The Strategic Framework for Somalia: 2016-2019

Strengthening the Foundations for a More Stable, Democratic and Prosperous Somalia
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ACRONYMS

AFR      USAID Bureau for Africa
ABE      Alternative Basic Education
AMISOM  African Union Mission to Somalia
CBO      Community Based Organizations
CDCS     Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CGPCS    Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CLA      Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting
COM      Chief of Mission
EU       European Union
FGS      Federal Government of Somalia
FFP      USAID Food for Peace
GEEL     Growth, Enterprise, Employment, and Livelihoods
GIS      Geographic Information System
ICS      Integrated Country Strategy
ICU      Council of Islamic Court
IDP      Internally Displaced person
IRA      Interim Regional Administration
M&E      Monitoring and Evaluation
ME&L     Monitoring, Evaluating, and Learning
OFDA     USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PMEP     Performance Management and Evaluation Plan
PPL      USAID Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning
PSG      Peace and State Building Goal
SFO      Somalia Field Office
SNA      Somalia National Army
SO       Sub-Objective
SPSS     Somalia Program Support Services
SSG      Strengthening Somali Governance
TIS+     Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus
TO       Transition Objective
USAID    United States Agency for International Development
USAID/KEA USAID Kenya and East Africa
USG      United States Government
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2016-2019 represents a crucial period for Somalia’s transition from decades of state failure. Should Somalia harness economic, political, and social momentum to achieve greater stability, build a functional economy, improve security, and establish credible and durable governance systems, the implications for stability not only in Somalia but through the Horn of Africa will be profound. Despite the immense challenges facing the country, Somalis are forging a promising path forward, evidenced by the country’s extraordinary efforts to establish regional states, rebuild institutions, and re-engage with the international community. To capitalize on this unique window of opportunity and Somali-led effort, USAID proposes a three-year (2016 – 2019) Transitional Strategic Framework (the strategy) for Somalia that guides USAID priorities and principles of engagement to assist the people of Somalia in making progress towards their development goals.

This strategy was informed by over 100 consultations in several regions of Somalia, Kenya and the United States with an array of stakeholders, including members of the United States Government (USG), the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), regional Somali officials, international donors, Somali leaders, academics, implementing partners, the private sector, and civil society. During these consultations, many stakeholders noted that USAID is widely perceived as a trusted partner with a broad network of relationships that has assisted USAID in successfully supporting and implementing development programs in Somalia since 2009. USAID’s development programs in Somalia have achieved notable results in building community cohesion, increasing confidence in nascent governing institutions, strengthening the capacity of key ministries, supporting elections and political processes; and providing critical social services in education and health. Despite the many challenges inherent to working in Somalia, this strategy aims to build on USAID’s past and current successes, and to contribute to USG strategic and foreign policy objectives in Somalia and East Africa and, most importantly, support a Somali-owned vision for the future as a stable, cohesive nation.

As outlined in the USG’s Integrated Country Strategy, this transition strategy contributes to the long-term desired end-state of “a unified, peaceful, and democratic Somalia with a stable and representative government able to degrade and defeat al-Shabaab; prevent terrorists and pirates from using its territory as a safe haven; provide for its own internal defense; and facilitate and foster development, growth, and political inclusion, while progressing towards long-term stability and prosperity.” The persistence of al-Shabaab remains the greatest threat to Somalia’s stability, and its development. Improving security and re-establishing rule of law are, and will remain, the most urgent priorities facing the country. Nonetheless, success in this area cannot occur without sustained investments in Somalia’s development. Security and stability in Somalia will hinge on the consolidation of accountable governance, credible political processes, transparent public sector financial management, and improvements in livelihoods—all issues that will guide USAID’s strategic focus during this crucial period.

This strategy acknowledges that myriad uncertainties make Somalia’s future difficult to predict as it emerges from decades of state failure, and takes on the complex challenge of building a cohesive federal state and fighting a still-powerful terrorist insurgency. As such, this strategy recognizes that development in Somalia will not occur along a neat continuum. Long-term development will occur alongside efforts to stabilize communities and to respond to urgent humanitarian crises. USAID may need to make strategic realignments to respond to emergent issues. Nonetheless, a developmental approach is both possible – and necessary – during this critical period in Somalia’s transition. This
strategy aims to ensure, through a robust learning framework and regular strategic and programmatic reviews, that USAID remains flexible and adaptive to changing realities in Somalia, while ensuring a consistent focus on helping Somalis build a durable foundation for long-term democracy, stability, and prosperity.
USAID Strategic Framework for Somalia: 2016 - 2019
I. COUNTRY AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Somalis share a common culture, ethnicity, language and religion. Their ethnic identity is informed by a complex network of clans and sub-clans with the four major clans being the Hawiye, Isaaq, Darod and Rahanweyn, with the Dir clan and other ethnic minorities making up the rest of the population. The population of Somalia today encompasses approximately 12 million people, with over 1.5 million Somalis in the diaspora and 2 million displaced both inside Somalia and in neighboring countries, with over 200,000 in Kenya.

Modern day Somalia is the result of a union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, which was created in July 1960. Somalia’s experiment with parliamentary democracy at that time came to an abrupt halt after a military coup in 1969, led by General Siad Barre. From 1969 to 1991, Barre’s government was characterized by oppressive dictatorial rule, including persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents. In 1991, the United Somali Congress, an amalgamation of paramilitary and political groups, ousted Barre, resulting in the complete collapse of the state. The subsequent two decades were marked by internecine clan conflict, humanitarian crises, and large-scale population displacement. In the north, Somaliland proclaimed its independence in 1991 and Puntland established a largely autonomous state government in 1998.

Social and Economic Dynamics

Somali society is built upon a patriarchal kinship system in which formal positions of authority are the entitlement of adult men. Women’s roles are typically confined to domestic and informal labor arenas. Somali society includes a sizeable group of ‘minorities’ who have historically faced significant discrimination and abuse, enjoy the least protection from armed violence, and are often a difficult group to access with basic services and humanitarian aid, as aid targeting them can easily be diverted by stronger groups. Households associated with weak or low-status groups have fewer means of claiming jobs, land and aid, and face a higher risk of losing assets to predatory groups such as criminal gangs, clan paramilitaries and uncontrolled security forces. Households from clans considered ‘guests,’ which include internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a dominant clan’s area, also enjoy fewer rights.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is $600. Just under half of the population is less than 15 years old, and 75 per cent of the population is under 30 years. 67 percent are unemployed among the 14-29 year olds, and only 6% of school age youth are enrolled in secondary school. Infant and maternal mortality rates are among the top four highest worldwide especially in south and central Somalia.

Conflict has propelled women to take on breadwinner positions. More than half of Somali households are headed by women, and approximately half of female headed households are living below the poverty line. Sixty-nine percent of the population covered by a 2016 World Bank survey live in poverty, ranking as one of the world’s poorest countries. Poverty is higher among rural and IDP households, and households without remittances.

