The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Bureau for the Middle East
Office of Middle East Programs
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Project Managers
Management Systems International, Inc.
  Allison Poyac-Clarkin
  Alex Nejadian
  Vanessa Coulomb

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
  Catherine Shea
  Jennifer Stuart
  Margaret-Ann Scotti

Editorial Committee
USAID: Mariam Afrasiabi, Charles Kiamie III, Summer Lopez, Sajda Ouachtouki, Amira Taha
MSI: Allison Poyac-Clarkin
ICNL: Kristen McGeeney, Cathy Shea
Regional Expert (Consultant): Hania Aswad
INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the third edition of the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa, which covers events in calendar year 2013. This report relies on local capacity and expertise to assess key components of the sustainability of the civil society organization (CSO) sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza.

The Index employs the broad definition of a CSO developed by the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) at Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Civil Society Studies. Under this definition CSOs are defined as:

“any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

The CSO Sustainability Index highlights both advances and setbacks in CSO sector sustainability, and it strives to allow for comparisons across countries and sub-regions over time. The report is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability of the CSO sector.

The Index’s methodology is qualitative and relies on the local expertise of CSO practitioners and experts to apply a standardized instrument in order to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of CSO sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. An editorial committee comprising technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s report with the aim of maintaining standards of quality and promoting cross-country comparability. For the first time, the 2013 Index reports scores for the dimensions of sustainability on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Previous versions of the Index only reported the three overarching categories that scores fall into: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. More detail about the methodology and scoring system used to rate each dimension is provided in Annex A.

Readers should note that this publication focuses on the situation on the ground in 2013. USAID notes that developments in the seven countries covered by this report continue to be turbulent and the situation in many of them is dramatically different now than it was in 2013.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals. Specific acknowledgements of the CSO implementers responsible for the Index appear on page ii. We would further like to express our deepest gratitude to all of the local CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert group panels in each country. Their knowledge, research, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this CSO Sustainability Index is based.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa evaluates the strength and viability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.

The Middle East and North Africa continued to be a turbulent region in 2013. Several places experienced political instability during the year. In Egypt, widespread public protests were followed by the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013; military leaders then appointed an interim government. Morocco experienced an eight-month political stalemate after the Istiqlal Party left the coalition government. In the West Bank and Gaza, relations between the two main Palestinian political parties—Fatah and Hamas—continued to be tense, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) endured intense political and financial pressures and continued to risk criticism for resuming stalled peace talks with Israel. The transition government in Yemen, which assumed power at the beginning of 2012, remained fragile during the year. Meanwhile, there were continued calls for political reform in Jordan.

Security also continued to be an issue throughout the region. In Iraq, the security situation deteriorated significantly in 2013, as terrorist attacks grew in frequency. In Yemen, political violence by militant groups including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to be an issue during the year. The civil war and resulting humanitarian crisis in Syria, which is not covered by the CSO Sustainability Index, also had a spillover effect in the countries covered in this publication, with Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon all accepting large numbers of refugees.

The seven countries and territories covered by the CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa also continued to struggle economically. Many deal with high rates of unemployment. According to UNESCO, in the fourth quarter of 2013 the unemployment rate was 21.4 percent in the West Bank and 41.5 percent in Gaza. Youth unemployment rates were 33.1 percent in the West Bank and 61.7 percent in Gaza. Yemen had a 40 percent unemployment rate. The Morocco report notes that the county faced economic challenges in 2013.

Several trends affecting civil society were apparent in the region in 2013. While several governments took action to close civic space during the year, others increasingly acknowledged the sector’s influence through formal dialogues and documents. At the same time, the ongoing civil war in Syria continued to impact the neighboring countries of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, affecting several dimensions of CSO sustainability, including service provision, organizational capacity, financial viability, and public image.

CLOSING CIVIC SPACE

Several governments in the region took actions to close civic space during 2013, mirroring trends in other parts of the world.

The situation in Egypt was particularly stark. In June 2013, a Cairo court convicted forty-three individuals from five foreign NGOs—mainly organizations working on democracy and human rights—for operating without licenses and receiving foreign funding without prior state authorization. In August, after the Morsi administration’s ouster, security forces violently cleared mass sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda Squares, killing hundreds of people. In September, an Egyptian court banned the Muslim Brotherhood and barred its activities. Two months later, the Ministry of Justice issued a resolution requesting banks to freeze the accounts of 1,055 NGOs that the Ministry alleged to have Muslim Brotherhood affiliations. Throughout the year, the Ministry of Social Solidarity denied well-known and reputable organizations permission to receive foreign funding for projects. In November, the interim government passed Law Number 107 of 2013
on public assembly, which has been criticized for limiting the right to assembly. The Law was applied for the first time just two days after its passage when dozens of activists protesting the draft constitutional provision allowing military trials of civilians were arrested and later charged with violating the new Law; among those prosecuted were some of the most prominent activists involved in the 2011 revolution.

In addition to affecting the legal environment, these actions impacted a number of other dimensions of CSO sustainability in Egypt during the year. The sector’s financial viability weakened as NGOs faced significant challenges to receiving foreign funds; advocacy declined as citizens became less willing to engage in public demonstrations; service delivery deteriorated when the government froze the bank accounts of NGOs that provided critical services; and public image was affected as the government’s actions negatively colored the public’s view of the sector.

CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza also experienced an increase in state interference in 2013, including bureaucratic impediments to operations and harassment of program staff. The defacto Ministry of Interior in Gaza continued to intervene in the affairs of CSOs, particularly those providing services to youth and implementing activities related to human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution. In 2013, the defacto Ministry issued two decisions that granted it wide powers to intervene in the work of associations in Gaza. For example, Decision No. 61 requires CSOs to notify or seek approval for certain financial transactions, even though the NGO Law does not provide for such a requirement. In the West Bank, the government continued to interfere in CSO operations by refusing to issue permits for events and arbitrarily suspending organizations.

In Jordan, while the government demonstrated some responsiveness to demands for further democratization, it also blocked over 300 websites in 2013 pursuant to 2012 amendments to the Press and Publication Law that require websites, especially news websites, to be registered with the government. A report issued by the Jordanian Press Association (JPA) in 2013 indicated a resultant drop in press freedom from approximately 51.5 percent to 44 percent.

In Morocco, the government engaged in a national dialogue on the role of civil society, as described below. At the same time, however, several episodes undermined the freedom of the press and freedom of expression. For instance, a student was imprisoned for posting a video in which he insulted King Mohammed VI.

In Iraq, partly in response to the country’s dire security situation, CSOs were increasingly harassed by national security officers and local police.

**GROWING GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

While some governments in the region restricted civic space, others increasingly acknowledged the sector’s role in society through formal dialogues and documents.

Two countries – Morocco and Yemen – engaged in national dialogues with civil society in 2013. In Morocco, approximately 10,000 associations engaged in a national dialogue on the role of civil society that resulted in 140 recommendations around civil society’s role in promoting democracy and protecting human rights. The dialogue highlighted the need for further legal reforms as well as increased access to funding and capacity building for CSOs. While participation was robust, several major associations viewed this dialogue as another effort by the government to control civil society and therefore boycotted the event and organized their own dialogue.

In Yemen, the government increasingly recognized civil society through formal processes and policies. Over 500 representatives of political parties, women, youth, and civil society participated in the National Dialogue
conference (nDC) in March 2013. At its completion in January 2014, the NDC produced recommendations on sustainable development, human rights, the nature of the state, and the contents of a new constitution. Meanwhile, the mutual accountability framework (MAF), approved in September 2012, reaffirmed the government’s commitment to establishing an active partnership with CSOs. The initial agreement on the MAF led to the adoption of the new CSO-government Partnership Framework in September 2013. The Partnership Framework provides clear guidelines for CSO-government collaboration, which includes a focus on program delivery based on community needs and capacity building of CSOs.

In the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), the regional parliament ratified and CSOs signed the Kurdistan Compact on Partnership and Development between Public Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2013. The compact lays the groundwork for a stronger and more effective partnership between public authorities and the civil society sector, and aims to empower CSOs in the IKR to express opinions and participate in the design and implementation of policies and laws. Unfortunately, an initiative to develop a similar cooperation policy at the federal level in Iraq stalled in 2013.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the NGO Development Center (NDC)—in cooperation with the four umbrella NGO networks—launched the Strategic Framework for the Palestinian NGO Sector 2013-2017. The Strategic Framework aims to give Palestinian CSOs direction over the next five years in dealing with major national issues in alignment with the Palestinian national development agenda and priorities. While led by CSOs, the Framework was developed through an inclusive process involving CSOs, the government, donors, and the private sector.

In Jordan, while no official policy documents were developed, CSOs had more direct lines of communication with local and federal governments in 2013. In addition to participating in various government committees and policy discussions, CSOs established memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with various ministries, as well as partnerships with municipalities to implement projects in the governorates.

**CSOs Respond to—and are Impacted by—Syrian Refugee Crisis**

The ongoing civil war in Syria continued to impact neighboring countries, particularly Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. By the end of the year, there were over 200,000 refugees in Iraq, almost 600,000 in Jordan, and close to 880,000 in Lebanon. While significant foreign aid poured into these countries to support the burgeoning refugee populations, the presence of the refugees strained local services and diverted CSOs from regular activities, while also straining relationships between refugees and the communities hosting them. As a result, CSOs in these three countries were affected, both positively and negatively, across several dimensions of sustainability, including service provision, organizational capacity, financial viability, and public image.

CSOs in all three countries played a key role in providing services to the refugees. In Lebanon, for example, the government relied almost entirely on CSOs to provide aid to the refugees, including services in the areas of health, education, psychological support, and the provision of water, food, shelter, hygiene supplies, blankets, and clothes.

All three countries noted an increase in donor support in connection with the refugee crisis. However, this had an uneven effect on the sector. The shift in funding priorities led many CSOs to adjust their programs in order to be eligible for funds. CSOs that were able to adjust their activities or were already focused on these issues had ample funding. On the other hand, some CSOs struggled to access funding for their regular activities. In Lebanon, which absorbed the greatest number of refugees, this shift in funding reduced the number of projects directly supporting local communities.
CSOs’ response to the refugee crisis generally had a positive effect on the sector’s organizational capacity. The Jordan report noted that many national-level organizations focused on the Syrian refugee crisis acquired new expertise, while also upgrading the efficiency and scope of programs that they provided to the local Jordanian community. These organizations partnered with international organizations and opened up branch offices outside of Amman. CSO employment in Jordan also increased in 2013 in response to the influx of Syrian refugees, as CSOs sought additional staff and volunteers to work on this issue. In Lebanon, although few donors invested in developing the organizational capacities of CSOs working on the Syrian crisis, several CSOs were able to build on their existing capacities and community networks to respond to the refugees’ needs.

The impact of the refugee crisis on the sector’s public image was mixed. In Jordan, the public had wide knowledge of the role of CSOs—including international organizations like Save the Children and International Rescue Committee—in providing relief to Syrian refugees. In Lebanon, however, the sector’s public image may have declined as Lebanese communities became increasingly frustrated with the level of support redirected from their needs to those of the Syrian refugees.

**TRENDS IN SUSTAINABILITY**

CSO sustainability in the region continued to be a work in progress in 2013. Scores for both individual dimensions and overall sustainability in all countries and territories continued to fall into the Sustainability Evolving and Sustainability Impeded categories. No scores in the region were in the Sustainability Enhanced category.

Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza continued to have the highest levels of overall sustainability. Overall CSO sustainability improved in Jordan and Yemen in 2013. With this improvement, Jordan’s overall level of sustainability moved up to the Sustainability Evolving category.

Overall CSO sustainability in 2013 deteriorated in Egypt, which now has the lowest level of sustainability.

Financial viability remained the weakest dimension of CSO sustainability in the region, with five of the seven countries and territories falling into the Sustainability Impeded category; financial viability did not improve in any country in 2013. CSO sectors in Egypt and Yemen had the weakest levels of financial viability and both deteriorated further in 2013. In Egypt, authorities further constrained access to foreign funding, which especially affected human rights organizations, which predominantly depend on such funding. Donor funding to Yemen’s local CSO sector decreased due to increased competition with international CSOs. CSOs in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza had the strongest financial viability, with scores falling into the Sustainability Evolving category.

Organizational capacity also remained a weak dimension of sustainability, with five of the seven countries and territories remaining in the Sustainability Impeded category. Despite the fact that organizational capacity in Yemen improved in 2013 due to the proliferation of targeted training and capacity building opportunities provided by donors, it remained, along with Jordan, the weakest in this dimension. CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza had the strongest organizational capacity in the region, followed by Lebanon, with both falling into the Sustainability Evolving category.
The strongest dimensions of sustainability for CSOs in the Middle East and North Africa region were advocacy and service provision. Advocacy improved in Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen in 2013. During the year, CSOs in Jordan had more influence and direct communication with decision makers and were involved in various government committees. Meanwhile, in Iraq, CSOs and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began implementing the Kurdistan Compact on Partnership and Development between Public Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and CSOs in the central Iraq region improved their relations with the parliament and used their government contacts, as well as social media, to lobby, advocate, and build networks. Yemen’s National Dialogue spurred remarkable advocacy and civic participation. For example, CSOs successfully pushed for a 30 percent quota for women and youth participation in the National Dialogue. In addition, for the first time, CSOs worked with the government to amend national legislation to align with international human rights agreements signed by Yemen. Iraq had the strongest score in the advocacy dimension, followed by Lebanon.

Advocacy in Egypt deteriorated in the second half of 2013, when the interim government that was appointed after Morsi’s ouster swiftly took measures to limit dissenting voices, including the violent dispersal of public protests and the passage of an extremely restrictive protest law. Egypt and Jordan had the weakest scores in the advocacy dimension and were the only two countries that fell into the Sustainability Impeded category.

Service provision was the only dimension in which all countries and territories fell within the Sustainability Evolving category. Yemen had the weakest score in this dimension. The CSO sector in Lebanon was the strongest in service provision, followed by the West Bank and Gaza. Service provision in Egypt dramatically deteriorated in 2013 when the interim government froze the accounts of more than 1,000 Islamic charities, scaling back many vital services. On the other hand, service provision in Iraq improved, as many CSOs in the central region and IKR began providing services to the Syrian refugee community, and the KRG began distributing funds to CSOs for service provision.

Egypt had the weakest legal environment in the region—it was the only country in the Sustainability Impeded category in this dimension—and the situation got worse during the year. As described above, the government denied prominent CSOs access to foreign funding; froze the accounts of over 1,000 charities in September; and adopted a law in November that granted security officials wide discretion to forcibly disperse protests. Morocco, on the other hand, showed moderate improvement—though the decree governing CSOs has gaps and is ambiguous on some issues, which fosters manipulation by authorities—Moroccan CSOs had more space to conduct their activities, operate in public, and contract with local and international partners in 2013. For example, authorities appeared to ban association activities less frequently. CSOs in Lebanon continued to benefit from the most enabling legal environment in the region.

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in the region experienced little change in 2013. Yemen continued to have the weakest infrastructure, though it showed significant improvement in 2013 due to new training and capacity building opportunities, as well as a new Supreme Partnership Council that unites CSOs and government to implement the new CSO-government Partnership Framework, which provides guidelines for CSO-government collaboration. Egypt and Lebanon had the strongest infrastructure scores in the region, both falling into the Sustainability Evolving category. In both countries, CSOs have access to a variety of capacity building services, although coalitions and networks continue to be weak.

The public image dimension experienced a fair amount of change in 2013. Lebanon—the strongest country in this dimension—and Yemen both demonstrated improvement. Lebanese CSOs enjoyed more media coverage of social issues, which demonstrated the positive role of CSOs in society. In Yemen, the public recognized the role of CSOs in dealing with national crises in 2013, and the government and businesses increasingly recognized CSOs as partners in development, as discussed above. On the other hand, the sector’s public image in Egypt—the weakest country in this dimension—deteriorated in 2013. A negative media campaign against human rights organizations resumed and the media continued to denounce organizations receiving foreign funding. Iraq was the only other country in the Sustainability Impeded category in this
dimension, as the public, government, and business sectors continued to have a weak understanding of the sector’s role in society.

Official data on the size of the CSO sectors in the region is often unreliable or unavailable. While the size of the CSO sectors according to local registration authorities varies considerably, almost all countries reported an increase in the number of registered CSOs in 2013. Morocco continued to have the largest registered sector. According to the General Secretary and the Ministry for Relations with Parliament and Civil Society, 11,899 new NGOs were registered in Morocco in 2013, bringing the estimated number of NGOs in the country to 110,000. In Egypt, the database of the Ministry of Social Solidarity indicated that the number of registered NGOs rose from 37,500 in 2012 to 43,500 in 2013. In Yemen, there were 9,701 CSOs registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL) by the end of 2013, an increase of about 600 since 2012. Iraq had the smallest official sector, with only 1,841 registered organizations by the end of 2013, an increase from 1,263 at the end of 2012, according to the NGO Registration Directorate; approximately 1,400 CSOs were registered in IKR. In Lebanon, there is no reliable data on the number of CSOs, with estimates varying from 5,000 to over 30,000.

CONCLUSION

As described above, governments in the Middle East and North Africa treated CSO sectors in divergent ways in 2013. While some countries—most notably Egypt—increased restrictions on civil society, other countries such as Morocco and Yemen increasingly acknowledged the sector’s role in society through formal dialogues and documents.

Even in countries where governments have started to formally acknowledge the sector, weak organizational capacity and financial viability continue to hinder the development of CSO sectors in the Middle East and North Africa. Many CSOs continue to have weak links with local constituencies and depend on foreign donors for financial support, particularly those focused on advocacy and human rights. CSOs need to develop deeper ties within their communities, provide necessary services, and represent citizens’ interests in order to increase their sustainability.

The country and territory reports that follow provide an in-depth look at the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza. We hope this annual survey captures useful trends for CSOs, governments, donors, and researchers supporting the advancement of CSO sectors.
## 2013 CSO Sustainability Ratings

### Middle East and North Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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Egypt experienced widespread public protests in June 2013, following a turbulent year under the leadership of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi during which he granted himself expanded constitutional authority by decree. With the support of the military, Morsi was ousted in July 2013. Following his ouster, military leaders appointed an interim government led by Hazem Beblawi and consisting largely of more moderate officials.

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**Country Facts**

- **Capital**: Cairo
- **Government Type**: Republic
- **Population**: 85,294,388 (July 2013 est.)
- **GDP per capita (PPP)**: $6,600 (2013 est.)
- **Human Development Index**: 110 (2013)


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**2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Egypt**

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**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.3**

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The dramatic political shifts of the summer of 2013 ushered in a brief moment of hope for the possible opening of civic space under Prime Minister Beblawi and his appointed Minister of Social Solidarity Dr. Ahmed Al-Borei. Within a month of the new government’s formation, however, security forces violently cleared mass sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda Squares, killing hundreds of people. Al-Borei, a known supporter of labor rights, established a committee consisting entirely of local CSO representatives to draft a new CSO law. The draft produced by that committee, while containing some problematic provisions, was one of the most enabling and progressive drafts considered in the past several years. However, it was ultimately tabled, and the optimism for greater civil society freedoms faded with new restrictive measures.

