulations for CSO operations. CSOs can work in any thematic area or geographic location. CSOs also have wide leverage to define their modes of operation and funding options.

The political and social environment in 2013 was CSO-friendly, and there were no known instances of state interference in the existence, operations, or internal management of CSOs. Some state institutions even partnered with CSOs to help monitor service delivery and formulate public policies. CSOs can freely express criticism of government policies. However, in practice some state actions such as displaying favoritism for particular CSOs and having them represent the sector during consultations weaken the CSO sector.

CSOs are obligated to pay a 5 percent tax on contractual transactions, particularly for outsourced services such as caterers, consultants, and stationery suppliers. According to the NGO Policy, CSOs registered with MOFED and SLANGO are eligible for duty exemptions on many imported goods, including medical, school, and agricultural supplies, as well as vehicles, furniture, books, and used clothing. To access this exemption, a CSO must write a letter to MOFED that is endorsed by SLANGO and indicates the type and quantity of goods, their purpose, and the location where they would be taken. As in previous years, CSOs do not pay taxes on grants and endowments received, though this is not stipulated in the law.

The law does not specify whether CSOs can earn income from the provision of goods and services. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, but the process is not usually seen as transparent or fair.

Local legal capacity for CSO matters is limited in Sierra Leone. Few legal practitioners provide legal advice to CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

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Some CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives, while others do not. Most CSOs have mission and vision statements, but some organizations deviate from them in pursuit of resources. CSOs might also deviate from their missions to provide essential basic services like water and sanitation when the state fails to provide them.

Few CSOs have effective internal management structures with boards of directors and staff management. Even when such structures exist, the level of engagement in governance by boards of directors is low. Boards provide advice and verify appropriate use of funds, but lack mechanisms to monitor adherence to internal management structures.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8**

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<th>Year</th>
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Established CSOs typically are more able to hire staff than less formal organizations. CSOs may depend on volunteers and interns when funds are unavailable to employ full time staff. Leading CSOs have permanent staff but struggle to maintain junior program staff like project officers, whose duties are tied directly to project funding. Volunteerism is fading as labor law only allows unpaid work from an individual for a limited time, and most individuals are only interested in paid employment. Most leading CSOs utilize the professional services of accountants and IT specialists. In rare cases, leading CSOs may engage lawyers.

Few CSOs have computers, Internet access, and other ICT equipment, especially those outside urban areas. Many areas lack the basic infrastructure or regular power supply needed to utilize ICT.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

The culture of local philanthropy is almost non-existent, in part because Sierra Leone is a low-income country. CSOs thus do not seek donations locally, and instead depend on foreign donors.

CSOs have access to multiple sources of local and foreign funding. However, these resources are insufficient for CSOs to remain viable beyond the short-term. CSOs largely depend on foreign donors to provide core operations and project related funding. A few CSOs receive support to monitor government activities. For example, the government provides support to the Health for All Coalition, a nationwide network of NGOs and other groups, to monitor the implementation of the Free Health Care Initiative.

Very few CSOs have membership outreach mechanisms. Organizations that collect membership fees, like the Sierra Leone Teacher’s Union and the Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association, have a core base of financial supporters, while CSOs that do not require membership fees are donor-dependent. CSOs that require membership fees are also more likely to have assets.

Some CSOs have sound financial management systems, but most do not. CSOs often do not have the financial resources needed to implement financial transparency mechanisms, such as independent audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

CSOs continue to cooperate and communicate with the government. In general, CSOs have opportunities to work with all government ministries, departments, and agencies on issues including land, education, health care delivery, rights of women and children, justice issues, and rule of law. CSOs also serve on various committees and forums with government. However, the opportunities for participation are determined by the government, not CSOs. CSOs were invited to engage with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, participating in the public consultations and serving as team members who conducted research for the design of the country program. CSOs have also been included in the constitutional review committee launched in July 2013 and are seen as strategic partners in its outreach programs.

Some CSO advocacy campaigns were effective at the local and national levels in 2013. For example, the Budget Advocacy Network ensured that the government increased funding to the health sector.
CSOs also had some lobbying successes during the year. For example, the Coalition on the Freedom of Information successfully lobbied the government to enact the Access to Information Law in 2013. The women’s coalition achieved the inclusion of Women and Gender as a pillar under the Agenda for Prosperity, the country’s social and economic strategy for 2013-2018.

With support from the UNDP, the President launched the Open Government Initiative (OGI) after the elections in 2007. OGI’s goal is to create an open governance platform for interaction between government and citizens, but because it is hosted within the presidency, it is perceived as a government entity and ineffective as a platform for citizen advocacy.

Discussions continue among CSOs on how to improve the legal landscape for the sector. CSOs believe that they have the freedom to operate but see the need for clear legal guidelines to safeguard the sector from undue interference.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSO service provision did not change significantly in 2013. While the sector as a whole provides services in several areas, the number of CSOs providing such services is generally low. The visibility of local CSOs providing health, education, housing, and other social services is weak since international CSOs like UNICEF, World Vision, and Plan International are more prominent and provide more visible services to various communities. Few CSOs visibly engage in governance and human rights.

Many CSOs implement projects without consulting with the target communities, or after engaging in weak consultation in the form of focus group discussions. Even when community needs assessments are done, implementation is sometimes still poor.

Many organizations provide information on key CSO engagements related to human rights, gender, women, and youth to the wider community. This is done through research publications and regular newsletters.

Though CSOs want to charge fees for goods and services, it is unclear if they are legally allowed to do so because they are considered not-for-profit organizations. The government does not have a standard process for funding CSOs. Government funding is ad hoc and driven by CSO lobbying to monitor developmental initiatives or be directly involved in government initiatives.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

There are few resource centers at the local level, and local CSOs have difficulty accessing information. Enhancing Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State (ENCISS) and SLANGO run resource centers but do not have a presence in all districts. Some SLANGO members, such as Campaign for Good Governance and Network Movement for Justice and Development, try to fill this gap in the areas where they operate.

CSOs are also challenged with limited access to relevant materials. Copies of documents are in short supply. Some CSOs use private channels to access relevant information, either through the Internet or informal sources. However, Internet access is weak in some parts of the country, hindering CSOs in these areas from accessing information.
Local grantmaking organizations address locally identified needs and projects and involve local people in deciding which projects to fund. Many of these organizations rely on international funding. For example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) supports both the Access to Security and Justice Program and ENCISS, which supports civil society engagement with government. The Non-State Actors Fund is supported by the World Bank through MOFED. Campaign for Good Governance also implements projects that involve sub-granting to other institutions.

Organizations working on thematic areas establish formalized coalitions or networks such as the National Elections Watch (NEW), Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), Partners for Conflict Transformation, National Coalition on Extractives (NACE), and Water and Sanitation Network (WASH). Others started but closed down, such as the UNDP CSO Forum and the ENCISS Civil Society Platform. Some coalitions and CSOs have email lists and websites for sharing information. However, they do not offer guidelines for sharing information. Instead, CSO members choose whether to share information. Furthermore, there is no central platform where groups, individuals, researchers, academics, and government can access relevant information.

Training is available in the capital and regional headquarters. Trainings are usually provided by donors for their partners. CSOs themselves organize very few training initiatives. Trainings have been held in budget tracking and analysis, development of organizational gender policies, financial management, proposal and report writing, and lobbying and advocacy skills to promote the rights of women or persons with disabilities. CSOs also occasionally participate in training opportunities in other countries that are organized by regional and global organizations, such as the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI), the Goree Institute, and the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Center.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

Most CSOs enjoy positive media coverage and form an integral part of the news on a daily basis. During the 2012 national elections, a number of CSOs established partnerships with media houses to air their programs. Media houses have also requested partnerships with a number of CSOs to ensure they are invited to cover their stories. Some media houses have established coalitions that connect CSOs to journalists covering human rights issues, as well as those addressing land and mining concerns. Though media, especially online media outlets, rely on CSOs as sources of news, CSOs must still pay for most media coverage, especially in print media.

The public’s perception of CSOs is mixed. CSOs are generally seen as either opposition or supporters of the government. Some claim that CSOs are sympathetic to the opposition when they criticize the government. Others view CSOs as selecting their interventions based on donor requirements, rather than national interests. CSOs sometimes are perceived as ineffective in monitoring the government on issues of corruption and service delivery. Much of the public perceives CSOs as mere talkers rather than action-oriented organizations. At the same time, comments made during radio talk shows and TV programs indicate that some segments of the public commend CSOs for their work.

The government and business perceptions of CSOs are also mixed. The government relies on CSOs for information and feedback on the public’s view of policies and plans. However, the government and businesses only recognize CSOs as sources of expertise and credible information when CSOs’ findings are favorable to them.

CSOs’ public relations are very strong. CSOs frequently invite the media to cover their activities and enjoy a largely cordial and professional relationship with journalists. Very few organizations utilize social media, though some have created Facebook pages. Poor infrastructure limits Internet usage in the country.
CSO self-regulation and SLANGO’s enforcement of its rules and regulations are weak. Most CSOs do not publish annual reports, though some of the more prominent CSOs do such as the Sierra Leone Bar Association and Sierra Leone Teacher’s Union.
2013 marks the nineteenth year of constitutional democratic rule in South Africa. Despite the country’s triumph over apartheid and successful transition to democracy, public trust in national leadership is declining.

While the economies in other parts of Africa are expected to continue expanding, South Africa’s economy has stagnated. Growth forecasts remain within the 2 to 3 percent range.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for 2013, nearly 20 percent of business executives surveyed listed “an inadequately educated workforce” as their greatest challenge in doing business in South Africa. The greatest proportion of the annual budget allocation goes to education, but this does not obtain the desired return on investment. Poor education is one of the greatest contributing factors to South African youths’ high unemployment rate.

Corruption also remains a significant problem. A recent survey conducted by Corruption Watch via the social media platform Mxit revealed students’ perceptions on corruption in schools. Over half (53 percent) of respondents stated that corruption was on the rise in their schools. Seventy percent claimed that school principals were responsible for misusing money or property, and 60 percent claimed that teachers solicited
favors in exchange for better grades. Public corruption reduces trust in government, takes resources away from the poor, and encourages CSOs to be corrupt in turn.

South Africa’s government continues to fall short in implementing development projects and social and welfare programs. The provision of basic and essential services also remains a national problem. According to Statistics South Africa’s 2012 General Household Survey, 11 percent of households do not have access to electricity, and the public increasingly rates the quality of the electricity supply as poor. Service delivery protests are commonplace in South Africa. The poor quality of public services places additional burdens on CSOs as they are often expected to fill these critical gaps.

As South Africa prepares for national and provincial elections in 2014, political commentators predict that the African National Congress (ANC) will lose at least 5 percent of its support. During 2013, CSOs engaged in voter education and voter registration and began organizing a national approach to election observation.

There is no accurate data on the size and scope of the civil society sector in South Africa due to the lack of coordination among the several government agencies that register CSOs. As of December 2013, the Department of Social Development (DSD) reported that there were 116,215 registered CSOs in South Africa. However, this number does not include the number of non-profit companies registered under Schedule One of the Companies Act. There are also no reliable statistics on the number of public benefit trusts. According to government statistics, only about 20 percent of CSOs registered with DSD are compliant with government regulations, while the rest risk de-registration.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

Several laws impact the CSO sector, including the Trust Act, the Companies Act, the Non-Profit Organizations Act (NPO Act), the Friendly Societies Act, the Income Tax Act, and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act. The sector’s legal framework did not change significantly in 2013.

In 2012, the registration process was slow and arduous, often taking between six and eighteen months to get the relevant government department to approve a CSO’s registration. In 2013, the DSD’s NPO Directorate introduced an online registration facility which has significantly reduced these long processing times. Although a CSO is not legally required to register, an unregistered CSO cannot open a bank account, which can stymie operations. There is little state interference in the internal administration of CSOs, and little evidence of direct state harassment.

Issues of CSO board composition, election procedures, and governance are mired in controversy due to recent guidelines produced by the Gauteng DSD. The guidelines would have given the national DSD overwhelming discretion through a steering committee to determine who should serve on boards and how board members should be selected. Many CSOs rejected the guidelines, viewing them as an attempt to undermine CSOs’ independence.

The Income Tax Act provides tax deductions for both individual and corporate donors under certain conditions. In 2013, the national government established a committee to review the Income Tax Act. This presents a new opportunity for CSOs to obtain increased tax relief, as well as address other questions pertaining to tax law, such as sales taxes and capital gains taxes. CSOs are legally allowed to earn income from the provisions of goods and services.
All law students receive some training on non-profit law and an increasing number of legal practitioners in both primary and secondary cities provide services to the CSO sector. These services are often too expensive for CSOs, although fees can be negotiated.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

CSO organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2013. The sector continues to be diverse. Small organizations, whether in urban or rural areas, are universally disadvantaged due to their poor resource base. Large organizations, on the other hand, benefit from their greater profile and capacity. Rural organizations remain invisible due to their geographical locations.

South African CSOs continue to identify and work with local constituencies to meet their needs. In some areas, CSOs have successfully built and nurtured networks and coalitions. In others, these efforts have been less successful. Reasons for this may include geography, lack of internal organizational resources, ineffective organizational approach, and excessive dependence on international non-profit organizations.

Many CSOs implement strategic planning techniques that are specifically adapted to local communities. CSOs understand that in order to effectively implement their visions, they must have executive boards, directors, and professional staff.

In 2013, CSOs experienced difficulties retaining staff and building organizational capacity as the funding crisis has taken a toll on many organizations. Prospects for long-term employment are in jeopardy, and CSOs continually lose qualified staff to the private and government sectors. In 2013, many CSO staff members also left the country to work for international organizations that offer better compensation. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) does not currently collect statistics on the number of individuals employed in the sector.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.2**

Financial sustainability is a perennial challenge for many CSOs. While there are no current and reliable statistics on funding to the sector, most organizations rely on a combination of international funding, corporate social investment (CSI), individual donations, and income-generation from government-contracted projects.

Diversification of funding sources for South African CSOs decreased in 2013. Nearly twenty years after democracy was introduced in South Africa, foreign donor agencies have drastically downsized funding or withdrawn completely, mainly due to the global recession. In addition, donor attention has been drawn to post-conflict reconstruction projects in North Africa, and donors are reallocating their funding to countries with higher levels of poverty. The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have long provided essential funds for health and other HIV/AIDS-related organizations in South Africa. In 2013, however, PEPFAR funds decreased and negotiations for Round 11 of the Global Fund collapsed completely, so no funding was available. Some of the major foreign donors, such as the Mott Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, and DANIDA, also reduced their funding in 2013, in some cases by as much as 30 percent. In addition, in 2013 the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development announced its plans to end direct aid to South Africa in 2015.
For CSOs that relied on these international donors, the reallocation of global resources has had catastrophic consequences, as demonstrated in 2013 by the sudden and shocking closure of the Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa), an internationally-recognized democracy and human rights advocacy organization. Thus, CSOs increasingly have begun looking toward the South African government and other domestic sources of funding. Local grantmakers have seen grant applications double. The National Lotteries Board (NLB) and the National Development Agency (NDA) also received an increasing number of applications from CSOs in 2013. The NLB provides funds for charity; sports and recreation; arts, culture, and national heritage; and other purposes. The NDA primarily provides funding for capacity building of CSOs. Due to mismanagement and internal fraud, the NDA’s budget has been dramatically reduced in recent years to an estimated 80 million rand per year (about $7.5 million).