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1 Somali High Frequency Survey Wave I (February 2016) Overview and Preliminary Results, Utz Johann Pape and Johan A. Mistiaen, Global Poverty and Equity Practice, The World Bank July 21, 2016
Newly constructed Ministry of Interior
II. USG PRIORITIES IN SOMALIA

USG priorities contribute to the long-term desired end-state of “a unified, peaceful, and democratic Somalia with a stable and representative government able to degrade and defeat al-Shabaab; prevent terrorists and pirates from using its territory as a safe haven; provide for its own internal defense; and facilitate and foster development, growth, and political inclusion, while progressing towards long-term stability and prosperity.”

The persistence of al-Shabaab remains the greatest immediate threat to Somalia’s viability and remains a key priority for USG national security interests. Improving security is urgent and requires ongoing support for AMISOM and Somali military operations, as well as medium- to longer-term efforts to build Somali military and police services and increase capacity in the justice sector that can protect human rights and deter future threats. Security and rule of law efforts will hinge on the consolidation of accountable governance, credible political processes, transparent and honest public sector financial management, and improvements in livelihoods. This is in turn depends on economic recovery and job creation, fueled by a revival of the agro-pastoral sector, the return of entrepreneurial diaspora, and the sustainable management of natural resources. These goals, if achieved, will successfully build on local structures and create opportunities to address push and pull factors contributing to violent extremism in Somalia.

III. DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION

Somalia’s transfer of power from a transitional to a permanent government in September 2012 generated domestic political momentum and catalyzed international re-engagement in Somalia. The September 2013 Brussels Conference further galvanized international support for the government through endorsement of the New Deal Compact for Somalia, based on a guiding set of principles for fragile states’ development that supports a country-led peacebuilding and state-building process that integrates political, security, and development objectives. Since the Brussels Conference, the New Deal Compact for Somalia has served as the primary framework for international engagement with the FGS and regional administrations. Organized around five Peace and State-building Goals (PSGs)\(^2\), coordination under the compact is organized by: 1) Working Groups for each PSG; 2) the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility Steering Committee, which governs the UN and World Bank trust funds and is the primary forum for coordination on development policy issues; and 3) the High Level Partnership Forum (HLPF), the highest-level forum for discussion of strategic and policy issues, convened bi-annually at the Ministerial and Ambassador level, respectively. USAID has, and will continue to play a leading role in the implementation of the New Deal in Somalia, and will align its activities to support the goals identified in the forthcoming FGS National Development Plan and post-2016 aid architecture.

In FY 2015, according to the Aid Flows in Somalia, data compiled from 36 development partners and prepared with the support of the World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), development partners provided approximately $700 million in development aid to Somalia. Coupled with an additional $598 million in humanitarian assistance, the total Official Development Assistance

\(^2\) The five PSGs are: Inclusive Politics (PSG 1); Security (PSG 2); Rule of Law (PSG 3); Economic Foundations (PSG 4); Revenue and Services (PSG 5). The United States actively participates in every PSG working group, and presently co-chairs PSG 2 and the elections sub-working group under PSG 1. USAID has also been the co-chair of PSG 4.
USAID continues to be the largest donor of humanitarian assistance and the third largest donor behind the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom for development assistance. This strategic framework takes into account the assistance provided by these development partners and aims to continue and enhance program and strategic coordination between USAID and other development partners to support Somalia’s short-term and long-term development goals.

IV. DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

Strengthening state-society relations is of critical importance to Somalia’s development trajectory, and informs all aspects of USAID’s strategic goals. For Somalia’s historic transition to succeed, its governing institutions must become more effective, accountable, and inclusive to reverse the destructive legacy of a predatory state, violent extremist ideology, and exclusionary clan and patronage-based politics. At the same time, these institutions must deliver; people must see tangible dividends in the form of more responsive and representative institutions, and improvements in economic opportunity and service delivery to become active participants in, rather than spoilers of, Somalia’s state-building project.

As such, USAID’s development hypothesis for this strategy is:

**IF Somali governance systems and processes that enable inclusive governance are strengthened AND the Somali people benefit from expanded, tangible dividends of the state-building project, then the foundation will be built for Somalia’s longer-term recovery.**

This hypothesis recognizes that the process of Somalia’s recovery will extend far beyond the life of this strategy. However, it is in USAID’s manageable interest to focus on core strategic areas that are most important for Somalia’s transition, and to maintain sufficient flexibility to adapt both our strategic approach and our programmatic mechanisms to adjust to changing political, security, and developmental circumstances.

To assist Somalia in this historic effort, the USAID Strategic Framework for Somalia 2016-2019 has identified three primary objectives to guide investments over the 2016-19 period that support the goal of building durable foundations for a more stable, democratic and prosperous Somalia:

**Transition Objective 1: Systems and Processes that Enable Inclusive Governance Strengthened**

**Transition Objective 2: Service Delivery Improved**

**Transition Objective 3: Inclusive Economic Growth Expanded**

These transition objectives represent the most important areas of investment in this critical phase of Somalia’s transition. Given the complexity of Somalia’s politics, building a sustainable foundation for a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Somalia is dependent on a strong governance system that can
guarantee more inclusive governance, while managing multiple governance and political processes that will determine the legitimacy of the state and set the stage for a citizen-government interaction.

The core assumption built in the strategy is that if there is an increase in political participation and trust in the political process; effective, accountable and representative governance institutions are strengthened, and key communities are stabilized, then the necessary systems and processes that enable more inclusive governance in Somalia will be strengthened. Interventions at the national and sub-national levels will focus on supporting core Federal Government executives’ functions like communication and coordination, developing informed plans, policies, and legislation; review and implementation of the constitution, establishment of a federal system and a function electoral system.

Even though security remains a priority for the government of Somalia, the provision of quality public services, particularly in education and health is critical in improving the lives of Somalis, contributing to lay the foundations for future economic growth and improved livelihoods. The Transition Strategy, in particular TO 2, assumes that if quality of service delivery in health and education along with equitable access is increased, through capacity building of education and health officials as well as curriculum and policy reform, then it will lead to improved service delivery and increased confidence in government's ability to provide basic social service.

As described under TO 3, Somalia’s economy has been shaped by sustained conflict and a war economy that has robbed the country’s wealth through illicit trade. Despite Somalia being among the poorest countries of the world with a GDP per capita of $435 (2013) and among the poorest economic performers, in the absence of state regulatory environment and formal institutions, a vibrant and resilient private sector exists and continues to expand. If USAID expands economic opportunities, strengthens the enabling environment to enable Somalia’s growth potential by removing or reducing economic barriers including access to finance and support to policy and regulation then opportunities for inclusive economic growth will be expanded across the country.