In June 2013, a Cairo court convicted forty-three individuals from five foreign NGOs—mainly organizations working on democracy and human rights—for operating without licenses and receiving foreign funding without prior state authorization. The environment for CSOs did not improve after Morsi’s ouster the following month. The interim government also assumed a restrictive approach targeting Islamic organizations in particular, including those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In September 2013, an Egyptian court banned the Muslim Brotherhood and barred its activities. Two months later, the Ministry of Social Solidarity issued a resolution requesting banks to freeze the accounts of 1,055 NGOs that the Ministry alleged to have Muslim Brotherhood affiliations. The frozen accounts included those of large associations such as Al-Gam’eya Al-Shar’eya (Islamic Association), and Ansar Al-Sonna Association. A subsequent court decision declared the freezing of accounts to be illegal, but the government’s actions had already damaged these groups’ reputations, resulting in major decreases in donations and volunteers to Islamic associations. In December, the government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization.

Unregistered political and social protest movements remained active in Egypt in early and mid-2013. For instance, the Tamarod movement claimed it collected more than 22 million signatures for a petition demanding President Mohamed Morsi to step down and allow new presidential elections to be held. These unregistered movements provided a means for citizens who were not willing to be visible in the public space to channel their grievances and had great influence on political outcomes in 2013. Nonetheless, the capacity of such groups was severely curtailed later in the year, as the government strove to limit dissent by cracking down on protests and opposition voices in the media.

Civil society in Egypt consists of NGOs and other associations, labor and professional syndicates, unions, industrial and commercial chambers, cooperatives, civil companies, and other organizational forms. NGOs, the most common form of CSOs in Egypt, are established under Law Number 84 of 2002 on Non-Governmental Organizations and are subject to the financial and administrative supervision of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (formerly the Ministry of Social Affairs). According to the NGO database of the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the number of registered NGOs rose from 37,500 in 2012 to 43,500 in 2013 despite the continued obstacles imposed by Law Number 84 of 2002. It is unknown how many registered organizations are active.

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<td>Impeded</td>
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After President Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, the interim president formed a committee to amend the 2012 Constitution. While the committee’s proposed amendments included expanded powers for the military and provided for military trials for civilians, they significantly expanded the constitutional rights and freedoms of Egyptian citizens in other ways. Article 75 of the proposed constitution explicitly protected the right of citizens to establish non-governmental associations, which would have legal status upon notification. Moreover, the new provision included a clause preventing administrative interference in associations’ affairs without a court order, an important addition in light of increasing interference in NGO affairs under Law Number 84 of 2002.
According to the proposed constitutional changes, laws will not be revised to align with the constitution until after the parliamentary elections initially planned for 2015. Law Number 84 of 2002 therefore remains the framework law for NGOs. The Law provides the government with broad grounds to block an association’s establishment, activities, access to foreign funding, and membership in international networks and alliances. Furthermore, the Law uses ambiguous and broad language, such as “prohibition of practicing any political activity” or “prohibition of harming public order,” providing the government wide discretion to declare associations and their activities illegal. Law Number 84 also provides penalties and prison time for associations’ activities that are deemed illegal. It further includes a collective penalty for all general assembly members of the NGO, which discourages people from participating in public work.

Security bodies and the Ministry of Social Solidarity continued to interfere in the work of associations in 2013. The Ministry of Social Solidarity denied well-known and reputable organizations permission to receive foreign funding for projects. For example, two prominent human rights organizations—the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights and the Human Rights Association for the Assistance of Prisoners—were denied access to funding in 2013; as a result, both organizations neared financial collapse. In June 2013, a Cairo court convicted forty-three individuals from five foreign NGOs for receiving foreign funding without authorization; the court also ordered the organizations to cease their operations in Egypt and the confiscation of their funds. In addition, the Ministry of Justice temporarily froze the accounts of 1,055 faith-based CSOs during the year, and the government deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Some CSOs believe that the General Intelligence Service makes the final decisions concerning CSOs’ access to foreign funding, while the National Security Body under the Ministry of Interior is responsible for collecting information on NGOs.

CSOs also faced problems with registration. During 2013, the Ministry of Justice rejected the registration applications of several organizations, among them the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and the Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies. Some public officials demand bribes to expedite registration and other procedures.

In November 2013, the interim government issued Law Number 107 of 2013 on public assembly. According to Human Rights Watch, the law effectively grants security officials the discretion to ban protests on very vague grounds; allows police officers to forcibly disperse protests if even a single protester throws a stone; and sets heavy prison sentences for vague offenses such as attempting to “influence the course of justice.” The Law was applied for the first time on November 26—a mere two days after the Law’s passage—to activists protesting outside the Shura Council against the draft constitutional provision allowing military trials of civilians. Dozens of activists were arrested and later charged with violating the new Law; among those prosecuted were some of the most prominent activists involved in the 2011 revolution.

After the ousting of former President Morsi, the Ministry of Social Solidarity launched an initiative to draft a new law for NGOs. Ministerial Decree 164 of 2013 called for the formation of a committee to work on amending the law. All of the committee members were representatives of NGOs and other associations. The committee submitted a draft law to the Cabinet of Ministers in December 2013. While the draft law was generally more enabling than most of the drafts previously considered in Egypt, it maintained a number of restrictions on civil society, in particular: barriers to foreign funding; constraints on the registration and activities of foreign organizations; limits on public fundraising; and barriers to entry for aspiring CSOs.

Under Egyptian law, CSOs do not pay taxes on funds and grants from abroad or on imported materials like office equipment that are required for their activities. CSOs must use such materials for the implementation of their activities and cannot sell the materials without prior approval from the Minister of Social Solidarity for five years from the date they import the goods or pay customs taxes. Additionally, CSOs do not have to pay taxes on contracts, powers of attorney, publications, or records. CSOs do not have to pay taxes for any
buildings they own. Law No. 84 of 2002 allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services.

Many CSO officials suffer from a lack of legal knowledge, including a basic understanding of their rights and duties under the law. CSOs continue to try to solve their problems with the Ministry of Social Solidarity through personal relationships, rather than through the courts because adjudication procedures are slow. In some cases, this pervasive practice has led to corruption. Organizations such as United Group and the regional bar syndicates are working to educate CSOs about their rights and help them better understand the laws governing their work.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4

The CSO sector’s level of organizational capacity remained unchanged in 2013. In general, urban CSOs have greater capacities and easier access to donors than organizations in rural areas. Some organizations, such as Al-Qebtiyah Al-Engeliya Committee, Misr el Kheir Association, and Al Orman Association, receive considerable grant funding, sometimes surpassing millions of Egyptian pounds a year, due to their large programs. Such organizations also receive contracts from the Ministry of Social Solidarity for economic and social programs in rural areas. Small organizations operating in rural areas are unable to attract funds and often have to shut down their activities or their entire organizations.

Small and medium-sized CSOs continue to lack clear visions and missions, administrative structures with differentiated roles, effective strategic planning, qualified staff, and technical equipment. Many associations continue to apply for registration with a set of unrelated objectives, from memorization of the Quran to the care of orphans and women, in order to avoid being rejected by the competent administrative body.

CSOs’ constituency building efforts differ according to the fields in which they work. CSOs focused on service provision have broader constituencies, while human rights CSOs—though they have gained support in recent years—continue to lack broad-based support. Most of the country’s organizations are well-informed about the meaning of empowerment and take rights-based approaches to their work.

CSOs generally lack effective internal management systems. CSOs do not regularly convene general assemblies, and boards of directors and executive directors make all organizational decisions. The chair of the board is typically an association’s founder and might remain in the position until death and then be succeeded by family members. Boards of directors are inactive in many associations, allowing the executive directors to exert total authority.

CSOs experience a shortage of technical staff and volunteers. Staff are generally unqualified; once staff members reach a certain level of competence and experience, they typically leave the association for better paying jobs with international or larger associations. Volunteerism is undeveloped because CSOs have insufficient resources to compensate volunteers for transportation and other costs, which is necessary given the current economic environment. CSOs also do not have the funds to train volunteers, which is necessary to encourage people to volunteer and commit to their positions.

Most CSOs in urban areas now have computers and Internet access and use email as their main means of communication, instead of old methods like fax or letters. Rural CSOs have limited access to the Internet, which impacts their abilities to access donors.
The financial viability of the sector declined in 2013. NGOs in Egypt face significant challenges to receiving foreign funds. Law Number 84 of 2002 prohibits receipt of foreign funds without the authorization of the Ministry of Social Solidarity, which seeks the opinions of several security bodies. In some cases, NGOs do not receive this authorization even though they run important development programs or activities. As constraints on the provision of foreign funds increased during 2013, the human rights organizations which predominantly depend on such funding suffered. Community development associations also rely on foreign donations received directly from foreign donors or through intermediary or umbrella associations. Faith-based groups depend on religious-based charitable donations, such as Sadaqah (charity) and Zakat (almmsgiving), and Oshour (tithes), which tend to remain stable despite the state of the economy.

The government sometimes provides contracts to public benefit associations to achieve certain targets or implement specific projects. These associations are regulated by the NGO Law and must be certified as financially sound by the Central Auditing Organization.

CSOs may charge beneficiaries for services provided, though these fees are generally symbolic and do not contribute meaningfully to the cost of providing services. For example, Al-Gam’eya Al-Shar’eya (Islamic Association) charges fees for the use of its incubators for premature babies.

The NGO Law obligates NGOs to maintain financial records and use auditors if their incomes exceed a certain amount. In practice, however, small- and medium-sized NGOs do not have the resources to exercise sound financial management practices or demonstrate financial transparency. Instead, these organizations frequently allow employees of the Ministry of Social Solidarity to control their financial records, which could encourage corruption and conflicts of interest. Large associations are more likely to have sound and transparent financial management systems and practices. Associations registered as NGOs are required to declare their budgets on an annual basis, a requirement they largely follow. USAID and other international donors help encourage sound financial management systems by requiring a minimum level of financial soundness from recipient organizations, as well as sometimes providing technical assistance in this area.

For the first half of the year, advocacy including public demonstrations and protests was quite common, culminating in massive, nationwide protests in late June 2013 that led to the ousting of President Morsi. The Tamarod movement led a public petition campaign calling for citizens to rally in the streets on June 30 in support of Morsi’s stepping down and holding early elections. Following Morsi’s ouster, however, the government swiftly took measures to limit dissenting voices. The interim government’s harsh approach to political advocacy was demonstrated by the violent dispersal of sit-ins at Raba’a Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda Squares in August 2013, which led to the deaths of hundreds of protestors, as well as the passage of an extremely restrictive protest law in November, both of which had a chilling effect on citizens’ willingness to engage in public demonstrations. The government generally allows and welcomes advocacy arising from direct service provision in the health and education fields, but tends to either resist or in some cases directly target advocacy activities related to political issues.
Some independent human rights groups persisted in their advocacy activities despite the restrictions. A coalition of CSOs led by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, for instance, played a prominent role in monitoring human rights violations, especially after the ousting of Morsi. They issued reports on the dispersal of sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square, torture practices in police stations, provisional detention, and other related incidents.

CSOs organized several advocacy campaigns surrounding the draft constitution and new draft laws as well. One campaign aimed to eliminate the proposed constitutional article providing for military trial of civilians. Although the campaign failed to eliminate this article, it succeeded in improving the provision slightly by clarifying when civilians could be tried in military courts. Another campaign successfully achieved the elimination of an article providing that only the Al-Azhar Mosque is entitled to interpret Islamic law. In 2013, Egyptian NGOs cooperated with the CSOs’ General Federation and CSOs’ Regional Federation on a large campaign to amend the NGO Law. This campaign prompted the Ministry of Social Solidarity to form a committee consisting of NGO representatives, which drafted a relatively enabling draft NGO law in late 2013.

Human rights CSOs also enjoyed some limited success when working with service and development CSOs on issues like female genital mutilation (FGM), torture, and early marriage. For example, Al Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture cooperated on a domestic violence program with service organizations concerned with early marriage. In addition, the Center conducted survey studies on these issues with the participation of grassroots associations providing care to local populations. The United Group launched a No for Torture campaign with the participation of more than eighty service associations from ten governorates. Both of these initiatives motivated participants and successfully raised awareness of these issues.

Egyptian women’s associations, such as the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights, Center for Egyptian Women Legal Assistance, New Woman Foundation, and Nazra for Feminist Studies continued to engage in substantial advocacy in 2013 on key issues like Egypt’s nationality law as it pertains to children of Egyptian mothers and non-Egyptian fathers; sexual harassment; and family laws. In particular, these organizations succeeded in garnering support against sexual harassment, attracting thousands of female and male volunteers.

At the grassroots level, CSOs were more successful when their advocacy efforts were connected to service provision or development issues targeting particular populations.

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Service provision was hindered by two challenges in 2013. First, CSOs rely either on precarious foreign funding or donations, which are received mainly during religious seasons. The lack of sustainable funding placed the continuity of services at risk. Second, following the removal of former President Morsi, the government began targeting religious organizations that it suspected of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It temporarily froze the accounts of more than 1,000 Islamic charitable associations in the second half of the year based on the charge that they were providing support to the Muslim Brotherhood. This decision nearly shut down the services provided by these organizations, until the Ministry of Social Solidarity appointed committees to evaluate the associations’ expenditures and ensure that they were not supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. The government unfroze the accounts a few weeks later.

Despite these challenges, CSOs continued to play a pivotal role in providing local communities with services, particularly in rural areas. Faith-based associations like Ansar Al-Sonna Association and community
development associations are expanding throughout Egypt, providing a social security network for Egyptians in light of the state’s failure to provide necessary services. CSOs have thus taken the lead in providing services in nearly all fields, including health, education, as well as direct financial and in-kind assistance. CSOs have also built bakeries to provide bread and established waste water networks. Principal Alshar’eyah Society for Qur’an and Sunnah Scholars have 800 incubators for premature babies, more than twice the number of incubators owned by Egyptian hospitals affiliated with the Ministry of Health.

During the last few years, new projects financed by foreign or international institutions have focused mainly on education and health. For example, in 2013 the International Population Council executed the We Can Participate project, which aims to build the capacities of girls to access markets and gain entrepreneurial skills. It has been implemented in three Upper Egypt governorates in cooperation with grassroots associations in targeted local communities. USAID implemented a maternal health project in cooperation with grassroots associations in Qena, Suhag, Sharqiah and BeniSweif governorates. Misr El Kheir is also playing a crucial role in the health and education fields, managing girls’ community schools in Upper Egypt in cooperation with grassroots associations and providing medical caravans to treat eye diseases in several governorates.

Some CSOs depend on community assessments and broad-based surveys to identify the specific needs of particular locales, while others depend on their relationships and previous knowledge of communities. CSOs market their products, such as publications, workshops, and expert analysis, to the government.

CSOs sometimes recover the costs of providing services. For example, some CSOs charge fees for child care services that are high enough to cover management allowances in addition to the cost of services. CSOs’ knowledge of market demand varies depending on the activity or service. However, local communities have limited ability to pay for services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.0**

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Though donor institutions have provided resources to CSOs for years, Egypt still needs specialized centers to train CSOs and provide administrative and technical capacity building. Currently, organizations like United Group and the Egyptian NGO Support Center provide technical support on good governance and fundraising, as well as legal assistance. In addition, a few specialized organizations like the NGO Service Center, the Center for Development Services (CDS), the ICT Trust Fund, and the Nile Center for IT Technologies provide small grants and capacity building services to CSOs. However, in general, CSOs rely on donor support to build their organizational capacities.

Several projects continued to build the capacity of CSOs in 2013. For example, in 2013 in cooperation with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNIL), the United Group trained another 100 CSOs on good governance. UNDP collaborated with government institutions on some projects that included capacity building components for grassroots and re-granting to CSOs. GIZ is implementing a large project with the Ministry of Planning that includes the provision of small grants to CSOs to build their capacities and infrastructure. However, these capacity building programs have not had significant impact, as they do not provide sufficient or sustainable support and benefit a very limited number of CSOs. Some new institutions emerged in 2013, such as Terous, an institution that facilitates experience and information sharing among people and communities on development projects.

Networking and coalition building is still not common and did not progress in 2013, though a few alliances do exist. Anti-Discrimination Against Women, an alliance of women’s organizations, advocates for greater gender equality and representation. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies organizes a Forum for Human Rights Defenders that gathers eleven human rights organizations. There are also forums organized by
the Qualitative Federation for Human Rights and Transitional Justice that bring together twenty registered organizations.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.8

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The media does not typically report on CSOs’ regular activities and programs. However, CSOs that work on civil, political, and human rights do at times receive media coverage of their seminars, workshops, press conferences, or statements.

There is little difference in CSO coverage between public and private media, as owners of private channels seek to stay on good terms with the government. The ongoing negative media campaign against human rights organizations was temporarily suspended in 2013 during Morsi’s ouster, but the campaign quickly resumed, coupled with unprecedented security measures. The media thus has denounced organizations for receiving foreign funding, or accused them of having foreign agendas or being corrupt. New media, such as social media, online newspapers and magazines, and Internet radio stations and TV, present more positive opportunities for CSOs to receive media coverage and to interact with the public.

In 2013, Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies implemented a community radio project in cooperation with a Jordanian institution with support from the government of Sweden. The project aims to establish low-cost Internet radio stations that cover the news and activities of small communities. These community radio stations could offer CSOs an opportunity to become familiar with local communities, and vice versa.

Large organizations like Misr El Kheir, Orman, and Resala publish advertisements for their work to garner donations, especially during Ramadan and other religious occasions.

The public still does not have significant knowledge of the sector. Generally speaking, CSOs and their work are only known in relation to their founders and CSO activities are still considered elitist. However, charity-related activities of health and education institutions receive significant support from the public and human rights organizations are increasingly recognized by victims and their families. CSOs working on civil rights continue to enjoy broad sympathy from the public at least when speaking on topics such as the fight against torture or women’s rights.

The government has a mixed view of civil society. State officials generally consider health, education, and charitable activities to be acceptable, while they are more likely to restrict political and cultural-related activities that are considered unimportant.

There is still no code of ethics for CSOs. The majority of CSOs do not issue annual reports, while some only submit such reports to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Regional unions and the Regional Federation of NGOs could play a more prominent role in building the self-regulatory capacities of associations. However, the NGO Law Number 84 of 2002 and the penal code prohibit unions from obtaining any domestic or international donations, thus making it difficult for them to contribute more resources to self-regulation.
In 2013, the security situation in Iraq deteriorated significantly, as terrorist attacks grew in frequency. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) data reports that 7,818 civilians were killed and 17,981 injured in 2013. Baghdad was the most affected area. Attacks increased against minorities, such as the Turkmen community in Salahidin and Kirkuk, and Christian and Yazidi communities in Ninewa and Baghdad. CSOs—particularly those focused on the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, women, and minorities—reported frequent threats and incidents of harassment. The security situation in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) was more stable in 2013, though some terrorist attacks and other violent incidents were reported. At the same time, disputes over oil revenue escalated tensions between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2013.
As a result of the ongoing conflict in Syria, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there were 202,040 registered refugees in Iraq as of November 2013. Most of the refugees traveled to IKR and Al-Qa’im in the Anbar governorate. The refugee crisis prompted many international donors to shift their funding priorities in Iraq to the refugee camps.

