The 2011 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Report
for the Middle East and North Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
   Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Bureau for the Middle East
   Office of Middle East Program
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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the first edition of the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Report for the Middle East and North Africa. This report relies on local capacity and expertise to assess key components of the sustainability of the civil society organization (CSO) sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen, as well as the West Bank and Gaza.

This report employs the broad definition of a CSO developed by the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) at John Hopkins University’s Center for Civil Society Studies. Under this definition CSOs are defined broadly as “any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

The CSO Sustainability Report highlights both advances and setbacks in CSO sector sustainability, and it strives to allow for comparisons across countries and sub-regions over time. The report is a useful information source for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability of the CSO sector.

The Report’s methodology is qualitative and relies on local expertise (CSO practitioners and experts) to apply a standardized instrument in order to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of CSO sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. An editorial committee comprising technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s report with the aim of maintaining standards of quality and promoting cross-country comparability. Each dimension is rated on a three-stage scale: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. More detail about the methodology used to rate each dimension is provided in Annex A (pages 61 -68).

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals. Specific acknowledgements of the CSO implementers responsible for the Report appear on the following page. We would further like to express our deepest gratitude to all of the local CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert group panels in each country. Their knowledge, research, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this CSO Sustainability Report is based.

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1 Toward an Enabling Legal Environment for Civil Society, Statement of the 16th Annual Johns Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, Nairobi, Kenya. The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Volume 8, Issue 1, November 2005
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Arab Spring which began in December 2010 and continues today to yield rapid political change and increased demand for wider political participation has in turn inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) to renew their focus on advocacy and human rights in the region. In Yemen, for instance, the youth movement, having played a key role in the revolution, pursued more than 300 initiatives to build advocacy capacity and knowledge of public policy and democracy. In Egypt, many new CSOs emerged after the January 25th revolution to advocate on behalf of interest groups such as the disabled, arts professionals, and labor unions. In Morocco, youth organizations and networks effectively mobilized to contribute to the new constitution; the 2011 constitution now ensures CSO involvement in the monitoring and development of public policy.

The environment for CSOs in the countries and territories covered by the 2011 CSO Sustainability Report varied particularly in societies going through rapid political transformation. CSO sectors have differing levels of capacity to organize, sustain themselves, advocate for legislative and policy change, garner public support, and provide social services. The estimated size of the CSO sector in each country varies greatly and generally does not account for unregistered CSOs. Egypt’s CSO sector has over 45,000 registered and an estimated 50,000 other CSOs. Morocco reportedly has between 40,000 and 60,000 registered CSOs; Yemen has about 7,400; and Jordan has 2,813 CSOs registered with the Ministry of Social Development, and several thousand CSOs are registered with other government departments. Approximately 5,000 CSOs are registered in Lebanon, 1,196 in the West Bank, and about 800 in Gaza. In Iraq, in 2011 only about 650 organizations had registered under a new law governing the sector, while approximately 1,000 applications await decision.

The CSO Sustainability Report for calendar year 2011 covers seven dimensions of CSO sustainability: Legal Environment, Organizational Capacity, Financial Viability, Advocacy, Service Provision, Infrastructure, and Public Image. Each dimension is rated on a three-tier scale of Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. Based on the ratings of the dimensions, the country is then assigned a rating on the same scale. The precise definitions of these categories are provided in Annex A. Generally, the results of the rating process reveal that CSOs face a number of challenges. The overall sustainability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen are rated as Sustainability Impeded. In Yemen, for example, poor implementation of the law governing CSOs makes entry into the sector burdensome and leaves CSOs vulnerable to arbitrary interference. CSOs in Yemen typically have weak management structures, in which one leader monopolizes all decision making and operates without transparency. Most CSOs also lack permanent staff, well-articulated missions, or strategic plans. CSOs mainly depend on precarious foreign funding and do not have strong financial management systems. In addition, service provision often does not reflect community needs. The infrastructure for the CSO sector is weak, characterized by informal and short-term CSO networks and training that is difficult to access outside of major cities.

In Egypt, the sector suffers from limited citizen participation, lack of resources, and a restrictive legal and political environment that existed under the Mubarak regime. Since the January 25 revolution, CSO sustainability has been further constrained as a result of deterioration in the political and regulatory environments for the sector. In Jordan, laws restricting the ability of CSOs to advocate, weak organizational management, and heavy dependence on foreign donors hinder the sector’s sustainability.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sectors in Iraq and Morocco are rated as Sustainability Evolving, but in both countries several dimensions are rated as Impeded. While both countries have enabling laws for CSOs comparable to other countries in the region, implementation of these laws can be problematic. In Morocco, for example, associations must get a registration receipt before they are considered legal entities, but receipts are frequently withheld from CSOs perceived as politically threatening. In Iraq, the new law governing CSOs is enabling, but delays in implementation have hampered the registration process. Both Morocco and Iraq have witnessed increases in CSO advocacy initiatives in recent years, but the governments have mostly been unresponsive to these campaigns. CSOs in both countries do not sufficiently publicize their
work to generate support and do not tend to form networks and coalitions because of the perceived competition for funding.

Lebanon and West Bank and Gaza have overall ratings of Sustainability Evolving. In Lebanon, the all seven dimensions were rated as Sustainability Evolving. Lebanon’s legal environment allows for unobstructed registration, and CSOs are protected against arbitrary dissolution. Lebanese CSOs are becoming more effective at coalition-building and broad-based advocacy, and are able to efficiently deliver services that reflect the needs of constituents. The sector has resource centers and many training opportunities for CSOs, as well as intersectoral partnerships with government and businesses. CSOs in Lebanon also have a generally positive public image, in part due to their efforts to demonstrate transparency with the public regarding their activities.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the CSO sector delivers 90 percent of all social services and have decades of experience conducting needs assessments, contributing to the generally positive public image of the sector. Unlike many other countries, CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza form coalitions, which play an important role in successful lobbying and advocacy initiatives. The sector benefits from lawyers who have expertise in CSO law and work to protect the right of freedom of association. Most CSOs can access basic office equipment and technology. They also have well-developed financial management systems and annual audits. Several CSOs sub-grant donor and locally generated funding to other local organizations.

All of the countries’ CSO sectors are in the Sustainability Impeded category for organizational capacity, financial viability, and at least one other dimension. In the majority of countries and territories assessed by this report, CSOs typically lack strong management structures and permanent staff, and they have weak relationships with constituents because they tend to follow donor priorities instead of responding to community needs. They also lack long-term financial viability because they rely heavily on direct or indirect foreign funding.

Legal Environment

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The legal environment was rated as Sustainability Evolving in all countries and territories except for Egypt, which has a Sustainability Impeded rating. Jordan, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, however, faced significant challenges in their legal environments. Many of the countries have substantial barriers to registration and regulatory systems that enable government authorities to harass CSOs.

In Lebanon, registration processes are clear, dissolution for arbitrary or political reasons is rare, and CSOs are exempt from VAT and income taxes. Egypt, by contrast, has the most restrictive legal environment. The registration process is lengthy, complicated, and subject to broad governmental discretion. Associations, particularly human rights and advocacy organizations, have often been refused registration or dissolved on vague grounds such as threatening “national unity,” or violating “public order or morals.” Hostility to CSOs appears to have worsened in the post-revolution environment, but it remains to be seen if this will be improved with the election and formation of a new government. After the launch of an investigation into the foreign funding of CSOs and months of escalating anti-CSO rhetoric in 2011, the year ended with a dramatic raid by authorities on the offices of certain Egyptian and foreign CSOs, in which operations were shut down and equipment and documents were seized. In November 2011, the ministry regulating CSOs pushed for a new law that would place additional restrictions on CSOs, prompting widespread concern from the civil society sector.

The new CSO laws passed in Iraq and the Kurdistan region in 2010 exemplify international best practices on the freedom of association. However, across the countries covered in this report, the gap between enabling laws on paper and the realities of implementation often makes registration of CSOs difficult. Registration is
lengthy and complicated in Iraq, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. Additional burdens faced by CSOs seeking registration include a background security check on the founders of associations in Iraq and exorbitant registration fees and a minimum of twenty-one founders in Yemen.

Governments in many of these countries and territories arbitrarily dissolve CSOs or restrict their activities. Laws include vague wording that provide government authorities with wide discretion to interfere with CSOs that they find controversial. In Egypt and Jordan, CSOs are not allowed to engage in “political” activities and both governments have used this prohibition to restrict CSO operations. In the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen, CSOs have been arbitrarily dissolved or stopped from carrying out activities because of CSOs’ perceived affiliations with political opponents.

Lawyers specializing in CSO law are uncommon in these countries and territories, and the few legal experts are concentrated in major cities. West Bank and Gaza is an exception; a number of lawyers have expertise in CSO law and regularly monitor and challenge violations of the right of association.

**Organizational Capacity**

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Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza stand out for having significantly stronger organizational capacity’s CSO sectors; organizational capacity was rated as Sustainability Evolving in both. All other countries have a Sustainability Impeded rating for this dimension.

In nearly all these countries and territories, CSOs tend to have weak relationships with local constituencies. In Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, CSOs fail to address or understand the priorities of the communities they serve. In Lebanon, CSOs prioritize constituency building but often find that target communities are uncommitted. In several countries, CSOs vary in their abilities to build local support. In Yemen, human rights organizations cultivate public support through campaigns, while service providers have a tenuous relationship with constituents because of their inability to meet the demand for services. In the West Bank and Gaza, trade unions and youth and women’s groups, as well as organizations focusing on the West Bank barrier and land confiscation issues have excelled at building local constituencies. However, many other organizations, including large national ones, struggle to build support and some even deliberately restrict membership.

CSOs in the countries and territories assessed by this report do not tend to have strong strategic plans. When they do, the plans are created primarily to meet donor requirements and are rarely implemented. Most CSOs are oriented toward short-term goals and define their missions broadly in order to be eligible for diverse sources of funding. Because of unreliable or inconsistent access to funding and the inability to compete with the pay scales of international organizations, CSOs in nearly all of these countries have trouble retaining permanent staff. In Yemen, for example, only 15 percent of CSOs have paid staff. CSOs in Jordan and Morocco are run primarily by volunteers, while CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza rely on a mix of volunteers and temporary staff based on funding availability and project cycles. In Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, and Yemen, the lack of a volunteer culture or the absence of effective recruitment systems prevent CSOs from relying on volunteers.

**Financial Viability**

Financial viability is the weakest dimension overall across these countries and territories. Except for Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza, all of them have a Sustainability Impeded rating. In Yemen, the political and economic unrest
generated by the Arab Spring and rising unemployment have diminished access to funding for many CSOs as donors channeled funding toward human rights and humanitarian relief initiatives.

CSOs in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and to a lesser extent, Egypt, heavily depend on foreign funding. As a result, their financial viability remains precarious. In Morocco, on the other hand, 80 percent of CSOs depend almost entirely on membership fees for funding, although many small CSOs also receive small grants from government-affiliated development agencies. In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen, CSOs that receive foreign funding require government approval or notification. In Egypt, obtaining approval for foreign funding can take a long time and organizations that receive foreign funds without approval can be shut down.

Funding that originates from local sources is uncommon across the countries in this report. CSOs in Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Morocco, and Yemen typically attract local philanthropy only for charitable projects for the poor or to fulfill religious charitable obligations. Similarly, in Lebanon, CSOs with religious affiliations are more able to raise funds locally, but this funding is insufficient to sustain service provision and does not affect advocacy or long-term development activities. Support from government and business sectors to CSOs is still nascent in most of the countries.

Economic activity and membership fees generally do not generate significant income for CSOs. CSOs in most of the countries typically charge either small or no fees for services because recipients cannot afford to pay. In Yemen, because of high start-up costs and low returns, 90 percent of CSOs do not earn any income.

With the exception of CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon, organizations in the countries covered in this report tend to have weak financial systems and internal controls. Many do not submit financial or annual reports, even though they are required by law in most countries. CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza have well-developed financial management systems, submit annual reports, and undergo independent audits. CSOs in Lebanon also typically submit financial and annual reports and publish information on their websites to promote transparency.

**Advocacy**

A renewed drive for political participation emerged following the Arab Spring, prompting CSOs in several countries and territories to increase their interaction and cooperation with local governments, as well as their advocacy efforts. Sustainability in this dimension in most of the countries and territories are rated as Sustainability Evolving. CSOs in Lebanon, for example, are becoming more effective at building coalitions and executing broad-based advocacy campaigns around certain issues, and they frequently cooperate with local authorities on joint projects. The CSO sector in Iraq has experienced rapid development in advocacy over the last two years, creating coalitions and implementing several successful initiatives, including the enactment of a new law on associations in 2010, a lawsuit against parliament to force it to resume sessions, and many local civic campaigns. Jordan and Egypt are the weakest in this dimension and have Sustainability Impeded ratings. Advocacy efforts in these countries are nascent, and CSOs have little formalized communication with policymakers or impact on policy and legislative processes.

Advocacy and lobbying efforts have gained momentum in some of the countries and territories since the Arab Spring. For instance, in Yemen, the youth movement in 2011 led to more than 300 initiatives to build

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advocacy capacity and knowledge of public policy and democracy. Several CSOs also worked with the youth movement to record human rights abuses and contemplate a new political system for the country. Donor funding for human rights advocacy also increased, further contributing to the growth of advocacy efforts. In Egypt, many new CSOs emerged after the January 25th revolution to advocate on behalf of interest groups, including the disabled, arts professionals, and labor unions. However, Egyptian CSOs are prohibited from engaging in “political” activities, a vague term that officials sometimes interpret as prohibiting civil or human rights initiatives, making such advocacy efforts risky. In Morocco and Jordan, advocacy efforts continue to be rare.

CSO advocacy efforts have declined in the West Bank since 2007 when the Palestinian Legislative Council was suspended and the Palestinian Authority began prioritizing security. In Gaza, Hamas disallows advocacy activities. CSOs in Lebanon prioritize advocacy efforts and have launched broad-based advocacy campaigns, but a politically divided legislative system has limited their influence on lawmakers.

In Iraq, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza, CSOs and local governments frequently work together on projects. In Lebanon, for instance, CSOs and local authorities work jointly on projects relating to transparency in governance, the environment, and small-scale economic support. Iraq’s CSO sector notably has open lines of communication with the national government. The prime minister and parliaments of both the federal government and the government of Kurdistan have standing committees that meet with CSOs at least once a week, enabling CSOs to comment on all draft bills. In other countries, CSO cooperation with the central government continues to be infrequent, but the Arab Spring has spurred some collaborative legislative initiatives. In Morocco, the central government worked with CSOs on the development of the 2011 constitution, which included provisions that increase CSOs’ roles in the monitoring and crafting of public policy. In Jordan, the central government consulted with CSOs in 2011 regarding amendments to the 2008 and 2009 laws governing civil society, although the government has yet to implement the sector’s recommendations.

**Service Provision**

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Service provision was rated as Sustainability Evolving in all of these countries and territories, the strongest dimension in this report. However, there are differences among the countries and territories in Lebanon, for example, CSOs efficiently deliver needed services to their constituents. On the other end of the spectrum, CSOs in Yemen provide a wide range of services, but they often diverge from the needs of the community.

Despite the range of services available in most of the countries, the services provided do not necessarily reflect the needs of the recipient communities. In Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, service provision is driven by foreign donor priorities, which often differ from actual community needs. In Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt, CSOs often neglect to conduct needs assessments to determine how to provide services most efficiently and effectively. In the West Bank and Gaza, by contrast, CSOs have decades of experience conducting needs assessments.

Across the region, CSOs often fill gaps in government-provided services, according to the expert panels; in the West Bank and Gaza, CSOs provided many social services. In Lebanon, CSOs surpassed the government in providing social services that reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents.

CSOs in these countries and territories typically do not recover the costs of services because beneficiaries cannot afford them. However, in Morocco, beneficiaries sometimes make in-kind contributions such as digging wells and building schoolrooms or providing food, clothing, and shelter to immigrants. Iraq has a few
CSOs, including a non-profit medical clinic and a women’s training organization, that have become self-sustaining.

Government recognition and support for CSO service provision vary considerably among these countries and territories. In Egypt, the government respects the role of CSOs in service delivery and subcontracts with them for service provision. In Morocco, the West Bank, and Yemen, cooperation between CSOs and the government is limited but increasing. In Gaza, the government places restrictions on service delivery organizations unless they are affiliated with the ruling party.

**Infrastructure**

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Except for Yemen, these countries and territories have intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers in their main cities that provide technical support to the sector. CSOs based outside of the main cities often have difficulty accessing this support. The availability of training varies. In Egypt and Lebanon, trainers on CSO management are available and cover a wide range of subjects, but Iraq and Yemen have few qualified trainers for CSOs.

CSOs in the countries and territories generally do not exchange information or work on projects because of perceived competition for recognition and funding. In Morocco, 80 percent of CSOs do not belong to a CSO network and two-thirds of CSOs are not aware of any network in which they could participate. In Jordan, there is very little coordination among CSOs, and there is no initiative to facilitate information-sharing within the sector. In the West Bank and Gaza, competition for funding leads organizations to exchange information only if they have similar political positions or if their members are on the governing bodies of multiple organizations. In Yemen, CSOs form coalitions to address immediate issues such as a new draft law, but dissolve after the issue is resolved. In Lebanon, where CSOs have been wary of sharing information, a network composed of CSOs, international donors, and individuals is forming and will use a website to foster information exchange.

Intersectoral partnerships with businesses or government are generally rare or at a nascent stage in these countries and territories. Large local businesses and multinational corporations are beginning to support CSOs in Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan. In Iraq, the government has started joint projects with CSOs, but most of the projects have been unsuccessful because of mutual distrust. In Morocco, coordination with the government is limited to small grants to CSOs for service delivery. Lebanon’s CSO sector is an exception, as most CSO projects are carried out in partnership with individual, local, or international businesses, or central or local government authorities.