The 2013 Trialogue survey of the top 100 South African companies found that these corporations devoted 7.8 billion rand (about $733 million) to CSI in 2013, up from 6.9 billion rand (about $648 million) in 2012. CSI programs in South Africa provide support to public and private sector education (41 percent of expenditures), social and community development (15 percent), health, environment, food security, and agriculture, as well as enterprise development. The most common reason companies cited for giving is because they felt a moral imperative (85 percent), followed by reputation management. Forty-four percent indicated that the driving force behind their CSI expenditures was the Department of Trade and Industries (DTI) economic empowerment codes, a legislative attempt to redress the economic imbalances caused by the apartheid legacy and improve the ownership, management, and staffing of corporations by black and other non-white South Africans. The prevalence of volunteering programs has increased from 46 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2013. High net worth individuals make individual contributions to pet projects in which they have an interest.

Some CSOs continue to provide fee-for-services to individuals and organizations, but struggle to ensure the sustainability of such practices. In recent years, through funding from the International Labor Organization (ILO), some local universities established institutes to advance social enterprise. However, social enterprises have no legal status in South African corporate or tax law and risk heavy penalties if mismanaged.

CSOs are required by law to submit annual financial reports. CSOs registered with DSD must submit them to the NPO Directorate, while NPOs and non-profit companies must submit them to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC). CSOs with less resources, capacity, or experience have poor financial management systems.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

Civil society is a significant partner in South Africa’s development, but its contributions are not widely acknowledged. There is a growing realization that the government cannot achieve its development goals without full participation by both the business and civil society sectors. Various research reports, from both government institutions and CSOs, have reiterated that the sectors must come together and create innovative, community-oriented solutions to South Africa’s problems.

Throughout 2013, a number of CSOs sought to use South Africa’s legal system to advocate for their causes. One notable example is the textbook crisis in Limpopo, which began in 2012 and continued through 2013. The provincial Department of Education failed to deliver textbooks to various schools in both urban and rural areas in a timely manner, causing a teaching delay of nearly six months in 2012. The issue received a great deal of attention from both media personnel and political parties in the country. The court demanded that the textbooks be delivered. A report commissioned by the CSO Section 27 in 2013 on the textbook crisis concludes that this case can serve as a model for further public interest litigation to keep the state accountable.
in realizing economic and social rights. Despite the litigation, in 2013 the Limpopo Department of Education and Section27 enjoyed a collaborative relationship, which was useful in dealing with subsequent issues, such as sanitation in schools.

CSOs ran an important advocacy campaign in the Gauteng province against e-tolls on the highways instituted by the South African National Roads Agency (Sanral). Active citizens decried the decision and resorted to various courts to prevent e-tolls from being introduced. However, the organization championing the cause lost credibility when the largest opposition political party announced that it would provide financial support for the legal action.

More than fifty organizations held a meeting in November 2013 in Johannesburg to establish Awethu (To the People). The primary goal of the organization is to monitor the funding of political parties in the run-up to the national and provincial elections in 2014.

Throughout 2013, several CSOs addressed the issue of corruption in various sectors of the government, including welfare, education, health, and construction, substantiating their claims against specific politicians and government officials. The media supported CSO efforts in this regard.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2**

CSOs continued to provide much-needed services in 2013. Often, CSOs provide water, sanitation, education, or healthcare services to communities when local municipalities are unwilling or unable to provide such facilities. CSOs’ success in providing such services has irked government departments, as they believe CSOs are trying to demonstrate the government’s incompetence and damage its public image. The national government continued to view CSOs as opponents in service provision, rather than as potential partners.

As a result of these dynamics, the relationship between civil society and the national government is quite dysfunctional. The National Planning Commission (NPC), a national office in the presidency formed in 2009, has admitted that relationships across sectors and between citizens and their government are broken and urgently need to be repaired. The government recognizes that intersectoral partnerships are necessary to achieve South Africa’s national vision for 2030 as articulated in the National Development Plan (NDP).

While CSOs have knowledge of the market demand, the beneficiaries of their services are too poor to afford market-based fees. In many instances, government departments now only provide salaries to CSOs and not any of the associated costs. For example, they will provide salaries for teachers at local education facilities but no funds for facility maintenance, food, or other necessary costs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in South Africa did not change in 2013. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers continued to operate in 2013, but these centers are inadequate and the services they provide are not always responsive to CSO needs.

The Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) were established by the government to provide professional career training and capacity to staff in a given sector. However, lack of funding makes it difficult for CSOs to pay
for the technical advancement and professionalization offerings. In addition, the requirements for applying for funding are onerous, particularly for smaller organizations. SETAs remain fragmented, such that a CSO operating in the arts and culture field may need to complete several applications to different, unrelated SETAs before it can obtain federal funds. Appeals to simplify the process have been met with interest, especially now that the SETAs have become the responsibility of the Minister of Higher Education.

CSOs in urban areas share information with one another and participate in networks and coalitions. However, rural CSOs are generally not able to do so.

Throughout 2013, there was much talk of improving intersectoral collaboration on a broad scale, but there were few instances of successful collaboration to date. One success in 2013 was the establishment of the National Education Collaboration Trust (NECT), which enables collaboration among government, business, and civil society in the education field.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

Media attention is linked to the ability of CSOs to market themselves as respectable organizations to be taken seriously by other segments of society, including the government and private sector. While some organizations have highly efficient public relations departments and personnel who draw positive attention to their organizations, many CSOs lack such structures and their overall perception suffers. International CSOs are able to buy prime-time TV slots, publish colorful brochures, and hold conferences to advance their causes, but local CSOs cannot afford to do so.

The visibility of CSOs is often linked to specific events or celebrations. In some instances, CSOs combine their efforts and work together to hold joint events and awareness-raising activities, such as Child Protection Week and Sixteen Days of Activism against Women and Child Abuse.

The public perception of CSOs varies according to the location and service provided by the CSO, but is determined largely by the organizations’ leaders and the media.

The government acknowledges the contributions of CSOs in all major policy documents, but often ignores CSOs when it comes to implementation of such partnerships. Some CSOs are seen as part of the opposition, while others are seen as partners of the ruling party due to personal connections between the leaders.

Business has a mixed attitude towards CSOs, working with them on some occasions and belittling them on others. For example, when CSOs complain of pollution or high drug prices, businesses in the water or pharmaceutical industry disparage them.

There is no clear concept of accountability and transparency in the CSO sector. Some CSOs have made efforts to develop more effective accountability structures, but these efforts generally have received a lukewarm reception from government. There is still no sector-wide code of conduct for the CSO sector.
When South Sudan attained independence from Sudan in 2011, it inherited two-thirds of Sudan’s oil production, while the infrastructure required to export the oil remained in Sudan. In January 2012, South Sudan shut the oil pipelines to Khartoum when the relationship between the two countries deteriorated. The country’s economy struggled until the two countries resolved their differences and oil began to flow again in March 2013. Socioeconomic conditions in South Sudan, however, continued to deteriorate throughout 2013 because of austerity measures introduced during the crisis. The country was thrown into political and ethnic conflict towards the end of the year. Between July and November 2013, dissatisfaction grew in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) under the leadership of Salvar Kiir, the country’s president, with many party members claiming that he was not consulting them in decision making. In response to these grievances, President Kiir removed the disgruntled members, including the vice president and many of the department ministers who were SPLM members. The party split along political and ethnic lines, with the majority of the Politburo members supporting the former vice president, who belongs to the Nuer ethnic group, against President Kiir, who belongs to the Dinka
On December 15, 2013, violent clashes erupted in Juba between Dinka and Nuer members of the Presidential Guard. The violence quickly spread to other parts of South Sudan, and the country ended the year on the verge of civil war.

The ethnic divide between Dinka and Nuer has driven most Dinka- and Nuer-affiliated CSOs—especially those focused on advocacy or activism, like the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS)—to either flee the country or go underground to escape targeting by security operatives. Some CSOs not affiliated with these ethnic groups, like South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Program (SSuDEMOP), also fled for safety. This situation affected advocacy in the sector, rendering CSOs unable to organize the calls for peace needed in the country in 2013. It also undermined the organizational capacities of some CSOs because of displacement of staff and equipment. Other organizations, like Fashoda Youth Organization in Upper Nile State, had their offices destroyed. Financial viability was also affected, as donors adjusted their strategies to address the current crisis, shifting funding from development projects to emergency needs. At the same time, CSOs’ humanitarian assistance efforts during the crisis enhanced their public image.

The political environment became more hostile to CSO operations in 2013. The government now views any CSO focused on accountability as supporting the opposition side of the SPLM. Independent media houses like The Citizen and the Juba Monitor were threatened with closure and told to resubmit their registration credentials, and their staff were subjected to temporary detention due to negative reporting against President Kiir. In this environment, civil society began to self-censor.

In 2013, the number of CSO members of the NGO Forum, a private umbrella body, surpassed 200. However, some CSOs have not been able to obtain membership because they did not meet the criteria, which include having a permanent office, sources of funding, an operational budget, thematic areas of operations, and an organizational structure. Due to armed conflict, the number of active CSOs in the country might have been reduced.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

CSOs continue to be governed by the NGO Act of 2003. Under the NGO Act, CSOs must register at the national level with the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). Each entity levies a fee, making registration expensive. CSOs operating at lower levels must also register at the state and county levels and pay related fees.

CSOs find the operating environment at the state level confusing because state governments have a high degree of autonomy. Each state government has its own constitution and standing orders that must be followed by all entities operating in the territory. These conditions place serious burdens on CSOs, especially those with unreliable sources of funding, because every requirement has financial implications.

CSOs continued to advocate for the Voluntary and Humanitarian Organization (VHO) Bill in 2013. The Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly organized two public hearings on the VHO Bill during the year. At these hearings, CSOs proposed changing the name of the bill to the NGO/CSO Bill to include all CSOs and not just organizations providing humanitarian services. They also argued against a proposed annual registration requirement; provisions imposing exorbitant

![Legal Environment in South Sudan](image-url)
fines on vague grounds; and the composition of the proposed NGO Coordination Board, as it would include the Director General of Internal Security, the Director of the Criminal Investigations Department, and only two CSO representatives. A decision on these proposals was still pending at the end of 2013.

Security agents from the military and National Security Service continue to harass CSOs that criticize the government. Harassment includes menacing phone messages and arbitrary arrests. For example, the editor in-chief of the Juba Monitor was arrested and later released due to government suspicion that the paper supported rebels.

The process for CSOs to receive tax exemptions remained difficult in 2013. Tax exemptions are primarily available for imported goods for health and other humanitarian needs. CSOs submit their applications for exemptions to SSRRC, but final approval is given by the Ministry of Finance, and decisions are highly arbitrary. In one egregious case, a CSO was taxed for importing emergency drugs.

CSOs are allowed to earn income, but it must be reinvested in CSO projects.

The legal field in South Sudan is still developing. General practitioners handle lawsuits and sometimes registration of CSOs, but there are no specialized lawyers trained in CSO law. However, SSLS handles an increasing number of CSO cases.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Most CSOs that deliver services continue to enjoy cordial relationships with the communities they serve. However, CSOs depend on funding from donors to deliver these services, which makes community relationships fragile and dependent on the availability of funding. Since 2012, CSOs that provide services have continued to expand their constituencies at the grassroots level. CSOs involved in activism and advocacy are generally based in the national or state capitals and have looser urban constituencies. Many CSOs operating in areas of conflict had to flee their locales.

The PACT National CSO capacity building project that began in 2012 aimed to target specific areas, including Warrap and Greater Bahr El Ghazal. Violence broke out in these areas in 2013 before the NGO Forum could conduct an evaluation for the project.

CSOs did not make significant progress improving their strategic planning in 2013. CSOs continue to depend on external donors to operate and therefore follow donors’ strategic directions rather than their own mission and vision statements. CSOs generally only receive funding for one year projects since South Sudan is considered a fragile state and therefore in need of short-term emergency response funding. Under this short-term funding, donors do not allocate funds for capacity building. CSOs also lack the resources to seek training in strategic planning.

As was the case in 2012, few CSOs have clearly defined roles and responsibilities for their staff and boards of directors. Furthermore, boards tend to meet infrequently and founders often run daily affairs of the organization instead of empowering the management structures, thereby undermining efficiency and accountability.

CSOs struggle to retain professional staff because of funding uncertainties. Turnover remains high in many CSOs. Many CSOs engage volunteers, who are frequently recent university graduates from neighboring countries.
Compared to 2012, CSOs made significant advances in obtaining office equipment. Many CSOs in urban areas acquired computers and telephones, as well as Internet access through computers or their mobile phones. CSOs in the rural areas are less likely to have these resources, though many that provide services have access to offices and Internet through partnerships with UN agencies. International CSOs are also helping to expand Internet access. For example, Rural Action Against Hunger (RAAH) entered into an agreement with an international CSO to share the cost of Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Financial viability remains challenging for CSOs, though in 2013, more funding was available to CSOs that deliver services. Foreign donors continue to be the main source of funding for CSOs.

In 2013, more CSOs won funding for humanitarian services than in previous years and were able to use the funding to increase staff and other core capacities. For example, thirteen additional CSOs that provide emergency services in different fields received funding from the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs because there were more disaster zones in 2013 due to the violent conflict, floods in six states, and cattle raids. At least five national level CSOs working in health services received funding from CHF (between $189,000 and $300,000), compared to only two in 2012. In total, South Sudan received more funding in 2013 than in 2012 for humanitarian needs. CHF granted $33 million in 2013, while USAID committed about $68 million for humanitarian services in South Sudan. Global Humanitarian Assistance to South Sudan committed $906 million for 2013.

At the same time, increasing political and ethnic tensions in the country shifted funding from development to humanitarian emergencies. The conflict not only created humanitarian needs but impeded the oil business, since the oil fields were in the conflict regions, thereby contributing to the decline in national revenue.

Given the extreme poverty in the country, South Sudanese citizens are generally unable to make financial contributions to CSOs. The culture of volunteerism is also underdeveloped in South Sudan. Local support to CSOs is limited to volunteering by unskilled labor for infrastructure projects, such as building a road to a market or health center after a disaster. Communities in Central Equatoria have more visible volunteerism, having built and maintained their own schools. Support from the diaspora does not typically go to CSOs.

CSOs have not improved the diversification of their funding. CSOs remain dependent on external donor support, and membership fees constitute an insignificant source of funding. However, in Juba, a few CSOs such as the South Sudan Older People Organization (SSOPO), SSLS, RAAH, and the South Sudan Women Association Groups (SSWAG) have diverse sources of funding. Although rare, some CSOs have assets that generate income for project activities. CSOs that received donor funding to provide humanitarian services are not allowed by the donors to charge for their services. Some CSOs have created income-generating services, such as restaurants or catering services and agricultural projects. CSOs generally do not receive contracts from the government or businesses.

CSOs still lack the skills and resources to launch fundraising drives. South Sudanese CSOs were invited to participate in several trainings on fundraising in 2013, organized mostly in Nairobi. In most cases, however, only international CSOs were able to attend because CSOs often could not afford the flights and expenses, even though the trainings themselves were free.

With improved access to donor funding, many CSOs have improved their financial management systems slightly. As a requirement for donor funding, CSOs have to prepare their accounts for internal and external
AUDITS: 4.7

CSOs also produce quarterly, midterm, and annual financial statements and reports for both their boards of directors and donors.

ADVOCACY: 5.0

Civil society continues to face challenges in advocacy, in part because they have only very recently become independent from the government. Before South Sudan gained its independence, CSOs essentially functioned as quasi-independent NGOs (QUANGOs), founded by the government of the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region to advocate for secession. This arrangement fell apart after independence in 2011 when CSOs began criticizing the government and did not engage with it or offer concrete recommendations on issues of accountability. CSOs have not yet created effective platforms to engage with the government for policy change.