Despite economic progress and an increase in the federal budget, the CSO sector’s financial viability did not improve in 2013. Much of the CSO sector continued to depend on foreign funding. The situation in IKR was slightly better. For the first time ever, the KRG awarded grants to CSOs, distributing more than 400 small grants valued at 11 billion Iraqi Dinar (approximately $9 million) during the year.

According to the NGO Registration Directorate, the number of registered organizations by the end of 2013 was 1,841. Approximately 1,400 CSOs were registered in IKR.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4**

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CSOs in Iraq operate under the favorable Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (Law 12 of 2010). CSOs that were registered before 2010 must register under Law 12 of 2010 to gain legal status. In the IKR, CSOs operate under the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations Operating in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG Law 1 of 2011), which is among the most enabling laws of its type ever passed in the Middle East and North Africa. Implementation of Law 12 of 2010 remained problematic in 2013. There are fewer problems with implementation of KRG Law 1 of 2011.

At the federal level, administrative instructions and unreliable interpretation by registration officials continued to hamper registration procedures and CSO operations. Though not required by law, the NGO Directorate requires all the founders to be present to register or update registration documents. This requirement has led to the dissolution of many CSOs when their registration was denied due to an absent founder. Legally required investigations into organizational founders by the Commission for Accountability and Justice continued to delay the approval of registration often for three months or longer. The NGO Directorate may also require CSOs to present special permits for certain activities, and unclear instructions from the NGO Directorate have allowed ministries to impose ad hoc requirements for special licenses. CSOs with personal connections to government officials as well as government-organized NGOs (GONGO) register more easily.

In early 2013, the NGO Directorate allowed CSOs to begin submitting registration applications online. However, only seventeen CSOs applied online in 2013, and none of these were registered as they failed to meet all requirements. CSOs are still learning about the online system, and even if they apply online, they still must travel to Baghdad to receive their registration certificate and submit original documentation, which poses a burden on CSOs based in other governorates. All registration regulations and instructions are available on the NGO Directorate’s website.

Some CSOs consider that sample forms provided by the government for bylaws and other organizational documents dissuade organizations from creating their own foundational documents and thereby interfere in internal governance, as most organizations copy these bylaws, instead of using them as guidelines.

Law 12 of 2010 restricts the work of CSOs to the goals written in their foundational documents, though in practice CSOs expand their work to other areas. CSOs are required to submit annual financial and activity reports to the NGO Directorate.
The national security apparatus imposes administrative obstacles on CSOs. For example, before holding workshops, conferences, and other activities, CSOs must submit formal letters to the National Security Directorate explaining the goals and reasons of their activities. A national representative of the National Security Directorate must also be present to monitor the activity, and CSOs must have a file at the governorate council. In addition, CSOs have been harassed by national security officers and local police, who, for example, have appeared at large CSO-organized conferences. This practice increased in 2013 in part due to the country’s dire security situation.

The legal environment is more enabling in the IKR. The registration process is simple and CSOs are informed within a month if their documents have been accepted. The government is more open to working with CSOs and presents few restrictions or impediments to their work. In 2013, the KRG regional parliament ratified and CSOs signed the Kurdistan Compact on Partnership and Development between Public Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The compact lays the groundwork for a stronger and more effective partnership between public authorities and the civil society sector, and aims to empower CSOs in IKR to express opinions and participate in the design and implementation of policies and laws.

An initiative to develop a similar cooperation policy at the federal level stalled in 2013. Legislation for a federal civil society support fund was also drafted in 2012, but did not make any significant progress in 2013.

According to Law 12 of 2010, CSOs seeking to "achieve a public interest" can apply for "public utility" status, which is granted by the Council of Ministers. CSOs with public utility status are exempt from income tax, VAT, customs duties, and sales tax. However, the law does not clearly differentiate between public benefit and other organizations. In 2012, the Council of Ministers verbally agreed to reverse its decision requiring all CSOs that are not public benefit organizations to pay income tax, VAT, customs duties, and sales tax at the same rate as Iraqi corporations, including retroactively, but this decision was not made official. As a result of this lack of legal clarity, at least some CSOs paid these taxes in 2013. CSOs must also pay taxes when they import special equipment or materials from outside Iraq, further hindering their operations. Neither individual nor corporate donors receive tax benefits for donating to CSOs.

CSOs can legally earn income, but must use the profits to further their non-profit activities, and they may be taxed on profits from this activity. The government often restricts CSOs from applying for tenders.

CSO law is not taught in law school in Iraq, and most lawyers are not aware of how laws affect CSOs. The Civic Center is the only known domestic organization with legal capacity in CSO law in Iraq and is unable to meet the demand for legal consultations in the country. As a result, few organizations have access to needed legal advice. In IKR, there are some consultants specialized in CSO law.

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There is no significant difference between organizational capacity of CSOs in IKR and the rest of Iraq. Aside from organizations that act on behalf of political parties, CSOs lack strong constituencies. CSOs do not seek to establish stronger support bases due to their lack of resources, the public’s disappointment with the current capabilities of CSOs, the unsustainability of CSO projects, and the vagueness of CSOs’ public messages.

Many CSOs still lack clear missions and strategic plans due to the lack of stable funding. Some organizations seek funding for projects that diverge from their stated missions. In 2013, the shift in donor funding to
refugee issues caused many CSOs to shift their programming to services in refugee camps, particularly to women and children.

Though most CSOs have boards of directors, the boards generally only meet to discuss major decisions. Many organizations do not have written internal governance policies. Rather, members undertake various tasks. Some organizations have started to show interest in establishing administrative and organizational structures and began some attempts to organize their human resources.

CSOs generally remain understaffed. Most staff members are hired on a project basis, though organizations may have one permanent, full-time employee focused on institutional functions like human resources and finance. There is high staff turnover due to competition with international organizations and foreign companies, which offer higher salaries and social security benefits. In addition, many CSOs lack the ability to develop their employees’ skills. Most CSOs do not have the capacity to recruit volunteers and do not have policies to regulate the use of volunteers.

Most CSOs have computers, but CSOs do not frequently use the Internet for formal communications. CSOs still do not save documents electronically, and those that do need training on IT security.

CSOs generally do not have diverse funding sources and continue to depend on foreign funders. US agencies and organizations, including USAID, the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Mercy Corps continued to be among the most prominent donors in 2013. In 2013, support for refugees became a priority for many foreign donors. As a result, many CSOs shifted their programs to be eligible for this funding, while others struggled to access funding for their regular activities. Most international organizations do not promote or seek to educate CSOs on the need for different sources of funding.

Local philanthropy—financial or in-kind—is limited, in part because potential local contributors do not believe in the efficacy of CSOs. Although CSOs rarely take the initiative to seek local support, fundraising—especially by youth groups—has increased. Youth initiatives like the Hygiene Campaign and Color Your City have received wide support. Some organizations try to raise funds in public places and online, but few individuals donate to CSOs. CSOs engage few volunteers. Board members frequently provide funding to prevent organizations from becoming insolvent, although other CSO members do not make financial donations to their organizations.

The government generally does not allocate funding or provide other mechanisms to support CSOs. The one exception is the allocation of small grants by the Ministry of Culture to organizations within a project promoting Arab culture in Baghdad.

CSOs are rarely awarded contracts for services, as the government does not believe that CSOs have the necessary capacities. In addition, the concept of non-profit organizations continues to be misunderstood as disallowing any economic activity by CSOs. Donors do not tend to focus on assisting CSOs in establishing income-generating activities.

CSO financial viability in IKR is largely the same as that in the rest of Iraq. For the first time, in 2013 the KRG distributed grants to CSOs. The local NGO directorate awarded 429 small grants to CSOs for projects related to women, children and youth, education, and health. The value of the awarded projects was 11 billion Iraqi Dinar (approximately $9 million).
Despite government and donor emphasis on the need for sound financial management systems, most CSOs do not have sound financial systems or even clear budgets, though they maintain accounts as required by donors and auditors of the NGO Directorate. Financial management systems are not electronic due to the high cost of such systems and the need to train personnel.

CSOs must use auditors from the NGO Directorate, which has reportedly led to bribery of auditors to complete the audits due to the limited number of auditors available and the time required to complete audits. CSOs have not spoken publicly against the need to bribe auditors due to fear of threats, blackmail, and abduction. There is also no reliable mechanism to request government documents that could help CSOs reveal such corruption.

**ADVOCACY: 3.9**

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There are no formal policies or mechanisms promoting cooperation between CSOs and the federal government in Iraq. In IKR, the KRG formally adopted and began to implement the *Kurdistan Compact on Partnership and Development between Public Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq* in 2013, creating a formal framework for cooperation between the sectors.

Despite the lack of a formal policy, in 2013 CSOs in Iraq started to realize the importance of engaging in dialogue with multiple government authorities and political parties. Organizations used their government contacts, as well as social media, to lobby, advocate, and build networks. As a result of such efforts, local councils have become aware of CSOs’ work and advocacy goals, making it easier for CSOs to receive approval for certain activities.

CSOs also improved their relations with the parliament in 2013. CSOs cooperated with some parliamentarians and the High Commission for Human Rights on certain campaigns, leading to the broadcast of parliamentary sessions on satellite channels.

CSOs organized several high-profile advocacy campaigns in 2013. CSOs advocated in favor of a law for the rights of persons with disabilities, culminating in the passage in 2013 of a Law on Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs and the establishment in late 2013 of a Commission for Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs, headed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, to implement the law. Pressure from CSOs blocked a government decision to replace ration coupons for basic goods such as oil and rice with monthly payments. CSOs also opposed the information crimes law, which opponents criticized for restricting freedom of speech; campaigned to reinstate the Freedom of Expression Law; and convinced the government to clean up some public areas during the year.

CSOs played an active role in both the Iraq Provincial Elections in April and KRG elections in September. Notably, the USAID-funded Broadening Participation through Civil Society (BPCS) program supported an alliance of local CSOs that recruited hundreds of volunteers to monitor the Kurdistan parliamentary elections and conduct a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). The PVT was the first ever to be carried out successfully in Iraq and confirmed the official tabulation. In addition, CSO voter education efforts for the provincial elections reached over 10,000 citizens.

In March 2013, the Council of Ministers endorsed a National Strategy on Combating Violence against Women, a great victory for CSOs supporting women’s rights which proposed the need for such a strategy and advocated for its passage. The Strategy creates a roadmap for improving legal protections for women and girls through review and reform of existing legislation, in particular those contravening the Iraqi Constitution and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This Strategy also calls
for the passage of the Family Protection Law, which has been pending since 2008; however, the law had not been passed by the end of 2013. In IKR, the calm security environment allowed progress in implementing the Domestic Violence Law No. 8 of 2011 through strengthening the Police Directorate of Combating Violence against Women.

CSOs and individuals also advocated, including by organizing demonstrations, to cancel the life-long pensions offered to government officials and members of parliament due to budgetary considerations. In September 2013, a special committee agreed to cancel pensions granted under special laws for all positions and jobs in the Iraqi state. However, the ultimate version of the Retirement Law passed in February 2014 included many exemptions for ministers and deputies.

CSOs in IKR benefit from a more cooperative relationship with the government and have greater access to focal points in the government. In 2013, the parliament began to allow CSOs to attend parliamentary sessions, a right CSOs had been demanding for several years. Throughout 2013, CSOs in IKR advocated against the common practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) among the Kurdish population, improving implementation of a 2011 law that outlawed FGM and increasing public knowledge of the issue.

In 2013, Iraqi CSOs advocated for a CSO-government cooperation policy, but the government failed to take any action on this initiative.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

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CSOs continue to provide a wide range of services, including legal, social, health, and employment services. As in 2012, most CSO services continued to focus on humanitarian needs resulting from the decline of security in the country. Some organizations began to provide specialized services such as the documentation of human rights violations and professional report writing. However, these organizations faced great challenges in retaining the needed financial and human resources due to competition with international organizations and oil companies for qualified employees. In 2013, many CSOs, particularly in IKR, began providing services to the sizable refugee community. In IKR, CSOs provide a similar range of services. In addition to refugees, CSOs emphasize services to orphans and widows, as well as microfinance services.

Many organizations design projects according to donors’ priorities, rather than needs assessments. Therefore, while CSO services may address the needs of local communities, they do not necessarily focus on community priorities. Donors have recently begun to support project proposals based on quantitative data, encouraging organizations to conduct research and studies to support their proposals. Donors often require activities to be assessed for effectiveness, but generally do not have policies for evaluating programs. Donors and local organizations rarely assess the impact of previous projects before moving on to other projects.

Most CSO services are provided to the broader public. Few local CSOs market products such as publications, workshops, or expert analysis to other CSOs or the government.

Due to weak financial resources and increased security threats faced by civil society activists, most CSOs in Iraq avoid working on sensitive issues such as corruption, the militarization of communities to provide security, and to a lesser extent, women’s rights. In these cases, CSO activities are restricted to simple training, education, and outreach.

CSOs typically provide services free of charge and try to cover all costs through their project-based budgets. The public may misunderstand CSOs that charge for services as inappropriately earning income.
The government's recognition of CSO efforts and services is limited. In many instances, the government contracts with foreign entities to provide training to its staff, and the foreign entities subcontract with local organizations to provide the training for very low wages. Though the law allows CSOs to apply for government contracts, the government still doubts the ability of CSOs to implement contracts, typically only deeming companies to be eligible to bid on contracts.

In 2013, the KRG started distributing funds to CSOs to provide a variety of services based on earlier needs assessments from CSOs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3**

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The main intermediary support organizations in Iraq are foreign organizations including Mercy Corps and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Many of the services they provide to the civil society sector—organizational development, policy advocacy, the promotion of civic engagement, strategic use of media, improving the enabling environment for CSOs, legal consultation, social services, empowerment, and rights awareness—focus on access to information, election observation, government transparency (including of government budgets), labor rights, women’s issues, domestic violence, and human rights.

Local organizations rarely provide grants to other organizations. Sometimes local CSOs, in partnership with international organizations, provide small grants and loans to individuals, such as widows or rural women.

International organizations operating in Iraq support and encourage CSO networks and coalitions, but there are significant legal barriers to registering such networks, such as requirements to submit multiple documents and for each member of the network to be registered. Although CSOs are becoming more adept at fulfilling the requirements for registering networks, the number of officially registered networks is small. Most networks only operate for the short term. Once funding runs out, or the project they were created to implement ends, the networks are dismantled. Only a few networks, including the Iraqi Women’s Network, the Youth Café Network, Publish What You Pay, and the Civil Initiative, have survived after funding ran out. Most networks lack transparent communications with their members. There are no strong networks representing the CSO sector as a whole.

Some organizations, such as Almurtaqa, the Alnawaeer Center for Training, the Training Network for Leadership, and the Alhaweya Center for Training, provide training and professional certification to CSOs, the government, and the public. However, this training is not tailored to the needs of CSOs. In addition, there is still a lack of training and expertise in the sector, including on human rights, women’s rights and gender issues, organizational development, and conflict management. CSOs also lack confidence in the ability of local trainers and instead seek foreign trainers. There is no cooperation between CSOs and university professors with relevant expertise. Furthermore, while leaders of organizations attend trainings—sometimes even the same ones multiple times—members seldom have the same opportunities.

Donors have started to require CSOs to develop more ties with other CSOs and the government. CSOs therefore increasingly try to establish foreign and regional relations with organizations in the Arab region.

The private and public sectors are not aware of the potential benefits of partnering with CSOs, so there are few examples of effective intersectoral partnerships. One of the rare examples of an effective partnership involves the National Initiative for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the government Stakeholders' Council. Through the National Initiative, CSOs train parliamentarians on UN Security Council Resolution 1325—which addressed the disproportionate impact of warfare on women and
the important role of women in peace building—and together formulate a national action plan to implement it.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.4**

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As the security situation deteriorated in 2013, media coverage and analysis of CSOs’ activities decreased. Particularly in Baghdad, the security situation prompted many CSOs to avoid media appearances in 2013. Some journalists prefer to cover political or government events rather than CSO activities or only cover events if they are paid to do so. Some media are affiliated with government parties and entities, and they distort the image of CSOs with whom they clash politically, claiming that CSOs seek to implement foreign agendas and that human rights defenders defend those who break the law.

Most of the public still has a poor perception of CSOs, due to the lack of understanding of CSOs’ role in society, disappointment regarding organizations’ capabilities, and suspicions surrounding CSOs’ work because they are financially supported by the West. According to a public opinion poll commissioned by the BPCS program, only 39 percent of the population believes that civil society makes a difference in their life and 70 percent of respondents replied they were not aware of CSOs working in their community.

However, in 2013, the public began to recognize the difference between CSOs and political parties. The public grew disappointed with political parties not fulfilling their promises, while recognizing that CSOs implement activities and make a positive impact despite limited resources. This is especially true in communities where CSOs work and implement activities. The public therefore began organizing voluntary activities in cooperation with CSOs and CSOs began to have the credibility to exert pressure for change. Youth are most familiar with CSOs and have become increasingly involved in the work of CSOs.

In 2013, the USAID-funded BPCS program supported eighteen CSO Fairs in seventeen provinces in Iraq with the participation of 331 CSOs. Over 5,700 citizens participated in these fairs, which were organized by BPCS partners and raised awareness of the role of CSOs in strengthening democratic, accountable, and participatory governance among stakeholders such as local government and the private sector.

Neither the private sector nor the government fully understands the role of CSOs, in part because the role of CSOs in communities is not prominent enough for them to notice. If companies provide support to CSOs at all, it is only to advertise their own businesses. Though most influential politicians have established their own CSOs, the government does not have confidence in CSOs’ capacities. Government distrust of CSOs increased somewhat in 2013 as a result of their role in various demonstrations during the year. In addition, the government is skeptical of the intentions of CSOs that receive foreign funding. The government took no action on the charter of cooperation proposed by CSOs in 2013, claiming there is no need for such a cooperation policy. The KRG has a better understanding of the role of CSOs in society, and therefore a more positive view of CSOs.

CSOs do not actively communicate with the general public and many organizations are not aware of the benefits of developing media plans and programs. Organizations rarely promote their visions and missions, except on their applications for project funding. At the same time, CSOs increasingly use social media to reach their audiences faster and more cheaply.

CSOs do not publish their financial reports for security reasons; they do not wish to publicize large budgets or foreign funding received, as they can face threats of kidnapping or blackmail from criminals. Only project managers and accountants know project budgets. However, CSOs have started to publish activity reports more widely because they demonstrate achievements and may assist them in obtaining new grants.
During 2013, the public continued to demand political and economic reforms in Jordan; however, additional issues gained attention including addressing the needs and concerns associated with the growing refugee population within the country. During the year, the government demonstrated some responsiveness to demands for further democratization. Most notably, the new Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) sought the involvement of CSOs in administering the 2013 parliamentary elections. CSOs and the IEC collaborated especially to raise public awareness of the importance of political participation, particularly among youth.