USAID predicates the achievement of these objectives on security, ongoing political commitment on the part of FGS and state actors, and citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of their governing institutions. The foundations required for political stability, sustainable growth and poverty reduction include inclusive political institutions that ensure the accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy of the state; economic institutions that encourage creative individual initiative, efficient mobilization of labor, public/private partnerships, and the allocation of resources to their most productive uses; and education and health service institutions that expand all Somalis’ abilities and opportunities to contribute to and benefit from development progress and to counter violent extremism.

Assumptions and Risks
USAID’s assumptions for Somalia, include:

- The security context in Somalia will remain fluid.
- Travel to and within Somalia will continue to be unpredictable given security dynamics.
- Vested interests will resist institutional change and accountability processes and mechanisms will remain issues.
- Somalia’s borders with its neighbors will remain porous. Al-Shabaab will operate in neighboring countries and will contribute to regional instability.
- Somaliland will continue dialogue alongside an effort to assert its claim to independence.
• Puntland and the FGS will continue to wrangle over issues related to the federalism process.
• Revenue collection will increase but remain insufficient, necessitating continued high levels of donor funding.
• Somalia will continue to require humanitarian assistance based on assessed needs, partner access and capacity throughout the period of this strategy.

USAID recognizes that this strategic framework is wholly dependent on internal dynamics that are beyond our control and this section discusses some of these contextual and programmatic risks. Annex I offers mitigating measures that USAID would employ to address these risks. The risks below are contextualized for USAID’s programming implementation.

Contextual Risks
1. Security deteriorates in Mogadishu and AMISOM and the SNA are unable to hold secured areas outside of Mogadishu.
2. Commitment of government leadership at FGS and state levels (including Somaliland and Puntland) to democratization weakens, and elections are postponed or cancelled.
3. Negotiations linked to state formation and the institutionalization of federalism exacerbate tensions over resource sharing and representation and trigger violent conflict.
4. Government does not plan for or allocate funds to sustain reforms.

Programmatic Risks
1. Inclusive political processes and decision-making do not result in inclusive outcomes, undermining efforts to increase state legitimacy.
2. Participatory political processes for establishing development priorities, and credible elections, do not significantly contribute to citizen perceptions of legitimacy.
3. Acute capacity constraints and limited absorption capacity limit knowledge transfer and value of technical assistance.
4. Political space becomes more constrained for civil society and media to engage around and report on democracy and accountability issues.
5. Changes in political leadership undermine government ownership of reforms.
6. Quick impact interventions do not improve public confidence in newly accessible areas or do not effectively counter the influence (economic blockades, political or security) of al-Shabaab.

This strategy includes a robust monitoring evaluation, learning, and adapting process that will be used to not only test the development hypothesis but also to validate assumptions and evaluate progress.

Opportunities
Despite these risks, there are many dynamic opportunities that USAID intends to build on in this approach. Somalis’ desire for education, enhanced economic opportunities, and global exposure remains high and USAID’s investments in basic education and economic growth can build on this indigenous momentum. The FGS has engaged with International Financial Institutions to assist with its internal financial management system and has agreed to oversight by international entities such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF). These efforts may help deter corruption and assist
with the transparent management of Somali revenue and donors’ contributions. As the regional and state formation process proceeds, the international community can build deeper relations with these authorities and develop a much more nuanced understanding of local dynamics outside of Mogadishu. This will assist the international community in responding more effectively to programming in these areas. Finally, Somali initiative to establish a National Development Plan in the post-New Deal aid architecture era creates opportunities for the FGS and the regional states to take more of a leading role in coordinating assistance to their country.
Galmudug team winning at the USAID supported girls’ basketball tournament
VI. TRANSITION OBJECTIVES (TOs)

TO 1: Systems and Processes that Enable Inclusive Governance Strengthened
In the 2016-2019 timeframe, Somalia must manage multiple governance and political processes that will determine the legitimacy of the state and set the stage for citizen-government interaction in the approach to expected democratic elections in 2020. At the national level, the federal government in Mogadishu must demonstrate its ability to manage and execute a credible budget, meet basic financial reporting standards, coordinate aid management processes, implement security sector reform, and maintain positive political relations with the disparate newly formed states. The central government must preside over consultations regarding the adoption of the new constitution via a referendum; an electoral process to facilitate a transition in parliament and of the presidency in 2016; and preparations for more direct elections in 2020. Emerging states must develop governing institutions, including decentralization frameworks to guide political and functional relationships between the states and the districts. In addition, the emerging states and the semi-autonomous state of Puntland may hold state-
level and regional assembly elections. The self-proclaimed autonomous state of Somaliland plans to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in 2017.

TO 1 will support the federal government, the emerging states and communities to strengthen state-society relations, promote inclusive processes and establish governance mechanisms.

The gender and generational inequalities evident in democracy, governance, and peacebuilding arenas are a reflection of overall social, cultural, and political imbalances in Somalia. As Section I noted, power dynamics are complex and cross-cut clan identity, location, class and occupation. Advancing women’s and youth’s political empowerment and leadership therefore requires action on multiple fronts. Increased political participation and leadership results from a confluence of factors, including removal of legal and logistical barriers; implementation of supportive frameworks; promotion of leadership through political party reform; support to civil society; and a positive shift in societal norms. A wide range of Somali women civil society organizations, cover crucial areas of service delivery, including health, support to survivors of sexual and gender based violence, legal assistance, economic empowerment, literacy and education. Women’s groups in particular—both formal associations and informal networks—have been at the center of social mobilization in support of peace. However, this expertise and experiences are yet to be fully taken into account in national policy and political processes. Women’s interest groups are allied with youth groups that share their second class status in the clan power structure. Both groups have a significant presence in political advocacy, although younger women are significantly less active.

Programs will work directly to promote inclusion and allow for greater engagement of women and youth, as well as other excluded and less powerful groups. While attitudes and values are deeply entrenched, USAID will work to change the landscape incrementally to reduce the power asymmetries. Key approaches will include a focus on ensuring facilitators at community levels encourage inclusive participation; supporting initiatives within government agencies and non-state actors to promote equality, human rights and active political participation; support to emerging female and youth leaders and politicians; and outreach and support to women and youth focused organizations.

USAID will work towards three Transition Sub-Objectives (sub-TOs) under TO 1:

**Sub-TO: 1.1: Create Enabling Conditions through Stabilization of Key Communities**

In fragile communities such as those formerly under the control of al-Shabaab, USAID/Somalia, in partnership with the Office of Transition Initiatives, will identify quick impact programming to provide immediate assistance and public assets to improve basic welfare in the months following a successful military operation. These efforts seek to increase the levels of confidence in AMISOM, the SNA and the government in a given area, so that communities do not feel abandoned after military interventions. Through this initial assistance, citizens’ may conclude that they will not be excluded from services under the FGS and that development dividends may increase.