Due to the political conflict in 2013, the government grew more hostile to CSOs that criticize the government, and civil society began to self-censor. Shortly after Catholic Radio Good News, a faith-based radio organization, aired commentary critical of the Lakes state authorities’ treatment of prisoners, the Lakes state government ordered its closure for three days, after which key staff were dismissed and the station switched from civic education to mainly music programming. The South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy (SSHURSA) led CSOs in condemning this move, as well as other high-profile incidents of media censorship in 2013, including arrests of the staff of the Juba Monitor following publications critical of public expenditures.

Despite this difficult environment, CSO coalitions advocated for the VHO Bill in 2013. CSOs heavily participated in all public readings of the bill and together pressured the parliament to make amendments. Another important advocacy success, following intense lobbying, was the allocation of three vacancies for CSO representatives on the 2013 National Constitutional Review Commission. CSOs also engaged in discussions with the government on the Media Authority Bill.

After violence broke out in South Sudan’s state capitals in late 2013, CSOs played a key role in calling for peace. Both the CSOs that remained in South Sudan and those that had to flee organized themselves quickly to engage the international community, contacting embassies for conferences and one-on-one meetings to lobby for a cessation of hostilities and to encourage the parties to engage in peace and reconciliation. Several coalitions such as Citizens for Peace and Justice (CPJ) continue to lobby nationally and internationally for a peaceful solution to the current crisis.

Advocacy for legal reform remains a challenge since the sector lacks professionals and lawyers. However, SSLS has developed a program to build the capacity of CSOs for advocacy and lobbying. SSLS’ involvement in the VHO hearings also led to productive dialogue on the bill.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7

In 2013, donor funding shifted to humanitarian services, thereby deteriorating CSO service provision for development-related services, especially in areas not affected by the civil conflict. However, CSOs continued to provide a variety of services in health (including vaccination campaigns on meningitis, malaria, and polio), water, education, and relief.
CSOs provided critical services, such as health care, sanitation, and provision of needed goods in relation to the civil conflict as well as devastating floods. During the last half of December, over one million people were displaced and about 150,000 were in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in conflict-affected areas. The two PoCs in Juba house 70,000 people in extremely limited space. Schools and churches were equally occupied, and the living conditions of the displaced continued to deteriorate. Some CSOs are working hand in hand with international partners to salvage the situation. At the same time, local CSOs are subject to criticism of their capacity from international CSOs that compete for the same sources of funding for humanitarian services.

CSOs and their international partners engage in a variety of interventions based on rapid needs assessments involving the government, CSOs, and community leaders. However, CSOs currently only meet basic needs; therefore constituencies outside the targeted groups do not benefit from CSO goods and services. As services are focused on humanitarian relief, they are provided for free. CSOs that previously had cost recovery policies had difficulty implementing them this year due to the violence, floods, cattle raiding, and influx of displaced persons.

Government recognition of CSOs, especially those that provide services like health, food aid, water, and shelter, increased as a result of CSOs’ response to the crisis at the end of 2013. However, government still views those CSOs that are involved in advocacy and activism as tools to implement foreign agendas.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

There are no significant intermediary support organizations (ISOs) or resource centers for CSOs in South Sudan. The NGO Forum continues to play the role of an ISO to more than 200 CSOs by providing coordination and information. Between 2010 and 2011, Mercy Corps built resource centers in Juba, Wau, Malakal, Lanya, and Torit to provide office space, Internet access, information, and training to CSOs. However, in 2011, Mercy Corps transferred the management of these centers to a Community Advisory Board. Since then, there have been complaints that some members may be exploiting the resource centers, using them as their own organizations and limiting access to other CSOs.

There are no local grantmaking organizations in South Sudan. Some national foundations exist in the state capitals of South Sudan, but they mainly implement their own initiatives.

CSOs have not yet fully embraced the formation of coalitions. In 2011, forty-six CSOs formed the CSO Alliance with support from Justices Africa. At the end of 2013, however, this Alliance was about to collapse due to disagreements on leadership selection, but consultations were ongoing to revive it by conducting fresh elections for new office holders.

There are no specialized CSO trainers in the sector. As in 2012, most trainings are still conducted by international training agencies like International Institute for Rural Reconstruction and RedR through the NGO Forum. Qualified individuals within CSOs could offer basic training in various areas, but CSOs lack confidence in their qualifications, though they are cheaper than international counterparts and better understand local conditions. Organizations like SSWAG, South Sudan Women Engagement Network, SSOPO, and SSLS offer basic training on CSO law. RAAH specializes in CSO matters and food security. The Association of Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) has established a training institute for specialized media personnel. It also trains local journalists on basic journalistic requirements. Because most trainings are conducted by international organizations, locally translated training materials are not available.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the government are rare. Before independence, government and CSOs worked together towards the common goal of a smooth and credible referendum and secession
from the North. But after independence in 2011, the partnership disintegrated, and the government branded CSOs as opposition parties. The increasing political instability in the country and CSOs’ ongoing efforts to hold the government accountable continued to hamper the development of intersectoral partnerships in 2013.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

The media provides free and objective coverage of CSO programs, although CSOs generally have to provide journalists with transportation to and from events. Many media outlets now distinguish between public service announcements (PSAs) and corporate advertising, due to the closer relationship between CSOs and media. Corporate advertising is charged at business rates, while PSAs are aired for discounted rates or for free. Miraya FM, a well-known UN-funded media house, still provides free coverage of non-political programs that benefit the public. Radio stations including Eye-Radio, a private radio station in Juba, offer talk shows on request, but few CSOs are aware of this opportunity.

In 2013, the government threatened media houses with closure and detained their staff for negative reporting about President Kiir. This development has driven media houses to form strong alliances among themselves and with CSOs, especially during discussions of the VHO Bill and Media Bill. At the same time, comments emerging from the newly reshuffled Ministry of Information have driven media houses to self-censor, particularly on negative stories about the government.

Public perception of CSOs is mixed, with some—especially elites—viewing CSO leaders and employees as opportunistic individuals who criticize the government to attract job offers. For example, a well-known civil society critic of the president was silenced when he was offered a job in the president’s office. In general, however, the public acknowledges CSOs’ contributions during the recent years of struggle, considers them as allies, and seeks them for support.

The government, on the other hand, only associates with CSOs because of external pressure. The business community worked with CSOs before independence, but now the business community engages less. However, when a policy may be detrimental to the business community, businesses turn to local CSOs for support, as they are more readily accessible than members of parliament.

Despite being challenged by a lack of professionalism and limited funding, most CSOs try to promote their image as much as possible. Some CSOs, especially service providers, publicize their work to a limited extent because they cannot afford more than half- or quarter-page ads.

In response to demands from donors and local communities, CSOs have recently improved their transparency by supporting joint monitoring efforts of CSO projects. CSOs have teamed up with government line departments and donors to evaluate service provision projects. For example, a local government and community met with RAAH to assess the impact of one of its projects.

CSOs generally produce activity and financial reports for the government, donors, and board members. A prerequisite for registration and renewal is the presentation of annual, quarterly, and mid-year reports, including financial reporting. While the NGO Forum’s CSO Capacity Development Work Group was considering adopting a self-assessment mechanism similar to Uganda’s NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), this project was suspended in 2013 due to the difficult operating environment in the country.
SUDAN

2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Sudan

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**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4**

Sudan, one of the largest African countries, has been plagued by war since its independence from British rule in 1956. The Second Sudanese Civil War ended with a peace agreement in 2005, which led to the 2011 referendum resulting in the secession of South Sudan. However, war continued in Darfur, particularly in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The independence of South Sudan also marked the beginning of a new phase of attacks by the state security organs against CSOs, especially leading organizations on human rights, rule of law, and democratic transformation.

Fighting in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile grew more severe in 2013, pitting the Sudanese army and allied militia groups against the Revolutionary Front (Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Darfur’s armed groups). Several tribal conflicts also erupted in North and South Darfur states in 2013. The intensification of war has resulted in more civilian casualties and mass displacement of the population.

**Country Facts**
- **Capital:** Khartoum
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 34,847,910
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $2,600
- **Human Development Index:** 171
Armed conflict also led to heightened state restrictions on CSOs and aid agencies for operating and providing humanitarian assistance. CSOs depend on international organizations for resources, but these organizations are accused of supporting the rebels and going beyond their relief work to expose human rights violations and atrocities. 

Peace talks between the government and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North, brokered by the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in April 2013, ended in deadlock. The government refused to sign a ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance to affected civilians in order to deny rebel forces an opportunity to rearm and reorganize.

The economy continues to be in crisis due to lost oil revenue from South Sudan’s secession, as well as the heavy cost of war. The government’s severe austerity measures and the war’s inflation of fuel prices increased the prices of all goods, sparking demonstrations by youth groups in all major cities of Sudan in September 2013. According to Amnesty International, over 250 people were killed or injured by the police and state militia, and over 3,000 were detained, hundreds of which were sentenced with fines, lashing, or prison terms.

As a result of the demonstrations, political parties, registered CSOs, and the state recognize the youth groups, some of which operated online for years before becoming involved in the demonstrations.

In response to the demonstrations, the Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC) introduced new measures targeting CSOs, including surprise inspections, some of which resulted in immediate decisions to close down CSOs; a new requirement for CSOs to sign technical agreements with HAC for each project; and a new “investigation” procedure for CSOs seeking to renew registration under the 1996 Cultural Groups Act.

In addition, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and other government entities have cracked down on press freedom by confiscating copies of newspapers, detaining journalists, and threatening the closure of newspapers.

The number of registered CSOs in Sudan is unknown. In 2012, the former HAC director in Khartoum State claimed that this information is a state secret. However, the number of registered groups is estimated to be about 3,000, less than 30 percent of which are active. About 300 are registered under the Cultural Groups Act. Since 2005, there has been a marked increase in the number of CSOs registered outside Khartoum, mainly in response to humanitarian needs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

CSOs in Sudan operate under an extremely restrictive legal environment. CSO registration is governed by several laws and institutions, including the 1996 Cultural Groups Act and the 2006 Act on Regulating Voluntary and Humanitarian Work. The Cultural Groups Registrar at the Ministry of Culture is in charge of cultural groups and mainly functions in Khartoum state. The 2006 Act is implemented by the HAC, which is under the control of the NISS. HAC, the Ministry of Culture, and NISS continue to make decisions on registration, renewal of certifications, and activity permits based on the perceived political affiliation of CSOs. Furthermore, new restrictions on CSO registration and operations were introduced in 2013 in response to the surge of youth demonstrations.

CSOs must renew their registrations annually, and for this purpose, must allow the relevant authority (either HAC or the Ministry of Culture) to attend their annual general assembly meetings, though this requirement is not specified in the law. The CSO must notify the relevant authority of the general assembly meeting one or
two weeks beforehand and provide the signatures, email addresses, and private phone numbers of all board members. For the last thirty years, CSOs were allowed to continue their work even when their general assembly meetings were overdue. However, in 2013, the National Civic Forum’s (NCF) registration was not renewed because some board members were out of the country, delaying the board meeting, and NCF has not been allowed to hold any major events.

Beginning in 2013, all applications for registration or renewal of registration must be examined by security authorities. Previously, this scrutiny was applied only to organizations registered with HAC, but now it also applies to those registered under the Cultural Groups Act, as well as training centers registered with the Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resources Development. For CSOs registered under the Cultural Groups Act, the investigation is done by NISS and takes two or three weeks. Details of the procedure are unknown, but CSOs fear it might be used to monitor or disqualify CSO members.

Also starting in 2013, CSOs registered at the national level must now receive approval from each state where they seek to work, eliminating any benefit to being a national level organization. For example, in 2013 the NCF had to sign an MOU with HAC in Gedarif State in order to observe elections there. No notification or explanation for this policy change was provided to CSOs. CSOs are also now required to sign technical agreements with HAC for each project, a requirement previously applied only to international organizations. The agreements allow HAC to oversee projects and confiscate project assets upon project completion.

In early 2013, word spread that the state classified about fifty organizations as "dangerous to security and inciting the public" and will closely monitor them. The list allegedly includes all active independent CSOs working on human rights, governance, and democratic transformation. To minimize the risk of closure and ensure continuity of operations, more CSOs are registering in other countries like Egypt, Uganda, and Kenya. CSOs previously tried to register as nonprofit companies to avoid government interference, but since 2011 this became more difficult and time consuming. In 2011, the Cabinet of Ministers suspended the Company Act 19/25, thereby allowing registration decisions for non-profit companies by the Cabinet to be completely arbitrary.

In 2013, some offices of international CSOs, including Concordis (UK), the International Republican Institute, and the Carter Center, were forced to close due to government interference or lack of funding. The staff of some international CSOs, including Norwegian Churches Aid and Adventist Development and Relief Agency, were also expelled.

HAC and NISS disallow or otherwise restrict CSO operations in conflict areas, which now constitute over 50 percent of the states. Work on politically sensitive issues like human rights and governance is also curbed. CSO activities are subject to close monitoring, and several activities were stopped by HAC or security authorities. In 2013, the HAC and security forces began conducting surprise inspections of CSO offices, effecting immediate decisions. For example, Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment (KACE) and the Sudanese Studies Center were closed down following surprise inspections. No reasons were given initially for the closure of KACE, but during the trial that followed, HAC claimed that KACE received funding from foreign organizations without government approval, in violation of Article 7 of the 2006 Act, even though Article 7 was suspended in 2006 by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs. The reason cited for closure of the Sudanese Studies Center was “holding an unauthorized meeting.”

Unless an organization is dissolved or banned, decisions by NISS are not typically written or explained, precluding CSOs from taking legal action. In 2013, NISS required the chairperson of Babker Badri Society of Ahfad University to sign an agreement not to undertake work on the constitution. The University of Sharg Alnil was forced to break its affiliation with the Regional Civil Society Studies Center.

Although the law provides CSOs with tax exemptions, CSOs are generally forced to pay taxes, including VAT. The process to obtain refunds on customs duties is lengthy and rarely pursued.
Organizational capacity of CSOs declined somewhat in 2013 due to the worsening economic situation in the country, the heightened restrictions on CSOs, and the withdrawal or expulsion of some international donor organizations. The attacks on the German and US embassies in the summer of 2012 prompted some donors like USAID and the UK Department of International Development to stop or sharply reduce funding to the CSO sector. The attacks also led the government to impose more restrictions on national and international organizations regarding the type and location of activities, as described above.

The withdrawal of international organizations has particularly affected institutional capacity support. CSOs now prefer to maintain a low profile rather than engage in outreach to constituencies, training, or development of their administrative capacities. In addition, national level CSOs are less able to help build the capacity of smaller organizations.

CSOs in Khartoum tend to be larger and have more experience, skills, and access to resources than CSOs in other states. Most CSOs outside Khartoum are village or tribe-based and are mainly engaged in limited service delivery and as intermediaries to communities for international CSOs, UN agencies, and some Khartoum-based national CSOs.

CSOs’ relationships with communities are primarily project-based and limited in duration. Because of this, as well as constraints on civic space, especially in the conflict areas, communities are more likely to be involved with projects than organizations. Development of projects into sustained campaigns is hindered by the lack of financial sustainability of CSOs. New youth groups have the potential to develop wide constituencies because they depend on local resources. For example, in July 2013, youth formed the Nafeer organization in response to the flood crisis in Sudan and raised a significant amount of money from local resources, as well as the Sudanese diaspora.