**Public Image**

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Most of the countries and territories in this report have a Sustainability Evolving rating for Public Image dimension, according to the expert panels. Lebanon’s sector, for example, enjoys a generally positive image with the public, government, and businesses, in part because CSOs use social media and demonstrate transparency in operations through annual reports, submission to independent auditing, and adoption of a code of ethics. Public Image in Iraq and Egypt, however, is rated as Sustainability Impeded. In Egypt, during 2011, the government has aggressively promoted a negative image of CSOs as corrupt, driven by foreign agendas, not transparent, and unwilling to adopt codes of ethics.
Public reception of CSO activities varies considerably by country. Local service providers, particularly in Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and the West Bank and Gaza tend to have the most positive public images because their constituents appreciate their services. In Yemen, however, the public sees CSOs as ineffective at responding to community needs and only concerned with personal gain.

According to these country reports, human rights and advocacy organization enjoyed relatively less support from the public than service organizations in 2011. In Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza, advocacy and human rights organizations are seen as agents of the West. In Lebanon, however, the public makes little distinction between charitable and advocacy organizations, and perceives the sector as working in the public interest.

Media reception to CSO activities also varied considerably by country in 2011. In Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen, media coverage of the sector is limited to government-supported CSO activities. Controversial advocacy activities are rarely covered in these countries, although such coverage has increased in Yemen since the Arab Spring and the country’s 2011 youth uprising. In Lebanon, the media positively reports on and analyzes CSO contributions to Lebanese society, including civil rights actions and development initiatives. In the West Bank and Gaza, local media cover CSO activities and publish public service announcements, but do not publish opinion pieces by CSOs unless they are paid or have political implications. In Egypt and Iraq, news organizations cast doubt on the sector’s credibility or inaccurately report on its activities.

The governments in Lebanon and Jordan have a positive perception of CSOs and recognize their role in providing social services, but the Jordanian government also perceives some CSOs to be a threat to its stability, and thus supports the expansion of civil society while seeking to keep it aligned with government policies. In Morocco, the government has begun to consult with certain CSOs with which it has implemented successful projects, but much of its interaction with the sector is for publicity. In Yemen, many in the government see some CSOs as having foreign agendas, but some government officials consult with them on non-controversial issues such as HIV prevention.

Generally, the CSO sectors in all the countries and territories in this report are challenged by a lack of transparency and accountability, which often contributes to a negative image of CSOs. With the exception of Lebanon, CSOs have not widely adopted codes of ethics, do not undergo independent audits, and often do not make annual reports available to the public. Many CSOs are making strides to improve this situation. For instance, in the West Bank and Gaza, a code of ethics was recently signed by 600 CSOs, and there is a growing tendency in Yemen to publish annual reports online.

CONCLUSION

This baseline assessment of sustainability in the MENA region illustrates the impact of rapid political changes on the CSO sector and continued areas of weakness that impede long-term sustainability. By providing this data, CSO activists, policymakers, and the international community can begin to track trends and utilize this information when determining priorities and approaches.
### 2011 CSO Sustainability Ratings

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
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Despite repressive autocratic restrictions on civil society activity, Egypt has a large civil society sector encompassing thousands of formal and informal organizations that vary widely in size, composition, and mission. According to the Institute of Development Studies, there are over 45,000 registered CSOs with approximately 30,000 civic associations; 13,000 agricultural, housing, and water cooperatives; 5,400 youth and sports centers; 115 trade and industry chambers; 24 professional syndicates; and 22 unions. Civil society experts in the field estimate an additional 50,000 unregistered CSOs. The repercussions for operating without a license include individual fines and imprisonment. Professional syndicates have resurfaced and have become increasingly active since the revolution.

Although the number of civic organizations has grown over the last ten years from about 13,000 in 1991, many are no longer operating and exist only on paper; there is no data on how many remain active. A large proportion of CSOs are located in the governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria and many focus on development and social services, and on cultural, academic, and religious activities.

Political protest groups have emerged and grown since 2004. Several of them, such as the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page, Hashd Movement, 6th of April Movement, Justice and Freedom Movement, Kifaya, and the National Association for Change, played key roles in organizing the January 25th revolution.

2 The expert panel for this report was composed of 16 people: 8 female, 9 male; 4 from universities and 12 from CSOs.

The Muslim Brotherhood, in a blurring of lines between civil society and the political sphere, and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), have taken on larger roles since the revolution.

Under Mubarak, limited citizen participation, lack of resources, and a highly constrained political environment characterized the sector. The NGO Law 84 of 2002 grants wide-ranging discretionary controls to the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA), effectively denying licenses to groups that are perceived as threatening to the government or engaging in activities the government does not support. The law also restricts foreign funding to NGOs and imposes penalties, including fines or imprisonment, for non-compliance with the law.

The January 25th uprising presented opportunities for civil society to widen its impact, create a more fertile environment for democratization, and generate socio-economic improvement and development. For example, under the Mubarak regime, the law required all unions to be a part of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), an organization perceived to be a part of the government apparatus to control dissent and manage the economy. During the revolution, the Egyptian Federation for Independent Unions (EFIU) was established and independent unions emerged.

Since the uprising, however, there has been a noticeable deterioration in the political, regulatory, and civil society environment, culminating in the raid of several non-registered organizations in December. Organizations such as Freedom House perceive the raids as a sign that the post-revolution government seeks to repress civil society.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: IMPEDED**

The Law on Associations and Community Foundations (Law 84 of 2002) governs all NGOs including associations, foundations, and unions regardless of their activities. MISA supervises the application of the law and regulates the activities of associations. Various government agencies regulate other types of CSOs: trade unions are regulated by the government-controlled General Federation for Egyptian Workers’ Unions, agricultural cooperatives by the Ministry of Agriculture, and industrial cooperatives by the Ministry of Industry. In the past, all of these regulatory bodies have adopted cooptation strategies to keep CSOs in line with state policies by appointing political allies or threatening harassment by security forces.

In November 2011, MISA announced its intention to issue a new NGO law and posted a draft version of it on its website. MISA also mailed copies of the proposed draft law to all registered NGOs and announced that the new NGO law would be effective as of January 2012. Most NGOs did not agree with the new provisions and additional restrictions included in the draft law proposed by MISA and there were numerous public debates and roundtable discussions regarding the proposed legislation. Several NGOs and NGO networks submitted official complaints and responses to MISA on the proposed law at the end of 2011.

Law 84 of 2002 specifies guidelines for NGO activities, internal management, and financial reporting but there is a lot of confusion in practice around the interpretation of permissible activities. According to the law, associations are prohibited from engaging in any political activities, which are restricted for trade unions and political parties only. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of activities that are considered political, opening the door to arbitrary enforcement based on the determination of individual MISA officials. For example, human rights CSOs see their work as civil in nature and therefore, in line with the law; however, the government has harassed human rights organizations, among others, for being political in nature, which is illegal. In addition, MISA approval is legally required before CSOs can accept foreign funding, but organizations involved in controversial activities cannot secure approval in a timely fashion, if at all. In order
to get around the problems of obtaining MISA approval of activities and foreign funding, more CSOs are registering as private companies, which are regulated by the Ministry of Investment, or as individual consulting firms, which are not subject to any significant government oversight.

The law requires MISA to respond to a license application within 60 days, but in practice the registration process is often lengthy and complicated. Applications are often returned for being incomplete even when they are fully complete, effectively and illegally denying registration. MISA has the right to accept or reject an application that it deems threatening to “national unity” or that might violate “public order or morals,” opening grounds for interpretation. This ambiguity grants MISA the ability to deny licensing to groups that the government perceives as threatening or engaging in activities not supported by the government. The government’s power to dissolve or seize the assets of organizations on vague grounds and harassment by security authorities make it difficult for CSOs to operate. Examples of this are the continuous harassment of human rights CSOs and the raiding of the offices of several Egyptian and international CSOs towards the end of 2011.

CSOs have limited access to legal services, especially outside the main cities. Legal services are often expensive and of low quality, although both their availability and quality has improved. An increasing number of law firms provide pro bono services to CSOs and increasing numbers of lawyers have been trained in CSO laws and regulations.

According to Law 84 of 2002, associations have the right to accept contributions “from natural or juridical persons.” Associations are exempt from registration and entry duties, property taxes, and customs duties on imported supplies and equipment and receive a 25 percent discount on the transportation of goods on national railways as well as a 50 percent discount on water, gas, and electricity. However, associations are not always aware of these benefits and face obstacles in claiming them; for example, it can take a very long time for tax-exemption letters for imported equipment to be granted.

Legally, all CSOs can compete for government contracts, but in practice government contracts are usually awarded to food and agriculture cooperatives only. According to Law 84 of 2002, NGOs are legally allowed to earn income as long as the income-generating activity falls within the purpose of the association and the income is generated within Egypt.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:**

CSOs operating in the urban areas tend to have much greater capacity than those in rural areas, and organizations in Upper Egypt are particularly lacking in capacity. Organizations with more financial resources, such as professional syndicates and newly established sports clubs, tend to adopt better management practices, have well-defined missions and strategic plans, and actively build local constituencies for their initiatives. However, many CSOs, including small, community-based ones, are more donor driven, implementing the activities donors are willing to support. Despite their focus on obtaining donor funding, however, only a limited number of CSOs are actually able to access these funds. Because many organizations do not primarily address the priorities of their communities, they tend to have weak ties with their constituents.

While organizations like Ashoka Arab World and other large CSOs have strong leadership and solid organizational structures, many smaller associations often rely on one capable individual to lead the organization. In many associations, board members do not understand their roles, and assume executive functions and manage day-to-day operations. Claims of nepotism and corruption are common, including
favoring family members, relatives, and friends for employment opportunities and/or service provision, as well as using restricted project funding for non-project purposes.

Few local CSOs can maintain full- or part-time employees, in particular in senior management, due, in part, to limited and irregular funding and the draw of better paying, more stable jobs with international organizations. The only management degree program in the country specific to CSO management is Cairo University’s NGO management diploma. As a result, organizations find it difficult to find and retain staff with the skills and training required to manage an organization. In 2011, however, recent graduates with advanced degrees began showing a renewed interest in the CSO sector. Many of these graduates volunteer to work at CSOs through Egyptian universities’ volunteer programs and centers. Many CSOs, however, do not have adequate human resource practices or systems to recruit and manage volunteers.

With the cost of modern technology decreasing, most CSOs now have access to modern office equipment. However, they still depend on funding from foreign donors to purchase it.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

Most CSOs operate with short-term and inconsistent funding. CSOs receive funding from national and international organizations, Egyptian businesses, the public sector, and individuals. Law 84 of 2002 states that no association has the right to obtain money from abroad, an Egyptian or foreign person or bodies, or a local representative without prior approval from MISA. The receipt of funds without prior approval is illegal, but the approval process can take a long time and failure to secure it can lead to the closure of the organization. For this reason, many organizations register as civil companies.

Several CSOs receive large foreign grants and issue sub-grants to CBOs. By law, CSOs are required to adopt paper-based book-keeping methods for financial audits, but in many cases CSOs have weak financial systems, policies, and internal controls. There is usually no clear division of tasks between the financial officer, accountant, and bookkeeper and all financial decisions and relevant signatures are often in the hands of one or two individuals.

Some CSOs, especially those providing social services, direct aid, or health services, have received increased support from local Egyptian corporations since the revolution. For example, the Egyptian Food Bank is funded by Sallam, Dar el Orman by Kabnoury, and the Gozour Foundation by Barclays’ Bank and CIB. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) such as the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), Caritas, and the Young Muslim Women Association are able to raise local funds successfully. These FBOs rely heavily on religious charity obligations in order to attract philanthropic contributions.

Some CSOs, particularly professional associations, generate revenue from membership fees. Others charge fees for services and products such as carpentry, prints, or crafts. Environmental CSOs operate over 17,000 nurseries that provide seedlings to community members and the government. Many CSOs provide health and education services to the poor at low and subsidized fees, supported by donations.
Before and during the revolution, CSOs had limited impact on policy and communication between CSOs and policymakers was limited due to a lack of advocacy capacity. Professional associations and unions generally have better access to government officials than other kinds of CSOs. Generally, CSOs are not prevented from advocating for particular initiatives, but are barred from participating in any quasi-political activities.

Human rights coalitions and groups that protect the rights of HIV-positive populations have achieved notable results over the past few years through their advocacy campaigns. The Freedom Program, for example, promotes the rights of people living with AIDS. Many new revolutionary groups, coalitions, and committees were formed during the January 25th revolution and, along with established CSOs, are voicing their concerns for the future of Egypt. For example, CSOs serving the disabled advocate to enforce existing laws that protect employment and social service rights for their constituents. The Syndicate of Arts Professionals advocate for a new constitution that protects freedom of expression for writers and artists. Women's organizations are advocating for women's representation in the new constitution and the right of women to make their own choices with regard to their families and professional lives. In addition, a number of labor unions are advocating for better wages and work environments for their constituencies. It is too early to assess the extent to which these lobbying and advocacy efforts will translate into legislative or policy change.

The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights formed a network of approximately 127 CSOs composed of political and human rights activists, representatives of CSOs, political parties, and law professors to actively lobby for reforms to a new draft law that would nationalize the civil society sector. This new draft law conflicts with international agreements to which Egypt is a signatory, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

During recent parliamentary elections, civic organizations were used for political purposes. For example, several candidates used their own charitable organizations or formed affiliations with popular existing organizations for purposes of self-promotion.

The number of associations providing services has grown in the past three decades as the government’s capacity to provide public services declined. CSOs provide services and direct aid in areas of social development such as women’s empowerment, street children’s needs, life skills for youth, literacy programs and cultural, academic, and religious activities and are often more effective than the state. While most of these organizations improve the well-being of citizens through direct aid, they are less successful in fostering sustainable development that empowers communities to provide for themselves.

Many CSOs provide other services such as subsidized or free health care and rely on participation, commitment, and contributions from citizens to sustain themselves. In many cases, these services end abruptly when funding runs out. CSOs that provide services directly rarely conduct needs assessments and typically assume that the needs of society are sufficiently grave to necessitate the provision of basic social services.
Several faith-based groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, are not formally registered as NGOs or CSOs but provide charity and other services such as food, clothing, health, and educational services to low-income communities through their members and other informal channels. As the Muslim Brotherhood and other faith-based groups, such as the Salafis, establish political parties, there are growing concerns that their service provisions are being used to gain political support.

Several CSOs such as Nahdet El Mahrousaa, a youth-oriented organization, provide services to a wider clientele than just their members. In many cases, CSOs that serve their own members exclusively have a negative impact on the wider society. For example, several professional associations bought arable land and used it for housing and recreational purposes to the detriment of agricultural production. CSOs rarely provide services to international organizations because the law sets barriers to international contact and these organizations often lack the technical expertise and language skills to develop and market beneficial services.

In 2011, the government recognized CSOs’ roles in the provision of services by issuing contracts for services provision, for example, due to the utility of CSO services and because having a visible CSO sector improves Egypt’s international standing.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**

Since the 1980s, foreign donors including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swiss Fund, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) have invested heavily in local CSO capacity building. CSO management trainers and technical assistants in various fields such as health, agriculture, employment, and education are available at Egyptian-established Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) including the NGO Service Center, the Center for Development Services (CDS), the ICT Trust Fund, and the Nile Center for IT Technologies.

Many of these ISOs are established in the three main governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria and provide technical assistance and capacity building services either for a fee or for free. Due to the large size and diversity of the sector in Egypt, these capacity building efforts only reach a relatively small number of CSOs. The primary beneficiaries have been community-based associations involved in donor-funded programs; large Egyptian CSOs like CEOSS, Caritas, and the Upper Egypt Association that serve as umbrella organizations for large, multi-CSO projects funded by international donors; and newly emerging advocacy and human rights organizations. The government-affiliated, regional CSO federations in various parts of the country focus on administrative duties and lack the capacity to coordinate between CSOs and the donor community.

Several large local CSOs such as Nahdet El Mahrousaa, Ashoka Foundation, Resala, Magdy Yacoub Foundation, and the Misr El Kheir Foundation provide sub-grants to smaller CSOs. Few small CSOs have the ability to manage sub-grants because of donor financial and program reporting requirements.

Large CSOs sometimes reach out to cooperate with smaller organizations; however, CSOs generally refrain from sharing information because they consider themselves to be in competition with one another; however, religious organizations closely work with faith-based CSOs.
There is little cooperation between the Egyptian business sector and civil society. The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is relatively new and the government has not adopted policies that promote socially responsible practices. However, large Egyptian businesses such as Mobinil, Vodafone, CIB, Orascom, and Amer Group as well as multinational corporations such as Microsoft, Barclays, IBM, Levi-Strauss, and Procter & Gamble are actively engaged in supporting development work and providing role models for Egyptian companies. Each company focuses on a different area such as health, education, environment, youth, and job creation. Still, most Egyptian business leaders think of civil society work as mainly charity work for orphanages and sick children.

PUBLIC IMAGE: IMPEDED

The Egyptian media often minimizes the importance of CSOs and even cast doubts on some CSOs activities and sources of funding. Only a few large direct-service CSOs such as Resala, the Egyptian Food Bank, and the Misr El Kheir Foundation have succeeded in securing positive media coverage through effective outreach and public relations. Most CSOs do not have public relations capacity and cannot afford to hire external media and marketing consultants. Large CSOs mainly publicize their work through their websites; radio, TV, or newspaper advertisements; and postings at places of worship, universities, and sports and recreational clubs.

Following the January 25th revolution in the summer of 2011, the government started aggressively campaigning against CSOs it perceived as having a foreign agenda to undermine the nation’s stability. Many Egyptians do not understand the function of CSOs and they consider the sector overall to be corrupt and untrustworthy. The panel asserts that this is due to the negative perceptions perpetuated by the previous government and the media. The Egyptian population has a better perception of FBOs that provide direct services and work with orphanages, environmental organizations, and women’s groups. A large number of Egyptians also trust trade unions, according to the panel.

There is a major lack of trust between the private sector and CSOs. The private sector regards CSOs as poorly managed organizations lacking transparency and solid financial practices. CSOs, in turn, view businesses as lacking social responsibility.