Another major development in 2013 was the ongoing arrival of refugees from the Syrian civil war, which stretched public and CSO services and resources and prompted the establishment of multiple refugee camps. The conflict’s escalation increased the total number of Syrian refugees in the country to almost 600,000 by the end of the year, a dramatic increase from the approximately 120,000 registered in the country at the end of 2012.
Groups organized 890 labor protests in 2013 in the form of sit-ins, strikes, and strike threats. In 2013, the government blocked over 300 websites pursuant to 2012 amendments to the Press and Publication Law that require websites, especially news websites, to be registered with the government. A report issued by the Jordanian Press Association (JPA) in 2013 indicated a resultant drop in press freedom from approximately 51.5 percent to 44 percent.

CSOs continued to face numerous challenges in 2013, including legal restrictions that greatly limit their ability to engage in advocacy and lobbying, weak internal management structures, and heavy dependence on foreign donors. Discussions about the Press Law and the Societies Law were prominent in 2013. CSOs continue to play a critical role in meeting development needs at the national level by implementing projects in health, environment, agriculture, economic support, rural development, capacity building, youth activities, and good governance. Many of these projects are conducted in partnership with local authorities.

The number of registered societies increased from 3,329 in 2012 to more than 3,800 by the end of 2013. This number includes about 2,750 charities within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

The Societies Law No. 51 of 2008 continues to be the primary law governing CSOs. CSOs are required to register in order to operate. The Registry Council may seek recommendations from the relevant ministry—such as the Ministry of Political Development, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Environment, and Ministry of Interior—on registration applications, but the final decision is left to the Registry, even if the relevant ministry has some reservations. After registration, the Registry Council refers CSOs to the relevant ministry for supervision. Not-for-profit companies register with the Ministry of Trade and Industry under the Companies Law No. 73 of 2010. There is also a special class of Royal Non-Governmental Organizations (RINGOs) that are registered under separate laws based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement. RINGOs usually have fewer restrictions on permissible missions and activities and may receive more funding from both private and public sources. Some RINGOs also receive government funding unavailable to other CSOs.

Law No. 51 contains vague language and is ambiguous on several issues, such as safeguards against the arbitrary dissolution of associations, procedures for imposing penalties on CSOs, and mechanisms for political participation. In addition, according to Article 9-A of Law No. 51, CSOs’ main aim should not be the achievement of “political or religious goals,” terms that are not clearly defined.

The steady increase of registered CSOs over the past few years demonstrates that there are few obstacles in the registration process, though some CSOs’ registration applications are rejected. For example, Komestair Initiative, which aims to assess the performance of parliamentary representatives, was denied registration in 2013. Prompted by recommendations from the High Court of Justice, the Registry became more transparent about its decisions in 2013, providing justification for rejecting some applications even though it is not legally required to do so. In addition, the Registry provided online guidance on registration requirements and procedures. In 2013, the government also provided support to international organizations in registering new offices and other registration matters in order to facilitate their work with Syrian refugees. While the Registry does not require security clearances, it asks for certificates confirming that the founders have no prior criminal convictions and, in practice, foreign CSOs are vetted by security agencies.

CSOs experience some interference in their work. For example, non-profit companies registered under the Ministry of Trade and Industry must obtain the approval of the prime minister for all funding, and the procedures are long and complex. RINGOs are not subject to these requirements. CSOs must also provide
notification to the Administrative Governor at least forty-eight hours before organizing any assembly. In addition, the Registry requires associations to provide lists of employees, volunteers, and staff wages in their annual reports, which many associations view as an infringement on their privacy, particularly as other sectors are not subject to these rules.

Amendments made in 2012 to the Press and Publications Law require owners of websites dealing with news and commentary about Jordan to be licensed, though it does not apply to major social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, or Yahoo. In June 2013, the government ordered three local Internet service providers to shut down nearly 300 news websites that were not licensed by the Press and Publications Department. The decision followed ten months of promises by the government and the royal court to revisit the controversial law.

To be considered a charitable organization and thus eligible to receive tax-deductible donations, a CSO must submit an application to the Council of Ministers. MoSD dissolved twenty-nine charities in 2013 because they ceased their work for a year, repeatedly violated legal provisions, or requested dissolution. MoSD also established twenty-nine temporary administrative bodies for charities, mainly due to the statutory expiration of their existing administrative bodies. According to news reports citing a press release from the MoSD, around twenty-four warnings were given to charities for committing violations in 2013.

Societies and other organizations that provide services for the public benefit can apply to the Ministry of Finance’s Income and Sales Tax Department for income tax exemptions. CSOs are not exempt from charging sales taxes on services they provide, but they may request reductions from 10 percent to 5 percent from the Ministry of Finance for two activities each year. However, CSOs do not automatically receive these exemptions, and the laws are generally unclear on eligibility requirements. Charitable organizations working with persons with disabilities or orphans tend to receive the most exemptions. Individuals or businesses can deduct donations up to 25 percent of their taxable income if the receiving CSO is registered as a charitable organization.

There are well-trained and qualified legal professionals who are knowledgeable about CSO law in all governorates of Jordan. Some CSOs provide free consulting services. The USAID-funded Civil Society Program (CSP), which ended in 2013, trained eleven trainers on legal aid and the Societies Law. CSP also had a Civil Society Legal Aid Fund for Jordanian legal aid organizations to deliver training on the Societies Law and provide pro bono legal consultations to societies to assist them to operate legally and defend their rights. Three of CSP’s sub-awards—the Thoria Center for Studies, the General Federation of Jordanian Women, and the Human Forum for Women’s Rights—delivered workshops on the Societies Law to a total of 575 participants from 357 CSOs around the country. The collective feedback from these sessions revealed numerous challenges, including a lack of understanding by MoSD staff on the details of the law, weak communication between societies and ministries, government efforts to control the work of societies, weak application within associations of good governance requirements in the law, and challenges in adhering to funding procedures, particularly for accessing local funding or collecting donations. In 2013, some CSOs began seeking legal information from the Registry, but the Registry has not yet exercised this role.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

Organizational capacity generally remained the same in 2013 for most of the sector. RINGOs and large CSOs generally have greater job stability and stronger missions, strategic plans, and organizational structures.

In 2013, many national-level organizations focused on the Syrian refugee crisis acquired new expertise, while also upgrading the efficiency and scope of programs that they provide to the local Jordanian community.
These organizations partnered with international organizations and opened up branch offices outside of Amman, as the Ministry of Planning required any international organization seeking to work with Syrian refugees to partner with national organizations.

Some CSOs have branches in all governorates and in rural and urban areas, but they do not engage in regular communication with local constituencies. Other organizations are capable of building a base of volunteers, but they lack well-defined and structured missions to attract local constituencies.

Strategic planning is generally weak. Professional organizations have strategic goals and sometimes reject funding that is not in line with their strategies. Small CSOs, on the other hand, have short-term plans and prospects. Between October 2012 and October 2013, CSP provided training and technical support to forty CSOs on strategic planning and other topics.

Internal management and governance structures are ineffective. In some cases, CSOs operate as “one-man shows,” in which the founder serves as both the CEO of the organization and the chairperson of the board of directors and has relatives on the board of directors. RINGOs often have representatives of ministries and private sector companies on their boards, which also provide them with greater access to funding.

CSO employment increased in 2013 in response to the influx of Syrian refugees, as CSOs sought additional staff and volunteers to work on this issue. This increased the capacity of institutions to respond to emergencies and needs by forming work teams, delegating tasks, and promoting voluntary work. CSOs in Irbid, Mafraq, Ajloun, and Zarqa benefited from donor programs and projects to raise their abilities to address these circumstances. Most CSOs rely on volunteers to operate, which impacts the consistency and capacity of human resources. The few organizations that have permanent paid staff members have difficulty retaining them because their funding is not secure and CSOs cannot offer competitive salaries.

Most CSOs in both rural and urban areas have some access to information and communications technology, but need technical support to help them use these resources effectively. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation provides equipment to CSOs for persons with disabilities.

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The lack of financial diversification continues to be a key issue facing CSOs in Jordan. Most of the sector continues to rely on foreign funding. Jordan’s key bilateral partners include the US, EU, Japan, and Canada. No official figures are available regarding foreign donor support. CSOs working with Syrian refugees continued to receive ample foreign funding in 2013. Smaller CSOs, especially community-based societies and youth clubs, have less capacity to partner directly with international donors and therefore tend to rely on funding from local organizations and individuals, as well as public entities like the Ministry of Planning and MoSD, though much of the funding from these sources is also of foreign origin.

CSOs have access to some local funding from both the public sector and the private sector, including banks, telecommunications companies, and large private companies. Takiyat Um Ali, the King Hussein Cancer Foundation, and other organizations focused on charity and humanitarian assistance are the most successful at raising local funding. CSOs must enhance their capacities for advocacy, fundraising, and proposal writing to attract local funding, especially from the private sector.

CSOs can apply for up to two licenses a year to organize fundraising events such as bazaars. However, their abilities to attract funding in this manner remain weak.
Some ministries, like MoSD, contract with CSOs to provide services to Syrian refugees and other target groups, but there is strong competition from the private sector for government contracts. CSOs charge nominal fees for services and collect membership fees.

Associations are increasingly expected to demonstrate financial transparency, as many are subject to inspections by the Audit Bureau. This led to some improvement in financial management systems in 2013, particularly among larger CSOs. CSOs are required to submit annual reports to their supervising ministries. CSOs with budgets exceeding 2,000 Jordanian Dinars (about $2,800) must hire external auditors.

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In 2013, CSOs were called upon to become an effective and influential force in the process of formulating, amending, and implementing policy. CSOs had more direct lines of communication with local and federal governments in 2013. CSOs involved in initiatives such as My Nationality is the Right of My Family could easily access decision makers, and therefore were able to influence the modification of some laws. CSOs were involved in various government committees overseeing rehabilitation centers and care centers for people with disabilities. CSOs have also established memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with various ministries, as well as partnerships with municipalities to implement projects in the governorates. For example, the King Hussein Cancer Foundation signed an MOU with the Ministry of Education for the El Khair Moneybox campaign, which aimed to provide financial support to uninsured patients who are unable to pay for cancer treatments.

In 2013, the My Nationality is the Right of My Family coalition advocated to remove all gender discrimination from the constitution, with a focus on the right of Jordanian women married to foreigners to pass on their nationality to their children, which would provide them with access to healthcare, education, and employment. While no legislative changes were made in 2013, these efforts forced the government to pay serious attention to this issue. During the year, CSOs also organized campaigns targeting the Universal Periodic Review—a periodic review of the human rights records of all 193 UN Member States—including joint efforts between the government and CSOs on the national report, and a campaign to protect the forests in Burgish. In addition, CSOs encouraged the participation of women and persons with disabilities in the 2013 parliamentary elections.

Additionally, in 2013 CSOs engaged on issues pertaining to human rights such as opposing gender-based violence, as exemplified by the work of multiple CSOs in the Shama’a (Candle) network, and securing the rights of the disabled. However, competition among CSOs frequently undermines advocacy efforts and coalition building. In 2013, CSOs established a coalition to protect the rights of people with disabilities and minorities.

CSOs are legally prohibited from engaging in political activities. As a result, there are no organized lobbying efforts or awareness of lobbying mechanisms among CSOs.

In 2013, CSOs engaged in limited advocacy efforts directed at reforming the CSO law, restrictions on funding, and the Registry’s operations, but these efforts did not continue.
The CSO sector offers a diverse range of goods and services. The majority of CSOs are involved in work related to charity, education, health, culture, children, youth, women, orphans, persons with disabilities, and Syrian refugees. In 2013, Syrian refugees received various CSO services, including humanitarian assistance, medical care, shelter, psychological support for children, reproductive health, food, clothing, and education.

Some CSOs implement projects that target the needs of local communities, which they determine through needs assessments, while others follow donor priorities, such as the environment and women’s political participation. CSOs are well-known for their abilities to provide services to a broad base of local constituencies, rather than just their members.

CSOs that provide basic services, such as training, healthcare, and legal counseling, impose nominal fees in line with the current economic situation. Such fees help to cover organizational operating costs, while the services provide work opportunities, especially for women.

The government may contract with CSOs to provide certain services. For example, MoSD contracts with CSOs to sustain homes for the care of orphans. At the same time, however, the government seeks the help of the private sector in providing necessities such as food and water to Syrian refugees, instead of using CSOs as intermediaries between government and citizens.

Some intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as the Abdel Hameed Shoman Institute and Nuqul Group, provide technical, financial, training, evaluation, and consultancy support to CSOs. These organizations have their own resources, though they sometimes partner with international CSOs and donors. Others, such as the King Abdullah Fund for Development—which provides grants for youth initiatives and partnerships throughout the country—are RINGOs. ISO services are available to CSOs around the country.

There are a few local grantmaking organizations in Jordan, but their funding generally originates from the government or international donors. RINGOs frequently provide sub-grants to community-based organizations, most notably through the Poverty Pockets program. A few foundations, including Shoman Foundation, Nuqul Group, and Ruwwad, have their own resources. Other CSOs, such as the Islamic Center Society, also provide sub-grants, partially with money raised locally through the provision of health, educational, and social services.

There is no overall umbrella organization or network that provides information exchange or dialogue for the whole CSO sector. There are some topic-specific networks like the Jordanian Women’s Union, but these are not sufficiently active to allow frequent information exchange. Activists and CSO representatives established the Civil Coalition against the Press Law in 2013 in response to the government shutdown of websites. Another coalition was formed in 2013 to develop the culture of voluntary work in Jordanian society.

In 2013, CSP qualified 123 individuals from CSOs such as the Noor Hussein Foundation, King Hussein Foundation, Jordan River Foundation, and the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) as master trainers. However, few CSOs are aware of these trainers. In addition, trainers are
concentrated in major cities, particularly Amman, which makes it difficult for CSOs located in remote areas to access training services. In addition, CSP and its partners published the Societies Start-Up Toolkit, a comprehensive resource for organizational management aimed at enhancing the capacity of CSOs in human resources, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management. CSP also provided an opportunity for qualified organizations outside of Amman to become certified and serve their local communities. As a result of these interventions, competition among CSOs and demand for training are expected to increase.

The level of intersectoral partnerships in Jordan did not change in 2013. Although most CSOs are aware of the importance of intersectoral partnerships, few currently exist.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7**

The public media continues to provide weak coverage of civil society issues, whereas private coverage by Ro'ya TV and news websites is more thorough. For example, in 2013, private media, independent journalists, and social media provided active coverage of the My Nationality is the Right of My Family campaign that highlighted the legal and socioeconomic problems suffered by Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians and therefore unable to pass Jordanian citizenship to their children. In contrast, public media only covered government opinion in this regard. Private media also provided more positive coverage than public media of civil society activities related to the labor strikes and the government shutdown of websites pursuant to the Press Law. There is a need for more specialized media coverage by journalists who understand and interact with civil society. RINGOs usually garner more interest than other CSOs from both the public and private media.

Due to negative media coverage, the public is suspicious of CSOs receiving foreign funding. The public also lacks awareness of the role of CSOs. Rural communities are more familiar with CSOs and their work. In 2013, the public had wide knowledge of the role of CSOs—including international organizations like Save the Children and International Rescue Committee—in providing relief to Syrian refugees.

Various government bodies in Jordan have a positive perception of CSOs and recognize their role in providing social services. The government supports the expansion of civil society, while seeking to keep it aligned with government policies. Businesses have a generally positive perception of CSOs, especially RINGOs and larger CSOs. Businesses develop relationships with RINGOs to cultivate ties with the Jordanian government.

Radio and television advertisements are cost prohibitive, but CSOs often promote their work in print media and online, including through social media. The My Nationality is the Right of My Family campaign worked directly with traditional media to promote its activities in 2013.

A draft code of ethics governing the work of CSOs, political parties, and syndicates was created in 2010, but it has not yet been applied.
Lebanon continues to be plagued by extreme pockets of poverty, especially in urban areas, regional disparities and inequality, increasing youth unemployment, and, above all, political instability resulting in ongoing security risks. Nonetheless, the greatest driver of instability in 2013 was the Syrian conflict that drove close to 880,000 refugees into Lebanon by the end of the year. Donors faced challenges addressing the range and scope of needs among both the Lebanese population and the incoming Syrian refugees.

In 2013, donor prioritization of the refugee crisis drove many CSOs to shift their work to projects related to the crisis. Many were swiftly able to do this by building on their existing community networks to respond to the refugee situation. While net funding to the sector increased, the prioritization of funding towards the Syrian crisis meant that many CSOs that could not adapt to this new priority had to downsize.
Advocacy efforts continued to show results in 2013 in terms of building awareness, changing attitudes, and attracting supporters, although the ability to impact policy and specific legislation remained extremely limited. CSOs continued to provide a diverse range of goods and services, such as health, education, housing, water, energy, relief, economic development, and empowerment. These services tended to complement or fill gaps left by government-provided services, especially with regards to the needs among the Syrian refugee population.

CSOs benefited from positive media coverage at the local and national levels, with increased media coverage of CSO news, activities, causes, and visions that emphasized the positive role that CSOs play in society. At the same time, the sector's public image may have declined as Lebanese communities became increasingly frustrated with the level of support redirected from their needs to those of the Syrian refugees.

As reported in 2012, there is no reliable data on the number of CSOs in Lebanon. An assessment conducted by USAID in 2011 concluded that there were approximately 5,000 CSOs, while the International Center for Non-Profit Law’s NGO Law Monitor indicates that there are “at least 6,000.” Some CSO experts claim the number of CSOs exceeds 30,000.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.8**

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The registration of CSOs is governed by the Law on Cooperative Societies No. 1325/1909, also known as the Law on Associations, which was established under Ottoman rule and amended in 2006. The registration process is simple, requiring only notification to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Municipalities, which provides clear guidelines about the process and required documents. Organizations such as scouts, clubs, cooperatives, unions, schools for special care, and public health centers are required additionally to register with relevant ministries. Although the state does not have the power to refuse registration, there are reports that it stalls—for months and sometimes even years—the issuance of documents that CSOs need to open bank accounts, purchase major assets, or provide proof of legal existence to potential donors.

The law stipulates few internal management requirements. Although CSOs are required to have bylaws to register, they may determine their own internal structures, and there are no known incidents of the government intervening to alter the bylaws of a newly founded organization. Lax oversight of the law, however, allows unsound management practices to emerge. For example, although CSOs must send income statements to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the ministry has no means of verifying the submissions or monitoring organizations’ financial management.

Under the law, the state can dissolve CSOs if national security is threatened. While this provision may open the door to state abuse, in practice the government has rarely ordered the dissolution of CSOs. Local and national authorities are more likely to abuse their positions to harass CSOs—for example, by refusing to cooperate with CSO projects, pressuring others not to cooperate, or even threatening CSO staff. Such political harassment takes place in part due to the divisive nature of the political system in Lebanon and the links many CSOs have with parties.

Excluding cooperatives, CSOs do not pay tax on revenues, including income from the sale of goods or services. CSOs are permitted to compete for government contracts at the local and central levels. Individual and corporate donors do not receive tax deductions for their donations to CSOs, which discourages philanthropy.

CSOs have access to affordable legal advice in Lebanon. However, as few lawyers specialize in CSO law, the expertise can at times be insufficient.
Donor prioritization of the Syrian crisis drove many CSOs to shift their work to projects related to the crisis. While few donors invested in developing the organizational capacities of CSOs working on the Syrian crisis, several CSOs were able to build on their existing capacities and community networks to respond to the refugee situation. Some CSOs are concerned that once donor prioritization of the Syrian crisis ends, they will have difficulty returning to their core missions.