CSOs increasingly have strategic plans because many donors require them. About 25 percent of CSOs are estimated to have strategic plans. However, many CSOs generate unrealistic strategic plans just to fulfill funding requirements. Other than larger CSOs with relatively stable funding and well-defined missions and strategies, CSOs tailor their priorities, activities, and location of their operations to donor preferences. As a result, it is likely that fewer than 10 percent of CSOs have genuine strategic plans to which they adhere. The political and economic environment in Sudan and CSOs’ lack of reliable funding make planning beyond one year very difficult.

A few organizations have full-time staff, and fewer still have adequate staffing. Most CSOs depend on volunteers, whose opportunities for training are limited to occasions that require mass participation such as elections. CSOs with adequate staffing tend to have executive directors, financial controllers, accountants, and administrators. For CSOs with no full-time staff, board members perform some staff work. Since 2012, several of the larger national CSOs have lost staff either as a result of projects terminating or drops in funding. Other reasons for staff shortages include donors’ short-term, project-based funding; the high cost of permanent staff, including health and other insurance as well as salaries; and the loss of trained staff to international organizations. In addition, HAC interferes in the hiring of staff. All applications must be reviewed by HAC, which greatly influences the short-listing of candidates. In addition, HAC is part of the interview panel and can veto any candidate.

Boards or executive committees, which are voluntary bodies, develop policies and conduct strategic planning. These boards or committees are elected by CSOs’ general assemblies each year, as required by law and in line with a long-standing tradition among Sudanese CSOs.
The vast majority of CSOs have computers and cell phones, and the Internet has facilitated communication throughout the sector. Most large Khartoum–based CSOs have websites, but very few maintain them. Outside Khartoum, technology is limited. Most donors are reluctant to fund equipment. In addition, the technical agreements imposed by HAC on CSOs provide HAC with the right to confiscate all assets linked to a project after the project terminates, thus denying CSOs the opportunity to accumulate assets. Many CSOs therefore do not request heavy equipment such as cars and photocopiers in fear that HAC will confiscate the assets or dissolve their organizations. In 2013, HAC confiscated assets, including personal laptops, from KACE.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Financial viability continues to be a major challenge for CSOs operating in Sudan. The situation was exacerbated in Sudan after the departure of international organizations. CSOs depend heavily on foreign donor support. Local financial resources are non-existent for CSOs that are not pro-government.

Very few private sector institutions—mainly telecommunications companies like ZAIN, SUDANI and MTN—provide funding to CSOs as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. These efforts tend to focus on events, such as sports and concerts, which help them advertise their products. There is a slow but noticeable increase in companies with CSR projects, but these companies do not yet focus on the sustainability of their support. Hajjar Foundation, the philanthropy arm of Hajjar companies, is one of the few companies that support CSOs. In addition, Hajjar Foundation has expanded the types of programs it supports, from education only to other areas.

Most donor funding lasts one year or less and is earmarked for specific activities. Donor support does not include core funding, partly because donors consider Sudan an emergency zone and therefore ineligible for development funding. In addition, donor funding is hampered by the embargo and boycott of Sudan, as well as HAC restrictions on CSOs receiving resources from organizations not registered in Sudan. This restriction was used in 2013 as a pretext to annul the licenses of several organizations, including KACE, which has taken its case to court.

Fundraising remains the weakest aspect of CSO funding. CSOs receive fees and donations from members and receive fees from the public for events like theatrical or musical performances or the sale of donated products. These methods are only effective for generating funds for humanitarian or charitable causes, partly because of the high poverty of the population. For example, CSOs working with cancer patients have successfully raised funds from the public.

CSOs are prohibited by law from investing earned or donor funds. Most independent CSOs do not earn income. Member contributions are nominal.

Government funding to non-affiliated organizations is limited to a microfinance initiative managed by the Bank of Sudan in collaboration with the World Bank. This funding is provided to microfinance CSOs, such as Port Sudan Small Enterprise Program (PASED).

Pro-government groups receive significant financial support from the government, in the form of grants or contracts, and some charity organizations like Sanad, AlShaheed, and Al Zubeir are engaged in heavy investment, mainly in trade and services. These organizations are government-initiated or run by prominent figures in government. For example, Sanad is chaired by the president’s wife. In addition to receiving direct government support and tax exemptions, they also use their government connections to get support from businesses.
In general, CSOs in Sudan have a significant level of financial accountability. CSOs are required to present annual audited accounts to their general assemblies and the authorities. Smaller CSOs with limited resources, especially outside Khartoum, are generally exempt from this requirement, but instead must present financial statements to their general assemblies for approval.

**ADVOCACY: 4.7**

In general, CSOs engage in numerous policy advocacy initiatives, but do not usually achieve their objectives due to the hostile environment in Sudan. Visible campaigns in 2013 focused on sexual harassment and constitution building. During the floods, the Nafeer youth group identified the most affected flood areas, disseminated information, raised funds for humanitarian assistance, and worked in hygiene promotion and health.

Advocacy remains weak for several reasons. The limited civic space discourages innovative ideas and methods. Most advocacy campaigns are short, intermittent, and reactive, and they are not evidence-based. Advocacy is also logistically difficult due to poor transport and limited resources in a large country. Lobbying is still weak, ad hoc, and uncoordinated.

The repressive response by NISS to the demonstrations in September 2013, during which people were detained, made it difficult to rally CSOs in campaigns. Nevertheless, the Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society—an umbrella network of twenty-five organizations formed in 2012 in response to the state’s crackdown on CSOs—led a campaign against repression of CSOs. Some unregistered women’s and youth groups such as NO for Harassment of Women, Grifna, Change Now, and Youth for Change led campaigns for the release of detainees that included sit-ins, online outreach, and statements to the international community and Sudanese living abroad.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2**

In 2013, new youth groups like Nafeer and Sadagat emerged to provide emergency humanitarian aid during the flood crisis. Among independent organizations, CSOs working on service delivery, such as water and health, experience less state pressure compared to those working in governance, human rights, rule of law, or democratic transformation.

While there are geographic, tribal, and ethnic-based CSOs that limit services to their members, most national CSOs provide services according to need and eligibility, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or gender.

CSOs do not earn income through the provision of goods and services. Most CSOs working on credit or microfinance follow a revolving fund approach aimed at expanding their coverage. CSOs consider market demand when designing vocational training and income generation projects.

Government institutions dealing with civil society represent the main impediment to CSOs' development and prevent constructive CSO-government relationships. The state’s differential treatment of CSOs creates division in the sector between pro-government organizations and independent CSOs. Only pro-government groups receive significant financial support from the government, in the form of grants or contracts.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2

The number of CSO resource centers is very limited. In addition to one center registered as a CSO, there are two units in universities. The most significant role in building CSO capacity is played by large CSOs with connections to international networks and thus more access to information, such as NCF, the Sudanese Environmental Society, and the Babiker Badri Society. These groups regularly transfer knowledge and expertise to CSOs outside Khartoum.

Although some charity organizations directly fund projects, such as the digging of wells or building of schools or clinics, none provide funding to independent CSOs.

Very few CSOs, if any, have funding available for training. The only training opportunities available are short, stand-alone workshops in a narrow range of topics. No assessments are done of the local trainers’ capacity or the impact of trainings. Many CSOs have received training from international organizations on peace building, civic education, and constitution building, but lack training in governance, management, and accountability. However, several international organizations that had a strong training component for local CSO partners were expelled from Sudan in 2009, including Oxfam UK, CARE, and the International Rescue Committee. This especially deteriorated the available training in the rural areas, as well as training provided by national CSOs to smaller CSOs.

A number of networks were developed over the years, but have not generated sustained campaigns. The new youth groups like Nafeer and Sadagat have the potential to become sustained movements, as they depend on local resources. However, they are challenged because they are known only for service delivery during the flood crisis. In addition, Nafeer is not registered and could be banned by the authorities.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1

Media coverage of CSO activities remains limited. Most media is controlled by the ruling party and its affiliates, and independent media is heavily censored by security authorities. Television channels and radio stations seldom cover civil society activities, as they are owned by the government or government-affiliated business executives. Newspapers—even pro-government ones—are private and therefore more in touch with public affairs and civil society activities. Outside of Khartoum, more attention is paid to national CSO activities, and coverage is higher when an event is linked to a UN agency. Although media coverage of CSOs was higher after the demonstrations in September, independent newspapers were censored by state security. CSOs thus relied heavily on online and social media.

Public perception of CSOs is positive and improving, especially in rural areas where CSOs provide needed services and represent public concerns. However, in the capital, CSOs are perceived by state authorities with suspicion and antagonism because some CSOs work on human rights, democratic transformation, and transparency. Public recognition and support of CSOs is a threat to the government, so the government even tries to restrict the work of CSOs in service delivery in the rural areas, where the work of CSOs is appreciated. Nevertheless, the CSO sector has gained some recognition, as indicated by statements of political parties and even some government officials calling for the participation of CSOs in national events.

Private sector links with CSOs are weak, especially with CSOs that work on human rights and other sensitive issues, because businesses fear antagonizing the state.
Very few organizations have public relations specialists due to limited resources, expertise, and access to media, as well as the restricted civic space in the country. CSOs maintain low profiles as a protective mechanism against state interference. Public relations are thus built mainly through consultations and meetings organized by embassies or international organizations. However, the use of electronic media has improved enormously, and several e-magazines facilitate information sharing among CSOs. CSOs use online media to debate various issues, spread information about human rights violations, and seek solidarity and support from the Sudanese diaspora and the international community.

All CSOs have constitutions, hold annual general assembly meetings, and present annual and quarterly reports. Larger CSOs present audited accounts each year to their general assemblies. Annual reports are also submitted to the authorities and to donors if requested. There were several attempts among CSOs to draft a code ethics, but none was adopted. Each organization applies its own self-regulatory system.
TANZANIA

2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Tanzania

CSO Sustainability | 4.1
---|---
Legal Environment | 4.4
Organizational Capacity | 4.3
Financial Viability | 4.9
Advocacy | 3.6
Service Provision | 3.4
Infrastructure | 4.3
Public Image | 3.9

Country Facts
- **Capital:** Dar es Salaam
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 48,261,942
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,700
- **Human Development Index:** 152

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.1

Tanzania’s economy grew by approximately 6.9 percent in 2013 due mostly to the expansion of the service industry. Despite overall growth, the gap between the wealthy and poor appears to be expanding. The CSO sector has responded by demanding income redistribution and assurance that foreign and government investments in services and the extractive industries benefit the poor. However, CSOs saw little financial benefit from the expanding economy, as there are no established mechanisms for CSOs to access funds from the government or private sector.

The government increasingly recognizes the role of CSOs in development processes. CSO and government cooperation remains high, particularly in policy engagement at the national level and service delivery at the local level. In 2013, CSOs across the country worked to increase public awareness and engagement in the constitutional review process.

The CSO sector includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), trade
unions, professional associations, media associations, women and youth groups, farmers associations, and societies. The number of CSOs continues to increase, with about 1,000 new CSOs registered in 2013 under various laws. Many different authorities register CSOs, including the Directorate of NGOs of the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, which registers NGOs; the Ministry of Home Affairs, which registers societies; the Registration Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA), which registers trusts; and the Ministry of State President’s Office, Constitution and Good Governance (Zanzibar) which registers NGOs in Zanzibar. According to data from these authorities, the number of registered CSOs was 19,489 in 2013. The number of active CSOs, however, is estimated to be smaller. There are also approximately 400 unregistered groups.

More CSOs are based in large cities and urban areas than in rural areas. Most rural-based CSOs are constrained by limited infrastructure and financial and human resources. Well-established CSOs are generally based in large cities and increasingly focus on serving rural populations. Service delivery, advocacy, and capacity building are among the key activities of CSOs in Tanzania.

Overall CSO sustainability improved in 2013. Organizational capacity progressed due to an increase in capacity building interventions. CSOs continue to rely on funding from local grantmaking organizations, particularly the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS). Public and government perceptions of the sector are increasingly positive, partly due to CSOs’ active engagement in constitutional review processes. There is no significant difference between CSOs in Zanzibar and CSOs in mainland Tanzania with regard to sustainability or capacity.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4**

CSO registration continued to be guided by the same laws and procedures as in 2012. The main statutes under which CSOs can register include the NGO Act (2002); the Societies Act (1954); the Trustees Incorporation Act (1956, as amended in 2002); and the Companies Act (No. 12 2002), which governs companies limited by guarantee. Other relevant acts include the Tanganyika Law Society Act, Cap 307 R.E 2002, which governs the Tanganyika Law Society, the country’s bar association; the National Sports Council of Tanzania Act (1976), which governs sports organizations and clubs; the Co-operative Societies Act (2011), which governs co-operative societies; and the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act (1999), which governs copyright societies; and Society Act Number 6 of 1995, which registers CSOs in Zanzibar. CSOs registered under other laws are required to comply with the NGO Act by acquiring a Certificate of Compliance from the NGO Registrar.

The law clearly stipulates CSOs’ geographical levels of operation and scope of activities. CSOs intending to operate in more than one region must register at the national level, while those intending to operate in more than one district must register at the regional level. Most CBOs are registered at the district level and are not allowed to operate beyond the district in which they are registered. CSOs registered in mainland Tanzania must also register in Zanzibar to legally operate on the island and vice versa.

Under the NGO Act, the Registrar of NGOs may dissolve an NGO if it engages in activities that are not in the public interest, are contrary to law, or are divergent from the NGO’s constitution. As of 2013, the Registrar of NGOs may also dissolve NGOs for failure to submit annual reports. No NGOs were dissolved in 2013.

Although there was no significant state harassment in 2013, the government and law enforcement do not tolerate movements against or debates criticizing government policies. For example, in 2013 a high-level government official stated that the government will not tolerate any NGO that acts against the Tanzania
Constitutional Review Act 2012, which includes a clause that prohibits awareness raising programs contrary to the Act. However, no organization was punished or harassed for that reason in 2013. Some advocacy organizations, like the Tanzania Gender Networking Program, Policy Forum, and Hakielimu opt to register as companies to avoid government harassment or arbitrary dissolution.

The second draft of the constitution, which was released in 2013, enshrines the rights of all citizens to assemble, express, and access information. The current draft also includes sign language as an official language and Braille as an official writing system, which is expected to enhance the engagement of organizations representing persons with disabilities in democratic and development processes.

Grants and endowment funds are not taxed. Revenue earned from the provision of goods and services is taxed unless CSOs apply for tax exemptions, which involves a time consuming and difficult process. Despite this, a wide variety of CSOs continue to engage in income-generating activities. In 2013, the government reduced the VAT rate from 18 percent to 10 percent for NGOs. Those organizations that provide food, medication, and other donations to children and orphanage care centers and schools do not pay VAT at all. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts at all levels.

A number of trained lawyers and legal organizations across the country provide legal advice to CSOs and are familiar with the NGO Act. For example, in 2013 the Legal and Human Rights Center prosecuted a high-level government official who instructed the police to beat up citizens challenging government decisions. However, such legal advice is mostly limited to urban areas.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

CSOs continue to build local constituencies. CSO constitutions clearly stipulate their target groups and beneficiaries. Some CSOs seek to build strong local constituencies to generate income through membership fees and contributions. Members also volunteer for CSOs, especially rural-based ones with limited financial capacities to recruit and retain competent staff. According to the State of CSOs in Tanzania, a report produced by FCS in 2013, 87 percent of CSOs in the country are member-based, a slight increase from 86 percent in 2011. Overall membership in CSOs also increased during the year.