Egyptian CSOs have been slow to adopt a code of ethics or transparent practices. Even leading organizations that publish annual reports typically fail to operate transparently. CSOs are calling for a more transparent and accountable government and recognize that their sector also needs to operate according to similar standards.
CSO Sustainability: EVOLVING

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have a history in Iraq that precedes the establishment of the modern state. Trade guilds as well as religious and educational societies existed in the earliest days of the Baghdad-based Abbasid caliphate and persisted through the Ottoman and British occupations. The early modern Iraqi state featured social clubs, trade unions, and non-profit cultural and educational organizations. Unfortunately, with the rise of the Ba’ath Party, independent civil society began to disappear and by the end of the Saddam Hussein regime, there were almost no independent Iraqi CSOs except for a handful of religious and charitable organizations. One major exception to this rule was the Kurdistan region where dozens of organizations emerged after the first U.S. invasion in 1991 and the withdrawal of Iraqi soldiers. To date, there remain few local or indigenous associations in Iraq.

After the second U.S. invasion and the collapse of the former regime in April 2003, civil society underwent an explosive growth across the country. Funding for these groups came primarily in the form of humanitarian assistance from international and multilateral organizations, including the U.S. government and UN agencies. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 45 on Non-Governmental Organizations (CPA Order 45) came into force in November 2003 and required the registration of “any organization or foundation that is organized to undertake... any... non-profit activity” (Section 1.1), but this order was loosely enforced and thousands of unregistered CSOs emerged and began operations.

4 The expert panel for this report was composed of 12 of people: 5 female, 7 male; 1 from a university, 10 from CSOs, and 1 lawyer.
Initially, the vast majority of Iraqi CSOs focused on implementing humanitarian assistance projects for internally displaced persons (IDPs), vulnerable groups, and victims of war and violence. The 2004 elections and constitutional reform process created new opportunities for Iraqi CSOs and many began to conduct activities in advocacy, human rights promotion, peace and reconciliation, capacity-building, and legal aid to vulnerable groups. These activities were further expanded in scope and degree as greater security returned to the country following the surge of U.S. troops in 2007.

Despite the important role CSOs play in Iraqi society, the current political and security context and lack of funding opportunities in Iraq pose numerous challenges. An extreme deterioration in the security situation and heightened activity by religious militias, particularly in Baghdad, Mosul, Diyala, and Anbar, has severely restricted activism and service delivery.

After years of lobbying by Iraqi and international CSOs to replace the restrictive CPA Order 45, Iraq’s Council of Representatives passed a new Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (Law 12 of 2010) in January of 2010. Although the law contained some restrictive provisions, by and large, Law 12 of 2010 represented a revolutionary break with the past for Iraqi civil society and was hailed as a highly enabling law for CSOs and mostly consistent with international best practices. Unfortunately, implementation of the new law has been highly problematic (see below) and as of late 2011, only about 650 organizations had registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) under the new law. Approximately 1,000 applications are pending decisions.

According to the Iraqi government, more than 8,000 unregistered organizations were in operation prior to the passage of Law 12 of 2010 although some independent observers have put this number closer to 3,000. It is clear that the sector has shrunk since the passing of the new law, though it is not yet clear whether this is due to natural post-war consolidation or the result of confusion and uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the new law.

In the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a new Law on Non-Governmental Organizations Operating in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG Law 1 of 2011) was passed shortly after the federal Law 12 of 2010. By any measure, KRG Law 1 of 2011 is a model of best practices in CSO regulation and among the most enabling laws of its type ever passed in the Middle East and North Africa. As with the federal law, however, implementation of the new KRG law has stalled and registration of new organizations have been frozen for almost one year. As a result, the 600 CSOs in operation in the KRG today are mostly organizations that were registered under previous Kurdish CSO laws. There are almost no unregistered organizations operating in Kurdistan.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

The federal Law 12 of 2010 provides the legal framework for CSOs operating anywhere in Iraq, except the three governorates that make up the KRG. The KRG Law 1 of 2011 is the legal framework for CSOs operating in the Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah governorates.

Iraqi civil society played a major role in the development of both laws and was very supportive in both of their passages. At both the federal and Kurdish levels, civil society leaders worked directly with members of parliament and government officials to draft the two laws. CSOs organized major educational and advocacy campaigns to create public and governmental support for the enabling laws and built coalitions that included thousands of representatives to work for their passage.

The two laws are broadly similar; both do away with long-standing restrictions on the right to freedom of association and make registration and domestic and international fundraising substantially easier than at any
point in Iraqi history. Both laws also remove the possibility of imprisonment for violations and require the
government to obtain court orders before attempting to dissolve an organization for violating the law.
Notably, the KRG law establishes a simpler registration procedure than the federal law and also treats
international and domestic organizations, as well as Kurdish and foreign nationals, in exactly the same way.
By contrast, the federal law imposes restrictions on the associational rights of non-citizens and the registering
of foreign organizations.

Subsequent implementing regulations issued at the federal level have imposed a mandatory registration
requirement that clearly violates the spirit and legislative history of Law 12 of 2010. Several Iraqi CSO leaders
have threatened to bring suit over this requirement, but the NGOs Directorate has not aggressively sought to
enforce the registration requirement and no lawsuits have been filed at the time of this report. In the KRG,
by contrast, registration of CSOs remains completely voluntary.

The optimism that greeted the passage of Law 12 of 2010 and KRG Law 1 of 2011 was dampened by the
implementation problems and delays that followed. Because it took the federal government several months to
form after the 2010 parliamentary elections, it was almost a full year before the NGOs Directorate began
operations. The NGOs Directorate’s registration process was extremely burdensome, although this was
remedied in part by the adoption of new registration forms designed in conjunction with Iraqi and
international organizations. In addition, the operation of a separate Law on Justice and Accountability,
popularly known as the “de-Baathification law,” created substantial processing delays because it required
background checks on all NGO founders by a separate agency. To its credit, the NGOs Directorate is now
working to address many of these issues.

Similarly, in the KRG, registration of new NGOs has been frozen since passage of Law 1 of 2011. The
KRG’s NGOs Department is still in the process of hiring staff and building an office, and is working now
with international organizations and Kurdish NGOs to finalize the registration procedures and announce new
registration forms. The NGOs Department was expected to begin registration of new NGOs and re-
registration of existing NGOs at the end of 2011, but the process has been pushed into 2012.

The new laws make it illegal for the government to dissolve CSOs or halt their activities without a court
order. CSOs are required to submit annual financial and activity reports to the NGOs Directorate (for
federally-registered organizations) and/or the NGOs Department (for organizations registered in the KRG).
This system has started to improve transparency and trust between civil society and the government to some
degree.

In some cases, the government has used bureaucratic stalling techniques, such as withholding necessary
permits from the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Education to block CSOs from pursuing activities; in
other cases, the police have illegally interfered in CSO activities. CSOs have little recourse against these
actions because they lack access to quality legal services. Though many lawyers are members of one or more
CSOs, very few specialize in CSO law and some do not even understand the registration process.

Tax regulation for CSOs remains unclear. Few CSOs paid taxes before Law 12 of 2010 and KRG Law 1 of
2011 were passed, but under the new laws only CSOs classified as public benefit organizations are tax
exempt. (The process of obtaining a public benefit designation is ambiguous, requiring a decision of the
Council of Ministers.) Employees of CSOs registered in the KRG do not pay income tax, but this exemption
is not extended to employees of CSOs registered with the federal NGOs Directorate.

The new laws allow CSOs to accept grants from both national and international donors and to partner with
any national or international organization without prior approval.
CSOs do not face any legal restrictions that prevent them from earning income; however, Iraqi citizens have come to expect free services from CSOs. As a result, organizations have a difficult time charging fees for trainings or materials, which limits income-generating opportunities.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:**

Few Iraqi CSOs attempt to build local constituencies for their activities, use volunteers, or form partnerships. Instead, they focus on building internal capacity and implementing projects as grants are awarded. CSOs are beginning to recognize the importance of strategic planning as an important process for new organizations, and as a method for responding to community needs. According to the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), 60 to 70 percent of Iraqi CSOs have been trained on strategic planning; however, Iraqi CSOs rarely follow their strategic plans due to financial restraints.

Many Iraqi CSOs have weak management structures that do not clearly define the roles of, or separation between, the board of directors and management. This is due to the fact that many CSOs have little formal organizational structure, a weak or non-existent human resources department, and no written job descriptions. Local CSOs find it difficult to recruit and retain qualified staff due, in part, to a dearth of experts. Furthermore, as employees gain experience, they frequently leave to work for international NGOs that offer more competitive salaries. Many of the most qualified workers also leave the country. Few CSOs have a system in place to mobilize volunteers and this is exacerbated by the fact that Iraq lacks a volunteer culture.

Access to technology and modern office equipment has improved rapidly over the last two years. While CSOs are generally ahead of the government in their effective use of social networks, new media, and technology overall, they do not use new media efficiently. The quality of Internet access remains poor in some parts of Iraq and many CSOs lack the training to use modern technology.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

Iraqi CSOs rely almost exclusively on grants from international organizations and UN agencies to implement relief efforts. Religious organizations provide the largest source of local funding, but they have limited funds and often distribute them to their affiliated organizations exclusively. In 2010, Asiacell and Zain telecommunications companies funded organizations that worked to help Iraqi widows, but this program has ceased and there was no further private sector funding in 2011. According to the NCCI, 82 percent of CSOs do not have access to non-sectarian local funding. As a result, most Iraqi CSOs are not viable if they lose funding from international sources.

Law 12 of 2010 and KRG Law 1 of 2011 requires CSOs to submit annual and financial reports to promote transparency. However, CSOs rarely follow this requirement as they generally lack professional financial services and do not understand the purpose of publishing financial statements. Some CSOs consider it very dangerous to publish their budgets and sources of foreign funding, as extremist groups regard some sources of funding as promoting a western agenda; for example, extremist groups in Musol, Diyala, and other conflict-prone areas of Iraq have attacked CSOs that have received funding from international organizations.

International donors generally do not fund long-term or income-generating projects, preventing Iraqi CSOs from developing sustainable funding sources. Very few individuals or businesses donate to CSOs. The central government has started to donate to some NGOs to implement, for example, government-sponsored...
programs or to provide services to poor citizens. The KRG recently created a committee within the Ministry of Youth and Culture to provide grants to NGOs.

Some member-based organizations collect membership fees, but the fees are very limited. Few CSOs engage in income-generating activities, and the government does not contract with CSOs.

**ADVOCACY:**

Iraqi civil society has not historically acted as an independent sector capable of representing the concerns of local communities and interacting with the government. However, the last two years have seen rapid advocacy development and success because of strengthened laws that govern the sector, a safer environment, and capacity-building opportunities for local NGOs to work with, and learn from, international and regional NGOs. Most notably, a coalition of Iraqi CSOs under the Civic Initiative to Protect the Constitution filed a lawsuit against the Council of Representatives in 2010 to force the federal parliament to return to work after more than eight months without a session; parliament returned to work in 2011 and continues to operate. This was a unique victory for civil society and an action that had never before been taken in any Arab country.

Some CSOs have built on personal relationships with government officials to cooperate on certain initiatives. These include the final push to a vote on Law 12 of 2010 in cooperation with the prime minister and the creation of an anti-violence against women training program in partnership with the judiciary.

While the KRG is open to cooperation with CSOs in the northern region, the central government is more suspicious of CSOs in southern and central Iraq. Nonetheless, the prime minister and both parliaments have standing committees that meet with CSOs at least once a week and CSOs have input into every draft bill. Together with the Civic Initiative to Protect the Constitution, CSOs met with and submitted to the president a set of demands concerning service provision, corruption, human rights violations, and rebuilding the country. There are no clear outcomes on these initiatives yet.

There are also many civic initiatives at the local level to improve the rule of law. In one notable instance, CSOs successfully campaigned to prevent the establishment of religious courts under the by-laws of the Iraqi constitution. In Kurdistan, CSOs succeeded in advocating for reforms to numerous laws in the civil code, including domestic violence laws. These and other local level initiatives succeeded, in part, through CSO participation in monthly meetings with government officials and parliament. These initiatives were community-initiated, not funder-driven and there was sustainable community support and participation, as well as receptivity from officials, who did not view the initiatives as threatening.

While there are many examples of advocacy successes related to elections and women’s legal and political rights, CSOs pay less attention to advocating for health, education, and economic development which require financial resources and experience that few organizations have.

CSOs face several challenges when implementing advocacy campaigns. The CSO sector lacks an understanding of the important roles of advocacy and lobbying organizations to shape public opinion and influence legislation. The sector underestimates the importance of networking and organizing for successful campaigns and the media typically ignore campaigns, allowing decision makers in the government to disregard them as well. In addition, many government officials make decisions on women’s issues based on their cultural and personal beliefs rather than on public opinion.
Most Iraqi CSOs were founded to provide humanitarian aid. Though they have expanded to other areas such as social services, aid continues to be their core function. The provision of services such as health, housing, and economic development fluctuates widely because of uncertain human and financial resources. Other challenges to service provision include internal CSO corruption and lack of monitoring mechanisms, which make it difficult for Iraqi CSOs to attract long-term and sustainable funding for service provision.

CSOs are particularly weak in the fields of environment and energy. As well, certain CSOs work to empower women to participate in the political process, but they do not address the problems of women’s economic and social status.

Many international CSOs propose projects without conducting needs assessments, and many other CSOs follow donor priorities rather than conduct assessments. However, some local organizations conduct assessments before writing proposals and thus, if and when funding is granted, their projects reflect real community needs.

CSOs have recently expanded their services to provide capacity-building programs to mosques and the government. Issue-areas covered for both sectors include peace-building, human rights, women’s rights, and gender. In addition, government officials are trained in election issues.

CSOs lack experience in marketing and disseminating information about their services, making it difficult for them to recover costs and build support for continual funding. Programs that have succeeded in recovering costs include the Iraqi Al-Amal Association’s Women in Technology program, which was funded by the Institute of International Education (IIE) and Microsoft from 2006-2008 and is now self-sustaining, and the self-financed al-Amal Clinic in Erbil.

Many CSOs that provide community services are unable to recover their costs because constituents cannot afford to pay for services.

The central government recognizes the existence of CSOs, but distrusts their ability to serve communities effectively. Many in the government believe that only the government should provide basic social services, a view that is now reflected in popular opinion. The KRG is more open to acknowledging the role CSOs play in service provision and forming partnerships, and often include CSOs in the decision-making processes.

The few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) that exist focus on facilitation skills, financial management, and technology. However, they have little sustainability or local buy-in. In addition, because of their limited numbers and limited services, they do not cover most CSOs’ needs. Those that do earn revenue do not cover their expenses, so fewer and fewer ISOs are offering services.

There are no local grantmaking organizations.

In general, the civil society sector suffers from a lack of information, resources, and studies relevant to its work. Many organizations are “one-man shows” that do not attempt to build networks, coalitions, or organizational capacity at the grassroots level. However, CSOs occasionally form local partnerships, particularly for the purposes of advocacy and lobbying. For example, the Civil Society Initiative is a local...
initiative that brings together local NGOs working on constitutional issues; however, the initiative does not sufficiently publicize its activities, so it is not as effective as it could be.

The CSO sector generally does not have a culture of openly exchanging information and knowledge. CSOs are more comfortable exchanging experiences than information because there is severe competition for donor funding and many organizations fear cooperation might lead to other organizations poaching their ideas and funding sources. There are some CSO networks, such as the Iraqi Kurdistan NGOs Network (IKNN) and NCCI, but even these rarely cultivate an exchange of information.

CSOs rarely cooperate in the implementation of projects and programs and do not include information exchange or collaboration in their strategic planning. Occasionally, they will recruit local partners when they lack the human and financial resources to implement a large project. This aversion to forming partnerships can create difficulties for CSOs when foreign donors make local partnerships a condition for funding.

When CSOs began to form in southern and central Iraq from 2003 to 2006, there was a massive effort to train CSOs and build their capacity in areas of project management, proposal writing, legal rights, health awareness, gender, human rights, and democracy. However, these trainings were poorly coordinated, needs assessments were not conducted, and many trainings were unnecessarily duplicated. In addition, the trainers were rarely Iraqi, leading to miscommunication and almost all trainings took place in Amman, making them inaccessible to many CSOs. This has resulted in few specialized trainers or experts available to CSOs. The few local experts that are available prefer working with international NGOs that often pay higher salaries. Experts also often leave the country when international opportunities arise.

Some CSOs have started to form project-implementation partnerships with the government and parliament. Most of these partnerships have been unsuccessful because of tensions between government officials and CSO leaders over project management and oversight. In addition, the projects were not government priorities, so there was little follow up. These failures have exacerbated the distrust between CSOs and the government. On the other hand, some joint initiatives in the areas of water and sanitation, health, and school renovation have been successful, suggesting a potential shift in the government-CSO collaborative dynamic.

Partnerships between CSOs and the media and private sector are very rare and weak.

PUBLIC IMAGE:

The media frequently perpetuates a negative image of CSOs by reporting inaccurately on their activities and omitting critical details about the problems CSOs are attempting to address. Certain news organizations with affiliations to political parties oppose CSOs for political reasons and accuse them of corruption to damage their reputations. Other news organizations simply do not understand the role of CSOs. These negative perceptions sometimes influence Iraqi communities at the local level, but many communities still have a positive view of the role CSOs play, particularly as service providers. Despite the aforementioned flaws in service provision, many communities still rely heavily on the sector to help meet their needs.

The government tends to perpetuate a negative view of CSOs as well, but some government institutions, including parliament and the Ministries of Education and Justice, are beginning to recognize the role CSOs can play in monitoring and providing public services. Some government foundations and institutions have begun to partner with Iraqi CSOs, recognizing that CSOs have a better understanding of the concerns affecting local communities. For example, CSOs worked with the Ministry of Planning to write the Human Development Report; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to draft a report on childhood; the Ministry of
health to provide health services; and the Ministry of Education on a literacy and human rights project. CSOs have also trained judiciary staff, among others. However, CSOs do not have the capacity to meet the huge demand for such services.

