The 2012 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa

Developed by:
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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the fourth edition of the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Index assesses key components of the sustainability of the civil society organization (CSO) sectors in twenty-five countries from all sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. South Sudan and Sudan have been added to the 2012 Index.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements the CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which includes twenty-nine countries, the sixteenth edition of which was published in June 2013. Through a partnership with USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, the Aga Khan Foundation supported the publication of CSOSI country reports for Afghanistan and Pakistan beginning in 2011.

The CSOSI highlights both advances and setbacks in CSO sector development and allows for comparisons across countries and sub-regions over time in seven key components or dimensions. The Index is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability of the CSO sector.

The Index’s methodology relies on a local panel of experts and CSO practitioners in each country to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of CSO sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The scores for each dimension are averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector in a given country. An Editorial Committee comprised of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining standards of quality and promoting cross-country comparability. The Index groups scores into three overarching categories: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce the corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. This publication was made possible in part by the financial support provided by the Aga Khan Foundation, which supports the inclusion of two African countries in the Index. The CSOSI depends on implementing partners in each country to facilitate the expert panel meetings and write the narrative reports, as acknowledged on the following page. We would further like to express our gratitude to the CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors for sharing their knowledge and observations in the expert panels in each country. Their contributions form the foundation of the CSO Sustainability Index.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Amid difficult funding and political environments in addition to security concerns, the CSO sectors in many Sub-Saharan African countries appeared to be expanding and building their capacity to advocate for reform and provide valuable services in 2012. CSOs continued to respond to communities’ needs, such as alleviating extreme poverty and providing relief for victims of mass floods and insecurity, while also engaging in areas such as environmental protection and women’s empowerment. CSOs not only assisted communities, but they also achieved national impact by influencing policy and legislation; monitoring elections; working with international mediators to resolve conflicts; and fighting corruption.

This year’s CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa evaluates CSO sectors in twenty-five countries, including two new countries: Sudan and South Sudan. According to the Index, South Africa continued to have the strongest overall sustainability score, followed by Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. The CSO sector’s overall sustainability in Angola again scored the worst, followed by Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Guinea.

In comparison to previous years, the overall sustainability of the CSO sectors in the assessed countries was largely stable in 2012. Fifteen countries continued to be within the Sustainability Evolving category, the middle range of CSO sector development, while ten countries, including Sudan and South Sudan, were in the Sustainability Impeded category, the lowest level of CSO sector development. No country moved to a different category of sustainability in 2012, and no country reached the Sustainability Enhanced category.

Four countries – Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Malawi – experienced slight deteriorations in overall CSO sustainability in 2012. Meanwhile, the CSO sectors in Rwanda, Senegal, and Mozambique improved slightly. Regional trends within dimensions were not apparent, except in Financial Viability. In this dimension, the Southern African region experienced markedly more deterioration than East and West Africa as a result of ongoing effects of the global financial crisis.

The CSO Sustainability Index revealed some common issues facing CSOs in 2012:

Human security issues placed new demands on service provision. In The Gambia, a major food crisis prompted CSOs to deliver relief to communities. Armed conflict resurfaced in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states of Sudan, causing a humanitarian crisis and heightening demand for CSO services. In Mali, separatists captured three major cities. CSOs
participated in talks with international mediators and many Malian organizations focused on humanitarian relief during the year at the expense of other services. In Nigeria, intensified sectarian conflict led to the closure or relocation of some CSOs and motivated other CSOs to focus more on peace and security.

Elections and leadership changes sparked political and social tension. In Senegal, the president sought re-election amidst controversy over the constitutionality of a third term, sparking protests and violence, but also prompting CSOs to mobilize people around the issue. The opposition candidate won the run-off election with 65 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the heads of state of Ethiopia and Malawi died while in office, prompting tensions and leadership changes. This gave CSOs in Malawi an opportunity to cultivate a new relationship with the government. In Zimbabwe, the government’s systematic harassment of CSOs increased in advance of general elections scheduled to take place in 2013.

CSOs faced difficult economic environments. Several countries experienced economic setbacks in 2012. Amid suspicion that Sudan was stealing its oil, the government of South Sudan shut down the oil pipelines to Sudan, resulting in a precipitous drop in South Sudan’s national revenue and basic public services. In Sudan, the loss of oil revenue caused by South Sudan’s secession also led to an economic crisis that prompted intermittent demonstrations. In Senegal, the population witnessed the near collapse of the agriculture sector, which employed about 60 percent of the workforce. Malawi’s currency experienced a huge devaluation, increasing the cost of CSO operations. On the other hand, the recent discovery of large amounts of coal and oil in Mozambique sparked a rapid influx of large multinational companies; CSOs struggled to monitor the situation. In addition, the lingering effects of the global financial crisis continued to depress donor funding and/or contract the local economies of several countries, including Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

CSO-government relations improved in several countries. While CSOs in many countries across Africa face harassment and government restrictions, several governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are establishing new mechanisms to engage with CSOs, while also engaging CSOs on new issues. In Botswana, the government established a policy to improve CSO-government relations and CSO sustainability, while the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone included CSOs in the formulation of new national development policies. In Zambia, the government is involving CSOs in assessing the government’s progress on international commitments on aid and development effectiveness. The government of Tanzania published guidelines for government ministries on engaging with non-state actors on service delivery.