USAID will follow on these initial interventions with a consensus based community-driven development model that prioritizes equitable participation in decision-making and management of community assets. USAID will work in tandem with multiple levels of government (i.e. caretaker and interim administrations, regional and state authorities, and the FGS) to help them build and strengthen relations
with these communities. Participatory, consensus-building approaches will be used to build citizen confidence in the governing institutions and address critical local-level needs and by facilitating the construction and/or rehabilitation of vital community infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, community centers, local administration offices, health clinics, schools, water sources, markets, playgrounds, etc.). These activities will additionally contribute in the short-term to TO 2: Improve Service Delivery.

Men’s role in peace building is most often described as resolving conflict through transactions, as compared to women’s role that is described as emissaries of peace and mitigating actors who head off problems before they erupt. As the 2014 Gender Assessment noted, support to local structures that include both women and youth also open more channels of communication for community members to raise issues as well as inform authorities about security threats.

To create an enabling environment for these longer-term local level governance processes, the personal and social effects of two decades of war must be tackled on a societal level. The emergence of extremist groups in Somalia was made possible because of the inequitable power and wealth systems that thrived during state collapse. Many Somalis saw this alternative, albeit draconian and harsh, as a fairer system of governance that at least imposed order during a chaotic period. To refute this alternative and reduce the appeal of extremism, Somali society must establish a new set of inclusive systems that enable participation in the political and social spheres.

To address this need, USAID will support a multi-faceted approach that seeks to counters the drivers of violent extremism in Somalia. The overall participatory decision-making model utilized in this sub-TO (discussed above) and activities under TO 2 (Improve Service Delivery) will build trust and confidence in Somalia’s government institutions while additional USAID activities will target other “push” and “pull” factors of extremism. Social reconciliation activities that promote healing and forgiveness will strengthen relationships within communities, limiting social fragmentation and building resilience against extremist groups seeking to perpetuate social and political cleavages for their own benefit. Activities that reinvigorate traditional Somali culture, including arts, music, literature, and athletics, will help build social pride and cohesion. Activities promoting inclusivity will target marginalized segments of society, such as women, youth, and minority clans. Helping these groups establish a strong voice in their communities will weaken a powerful recruiting tool of al-Shabaab and other forces seeking to destabilize the country.

Activities under this sub-TO align with U.S foreign policy objectives to counter terrorism and violent extremism in East Africa, which are:

1) Promote the stabilization and functionality of Somali territory liberated from al-Shabaab; and,
2) Empower vulnerable communities in East Africa to address the most salient political and economic drivers of radicalization and recruitment.

Sub-TO: 1.2: Strengthen Effective, Accountable, and Representative Governance Institutions

USAID will carry out programs under this Sub-TO at both national and sub-national levels. At the national level, interventions will focus on supporting core Federal Government executive functions such as intra-governmental communications and coordination, developing informed plans, policies, and
legislation, and putting in place systems to improve the management of public resources. Interventions will also combat corruption, foster constructive political dialogue, and establish the conditions necessary for the delivery of core public services and more inclusive economic growth. Additionally, USAID will improve the legislative and oversight functions of Somalia’s deliberative bodies, increasing the functionality and capacity of the federal and regional Somali parliaments. The approach will be closely linked to interventions in the executive branch, to ensure a critical mass of support is deployed to review and pass the key legislation necessary to codify political agreements, to establish core government mandates and functions, and to strengthen accountability, particularly in the management of public resources. A cross cutting priority is to support ministerial and parliamentary partners to actively communicate with the public, media, and civil society in order to build awareness of government priorities and actions, and more effectively incorporate citizen’s views.

Under TO 1, USAID will focus on economic governance, including strengthening revenue management and the capacity of the Central Bank, negotiating the framework for intra-governmental fiscal arrangements, and public financial management to build transparency, integrity, and effectiveness in the management of public resources. USAID is making significant investments in improving service delivery and supporting local participation under TOs 2 and 3. Over the longer term, these interventions are most effective when higher level institutions of accountability function well. Under TO 1, USAID will prioritize a few core systems that enable sector level initiatives to move – such as policy processes for identifying key priorities and for getting resources to where they need to go, key steps in the long-term process of embedding robust financial controls. Performance gaps are in part attributed to the shortfalls of financial resources and capacity, but ultimately are reflective of core failures in accountability relationships: weak political incentives, unclear objectives, and limited enforceability. A key assumption is that strengthening core accountability institutions, and the relationships between them as well as with non-state actors, will influence the wider system and lay the foundation for sustainable service delivery over the longer term.

State formation processes are the foundation for Somalia’s longer term political stability. As state formation proceeds, USAID will increasingly focus on supporting decentralization frameworks and implementation at State levels and in Somaliland. Building on investments and approaches developed under TO 1.1, efforts will focus on the ability of the states to legitimize governance through service delivery, as well as through creating more inclusive decision-making processes. Furthermore, as necessary, USAID will contribute to efforts to build the capacity of Federal and State actors including Somaliland to dialogue and facilitate agreements regarding revenue sharing, natural resource management, and the delineation of the powers and authorities of federal, state, and local governments.

Defining the roles and functional responsibilities of the district administrations; the frameworks for district council formation; conducting capacity development for public administration core functions, and service delivery are foundational for the success of Somalia’s federalist democratic system. Somaliland and Puntland have agreements on decentralization frameworks with initial steps underway, but much remains to be done.

Numerous disputes and grievances remain salient in fueling perceptions of injustice, driving mobilization into armed groups, and inhibiting investment and development. Most Somalis look beyond the state justice system to customary authorities, Sharia courts, or private mediators, to resolve most disputes. Protracted conflict; however, has undermined the efficiency and credibility of these processes. Violent
extremist groups - including al-Shabaab - have at times attempted to fill this gap, generating citizen support. The structure and performance of the formal justice system continues to reflect divisions along clan, ideological and political-economic interests. Judicial performance remains deeply tied to narrow interests along these three axes, with divisions inhibiting efforts to restructure, strengthen, or improve its performance. Rather than waiting for the justice system to become fully functional, USAID will adopt a problem-driven approach to addressing the most critical justice needs, building on existing dispute resolution mechanisms, which range from women’s access to justice, widespread land, property and commercial disputes, to exclusion among IDPs and other minorities. USAID will focus on improving access to and the human rights standards of alternative dispute resolution systems, improving women’s access to more equitable fora, and linking informal processes to the formal justice system over time.

Sub-TO: 1.3: Increase political participation and trust in political processes

Vision 2016 established the federal government’s priorities in pushing forward Somalia’s democratization as: 1) review and implementation of the constitution; 2) establishment of a federal system and boundary delimitation; and 3) establishment of a functioning electoral system. These political processes are therefore key benchmarks framing Somalis expectations of their government, and priorities for USAID in furthering the overall objective of enabling inclusive governance.