CSOs bear some responsibility for their negative images. They do not communicate their identity, goals, and objectives clearly and fail to make effective use of media to connect with the community and create local constituencies. In addition, CSOs do little to show that they are operating transparently. CSOs rarely publish annual reports and often do not follow their own by-laws.
Jordan’s modern civil society began to take root in 1989, when rising commodity prices triggered social unrest. In response, the Jordanian government liberalized both politically and economically, which created a void in service provision. Civil society organizations (CSOs) stepped in to provide services, as well as to safeguard human rights, expand political participation, and institutionalize democracy.

The Jordanian government both supports civil society and attempts to depoliticize it. It encourages the overall growth of the sector while impeding CSO operations that support initiatives deemed threatening to Jordan’s political stability and security. The Arab Spring has yet to change this basic characteristic of the civil society-government relationship.

Jordanian CSOs have survived, and sometimes flourished, within this uncertain legal-political environment. There are 2,813 CSOs registered with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) as societies, including both national-level CSOs based in the capital, Amman, and community-based organizations (CBOs) throughout the country. These societies provide numerous social services with a special emphasis on services for orphans, persons with disabilities, and Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. There are also several thousand CSOs registered with other government departments, including CSOs registered as not-for-profit companies, professional associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and

5 The expert panel for this report was composed of 14 people: 10 female, 4 male; 2 from universities, 11 from CSOs, and 1 lawyer.
tribal associations. These latter associations are particularly important because family and tribal ties form the basis of Jordanian society and significantly impact Jordanian politics, economics, and culture. These associations are an important means for people to extend financial support and social services to others, especially in rural and impoverished areas.

Social media networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, have encouraged online communities to develop. While Jordan remained relatively stable during the Arab Spring, the new Jordanian activist communities and the web-based advocacy efforts they engender will have an impact on Jordanian civil society in coming years.

CSOs face numerous challenges, including legal restrictions that greatly limit their ability to engage in advocacy and lobbying, weak internal management structures, and heavy dependence on foreign donors.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

The majority of CSOs in Jordan is registered as societies and is governed by Law No. 51 of 2008 on Societies, as amended in 2009 by Law No. 22. Under these laws, the Registry Board of Directors (Registry), chaired by the MSD, is responsible for CSO registration and administration. Many societies are also supervised by the ministry most closely related to their activities. Government security services sometimes use other laws, such as the 2004 Law of Public Gatherings and the 2006 Prevention of Terrorism Act, to restrict CSO activities. For example, the Terrorism Act gives the government the right to punish those who donate to charities that are fronts for terrorist organizations.

There is also a special class of Royal Non-Governmental Organizations (RINGOs), which all operate under special laws based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement. This law allows RINGOs to bypass aspects of government bureaucracy and restrictions that constrain other CSOs. Notably, RINGOs have fewer restrictions on permissible missions and activities. In addition, their status allows them to access resources from donors and the government, including some government funding, unavailable to other CSOs.

There are a several hundred CSOs registered with the Ministry of Trade and Industry as not-for-profit companies, while tribal associations register directly with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI).

In order to register as a society, CSOs must have at least seven members, provide a service or conduct activities on a voluntary basis, and have open membership. Of the over 800 applicants for registration in 2011, only six or seven were rejected. However, the Registry is not required to justify its denials, and in some cases the decisions appear to be politically motivated. In 2011, for example, the Registry denied registration to an organization that advocates for the Palestinian right of return and to another that advocates on behalf of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians and their children.

CSOs registered as societies must adhere to administrative requirements. They must submit general assembly resolutions, an annual plan, and an annual report to the MSD. CSOs with annual budgets exceeding 2,000 Jordanian dinars ($2,825) must also submit audited annual balance sheets. CSOs must give the Registry and the ministry they are affiliated with two weeks’ notice before convening general assembly meetings and must allow representatives from each to attend. Importantly, the Registry must approve resolutions to amend CSOs’ articles of incorporation. CSOs must also request approval from the Council of Ministers before accepting any foreign funding. While this can add to the administrative burden of small organizations, the Council of Ministers has not turned down any requests for approval.

CSOs cannot engage in any political activities governed by the 1992 Law on Political Parties. The term “political activity” is undefined in both the Law on Political Parties and in the laws governing CSO activities. Consequently, the government can use the law to stifle controversial CSOs. For example, in 2006, the
Jordanian government dissolved the management boards of the Islamic Center Society and General Union of Voluntary Societies.

This ambiguity in the law is especially troublesome because Jordan has very few lawyers who specialize in CSO law. The few non-profit organizations that offer pro bono legal services to CSOs are concentrated in large cities, and CSOs elsewhere have little opportunity to seek outside counsel.

CSOs have also reported interference from security services, especially during CSO leadership elections and membership registration. In addition, the ministries overseeing CSOs sometimes show favoritism. By contrast, RINGOs are reportedly spared many of these difficulties. However, restrictions placed on CBOs’ activities sometimes impede RINGO activities because RINGOs frequently issue grants and subcontracts to CBOs.

CSOs registered as societies, and other organizations that provide services for the public benefit, can apply to the Ministry of Finance’s Income and Sales Tax Department for income-tax exemptions. CSOs are not exempt from charging sales taxes on services they provide, but they may request a reduction from 10 percent to 5 percent from the Ministry of Finance for two activities each year. However, CSOs do not automatically receive these exemptions, and the laws are generally unclear as to exactly which organizations are eligible. Charitable organizations working with disabled people or orphans tend to receive the most exemptions.

Donations to CSOs may be deducted from up to 25 percent of an individual or business’ taxable income if the receiving CSO has been successfully registered as a charitable organization. To be considered “charitable,” a CSO must submit an application to the Council of Ministers (COM).

There are no restrictions on income-generating projects or economic activities, provided that such income is allocated toward activities that meet the CSO’s objectives and not distributed to its founders or members. Public fundraising requires the prior approval of the MSD in accordance with Regulation 1 of 1957.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:**

The organizational capacity of CSOs is improving overall, but national-level CSOs and RINGOs have much stronger capacity than local CBOs. Larger organizations often have adequate organizational structures and quality management systems and develop strategic plans, but smaller CBOs, especially those outside of major cities, do not.

Jordanian law requires that CSOs adopt basic standards of governance and management, or risk having society status revoked. CSOs must elect a board of directors, hold regular board meetings, and have written job descriptions for their employees. Smaller CBOs with limited resources often cannot follow these requirements.

CSOs are hard-pressed to retain staff members because of inconsistent funding. Consequently, most CSOs rely on volunteers to operate, which impacts the consistency and capacity of human resources. In some cases, CSOs are run as “one-man shows,” in which the founder serves as both the CEO of the organization and the chairman of the board of directors, and has relatives on the board of directors.
Large, national-level CSOs use modern technology, including the Internet, email, and the latest operating software. But smaller CBOs, often because of financial constraints and untrained staff members, cannot take advantage of these innovations.

CSOs often struggle to win support among potential beneficiaries who are unfamiliar with their services and assume they are of low quality. Jordanian CSOs often do not develop local constituencies because they lack the organizational capacity to do so or because of fear of harassment by security services.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

Jordanian CSOs are heavily dependent on foreign donors. Foreign aid to Jordan totaled $1.3 billion in 2010, a sum greater than one-fifth of the Jordanian government’s $6.26 billion budget. Foreign donors favor RINGOs and CSOs with established histories of project implementation; while the majority of CSOs do not directly receive foreign donations, the Jordanian government and RINGOs provide sub-grants to smaller CSOs and CBOs. However, most CSOs, and especially smaller CSOs, do not receive any of these funds and rely on membership fees.

More sustainable funding from the Jordanian and international business sectors is beginning to emerge. For example, Tamweelcom, a microfinance CSO, receives financial support from the international telecommunications company Zain. Businesses primarily support RINGOs, as an opportunity to develop relationships with the royal family. However, RINGOS often sub-grant the funds they receive from the business community.

Certain CSOs have built strong reputations and successfully diversified their funding sources. For example, Mizan, a legal advocacy CSO, and the Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development secure funding from multiple sources, including individual donors, businesses, the Jordanian government, and foreign donors. In addition, many larger CSOs, such as the Islamic Center Society, engage in membership outreach and have active philanthropy development programs.

While CSOs are legally allowed to charge for services, most do not because their beneficiaries cannot afford the cost. In addition, some donor agencies prevent CSOs from collecting fees for the projects they fund. But there are exceptions; for example, Tamweelcom uses the interest from its micro-loan program to support program activities. In addition, CSOs are allowed to charge membership fees, which make up the bulk of funding for CSOs that do not receive foreign funding.

The MSD also provides up to 100,000 JOD ($140,950) annually to CSOs through an NGO Support Fund. Grants are as large as 2,000 JOD ($2,825), and support institutional development. Jordanian CSOs with annual budgets greater than 2,000 JOD ($2,825) must submit audited financial statements to the MSD.

**ADVOCACY:**

CSOs rarely lead advocacy and lobbying efforts because societies are legally prohibited from engaging in “political activities.” Laws prohibiting libel or defamation of government officials under the threat of imprisonment also have a chilling effect on CSOs.
Most CSOs with the capacity to engage in advocacy and lobbying, including RINGOs, are funded by foreign donors. The narrow spaces open to their efforts are typically driven by donor priorities and sanctioned by the monarchy. However, advocacy-focused CSOs frequently face opposition from the parliament and security services. This apparent contradiction reflects Jordanian government policies, which often balance social development and donor priorities with security and cultural concerns; and has meant that the few advocacy campaigns led by CSOs have not been particularly successful. For example, a campaign led by a coalition of women’s rights CSOs, which in part formed because of donor priorities and was supported by both the government and the monarchy, failed to outlaw gender-based discrimination during Jordan’s recent passage of constitutional amendments.

Demonstrations and rallies fall under the supervision of the MOI and security services, which believe that widespread political activism threatens Jordan’s stability. CSO-organized rallies against military occupation in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine were not granted licenses by the MOI, and were broken up by security services.

There are no established mechanisms for CSOs to participate in policymaking, but the government has started to work with CSOs to amend the 2008 and 2009 laws that govern CSOs. In an unprecedented move, the MSD met with representatives from 400 national CSOs in 2011 to discuss amendments to the CSO laws. However, the MSD has not yet implemented the recommendations from that meeting.

Despite the obstacles, CSOs do engage with the government, most commonly in implementing projects. Government agencies have partnered with CSOs on several projects, including one with Mizan to run an anti-torture advocacy program.

**SERVICE DELIVERY:**

CSOs provide health, education, relief, housing, water, and energy services to their beneficiaries, and work in economic development, environmental protection, and job training for youth. A large portion of CSOs registered as societies provide charitable services to orphans and persons with disabilities. Another major beneficiary of CSO services are the 750,000 Iraqi refugees who are either temporary residents of or settled in Jordan.

Large-scale CSO projects are normally based on donor priorities. While these projects provide services needed by local populations, they are not specifically tailored to suit particular communities. By contrast, CSOs outside of the major cities often respond better to their communities’ needs because of first-hand local knowledge.

The Jordanian government began to reduce its social service provision following the economic crisis of 1988/1989, and turned to large CSOs to implement development initiatives in its stead. For example, in 2011 the Jordanian government launched the 25,000,000 JOD ($35,240,000) Poverty Pockets project, designed to increase economic activity in thirty-six impoverished areas of Jordan. Three RINGOS and one national CSO lead capacity-building and income-generating projects as part of this initiative.

CSOs are typically unable to recover the costs of their services by charging fees. Their beneficiaries are typically unable to pay for services, and in some cases they are not allowed to charge fees under the grant agreements with foreign donor agencies.
Although mostly confined to major cities, there is a nascent system of intermediary support organizations (ISOs). Certain Jordanian CSOs, such as the Business Development Center, are dedicated to building the organizational capacity of national-level CSOs. Other ISOs, which are often RINGOs, provide intermediary services to smaller CSOs and CBOs, primarily in the capital. A variety of donor-funded initiatives are working to build the capacity of CSOs outside of the major cities to help them compete for local and international funding. Through these growing initiatives, free or subsidized training programs are available for CSOs to skills such as program development, marketing, effective service delivery, and management techniques.

There are several local grant-making organizations in Jordan, but their funding generally originates from the government or international donors. RINGOs frequently provide sub-grants to CBOs, most notably through the Poverty Pockets program. Other CSOs, such as the Islamic Center Society, also provide sub-grants with money raised locally.

Collaboration among CSOs is minimal and there are no networks or organizations that are dedicated to helping CSOs share information.

Intersectoral partnerships are becoming more common. Large, multinational businesses, such as Aramex and Zain, favor working with RINGOs because of the advantages gained from developing connections with the royal family. These partnerships typically involve providing financial support along with some capacity-building support. In addition, employment-skills training CSOs, such as the Jordanian Career Education Foundation (JCEF), have cultivated partnerships with private sector companies, which provide training support and hire training program graduates.

COS-government collaboration includes an initiative called the Shama’a Network, which coordinates individual and organizational efforts to end violence against women.

The Jordanian media generally does not understand the role of CSOs and covers their activities superficially, often without fully understanding the role of civil society. However, RINGOs and government-patronized initiatives often receive more in-depth and positive coverage.

Radio and television advertisements are cost-prohibitive, but CSOs often publicize their work on the Internet, including through social media, and in print media.

Large national CSOs and RINGOs based in Amman have gained reputations as implementers of a western agenda or serving VIP patrons, royalty, tribal leaders, or influential politicians, which has undermined the sector’s image in the eyes of the public. However, this perception is beginning to change. Increasing numbers of Jordanian youth are turning to the CSO sector to seek work because of the career advancement
possibilities. In addition, as CSOs provide quality services to their beneficiaries, perceptions about CSOs have become more positive.

Transparency and accountability are still problems for many Jordanian CSOs. Jordanian law requires CSOs to be transparent in their organizational and financial reporting, but this regulation is often not observed. In addition, while the Jordan National Center for Human Rights helped to create three CSO codes of conduct in 2009 to guide CSO activity, these have not been widely implemented.

Businesses have a generally positive perception of CSOs, especially RINGOs and larger CSOs. Businesses develop relationships with them to cultivate ties with the Jordanian government, in the case of RINGOs; for public relations reasons; and because some relationships, especially those involving job-skills training, provide businesses with skilled employees.

The Jordanian government views CSOs as a means to provide social services to Jordanians and to ensure the steady flow of foreign donor funds, but also as a potential threat to the government’s stability. Consequently, it supports the expansion of civil society while ensuring it remains aligned with government policies.
Lebanon has suffered through three decades of war, armed conflict, political instability, and economic crisis. The country also has a long and complex history of sectarianism, which deeply affects the current state of its civil society. Sectarianism is not limited to the Christian-Muslim divide that has plagued Lebanese society, but also affects sects within the same faith. Religious differences are exacerbated by differing visions of governance and the priorities of the country. Secularization and modernity has had a deep impact on Lebanese society, causing communities to isolate themselves from elements that threaten their identities.

Numerous wars have deepened the fear and suspicion that permeates this divided country, resulting in the geographic separation of religious sects as populations have been evicted or relocated according to affiliation. In addition, the wars have had a devastating impact on women and children. The population displacement has contributed to the disruption of health and education services and providers, adversely affecting the quality of services offered during peacetime.

Social and economic indicators have deteriorated, unemployment is increasing, and the number of out-of-school children, mostly at the intermediate level, is growing. In addition to the trauma of war, families are now facing economic hardships.

CSOs have played an important role throughout the country’s instability and the absence or insufficiency of government social support over the last thirty years. Utilizing local and foreign funding, CSOs play an important role in providing basic needs at the community level.

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6 The expert panel for this report was composed of 12 people: 3 female, 9 male; 2 from universities, 8 from CSOs 1 lawyer, and 1 journalist.
In 2011, CSOs became more involved in meeting development needs at the national level, implementing projects in health, environment, agriculture, economic support, rural development, capacity building, youth activities, good governance, and vocational training. Many of these projects have been conducted in partnership with the government and municipalities with low levels of involvement by the private sector.

Although there are no reliable, up-to-date statistics, the number of registered CSOs is estimated to be about 5,000. It is believed that the number of organizations increased significantly after 2005 due to a less restrictive environment in the aftermath of Syrian withdrawal and an influx of donor funding.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

The Lebanese law governing NGOs, the Ottoman Law on Associations, was established in 1909 and some procedural issues were updated in 2006. Certain types of CSOs, such as scouts, cooperative organizations, unions, and international organizations require approval from relevant ministries. For example, youth organizations need approval from the Ministry of Youth and Culture and foreign organizations need approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The registration process is fairly straightforward and primarily designed for the state to collect information. The government has no hand in the actual launching of new organizations, which lies entirely with an organization’s management and other stakeholders.

While the law is outdated, it provides clear guidelines regarding internal management, scope of activities, and financial reporting. The level of operational freedom is directly related to a CSO’s mission statement as well as its political, religious, regional, and/or issue-based affiliations. The government may only dissolve CSOs if national security is at stake, but this provision is not abused and dissolution happens rarely. Likewise, state harassment by central and local governments are exceedingly rare and not permitted by law.

There are few lawyers who specialize in CSO law and those who do are concentrated in the cities and their suburbs. However, the simplicity of the law means that interpretation does not require a high level of expertise and lawyers are available who sufficiently understand the civil society sector.

CSOs are exempt from paying Value Added Tax (VAT) and income tax, but employees must pay income taxes. There are no tax incentives for the private sector to participate in non-profit activities.

There is no explicit prohibition against CSOs bidding on government contracts and CSOs do in fact enter into contracts with central and local governments. CSOs are permitted to participate in income-generating activities, but they cannot distribute the revenue to their stakeholders; rather, they must use any income generated to provide services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:**

Many CSOs have weak organizational capacity, particularly in administrative areas. However, the last few years have seen international donors working to develop CSO abilities in strategic planning, internal management, and human resource management that have resulted in major advancements in capacity.

While CSOs prioritize constituency building, many find target communities to be unreliable, uncommitted, and apathetic. This is likely due to the political and religious affiliations that dominate Lebanese society and choices or constituents are wary of dedicating time to organizations that do not have financial or strategic
sustainability. Indeed, well-established CSOs tend to have devoted constituents, even in the face of financial or organizational crises.