Sectarian CSOs tend to have stronger constituencies than advocacy CSOs. Religious-based CSOs enjoy the support of official religious institutions and international faith-based organizations, such as Caritas. Political leaders use partisan CSOs to deliver public goods to potential voters. On the other hand, advocacy CSOs face challenges in building broad constituencies. Most of them are based in Beirut and have not successfully reached out to the regions. They tend to be viewed as elitist and out of touch with local communities. At the same time, advocacy CSOs seek to expand their constituencies by attracting and mobilizing people. Some CSOs do not engage in any efforts to build constituencies, in some cases because they view their beneficiaries simply as clients for their services.

Many capacity building programs offered by international donors over the past few years have focused on strategic planning and other areas. In 2013, the EU-funded AFKAR III Program had a strategic planning component. The USAID-funded Promoting Active Citizen Engagement (PACE) project focused on several areas, including strategic planning, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, communications, and social media skills. CSOs, especially highly active organizations, increasingly adopt long-term strategies as they become more aware of the importance of strategic planning. However, such organizations remain in the minority, and even those that engage in strategic planning have the tendency to stray from their strategies when competing for donor funding.

Although donors demand good governance to ensure the appropriate use of funds, CSOs continue to suffer from unclear definitions of authority, poor governance practices, and lack of accountability and transparency. On paper, CSOs generally have clear management structures, including a division of responsibilities between the board of directors and staff. However, these structures are often not implemented in practice.

Many CSOs have just a few paid permanent staff. The majority of staff within CSOs are employed on project-based contracts. In addition, after three years of employment, CSOs must start providing employees with pension and other benefits, which they often cannot afford.

Although very few CSOs have written policies and procedures on human resources management, they do recognize that experienced staff and volunteers are essential to their success. Some well-established CSOs are organized and have effective systems to manage their human resources, including volunteers. Newer CSOs are less capable in this area due both to their lack of experience and the scarcity of volunteers. Skilled social workers are usually more attracted to working with international organizations, as they offer better wages than local CSOs.

CSOs typically can access modernized office equipment and the Internet through donor grants and contracts. Most CSOs have computers, though they may be old and have outdated or pirated software. Small CSOs based outside Beirut are generally less well-equipped than larger organizations based in Beirut and other urban centers. In addition, the Internet infrastructure is less reliable in some rural areas of Lebanon.
Lebanese CSOs continue to rely primarily on international donor funding, which makes them highly vulnerable financially and compromises their ability to pursue objectives independently of donors’ agendas. Donors increased funding in 2013, but prioritized projects related to the Syrian crisis. CSOs focused on other areas therefore faced the need to diversify their funding sources as they competed for decreasing resources. Although there were no reports of CSOs closing as a result of the shift in funding, some downsized while others changed their areas of work, moving to communities where Syrian refugees are based, for example.

CSOs are improving their fundraising abilities and some organizations engage in philanthropy development programs and attempt to cultivate a loyal core of financial supporters. However, these fundraising activities are not systematically pursued and do not provide significant amounts of income. Many impediments remain to raising or earning funding locally, including CSOs’ lack of knowledge of fundraising techniques, increased poverty, a shrinking middle class, and CSOs’ lack of financial transparency. Only a few organizations sustain themselves solely on local support, including Islamic organizations that benefit from zakat (almsgiving) contributions, Christian organizations that receive support from various churches, small community-based organizations (CBOs) sponsored by local municipalities, and politically-affiliated CSOs. CSOs concerned with certain causes such as cancer, orphanages, or the physically challenged also depend completely on local funding. They organize fundraising campaigns on television, concerts, gala dinners, and other events, as well as local collections, including through SMS contributions. Such organizations find fundraising relatively easy, as their causes are compelling to the public.

Corporate support for CSOs remains limited and competitive, although the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is growing in Lebanon, particularly among banks and insurance companies. However, companies tend only to support causes or issues that are not controversial, such as the environment. In 2013, Cisco expanded its CSR programming in the Middle East region. PACE collaborated with Cisco to establish a Cisco Networking Academy with a CSO based in the Beqaa Valley, where Cisco provided training of trainers and access to its curriculum and resources for IT professionals free of charge. Like many CSR programs in Lebanon, the program only provided in-kind support. Lebanese laws do not provide sufficient tax incentives for corporations to provide financial support to CSOs.

The Ministry of Social Affairs provides funds to approximately 250 Lebanese CSOs that work with persons with disabilities, the homeless, and orphans. Funding is highly politicized and new CSOs become beneficiaries as new ministers are appointed. In 2013, the Ministry of Social Affairs collaborated with CSOs on several modest projects supported mainly by the World Bank.

While service provision to the public and private sectors is an existing source of income for CSOs, only a limited few generate income through the provision of services. Overall, membership fees, income from the provision of goods and services, and the lease of assets are rarely a significant source of revenue.

A very small number of CSOs have sound financial management systems, as the training and resources required to implement such systems are not readily available for the majority of CSOs. In addition, most CSOs fail to appreciate the importance of transparency and accountability. Some CSOs even engage in financial misconduct to cover expenses and promote long-term financial viability. CSOs are starting to undergo external audits to meet donor requirements. In general, however, CSOs do not undergo audits due to the high costs involved.
CSOs cooperate substantially with all levels of government. However, these linkages depend greatly on personal relationships, political and religious affiliations, and electoral considerations. Institutionalized mechanisms to organize collaboration between CSOs and the government do not exist.

In 2013, advocacy campaigns continued to build awareness, change attitudes, and attract supporters. However, it often takes years to see progress on advocacy or policy initiatives in Lebanon because the political system is dysfunctional and highly resistant to change. Problems also persisted in 2013 with the temporary nature of cooperation in CSO advocacy coalitions. Although donors push for joint efforts, coalitions sometimes fail to exert sufficient collective effort to handle long legal challenges or effect social change.

The Trade Unions Coordinating Body campaign was the largest advocacy initiative in 2013 and had the most financial leverage. While it mobilized much support for its demands for increased wages promised by the government in 2012, no notable changes resulted. Take Back Parliament was a civil society-led campaign protesting the parliament’s extension of its term and calling for accountability of members of parliament. It raised awareness but also did not lead to any change. Campaigns in 2013 addressed various issues, including domestic violence, the right of women married to foreigners to pass Lebanese citizenship to their children, and proper implementation of Law 220/2000 to improve living conditions of people with disabilities. There were also environmental campaigns, including one concerning the Al Na’meh solid waste collection site.

Some local campaigns also made progress during the year. For example, a campaign led by Akkarouna called for the establishment of a motor vehicle department in Akkar in northern Lebanon to save costs for public transport drivers and local motorists. Two successive ministers of interior expressed support and pledged to establish the department, and official decisions were taken in that regard, but actual work to implement these promises had not started by the end of 2013.

Lobbying with the central government and parliament has become less common, especially given that the parliament rarely convenes. Moreover, the parliament tends not to pass legislation except in cases of emergency or very pressing issues. CSOs continue to be blocked from participating substantially in parliamentary decision making, although some mechanisms allow CSO representatives to be present when decisions are made. For example, CSOs can apply to be observers in parliamentary committee meetings, which provides them with an opportunity to generate media coverage and public attention and thereby pressure members of the parliament. USAID is also supporting a local governance activity that forms committees of CSOs and local government representatives to jointly implement activities and make decisions at the local level. In 2013, the former minister of interior affairs and municipalities proposed a legal framework that would allow CSOs to take part in legislative decision making by directly lobbying members of parliament. This law was still in draft form at the end of 2013. Lobbying tends to be stronger at the local level than the national level.

CSOs understand the benefits of a legal and regulatory framework to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the sector, although many would prefer that the government leave the sector unregulated. Nevertheless, there were no concrete efforts in the sector to reform the legal framework in 2013.
CSOs provide a diverse range of goods and services, such as health, education, housing, water, energy, relief, economic development, and empowerment programs. CSO services often complement or fill gaps left by government-provided services in these areas. CSOs also engage in environmental protection projects, supported by a modest governmental presence in this area.

Through a huge volume of projects, CSOs at least partially meet community needs. However, CSOs’ ability to meet the priorities of the communities they serve is restrained by two major obstacles. First, CSOs find it difficult to come up with innovative solutions that align with the limited funds and restricted timetables available. Second, CSOs often find that they need to respond to donor requirements rather than community needs. For example, the Syrian refugee crisis shifted donors’ attention and resources to refugee work, thus curtailing much CSO involvement with the Lebanese population. Services provided to refugees include health and education and the provision of water, food, hygiene supplies, blankets, and clothes. Donors funded some programs that benefit both Syrian refugees and the Lebanese population, including programs to rehabilitate war devastated areas, encourage dialogue between Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities, and allow Lebanese citizens to help manage and provide food supplies to Syrian refugees.

A small number of CSOs provide services beyond their basic constituencies. In this sense, four categories of CSOs may be identified: well-established organizations that have a presence all over Lebanon that reach diverse constituencies; small CSOs that work within their own constituencies; CSOs that are religiously affiliated and tend to reach constituents that identify with the organization’s religious affiliation; and CSOs that work on broad causes affecting all Lebanese citizens.

CSOs generally do not charge fees for services, but discussions on how to do so are underway, as CSOs realize that they must generate their own resources to survive. The main challenge is that CSOs do not know how to compete with the public and private sectors to provide paid services. Among the few examples of CSOs generating revenue from their services is Arcenciel, a CSO that sells dairy products and hostel services in the Bekaa Valley. As a social enterprise, Arcenciel provides a promising model for CSOs to develop ways to generate revenue.

In principle, government and local authorities recognize the value of services provided by CSOs. Local authorities are receptive to local CSOs participating in managing donor funding at the local level, in part because most donors require this collaboration. For example, EU Strategic Planning and the USAD-funded BALADI project both included collaboration between local authorities and CSOs. Some well-established CSOs at the community level have built enough credibility to be recognized in their own right by local authorities. However, partnerships between authorities and CSOs are usually limited to temporary alliances for particular projects.

Several intermediary support organizations (ISOs) provide training and capacity building assistance to CSOs in various areas, such as fundraising, strategic planning, project development, human resource development, and financial management. Most ISOs support CSOs within individual sectors, such as media, women’s empowerment, or conflict management and resolution. ISOs have limited capacities to provide support to
local CSOs and depend largely on the availability of donor funding. In addition, since ISOs are mostly located in and around Beirut, access to them by CSOs in more remote areas is limited. ISOs do not generally provide sub-grants to local CSOs.

The number of CSO coalitions in Lebanon has grown in recent years, but coalitions are still rare. Those coalitions that do exist are generally motivated more by an intent to realize a specific purpose quickly or to request funds from an international donor than a desire to produce better results. Coalitions are generally led by one or two CSOs, with more minimal involvement by other coalition members. Coordination and communications within coalitions are usually ineffective. Coalitions rarely last without considerable donor funding.

Online platforms, such as the Civil Society Portal (http://daleel-madani.org), provide CSOs with information about jobs and projects. However, as a large number of CSOs compete for ever decreasing resources, information sharing among them is becoming increasingly rare.

Access to training is limited due to the high fees charged by local private training and consulting firms, such as the Knowledge Development Corporation (KDC). CSOs instead take advantage of capacity building programs financed through donor institutions, though most of the time such training is not tailored to their practical needs. In 2013, international donors like UNDP and the EU launched training programs to build the capacities of grassroots CSOs. During the year, USAID launched a capacity development project to provide at least fifty local CSOs with such assistance. Support is customized to each organization’s needs and employs a combination of on-the-job training, coaching, and mentorship. However, there are still an insufficient number of high-level trainings that would benefit CSO leaders.

In 2013, intersectoral partnerships, particularly between CSOs and the business sector, grew in popularity. Private sector leaders increasingly supported national CSO efforts, including those focused on anti-corruption, children with autism and Down syndrome, and preserving national heritage.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2

In 2013, CSOs generally enjoyed positive media coverage at the local and national levels. Increased media coverage of social issues emphasizes the positive role that CSOs play in society. CSOs recognize that the media is an essential partner for their visibility, information dissemination, and fundraising. At the same time, as the media grows more partisan, media coverage of CSOs is increasingly tied to political affiliation. For example, if a CSO is affiliated with a politician or a political party, it may receive significant exposure during primetime, while an event sponsored by a non-affiliated CSO is ignored. In general, CSO media coverage is sporadic rather than the result of a systematic strategy.

CSOs in Lebanon have never enjoyed full public trust. Although the public perceives CSOs more positively than it does the government, according to PACE public opinion polls, the public is skeptical that CSOs provide services equal to the amount of funding they receive from donors. In other words, the public believes that some CSOs, especially charitable associations and international organizations, are fraudulent and self-serving, in line with the general perception of corruption throughout Lebanese society. This view may result partly from the nature of CSOs’ public profile. Many CSOs that are highly visible in the media lack genuine connections with grassroots audiences, while CBOs that are better known and respected by their constituencies do not have the resources to hire media specialists. At the same time, there is increasing resentment from Lebanese communities towards CSOs, particularly international organizations, which many people feel cater to Syrian refugees while leaving them out.
The private sector has an increasingly positive attitude towards CSOs, as witnessed by the increasing attendance of business leaders at CSO gala dinners and other events. However, private sector interest in CSO activities is still largely focused on marketing and public relations. The government perceives CSOs as a complementary partner, particularly in terms of service provision. For example, the government relies almost entirely on CSOs to provide aid to Syrian refugees.

CSOs recognize the importance of promoting themselves and their activities. Many organizations hire media specialists to publicize their accomplishments on social media and to develop relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage. However, CSOs’ relations with media outlets are mostly based on personal contacts or political affiliations. CSOs without media specialists usually lack explicit media strategies and have limited experience in public relations techniques.

There is no sector-wide code of ethics in Lebanon. Many leading CSOs publish information about their budgets and activities online. Small and medium-sized organizations are less likely to do so as they lack the resources to establish and maintain websites.
In 2013, Morocco witnessed an eight-month political stalemate after the Istiqlal Party left the coalition government. Five of its ministers resigned in July and the Istiqlal party officially joined forces with the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). The political crisis diverted attention from a series of projects related to implementing new provisions of the 2011 Constitution. At the same time, Morocco experienced economic challenges. To address these challenges, in renewing its $6.2 billion precautionary liquidity line to Morocco, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required structural reforms for inclusive economic growth, including overhaul of the compensation system. The executive branch cut investments by 15 billion dirhams ($1.8 billion), froze uncommitted budgets, and partially indexed petroleum products to overhaul the compensation system and monitor its effects on Moroccan society. These political and economic conditions, while considered necessary to avoid severe economic consequences, created challenges for the financial viability of the civil society sector as less funding was available for CSOs.

In March 2013, the government launched a national dialogue on the role of civil society, which brought together approximately 10,000 associations and organized eighteen regional meetings. The results from these
meetings included 140 recommendations around the role of civil society in promoting democracy and protecting human rights. Despite the participation of a considerable number of associations, 3,500 organizations including major women rights associations, human rights networks, and Amazigh rights associations, boycotted the event because they considered it to be an attempt by the government to control public discourse on civil society. Between May and November 2013, the Call of Rabat campaign—which was originally launched in 2012 by five hundred CSOs to promote democracy, rule of law, and the protection of human rights—organized the National Conference of Democratic Associative Movement to carry out public debates and meetings.

In 2013, several episodes undermined the freedom of the press and freedom of expression. For instance, a student was imprisoned for posting a video in which he insulted King Mohammed VI, and a senior staff member of an online website was arrested on terrorism-related charges for posting a link to an Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb video that attacked the King. The website has since been shut down, and although the staff member was released, the investigation was still ongoing at the end of 2013. Amid these events, the government continued to target Moroccan civil society, including human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and the Morocco Association of Human Rights (AMDH).

According to the General Secretary and the Ministry for Relations with Parliament and Civil Society, 11,899 NGOs were created in 2013, bringing the estimated number of NGOs to 110,000.

Despite some improvement in the legal environment and in infrastructure, civil society sustainability did not change much in 2013. The legal environment improved with the approval of the new Constitution following the 2011 protests, though there were still some cases of harassment in 2013. Infrastructure improved in 2013 as the availability of information and support allowed the country to overcome problems related to funding and resource mobilization despite the absence of sectoral partnerships. Nonetheless, organizational capacity still suffered from a lack of human resources, capacity, and poor governance. Economic challenges in the country also continued to negatively impact the ability of civil society to access funding. Although CSOs and the government took part in a national dialogue on the role of civil society in Morocco, many human rights organizations were still harassed. As the government reduced its provision of some social services, CSOs stepped in but continued to struggle to recover their costs. CSOs took stands on social causes and responded to the rise of more conservative trends.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

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The Dahir (the King’s decree) on Civil Liberties 1958, revised in 1973 and 2002, governs associations and other NGOs. The decree has gaps and is ambiguous on some issues, which fosters manipulation by authorities who cite security, good mores, or general order as justification to impede the work of CSOs. Implementing laws include the Decree on the Right to Establish Associations of 1958 (amended in 2002) and the 2005 Decree to Implement the Decree on the Right to Establish Associations. If more consistently applied, these provisions would be amongst the most enabling in the region for civil society.

Authorities maintain control of association dynamics and create administrative obstacles in the registration process such as requesting documents not stipulated by law or refusing further registration requests. The Ministry of Interior often denies registration based on security concerns, political or religious affiliations of founding members, and other arbitrary factors. At the local level, authorities do not always give temporary receipts to organizations that file for registration, which delays the creation of the organization. The authorities continue to deprive organizations supporting self-determination for the Western Sahara from obtaining operation permits. This is also the case for many other associations focused on sensitive topics such as monarchy as a form of government and state religion. The government considers political opposition
groups as unqualified for NGO status and thus does not grant them approval for registration. While the registration of a CSO requires formal approval from the government, organizations that do not obtain this approval are still generally tolerated by the government. Yet, all unofficial organizations are legally restricted from accessing government funds or accepting contributions.

Despite these practices, Moroccan associations in 2013 enjoyed overall greater freedom in conducting their activities, contracting with local and international partners, and operating in public spaces. Authorities appeared to ban association activities less frequently, although AMDH still reported some episodes of harassment by authorities during peaceful protests. For instance, in April 2013, police violently suppressed Sahrawi protests and dozens were injured in a protest in Laayoune in January. Some human rights NGOs were also denied authorization to organize activities in public spaces. Certain organizations such as Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) and the Islamist Justice and Charity Organization (JCO) have appealed these rulings and were subsequently registered.

The legislation overall, especially the provisions implemented in the 2011 constitution, gives associations more room to mobilize constituents and act on issues of concern. However, the lack of financial resources often impairs associations, especially since most of them depend on local subsidies ($10,000 to $20,000) to operate. Subsidies typically come from local collectivities, the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), ministries, the Agency for Social Development (ADS), the Foundation of the Phosphate Cherifian Office (OCP), and the National Support (EN). Regarding the management of associations, current legislation gives organizations wide freedom to close out contracts, implement various transactions, and control their internal management.