USAID will support political processes in Somalia and Somaliland, including the 2016 electoral process and the constitutional review at the federal level and the 2017 parliamentary and presidential elections in Somaliland. USAID will also support the foundations for eventual one-person-one-vote elections at the federal level. USAID will work closely with stakeholders, including Somalia’s National Independent Electoral Commission, Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission, other government agencies, civil society organizations, and other donors and partners also supporting these processes, to ensure that activities are effective, aligned with Somalis’ aspirations for their country, and well-coordinated with other support.

Activities will promote credible and inclusive electoral and political processes by supporting the establishment of capable institutions that can administer credible elections; inclusive, issue-based participation by political parties; and an informed and engaged citizenry. The federal constitutional review process will be fraught with struggles over competing interests and visions for the future, particularly in terms of federalism and power sharing between levels of government. USAID will support public consultation and input into this process, as well as the facilitation of discussions between levels of government. USAID will also support political and electoral processes in the emerging states. Clan elders have played a key role in most major political decision-making processes in Somalia, while women and youth have for the most part been excluded from these fora. USAID will ensure that women and young people are at the center of its civic and voter education activities so that they are empowered to participate in political processes, and will promote their participation in public consultations on electoral plans and constitutional review. USAID’s electoral support interventions will work with political parties to be inclusive of women and youth as party members, leaders, and candidates. Both groups will be a particular target as election officials and observers. Interventions will also advocate for women’s engagement in political processes, such as support to youth and women’s organizations on public awareness campaigns around women and youth as political leaders.
TO 2: Improve Service Delivery

Violent conflict and the disintegration of government in Somalia destroyed core institutions that provided basic services to citizens, including formal education systems and basic health services. USAID will build on lessons learned from humanitarian assistance and development activities to improve access to equitable and quality education and health services in communities throughout Somalia. In areas where there is relative stability (such as Somaliland and Puntland) programs will focus on strengthening institutions to improve the quality of service delivery. In newly recovered or less stable areas, the focus may be on direct service delivery and linking humanitarian and development interventions, with a greater shift towards improving quality and institutional strengthening as these areas become more stable.

USAID will work to achieve two Sub-Objectives under TO 2:

Sub-TO: 2.1: Increase Equitable Access to Basic Services

While security remains a priority for the FGS, the restoration of public services, especially education and health systems and interventions to improve education and health outcomes, is also high on the government’s agenda.

Somalia has some of the lowest education indicators in the world and access to equitable quality education remains a major challenge for Somali children and young people. Despite major improvements in overall school enrolment over the last eight years, only 710,860 children out of an estimated 1.7 million (UNDP projection) of primary school age children – 42 percent – are in school. Of those attending school, only 36 per cent are girls. Girls’ enrolment drops particularly dramatically at the secondary school level, and the onset of puberty presents a host of reasons for girls to leave school, including: lack of appropriate facilities, insensitivity of teachers, few female teachers, early marriage, and the poor cost/benefit of attending school in a cultural context where men are still perceived to be the primary breadwinners. The southern and central areas are estimated to have significantly lower enrolment and attendance than Somaliland and Puntland, although due to the security situation no full school census or household survey has been completed since 2006. A 2011 UNICEF survey in Somaliland and Puntland showed much higher rates of school enrolment and attendance, though disparities favoring urban and wealthier households still remained. Other exclusionary factors include children from IDP families, coastal and riverine areas, nomadic populations, and girls and children with special needs.

In countries like Somalia, provision of and participation in education is vital in fostering more cohesive societies and restoring the social fabric damaged by years of conflict and violence. Strategic priorities have been set in each region of Somalia and donors are eager to promote complementary programming aligned with each region’s Education Sector Strategic Plans. Although there are no rigorous studies to detail the most prevalent barriers to education for various segments of the population, evidence points to long-term effects of instability, fragile and weak institutions, social and clan discrimination, as well as livelihoods and cultural norms as the prevailing factors. In addition, there is need to strengthen educational institutions and develop clear policies and frameworks that cater to nomadic pastoralists’ needs.
USAID will continue to work on improving access and quality to non-formal and formal education by expanding and creating education opportunities in underserved and in newly liberated areas from al-Shabaab.

Although there have been steady gains in increasing access to education, these gains cannot be sustained unless they are complemented by investments in the teaching force. Education administrators at all levels lack the training and resources necessary to carry out their jobs effectively. To address these challenges, USAID will leverage other donor support and work with key education stakeholder on teacher training and capacity building of targeted education institutions.

Strategies to address gender disparities and social exclusion include: provision of Alternative Basic Education programs; supporting the transition to formal schooling; enrolment at the right age; recruitment and training of female teachers and a more diversified educational workforce; and support to more inclusive government policies, resource allocation, and institutional frameworks. Programs will incorporate a special focus on increasing girls’ enrolment, retention and recruitment, and training and retention of female paraprofessional teachers from local communities.

The destruction of the public health system during the civil war left Somalis with unreliable and unregulated health services. Life expectancy at birth remains low at 51 years, and the average Somali accesses health services only once every eight years. The impact on Somali women and children of this lack of access to quality and affordable maternal and child health care is particularly dire. Somalia’s fertility rate of 6.6 per woman is the third highest in the world, though it has declined slightly from a peak of 7.6 in 1998. This exceptionally high fertility rate contributes to the country’s very high maternal mortality ratio (732 per 100,000 live births); it strains household capacity to invest in basic education, health care and nutrition for all the children in the family; and it contributes to the country’s annual population increase, which, at 2.9 per cent, is among the highest in the world.

Under-five mortality rate (146 deaths per 1,000 live births) also ranks among the highest in the world, in Somaliland and Puntland 44 and 38 percent of births respectively, are being attended by skilled health providers. Responses to outbreaks are also a challenge. As recently as 2013, Somalia had 171 confirmed polio cases in 10 provinces affecting 34 districts. Based on availability of funds, USAID will collaborate with other donors and the Somali health authorities to improve health service delivery in Somalia through proven high impact, low cost, and sustainable interventions, including promotion of safe drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, treatment of common illnesses, and pre- and post-natal care. In addition, an important focus would also be on health systems strengthening to include the prevention, monitoring/surveillance and treatment of infectious disease.

**Sub-TO: 2.2: Improve Quality of Service Delivery**

USAID investments will target Somali education authorities’ ability to effectively manage and lead the education sector. These interventions will include capacity building of education officials, curriculum reform, and policy development, especially for non-formal education, strengthening community engagement in education issues, and increasing opportunities for youth civic participation. In environments where communities are coping with the compounded effects of conflict, displacement, harsh climatic conditions and a decimated education infrastructure, access to education can be expanded through the delivery of alternative basic education. Such programming will be rigorously designed, implemented and documented to inform and support the FGS in developing an evidence-
based Policy Framework for non-formal and pastoralist education. In collaboration with the EU, DFID, the World Bank, and other partners, USAID will apply best practices to strengthen education institutions and to build foundational frameworks for education in Somalia.