Most CSOs do not have solid strategic plans and long-term strategies tend to be replaced by short-term plans for the rapid implementation of projects. Donors tend to fund short-term projects that divert attention away from actual needs. Competition for scarce resources lead organizations to follow donor priorities, often adopting any tactics necessary to access desperately needed funds.

The law requires a clear division of responsibilities between an organization’s board of directors and its staff; however, bad practices abound. Boards often do not govern or supervise project implementation, most organizations rely completely on staff members and strong leaders, and there is little transparency or accountability.

CSOs have difficulty retaining permanent or adequate staff due to a lack of funding, adversely affecting organizational programming, potential, and sustainability. Volunteers tend to be apathetic and unreliable. On the other hand, more organizations have started to engage technical and professional staff on a freelance basis, which has been quite successful.

Almost all CSOs have access to advanced technology, which is widely available and inexpensive.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

Lebanon has suffered through three decades of war, armed conflict, political instability, and economic crisis. The resulting circumstances have attracted massive funding from international development organizations and other donors concerned with short-term relief projects. Lebanese organizations have also been concerned with fulfilling immediate needs rather than achieving financial viability, resulting in a lack of long-term strategy across the sector.

As Lebanon stabilizes and emergency donors pull out of the country, financial sustainability has become a major issue.

Few CSOs have long-term financial viability and therefore most plan only for the short-term. As foreign resources dry up, CSOs have started to pursue alternative and diverse sources of funding, including local contributions. Individuals, businesses, and local philanthropic organizations contribute significant financial and in-kind support. For example, some private banks support environmental and cluster bomb recovery projects while other industries provide food and other necessary items for the poor. However, CSOs remain far from self-sufficient and must continue to rely on international funding. While CSOs have tried to cultivate volunteers, both to promote a spirit of community giving and to reduce project costs, there is little interest and those that do volunteer are not committed enough to be reliable.

Many organizations cannot access foreign funding due to poor financial management systems, which usually reflect a lack of accountability and transparency. There are many reputable accounting firms in Lebanon, but many dishonest organizations refuse to undergo external audits, citing the inefficiency of audit systems as an excuse.

A few CSOs, mostly with religious affiliations, have solid fundraising bases that include a loyal core of financial supporters as well as seed money from grassroots movements. More and more CSOs are pursuing membership outreach and fundraising events tied to specific charitable causes such as services to the disabled.
There are some local philanthropic initiatives and community foundations, but their resources make up only a fraction of the funding available to CSOs. The distribution of local grants is often characterized by political, religious, and regional sectarianism rather than the quality or qualifications of an organization.

CSOs engage in income-generating activities, selling goods and services such as craft production and sales or renting out tools and venue spaces to other CSOs, which has the added value of sharing resources within the sector. However, any income generated must be used for programmatic activities and cannot be distributed to members or stakeholders.

Funds generated by membership dues are insignificant and illustrate the limited understanding of the importance of contributing dues by the communities.

**ADVOCACY: EVOLVING**

There is substantial cooperation between CSOs and local authorities, both because Lebanon is a small country with a lot of interconnectivity and because of international donor strategies to strengthen the relationship between civil society and local government. There have been many jointly-implemented projects in recent years, particularly around transparent governance, environment, and small-scale economic support. However, much of this cooperation is based on personal interest and relationships rather than the pursuit of public welfare. There is limited cooperation between CSOs and the central government.

Advocacy has always been a priority for Lebanese CSOs, which have used it to promote social and legislative reforms in the face of an impotent legislative system that is subject to extreme sectarian divisiveness. There is some mistrust of organizations that seek to engender reform and many such organizations are in conflict with one another, rendering them ineffective. However, international donors are focusing on strengthening CSOs’ advocacy capacity and many CSOs are becoming more effective in network and coalition building, leading to a rapid exchange of information, knowledge, and experiences. Coalitions have also started to implement broad-based advocacy campaigns, particularly around women’s issues such as gender-based violence, marital rape, and the right to nationality for the children of Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers as well as migrant workers’ rights. These campaigns have been very effective in raising public awareness and pressuring legislators. Successes include the drafting of a law to eliminate the Kafala system, which binds migrant domestic workers’ resident permits to their domestic employers, leaving them exposed to deportation and potential abuse. A series of organized public protests and campaigns by CSOs resulted in the drafting of a new law that would grant migrant workers more rights overall, such as the right to leave an employer’s home or to change jobs.

There are no lobbying efforts because of the complicated legislative framework and the politically divided sectarian parliament.

The CSO sector has not reached consensus on legal reforms that would enhance the sector so there have been no efforts to launch a campaign to promote legal reforms to the CSO regulatory framework.

**SERVICE DELIVERY: EVOLVING**

Despite many social, political, and sectarian obstacles, Lebanese CSOs are very efficient in delivering services to meet the many needs created by three decades of economic and social instability, political unrest, armed...
conflict, and governmental negligence. Throughout the past three decades, CSOs have covered public shortages and maintained social cohesion by bringing people together from different sects to work toward common goals. CSOs surpass the government in providing services that reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents in all fields including economic development, environmental protection, and women’s rights. CSOs provide partially subsidized services to poor communities and while they have effectively eased needs, they have also made target communities dependent on them. Supported by international donors, many CSOs are adopting a new approach that aims to encourage empowerment and independence.

Because it is so difficult for Lebanese CSOs to achieve self-sufficiency, even through commercial activities, it is difficult to adhere to a plan to meet urgent needs. Instead, the priorities, target communities, locations, and schedules are dictated by foreign donors who often have little understanding of the social landscape.

Some CSOs try to move beyond providing basic needs and addressing a constituency beyond their members, but most stay within the narrow interests of their own circles. This is primarily due to a propensity to follow international donor priorities which grant organizations short-term sustainability, but often results in a shift of CSO goals and missions away from community needs.

Both the government and the public recognize and appreciate CSOs’ contributions to service delivery and the government provides funding and implementation support to the extent possible, given the government’s own resource constraints. In recent years, there have been increased partnerships between the government and CSOs, encouraged by international donors.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**

Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers have flourished in the last few years, becoming essential resources for assistance and information to CSOs and the public and private sectors and providing services such as scholarship grants from academic institutions, wealthy Lebanese, and local foundations such as the Hariri Foundation. They also provide news digest publications; electronic databases including statistics, analysis, and information on Lebanese organizations and activities; electronic and hardcopy libraries; training workshops; and consultation sessions. ISOs, however, are under financial duress.

Another impediment to information sharing is the competition for resources among CSOs that limits the knowledge organizations are willing to share with each other. However, a network is being formed through a consortium of CSOs, international donors, and individuals, that will facilitate information sharing through a web portal. In addition, the Lebanon Support Civil Society Portal, created in 2006, is currently being used by many CSOs to promote their goals, work, activities, and achievements.

Lebanese CSOs typically look to grow and improve through training and there are many opportunities to do so, which enriches the infrastructure of the entire sector. Training curricula, ranging from basic to highly specialized, are available in English, French, and Arabic and appropriate for a wide range of organizations, encompassing strategic management, finance and accounting management, fundraising, volunteer management, human resources, and other technical classes. Even though most training opportunities are in major cities, some CSOs in rural areas are still able to participate because the country is small.

Due in large part to donor requirements, most CSO projects are implemented as intersectorial partnerships with individuals, local and international businesses, or governmental and local authorities.
PUBLIC IMAGE: EVOLVING

Small-scale, apolitical activities that do not serve media interests in any way are generally excluded from coverage. However, CSO contributions to Lebanese society, including civil rights actions and development initiatives, receive positive media coverage and analysis. CSOs are praised for their contributions and CSO personnel are hosted by talk shows to promote events or programs. There is a distinction made by the media between public service announcements developed by CSOs for public outreach and corporate advertising.

In the past, garnering public support has been a low priority for Lebanese CSOs. However, as funding opportunities decline and competition for resources has risen, more organizations are focusing on cultivating public opinion and visibility in order to develop strong reputations to use in funding proposals.

The public generally has a positive perception of CSOs, although people tend to equate CSOs in general with charitable organizations. While this is a barrier for advocacy organizations to harnessing public support for their campaigns, it has contributed to the perception of CSOs as working toward the public interest.

CSOs often prefer to promote their images and publicize their activities through social media. CSOs with strong personal contacts in traditional media try to harness those channels as well. Many organizations also use pamphlets, leaflets, newsletters, electronic digests, and periodical reports to advertise their activities.

Both government and businesses generally have a positive perception of CSOs and recognize the importance of CSOs in providing social services that the government is unable to fulfill. Advocacy organizations are also seen as playing an important and necessary role in politics. While the government rarely recognizes or funds CSOs officially, authorities work to facilitate CSO activities and thus maintain excellent relationships with the sector. The civil society sector’s relationship with businesses, on the other hand, tends to be uneven as businesses regard intersectorial projects as solid investments rather than opportunities to be socially responsible.

While there is no national CSO code of ethics, many CSOs include ethics statements in their mission statements or activity plans. However, many organizations have little commitment to abiding by such ethics statements. The majority of CSOs demonstrate transparency in their operations through published narratives on their websites and financial and annual reports mandated by the government. Many organizations also submit to independent audits.
Moroccan civil society can trace its roots to the periods of the French and Spanish protectorates, during which Moroccan CSOs held a strong traditional Moroccan identity, resisted cultural assimilation, and were loosely associated with the independence movement. Between 1956 and the early 1970s, CSOs, governed by the law on civil liberties of 1958, invested in activities targeting children and youth and the promotion of sports, operating in a climate of relative freedom. Between 1973 and 1984 repressive government policies dampened associative action and crippled civil liberties in general. During this period from 1975-1979, the country’s three major human rights organizations were created. Beginning in 1985, national and international policies favoring civil society enabled the number of CSOs to increase as funding became more readily available and the political repression that began in the late 1960s subsided. Civil society was now considered a partner in development and an essential link between the state and its citizens. This new outlook was also related to the structural adjustment policy of 1983, leading the Moroccan government to increasingly rely on CSOs to fill gaps in the delivery of public social services.

In the mid-1990s, grants became more readily available to CSOs as civil society became increasingly engaged in social policy and the growing social service apparatus of the kingdom. King Mohammed VI, who succeeded his father in July 1999, proclaimed himself “King of the Poor” and pursued a social agenda through the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity (created in 2004), National Solidarity Agency (Entr’aide Nationale), National Initiative on Human Development ([INDH] created in 2005), and a number of foundations linked to the monarchy. The INDH is a mechanism that enables the sub-national programming of resources, including grants and income generating activities, to target the poor based on tripartite governance mechanisms that include state services, local elected officials, and CSOs. The number of registered associations has grown significantly and increasingly from 1994 to today. In a national survey of 7 The expert panel for this report was composed of 16 people; 6 female, 10 male; all 16 came from CSOs
1,254 associations conducted in 2011 by the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity, only 8.4 percent of CSOs reported being created before 1994, while 17 percent were created between 1994 and 1999. Three-quarters of CSOs surveyed were created after 2000 and a full one-third were created after 2005. Three-quarters of CSOs report public Moroccan funding as a source of revenues. The total reported number of registered CSOs in Morocco varies significantly between 40,000-60,000 and more than half of them are concentrated in three regions (out of 16 total). Additionally, 94 percent of CSOs do not have activities outside of their communes of origin.

The spectacular growth of CSOs and the increasing role of the sector in service delivery have raised issues of CSO governance and capacity, as well as standards and controls in services delivered by the sector. Public agencies lack the capacity to provide training, oversight, and management of their CSO partners. Moreover, individual organizations are relatively isolated from one another and from the policy and program environment in which they operate. They also lack basic organizational capabilities such as project design, monitoring, and reporting. The bulk of CSOs are small and the sector is not currently evolving in terms of improving service delivery and local governance or influencing policy.

Larger CSO networks, beyond the human and women’s rights organizations that spearheaded advocacy efforts, have been progressing and include a federation of consumer groups, two networks that promote socially conscious economic development, and a network of persons with disabilities. Moreover, organizations that group together into larger NGOs, such as Espace Associatif and Carrefour Associatif, have emerged as stable interlocutors of the CSO sector. Since the Arab Spring, a number of CSOs have been increasingly vocal on public policy and youth CSOs are increasingly active on youth issues and policy.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

Morocco has ratified major international covenants that govern civil and associative rights, and a new national constitution was adopted in 2011 which was favorable to CSOs. Article 12 of the July 1, 2011 constitution allows for associations to be created, and to implement activities freely in accordance with the constitution and law. Moreover, associations may not be dissolved or suspended except by virtue of a judicial decision. The 2011 constitution is unusually explicit in defining civic and political rights (Title II). Numerous memorandums produced by CSOs were formally submitted to a Consultative Commission on Constitutional Reform, and a number of proposals therein were incorporated into a referendum submitted on July 1. The rights detailed in Title II is generally perceived as a response to pressures for reform stemming from the February 20 Movement, a youth-led reform movement, and the Arab Spring.

A recent report by the International Center for Not For Profit Law states, “If implemented properly, Morocco's legal framework for NGOs could be considered among the most enabling for civil society in the entire Arab world.” The laws regulating associations include Law 00/75 (specific to associations), and 00/76 (on public assembly in general). There are no legal or administrative difficulties in registering. The law on associations indicates that the act of founding an association requires no prior authorization and outlines a simple CSO registration process, whereby newly created associations submit their registration applications to local prefectures that represent the Interior Ministry. CSOs are required to state their missions in their registration applications and the application must include copies of General Assembly minutes, a list of General Secretariat (GA) members, the internal policy of the association, and copies of the identification cards of GA members (permanent resident permits for foreigners).

Associations are legally recognized from the moment they obtain a receipt of deposit. In practice, this receipt is not provided if the authorities view the association as a political threat. For example, a receipt is usually not
provided if members of a new association are associated with groups that are in opposition with the monarchy, such as Al Adl Wal Issane, an Islamic political organization that is tolerated by the authorities but not legally recognized. There is no legal ground for authorities to withhold receipts or to reject complete applications.

Law 00/75 does not prohibit any particular civil society activities. CSOs are allowed to participate in public debate or express criticism as long as they respect the country’s religion, national unity, and the king. Judgments regarding civic rights are sometimes politically motivated, usually when an individual or organization crosses the “red lines” of monarchy, territorial integrity, or Islam. The courts can dissolve associations that pursue activities considered "illegal, contrary to good morals, [or which aim] to undermine the Islamic religion, the integrity of the national territory or the monarchical regime, or promote discrimination." No legal provision provides a definition of what "contrary to" or "undermine" mean in this context, making it difficult to identify, avoid, or contest these infractions. To tighten their control over CSO activities, local authorities sometimes insist on attending local CSO general assemblies, which are mandatory in establishing an association.

The law favors organizations officially recognized as “public interest” organizations, a designation that represents only five percent of all CSOs. These organizations are granted tax exemptions on procurements. All CSOs are allowed to sell goods and services, but CSOs without public interest status have to declare all sales and pay taxes.

Public interest status is a major area of concern for associations. Associations that wish to obtain public interest status must submit a written request as well as a copy of the receipt obtained upon filing an association application and copies of various legal and administrative documents related to the organization. The process of obtaining the status is complex and time consuming, thus only CSOs with strong financial and human resources can afford to apply. When approved, the status is made official by a decree signed by the Prime Minister. The decree specifies the maximum amount of financial resources and assets the association can own; the criteria for review is not specified. With regards to funding, non-public and public interest CSOs are not allowed to bid on government contracts. All CSOs must inform the government of any foreign funding they receive, although there are no legal barriers to accessing resources from either domestic or foreign sources. Prior to the constitutional reform, only public interest organizations were allowed to bid for government contracts, but Article 6 of Law 00/75 stipulates that associations whose registration file has been accepted and are in possession of a written confirmation of registration and approval may compete for government contracts.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: IMPEDED

According to a 2011 study conducted by the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity, the majority of CSOs (94 percent) operate locally and are organizationally weak. Most CSOs are managed by a few founding members who lack the skills and resources necessary to efficiently mobilize their membership base. Although CSOs have a relatively high number of volunteers and members on average (38 and 85 respectively), communication and member involvement in activities are timid. More organizationally mature CSOs do not fare much better; membership drives are uncommon and communications capacity is limited. Forty percent of CSOs identify communications as an area of weakness.

The majority of CSO leaders do not perceive formal, modern organizational governance practices to be suitable for their activities, and rely on informal methods to arrange meetings and manage their organizations. However, 80 percent of CSOs hold regular general assemblies and only 10 percent of members surveyed identified problems with the concentration of power in the hands of the president. Two-thirds have formal management structures and defined job descriptions for the president, secretary general, and treasurer. One-
third of CSOs do not have a functioning accounting system; this deficiency is not due to a lack of training but rather, CSOs fail to recognize the importance of formal financial management and oversight systems.

CSOs typically define their missions very broadly so they can access diverse funding sources. This is primarily a matter of economic necessity as Moroccan CSOs are dependent on funding from domestic and international sources. As such, CSOs adjust accordingly when priorities and programs change. Moreover, significant increases in funding opportunities over the last 15 years has led to a sharp increase in the number of associations, including opportunistic initiatives that lack a grassroots base and shared mission. Only a limited number of CSOs, essentially those that have a national or regional activity base, have a sector specific focus, strategic plans, or implement activities based on well-defined action plans.

CSO staff is comprised primarily of volunteers. The few organizations that have permanent paid staff members have difficulty retaining them because employment is very insecure and CSOs cannot offer competitive salaries. Volunteers that hold elected offices and those brought on handle the technical aspects of most activities and make up the majority of CSO staff. The high turnover rates within CSOs are primarily due to a scarcity of funds and CSOs’ dependence on volunteers and interns.

Although Morocco has robust access to technology, many organizations, particularly those in rural areas, lack information technology (IT) equipment. Staff members often have to use their own personal computers. This is due to budgetary limitations and a lack of maintenance and access to IT services.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

CSOs rarely raise funds from more than one or two sources per year. Due to limited financial resources, most small organizations are limited to single, stand-alone activities and short-term commitments. Small organizations typically receive small grants from sources such as the National Solidarity Agency (Entraide Nationale), INDH, and the Social Development Agency (ADS). These funds are usually earmarked for specific project expenses and therefore, cannot be used to cover general operating costs. Medium-size and large organizations generally have access to foreign funding through donor projects and international organizations. Since the constitutional reform, all registered CSOs have also been able to bid on government contracts.