NGOs seek legal counsel for specific issues. Legal counsel is available for local NGOs, especially in larger cities. NGOs are treated like regular clients. Few organizations offer pro-bono services, but the Association of Young Lawyers offers legal aid and legal advice for advocacy purposes.

NGOs do not benefit from tax exemptions unless they are officially recognized as serving the public interest. The process is very cumbersome, and therefore few NGOs are recognized as public interest organizations. NGOs must pay income tax, VAT, registration and license fees, and council tax. These obligations put a large financial burden on organizations and hinder their ability to hire full-time skilled employees.

The organizational capacity of CSOs did not change in 2013. Although Moroccan associations cover almost all social sectors, their weak organizational capacity heavily hinders their performance. Newly established CSOs need a lot of support at all levels including long-term financial support to enable them to establish strategies, maintain their staff, and operate consistently over time.

CSOs made some strides in building new constituencies for their initiatives in 2013. The OCP opened two new vocational skills centers in 2013, increasing the total number of centers to six. OCP centers operate in partnership with civil society and the private sector to offer beneficiaries the opportunity to pursue training delivered by the Vocational Training Office and other institutions including the Institute for Post Office and Communication, the Mohammedia School for Engineers, the Moroccan School of Bridges and Roads, and Casablanca School for Engineers. The Citizen School of Political Studies and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) offered various trainings for NGO executives and support staff. Despite these positive steps and initiatives, the civil society sector still struggled to fully mobilize partnerships and memberships at the local level.
Only a few associations have developed strategic plans, despite tremendous capacity-building efforts by programs such as Takwia and USAID’s Civil Society Advocacy Project (SANAD) (2009-2012). The majority of projects undertaken by CSOs cater to donor objectives. Since donor objectives typically shift overtime, the focus placed on their objectives tends to have a negative impact on CSOs developing long-term strategies.

Most CSOs still have loose management structures that limit their efficiency and ability to raise funds or resources. Each organization defines its own status and management structure. However, larger organizations do tend to have multiple management structures, each with clear and distinct roles and authorities. For these organizations, board members are regularly involved in day-to-day activities. Few organizations operate in an open and transparent manner that would allow contributors and supporters to verify their use of funds. The majority of organizations do not report their revenue. Only large CSOs use accounting and auditing services. These administrative inefficiencies hinder the development of associations that are small and less structured.

Many NGOs experience problems with staffing. The current tax system limits organizations’ financial ability to hire full-time staff. Many organizations continue to use ineffective administrative and financial management methods, often lack communication and staff recruitment tools, and maintain only basic accounting records. Inconsistent recruitment practices, archaic financial management methods, and non-existent internal and external communication tools all hinder the development of Moroccan associations. Small NGOs do not declare all of their employees, and often pay very low wages that are exempt from income tax. Many organizations benefit from the help of volunteers, including foreign volunteers under the South Korean Cooperation Agency, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, and the Peace Corps. Many of the volunteers are involved in the running of the organization and serve as board members or members of the executive staff.

Many CSOs have computers, tablets or smartphones, and reliable Internet access due to the development of 3G networks. Urban CSOs have faster and more reliable Internet access than rural CSOs, even though 96 percent of the territory has electricity. While access is widespread, few organizations have incorporated technology into everyday organizational practices.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

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In 2013, economic instability and unrest deepened in the country, due in part to high fuel and food costs. This unrest caused a serious rift in the government resulting in the resignation of the second largest party in parliament, the Istiqlal party. The tenuous financial situation negatively impacted the financial viability of CSOs, most notably by reducing the available funding and increasing operational costs.

Insufficient levels of funding remains a barrier to the development of Moroccan associations. Despite the income earned from membership fees, CSOs remain dependent on external sources of funding. The INDH and its subsidiaries remain the main source of funding for local associations, which makes them more vulnerable to changes in strategic direction or policies. This also diminishes their ability to apply long-term recruitment strategies that would allow them to secure and retain professional staff.

The level of international funds for CSOs in Morocco has been declining for several years. The majority of funds, including a portion of the funds from the U.S. Department of State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), have been redirected from Morocco to other countries emerging from the Arab Spring. Although some projects such as the Young Leaders’ Project received funding from MEPI, the number of grants has dropped considerably due to shrinking donor budgets. Donations to local associations from Moroccans abroad have also witnessed a drop.
Funding levels are generally related to the strategic direction of donors. Informed by donor strategies and local circumstances, targeted funds go to areas such as gender equality, good governance, capacity building, and involvement of youth in politics. Given the dependency on INDH funding, many CSOs focus their activities around INDH projects. However, some local organizations structure themselves within umbrella organizations to pool resources and capacities in order to better access the funding of Revenue Generating Programs and to request funds from the Ministry of Social Development, or the Human Rights National Council (CNDH).

Many CSOs continue to depend on government donations. Community and local individual donations also serve as a source of financial support for CSOs in Morocco, especially during times of crisis or religious and national holidays when people are inclined to more frequently give donations. Yet both of these types of financial support are insufficient to provide a sense of security and ultimately sustain the majority of charities, community-based organizations (CBOs) and CSOs, apart from a few that are well connected or related to government officials or philanthropists.

The majority of associations do not have proper financial management systems in place, due to lack of capacity and/or a culture of transparency, often stemming from insufficient human resources and skills. Nonetheless, the National Associations Accounting Code, passed in 2012 and implemented in 2013, represented a positive development towards the standardization of accounting practices. Several national lenders, including INDH and the Social Development Agency (ADS), are now requesting that NGOs follow national standards of administrative and accounting procedures, which could improve financial management structures in the future and possibly increase the ability of organizations to access capital.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

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In Morocco, civil society cannot organize without government interference or suppression and thus cannot function fully as an agent of political change. However, associations have learned from their shared experiences, networks, and coalitions and have begun to realize that advocacy is part of their mission regardless of the issues they work on. Thus, while the overall status of advocacy efforts remained the same in 2013, more initiatives are being launched to defend a range of interests including youth, women, and human rights.

The highlight of 2013 was the government’s national dialogue on civil society, launched in March 2013 to recognize civil society’s role in society. One of the anticipated positive outcomes of the dialogue was the acknowledgment of the positive role of CSOs in the arena of public freedom, sustainable development, and advocacy. The dialogue highlighted the need for further legal reforms as well as increased access to funding and capacity building for CSOs. While participation was robust, several major associations viewed this dialogue as another effort by the government to control civil society. More than 5,000 activists and 3,500 diverse human rights organizations and community networks, including associations of Moroccans living abroad, mobilized against the government, boycotted the event, and organized their own dialogue.

NGOs had positive interactions with the parliament in 2013 as a result of the new 2011 constitutional provisions, which put direct lines of communication between the civil society sector and the parliament in place. As a result, some NGOs participated in parliamentary commission meetings to discuss social, economic, and legal issues. Parliamentary commissions with NGO participation also discussed access to information as well as debated freedom for public and on-line radios launched by the Morocco Alternatives Forum (FMAS-Maroc) and Ejoussour.
Associations defending human rights are alone in taking a stand against government interference. In particular, human rights organizations such as AMDH and Amnesty International reported government harassment. However, NGOs started structuring their advocacy efforts to mobilize constituencies to pressure or influence political issues. Several initiatives related to women’s rights such as the Spring of Dignity Coalition, the National Dialogue on Collective Land, and local women’s councils have demonstrated the power of CSO coalitions to prompt change and curtail government opposition. Social movements by unemployed youth were still a big feature in civil society in 2013, but they have yet to generate tangible results.

CSOs also advocated around several new constitutional provisions that could positively influence the operating environment of civil society. Such provisions include the Law on Associations, access to finance for CSOs, the Law on Volunteering, the law and the legislative petition on tax reform, the establishment of mechanisms for public participation, the Law on Regionalization, the Law on Public Gatherings, the Law on the Council of Parity, legislation and measures to protect the rights of people with disabilities, public youth policies, free and transparent elections, and the implementation of a Law on Social Mediation.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6**

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In Morocco, associations focus on urban and rural socioeconomic development to reduce extreme poverty and improve living conditions. Thus, local development associations are typically the first to offer services to communities, followed by social and health service associations such as the Association to Combat AIDS, Oujda Ain Ghazal (shelter for women victims of domestic violence), and Lalla Salma Association (geared towards combatting cancer). Beyond providing basic services, associations have empowered their communities, giving them the tools to organize and advocate for causes. For example, Soulaliyat supports the right of all women to benefit from the distribution of collective land, and develops vocational skill centers in communities.

Although the general trend for NGOs is to work on multiple issues that reflect donor priorities, more associations are beginning to specialize in specific topics and develop skills (e.g., monitoring of public policies, entrepreneurship, youth employment) to better address community needs. In doing so, they are also attracting commitment and initiative from youth in the community. Some organizations are able to publish reports and share their expertise; however, the audience is usually limited to contributors. One exception was a women’s rights campaign led by women’s rights groups which reached a large and diverse constituency.

As a result of the government’s reduction of funds for welfare services, CSOs expanded and offered a wide range of services to communities, including education, literacy, and health. Services are generally free of charge, except in special cases where beneficiaries are required to give a contribution (cooperatives, for example).

CSOs struggle to recover their costs. While they rely on volunteers, often the activities they undertake are not reported or documented. As a result, many organizations have difficulty assessing the real costs of activities or how to calculate their costs to provide services.
Infrastructure improved in 2013 as the availability of information and support allowed the country to overcome problems related to resource mobilization. Moroccan associations have improved their collaboration and communication. Joint activities such as the Coalition of the Feminist Spring for Democracy and Equality, which regrouped women’s rights initiatives of several progressive Moroccan organizations, including Women Learning Partnership (WLP) Morocco and the Association of Democratic Women of Morocco (ADFM), have created or enhanced consultative and networking opportunities.

New association leadership and resources have opened doors for training services and information products within the CSO sector. In 2013, Morocco had nearly 16.3 million Internet users and 47 percent of the population had a home computer. With the development of new information and communication technology, local organizations find it increasingly easy to access and share information. Local and regional Internet websites such as Zagora-online and Chamalcity provide space for civil society actors and umbrella organizations like Tanmia, a principal intermediary support organization, to share information.

The Phosphate Cherifian Office (OCP) Foundation, the National Aid, and various city councils have given local grants to benefit populations in isolated areas. Examples of such grants include medical caravans or grants to organizations distributing school supplies and clothes.

There are some CSO coalitions that operate in Morocco, such as the Call of Rabat, which have brought together a range of NGOs. Coalitions also exist between the feminist movement and organizations focused on penal code reform. These groups have successfully banded together due to good cooperation and common goals.

Social networking applications including Twitter are still poorly used. The few associations that maintain profiles or Facebook pages do not systematically update them, so they generally do not reflect the image of the association. Very large and dynamic associations have quasi-static pages.

Kits and training modules are available for use by CSOs on almost every subject. These resources are largely provided in Arabic and French through the work of the Moroccan Solidarity and Development Association (AMSED), the associative space, and Tanmia, the umbrella support organization. Universities and international donors provide specialized training in accounting, financial management, and board development.

Intersectoral partnerships do exist between NGOs and media, government, and businesses. For example, CSOs have partnerships with certain ministerial departments, notably the Ministry of Social Development’s partnerships with NGOs focused on social issues. The OCP Foundation is also partnering with local NGOs to offer capacity building programs such as Rhamna Skills and Youssoufia Skills in areas where OCP has mining operations. The Ministry of Social Development provides support to associations focusing on victims of domestic violence. There are also existing partnerships between NGOs and media outlets such as local radio stations and electronic journals. These partnerships tend to be essential for the success of advocacy efforts.
The public image of CSOs remained the same in 2013. Moroccan citizens want CSOs to limit their scope to the nonpolitical, nonpartisan, and voluntary sector, yet they still expect them to drive political change. Advocacy is generally not perceived as a fundamental aspect of community work; however, society overall regards human rights as increasingly more important. Nonetheless, public opinion is quick to discredit any action related directly or indirectly to policy. Social activism is discredited or ignored when CSOs cross the line between charity and policy advocacy.

CSOs have enhanced their access to media to promote their activities, especially at the local level, by using conventional media channels, including radio, TV, and newspapers.

A notable change in 2013 was that official media started to report the actions of NGOs in a more positive manner. This trend, however, did not have much distinguishable impact on the way in which communities accept the role of civil society. Generally, Moroccan society does not pay much attention to media concerned with development, which may partly explain why the community by and large does not yet understand the place and role of civil society.

Another important element to underline is that the image conveyed and the coverage conducted by the media do not address organizational or strategic dimensions of NGOs—rather they report on accomplishments and noteworthy events. Media generally perceive NGOs similarly to how the government perceives NGOs. The common perception is that NGOs are a part of government, or are simply providers of services rather than engaged actors in politics and advocacy.

Government and business perceptions of the expertise and value of NGOs are mixed. The 2011 constitution situated civil society as a principal actor in society, yet the implementation of the legal framework needed to support and facilitate this role is not fully established. Additionally, civil society actors have differing levels of skills and expertise which fuel perceptions from the government and businesses that NGOs are not legitimate or credible.

The official media coverage generally places emphasis on organizations whose activities are aligned with political interests. Rallies and sit-ins are not covered by the media unless they are politicized. There are certain NGOs that maintain tight relationships with local media and assure coverage of their activities.

Civil society actors are currently researching the establishment of a common ethical code, especially with regards to their dealings with the media. This exercise is challenging, however, because there remains considerable diversity of opinions within the sector. For instance, there are left-leaning associations that advocate the idea of total independence from politics and others that position themselves in alignment with the national government, while others believe that their legitimacy must come from the overall policy and legal framework established by the government. As a result, there is not yet consensus on an ethical code for the sector.
WEST BANK AND GAZA

2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for West Bank / Gaza

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**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3**

Political and economic conditions in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza remained extremely unstable in 2013. The Palestinian Authority (PA) endured intense political and financial pressures and continued to risk criticism for resuming stalled peace talks with Israel. Tensions remained between influential individuals within the Fatah party and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. During 2013, various public sector employees went on extended strikes, resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Fayyad and the appointment of Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah, former President of Al-Najah University, as the new prime minister.

Due to slow economic growth, unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza remained high. According to UNESCO, in the fourth quarter of 2013 the unemployment rate was 21.4 percent in the West Bank and 41.5 percent in Gaza. Youth unemployment rates were 33.1 percent in the West Bank and 61.7 percent in Gaza.

The political division and ongoing conflict between Fatah and Hamas continued to burden CSOs’ legal and operational capacities in 2013. Moreover, CSOs experienced more state interference in 2013 than in 2012,

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**Territory Facts**

- **Population**: 2,676,740 / 1,763,387 (July 2013 est.)
- **GDP per capita (PPP)**: $4,900 (2012 est.) for both West Bank and Gaza
- **Human Development Index**: 107 (2013)
including bureaucratic impediments to operations and harassment of program staff. Unreliable and limited funding also remains a major obstacle for many CSOs, limiting their abilities to provide adequate services to their constituencies and decreasing their capacities to implement strategic plans. In addition, many CSOs still lack sound internal governance processes and transparency with regard to their activities and finances.

Due to the PA’s limited capacity to provide adequate public services, including health, education, and relief, the majority of CSOs continue to focus on service provision rather than policy development and advocacy. As the Palestinian Legislative Council has not met since 2007, CSOs have great difficulty influencing policy and decision makers at the national level. However, some CSOs, such as the Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), which is the local chapter of Transparency International, worked with the government on anti-corruption efforts in 2013.

According to the most recent data available from the Ministry of Interior, as of 2012 there were 3,190 registered CSOs in the Palestinian territories, including 2,425 in the West Bank and 765 in Gaza. The sector is diversified in terms of geography, target groups, and sectoral coverage.

CSOs face restrictions on their work from the PA, as well as Hamas as the de facto authority in Gaza. Both authorities continued to impose measures to obstruct associations’ work and limit their independence. Since the start of the Fatah-Hamas conflict in 2007, the government in the West Bank has closed more than 100 associations affiliated with Hamas, while authorities in Gaza similarly closed CSOs affiliated with Fatah. These decisions were made arbitrarily by the security apparatuses in both the West Bank and Gaza, and do not reflect legal provisions or court orders.

CSOs must register with the Ministry of Interior and the relevant ministry, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, or Ministry of Education, based on their field of work. Registration is often subject to the political agendas of Hamas and Fatah.

In December 2012, President Mahmoud Abbas signed the Presidential Decree on Establishment of the Civil Society Organization Affairs Commission, the latest in a series of legislative interventions targeting CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza in recent years. According to the December 2012 Decree, the new Commission will be tasked with regulating CSOs, which some feel violates the constitutional right to freedom of assembly. The Commission is not yet operational, and its mandate has not been clearly defined.

CSOs in Gaza experienced more de facto interference in 2013 than in 2012, including impediments to operations and harassment of program staff, which impacted programming decisions and in many cases led to the closure of CSOs. The defacto Ministry of Interior continued to intervene in the affairs of CSOs, particularly those providing services to youth and implementing activities related to human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution. In 2013, it issued two decisions regarding governance within charitable societies and community organizations: Decision No. 98 regarding the election of boards of directors and Decision No. 61 concerning their financial affairs. While the latter decision contains some positive provisions, it also grants the defacto Ministry of Interior and its NGO Department wide powers to intervene in the work of associations by requiring notification or approval for certain financial transactions and holding CSOs accountable for following these rules, even though the NGO Law does not provide for such a requirement.

In the West Bank, the PA government continued to interfere in CSO operations by refusing to issue permits for events and arbitrarily suspending organizations. However, no new legislation or administrative procedures were adopted in 2013. The Ministry of Interior still refused to register any association that is affiliated with
Hamas. Furthermore, security services continued to refuse to comply with judicial decisions to re-open some associations.

In 2013, the NGO Development Center (NDC)—in cooperation with the four umbrella NGO Networks in West Bank and Gaza (the Palestinian NGO Network, the National Institute of Palestinian NGOs, the Palestinian General Union for Charitable Societies, and the General Palestinian Union for NGOs – Gaza)—launched the Strategic Framework for the Palestinian NGO Sector 2013-2017. The Strategic Framework aims to give Palestinian CSOs direction over the next five years in dealing with major national issues, in alignment with the Palestinian national development agenda and priorities. It outlines five objectives for CSOs: more effective engagement of CSOs in the process of national liberation and democratization based on an internationally recognized legal framework, including increased networking with international organizations and networks; streamlining and promoting effective relationships between the CSO sector and development partners; improving access to quality public and CSO services that are responsive to community needs; exercising more accountability and transparency; and securing adequate financial resources for CSOs.

CSOs are exempt from customs duties; however, a CSO must seek approval for the exemption from the Ministry of Finance on a project-by-project basis, which can be a lengthy process and contribute to delays in CSO activities. CSOs are allowed to bid on public contracts and earn income from the provision of goods and services.

Palestinian legal experts and national organizations monitor violations of the right to free association, take legal steps to defend CSOs from infringement of such rights by public authorities, and provide CSOs with legal representation. Legal experts are available in both the West Bank and Gaza, but availability is generally uneven across various districts. Smaller organizations lack the financial means to hire qualified lawyers.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

In 2013, Palestinian CSOs were still unable to develop strong internal structures that were democratic, accountable, and transparent. At the same time, Palestinian CSOs are experienced, flexible, and capable of coping with social and political changes. Overall, the CSO sector enjoys a high level of professionalism and independence from the public sector, and CSOs continuously seek to improve their financial and administrative procedures. There are no significant distinctions between the capacity of CSOs in the West Bank and those in Gaza.