During the year, constituency building improved as various CSOs including organizations of persons with disabilities, professional associations, farmers and fishermen groups, trade unions, and faith-based organizations mobilized their members to comment on the draft constitution and address their respective issues. In addition, Organizational Capacity Assessments facilitated by FCS show improved capacities of CSOs especially in community engagement, external stakeholder relations, governance and management, and institutional capacities.

More CSOs now have strategic plans due to intensive capacity building efforts by FCS and others. CSOs with well-written strategic plans and clear missions are more likely to win funds from diverse local and foreign sources and incorporate strategic planning techniques into their decision making. On the other hand, small CSOs with limited resources are more likely to be influenced by donor priorities.

CSOs demonstrated enhanced accountability, transparency, and good governance following intensive trainings on organizational development provided by FCS and others. Impact assessments of capacity building interventions showed improved managerial and institutional capacities of CSOs, including improved accountability, better understanding of job roles and responsibilities, and greater transparency and information sharing with other stakeholders. More CSOs have clearly defined management structures and division of duties. As a result, internal conflicts have decreased, and service delivery has improved. Many
CSOs have independent boards of directors that oversee organizational performance. For instance, according to the FCS study, 76 percent of CSOs reported having an independent board of directors in 2013, up from 56 percent in 2011. Also, more CSOs had their accounts edited by external audit firms and shared annual reports and financial statements with different stakeholders. Nevertheless, a few organizations—especially small, rural-based organizations with limited financial and human resources—continue to have poor management and governance structures.

With the exception of a few well-established CSOs, recruiting and retaining competent human resources continues to be a challenge for many CSOs due to limited resources. Well-established CSOs engage professionals such as accountants and IT managers and have job contracts, job descriptions, and human resource management manuals. On the other hand, most small CSOs rely on local volunteers, who are sometimes retirees or people without professional expertise in the organization’s area of activity. Such organizations rarely use contracts. Students from higher learning institutions continue to seek internships with CSOs, but it is difficult to retain them in the sector after they graduate.

Many CSOs, especially those based in urban areas, have modern basic office equipment, including updated computers and Internet access. Rural-based CSOs have limited financial capacities and poor access to electricity, preventing them from having computers and Internet access. Increasingly, CSOs with access to Internet facilities—both in urban and rural areas—use social media such as Facebook to promote their work.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

Local sources of funding for CSOs remained limited during the year. There is no clear mechanism for most CSOs to access government grants. Private sector funding to CSOs is largely unexplored, and philanthropy remains underdeveloped. The culture of giving to CSOs or particular causes is underdeveloped in comparison to giving for social events such as weddings and funerals. Local fundraising thus remains minimal.

The level of international donor support did not change significantly in 2013. Compared to the overall size of the sector, few CSOs access grants directly from international donors. CSOs continue to rely mainly on local grantmaking organizations like FCS, which primarily manage basket funds of development partners. A few new grantmaking organizations emerged during the year such as the Legal Service Facility which supports legal projects such as the provision of legal aid, legal empowerment, and the protection of women’s rights. However, the number of CSOs accessing funds from grantmakers other than FCS is small because of their limited capacities to write proposals and manage grants.

Given these challenges, CSOs increasingly consider strategies to diversify their sources of funding. For example, some CSOs are engaged in income-generating activities. Large CSOs provide consulting services and small, rural-based CSOs engage in tree care, flower cultivation, poultry farming, and beekeeping. Member-based CSOs try to solicit funds from members through membership fees and contributions, but the amounts are small.

The financial management capacity of CSOs improved during the year due to capacity building interventions and ongoing support, including the development and implementation of financial management manuals. According to FCS, 38 percent of CSOs had their financial statements audited in 2013, roughly the same as in 2011 (37 percent). Impact assessments show that capacity building interventions have improved financial management systems, policies, procedures, staff compliance, maintenance of accounts, and preparation of financial reports. CSOs increasingly prepare annual reports and statements and disseminate them widely, in
part because annual reports are legally required. In 2013, the Registrar of NGOs stated that NGOs that fail to submit annual reports will be dissolved. However, no NGO was dissolved during the year.

**ADVOCACY: 3.6**

Cooperation between CSOs and government at both the local and national levels continued to improve in 2013. At the national level, CSOs and government increasingly cooperated on policy and other strategic issues. CSOs also work with the parliament and government committees. The national government continues to recognize CSOs as important actors in development processes and government policies, plans, and strategies. For instance, the government engaged CSOs in the development of oil and gas policy. In Zanzibar, the executive level of government and House of Representatives worked closely with CSOs within the Local Government Reform program and on development of the Local Government Reform Act.

The government welcomed CSO recommendations during the review of the Constitutional Act during the year. FCS provided support to more than 252 CSOs across the country to organize constitutional fora to review and provide recommendations on the draft constitution’s content. Other CSOs also organized constitutional fora. As a result, the second draft constitution included many provisions recommended by CSOs. CSOs also implemented awareness programs on the content and process of the new constitution using radio and television programs and social media.

CSOs increasingly cooperate with government officials to track local government expenditures. In 2013, more CSOs engaged in Public Expenditure Tracking and used such reports to advocate for better use of public funds, improving the use of public funds and the quality of services at the local level.

In order to fight corruption, CSOs implemented a number of projects aimed at enhancing governance and accountability at different levels. For instance, a number of CSOs promoted a policy to provide access to free medical services to the elderly. CSOs also worked with the government to raise public awareness about ethical issues involving local-level civil servants. Other CSOs develop corruption-related surveys and use such findings to advocate for change.

CSOs increasingly come together to form thematic networks. In 2012, several organizations formed the Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania (Tanzania Constitutional Platform) to monitor constitutional review processes. The platform has been successful in raising public awareness on the process and, along with other stakeholders, advocated for amendments to the Constitutional Review Act that ensure a people-centered process for drafting the new constitution. In addition, several organizations formed the People with Disabilities Consortium to advocate for the constitution to address the rights of people with disabilities. As a result, the draft constitution officially recognized Braille and sign language as official languages and addressed other issues concerning people with disabilities such as access to information, right to assembly, and right to public participation and decision making. The draft constitution also provides for representation of persons with disabilities in the National Assembly.

The CSO community recognizes the need for a supportive legal and regulatory framework for the civil society sector. Besides work on the constitutional review process, there were no concrete efforts to lobby for legal reforms to promote local philanthropy or other measures that would improve the legal framework for CSOs in 2013.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSO products and services, as well as their target groups, are diverse. CSOs continue to provide a variety of services, including legal counsel, provision of medicine, psychological counseling, education, social and economic empowerment, promotion of good governance and accountability, and environmental protection, among others. In addition, several institutions focus on developing the organizational and technical capacities of CSOs.

While a few CSOs implement projects reflecting donor priorities just to access funds, most services provided by CSOs reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents determined through baseline surveys, community needs assessments, government plans and strategies, and the experience of local CSOs. Many CSOs address the needs of marginalized groups. These efforts have had significant results. For example, a number of street children have been reunited with their families, while drug users have been provided with rehabilitation programs. CSOs have provided orphans with access to education and the elderly with access to medical services. CSO interventions, as well as efforts of the government and other actors, have also reduced the stigma towards people with HIV/AIDS.

Some CSOs actively sell self-made goods, services, and publications to other CSOs and stakeholders, using the revenue to support the organization. However, most CSO services are provided for free as beneficiaries are typically unable to pay for services.

The government at all levels continues to recognize CSO efforts in the provision and monitoring of public services. The government contracts CSOs to implement special projects, such as public expenditure tracking and promotion of good governance and accountability.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

The number of intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers in Tanzania remains relatively low, unable to meet the needs of the growing CSO sector. In most cases, these organizations are found in urban areas.

FCS is a prominent source of information and resources for CSOs. Like most CSOs, FCS relies heavily on donor funding. It facilitates linkages between CSOs and other development actors and provides training, technical assistance, and access to technology, such as assisting CSOs in developing their websites. CSOs across the country use the FCS mailing list to share information. FCS continues to facilitate information sharing in the sector by organizing national events like CSO exhibitions and annual forums. FCS also continues to support geographical and thematic networks to facilitate collaboration among CSOs in those areas.

Other capacity building institutions, such as the Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE) and OD Training and Facilitation Center (TRACE), also provide technical support to CSOs. In addition, a number of thematic and geographical networks continue to serve as resource centers for member organizations. Research institutes such as Policy Research for Development (REPOA) also serve as resource centers for CSOs.

All local grantmaking organizations are donor funded and re-grant international donor funds to address locally identified projects.
The National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) is charged with the responsibility of coordination and self-regulation of NGOs operating in Tanzania.

Several training institutions such as TACOSODE, TRACE, Ubunifu Associates, and MS Training Center for Development Cooperation (MS-TCDC) are based in large cities and provide capacity building on topics including project management, financial management, organizational development, policy analysis, and fundraising. Training materials are translated into Swahili. While trainings are designed to address specific capacity gaps constraining the sector, demand remains high. Most CSOs that attend such trainings are financially supported by grantmaking and capacity building institutions such as FCS and the Legal Service Facility.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the government, particularly those focused on service provision, are increasing. The government recognizes the importance of CSOs in development processes, and CSOs recognize the importance and advantages of forging strong partnerships with media to promote development priorities and stimulate further dialogue. In 2013, Agriculture Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) worked with media and government on issues related to agricultural advancement. Partnership with the private sector remains unexplored.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9

CSOs continued to enjoy positive media coverage, mainly at the national level and especially on issues related to the constitutional review process. The public’s understanding and support of CSO initiatives are on the rise, as demonstrated by increased public participation in CSO events and activities. In addition, CSOs’ involvement in the constitutional review process improved CSOs’ public image.

The government perception of CSOs is positive at both the national and local levels, although there is occasional tension between CSOs and local government authorities on transparency and accountability issues. Business perception of CSOs is positive, although the business sector has yet to explore potential partnerships with CSOs.

Financial constraints limit the ability of CSOs to promote their activities. CSOs typically must pay for media coverage, which they cannot afford. Well-established CSOs remain better positioned to access media coverage and pay the costs of coverage. CSOs with access to Internet facilities—both in rural and urban areas—use platforms such as FCS’s mailing list to promote their activities and share information online.

There has been a sector-wide CSO code of ethics since 2008. However, few CSOs are aware of the document or have adopted it, and its enforcement is still weak. All CSOs are legally obligated to submit annual reports to their respective registry offices. Large CSOs publish annual reports. Small CSOs are less likely to publish reports or publicize their work because of limited financial capacities.
CSOs in Uganda continue to provide valuable social, political, and economic contributions, including as strategic partners to the government in the delivery of services. During 2013, political tension, especially in Kampala, arose from disagreements between politicians in the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and those from opposition political parties. There were also serious disagreements between the government and legislature on issues such as the passage of the Public Order Management Bill, appointment of an army officer to the cabinet, and the reappointment of a retired judge as head of the judiciary. The process of amending the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Act and implementation of the NGO Policy, launched in 2012, were stalled during the year.

While the relationship between the NGO Registration Board and the CSO sector remained relatively positive, tensions arose during the year due to the appointment of a new Minister of Internal Affairs, who made numerous attacks and derogatory statements about CSOs. As a result, CSOs were concerned about state plans to amend the 2006 NGO Act. The financial viability of the CSO sector remained vulnerable due to continued reliance on donors, especially the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a multi-donor fund that
supports state and non-state partners to strengthen democratization, access to justice, and accountability in Uganda.

CSOs engaged on critical national issues during the year, leading to improvement in advocacy. Anti-corruption initiatives targeting government continued to be civil society’s advocacy focus in 2013. CSOs were involved in assessing the performance of the NRM government two and a half years after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2011. In addition, CSOs demanded electoral reform and were involved in the formulation of the National Civic Education Policy to prepare citizens for 2016 general elections.

According to the NGO Registration Board, despite impediments in the registration process, the number of registered NGOs increased from 10,000 in 2012 to 12,456 in 2013. This growth is attributed in part to citizens’ interest in starting organizations to create jobs, in view of shrinking opportunities in the government and private sector. In 2013, the NGO Registration Board ordered all registered NGOs to update their files at the registry to ensure accurate statistics. There is a strong belief that civil society is significantly larger than what the NGO Board’s figures indicate, as there are many unregistered CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and self-help groups in operation, especially in rural areas. However, data remains poor, and there are no reliable statistics on the number of operating organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

In 2012, the government launched a new NGO Policy that calls for amending the NGO Act. The Act was last amended in 2006 and supplemented with regulations in 2009. By the end of 2013, the government had not yet amended the Act or allocated adequate funds to the NGO Registration Board to implement the NGO Policy. However, during the year, the NGO Registration Board disseminated the NGO Policy in twenty-three districts, which also improved Resident District Commissioners’ understanding of CSO regulations and oversight.

The NGO Act and the 2009 regulations still contain several restrictive provisions that many CSO leaders consider contrary to the constitution which guarantees the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. For example, clause 3(d) of the Act outlines a cumbersome registration process. Once registered, an NGO must also seek permission from the local police or security agencies to operate in a given locality. Registration is particularly burdensome for village-based CSOs, as it is difficult to receive permission to work in rural areas. The NGO Act continued to provide the government the power to de-register CSOs perceived to be working against the government, such as CSOs engaged in advocacy in the oil and gas sector. Though no CSOs were de-registered in 2013, many organizations received warnings.

The Public Order Management Act signed into law in September 2013 provides for the regulation of public meetings. The Public Order Management Act has been criticized for violating international and regional human rights law and restricting freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly.

State harassment of CSOs engaged in advocacy persisted. More than thirty-two CSO activists in the ongoing Black Monday anti-corruption campaign were arrested under the Public Order Management Act, but were released quickly on bail because the Act’s legality was questioned in court. In addition, many CSOs working
on oil and gas policy in the Bunyoro region were intimidated and harassed. The executive director of the Lira NGO Forum was arrested many times for advocating for improved accountability.

CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions on revenue from grants, endowments, and economic activities, but these exemptions are difficult to access. Small CSOs are particularly burdened since they have limited funding and cannot afford to pay taxes. The Employment Act in Uganda also provides tax exemptions to organizations employing at least five staff with disabilities, but the process for accessing these exemptions is also prohibitively cumbersome. Furthermore, many CSOs are unaware of these exemptions.

CSOs are permitted to charge for goods or services they provide, but only to recover the costs of providing them. CSOs are allowed to bid for government contracts. In 2013, however, CSOs perceived that the districts did not contract with them due to fear that the CSOs would scrutinize the district contracts as part of their anti-corruption agenda. CSOs can also bid for international contracts. For example, the Uganda National NGO Forum won a contract from the UN Development Program (UNDP) to carry out a CSO capacity needs assessment.

There are no courses in Uganda on NGO law, and there are not enough legal professionals specialized in non-profit law. As a result, CSOs often struggle to find legal representation when they face state harassment and intimidation. CSOs sometimes receive pro bono representation.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

CSO organizational capacity continued to be a challenge in 2013. Most CSOs still do not sufficiently separate the roles of board members and managers, and experience internal organizational conflicts. For example, at the Uganda Functional Literacy and Resource Center in Kanungu District, members and founders argued over whether to sell some assets and how to allocate the proceeds. According to a capacity assessment survey conducted by the Uganda National NGO Forum in 2013, the members of most CSO board of directors lack leadership skills and do not understand their roles and responsibilities.

In 2013, the majority of CSOs had well-defined strategic plans that stated their mission, vision, and objectives. CSOs establish such plans in order to attract funding from donors, especially DGF and the Civil Society Capacity Building Fund, which provide support to CSOs to implement their strategic plans. However, most CSOs develop strategic plans based on the funding available rather than their strategic directions.