Based on availability of funds, USAID will also work to strengthen health systems and improve access and equality of health care. USAID’s programs will focus on capacity building and health care system strengthening to build capacity of the health care workforce, support policy development, and rebuild the health sector to promote better health services for all Somalis.

**TO 3: Inclusive Economic Growth Expanded**

Somalia is among the poorest countries of the world with a GDP per capita of $435 (2013) and among the poorest economic performers (with a 75 percent unemployment rate among 14-29 year olds). Sustained conflict and a war economy have shaped Somalia’s economy, pillaging the country’s wealth through illicit trade. Nonetheless, in the absence of state regulatory environment and formal institutions, a vibrant private sector that largely operates informally, has proven resilient and continues to expand. Growth has in part been financed by remittances from the over one million Somalis living outside the country who send between $1.2 million to $2 billion annually back to Somalia, equivalent to 23 to 38 percent of the national GDP.

As the world’s largest exporter of live animals in 2015, Somalia exported over 5 million heads of livestock, equivalent to an estimated value of $360 million. It is estimated that roughly 30 percent to 40 percent of the 5.3 million live animals exported from Somalia last year came from Ethiopia and even Kenya. Crop-based agriculture and fishing will also play a significant role in driving economic growth. Somalia is a significant exporter of sesame, for example, and with adoption of advanced technologies and improved infrastructure, has the opportunity to increase horticultural and other agricultural exports to the Middle East and beyond.

The value of domestic fisheries sector to the Somali economy is $135 million. The value of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing contributes $306 million in benefits to other economies, highlighting opportunities for this sector to better support Somali enterprises and livelihoods in the future. Furthermore, potential government revenues from regulated fishing activities, estimated at a value of $4-17 million per year, could be utilized to fund co-management schemes and invest in sector human resource development.

Southern regions of Somalia were hardest hit by the civil war and suffer more than the rest of the country from the al-Shabaab insurgency, diverting attention away from long-term economic growth solutions. Nevertheless, the fragile peace and security gains there have led to a remarkable rebound of business activity and surge of investor interest, including from returning members of the Somali diaspora. The private sector operates mostly autonomously. Businesses continue to thrive despite conflict. They bring together entrepreneurs across clan, regional, and ideological differences and many operate in all parts of Somalia, as well as in Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Furthermore, there has been technical collaboration, particularly in the livestock sector, that spans political boundaries, including links between Somaliland and FGS.
The absence of regulation has thwarted broad-based economic development in favor of a small minority of business elite, however. Women and youth are disproportionately affected by the low level of economic activity in Somalia and face unique additional constraints to greater economic participation. Women face much narrower opportunities than men when seeking employment and higher barriers to starting and operating their own businesses. Generally, women are not accepted to pursue employment and entrepreneurship unless they are widowed. Youth bear the weight of the collapse of education during the country’s civil war and suffer an even higher rate of unemployment than the overall population.

USAID will address constraints to inclusive economic growth and capitalize on Somalia’s assets through a two-pronged approach that both strengthens the enabling environment for growth through systemic interventions and expands economic opportunities through targeted sectoral interventions. Sectoral interventions will focus on value chains with the highest potential for growth within field crop, horticulture, livestock, fisheries, and renewable energy sectors.

USAID will work to achieve two Sub-Transition Objectives under TO 3:

Sub-TO: 3.1—Strengthen Enabling Economic Environment

Somalia’s lack of current and updated agricultural and economic policy and regulation presents myriad constraints to economic growth. It means there has been no protection of competition, impartial enforcement of contracts, or other measures to assure that the success of businesses and investors benefit Somalia as a whole. Investor protections, property rights, and the ability to enforce contracts are very weak. The time and cost of export/import is inefficient and inconsistent. There are no conventional financial institutions currently providing the full range of banking services needed in Somalia. The recent passage of a Banking Law by the Federal Parliament means that several commercial banks are expected to be operating in Somalia by the end of this year. However, in the near future this will not likely facilitate access to credit for any but the largest borrowers.

Notwithstanding these constraints, Somalia’s private sector is one of the country’s most valuable assets and an important partner for development actors. Somalis are extraordinarily entrepreneurial and willing to take risks. Despite the unstable environment, diaspora investors in particular are aggressively exploring investment opportunities.

To strengthen the business enabling environment and unleash Somalia’s growth potential, USAID will work to remove or reduce economy-wide barriers to economic growth that affect multiple sectors and industries, and businesses of all sizes. Such systemic activities are expected to promote competition in Somalia’s economy and benefit startup firms, SMEs, and women- and youth-owned businesses that, unlike large, more established companies, lack the relationships and resources to overcome barriers in other ways. Key constraints to be addressed include access to finance, and support to policy and regulation, and provision of business development services.

As the policy environment and services provided the government increase, there is a recognition that the government needs to strengthen its revenue capacity to further fulfill its public sector role. The economic growth portfolio will work closely with the investments made under TO1: Systems and
Processes that Enable Inclusive Governance Strengthened to improve government generation and management of revenue.

**Sub-TO: 3.2—Expand Economic Opportunities**

In conjunction with systemic interventions to strengthen Somalia’s enabling environment, more focused sectoral interventions are needed to drive key growth sectors and expand economic opportunities for a broad cross-section of society, with a focus on value chains that can engage women and youth. USAID will expand economic opportunities through investments in industries and value chains with particular potential to grow and create jobs, including in regions previously inaccessible due to insecurity. In addition, USAID will focus on how to maximize work with regional programs to further build on Somalia’s important role in the regional economy.

Using a competitiveness approach, USAID will work to improve production, employment, and incomes in key value chains (within agriculture, fisheries) and increase participation by women and youth in the economy as entrepreneurs, employers, and employees. USAID will introduce low-cost technology, promote increased investment, expand access to financial services, and carry out small-scale infrastructure activities to reduce the risks of business start-up and expansion. Because key growth industries will largely depend on import substitution and export markets, strengthening local capacity to establish food safety systems and other quality control mechanisms will be essential for these industries to achieve their potential.

USAID recognizes that that sustainable natural resource management, including improved fisheries management, will play a critical role to long-term economic growth. Biodiversity impacts of economic growth activities have been considered in USAID’s approach. The growing pervasiveness of IUU and the existing poor ecosystem management require prioritization on the Somali development agenda, as these coastal resources are among the richest natural resources available to Somalia. USAID will invest in activities that are designed in support of the National Development Plan (NDP) of Somalia and will strengthen local consultative design processes. Activities will jointly protect and rehabilitate the depressed natural capital of marine resources along the Somali coast and economically support improved coastal livelihoods.