Most CSOs have developed management structures, the scale and sophistication of which vary depending on a CSO’s size. The division of responsibilities between the board of directors and staff members, however, is often unclear. Some board members are heavily engaged in the day-to-day operations of CSOs, while taking a passive attitude toward policy and strategic development matters.

Most CSOs view their role as providing humanitarian services rather than representing their communities and beneficiaries. As a result, CSOs do not generally devote a substantial amount of time to building local constituencies. CSOs sometimes form local project committees and recruit volunteers only to dissolve these structures once projects are completed.

More CSOs are aware of the importance of strategic planning, but remain rather limited in their abilities to pursue it. Many large and mid-sized CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza respond to donor requests for strategic plans by holding meetings and adopting strategic planning policies. However, CSOs’ abilities to enforce and implement these policies remain limited, in part due to a lack of funding, shifts in donor priorities, and the unstable political environment.
Due to limited funding, many CSOs hire staff on a temporary or project basis. Smaller organizations find it difficult to compete for and retain highly skilled, professional personnel. Well-trained, experienced professionals continue to leave the sector for better opportunities, decreasing the skills, knowledge, and experience in the sector. Most charities, smaller organizations, and local clubs are run by volunteers.

Most CSOs have computers, laptops, and digital cameras, as well as Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

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Financial viability remained one of the most challenging issues for CSOs in 2013. There are no significant differences in CSO financial viability between the West Bank and Gaza.

Most financial support to CSOs comes from foreign donors, and most foreign funding is channeled through the PA, which limits the amount of direct funding for local CSOs. The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2013—a program cycle for aid organizations to coordinate responses to emergencies in consultation with government—requested $400.8 million to implement 167 projects in the West Bank and Gaza. By the end of the year, the CAP was only 55 percent funded, which is comparable to the mid-year funding level of the 2012 CAP (59 percent), signifying a drastic reduction in funding. In 2013, USAID spent $6.45 million on democracy, human rights, and governance programs with civil society, a significant increase from $3.9 million in 2012; other USAID programs also benefit CSOs. However, most US government assistance is directly channeled through US-based CSOs and US government contractors. Some national-level organizations and other politically-affiliated groups will not accept funding from the United States.

While still very limited, a few businesses implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in partnership with CSOs. Paltel Group Foundation, a charitable arm of the telecommunications company Paltel Group, remains the largest private sector contributor to CSOs in the Palestinian territories, providing nearly $8 million in 2013. Al Watania Mobile, the second largest mobile service provider in the West Bank and Gaza, also made limited contributions to CSOs providing humanitarian assistance to local communities. The Bank of Palestine’s CSR budget constitutes 2 percent of annual net profits, one of the highest rates among banks in the region. It allocated nearly $2 million to CSR programs in 2013, a small increase from 2012. Although more private corporate entities are becoming aware of the importance of supporting local communities, most of their CSR programs focus on sponsoring events or providing humanitarian assistance. With the exception of Paltel Group, most companies still do not view CSO partnerships as part of their corporate strategies.

The Welfare Association (WA), a non-profit established by Palestinian business and intellectual figures, remains the most significant actor supporting Palestinian communities through local CSOs. In 2013, WA disbursed nearly $33 million in the West Bank and Gaza. Most Palestinian philanthropists are business owners living abroad, mostly in the Gulf countries. They often provide financial support to a limited number of organizations, usually based on personal affiliation.

Very few CSOs are able to cultivate loyal groups of financial supporters. CSOs rarely engage in any sort of membership outreach, philanthropy development, or fundraising campaigns. CSOs’ abilities to draw upon volunteer and non-monetary support from the local community remain very limited.

CSOs implement income-generating programs by charging fees for services and products or by renting out organizational assets such as halls and conference space. Also, many organizations collect annual dues from their general assembly members. However, these income sources do not constitute a significant portion of
organizational budgets. CSOs providing education and health services are more capable of charging fees for services, with such income accounting for as much as 70 to 80 percent of their annual budgets.

Small CSOs have limited financial management systems, while more established organizations continually adjust their systems to meet donors’ requirements. Additionally, while CSOs produce annual reports to adhere to the Ministry of Interior’s reporting requirements, few make these reports publicly available, thereby undermining efforts to enhance transparency and ensure public accountability.

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CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza remain ineffective advocates for the civic and human rights of local communities. Because of the internal political and factional divide, which has weakened policymaking institutions, many CSOs refrain from actively participating in governmental processes and very few try to influence policy making directly or to identify alternative or complementary policies in lieu of those enacted by the national and local authorities. Instead, the majority of CSOs continue to focus on service provision rather than policy development and advocacy.

Despite these difficulties, in 2013 advocacy campaigns by local CSOs were effective in increasing awareness and support for Palestinian independence. The Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, for example, is a coalition of Palestinian CSOs, trade unions, and global and international networks, which states among its goals, “full economic, political, and cultural independence from the state of Israel.” Due to these advocacy efforts, an American security company, G4S, faced mounting international criticism and lost major contracts in South Africa and across Europe due to its provision of services to Israel’s checkpoints, settlements, and prisons holding Palestinian political prisoners. French multinational company Veolia also lost contracts in the US, UK, and France and announced that it would cease running bus lines for Israeli settlers in occupied Palestinian territories. In addition, world-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking and academic unions and associations across Europe and the US endorsed the academic boycott of Israeli institutions.

Also in 2013, several organizations and coalitions issued reports focused on national-level issues. The Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Council (PHROC), a coalition of twelve Palestinian human rights organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza, issued a position paper on the return to direct negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the US. The paper pressured Palestinian leadership not to allow the expansion of Israeli settlements. The Council called on the PA to continue the process of ratifying international conventions and joining international institutions and agencies.

The Palestinian Center for Human Rights and the Independent Commission for Human Rights issued annual human rights reports documenting human rights abuses and political violations in 2013 by the Israeli occupation, as well as by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.

AMAN published its annual corruption report, Integrity and Combating Corruption in Palestine 2013. It tracks reform efforts to combat corruption and the state of affairs for various sectors in the West Bank and Gaza, aiming to inform decision-makers, politicians, and CSOs involved in anti-corruption efforts with the hope of eventually resulting in legislation and measures that would combat and prevent corruption.

Local government institutions are becoming more aware and appreciative of CSOs’ contributions to Palestinian society. In 2013, more CSOs were engaged with municipalities and local governance committees on local developmental and strategic planning. For example, Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) works with the municipalities and village councils to further increase the role of CSOs and their constituencies in decision-making processes and planning at the community level. Global Communities
implements the Youth Local Council Initiative, funded by USAID, to promote leadership and citizenship among youth by providing an opportunity for them to participate in governance within their communities at the municipal level.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

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Service provision remained one of the strongest dimensions of CSO sustainability in both the West Bank and Gaza during 2013, despite a reduction in donor funding to local CSOs. USAID and the European Commission continue to provide direct relief instead of supporting local CSO service provision. There are no significant differences in service provision between the West Bank and Gaza.

CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza provide services in a variety of fields including health, education, rehabilitation, special needs/disability services, housing, agriculture, environment, welfare assistance, and economic development. CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza have had decades of experience in service provision due to the lack of sufficient public services offered by either Israel or the PA. Service provision by local CSOs remains vital in locations outside the control of the PA, especially Area C and East Jerusalem. For example, due to the inability of public health institutions to serve all citizens, the Ministry of Health transfers patients to CSO centers inside and outside of the West Bank and Gaza.

In general, CSOs in West Bank and Gaza are more focused on providing immediate relief to humanitarian and other emerging needs, rather than planning and designing longer-term community services or products. Some CSOs base their interventions on community plans or strategic plans. CSOs in certain fields like agriculture, environment, and research and development have greater capacity to design products and implement services that benefit diverse groups of beneficiaries. These CSOs have the expertise to increase outreach efforts through publications, community workshops, and analysis.

Although many CSOs charge fees for their services, their earnings rarely cover the full costs of service provision. However, CSOs believe that charging fees is essential to promoting community ownership of these services.

While CSOs are allowed to bid on public contracts, few CSOs pursue such contracts as they do not want to be perceived as sub-contractors for public authorities. CSOs are concerned with maintaining their image as politically neutral and not part of the private sector.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.1**

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A number of consulting and training firms in both the West Bank and Gaza—some of which were established by former CSO professionals—provide services that include strategic planning, accounting, financial management, and fundraising. However, the quality of training and training materials is low on topics such as advocacy, communications, and community engagement. CSOs in marginalized and remote communities have less access to quality training. In 2013, WA continued to train CSO staff in management, finance, and planning; help CSOs develop administrative, financial, and technical systems; and facilitate networking among CSOs. Palestinian NGOs IV (PNGO IV), a World Bank project implemented through the NDC, continues to strengthen the capacity of NGOs to provide social services to vulnerable and marginalized communities.
Universities continue to play an important role in supporting the work of CSOs. For example, Bethlehem University’s Institute for Community Partnership and Al-Quds University’s Community Action Center provide capacity building, organizational development, and research consulting services to the CSO community in the West Bank.

The WA and the NDC provide infrastructural support for Palestinian CSOs operating in the West Bank and Gaza. Funds from the WA primarily provide support for service delivery to CSOs in a variety of sectors, including education, culture and the arts, economic development, health, agriculture, and emergency relief.

NDC channels international donor resources and fosters a wide range of capacity building activities nationwide. In 2013, NDC completed an extensive capacity building program that provided targeted assistance for financial management, good governance, and new media to twenty-nine CSOs. The NDC also implemented the Code of Ethics Compliance System, which was piloted with twenty-five CSOs, seven of which qualified for certification.

Umbrella organizations occupy a prominent space in Palestinian civil society. Key umbrella organizations include the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) (including a main branch in the West Bank and another in Gaza), the Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies, the General Palestinian Union for NGOs in Gaza, and the Palestinian National Institute of NGOs (PNIN). However, with fewer than 1,000 active member organizations, these umbrella organizations represent a minority of CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza, and their capacities to convene member associations and to mobilize resources appear limited. In 2013, PNGO held its third annual conference on the state of Palestinian CSOs. The conference was organized with the participation of representatives of political parties, CSOs, experts, and academics as part of a project in partnership with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to enhance democracy and build CSO capacity. Representatives of all sectors stressed the need for Palestinian governments in the West Bank and Gaza to involve CSOs in planning processes and enhance the role of these organizations in monitoring and evaluation.

CSOs frequently assume responsibility for supporting interaction and partnership between the public and private sectors to develop harmonized policies for development. For example, a strategic goal of the WA is to promote integrated work between governmental institutions, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), international organizations, CSOs, and the Palestinian private sector. The Strategic Framework for the Palestinian NGO Sector 2013-2017, which was finalized in 2013, was developed through an inclusive process involving CSOs, the government, donors, and the private sector. One of its main objectives is to promote effective relationships between the CSO sector and Palestinian development partners, including the public and private sectors.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

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Media coverage of CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza remained relatively stable in 2013. Although CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at both the local and national levels, media remains uninterested in analyzing CSOs’ role in society. Local media usually does not take the initiative to cover CSO activities. Some CSOs pay for press releases to promote their visibility. Most CSOs publicize their activities and promote their public image through social media and websites, providing them with relatively wide reach.

The public perception of CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. However, CSOs’ agendas continued to be influenced by donors’ priorities, as well as political pressures by Fatah and Hamas, thereby causing them to be less cognizant of local communities’ needs and less capable of engaging these same communities in developing services. In addition, some in the public continued to attack Palestinian civil society for being...
corrupt and undemocratic due to the absence of proper internal democratic structures. However, according to AMAN’s 2013 Transparency and Integrity in NGOs report, the public viewed CSOs as less corrupt than political parties or the government.

Although local authorities appreciate the role CSOs play in providing services to the Palestinian community, they still perceive these organizations as competition for funding. Many also feel politically threatened by CSOs whose work addresses violations of human and political rights.

Few major companies are aware of their social responsibility or implement partnerships with local CSOs. However, the private sector does provide fee-based training services, including in strategic planning, accounting, financial management, and fundraising.

Overall, CSOs’ relationships with mainstream journalists appeared to have diminished in 2013. CSOs’ public relations capacities therefore appear to be decreasing or shifting to social media as more effective alternatives to publicize their efforts.

PNGO IV continued to promote accountability and transparency in the CSO sector through capacity building and the development of standards, such as the NGO Code of Conduct. In 2013, the Code of Conduct’s compliance board was established. According to the NDC, seven CSOs were accredited and four CSOs adopted the Code during the year. CSOs are also given incentives to adopt the Code, including access to capacity building programs and small grants.

According to AMAN’s report, many leaders of influential CSOs are still reluctant to develop clear mechanisms for self-assessment according to the principles in the Code. Moreover, the report indicates that CSOs lack effective governance structures, such as general assemblies and boards of directors, and face difficulties managing resources and staff and holding leaders accountable. As a result, CSOs rarely publish reports or information about their activities and resource management. Reports are mainly submitted to donors as part of project funding requirements, and such reports only cover particular programs, not the entire performance of the organizations.
YEMEN

2013 CSO Sustainability Scores for Yemen

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CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

The Republic of Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world. It ranked 160 out of 186 on the United Nations Development Program’s 2013 Human Development Index and had a 40 percent unemployment rate. The economic situation is precarious due to the current political and security situation and the lack of functional government institutions. Furthermore, Yemen has one of the highest population growth rates in the world and suffers from critical food insecurity, with over 10 million people unable to meet their basic food needs.

The transition government assumed power at the beginning of 2012, following the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The government remained fragile in 2013, failing to address the country’s dire challenges. Political violence by several militant groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued in 2013, further aggravating other enduring issues in the country. These include the state’s use of force, separatist movements in southern Yemen, population growth, weak infrastructure, and poverty, combined with a poorly skilled labor force, food insecurity, Sunni militancy activities, and the Shiite Houthi militia’s continuous challenge to the state's power.
In March 2013, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was launched with the participation of 565 representatives of political parties, women, youth, and civil society. The NDC produced recommendations on sustainable development, human rights, the nature of the state, and the contents of a new constitution. While these recommendations presented a path to address many of the nation’s challenges, it remained to be seen if they would be accepted in early 2014.

Yemenis have grown discontent with the transition process and the government’s response to the deteriorating economic and political situation, which has also driven the proliferation of international CSOs in Yemen since 2012. While international CSOs provide much needed expertise to local CSOs, those that are new to Yemen may lack local knowledge and access and compete with domestic CSOs for funding. As a result, the funding available to local CSOs decreased in 2013.

The CSO sector in Yemen is still relatively new and its institutional capacities are limited. CSOs have dysfunctional organizational structures and strategic planning is absent even though most CSOs have received training in this area. Most CSOs in Yemen focus only on standalone and seasonal activities, without clearly defined long-term goals or concrete measurements of impact. Lack of coordination among CSOs continues to cause duplicate and fragmented efforts, undermining the effective implementation of development programs. Public awareness of the role of CSOs in national development is still weak in Yemen and the majority of youth have little interest in volunteering for CSOs. In addition, transparency and social accountability among the majority of CSOs are limited.

At the same time, the civil society sector in Yemen is vibrant, with a wide range of CSOs throughout the country, including charity organizations, cultural and social organizations, forums, initiatives, and professional unions. By the end of 2013, there were 9,701 CSOs registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL), an increase of about 600 since 2012. There are an estimated 12,000 unregistered organizations in Yemen. The governorates of Al Mahrah and Al Bayda have the lowest numbers of registered CSOs in the country, with three and five organizations respectively. The highest numbers of CSOs are registered with the Central Office of MoSAL in Sana’a—most of which work in Sana’a—and with the Sana’a Municipality, with 1,394 and 960 organizations respectively.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

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The Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 1 of 2001) governs the establishment and operations of CSOs in Yemen. The law guarantees the right of all people to contribute to the country’s development through the establishment of not-for-profit associations and foundations. Executive bylaws introduced in 2004 stipulate the legal and technical supervisory role of MoSAL over CSOs.

The Government of Yemen has come to realize the enormous contribution of CSOs in service delivery, policy development, and the national development agenda. In recognition of this, a new CSO-government partnership policy was formed in 2013. The Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF)—approved at the Donors Meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in September 2012—reaffirmed the cooperation between the Government of Yemen and its development partners during the country’s transition. The MAF provides a strategy for key economic reforms that complement political and security reforms under the Gulf Cooperation Council political initiative. One of the six pillars of the MAF is Civil Society Empowerment and Partnership, confirming the government’s commitment to establishing an active partnership with CSOs, enabling their active participation during the transition period, expediting the finalization of legislation and bylaws governing the sector, and most importantly, providing financial and technical assistance to help CSOs become effective development partners.
The initial agreement on the MAF led to the adoption of the new CSO-government Partnership Framework in September 2013, following a consultative process between the two sectors. The Partnership Framework provides clear guidelines for CSO-government collaboration, which includes a focus on program delivery based on community needs and capacity building of CSOs. It also defines specific areas for partnership such as empowerment of youth and women, poverty reduction, health and environment, human rights, vulnerable groups, humanitarian relief, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and good governance. The inclusion of human rights is a significant development as CSOs’ work in this area continues to remain highly controversial with the government, including the notable absence of human rights as a recognized field of work on MoSAL’s registration forms. Some concerns remain, however, as to whether this new Partnership Framework will result in genuine partnership given that international pressure prompted the government to engage CSOs in the development of the MAF.

Registration procedures were slightly easier in 2013. MoSAL authorized its branches in all governorates as well as some districts to renew licenses for locally-based associations and to register new associations. In addition, MoSAL appeared less concerned about the political affiliations of applicant CSOs. Only foundations still have to register in the Central Office in Sana’a.

However, other problems with registration remain. CSOs must renew their licenses annually and there are reports of registration officials demanding bribes to expedite the registration process. In addition, neither the Law on Associations and Foundations nor registration forms mention other types of organizations such as human rights organizations, initiatives, or networks. Consequently, these types of organizations obtain licenses that do not reflect the true nature of their work and are sometimes scrutinized—or even penalized—when they operate outside the boundaries of the regulations of their registered entities.

CSOs work freely and are legally protected against arbitrary closure. While MoSAL legally has the power to close down organizations that are unregistered, it lacks the human and financial resources to do so. MoSAL does not have the power to shut down CSOs that do not renew their licenses annually, but CSOs continue to satisfy this requirement in order to win grants from international donors. There were no reports of the government closing CSOs in 2013.

During 2013, no harassment of CSOs was reported, a marked improvement from 2012. This is possibly due to the government’s focus on pressing political issues rather than to an improvement in the government’s attitude toward CSOs. At the same time, CSOs still fear private groups and entities, such as members of the Houthi sect and their affiliates, who might disfavor their activities.

The Law on Associations and Foundations exempts CSOs from income tax, including on earned income, as well as customs taxes and fees, but the Ministry of Finance generally does not implement the customs tax exemption. Organizations providing humanitarian assistance have a better chance of receiving tax exemptions on specific products, such as foodstuffs or clothing.