CSOs continued to build constituencies by mobilizing grassroots support for advocacy movements. The Citizen Manifesto Amplified (CMA) movement returned to public view in 2013. CMA is an expanded initiative to advance the Citizen Manifesto, a package of citizen demands to candidates for elected positions in Uganda. Furthermore, the Movement for Political Accountability transformed the Black Monday Movement into a sustained platform for citizens to demand accountability from the government. In addition, CSOs have built constituencies through mass mobilization and the creation of platforms such as the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform; Call UGANDA, a campaign against the Public Order Management Bill; and campaigns for quality public education and CSO development effectiveness.

In 2013, a few additional CSOs implemented the NGO Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure the quality of institutions and programs, but the National QuAM Council did not certify them, leaving the total number of certified CSOs stagnant at fifty-two. The rate of certification was slow in part because of the complexity of the process, which involves self-assessment and verification by the National QuAM Committee. The stagnation may also indicate that few CSOs were confident enough in their internal systems to undergo external audits.
The CSO sector continues to rely on volunteers, contract professionals, and part-time staff whose pay is often below their market rate. CSOs continued to face problems retaining highly skilled staff due to the irregular nature of funding and their ability to offer only short-term contracts. In addition, CSOs are not traditionally known as employers, but rather as voluntary associations. In 2013, the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the NGO Registration Board reviewed guidelines for CSOs that hire expatriate staff, and the National Social Security Fund began a review of contributions by expatriate staff of CSOs.

All CSOs have offices with basic equipment, such as mobile telephones, computers, and furniture, though electricity and Internet access are less accessible in the rural areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1**

The financial viability of the CSO sector remained precarious.

Most CSOs rely on grants to function, and CSOs continued to struggle to secure grants. Most donors in Uganda have formed basket funding mechanisms, decreasing the number of funding competitions available to CSOs. Funding consortiums such as DGF and the Independent Development Fund, as well as funds from the European Union, are therefore very competitive. CSOs often join larger consortiums to apply for these funds. However, the lead CSO in these arrangements typically struggles to manage the project and therefore often delays issuing sub-grants. CSOs working at the local level do not have the capacity to write funding proposals.

Domestic corporate philanthropy in Uganda remains limited, though there are sub-grant programs in health and education. Local support from individuals and companies is weak because of difficult economic conditions and the low incomes of Ugandans. Faith-based organizations are more viable and receive more support from their members.

Some CSOs earn income through consultancies or from their assets, such as renting out conference space. Other CSOs such as the Human Rights Center and the Uganda Law Society collect membership fees, but those fees account for less than five percent of the organizations’ annual income. The government sometimes sub-grants to CSOs for service delivery, but this is rare and grants do not include institutional support.

Many CSOs that have received support from donors have well-developed financial systems. Those CSOs are relatively stable, which allows them to attract new donors and diversify their funding sources. However, most CSOs in Uganda do not have sound financial management systems. This is particularly true for small organizations because they cannot afford expert accountants or financial managers.

**ADVOCACY: 3.6**

CSO advocacy improved moderately in 2013. Collaboration between the government and civil society is regulated by official frameworks with clear and structured guidelines. CSOs are members of sectoral committees in the government, such as the CSO-Parliamentary interface and a platform for monitoring accountability, and have signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with local governments in several districts. Government officials at all levels consult with CSOs on policy decisions, and CSOs
have helped to monitor the implementation of the National Development Plan and district development plans.

CSOs saw the 2013 passage of the Public Order Management Act and the Anti-Homosexuality Act. The latter supported the prohibition of homosexual acts and frames homosexuality as a threat to freedom of expression, assembly, and association.

CSOs working in governance and service delivery increasingly collaborate with local governments and the central government to pursue common interests. Civil society and the NGO Registration Board worked together to disseminate the NGO Policy in twenty-three districts. Several meetings were held between CSOs and the National Assembly in fifteen districts of the Western and West Nile regions to foster good parliamentary practice at the district level. As a result of these meetings, an MOU was formed between CSOs and the National Assembly to strengthen their dialogue. At the local level, consultations with the national parliament continue to provide a platform for citizen engagement.

The Return our Money Campaign continued in 2013, demanding the government to end impunity and punish all government officials implicated in corruption and theft. CSOs also continued to advocate for electoral reforms and the restoration of presidential term limits as Uganda moves towards the 2016 general elections. In the area of social and political accountability, the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment and the Uganda Local Government Association worked on the local government scorecard, and the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform worked on the Citizen Manifesto and Leadership charters.

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In some cases, CSO advocacy led to concrete changes in government policy. As a result of the Black Monday Movement, in 2013 the Ministry of Finance undertook tremendous reform in financial management. In addition, CSO advocacy led the President’s office to establish a special program to develop the Karamoja region.

While CSOs functioning on the national level continued to lead advocacy and lobbying activities, smaller grassroots organizations showed some improvement in their advocacy capacities. For example, grassroots CSOs, led by larger advocacy groups at the national level, addressed corruption. The anti-corruption caravan, a mobile team of CSOs, traversed the entire northern region of Uganda to mobilize communities against corruption.

CSOs increased their lobbying efforts in 2013. At the national level, CSOs are represented in sector working groups (SWGs) set up by the government ministries. CSOs have also established special lobbying groups to influence specific agendas. For example, the CSO Coalition of Oil and Gas, a CSO lobbying group seeking transparency and accountability in the oil and gas industry is attempting to influence the formulation of the Oil Revenue Policy and the institutional framework for the nascent oil sector in the country. However, these initiatives have had little impact because of the lack of transparency and public participation in the legal and policy making processes in the country.

CSOs continued to lobby the government not to implement laws such as the Public Order Management Act, which would have an adverse impact on the enabling environment for CSOs and dramatically affect the right to freedom of association in Uganda. Apart from the most established CSOs based in the capital and regional cities, however, CSOs do not appreciate how the regulatory framework affects their work.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

CSOs are often formed to meet the needs of the communities they serve and are generally responsive to those needs. CSOs use participatory development approaches, such as participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), as well as participatory governance, planning, and budgeting techniques.

Before independence in 1962, most CSOs were faith-based and provided services in education, health, spiritual guidance, and social development, but did not work on core advocacy issues of governance,
democracy, and accountability. CSOs have historically been, and continue to be, core partners with the government in delivering essential services. However, the quality of service provision has declined over time as CSOs focused more on advocacy, work that has often led to clashes with government.

CSOs often step in to provide services where the government is financially and logistically constrained. For example, in the Moroto district in northeast Uganda, service delivery by CSOs accounts for about 60 percent of the local council’s budget. In 2012, government officials in the Office of the Prime Minister embezzled massive amounts of money intended for services for northern and eastern Uganda. In 2013, this continued to affect service delivery at the local level. Funding transfers from the national government to the districts remained slow, also in part due to declines in donor funding to the government, leading many districts to fail to deliver essential services in health, education, and other areas. For example, sub-grants declined to CSOs to deliver education, health, and water in Karamoja, one of the least developed regions of Uganda.

Apart from local self-help organizations, CSOs generally serve the wider public, not just their members. For example, CSOs share publications and annual reports with academia, churches, government, and the public. However, producing these publications can be prohibitively costly. CSOs also struggle to recover the costs of the basic services they deliver. Most CSOs find it difficult to charge poor communities fees for services. Instead, CSOs rely on grants to cover the costs of these services. However, there are exceptions. For example, CSOs that provide health care often charge for their services.

The government increasingly recognizes the contributions of CSOs, especially as citizen demand for better services from government grows and the government faces dwindling resources. The government continues to acknowledge the contribution of CSOs in service delivery, especially in hard-to-reach areas such as Karamoja. The government also contracts CSOs to implement programs such as the Peace, Recovery, and Development Program and the Karamoja Integrated Program.

INFRASRTUCTURE: 4.6

CSO infrastructure did not change significantly in 2013, though unreliable Internet access and electricity made it difficult for CSOs in the rural areas to access online resources, such as reference materials and platforms for e-training and e-advocacy.

Forums and networks such as the Uganda National NGO Forum, the Think Tank Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives, the Uganda Women’s Network, and other coalitions working on issues such as the environment, oil sector transparency, and youth continued to operate at similar levels as in the previous year. Many networks, consortiums, and partnerships within the civil society sector work together on grassroots advocacy campaigns. Most of the national CSO networks include both NGOs and grassroots CBOs as members, leading to vibrant linkages between urban and rural organizations.

Apart from the most established CSOs in the capital city, most CSOs are unable to receive essential technical assistance or even access relevant resources, which are generally provided in hardcopy by districts networks and forums. Donors are also reluctant to support CSO resource initiatives in rural areas. While there are problems with electricity and Internet coverage in the rural areas, there is already a high level of online information sharing, particularly among youth organizations and among women’s organizations.
In 2013, over 2,400 staff members from more than 500 CSOs and over 5,000 other stakeholders attended the third National Civil Society Fair, which allowed CSOs to showcase their projects and innovations, share information and ideas, and network.

The Support Program for Advocacy Networks, a national program hosted by the Uganda National NGO Forum and funded by DGF, continued to provide sub-grants to CSOs in 2013. The program continued to support four regional advocacy networks and thirty-five district networks that provide training and support mechanisms to CSOs. Some CSOs also provide training to government agencies and institutions such as schools and hospitals. Many international CSOs such as Action Aid International, CARE International, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, World Vision, and the Aga Khan Foundation provide sub-grants to smaller organizations to implement development projects.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

The sector’s public image did not change significantly in 2013, despite CSOs receiving extensive media coverage for their high profile involvement in national issues such as the NRM performance audit; the Black Monday Movement; debates over the Citizen Manifesto; the Public Order Management Bill; oil revenue policy; and advocacy at the local level, such as the local governance scorecard initiative. As a result of the massive Return our Money campaign, corruption was widely covered by print media, radio talk shows, and television, generating national and sub-national debates and discussions on corruption in Uganda.

The National Civil Society Fair of 2013 also led to greater media coverage and improved the profile of CSOs. CSOs are also getting exposure by participating in TV and radio talk shows. On average, major radio stations in the eastern and western parts of the country program eight hours per week of talk shows on issues of governance and democracy, at no cost to featured CSOs. Uwezo, a CSO-led East African initiative that assesses education, continued to attract tremendous media attention. However, aside from high profile issues like the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, the media often ignores CSO activity in favor of stories it considers more newsworthy, and generally only covers the work of well-connected CSOs. Because holding press conferences can be costly, CSOs often pool their resources to hold joint press conferences on key issues.

Public perceptions of CSOs improved in 2013. In general, CSOs are highly regarded in the communities where they work, and relations between CSOs and the government are generally good. The NGO Registration Board and many local governments have positive working relationships with CSOs. However, some government officials believe that CSOs undermine the government, particularly by engaging in advocacy. Sometimes the government also tries to take credit for CSO services by claiming that government policies enable this work. Businesses, by contrast, regard CSOs as unprofessional, and relations between the two sectors remained cold in 2013. This is exacerbated by the fact that CSOs provide free-of-charge some services for which businesses would have charged.

CSOs continued to make gradual progress in self-regulation. CSOs continue to have a positive view of the QuAM, though they are slow to undertake the process. The National QuAM Council is still operating, although it has not been able to reach the districts. While the rollout of QuAM, which was launched eight years ago, was slow in 2013, hundreds of CSOs are in the process of completing certification and will be trained in 2014. In addition, the majority of national CSOs have continued to adopt individual codes of conduct that guide their operations. The formation of the Civil Society Accountability Platform in 2009 helped focus and coordinate accountability efforts, as well as the active participation of CSOs in the post-Busan Civil Society Development Effectiveness agenda.
ZAMBIA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

In 2013, the ruling party in Zambia—the Patriotic Front (PF)—became increasingly intolerant of divergent political views. During the year, the government selectively applied the Public Order Act (No. 38 of 1955), last amended in 1996, which establishes restrictive rules for public gatherings. CSOs were harassed for “unlawful assembling” and were denied police permits to hold public meetings on constitutional reform. At the end of 2011, the newly elected President Michael Sata appointed a technical committee to begin the constitutional reform process and promised to deliver a new constitution within his first ninety days of office. The technical committee finalized its work in 2013, but the government made no further effort to adopt the new constitution. Instead it announced that Zambia would continue operating under the current constitution. This has angered many citizens, resulting in demands for a roadmap that would lead to enacting the new constitution.

Though the PF’s platform for the 2011 elections included a promise to amend the contentious NGO Act of 2009, once in power it implemented the Act without amendment and increased pressure on CSOs to register...
under the Act. This concerned many CSOs, especially those focused on advocacy. Many CSOs refused to register under the Act.

Though CSOs faced a difficult and unstable political climate, they continued their advocacy work, especially on key policy issues such as constitutional reform. In part because of pressure from the government, many CSOs invested in building relationships with grassroots constituencies to support and legitimize their advocacy work. CSOs also formed a number of coalitions to advocate on issues including access to information, constitutional reform, tax compliance, and education.

Most CSOs rely on funding from foreign donors, and several major donors stopped working in Zambia in 2013. The level of funding also varied depending on the type of activities in which CSOs are involved. For example, the funding available to CSOs working on advocacy declined compared to funding for service delivery. Despite this, CSOs expanded their activities in several areas including social protection and poverty reduction.

Media coverage of CSO activities increased, especially at the local level through community radio stations. However, public perceptions of CSOs were mixed: while some citizens continue to hold CSOs in high regard and look to them for leadership, others felt CSOs had compromised themselves by working with the PF during the 2011 elections.

There is a lack of data on the number of CSOs in the country. Based on a 2012 mapping exercise conducted by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health (MCDMCH), there are just 442 registered NGOs in Zambia. Community-based organizations (CBOs), cooperatives, community clubs, and faith-based organizations (FBOs) were not included in this exercise because they do not fall within the definition of NGO provided in the NGO Act of 2009. According to the Zambia Council for Civil Society Development (ZCSD), there were more than 10,000 CSOs registered with the Registrar of Societies in 2003. A more recent estimate is not available.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

The legal environment governing CSOs worsened in 2013, as the government increased pressure on CSOs to register under the NGO Act, even if they were already registered under the Societies Act of 1974 through the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA). Registration under the Societies Act is easy and inexpensive and has clear steps which enable an organization to register in one week. It also allows CSOs to operate freely. CSOs have refused to register under the NGO Act and continued to call for the Act to be reviewed, arguing that it only serves to police them, rather than facilitating freedom of association as guaranteed by the current constitution.

The NGO Act contains several restrictive clauses. For instance, it provides that the NGO Registration Board, which is comprised mainly of government officials, determines the geographical area in which a CSO can work. It can also reject a CSO’s thematic area of activity. The Board can cancel the registration certificates of CSOs that operate beyond the permitted areas.

The government developed a roadmap for reviewing the NGO Act, but the review has been delayed and the roadmap has not yet been made public. CSOs are also not confident that their concerns will be taken into consideration even if the review proceeds.
During the year, the government put pressure on advocacy CSOs both indirectly and directly—particularly by issuing press releases with threats to deregister CSOs that contravene the Public Order Act or fail to register under the NGO Act. The Ministry of Health refused to provide letters of endorsement to CSOs that were not registered under the NGO Act, thus preventing them from implementing activities in the health field. The government also called CSO leaders directly to threaten to deregister their organizations. Faith-based CSOs were also subject to government pressure.

The police openly disregarded CSOs’ freedom of assembly by selectively applying the Public Order Act to target CSOs that were critical of the government. Organizations such as Action Aid Zambia, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), and the Southern Africa Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) were summoned by the police for holding public meetings on the constitutional reform process and warned that they would be arrested for future violations. Furthermore, social media websites that were critical of the government, such as the Zambian Watchdog, were shut down. However, there were no instances of police brutality during 2013.