USAID will also focus on cross-cutting economic challenges and opportunities, such as energy. The use of unsustainable energy sources, particularly charcoal, is one of the contributors to environmental degradation. Furthermore, Somalia has one of the highest energy tariffs in the world, exceeding $1 per kilowatt-hour, compared to less than $0.15 per kilowatt-hour in Kenya or $0.06 per kilowatt-hour in Ethiopia. This is a huge operating expense and obstacle for businesses trying to operate any significant level of equipment, such as processing machines. It is also a great opportunity for enterprises looking to exploit the excellent alternative energy resources in Somalia, such as wind and solar. USAID will leverage technical assistance from Power Africa to invest in more efficient and cheaper energy generation and distribution in Somalia.

Somalia remains highly vulnerable to climate variability. Reductions in rainfall have proven devastating to rain fed crops and rivers that feed fertile riverine irrigation systems. Climate smart technologies, such as more efficient irrigation, improved seed varieties, and focus on perennial crops, should be utilized. USAID will seek ways to apply lessons learned from Feed the Future investments in the region.
Pastoralist children learning to read using USAID provided literacy materials
VII. HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS

The only country with an officially declared famine during the 2011 drought, Somalia is characterized by chronic vulnerability to natural and man-made emergencies, and a significant humanitarian caseload persists each year. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Food for Peace (FFP) respond to urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia—including acute food insecurity; health; nutrition; water, sanitation, and hygiene; livelihoods; and protection—where available funding, implementing partner capacity, and humanitarian access allow. In addition to the provision of life-saving assistance, USAID/OFDA and FFP have also made substantive investments in UN and NGO resilience interventions to help vulnerable communities better withstand shocks and avoid resorting to negative coping strategies in the face of these shocks.

Somalia is one of eight priority USAID resilience-focus countries and this strategic framework recognizes that the continuum from relief to development is neither linear nor time-bound, and allows for an opportunistic approach within USAID to building linkages as the development space expands or contracts. USAID OFDA and FFP along with USAID/Somalia jointly designed and funded three resilience-oriented activities in Somalia that blend humanitarian and development goals and funding streams. These activities are jointly managed and support our strategic approach laid out in this document. Further opportunities to encourage collaboration between development and humanitarian program will be explored building on this experience.

In line with other donors and the broader international community, USAID/Somalia and USAID/OFDA and FFP intend to develop additional opportunities for more intentional strategic and operational linkages between relief and development programs. USAID/Somalia will explore ways--through a development lens--to address the chronic needs of populations and sectors, such as urban internally displaced persons and the provision of basic health services, served year after year by humanitarian actors. In addition, USAID/Somalia can develop the capacity of the private sector to increase its capacity to produce/deliver critical seed and other agricultural inputs, for example. Moreover, USAID plans to further explore the possibilities for layering, integrating, and sequencing humanitarian and development efforts with the goal of building resilience. Although it would be desirable to see a change in the balance between humanitarian and development assistance over time, we do not envision a dramatic shift during the strategy period all layers will continue to be required.

VIII: IMPLEMENTING AN ADAPTABLE STRATEGY: COLLABORATION, LEARNING AND ADAPTING

Achieving and assessing results in a fragile, ever-changing environment requires a systematic approach to learning that allows for flexibility and adaptation at both the strategic and activity level. USAID/Somalia embraces a robust monitoring, evaluation, learning and adaptation approach that facilitates rapid response to emergent findings in, and changes to, Somalia’s complex, dynamic context.

Given the complexity of the country’s context, a timely, flexible learning framework is critical to ensuring the underlying factors affecting change in a dynamic environment, and emerging knowledge gaps and needs, are quickly identified and understood. From a development perspective, efforts yield
positive change more quickly if they are coordinated and collaborative, test promising new approaches in a continuous search for improvement, and build on what works and eliminate what does not.

This strategy acknowledges that Somalia remains a fragile state, while focusing on supporting Somali-led efforts that are underway to create the foundations for a more stable, democratic and prosperous Somalia. At the same time, USAID will build its own internal capacity and will maintain a flexible and continuous learning approach that allows for activities to be modified during the course of the strategy, by determining what works in Somalia and reevaluating programs based upon that knowledge. Achievement of the strategy goal, and related transition objectives, will require implementation of rigorous monitoring, evaluation, collaboration, learning and adaptation tools, methods and processes at each step in the program cycle, through participatory processes that engage a broad set of stakeholders and knowledge sources. Supporting conditions that facilitate transition and development success will be the focus of the Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) approach.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation are critical to the implementation of this strategy and provide the foundation for this CLA plan. The implementation of this strategy will prompt the revision or development of several critical M&E and program cycle processes and products to align USAID/Somalia’s M&E activities with the new Transition Objectives. USAID/Somalia will develop a three-year work plan to aid in the implementation of the CLA plan described below.

**USAID/Somalia’s monitoring and evaluation platform:** Because of the challenges of the environment in which it operates, USAID/Somalia employs an independent support services mechanism to support core services relating to M&E and to conduct performance monitoring, field verification, and evaluation tasks. The Somalia Program Support Services contract, which extends through July 2019, will provide technical support for critical M&E processes triggered by the approval of the strategy, including: developing a Performance Management Plan (PMP) for USAID/Somalia that is aligned with the transition objectives outlined above; developing project logic models and Project MEL Plans; and collecting baseline data for indicators relating to the transition objectives and sub-objectives described above.

**Monitoring, Verification, and Reporting:** USAID/Somalia’s approach to monitoring, verification, and reporting is rigorous, systematic, and transparent; frequent systematic consultation with partners and thorough documentation assure high confidence in findings and early warning of emergent challenges for USAID and its partners. Site visits made by third-party monitors are selected systematically to be representative and are comprehensive across activities. USAID builds in mechanisms to feed lessons learned from monitoring and verification processes back to stakeholders, and to support implementing partners in incorporating these lessons into programmatic decision-making.

**Evaluation:** Performance evaluations will directly test how USAID/Somalia’s activities and projects contribute to inclusive, representative government, economic growth, and improved delivery of social services. Such evaluations will complement USAID/Somalia’s rigorous monitoring data, and will evaluate the effectiveness of different approaches to implementation employed by partners under USAID/Somalia’s flexible implementation mechanisms. These evaluations present strategic opportunities to understand what conditions and contextual factors are necessary for or most conducive to the achievement of USAID/Somalia’s development hypothesis. To optimize learning
potential from its investment in evaluation, USAID will clearly differentiate evaluation questions meant to document issues and successes related to performance from those designed to test USAID’s development hypothesis.

As need arises and resources become available, impact evaluations and special assessments will contribute strategically to USAID/Somalia’s understanding of and articulation of its development theory. USAID/Somalia will ensure that planning for such evaluations and assessments is informed by a clear understanding of how decision-making will be directly influenced by the findings of any such questions undertaken, as articulated in the PMEP. The use of quasi-experimental designs in Somalia is complicated by elevated risks relating to engaging communities for data collection but not investment. Impact evaluations must therefore be approached cautiously. In partnership with its M&E partner, USAID/Somalia is exploring rigorous alternatives to quasi-experimental designs for assessing USAID’s specific contributions to achieving transition objectives, including methods such as contribution analysis and propensity score matching.