CSOs have difficulty raising revenue from members because the vast majority of CSOs have very few members. However, in membership organizations, member dues constitute a major part of the organizational budget. According to a report by the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity, 80 percent of Moroccan associations depend almost entirely on membership fees to run their organizations.

Public donation drives are only allowable under certain conditions and restricted to “public interest” associations. Local philanthropy, consisting of donations by individuals, is usually directed toward the needs of the poor (orphanages, homes for the elderly, food donations) or to the building and repair of mosques and Quranic schools. Thirty eight percent of CSOs in Morocco get their funding from private philanthropists and donors. Ten percent of CSOs are able to obtain international funding and 11 percent mobilize funds from the private sector.

Apart from cooperatives and micro-finance institutions, CSOs do not earn significant income from services, products, or rentals. This is due to the fact that most beneficiaries are low-income families and individuals; thus, most services are provided for symbolic fees that barely cover expenses. In addition, there is a general
sentiment that CSOs should provide these services voluntarily and not for profit. Associations are not allowed to earn income from activities that are not directly related to their core missions.

ADVOCACY:  

Although there are no significant barriers to advocacy in Morocco, the CSO sector has led advocacy campaigns in few sectors, mainly human and women’s rights, and the government is typically non-responsive to their demands. However, CSOs have also led successful campaigns to influence public policy on women’s and youth rights, increase public awareness of Amazigh culture, and promote integration of persons with disabilities in society. The weakness of most campaigns can be explained by a lack of advocacy capacity and human resources capable of designing a technically sound advocacy plan with clear goals, objectives, outputs, resources, indicators, and timelines. In addition, according to the CIVICUS civil society index for Morocco, 32 percent of Moroccans surveyed see advocacy as a part of human rights work, which they consider to be important, but less urgent and relevant than other domains such as health and education. Forty-four percent of respondents in this survey believed that advocacy projects are unsuccessful due to CSOs’ lack of mobilization capacity.

Moreover, advocacy efforts focus on national level institutions and the monarchy rather than targeting local communities. Local authority figures hold positions of power and control in their communities, and are not accustomed to open dialogue with associations. Public officials face uncoordinated expressions of public grievances – from parents when student grades are poor to displaced families when unviable housing is torn down. Local associations must compete among these various interests, but they lack the knowledge, information, and approach necessary to make credible proposals and mobilize constituents.

The Arab Spring increased CSOs’ advocacy efforts, culminating in a series of protests led by youth groups that became known as the February 20 Movement. The movement began to wane toward the end of 2011, but sporadic violent protests were evident throughout the year over the cost of public utilities and other social grievances. Youth mobilization in the February 20 Movement opened areas of debate and expression that were formally taboo, or limited to specialized associations and experts. Social injustice, corruption, and the powers of the monarchy became part of open and popular debate. In response, the government cracked down on the leaders of public demonstrations and some received legally dubious prison terms.

When King Mohammed VI launched a constitutional reform agenda in response to repeated public demonstrations across 50 cities, youth associations and networks mobilized to weigh in on the process. Forums were held regionally and nationally, culminating in a number of memorandums to the Consultative Commission on Constitutional Reform that led to constitutional gains in youth, human, and civil rights. The powers of the monarchy, however, remained essentially untouched by constitutional reforms. Youth associations remain mobilized on the reform agenda, demonstrating sustained involvement in youth policy and the Consultative Committee on Youth and Associative Action prescribed by the July 1, 2011 Constitution. The new constitution includes CSOs as central players in the public arena by stating in Article 12 that CSOs can participate in and contribute to the enactment, implementation, and assessment of decisions and initiatives taken by elected institutions and public powers.
The spectacular growth in the number of CSOs is based on new opportunities for funding by national and local governments that seek to fill gaps in access to public services. However, the majority of CSOs are not formally trained or specialized and many projects implemented by CSOs (78 percent) fall into the category of information, education, and communication (IEC). Only 6.8 percent of 1,254 associations surveyed in 2011 worked in the field of health services, while 23 percent worked in environment and housing. Moreover, half of the associations surveyed have changed their sector of activities and 42 percent of CSOs surveyed identified as self-funding and thus, not subject to rigorous monitoring from state sponsors.

There is no evidence that needs assessments are conducted by funding agencies or CSOs for service delivery projects. Two-thirds of CSOs surveyed identify the state as their principal partner with 31 percent funded by state agencies and 45.6 percent funded by local governments. The funding mechanisms, however, do not integrate sub-national priorities or programming to address the specific problems of localities. Generally, the funding of CSO projects is based on what the CSO proposes and not on a conscious effort to address a particular issue by the local donor. While needs assessments are uncommon, most CSOs work to recognize and respond to the local needs of target populations in close-knit vicinities.

Collaboration between CSOs and the government generally occurs through small funding programs for service delivery, especially from the INDH. Hundreds of CSOs deliver services such as kindergartens, care for the elderly, management of shelters, etc., with state funding. Issues related to this relationship include lack of training, standards, and controls for services delivered.

The vast majority of CSOs (80 percent) are not affiliated with a network or coalition and thus, unlikely to benefit from training and materials from mature CSOs with technical knowhow. Moreover, only a handful of national organizations have developed the technical capacity that enables them to share their expertise. This capacity exists in a few specialized sub-national CSOs, but is seldom shared between CSOs.

CSOs generally provide goods and services to their beneficiaries free of charge because these services are often considered charity. However, beneficiaries sometimes contribute to certain types of CSOs such as village associations or immigrant groups. For example, village associations contribute to digging wells and building school rooms, while immigrant associations assist incoming populations in their first weeks by providing food, clothing, and shelter when possible. Local populations, particularly the youth, prefer volunteering with service provider organizations.

Training for CSOs is provided in various forms. At least one university program provides a Certificate on Social Work and there is one national training center run by CSOs for CSOs. A handful of larger CSOs (Espace Associatif, Carrefour Associatif, and AMSED) and foundations train other CSOs on organizational development with international funding. Other larger CSOs provide thematic trainings on topics such as corruption or HIV/AIDS.

Experts are available to provide training in areas of demand including strategic management, project design and implementation, financial management, and accounting. Training is concentrated in larger cities and is offered as part of national capacity building programs run by state agencies such as ADS. Trainings are also available in a number of provinces and prefectures, but they are rarely systematic or continuous.
Two-thirds of CSOs surveyed by the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity mention state agencies as partners in the implementation of their projects. At least three state agencies provide local funding for CSOs, including grants to manage services for the agencies, such as the Ministry of Social Development, National Solidarity Agency (Entraide Nationale), and INDH. However, two-thirds of CSOs are not aware of the existence of any CSO network with which they can work and eighty percent of CSOs do not belong to any CSO network or coalition. In addition, one-quarter of CSOs find it difficult to work in partnership with state institutions.

There is no single entity that represents the interests of the CSO sector. Networks are organized by issue or geographical location, or sometimes both. For example, there are nationwide networks that defend and advocate for the rights of employees, with representation from local CSO groups. Communication among these networks is done mainly through email lists, simplified newsletters, and occasional gatherings. Many web portals exist, including websites and forums, to bring CSOs together; perhaps the most famous of those in Morocco is Tanmia.ma.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: EVOLVING**

Media coverage of CSO activities is generally positive but limited to public media channels which frequently cover CSO work as a part of government-funded activities, not as independent CSO initiatives. For example, the media may showcase how a particular CSO succeeded in changing the reality of a given neighborhood or a target population, but focus will be placed on the fact that this was done through INDH funding.

CSOs themselves do not sufficiently publicize their activities or solicit media coverage nor do they often document their work and produce statistics or information. However, print and audio-visual media are becoming more accessible and CSOs are using new media tools such as short videos that are shared through social media networks including YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook.

The public has a generally positive perception of CSOs and their activities, particularly those that serve poor communities. Within the culture of solidarity in Morocco, any institution voluntarily working for the benefit of the local population is viewed in a positive light. However, constituents generally believe that CSOs exist to serve them and do not consider it their civic duty to contribute to CSOs or to volunteer with them. Certain CSOs have built credibility with the government through successful implementation of numerous projects, and the government now consults with them on a wide variety of topics. However, a great deal of state interaction with CSOs is for show and publicity, especially when dealing with small organizations.

Many CSOs have codes of conduct, but they do not always follow them due to poor management and governance systems. Not all CSOs publish annual and financial reports and most organizations that do make their reports available to their members, not to the general public.
Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs) including faith-based and religious organizations, women’s organizations, charitable societies, and youth clubs emerged in the 1920s in the absence of national independence or sovereignty. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the West Bank was annexed to Jordan and Gaza came under Egyptian control. Many organizations, such as the Women’s Renaissance Movement (WRM), continued to work in Israel and focused on maintaining the Palestinian identity. By the 1970s, service and relief organizations, many of which were faith-based, began to emerge. Many of these organizations emphasized political organization and participation.

During the first Intifada in 1987, the priority of CSOs shifted to setting a political agenda, long-term development, and targeting human rights violations by Israel. Islamic charitable organizations began to emphasize political participation and by 1988, Hamas emerged as a political organization. By the time of the second Intifada in 2000, CSOs in the West Bank had undertaken several areas of focus, including service delivery, democratization, institution building, development, human rights, governance, advocacy and lobbying, anti-militarization, peace and nonviolence, and services for the disabled, youth, and women.

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8 The expert panel for this report was composed of 11 people: 4 female, 7 male; 1 from a university, 9 from CSOs, and 1 from government; 4 from Gaza and 7 from West Bank.
In 1994, the estimated number of CSOs reached 1,400 in the West Bank and Gaza. About 800 organizations disappeared following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and a new generation of organizations was founded.

The Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations was promulgated in 2000. CSOs and foreign governments mobilized to ensure that the law recognized the right of CSOs to work by registration rather than by permit. Consequently, the PA lost the legal basis to impede CSOs from operating through revocation of their permits. Additionally, the law enabled decision-making independence for CSOs.

Following the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) ceased to function and was suspended in 2007. Since 2006, the executive branch has consolidated its power and the PLC and the judiciary are no longer able to effectively maintain checks and balances on the executive branch. CSOs play an important but largely ineffectual role in holding the government accountable to its citizens due to the lack of mechanisms for influencing the decision-making processes of the PA and the exclusion of CSOs from consultations on laws and policies that affect Palestinian citizens. This role was further reduced in 2011.

The 2006 elections also led to an administrative divide between the West Bank, governed by the Palestinian Authority, and Gaza, governed by Hamas. The division increased pressure on CSOs to become affiliated and loyal to the local ruling party. CSOs affiliated with the opposition party in both the West Bank and Gaza since the divide have faced open conflict with political authorities sometimes leading to the imposition of governing board members by political authorities. CSOs began to renew their focus on service delivery in order to avoid conflicts with the administrative governments.

At the same time, relations between CSOs and local-level governments improved. Municipal authorities established local councils involving CSO representatives and ministries often relied on specialized CSOs for project support.

Palestinian CSOs are limited by political and financial constraints rather than by legal or administrative obstacles. They provide a wide range of services and enjoy a high degree of professionalism, strong infrastructure, wide-ranging technical know-how, and recognition internally and abroad. Yet the sector lacks financial independence and the trust and support of the Palestinian people because of the sector’s reliance on international funding. In addition, the precarious political context threatens to erode and marginalize the accomplishments of the civil society sector.

Almost all CSOs in operation have branches in both Gaza and the West Bank, and most are headquartered in Ramallah in the West Bank. According to the Ministry of the Interior, there are 1,196 CSOs in the West Bank and about 800 in Gaza. Of these, 30 international organizations and 346 local organizations were registered in 2011.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

The Palestinian Basic Law and the Law on Charitable Associations and Community Foundations (Law 1 of 2000) provide the legal framework for CSOs in both Gaza and the West Bank. The registration process is the same in both places, although implementation practices differ. The Ministry of the Interior registers CSOs while other ministries will occasionally provide technical oversight and licensing. Sports clubs can register with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Sports and Youth, or maintain registrations with both. Law 1 of 2000 does not cover cooperatives, not-for-profit firms, trade unions, networks, and platforms. Cooperatives are registered at the Ministry of Labor and not-for-profit firms are registered at the Ministry of the Interior.
of Economy and Trade. Trade unions in the West Bank are governed in accordance with the Jordanian Trade Union Law and Gaza still uses the Egyptian Trade Union Law.

In theory, the Palestinian legislative system allows CSOs to form and function independently; in reality, there are a number of obstacles that make registration for CSOs a lengthy, complicated process. The law states that an applicant becomes registered by default if the applicant receives no official response within 60 days of submitting an application. However, neither Hamas nor the PA respects that deadline and organizations are not allowed to function without an official registration certificate. The PA Ministry of the Interior maintains that the registration committee reviews applications weekly, but concedes that complex security clearance procedures instated in 2006 often cause delays. The procedures, introduced by the PA Cabinet, require PA security forces to clear all founding and board members and applicants are sometimes asked to propose new founding members if the original ones do not pass clearance. Without clearance, organizations cannot register, operate, or open bank accounts. The cabinet also now requires existing organizations to obtain ministry approval before opening bank accounts.

Palestinian CSOs report that registration decisions are often politically motivated and that registration serves to control rather than regulate civil society in both Gaza and the West Bank. For example, it took three years for the Coalition of Integrity and Transparency (AMAN), which focuses on government accountability, to obtain registration and the PA has closed many CSOs suspected of having affiliations with Hamas. Therefore, many coalitions, local groups, and initiatives include well-known individuals, Fatah supporters, PA officials, or people with no record of political activism or affiliation in their founding committees and governing bodies. Many others function without registration, but this makes it extremely difficult for them to conduct financial transactions and other administrative functions, obtain funding, and carry out activities.

In the West Bank, CSOs have a wide margin for operations as long as activities do not carry political overtones. In Gaza, however, CSOs face a lot of interference, contrary to the provision of Law 1 of 2000 that states: "If the decision to dissolve an association or organization is appealed before a competent court, the concerned association or organization may resume its activities until a permanent or final court decision is taken to suspend the activities of this association/organization or to dissolve it." Notwithstanding this provision, Hamas shut down the Sharek Youth Forum’s offices, as well as other youth centers, despite the fact that no such court decision was taken.

Palestinian legal experts and national organizations monitor violations of the right to free association, take legal steps to defend CSOs from its infringement by public authorities, and provide CSOs with legal representation. However, smaller organizations lack the financial means to hire qualified lawyers. Legal experts are available in both the West Bank and Gaza, but availability is uneven across districts of the West Bank.

The laws exempt CSOs from customs duties, but CSOs are not automatically exempt from other various taxes. Instead, it must seek approval for an exemption from the Prime Minister’s office on a case-by-case basis unless it is funded by an international donor that is tax exempt pursuant to an agreement with the Minister of Finance, in which case, the CSO benefits from the donor’s exemption. Individuals may deduct donations to CSOs from their taxable incomes.

CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services. Earned income is tax exempt unless a CSO runs large-scale production facilities or income-generating projects such as a dairy or olive oil business, which the Ministry of Finance perceives as competition with for-profit businesses.

The law allows CSOs to bid on public contracts. For example, national organizations working in the health, humanitarian assistance, and water sectors often partner with or implement projects for the PA. However,
many CSOs do not want to be perceived as sub-contractors for public authorities; the exact terms of reference and conditions of each public tender determines whether or not CSOs apply for public contracts.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: EVOLVING**

In the past five years, CSO organizational capacity has decreased as donor funding has declined.

CSOs vary in their commitment and abilities to build constituencies. Trade unions, youth, and women’s organizations have substantial support at the grassroots level; however, such support is declining. For example, membership rates in women and student committees and trade unions are lower today than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Many other organizations, including large national ones, function like private clubs that restrict their memberships and manipulate the results of their internal elections. Declining membership rates generally impede the efforts of CSOs to build public support around their objectives. However, CSOs that work on issues such as land confiscation and the West Bank barrier continue to draw public attention and participation.

Donors require strategic plans from their grantees and many large and midsize CSOs in the West Bank have responded by adopting participatory strategic planning techniques. Few CSOs in Gaza have developed strategic plans because donors usually direct funding there to humanitarian and relief activities, imposing fewer conditions. CSOs in both territories tend to adopt donors’ agendas rather than pursue their own strategic objectives.

The West Bank and Gaza share other similar capacity-related considerations. Executive managers of CSOs often sidestep their governing bodies and fail to operate in a transparent fashion. For example, general assembly members, who usually only meet once a year as required by law, are seldom consulted in CSO planning processes. Boards of directors rarely participate in decision-making processes and tend to lack the power or interest to enforce accountability on the part of management.

Because of limited funding, CSOs tend to hire staff on a temporary or project basis. Donor dependency makes it difficult for smaller organizations to compete with large international organizations or to retain professional, highly skilled personnel. Volunteers run most charities, small organizations, and local clubs. CSOs sometimes create local project committees and recruit volunteers for specific projects, but typically dismantle this infrastructure when the project is completed.

Few CSOs have permanent, well-qualified technical and managerial staff. Urban-based CSOs have greater access to specialized experts than their rural counterparts. Most accountants and IT staff are hired part-time or on a contractual basis. CSOs have access to and seek legal services from Palestinian lawyers when needed, but few organizations hire lawyers on a retainer basis unless they are involved in human rights monitoring, legal advocacy, or other justice-related activities.

Rural CSOs have less access to technology than urban ones. However, most CSOs are able to acquire the basic office equipment and technology they need to function, although many could benefit from updated systems and infrastructure.
CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza are heavily dependent on fluctuating funding from foreign donors, including Arab donors and Palestinian expatriates. Few organizations have core funding or sufficient funds to operate for more than one or two years. Although the West Bank and Gaza receive significant foreign assistance, less than 13 percent of foreign aid is channeled through Palestinian or international organizations; instead, the PA receives the bulk of the aid in direct bilateral assistance and is often in direct competition with CSOs over funding.