CSOs generally pay Value-Added Tax (VAT), income tax, Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax, withholding tax, and taxes on employee salaries, wages, and benefits. In 2013, the government withdrew the Statutory Instrument (SI) 103, which provided CSOs with tax exemptions on capital goods, such as motor vehicles.

Existing legislation allows CSOs to earn income from several sources including income generating activities, consultancy services, and fees charged for goods and services. CSOs had more opportunities to compete for government contracts at the local level than the national level, as local governments are more organized and closer to the people. For example, many community-based organizations (CBOs) won contracts from the government to clear roads.

A few lawyers in Zambia are familiar with the CSO law, but they rarely take cases on a pro bono basis. Legal fees in Zambia remain high, so CSOs typically cannot afford to engage lawyers to challenge the government when their rights are infringed. Furthermore, most well-trained lawyers are concentrated in developed areas such as the Copperbelt and Lusaka province, whereas only paralegal services are available in rural areas.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2**

In 2013, both local and national CSOs invested in building relationships with grassroots constituencies to support and legitimize their advocacy work. Many national and local CSOs actively built constituencies and involved local populations in the constitutional reform process through a series of conferences held at the district level. To a lesser extent, CSOs at all levels also mobilized citizens to repudiate the NGO Act. Beyond these two issues, CSOs formed numerous coalitions that helped build local support amid an increasingly hostile political climate.

Most national and larger CSOs have strategic plans, both because donors require them for funding and because CSOs have increasingly embraced the utility of these plans. However, as potential funders constantly change their focus, CSOs struggle to adhere to their plans. CSOs have also needed to adapt to the rapid changes in the political context. For example, organizations that had not incorporated constitutional reform as part of their strategic plans found themselves engaging in this process when donors started to prioritize such work.

Larger CSOs, which generally operate at the national level, continued to operate with defined administrative structures including boards of directors and secretariats. However, boards typically play more of an advisory role than an executive role. Due to the threat of the NGO Act, in 2013 some national and local CSOs took steps to clarify roles between their boards of directors and management and invested in building their
institutional capacities, particularly for resource mobilization. These CSOs aimed to show the government that CSOs can regulate themselves without government monitoring. As a result, internal governance improved, though resource mobilization has not yet demonstrated progress.

More established CSOs have operational procedures, such as staff policies and formal contracts with terms of reference. Though some large and well-established CSOs are able to attract quality staff, they often struggle to retain professional staff. Many professional staff leave the CSO sector for jobs in the government or with the private sector. CSOs also frequently engage volunteers.

Smaller CSOs rarely have strategic plans, as they lack the money to engage experts to help them develop plans. Those that do have strategic plans find it difficult to operationalize them. These organizations and CBOs also do not have defined governance and management structures. Because of a lack of funding, smaller CSOs and CBOs also find it impossible to attract and retain professional staff. Therefore, members often serve as staff as well.

Almost all CSOs at the national level have sufficient, modern office equipment. At the sub-national level, CSOs continue to make progress in accessing technology. Most CSOs use mobile phones and email to communicate, which has been aided in part by the reduction in the cost of Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

The level of donor funding for advocacy organizations plummeted in 2013. Advocacy organizations were more likely to criticize the NGO Act and refuse to register under it. Because the government threatened to deregister CSOs that did not register under the NGO Act, donors avoided funding these CSOs for fear that their funds would be lost if their grantees were deregistered. In addition, major donors such as the governments of Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands stopped working in Zambia because of global funding cuts. On the other hand, funding for service delivery rose in 2013, especially for food security and nutrition, water and sanitation, and agriculture, areas which were not receiving attention from government.

In 2013, local foundations and corporations became concerned that any efforts to finance CSOs that are critical of the government may be perceived as financing “regime change.” As such, most local funders sponsored churches and service delivery CSOs rather than advocacy or other controversial activities. Resources also dwindled for membership-based CSOs compared to professional associations with higher membership fees. Some CSOs attempted to raise revenue from the corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs of global firms such as China Henan, but this continues to be a rare practice. CSR is also slowly spreading among Zambian companies. While initially only banks had CSR programs, the concept has now spread to telecommunications, mining, and road construction companies.

Very few CSOs have their own sources of revenue. However, a few organizations such as the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) and Non-Governmental Organization Coordinating Council (NGOCC) own real estate and earn income by charging rent.

Other CSOs such as Caritas have government contracts to provide services. Some CSOs work with the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) and a few CBOs have government contracts to clear roads and to conduct HIV/AIDS sensitization work.

Though CSOs do not typically publish their financial reports, reports are normally available on request. CSOs also submit annual reports, including audited financial reports, to the Registrar of Societies and PACRA.
ADVOCACY: 3.7

Despite the decrease in funding for advocacy in 2013 and the difficult legal environment, the scope and scale of CSO advocacy increased during the year, as CSOs decided to pool resources and work together. This trend enabled the development of new ideas and innovative approaches for joint campaigns and advocacy on key policy issues such as constitutional reform and signaled an unprecedented change in the way CSOs worked.

Most government officials maintained communication with CSOs in 2013. At the national level, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) held a Poverty Indaba (gathering), which was attended by the Minister and Permanent Secretary of Finance, the Secretary to the Treasury, and other government officials. This meeting culminated in an agreement between the government and CSOs on an action plan for tackling poverty. However, other platforms for CSO-government dialogue, such as the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs)—multi-stakeholder working groups monitoring government interventions in particular fields—remained haphazard, and meetings were not always held as required. Frequent changes in staff, particularly the controlling officers, in key ministries also made it difficult for CSOs to engage with the government at the national level.

Implementation of the decentralization policy, which was revised in 2013, created opportunities for collaboration between CSOs and local government administrators. In some cases, local governments signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with CSOs to support the policy’s implementation.

CSOs engaged in several important advocacy campaigns in 2013 focused on issues including constitutional reform, the NGO Act, poverty reduction, and the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The CDF campaign led to the modernization of the parliamentary constituency office and increased public participation in decision-making processes. Other initiatives that influenced the policy process focused on access to information, tax compliance, the extractive industries, and gender-based violence (GBV). The GBV campaign was noted to have made Zambian women, children, and vulnerable groups at the local and national levels more assertive on GBV issues and proactive in reporting cases of violence.

Most CSOs view lobbying as an important advocacy tool, and CSOs engaged in lobbying in several cases in 2013. In response to the increased hostility of the government regarding advocacy on the constitution and the NGO Act, CSOs made more effort to have direct dialogue with the government rather than publicly confronting the government through the media. CSOs thus worked together on a national campaign in 2013 to amend the NGO Act, lobbying local representatives and members of parliament on the implications of the Act. The government was receptive to this direct communication, especially early in the year. NGOCC also used the Oasis Forum—a coalition of the Law Association of Zambia, Zambia’s three main Christian organizations, and leading women’s organizations—to lobby for the constitution to include minimum standards for gender equality in parliament and economic opportunity.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4

CSOs work in all fields and provide diverse services. A mapping exercise conducted from 2012 to 2013 by MCDMCH found that the most common areas of CSO services are agriculture, education, health, economic development, HIV/AIDS, human rights, empowerment, governance, gender, disability, environment, and trade.
The majority of CSOs at the local and national levels expanded their services in 2013 for three main reasons. First, funding for service delivery projects increased in 2013, especially in the areas of hunger and nutrition, water and sanitation, and agriculture. Some CSOs expanded their work to these areas. Second, CSO services now reach most parts of the country due to the government’s 8000 Link Project, which greatly improved the country’s road network in 2012 and 2013. Third, the continuing decrease in the cost of Internet access and mobile communications has led to innovative initiatives. For example, a CSO in one of the provincial capitals is using SMS to provide information to pregnant women to reduce maternal mortality.

Most services respond to community needs. For instance, CBOs consulted with local communities on the design of a malaria control program. To a large extent, CSOs share their products with the wider public. However, there is still a weak link between CSOs and academia.

While CSOs are aware of the costs involved in delivering goods and services, they typically are unable to charge market value. The CSO sector in Zambia works in a context of widespread poverty. Beneficiaries often cannot afford to pay fees and feel entitled to receive the goods and services CSOs provide free of charge.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs, especially in delivering basic services such as health, education, agricultural development, water, and sanitation, and provides CSOs with grants and contracts. For example, MCDMCH contracts CSOs like Micro Bankers Trust and Program Against Malnutrition to deliver social cash transfers.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

There are only a few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers that provide capacity building services to CSOs at local or national levels, but these organizations are responsive to the needs of the country’s CSOs. The Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF) and the Civil Society Environmental Fund (CSEF) continue to be the lead ISOs providing capacity development assistance, training and operation manuals, and technical assistance. In addition, a new center called the Zambia Civil Society Center provides training services, facilitates networking, and informs CSOs about funding opportunities. It also assists CSOs in staff recruitment, procurement of equipment, access to conference space, and research needs. It has a fully equipped business center that provides Internet, printing, photocopying, and binding services.

Several organizations provide sub-grants to local CSOs. For example, NGOCC provides sub-grants to CSOs with funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). The Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ), ZGF, Zambia Prevention Care and Treatment (ZPCT) II, and CSEF also provide sub-grants to CSOs.

In response to the government’s increasing pressure on CSOs, there was more networking in the sector in 2013. For example, various small networks that had formed to spearhead constitutional reform decided to work together, thereby forming the Grand Coalition on the Constitution. Various coordination bodies enable CSOs to share information among their members or with other CSOs working in a particular field or issue. Several organizations—including CSPR, NGOCC, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), and the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR)—have made efforts to share information. In addition, several coalitions or multi-stakeholder platforms—such as the Grand Coalition on the Constitution, the Mining with Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the National Aids Council (NAC), the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative, and the Access to Justice under Paralegal Alliance Network (PAN)—facilitate CSO information sharing. At the subnational level, there are several coalitions against GBV.
Zambian trainers engaged by ISOs provide assistance in several areas related to empowerment including economic literacy, financial management, and the development of governance systems. These trainings are increasingly available at the local level. However, specialized training in areas such as strategic management and resource mobilization are usually accessible only to national level CSOs, as few trainers have such expertise and local CSOs cannot afford the costs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

CSOs’ public image improved in 2013. During the year, public and private media covered CSOs’ advocacy activities around the constitutional reform process. Community radio stations became more receptive to CSOs but found themselves threatened with closure. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Service was removed from his post, in a move that many believe demonstrates the government’s interference in the operations of private media. Many suspect that he was removed because he issued a nationwide broadcasting license to a private media firm, which would have increased CSOs’ access to media coverage.

Government harassment of the CSO sector in 2013 led many in the public to be more sympathetic to CSOs because they were seen as trying to address issues of general concern. At the same time, there are still some negative perceptions of CSOs in urban areas, as some people believe that CSOs campaigned for the PF in the 2011 elections. However, at the local level, the public typically appreciates the role CSOs play in empowering communities through a rights-based approach to development.

Government and business entities had mixed perceptions of CSOs depending on the context and issues involved. For example, both government and private sector actors were very reluctant to engage with CSOs on the issue of constitutional reform. On the other hand, the Ministry of Commerce and Trade established a national steering committee comprised of private sector representatives and some national CSOs focused on an Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) to strengthen Zambia’s production and trade.

Most CSOs endeavored to publicize their work and many have communications strategies, but at times the channels CSOs choose to communicate their strategies do not effectively relay their messages.

A code of conduct for CSOs was drafted in 2012, but the sector’s focus in 2013 was on the implementation of the NGO Act, with which CSOs have refused to comply. However, CSOs improved their transparency and governance in the wake of the NGO Act and have their own organizational codes of conduct. In addition, CSOs already comply with obligations under PACRA and the Societies Act to submit annual reports and demonstrate that they have functioning governance systems.
ZIMBABWE

Country Facts
Capital: Harare
Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy
Population: 13,182,908
GDP per capita (PPP): $600
Human Development Index: 172

Two important political processes took place in Zimbabwe during 2013: the constitutional referendum and the general election, referred to as the harmonized election. The constitutional referendum in March led to the adoption of a new constitution that includes greater protection for human rights. The election in July put an end to the Inclusive Government (IG) between the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The incumbent President Robert Mugabe was re-elected, while the ZANU-PF won an overwhelming majority in the House of Assembly, exceeding the two-thirds majority required to make constitutional amendments. The members of the Assembly and Senate were sworn in for the new parliamentary term in September 2013.

Prior to the election, ZANU-PF and the government continued to restrict the operating space of civil society. At its Thirteenth Annual National People’s Conference in December 2012, ZANU-PF resolved to “ensure that Government enforces de-registration of errant NGOs deviating from their mandate.” In the run-up to the election, ZANU-PF orchestrated a campaign to harass and intimidate civil society, which included the arrests of several civil society activists, raids of organizations, and confiscation of equipment. Although
harassment decreased after the election, it remained a problem throughout the year. In particular, organizations working on LGBT issues often fell victim to government repression in line with the president’s anti-gay rhetoric.

Despite these challenges, civil society remains relatively strong and played a key role in advocating for the new constitution and peaceful elections. Civil society worked with the government in the constitution-making process, raising awareness in communities and lobbying policymakers on both the process and content of the constitution. For the elections, CSOs encouraged first-time voters to register and vote and promoted peaceful elections. CSOs also advocated delaying the election date to allow more time to prepare for the elections and institute reforms.

With the exception of security forces, CSO engagements with government in 2013 were largely encouraging. For example, various ministries and arms of the government like the Zimbabwe Elections Commission (ZEC) engaged with CSOs around the elections. However, this level of engagement might not continue under the ZANU–PF which has been responsible for the harassment of CSOs.

Approximately 5,000 CSOs are registered in Zimbabwe, either as trusts under the Ministry of Justice or as private voluntary organizations (PVOs) under the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

CSOs in Zimbabwe can register either as trusts or as PVOs. It is easier to register as a trust than a PVO, but registration as a PVO provides certain benefits, including tax exemptions, waivers on import duties, and the possibility of earning income through the provision of goods and services. Registration as a PVO is cumbersome, particularly if an organization’s mission is deemed to be against the interests of the government. As a result, most organizations choose to register as trusts.

The legal environment for CSOs in Zimbabwe is difficult, and the election in 2013 exacerbated an already difficult situation. The government’s continued use of repressive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Miscellaneous Offences Act, the Criminal (Codification and Reform) Act, the PVO Act, and the Electoral Act greatly undermined CSO sustainability. State harassment of CSOs was particularly rampant in the run-up to the election, continuing at a lesser rate following elections.

Several organizations were targeted by the police in the run-up to the election. The ERC was charged with contravening the Electoral Act by allegedly conducting voter education without the approval of the ZEC. Two human rights defenders from the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) spent time in custody on politically-motivated charges. Both activists and ZimRights were acquitted in June 2013 when the state’s case was closed. The Zimbabwe Peace Project, Counselling Services Unit, Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), and Radio Dialogue were also targets of police harassment during the year.

The governor of Masvingo Province, who banned twenty-nine organizations from working in the province in 2012, also continued to restrict CSO operations in 2013. Some organizations have since moved from Masvingo to the Midlands Province where the environment is less restrictive.
The adoption of a new constitution for Zimbabwe, which guarantees the freedom of assembly and association and does not require police notification to organize public events, presented opportunities to change the legal and operating environment for CSOs. By the end of 2013, however, laws had not been aligned with the new constitution, thus delaying the realization of some of the gains in the new constitution.