**Performance monitoring:** USAID/Somalia has a Performance Management and Evaluation Plan (PMEP), which integrates the M&E systems and the learning agenda to operationalize the adaptive approach outlined in this strategy and articulate systematic opportunities for learning. Project Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plans will be developed to articulate how USAID/Somalia will assess progress toward each of the three Transition Objectives, drawing from sources including MV&R findings, performance indicator monitoring, contextual indicator monitoring, and evaluation findings. The PMEP will be used to develop the Mission-wide PMP, aligned with the Results Framework presented in this strategy and will incorporate Project MEL Plan efforts and indicators. In this PMEP, USAID/Somalia will clearly articulate its measurement goals at all levels with respect to monitoring, performance evaluation, and the specific learning expectations for each of the M&E activities described. The PMP will also define monitoring approaches to track contextual and programmatic risks to achieving the strategy’s objectives. Following the development of the PMP and Project MEL Plans, USAID will assist implementing partners to review and align Activity MEL Plans to the Project MEL Plans and the new USAID/Somalia goals and objectives.

**Collaborating, Learning and Adapting**

**Collaborating:**

The learning agenda described below is designed specifically to facilitate collaboration. Learning events including presentations of MV&R findings, IP meetings, and thematic workshops will provide both the opportunity and the critical knowledge resources to leverage collaboration between USAID and its partners in Somalia.

**Learning:** Because of its substantial investments in monitoring and evaluation, USAID/Somalia is positioned to contribute significantly to the learning of other stakeholders in Somalia, including implementing partners, government partners, and other donors. The learning plan will therefore establish fora to build on knowledge resources developed by USAID/Somalia and its partners and to share them with relevant stakeholders.

These fora will include:
1) **Presentation of MV&R findings.** Three times a year, USAID/Somalia’s M&E platform will convene meetings to present findings from MV&R site visits to USAID/Somalia and implementing partners. In these meetings, partners provide context for and learn from observations made by SPSS in the field, and USAID/Somalia and its partners can establish action plans to implement recommendations emerging from observations.

2) **Implementing Partner Meetings.** Ideally, these meetings can be scheduled to co-occur with MV&R presentations, to economize on IP travel to Nairobi and capitalize on learning from MV&R presentations. The agenda for each IP meeting should include a topical focus for learning, adapting, or collaboration of cross-sectoral relevance (e.g. women’s inclusion/empowerment; resilience programming).

3) **Thematic workshops.** These one-off meetings will be convened either internally or with stakeholders to discuss issues of critical importance to USAID/Somalia and its partners. Thematic foci of interest to USAID internally might include selecting and overseeing adaptive mechanisms and geographical strategizing of activities across TOs. Topics of interest to USAID and its partners (including IPs as well as other donors or agencies) could include: issues in evaluation of stabilization programming; improving quality of data collection in Somalia; sharing results from the Somali Perceptions Survey; working with media; or addressing corruption across sectors. Planning these workshops will be led by TO teams.

**Adapting:** USAID/Somalia’s implementing mechanisms give implementers and USAID the flexibility to adjust approaches over the life of an activity, so that they can rapidly adapt to changing conditions and allow them to respond to unforeseen opportunities and challenges. Frequent stakeholder consultations and portfolio reviews and a flexible and responsive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism will ensure that timely analysis of implementation can influence programmatic and strategic decision-making. In addition to biannual internal portfolio reviews, USAID/Somalia will undertake yearly strategic reviews in consultation with experts and key stakeholders to ensure that the assumptions and objectives outlined in this strategy remain relevant to Somalia’s dynamic and rapidly changing context.

Because the context in which USAID implements programming in Somalia may shift rapidly over the course of this strategy, it is critical that the strategy itself allow flexibility to respond to emerging needs identified through the learning approaches identified here. Contextual assessments, evaluations, and portfolio reviews all have the potential to identify areas where critical programming may be needed to complement existing mechanisms.

**M&E Platform Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:** SPSS has developed a monitoring and evaluation plan to monitor the progress of the platform in supporting USAID/Somalia and increasing the effectiveness of its activities. The key metrics for evaluating the M&E processes are quality, timeliness and utility. Under this plan, SPSS tracks, among other things, the utilization by USAID and IPs of findings and recommendations from DQA, MV&R and evaluations, and the improvement of management practices by IPs and USAID. These data will be a source for improving the platform’s M&E processes as well as for broader learning about M&E platforms in non-permissive environments and non-presence countries.
Risks and Assumptions:

This strategy has identified several critical risks and assumptions, both programmatic and contextual. USAID/Somalia will identify a set of indicators to monitor the most critical of these, which will be incorporated into the PMEP. Examples of contextual risk indicators include: occurrence of conflicts over resources; primary causes of conflicts, geographically; security sector resourcing; implementation of planned reforms. In addition, in each biannual portfolio review, the current status of risks and assumptions and their potential effects on activities will be analyzed and updated.

A plan will be developed to assess programmatic risks, either through activity- or project-level evaluations or through other special assessments. For example, USAID/Somalia may prioritize ongoing (for example annual or every other year) monitoring of citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of government across regions, including correlations between perceptions and USAID programming, other donors' programming, and contextual and political shifts or events. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of stabilization programming will assess confidence in government to deliver needed services. This close monitoring of Somali attitudes will 1) trigger USAID/Somalia response in the event that the risks identified here are realized; 2) inform programmatic decision-making, in particular responsive investment of stabilization efforts; and 3) contribute learning to the evaluation of USAID/Somalia's development hypotheses.

Gender:

Gender assessment: In 2014, a gender assessment was conducted to answer the questions: 1) How does and will the different roles and status of women and men within the community, political sphere, workplace, and household (for example, roles in decision-making and different access to and control over resources and services) affect USAID activities? 2) How will USAID current activity results affect women and men differently? This assessment resulted in recommendations for the following program sectors: peace and security; democracy and governance; youth and education; economic growth; health; and combating violent extremism. Upon approval of this strategy, a gender assessment should be conducted to update recommendations and findings from the previous assessment, in light of the approved Transition Objectives and drawing from the data generated from evaluations and other M&E processes since the prior assessment was completed. A gender assessment should then be conducted in the final year of the current strategy to reflect upon successes and challenges in gender inclusion to inform the subsequent gender strategy.

Gender and inclusion activity action plans: The 2014 assessment resulted in recommendations to develop gender activity action plans. These were completed for several activities in 2015. New activities since early 2015 should develop gender activity action plans. All activities, including those that developed action plans in 2015, should monitor the implementation of these plans as part of the regular portfolio reviews. Subsequent gender assessments should include a review of the results of this monitoring process.