The political situation in the West Bank and Gaza has led to a decline in funding from foreign donors. As a result, CSOs have attempted to diversify and draw on local resources. While some money is donated to charitable societies to fulfill religious obligations, local resources including membership fees, service revenues, and income-generating activities only constitute a small fraction of CSO budgets, as deteriorating economic conditions since the 2000 Intifada have led to high rates of poverty. In addition, CSOs typically have small, closed membership bases as the process of clearing new members can be cumbersome. Most CSOs charge only nominal fees for their products and services.

The government gives financial support to some organizations to deliver public services. For instance, the PA pays CSOs to supply specialized medical treatment, emergency, and ambulance services through agreements with the Ministries of Health and Finance. Often, these CSOs were providing health services for decades before the creation of the PA, so this arrangement is more cost-effective than creating a new government-run system.

In both the West Bank and Gaza, local councils sometimes provide office space, utilities, and financial support to local CSOs. Some CSOs benefit from the emerging corporate social responsibility movement; in particular, the banking, foreign trade, and telecommunication industries provide cash and in-kind support for CSO activities, especially youth programs such as sports tournaments, children’s fun days, summer camps, and music concerts.

CSOs have well-developed financial management systems because both Palestinian law and donors require CSOs to be audited annually and to submit annual budgets, project budgets, and financial statements to the Ministry of the Interior or the donor organization. The Ministry of the Interior has intensified its financial auditing and provides CSOs with record-keeping instructions while Article 13 of Law 1 stipulates that the Monetary Authority scrutinize all transfers exceeding $10,000.

Human rights organizations that monitor the PA and security forces maintain independence from the government; however, many other Palestinian CSOs work directly with public authorities to undertake joint activities, participate in sectorial planning processes, and attempt to influence legislation and policy. CSOs often work more closely with local councils than with the PA or Hamas governments. In the West Bank, the PA involves CSOs in the preparation and execution of national and budgetary plans. It is still unclear whether the PA actually implements these plans or simply markets the CSOs’ roles to donors.
The crackdown on Gazan organizations has made advocacy work difficult. While monitoring is permitted, and human rights organizations play an important role in monitoring human rights violations by Hamas, all lobbying and advocacy activities are prohibited, including anti-occupation activities.

Advocacy campaigns have decreased substantially in the West Bank since the PLC was suspended and the PA began to prioritize rule of law and security issues. CSOs in both the West Bank and Gaza generally avoid tackling controversial issues such as government corruption or mobilizing communities around political issues for fear of prosecution or harassment by the government.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the executive branch is responsible for drafting legislation and the PLC reviews and passes legislation, but in the absence of a functioning PLC since 2007, new laws are reviewed by the cabinet and various ministries and passed by presidential decree. West Bank CSOs therefore focus their advocacy and lobbying efforts on the PA president. The executive branch often passes laws without consultation with CSOs and citizen groups. The lack of public consultation in the legislative process is a major weakness in terms of public oversight and accountability of the PA.

Most coalitions and campaigns address issues related to Israel rather than internal political or policy issues. However, the AMAN Coalition successfully lobbied for the creation of an anti-corruption commission and developed, in cooperation with the Higher Judicial Council and the Anti-Graft Commission, codes of conduct for public sector employees and the judicial authority that have been implemented in the West Bank.

CSO coalitions played a role in the promulgation of important laws regarding labor, civil status, disability, and agriculture and successfully advocated for the inclusion of quotas for women in various elections laws. In late 2011, the PA yielded to CSO pressure to halt the enforcement of articles in the penal code that discriminate based on gender. Other efforts include a coalition, led by the Palestinian NGO Network, which succeeded in halting decrees and amendments to Law 1 of 2000 that would have restricted the legal environment. CSOs have been less successful in advocacy campaigns to ban capital punishment, set minimum wages for the private sector, and modify security clearance procedures.

**SERVICE DELIVERY:**

Palestinian CSOs in both regions have had decades of experience conducting needs assessments and delivering services in fields ranging from relief to economic and human development. However, West Bank organizations have more financial and material resources at their disposal. In Gaza, international organizations take the lead in service delivery but services and imports have been impacted since 2007.

Some CSO sectors, such as agriculture, water, and the environment are substantial in size with greater technical expertise, stronger human resources, and better services than relevant line ministries. A 2011 European Commission report found that over 90 percent of social services in the territories are managed by CSOs. The Red Crescent builds more hospitals than the PA. CSOs also provide services such as education; assistance to seniors, persons with disabilities, political ex-detainees, and victims of torture; and economic empowerment programs for women and youth. When there is sufficient funding, CSOs respond flexibly to emergency needs during periods of conflict and fill gaps in government services. However, the CSO sector is saturated with organizations working on similar issues, leading to duplication and stifling competition for donor funding. At the same time, many other needs are not addressed by any organizations leading to a failure to meet the huge public demand for services. Public access to services in many rural and remote areas is still lacking especially in secondary health education, rehabilitation, water, sanitation, and other infrastructure.
Large, specialized Palestinian organizations provide technical and capacity-building services to the PA such as staff and police training or health and justice reform training.

The PA refers patients to medical facilities run by specialized organizations and charitable societies, although it generally does not compensate these organizations for their services. The PA sometimes informally provides financial support to CBOs and national organizations with shared political affiliations to help them with rent, salaries, and other basic operating costs. CSOs rarely earn enough income from fees to cover their costs, although universities are able to cover most of their costs through tuition. Generally, CSOs cannot adopt a private sector model for service delivery due to the limited financial means of the majority of service users.

The PA has gradually embraced and recognized CSO contributions to public service delivery. In Gaza, CSOs rarely enjoy such recognition and cooperation. Hamas places many restrictions on service-delivery CSOs, except for organizations affiliated with the ruling party that distribute cash assistance to the poor or people displaced by Israeli military activities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: EVOLVING**

The NGO Development Center (NDC), Welfare Association, Al-Qattan Foundation, and a few coalitions and networks serve as intermediaries for some foreign and Arab donors. They also draw on their own resources acquired from local donations and fees, sub-grants from international donors, or support from expatriate donors to offer project-based grants to local organizations. Some multi-year, donor-funded programs are designed to award grants and provide technical assistance concurrently. These programs tend to register themselves as local organizations so they can continue to play intermediary roles during the project cycle.

Some universities, including Bethlehem University’s Institute of Community Partnership, Al-Quds University’s Insan Institute for Gender Equality, and Birzeit University’s Continuing Education Center, provide general or specialized management training courses and diploma programs for the staff and leadership of CSOs. Numerous organizations provide technical assistance to CSOs, including the Palestinian Commission for Elections Observation in matters related to elections, the Tamer Institute on education, the Agricultural Relief Committees on rural development, and the Commission for Citizens’ Rights on national and international laws.

There is no single organization or network that represents the entire CSO sector in the West Bank or Gaza. The Network of Palestinian NGOs is an umbrella organization of one hundred CSOs that work on issues of collective importance to the sector, including a CSO code of conduct. Organizations working in a particular subsector such as women, youth, or the environment sometimes build coalitions to implement a particular project but because the cooperation is not based on shared strategic objectives, these coalitions tend to remain ad hoc, ineffective, and very limited in membership.

Networks and coalitions have difficulty securing local resources or foreign funding for their member CSOs, even though donors encourage sectorial and regional coordination through consultative events and joint project funding. Donors do not fund the creation or coordination of coalitions, but will sometimes support the direct costs of project-based interventions such as campaigns or training events. Due to the fierce competition for grants and funding, competing organizations only exchange information if they share the same political tendencies or if individuals members sit on the governing bodies of multiple organizations.
Sometimes CSOs form partnerships with the private sector. For example, Jawwal, a local telecommunications company, and the Arab Bank have made enormous contributions to educational, cultural, economic, and humanitarian programs via contributions to CSOs working on these issues as well as directly to beneficiaries. Rawabi, an urban planning company, has established a foundation that partners with CSOs such as the Education for Employment (EFE) to support young entrepreneurs. More and more private companies are following suit.

PUBLIC IMAGE: EVOLVING

Palestinian CSOs working in areas of service delivery and social services are positively perceived by the public as noted in the European Commission’s Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, published in July 2011. One expert involved in the study noted that the civil society sector is wide and vibrant, manages a large variety of activities, work in all sectors, maintain precious human resources, and hold an important reservoir of information and knowledge; thus, constituting the primary bridge between the West Bank/Gaza and the rest of the world. Charitable societies and legal aid centers also enjoy a strong reputation because of the relatively high quality of public services they provide.

On the other hand, organizations that advocate for democratization and gender rights are often perceived by the public as driven by foreign agendas, lacking transparency, and divorced from the grassroots. The public also holds negative perceptions that CSOs misuse resources, undertake unnecessary international travel, and compromise national interests for personal benefit. Much negative perception is tied to the fact that a lot of donor interest came out of the framework of the Oslo Accords, which were not supported by all Palestinians and have not resulted in a Palestinian state or the end of the Israeli occupation.

On the other hand, a recent report by the Sharek Youth Forum indicates that over 67 percent of youth trust CSOs to express the rights and interests of young people, while only 16 percent of youth in the West Bank and 5 percent in the Gaza Strip trust government institutions to do so.

Local media covers CSO activities and runs paid public service announcements for them but journalists in the national media tend to disregard opinion pieces or other articles by CSO staff, unless they are paid to run them, and ignore CSO activities unless they carry political implications. Many CSOs do not have public relations staff and fail to engage the media in a creative way. In some cases, poorly performing but media-savvy CSOs have a more positive image and greater media coverage than effective CSOs with less funding or media focus.

Local CSOs typically have more local support than national ones, and municipalities and local councils routinely request local CSOs to participate in their planning sessions and help determine community funding priorities. Local councils also rely on CSOs to fill the gap left by the central government in education, health services, and service delivery to pre-school children, senior citizens, the disabled, youth, and women. Despite this cooperation, local authorities rarely form long-term partnerships with local CSOs that have modest capacities or different political inclinations.

CSOs generally exhibit a low level of transparency to the public; they rarely disseminate strategic plans, annual reports, or financial statements and are sometimes accused of financial mismanagement, corruption, and falsifying financial documents by the public and authorities. On the other hand, many organizations make their annual PA registration documents, particularly the relevant financial documents, publicly available on their websites.
Many CSOs are attempting to improve their self-regulation. Over the past ten years, there have been numerous efforts to prepare and disseminate a code of conduct. The NDC’s version was signed by 600 CSOs from the time of its publication in 2008 through 2011. The NDC led a coordinated effort to encourage CSOs to adopt the code by disseminating manuals and providing training. While the NDC does not require CSOs that apply for funding to adopt the code, they do consider adoption and implementation when reviewing grant applications. It is too early to tell what the impact of the code will be on the sector.

Businesses perceive CSO staff to be competent and efficient and as the private sector grows, many companies try to recruit CSO staff.
Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab region, ranking at 154 out of 176 on the UN human development index (Human Development Report: Sustainability and Equity: a Better Future for All, 2011. UNDP). Unemployment is rising, particularly among youth and women. Forty-two percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day. In February 2011, youth instigated an uprising, inspired by the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, protesting against corruption, economic disparity, and unemployment. The movement succeeded in mobilizing the public and ultimately driving Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled Yemen for over three decades, out of power. He was forced to transfer power to his vice president, Abd Rabu Mansour, through an agreement signed on November 23, 2011, brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council and supported by the international community.

Also this year, the Houthis in the north, who have fought six wars against the Yemeni government, succeeded in taking control over the Governorate of Sa'adah. The secessionist movement in the south joined the youth uprising, but after Saleh was removed from power, one southern faction demanded separation from the north, while another faction called for a federated state. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also exploited the chaos of 2011 and Abayan, in the south, is currently held by insurgents; the insurgency continues to expand into other areas such as Shabwa, Albeida, and Hadramout.

The youth movement pursues over 300 initiatives in various forums and on various topics. These include training on development of goals and objectives, effective campaigns, and slogans; and lectures and training on public policy, social media, and democratic government. Parliament members who have resigned and academics contribute to these endeavors, participating in seminars, lectures, and other influential events. A number of CSOs took an active role in Change Square, the primary venue for the protests. For example, the

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9 The expert panel for this report was composed of 12 people: five (5) female, seven (7) male; all 12 from CSOs.
Youth Leadership Foundation assisted the youth in formulating a vision for a new political system. Other CSOs, such as Sayaj, Sisters Arab Forum, the National Organization for Defending Rights & Freedom (HOOD), the Human Rights Information and Training Centers (HRITC), and Sawasia for Development and Justice, focused on recording human rights abuses, including recruitment of child soldiers, illegal imprisonment, and conflict among groups of different political affiliations. However, the contribution of CSOs was limited compared to that of the many youth-led initiatives.

The unification of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 led to the adoption of a new constitution and the creation of the first multiparty democracy in Yemen’s history. Article 58 of the constitution and the Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 1 of 2001) formally guarantee freedom of association. However, the government applies Law 1 of 2001 and its executive by-laws inconsistently, and officials sometimes block or delay registration of, or arbitrarily dissolve, certain organizations.

The majority of CSOs provide basic social services, such as relief for impoverished populations and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The demand for these services increased in 2011 as the security situation deteriorated and the number of impoverished and displaced people increased. Since the 1990’s, CSOs have diversified their services and activities, expanding into human and economic development, including microfinance, education, and capacity building for other organizations and communities. According to the French Institute for Yemeni Studies (FES) and the French Center for Archeology and Social Science (CEFAS), Yemen for the first time has organizations that are dedicated to defending human rights, ending violence against women, and protecting the rights of consumers, refugees, and marginalized populations. According to a report from HRITC, fewer than ninety organizations are active in human rights, and 53.9 percent of these organizations are located in the capital.

CSOs are constrained by their sources of funding. Many CSOs depend almost exclusively on foreign funding and they adopt the agendas and interests of their donors rather than responding to the needs of the communities they serve. Most CSOs provide basic relief to the needy, but neglect activities that could empower communities and foster sustained economic development.

CSOs also have internal organizational problems. The founders of CSOs often monopolize decision making and undermine the transparency and accountability of their organizations. The majority of CSOs are unable to recruit and retain professional, well-qualified staff. They also have trouble recruiting local volunteers because they conduct little community outreach and have little local support. Most CSOs work in isolation, resulting in duplication and waste. Finally, CSOs are concentrated in urban areas, neglecting populated rural areas, which lack basic services.

According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA), the number of registered CSOs has grown rapidly, from 286 in 1990 to 7,414 in 2011. There is no way to determine the number of unregistered CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:**

The law governing CSOs are enabling, but implementation of its provision governing both registration and activities is problematic. The Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 1 of 2001) guarantees the right of citizens to form associations (jama’iyāt) and foundations (muassasāt). Law 1 of 2001 placed CSOs under the oversight of MoLSA. The law clearly stipulates the registration process, but MoLSA frequently delays registration as a means of extorting bribes in exchange for expediting the process. In addition, foundations are required to deposit one million Yemeni Riyal (approximately $5,000) in a bank in order to register, and the money has to remain in the bank as long as the foundation is in operation. This fee is unaffordable to many organizations, resulting in delayed registration or failure to obtain registration altogether. Article 8B of the
According to Law 1 of 2001, CSOs have to publish their registrations in the national official registry, which costs 60,000 Riyal (approximately $300), a sum that many CSOs cannot afford. Law 1 of 2001 requires associations to have a minimum of twenty-one founding members. In many cases, this has forced organizations to include founders who are completely uninvolved in running the association.

Once a CSO is officially registered, it is issued a license, which has to be renewed annually. Organizations must submit annual financial and technical reports to MoLSA as a precondition for renewal; MoLSA uses this requirement to revoke the licenses of organizations that are considered controversial, such as human rights organizations, or those that are suspected of affiliating with the political opposition. Sometimes CSOs have to bribe government officials to avoid closure. The government arbitrarily dissolved approximately fifty CSOs in 2011 on the grounds that they were linked to sectarian groups. Human rights organizations are also under constant scrutiny, and this year the government harassed and unlawfully arrested human rights workers. On the other hand, HOOD could not renew its license for approximately six years, but continued to operate openly without a license and receive funding from international donors without any repercussions. It would have been a publicity risk for the government to close down an organization as well-known and respected as HOOD, and the registration department does not have the financial or human resources to shut down every organization that does not properly register or renew its license.

Law 1 of 2001 allows CSOs to receive foreign aid on the condition that they inform MoLSA; however, most CSOs do not abide by this law and they do not face any repercussions. In 2011, the government proposed to tighten this restriction by requiring that a CSO obtain an additional approval from the Ministry of Planning before accepting foreign funds. This proposal ultimately was not adopted.

Law 1 of 2001 also exempts CSOs from custom duties and taxation on revenue and grants that they receive from foreign donors, and allows CSOs to receive a 50 percent reduction on electricity and water bills. However, an exemption must be recommended by MoLSA and approved by the Finance Minister; the process of obtaining it is long, bureaucratic, and subject to the whims of government officials.

CSOs can earn income from the provision of goods and services, and this income is also tax exempt. The law does not state whether CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, but they rarely do so. However, the law provides that MoLSA may contract a CSO to run its institutes or welfare associations, for example, the Productive Family Association. Organizations do not compete for contracts but are selected by MoLSA.

In 2009, the government proposed an amendment to Law 1 of 2001 that would have restricted CSO registration, government financial support, foreign funding and donations, and given government officials the right to close down any CSO with or without a reason. However, this year, parliament concluded that the current law does not require an amendment, and rejected it. Parliament called instead for the development of by-laws to make the law more transparent and enabling. The failure to enact the government’s draft was due, in large part, to successful lobbying by 180 CSOs nationwide. These CSOs also developed recommendations for a progressive alternative amendment. The amendment focuses on registration, funding, and penalties, and would eliminate the supervisory role of MoLSA over associations. The group also recommended formalizing the inclusion of CSOs in the formulation and implementation of national plans and public policies. This amendment has been discussed in parliament but not passed.