The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) provides legal assistance and advice to both CSOs and individuals. ZLHR is knowledgeable about CSO law and has a network of lawyers throughout the country.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

CSO organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2013, despite the fact that most CSOs are focused on building their organizational capacities, and many intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and donors have established programs to support organizational development and strategic planning, especially after the elections.

CSOs have been able to carve out strategic niches for their programming both in terms of geographic focus and issues. Various organizations have carried out initiatives to build constituencies for their work. For example, ZimRights mobilized more than 100,000 new members in the year 2013. The perception that CSOs support the opposition made it difficult for civil society to build constituencies in some areas.

Most organizations have defined missions and visions to which they adhere. However, due to funding constraints, some organizations divert from their core mandates or adopt broad mandates in order to pursue resources from donors to remain viable.

The majority of CSOs, including community-based organizations (CBOs) and others in rural areas, have boards of advisors that determine organizational policies while secretariat members, often led by the director or coordinator, preside over day-to-day operations. Most boards operate in an open and transparent manner.

CSOs are able to attract qualified personnel, and most CSOs have paid staff although contracts are renewed on an annual basis or according to the length of particular projects. However, some CSOs have lost their leaders to international and regional CSOs, and to a lesser extent, political parties. In addition, many civil society activists have benefitted from scholarship and fellowship programs abroad. Some organizations have a pool of volunteers to help with the implementation of projects. More established organizations engage IT experts, auditing firms, and lawyers when they require their professional services.

Most organizations in urban areas have the necessary equipment for their work, including computers, cameras, and vehicles. CSOs have been able to keep up with current trends, including using social media to mobilize their constituents and supply them with information. Smaller CBOs in rural areas lag behind in technology, as some areas have neither electricity nor Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Most Zimbabwean CSOs are funded by international donors directly or indirectly through ISOs. Most organizations have multiple donors from diverse sources ranging from small Western foundations to larger agencies such as USAID, the World Bank, UNDP, and the EU. Funding for organizations working on democracy and governance issues decreased after the harmonized election, leading them to scale down their activities and staff.
Advocacy in Zimbabwe

Some organizations have begun exploring the possibility of engaging companies as financial supporters or partners, mainly in advocacy campaigns around health issues and the environment. Organizations working on democracy, governance, and human rights issues find it very difficult to attract support from the corporate world because of the government’s attitude towards CSOs working on these issues. Some organizations registered as PVOs get support from the government, but this support is limited due to the government’s lack of funds.

Communities support civil society activities by volunteering and providing other in-kind support such as free labor and use of premises. Civil society does not benefit from any systematic support from local sources of philanthropy. Some organizations earn income from business activities. For example, ZLHR continues to operate a conference center that other civic groups can rent for trainings and conferences, and Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ) continues to offer consultancy services on organizational development and capacity building.

Larger organizations tend to have financial management systems in place. Some smaller organizations that lack established financial systems benefit from sub-granting arrangements with larger organizations that have such systems, allowing them to better manage the funds. Most donors require their grantees to undergo annual organizational or project specific audits. Most organizations do not make these audits public for fear that the government would use information about their levels of funding to tarnish their reputation through the state media.

ADVOCACY: 4.3

CSOs had increased communication and cooperation with some branches of government that are not directly linked to the security apparatus in 2013. Cooperation was especially strong during the last stages of the constitution-making process and after the elections because the government wanted to show its commitment to reform. For example, the government cooperated with humanitarian relief organizations to address the food shortage in some parts of the country. In addition, a group of CSOs worked in partnership with the Human Rights Commission to organize the International Human Rights Day commemorations.

CSOs carried out many advocacy initiatives around constitutional reform and the elections in 2013. Civil society maintained a close working relationship with the Select Committee of Parliament on the New Constitution (COPAC) and advocated for a constitution that guarantees more rights and freedoms. After the constitution was passed, civil society actively called for the alignment of laws to the new constitution. However, laws had not yet been aligned with the constitution by the end of 2013. In advance of the election, the XIG campaign encouraged young people to become registered voters, while the Peace in My Hood campaign promoted peace around the election. Both campaigns were successful, as the election achieved great voter turn-out and was relatively peaceful. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network deployed election observers throughout the country for both the constitutional referendum and the harmonized election.

At the same time, state harassment of CSOs had a negative impact on advocacy during the year. Some CSOs were denied permission to carry out activities, while others were arrested while carrying out legitimate work. Civil society was somewhat disoriented after the unexpected results of the harmonized elections. Eventually, many organizations embarked on strategic planning processes to redefine their roles and remain relevant.
CSO coalitions tackle a wide range of issues including elections (Zimbabwe Election Support Network), governance (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition), women’s issues (Women’s Coalition), and human rights (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum). These coalitions have been able to carry out awareness raising activities in communities, as well as high-profile lobbying and advocacy with policy-makers at local and regional levels. In 2013, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition lobbied policymakers at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which promotes socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among its fifteen member states. The coalition lobbyed specifically on the need for reforms in media, the security sector, and access to information before the next election in Zimbabwe. As a result, SADC affirmed the need for these reforms and even encouraged delaying the election date to introduce them. Nonetheless, the elections were held without delay.

CSOs are aware of how restrictive legislation hampers their advocacy and lobbying work. Reforming the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), POSA, and other legislation constraining CSOs remains a priority for civil society, but the government has been reluctant to cooperate on reforms. In 2013, CSOs sought legal reform in this area by working on the new constitution. In addition, CSOs organized coordinated campaigns against restrictive laws regarding the operation of CSOs, freedom of assembly and association, and access to information. For example, the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA-Zimbabwe) has been at the forefront of advocating for a change of media laws while ZLHR used litigation to challenge POSA.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

CSOs in Zimbabwe provide services throughout the country in a broad range of areas, including health, education, humanitarian assistance, agriculture, environment, human rights, and governance.

Generally speaking, CSO services are highly responsive to the issues affecting their beneficiaries. Organizations that work within communities have been able to train their constituencies on a broad range of issues. For example, the Combined Harare Residents Association has provided training on participatory budgeting, and MISA organizes programs on community journalism.

CSOs distribute a number of publications to their constituencies. Kubatana’s online newsletter provides information relevant to civil society to its 45,000 subscribers. ZLHR produces 50,000 copies of The Legal Monitor, which covers current legal and human rights issues on a weekly basis. Organizations have started engaging in evidence-based programming, and other stakeholders such as media and academia have found the research findings to be useful. For example, the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) carried out research related to the election results while the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition produced the Transitional Barometer Series, a publication that tracked government compliance with the Global Political Agreement.

Very few organizations charge fees to recover the costs of their services. CSOs rarely conduct research about the market demand for products or the capacity of beneficiaries to pay.

The government recognizes the role of civil society in development, but due to politics and the government’s stance towards Western nations, it does not publicly acknowledge this role. Organizations working on service provision are better received than those working on advocacy. Various ministries call on CSOs to support citizens, primarily in the areas of health, education, and humanitarian assistance. The government does not provide direct support to these organizations, but approaches international partners such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for support. By these means, larger international organizations operating in Zimbabwe have been awarded tenders to help the government implement programs focused on food assistance, tuberculosis control, and HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

ISOs help build the capacity of CSOs and encourage CSOs to work together. A number of resource centers, including the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), Zimbabwe Women Resource Center and Network, and the Media Center, provide CSOs and the public with access to information, Internet, and legal advice. However, ISOs are only available in the major cities, making it difficult for CBOs in rural areas to access their services. ISOs derive some revenue from administering grants on behalf of international donors. Some ISOs also charge fees for capacity building trainings.

Some organizations sub-grant international donor funds to smaller organizations that have the potential for impact but lack the financial and organizational systems needed to attract foreign funding directly. For example, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT) provides sub-grants to youth organizations to carry out various advocacy initiatives.

Donors and ISOs have provided some training in project management, results-based management, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy techniques. The trainings generally meet the needs of CSOs. Although the trainings are not in local languages, the majority of people working in civil society, particularly in urban areas, are comfortable working in English. After the harmonized election in July, donors provided support to organizations so that they could re-strategize in light of the changing political context and unexpected election results.

Coalitions and other informal platforms coordinate civil society activities. CSOs are generally aware of the benefits of forming coalitions, networks, and consortiums in fundraising and implementing activities. CSOs have mechanisms for sharing information such as social media and websites.

A few organizations have been able to form partnerships with businesses. For example, With Love Foundation, a CSO that runs a soup kitchen to support the needy, has partnerships with business entities. Advocacy organizations find it difficult to get support from the business sector. There is some awareness of the value of public-private partnerships, but the political environment is not conducive for state cooperation with advocacy organizations. The media is more likely to be supportive of civil society initiatives.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

Civil society in Zimbabwe received a range of coverage by the state media and independent media houses in 2013. State media houses provided little coverage to civil society or its initiatives, and the limited coverage was usually negative. ZANU-PF, which controls the state media houses, labeled the opposition and CSOs as Western agents and used the state media to discredit civil society, seriously undermining civil society’s image, especially among people with limited access to independent media. CSOs that provide services, however, were spared from attacks by state media. Private media provides positive coverage of civil society, its activities, and achievements. The so-called “pirate” radio stations—Voice of the People, SW Radio Africa, and Voice of America’s (VOA) Studio 7— which broadcast in Zimbabwe without licenses, also provide positive coverage and space to civil society.

Star FM and Zi FM, two radio stations licensed in 2012, provided greater coverage of CSO activities in 2013. CSOs have more access to these stations than the stations owned by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting
Cooperation (ZBC). Most organizations were able to place advertisements and run paid public affairs programs on these stations on issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence, and voting. These radio stations have broad reach, especially in urban areas. The independence of these stations, however, is questionable. Star FM is owned by ZimPapers, the publisher of state-owned newspapers, while Zi FM is owned by a senior official in ZANU-PF. The stations’ editorial policies as reflected in the news and other unpaid programs demonstrate how they are not independent or open to civil society viewpoints.

Many CSOs have established productive relationships with journalists. Some CSOs even employ journalists, providing them with entry points to the media and creating opportunities for the media to know more about the work of civil society. CSOs also invite the media to cover and participate in their events. Civil society groups often hold joint press conferences where they issue joint statements on key issues. CSOs also produce materials—including mosquito nets, t-shirts, caps, umbrellas, and cups—to support their advocacy issues and create brand recognition.

The public has mixed perceptions of CSOs, depending on the dominant political leanings in a given locale. The public views CSOs working on service provision more positively than CSOs working on advocacy, especially in rural areas, where ZANU-PF enjoys considerable support. People in urban areas are generally aware of CSOs and appreciative of their work. The role of CSOs in the constitution-making process greatly improved civil society’s public image, especially following public recognition by the parliamentary committee responsible for the constitution-making process. However in some areas, especially rural areas, people tend to believe that CSOs are pursuing a “regime change agenda.” The state’s increased harassment of CSOs after the election, however, might have altered this perception.

Businesses seem indifferent to civil society. They do not support civil society initiatives for fear of reprisal from the government, but they also do not interfere with CSOs’ work since CSOs are some of their customers. With the exception of ZANU-PF, political parties view civil society as critical allies in the struggle for democracy and respect for human rights.

Civil society adopted a code of ethics in 2004, but it is not widely known. CSOs try to demonstrate transparency and accountability by publishing annual reports. However, CSOs may not make all financial information public for fear that ZANU-PF will use it for propaganda purposes.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

I. OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector’s performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, the Aga Khan Foundation and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the category of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the implementing partner and local expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s score recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

II. DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs’ effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.

Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector’s ability to engage in constituency building and strategic
planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.

**Financial Viability**

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

**Advocacy**

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs' record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

**Service Provision**

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

**Infrastructure**

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary to provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

**Public Image**

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs' ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media's coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs' public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.

**III. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER**

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index.
1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts.

Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. The panel may include representatives from the USAID Mission, but they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores. They are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

- local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary civil society support organizations (ISOs);
- local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business, or media;
- think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users groups;
- international donors who support civil society and CSOs;
- and other local partners.

It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. To the extent possible, panelists should be representative of women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise.

The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

It is recommended to distribute the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it may be useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners chose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The project team is very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. It would appreciate implementers recording and
submitting any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool to MSI and USAID.

3. **Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.**

4. **At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the CSOSI should be scored according to evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events.**

The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every rating awarded should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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5. **Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description.**

For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

6. **Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.**

Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

7. **Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, DC.**

The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may request adjustments in scores and/or additional justification to support scores.

8. **Prepare a draft country report.**
The report should cover the calendar year. The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief
discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The
section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that
dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an
overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to MSI to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that the
process relies on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as the
project does not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts and their organizational affiliation who served on the panel with the report.
This will be for our reference only and will not be made public.

While the individual country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write
longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. In addition, the
project will introduce a public launch event or electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) to promote
the release of the report in implementers’ countries.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to MSI.

The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding
questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content.

9. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and draft country reports,
and will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer.

The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in
the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. Further description of the EC is included in the
following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.” If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are
not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other
countries in the region, the EC may request that the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country
comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC,
as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID
representative chairs the EC.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As a final step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an
Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC. This committee is chaired
by a USAID Civil Society Advisor and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included
experts from the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of
Excellence for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), USAID Africa Bureau,
USAID/Office of Development Partners and Private and Voluntary Cooperation (ODP/PVC), and USAID
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes a
representative from the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are
adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score. A compelling narrative
demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one
or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a large number of CSOs with
strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification
for an elevated Financial Viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs have the ability to raise

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funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual category of CSO sector development. Finally, and most importantly, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores.

All final scores are discussed with drafting CSOs. USAID/Washington has the final say on all scores.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare their scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be fewer differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes an adequate explanation for a score will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

Step 1: Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

<table>
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<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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Step 2: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

Step 3: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.

Step 4: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For

Definition of CSO:
Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 5: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion.

**SCORING SCALE:**

The *CSO Sustainability Index* uses a seven-point scale to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector’s sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector’s sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector’s sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.

For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look” below.

**VI. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS**

The following section is the worksheet that members of the Expert Panel use to keep track of the scores they propose for each indicator of each dimension. Each panel member should rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

- **REGISTRATION.** Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

- **OPERATION.** Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

- **ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT.** Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

- **LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.** Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

- **TAXATION.** Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

- **EARNED INCOME.** Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

- **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.** Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

- **STRATEGIC PLANNING.** Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

- **INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.** Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?

- **CSO STAFFING.** Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

- **TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT.** Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

FINANCIAL VIABILITY
• **LOCAL SUPPORT:** Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

• **DIVERSIFICATION:** Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

• **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:** Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

• **FUNDRAISING:** Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

• **EARNED INCOME:** Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

### ADVOCACY

• **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.** Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

• **POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES.** Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOBBYING EFFORTS.** Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM.** Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?

### SERVICE PROVISION

• **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water, or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

• **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

• **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such
as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government?

- **COST RECOVERY.** When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

- **GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.** Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

- **INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.** Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

- **LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS.** Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

- **CSO COALITIONS.** Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

- **TRAINING.** Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

- **INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.** Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

- **MEDIA COVERAGE.** Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

- **PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?
• **GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOs.** Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

• **PUBLIC RELATIONS.** Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

• **SELF-REGULATION.** Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

**VII. RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK**

The following section goes into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and categories are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic categories: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced category, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving category corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded category, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are
widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. In this category, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

**ADVOCACY**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs in this development category will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive
branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries in this category have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.
**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' forum are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** This category is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental," "nonprofit," or “civil society,” including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
### ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

#### 2013 CSO SUSTAINABILITY SCORES

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