The Law also allows organizations to engage in economic activities with some conditions. For example, the economic activity must be allowable, the goal of the activity should be to generate income that conforms to the association’s goals and objectives, and profits cannot be distributed to board members or members.

Local legal capacity is only available at the governorate level, where many larger CSOs, such as the Yemen Observatory for Human Rights and the Human Rights Information and Training Center, have trained a number of lawyers on CSO law. Still, most CSOs are unaware of the availability of trained lawyers and thus tend to solve any disputes outside the legal system.
The sector’s organizational capacity increased in 2013 as CSOs had more access to a diverse number of training and capacity building initiatives. Many donors conducted assessments of CSOs’ capacity needs and based training on those needs, leading to improved organizational structures, human resources, and implementation and reporting of development programs. For instance, in partnership with USAID, in September 2013 the Institutional Strengthening Unit at the Business Administration Center at the University of Aden held a training to build the capacity of twenty-one CSOs. Also, Yemen Development Network (YDN), in partnership with MTN (a telecommunications company), carried out training in Sana’a targeting 280 participants representing 146 CSOs. The training covered such topics as strategic planning, grant writing, planning for results, human resource management, financial management, and fundraising.

Most CSOs view constituency building as important for successful advocacy, but have only succeeded in building constituencies around ad hoc issues rather than their overall missions. In addition, most CSOs lack a sustained presence in the communities they serve. Instead, their interaction with targeted communities ends upon the completion of individual projects.

Many CSOs have received training in strategic planning and developed strategic plans, ranging from simple plans for community-based organizations (CBOs) to detailed plans for well-established organizations. However, CSOs do not implement these plans. Rather, they continue to conduct programs based on donors’ priorities, regardless of their strategic focus.

CSOs’ internal management structures slightly improved in 2013, as organizations started to establish clear organizational structures and job descriptions and began to establish strong communication between the two highest bodies within CSOs—administrative bodies and general assemblies. Interaction between these two bodies also improved with the use of modern technology.

On the other hand, staff members continue to have overlapping functions and there is a lack of qualified staff. Although CSOs provide professional training and capacity building to their staff, they suffer from high staff turnover due to the higher salaries offered by international CSOs. Many organizations, especially small ones, still have problems attracting volunteers, in part because youth are unaware of volunteering opportunities. In addition, most organizations do not cover even transportation costs for their volunteers, thus deterring applicants who cannot afford to pay for transportation.

Large organizations have greater access to advanced technology. The cost of Internet access, in addition to servers, networks, and maintenance, is beyond the means of many organizations. However, most CSOs have come to realize the importance of providing staff with computers and Internet access and thus are beginning to invest in advanced technology. At the same time, power outages and slow Internet speed undermine accessibility, and local servers do not provide adequate security. Larger organizations use external servers to protect their data.

Financial viability worsened in 2013. CSOs largely depend on international funding. Although several donors, including USAID, increased their funding in 2013, grants awarded directly to local CSOs declined due to
increased competition with international CSOs, which have proliferated in Yemen since the end of 2012. While these groups partnered with local CSOs, only a small percentage of overall funding levels reached the local partners.

While there is no precise data on total foreign donor funding to the CSO sector in Yemen, some of the major donors include the EU, which provides 50 percent of its aid to Yemen to local and international CSOs; USAID, which provides capacity building to CSOs through the Responsive Governance Project; Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which collectively give between $5 million to $10 million to Yemen; the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Oxfam; AMIDEAST; and PARTNERAID. The World Bank also started to engage actively with CSOs in 2013 and allocated $8 million for CSO projects to be implemented in 2014.

Local funding is available, but limited. Organizations that work on locally popular issues, such as support for orphans or persons with disabilities, are more likely to access local funding from individuals and businesses. However, local donors are discouraged from giving due to the fact that many CSOs have poor financial management and financial transparency.

The business community and philanthropists provide some funding to a small number of organizations. For example, Alsafwa received in-kind support and Khadija Foundation received both in-kind support and small grants to provide health services to children with disabilities. Their donors included Al-Kabous Trading Agency, which markets coffee and tea, and Al Shebani Group, which owns a chain of traditional Yemeni restaurants. In 2013, the private sector supported a more diverse array of organizations than in 2012, including in-kind support for human rights programs, such as providing sanitary and milk products to women prisoners in Taiz and Lahj governorates. Most business executives prefer to support organizations established in their own villages. Some well-known companies, such as Hayel Saeed’s Group and Al-Ahmer Groups, have even founded their own charitable organizations.

In 2012, MoSAL provided funding to many CSOs ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 YER (about $50 to $500) per month. In 2013, however, MoSAL provided no financial assistance to any CSOs due to insufficient financial resources and the increased number of registered CSOs.

Some CSOs, like the Charitable Society for Social Welfare, have been able to diversify their funding sources because they have the requisite institutional capacity and ability to market their projects. Most CSOs, however, depend largely on donor funding—if such funding is suspended, these organizations cannot continue to operate.

CSOs do not have fundraising plans or organize fundraising events; rather, most CSOs depend on staff members and directors to solicit contributions from personal contacts or interested philanthropists.

Some organizations have begun to generate revenue by charging fees for training programs, but they lack the knowledge to calculate costs accurately. As a result, they still often yield a loss or at most a marginal surplus. Some larger organizations have established health centers based on cost sharing to earn revenue. However, many in the public believe they are entitled to free services. Though the law allows the government to contract organizations to operate its social service centers, very few CSOs have been contracted as the government still lacks trust in the CSO sector.

CSOs have come to realize the importance of sound accounting systems. The YemenSoft Company provides free accounting software, which is used by about 90 percent of CSOs and meets donor requirements for good financial management and control. MoSAL requires organizations seeking to renew their licenses to have accounting systems that accurately show the amounts received from donors so that MoSAL can compare these amounts to information from the Central Bank of Yemen. On the other hand, a number of
organizations, mostly small CBOs, depend on charity and membership fees and thus work without any financial systems.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

The new partnership frameworks are expected to promote cooperation between CSOs and the government, and thereby enhance CSO advocacy. The MAF provides a platform for CSO-government partnerships, though this cooperation is limited to certain state-affiliated organizations based on partisan quotas established by the transition government. Consequently, CSOs were selected to participate in MAF meetings based on the representation of their affiliated parties in the government. In 2013, the MAF granted more autonomy to local authorities, which has facilitated CSO cooperation with local governments. In addition, the CSO-government Partnership Framework was approved in September 2013, although its impact was still unclear at the end of the year.

A total of forty CSOs participated in the NDC, which was initiated in March 2013. Despite CSOs’ continuous demand for representation, CSOs were not represented in the general secretariat of the conference. Most CSO members participated in the state formation group and contributed actively to envisaging the future form of the state. In addition, CSOs that were not involved directly in the NDC contributed actively to the community outreach campaign, which aimed to engage the public in the NDC through workshops, seminars, and online interactive dialogue. The results of these events were documented and shared with the NDC general secretariat.

Overall, CSOs’ role in policy advocacy remains modest. However, in 2013 the NDC spurred remarkable advocacy and civic participation. CSOs successfully pushed for 30 percent participation of both women and youth in the NDC. Moreover, a number of CSOs established the Akon network, which carried out advocacy campaigns calling for a 30 percent quota for women in government posts and demanding the endorsement of this quota in the upcoming draft constitution.

The rise in youth activism in 2012 continued into 2013, with many youth initiatives, such as Shabab Waee and Shabab Roautna Ghaeer, establishing CSOs and being awarded funding. In addition, over ninety initiatives were launched by youth in 2013 with diverse missions, including raising awareness on environmental issues and corruption, promoting democratic reform, and encouraging youth to innovate. The variety of youth initiatives shows that youth activism is no longer focused on core political issues but has expanded to include many societal and community-based issues.

There were some attempts and successes in lobbying in 2013. For example, pressure from CSOs achieved the enactment of a law on the right to information in 2013. In addition, CSO lobbying and advocacy efforts led to the participation of persons with disabilities in the NDC. Several alliances formed to lobby on human rights issues.

For the first time, CSOs worked with the government to amend national legislation to align with international human rights agreements signed by Yemen. CSOs actively participated in the discussion on transparency and anti-corruption laws and developed a matrix of laws that should be amended. In addition, CSOs took part in reviewing the laws affecting children’s rights and recommended amending fifty-five laws to align with international conventions signed by Yemen. Moreover, many CSOs participated in workshops that were held in five governorates to discuss the CSO law and develop recommendations to amend the current legal framework. The recommendations are expected to be presented to the Ministry of Legal Affairs to be incorporated in the draft CSO law, which the National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms
(HOOD) has been developing since 2012. The NDC also recommended that the laws governing CSOs be reviewed and amended.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

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The range of services provided by CSOs did not change significantly in 2013. Most organizations carried out similar activities as in 2012, including training, health, education, and women’s empowerment. At the same time, CSOs increasingly focus on good governance, entrepreneurship, microfinance, and peace building, which are priority areas for donors. In 2013, human rights organizations succeeded in incorporating human rights topics in school curricula and police academy programs.

A number of CSOs, including Sama Al Yemen Development Foundation, Society for Humanitarian Solidarity, the Humanitarian Forum Yemen, and the National Foundation for Development and Human Rights, provided shelter, medicine, and water to IDPs in Amran and Shabwa in 2013. Nearly 19 percent of humanitarian funding in 2013 went to national organizations, while international CSOs and UN agencies received 52 percent and 29 percent of allocated humanitarian funding respectively.

Most programs carried out by CSOs are based on donor agendas rather than community needs or CSOs’ missions, though CSOs did improve their community responsiveness in 2013. International donors and local CSOs established a humanitarian assistance cluster, which conducted several needs assessments, allowing programs to be more tailored to the needs of communities. At the same time, many CSOs are unable to build strong relationships with local communities because their presence ends at the completion of projects.

It remains difficult for CSOs to recover the cost of providing trainings or implementing programs because participants expect to receive free training as well as daily stipends for their attendance. In addition, widespread poverty discourages CSOs from charging fees for their programs.

The government confirmed its commitment to partnering with CSOs to pursue national development through its adoption of the MAF in 2012, and subsequently the Partnership Framework in September 2013. In 2013, the government continued ongoing contracts with certain CSOs. For example, MoSAL contracts Al-Saleh Foundation to run the Safe Childhood Center and the Ministry of Education contracts Al Aman association to run the Blind Female Center.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5**

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There are no formal intermediary support organizations or resource centers dedicated to CSOs in Yemen. However, there are organizations, networks, and international organizations that provide training and capacity building for CSOs. More training was available for CSOs in 2013 than in 2012. International organizations such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UNICEF, national networks, and large organizations provided capacity building for local CSOs on various topics, including advocacy, provision of humanitarian assistance, proposal writing, and fundraising. Trainings were provided for free, and though they were held mostly in major cities, organizations based in rural areas were also targeted. The Social Fund for Development also provides some training to CSOs on an intermittent basis and provides a small amount of funding to CSOs.
Larger organizations that receive international funding, such as SOUL and the Youth Leadership Development Foundation, provide sub-grants to smaller organizations to implement programs in governorates or districts where they lack presence. Grants originating from local sources are generally not available to CSOs, though business executives and philanthropists provide some grants to a small number of organizations, especially those serving vulnerable groups such as orphans or persons with disabilities. In 2013, for example, a Yemeni business executive residing in another Gulf state donated considerable funding to the Al Awn Foundation in Hadramout, which distributed these funds to smaller associations, especially in Hadramout.

The process of establishing a Supreme Partnership Council with CSOs, with 60 percent of the Council made up of civil society representatives and 40 percent from government representatives, began at the end of 2013. The Partnership Council will oversee the implementation of the Partnership Framework.

Coalition building and networking are still nascent among CSOs in Yemen. Larger organizations rarely, if ever, cooperate to implement programs or share knowledge. On the other hand, well-established organizations collaborate closely with smaller NGOs or CBOs, as there is no competition in this type of relationship. The Yemeni Development Network for NGOs and the Yemeni Human Rights Network were established in 2013 to collaborate on relevant projects. Moreover, in 2013 a number of networks formed around the NDC. These include the Yemen NGOs for Supporting the National Dialogue and the CSO Network for Supporting Women and Youth in the NDC, which advocated for the participation of women and youth in the NDC. The Yemen Electoral Monitoring Network brings together CSOs to monitor elections. In addition, the Alliance for Social Society Organizations for Supporting the National Dialogue carried out trainings for twenty-eight CSOs in relevant topics such as negotiation skills and conflict resolution. It also held a seminar for ninety CSOs to discuss the mechanism of CSO participation in the NDC.

There are professional trainers in all topics of CSO capacity building. Although trainers are concentrated in major cities, organizations can contract them to organize short-term training in rural areas, though the fees are higher for such services than for trainings provided in major cities.

Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector tend to be temporary, ad hoc programs that are mostly based on personal contacts, not business policies or practices. Although CSOs do not market their programs to the private sector, large corporations increasingly support CSO activities, especially training programs for youth and women. However, the CSO sector has not maximized the potential for corporate support due to lack of awareness of opportunities or insufficient capacity to deliver high quality training programs.

### PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.8

Media coverage of CSO activities in both state-owned media and privately owned media slightly expanded in 2013, though organizations still must pay for media coverage. While online media is more accessible, it sometimes provides inaccurate or sensationalized coverage, undermining the image of CSOs.

The public image of CSOs improved slightly due to the positive role that CSOs played during national crises in 2013, such as the conflicts in Rada’a, Amraan, and Aljawf, in providing support to IDPs, and in and around the NDC. CSOs’ contribution to local communities has become more recognizable, and the public has begun to realize their role in national development. At the same time, many in the public continue to view CSOs working on human rights as promoting a Western agenda. In 2013, CSOs focused more on using social media to attract volunteers, announce employment opportunities, invite the public to events, and promote their
civic activities. Their social media presence enhanced their public image, especially among youth, who increasingly see CSOs as a means for getting training and making their voices heard.

The government’s view of CSOs also improved in 2013. The state-owned media now often refers to CSOs as partners in development and stresses their important role in assisting the government in providing basic services, especially in remote or insecure areas where the government lacks a presence. At the same time, significant distrust remains between the government and CSOs.

The business community’s perception of CSOs improved slightly. The private sector has come to realize that collaboration with CSOs is important to achieving Yemen’s development goals. As a result, CSO representatives were invited to participate in meetings with the Yemen Businessmen Club (YBC) to develop a vision of Yemen’s development priorities and a CSO was selected as a secretariat for the Economic Reform Team that was responsible for developing the vision.

The CSO sector lacks transparency and accountability, CSOs’ operations are generally neither scrutinized nor regulated, and the sector does not have a code of conduct. Very few organizations publish financial reports. Some organizations that previously published these reports have stopped, as they fear that the types of programs they implement or their funding sources could attract negative attention and jeopardize their work. Many organizations fail to submit financial and technical reports, even though this is required to renew licenses. In 2013, only some large organizations submitted annual reports to MoSAL.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

I. OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector’s performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the category of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the local implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the local implementing partner and expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s score recommendations, the implementing partner has a chance to strengthen the narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

II. DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs’ effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.
Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector’s ability to engage in constituency building and strategic planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.

Financial Viability

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

Advocacy

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs' record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

Service Provision

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

Infrastructure

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary to provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

Public Image

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs' ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media's coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs’ public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.
III. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index.

1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts.

Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. The panel may include representatives from the USAID Mission, but they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores. They are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

- local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary civil society support organizations (ISOs);
- local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business, or media;
- think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users groups;
- international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and other local partners.

It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. To the extent possible, panelists should be representative of women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise.

The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.
It is recommended to distribute the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it may be useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The project team is very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. It would appreciate implementers recording and submitting to MSI and USAID any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool.

3. **Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.**

4. **At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the CSOSI should be scored according to evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events.**

The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every rating awarded should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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5. Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description.

For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

6. **Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.**
Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

7. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, DC.

The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may request adjustments in scores and/or additional justification to support scores.

8. Prepare a draft country report.

The report should cover the calendar year. The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to MSI to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that the process relies on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as the project does not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts and their organizational affiliation who served on the panel with the report. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public.

While the individual country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. In addition, the project will introduce a public launch event or electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) to promote the release of the report in implementers’ countries.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to MSI. The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report's content.

9. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and draft country reports, and will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer.

The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.” If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As a final step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC. This committee is chaired by a USAID Civil Society Advisor and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), USAID Africa Bureau, and
USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated Financial Viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual category of CSO sector development. Finally, and most importantly, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores.

All final scores are discussed with drafting CSOs. USAID/Washington has the final say on all scores.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare their scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be fewer differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes an adequate explanation for a score will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

**Step 1:** Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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**Definition of CSO:**
Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

_Toward an Enabling Legal Environment for Civil Society, Statement of the 16th Annual Johns Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, Nairobi, Kenya. The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Volume 8, Issue 1, November 2005._
Step 2: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

Step 3: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.

Step 4: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 5: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion.

SCORING SCALE:

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector’s sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector’s sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector’s sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.
For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look” below.

VI. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

The following section is the worksheet that members of the Expert Panel use to keep track of the scores they propose for each indicator of each dimension. Each panel member should rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

- **REGISTRATION.** Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

- **OPERATION.** Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

- **ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARRASSMENT.** Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

- **LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.** Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

- **TAXATION.** Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

- **EARNED INCOME.** Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

- **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.** Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

- **STRATEGIC PLANNING.** Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

- **INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.** Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?
• **CSO STAFFING.** Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

• **TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT.** Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

• **LOCAL SUPPORT.** Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

• **DIVERSIFICATION.** Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

• **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.** Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

• **FUNDRAISING.** Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

• **EARNED INCOME.** Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

ADVOCACY

• **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.** Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

• **POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES.** Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOBBYING EFFORTS.** Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM.** Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?
SERVICE PROVISION

- **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water, or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

- **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

- **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops, or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government?

- **COST RECOVERY.** When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

- **GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.** Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

INFRASTRUCTURE

- **INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.** Are there ISOS, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

- **LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS.** Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

- **CSO COALITIONS.** Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

- **TRAINING.** Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

- **INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.** Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?
PUBLIC IMAGE

- **MEDIA COVERAGE.** Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

- **PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?

- **GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

- **PUBLIC RELATIONS.** Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

- **SELF-REGULATION.** Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

VII. **RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK**

The following section goes into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and categories are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic categories: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced category, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving category corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded category, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

**Sustainability Evolving:** CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.
Sustainability Impeded: The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Sustainability Enhanced: Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

Sustainability Evolving: Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

Sustainability Impeded: CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. In this category, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

Sustainability Enhanced: A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

Sustainability Evolving: CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

Sustainability Impeded: New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

ADVOCACY

Sustainability Enhanced: The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2)
monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this category of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

**Sustainability Evolving:** Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

**Sustainability Impeded:** Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries in this category have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

**Sustainability Impeded:** A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize
the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

**Sustainability Evolving:** ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' forums are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

**Sustainability Impeded:** There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** This category is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

**Sustainability Impeded:** The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental," "nonprofit," or "civil society," including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
# ANNEX B: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX DATA

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## Middle East and North Africa

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80 THE 2013 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
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| Iraq                    | 5.4                     |
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