There is a very limited number of lawyers who specialize in CSO law, and some legal services are available to CSOs. Some CSOs such as HOOD provide legal advice to other CSOs for free, but few CSOs take advantage of this service because it is not publicly advertised and CSOs are unaware of it.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: IMPEDED

Most CSOs suffer from “leader-for-life” syndrome, in which the founder monopolizes all decision-making processes. Legally, associations and foundations have different requirements for their organizational structures. According to the law, an association must have an executive body, an independent board, and financial controls, whereas a foundation is essentially a one-man show, with the founder responsible for decision making, financial oversight, control of the foundation’s assets and funds, and close supervision of its staff. However, in practice, few associations have well-established management structures with a clear division of responsibilities between the board of directors and executive management. In most CSOs, the two groups are the same, and there is little turnover, resulting in lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability.

A study conducted by Islamic Relief (IR) and The Humanitarian Forum found that only 25 percent of CSOs have properly articulated missions and visions, and only 20 percent of CSOs have strategic plans, which are usually developed in response to donor expectations.

CSO have varying relationships with their constituencies. Human rights organizations actively cultivate public support through advocacy campaigns. However, service providers have tenuous relationships with their beneficiaries because the provision of services relies on external funding, which is often insecure or short-term; and because CSOs see their constituents as passive recipients of services, and therefore do not try to build relationships. This undermines CSOs’ relationships with the communities they serve and makes it more difficult for them to access local funds.

Before the youth uprising, most CSOs worked in isolation from one another, and their connections to their constituencies was limited. The uprising led to greater overall CSO involvement, with CSOs, such as the Youth Leadership Development Foundation (YLDF) and the All Girls Association, participating in the youth movement. Some organizations, such as the All Girls Association, changed missions to in order to have greater involvement in Change Square; others, such as the Social Development Organization, became active in Change Square, and attempted to influence the political affiliations of the youth. A number of new CSOs, such as the Bader Foundation, which aims to build the capacity of the youth in media and community development, were established specifically to meet the needs of the youth. Further, various CSOs were established to tackle issues that emerged as a result of the uprising, such as Wafa for the Welfare of Widows. Some organizations such as YLDF, the Bader Foundation and the All Girls Association, provided support to youth initiatives including trainings in media, human rights, and political participation. On the other hand, some NGOs did not want to be involved in Change Square, as they didn’t know if the youth uprising would succeed, and were afraid of the repercussions if it did not. Still others avoided the uprising because they did not want to be seen as having political affiliations and risk losing their constituents.

According to the IR/Humanitarian Forum study, only 15 percent of CSOs have permanent paid staff due to lack of funding. Yemeni society lacks a culture of volunteerism and most CSOs lack the structures and systematic approach needed to engage and retain volunteers. Volunteers are discouraged by CSOs’ often ad hoc recruitment practices. However, organizations that have a clear system of recruitment, training, and incentives for volunteers, such as the Youth Development Foundation, have quite successful programs.

Law 1 of 2001 requires CSOs to have permanent offices. Many CSOs follow this regulation, but some operate on a seasonal basis, closing down during major religious holidays (e.g. Ramadan and Eid), or rent temporary office space. Furthermore, many CSOs lack access to modern technology and have only basic communication tools such as phones or faxes. Some larger organizations have modern office equipment,
which they upgrade regularly to facilitate work and attract international funding. Such organizations typically employ a large number of people and provide IT training to their employees. In 2011, power cuts limited access to the Internet and other technology; power cuts can last for up to eighteen hours at a time, and even in the capital there is sometimes only two hours of power per day. Smaller towns can go for days without electricity. This exacerbates the disparity between large and small CSOs, because only larger organizations can afford to purchase generators.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY:**

Most CSOs depend on foreign funding and are unable to generate revenue or find alternative sources of funding. When CSOs attempt to diversify, they typically look for funding from additional foreign donors. This was particularly problematic in 2011, because many foreign donors, including multilateral donors, responded to the political unrest by channeling funding primarily to CSOs that work on human rights issues or provide humanitarian relief.

A few CSOs draw on local sources of funding such as religious organizations and philanthropic businesspersons. Charitable organizations, which distribute food, clothing, school supplies, and other essential items around holidays such as Ramadan and Eid, are the most successful in attracting local funding, but only 20 percent of these secure such funding. Orphanages receive regular financial and in-kind support from local sponsors, including individuals and private-sector companies, probably because of the religious obligation to assist orphans.

Large CSOs sub-contract their international donor funds to smaller CSOs for help with implementing projects. Article 18 of Law 1 of 2001 stipulates that the government should provide financial support to CSOs that serve the public interest after they have operated for one year, but in practice, only CSOs that have ties to government officials receive financial support, usually of about 55,000-80,000 Riyal ($255-$372).

Most CSOs do not have strong financial accounting systems or external audits to ensure that their funds are used transparently and legitimately. The IR/Humanitarian Forum study showed that only 25 percent of CSOs have accounting and financing software. The majority of organizations use only a simple spreadsheet to track their income and expenditures. CSOs occasionally submit to external audits in an attempt to meet the financial reporting requirements of international donors.

Law 1 of 2001 allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services, but only a few leading organizations, such as the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW), do so, in large part because of high business start-up costs and low returns. According to the IR/Humanitarian Forum study, about 90 percent of CSOs are unable to earn any income. Some smaller organizations charge fees for social services, but their revenues rarely cover their costs. Other CSOs provide training in embroidery, sewing, computer training, and traditional handicrafts; they, too, only charge small fees that do not cover costs, as their constituents are mostly low-income women.

Few CSOs charge memberships fees, and neither government nor private sector contracts are available. However, some companies select organizations to conduct employee training. For instance, the Bahrain Al-Shamel Bank contracted SOUL to manage an IT training program.
ADVOCACY: evolvinG

CSOs do not have a well-defined mechanism to partner with the government, and while the parliament is fairly accessible to the sector, dialogue, lobbying, and advocacy rarely result in change. Only CSOs that are considered pro-government or have personal relationships with government officials have access to decision-making bodies.

While most CSOs perform charitable work and do not engage in lobbying or advocacy, some leading organizations have attempted to lobby. Notably, in 2009, a number of CSOs formed an advocacy group to successfully prevent the enactment of a stricter law governing CSOs. While the new law has not been completely tabled, the group succeeded in postponing parliamentary approval of the law pending further discussion. Eight women’s organizations that usually compete with one another formed a highly visible alliance to advocate against early marriage. The campaign did not succeed in changing the law, but it did shape public opinion and raise awareness of the problems faced by girls who are married at a young age. More CSOs became engaged in advocacy in 2011, when donor funding for human rights advocacy increased, as discussed above. For example, a group of human rights organizations lobbied for the release of imprisoned journalists, and secured the release of journalist Mohammed Almaqaleh.

A coalition of CSOs lobbying for the modification of Law 1 of 2001 succeeded in presenting their suggested modifications to the parliament. Due to the current political situation, no action has yet been taken.

SERVICE DELIVERY: evolvinG

CSOs focused on economic and human development provide services in education, health, law, microcredit, and capacity building, including staff training, financial and administrative management, proposal writing, and marketing. Charitable organizations focus on distributing food and clothing. As a result of the war in the Sa’adah Governorate and the political conflict in 2011, an increasing number of CSOs work with IDPs and deliver humanitarian relief. However, most CSOs provide services based on the agendas of their donors. Most do not conduct needs assessments, and do not understand the needs of the communities they serve. For example, an organization may conduct awareness raising regarding women’s political rights in a community where there is still a struggle to allow girls to go to school.

The government lacks the capacity and resources to provide basic social services, especially to vulnerable groups such as the disabled. This is particularly a problem outside the major cities. CSOs fill this gap, and in some small towns and rural areas, they are the only service providers for the disabled. For instance, the Khadija Association for Development serves the disabled not only in Yareem, but also in communities up to an hour’s drive away. Even in Sana’a, all services to autistic children are provided by CSOs, not the government.

Some CSOs provide training and capacity-building services to other CSOs, and widely distribute brochures, leaflets and newsletters.

CSOs typically do not have mechanisms to recover their costs and most do not believe that they should charge for services. While CSOs are able to cover some costs by charging fees, most recipients are unable to pay.
Cooperation between CSOs and the government is still limited, and the government often prefers to deal with organizations that are either established by the government or are loyal to it. For example, while there are many development organizations working in Yareem that are highly regarded by the residents, the Khadija Association for Development is singled out for recognition by the local government because of its affiliation with the ruling party. However, some government agencies have started to recognize the value the wider CSO sector can bring to service provision. For example the Ministry of Youth has been collaborating with SOUL for Development since February 2011 in the implementation of a youth training program funded by the World Bank.

The government’s Supreme Council for Motherhood and Childhood coopted with a number of CSOs to raise awareness about the importance of girls’ education, especially in rural areas, as well as with the Ibechar Foundation on a UNICEF-funded youth program. The Altakaful Foundation in Taiz worked with the local development authority in building a residential compound for low-income groups. It also established an institute for mute and blind children funded by MoLSA.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**

The UN tried to establish an intermediary support organization (ISO), but negotiations with the government failed. The Social Fund for Development (SFD), a semi-governmental organization funded by a consortium of international donors, sub-grants to intermediary CSOs to provide microcredit. It also provides capacity-building training in loan administration, bookkeeping, marketing, organizational administration, and communication and negotiation skills to both CSOs and government agencies. A number of other CSOs periodically hold trainings and workshops on topics such as proposal writing, strategic planning, and financial management, contingent on funding.

There are a few well-qualified trainers available on topics such fundraising and volunteer management. Trainers are concentrated in major cities, particularly Sana’a, which makes it difficult for organizations located in remote areas to access training services.

Local grant-making organizations are relatively new in Yemen. In addition to the SFD, a few other organizations, including the Humanitarian Forum and SOUL for Development, receive large grants from international donors and offer sub-grants to smaller organizations.

CSO networks tend to be informal, ad hoc initiatives formed to address immediate problems, rather than long-term coalitions that work toward shared strategic objectives. For example, following the early marriage campaign discussed above, the coalition of eight women’s organizations disintegrated; they now compete with one another for funding and duplicate activities.

However, some specialized and regional coalitions work quite efficiently. For example, the Humanitarian Forum, a network of humanitarian and development organizations from several Muslim countries with a membership of twenty-one organizations in Yemen alone, worked collectively to highlight human rights violations during the uprising of 2011. A network of human rights organizations, headed by HOOD, has succeeded in securing the release of some prisoners, raising international awareness about the status of political prisoners, and providing legal support to political activists arrested or jailed during the youth uprising. The Yemen Elections Monitoring Network (YEMN), comprised of six CSOs, advocates for democratic principles. It seeks to monitor the full electoral process and ensure that voters can register and vote; raise awareness through the media on electoral systems in order to enhance democracy and political participation; train media professionals on election reporting; and advocate for a quota for women in elected positions.
CSOs are beginning to form partnerships with the private sector. For example, the Al-Shamel and Bahrain Bank is funding SOUL for Development’s professional skills development program for youth. Many banks and oil companies also contract with CSOs to provide professional development training to their employees in areas such as computer skills and human resource management.

A growing number of CSOs work with the government. For example, the Altakaful Foundation in Taiz built housing for low-income groups with the support of the local government.

PUBLIC IMAGE: EVOLVING

The public sees CSOs as donor-driven entities that fail to respond to the needs of the communities they serve. Many believe that the CSO founders use their organizations for personal gain and that the costs of the services they provide only account for a fraction of the funds they raise. A study conducted by HRITC in 2006 showed that 42.5 percent of the public was unaware of the existence of human rights organizations. However, the more educated population is more aware and more supportive of the role CSOs play in serving society, such as filling gaps in service provision and raising awareness about civil rights.

In 2011, there were few independent television channels, and the few private channels that existed, such as Suhail, have political affiliations and/or operate from abroad. Most CSOs prefer not to have media coverage on politically affiliated channels, to avoid being perceived as having political associations.

The state-owned Yemen Satellite Channel is required to cover events attended by government officials, who attend CSO events on a daily basis. On occasion, officials attend events to show support around a certain issue, even if the event is run by an organization of which the government does not approve. For instance, the government sent representatives to a HOOD-organized seminar to discuss the plight of Yemeni prisoners in Guantanamo, to show support for imprisoned citizens, even though the government does not approve of HOOD’s work. For the most part, though, officials only attend events run by organizations that are uncontroversial, so coverage is skewed.

Independent media coverage has increased, reflecting CSOs’ involvement in reporting advocacy and human rights violations during the 2011 youth uprising. However, CSOs must pay a fee for media coverage, which limits the coverage of CSOs with modest resources. Building on the role that social media played in the Arab Spring, CSOs, including HRITC and SOUL for Development, have established websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts to promote their activities.

Many in the government share the perception that CSOs are agents of western influence and not authentic partners for national development, but some government agencies have to work with CSOs because of CSO expertise. For example, the two sectors work together on HIV prevention and other health services, because CSOs have better access to and reputation with communities.

The relationship between the private sector and CSOs has visibly improved. For example, some companies and banks provide funding to CSOs to run development projects. SOUL received funding from the Al-Shamel Bank and Western Union to conduct trainings. The Khadija Association in Yareem received funding from businessmen to cover operation costs such as rent.

CSOs do little to regulate themselves. Many CSOs fail to operate transparently, but there is a growing tendency, especially among some network organizations, to publish reports online. There is also a growing push to introduce a sector-wide code of conduct or ethics. A few organizations are working on a draft, but it has not yet been discussed by all CSOs. The SFD has formulated a charter code of ethics for all CSOs to adopt, but so far it has not been adopted.
I. OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Report. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the strength of civil society on seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion. Then, based on the narrative description, each dimension and the country overall is rated on a three-stage scale: sustainability impeded, sustainability evolving, or sustainability impeded. The definitions of these three ratings for each dimension are provided in section II of this annex.

USAID then convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and on the CSO Sustainability Report methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and ratings to ensure that the ratings are adequately supported and accurately reflect the stage of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s overall rating in relation to the proposed ratings in other countries. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed ratings based on the narrative and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these recommendations and requests, to the implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the implementing partner and local expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify their proposed ratings. The Editorial Committee makes the final decision on the rating of each dimension.

II DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Report: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, CSO infrastructure, and public image. In the Report, each of these dimensions is examined with a focus on the following questions:

1. What has been accomplished?
2. What remains a problem?
3. Do local actors recognize the nature of outstanding challenges?
4. Do local actors have a strategy and the capacity to address these challenges?

A brief explanation of the criteria used to evaluate each dimension of sustainability as well as the definitions for the three-level rating scale follows:

Legal Environment

For an CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. The legal environment dimension of the Report analyzes the legal status of CSOs. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, access to information and other issues benefit or
deter CSOs’ effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.

Questions asked include: Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate? Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the state dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons? Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism? Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities? Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions? Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

**Sustainability Evolving:** CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

**Sustainability Impeded:** The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

**Organizational Capacity**

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Report addresses the operation of CSOs.

Questions evaluated include: Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors? Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision making processes? Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the board of directors and staff members? Does the board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the boards of directors operate in an open and transparent
manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds? Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers, or lawyers? Do CSOs’ resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, internet access, etc.)?

This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

**Sustainability Evolving:** Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need for, and are making an effort to develop, local constituencies.

**Sustainability Impeded:** CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. At this stage, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

**Financial Viability**

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds.

Factors influencing the financial viability of CSOs include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, and the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue-raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

Questions asked under this dimension include: Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and nonmonetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy? Do CSOs typically have multiple, diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future? Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements? Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs? Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

This dimension is rated as follows:
**Sustainability Enhanced:** A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

**Sustainability Evolving:** CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues, and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

**Sustainability Impeded:** New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

**Advocacy**

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs’ record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance. This dimension does not measure the level of CSOs’ engagement with political parties.

Questions asked include: Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policymakers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together? Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level in increasing awareness or support for various causes? Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of the government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc?

This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to (1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; (2) monitor and lobby political parties; and (3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this stage of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and
respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, noCOvernmental organizations.

**Sustainability Evolving:** Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead (“where the power truly lies”). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

**Sustainability Impeded:** Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors and united in their opposition to the old regime, fall apart or disappear. Some countries at this stage have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns become predominant for most citizens. There may be an increase in passivity, cynicism, or fear within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views, and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

**Service Provision**

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities and expectations of their constituents.

The Report reviews questions such as: Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services and other areas such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified? Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities? Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops, or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government? When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees? Do they have knowledge of the market demand and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay for those products? Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services that reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection, or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services, or other sources of funding including private donations, grants, and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an
unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports, and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

**Sustainability Impeded:** A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few, if any, government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services, or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

**Infrastructure**

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary that can provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest.

Questions include: Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects? Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages? Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grantmaking institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

**Sustainability Evolving:** ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' fora are formed to
coordinate the financial support of international donors and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

**Sustainability Impeded:** There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

**Public Image**

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs’ ability to recruit members and volunteers and encourage indigenous donors. The Report looks at the extent and nature of the media’s coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public’s knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole.

Typical questions in this section include: Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society? Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of an CSO? Is the support of CSO activity overall? Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information? Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage? Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports? This dimension is rated as follows:

**Sustainability Enhanced:** This stage is characterized by growing public knowledge of, and trust in, CSOs and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

**Sustainability Impeded:** The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "noCSOvernmental" or "nonprofit," including government officials, business leaders, and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
# ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

## 2011 CSO SUSTAINABILITY RATINGS

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## COUNTRIES BY RATING

### LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

- **SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED**
  - Iraq
  - Jordan
  - Lebanon
  - Morocco
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**
  - Lebanon
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED**
  - Egypt
  - Iraq
  - Jordan
  - Morocco
  - Yemen

### ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

- **SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED**
  - Lebanon
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**
  - Lebanon
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED**
  - Egypt
  - Iraq
  - Jordan
  - Morocco
  - Yemen

### FINANCIAL VIABILITY

- **SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED**
  - Lebanon
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**
  - Lebanon
  - West Bank/Gaza

- **SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED**
  - Egypt
  - Iraq
  - Jordan
  - Morocco
  - Yemen
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