The magnitude of CSO sectors in the region varies widely according to official statistics, though it is difficult to ascertain the number of active CSOs, either registered or unregistered. Nigeria, with over 57,000 registered CSOs, replaced South Africa as the country with the largest official CSO sector. In South Africa, 36 percent of CSOs were de-registered for legal non-compliance in 2012, leaving only 48,906 registered in November 2012. Kenya might have the largest unofficial CSO sector, with over 300,000 informal community-based organizations. At just 200, South Sudan has the smallest registered CSO sector, while it is estimated that there were fewer than twenty active local CSOs in Angola in 2012.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

The legal environments in the assessed countries were almost evenly split between the Sustainability Evolving and Sustainability Impeded categories. South Africa had the best score for Legal Environment and Ethiopia had the worst score. Burundi, Mali, Uganda, and Zimbabwe experienced deterioration in 2012. The Burundian government took steps to limit the freedom of assembly and media freedoms, while harassment of CSOs increased in Zimbabwe. In Mali, the separatist movement in the north of the country and subsequent instability accounted for the deteriorating legal environment. In Uganda, the NGO Act and its 2009 regulations continued to constrain the work of NGOs, imposing many bureaucratic procedures and violating the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of expression and assembly. Meanwhile, Kenya and Rwanda experienced improvements in their scores. In Kenya, the Public Benefit Organization (PBO) Act passed, while a new legal framework for CSOs was enacted in Rwanda.

CSOs view the registration process as being lengthy and/or cumbersome in at least one-third of the countries assessed. The situation in Angola, where it can take at least five years for a CSO to register, is particularly difficult. In many countries, CSOs are required to travel to the capital city to register, making registration difficult and expensive for those based outside of the capital city. Registration is expensive in South Sudan due to multiple levels of registration and associated fees. Governments in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe have wide discretion to deny registration, making registration unpredictable for CSOs, particularly those engaged in advocacy. Registering in Sudan requires a government representative to approve and attend a CSO’s initial general assembly, which can delay the process for excessively long periods. In 2012, CSOs in Rwanda had difficulty registering under the new law. Only a few CSOs had begun the process of re-registering by the end of 2012, despite the fact that the deadline for re-registration was just months away. On the other hand, registration is not considered to be unduly burdensome in Botswana, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. For example in Zambia, registration can be obtained in just two business days.

In many of the countries that this report examines, CSOs – particularly those engaged in advocacy or human rights work – face significant and often vague restrictions on their operations. In Angola, a new law prohibits CSO advocacy activities from being political, a term open to broad interpretation. In Gabon, the government can dissolve CSOs on broad grounds, such as “discred[ing]” public institutions. Local governments in Burundi continue to exert arbitrary controls on CSO activity, such as requiring approval for renting out conference rooms. In Sudan, National Intelligence and Security Services closely monitor and...
control service-providing CSOs in several states. In other countries, such as Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, CSOs operate without significant government interference.

The harassment of CSOs was rampant in several countries in 2012. CSO members and supporters in South Sudan were reportedly subjected to arbitrary killings, arrests, abductions, and torture following demonstrations. In Zimbabwe, where elections were scheduled for 2013, the police raided offices and arrested CSO staff involved in human rights, elections monitoring, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues. CSOs also experienced government interference in their work. A local government official in Zimbabwe banned fifty CSOs from operating in the province. Many advocacy organizations in Uganda were threatened with closure, and in Burundi, the state cut the funding of some CSOs that were critical of government policy. CSOs in Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa experienced little state interference in 2012.

Across the region, legal frameworks typically provide at least some tax exemptions to CSOs, most frequently on income from grants. However, these exemptions are often difficult to access due to the procedures involved or the discretion of the government. In Kenya, CSO tax exemption claims have dropped precipitously since 2010 when the Revenue Authority started requiring CSOs to renew their tax exemption status. In the majority of countries discussed in this report, CSOs are permitted to engage in income-generating activities and to compete for government contracts; however, they often experience difficulty doing so.

With the exception of Guinea, South Africa, and Tanzania, there are not typically lawyers specialized or trained in CSO law in the countries examined herein. Other impediments to accessing legal services include cost, geography, and lawyers’ avoidance of cases challenging the government.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The assessed countries were almost evenly split between evolving and impeded sustainability in Organizational Capacity. South Africa had the best score in this dimension, while Burundi and The Gambia had the worst scores. Mozambique and Uganda experienced improvements in their scores for the second year in a row due to improved constituency building. Ethiopia, Malawi, and Mali, on the other hand, experienced deterioration in their scores. In Ethiopia, the organizational capacity of CSOs suffered from directives issued in 2011 that limited funding, leaving about 10 percent of the sector inactive in 2012. Meanwhile, CSOs in Malawi and Mali laid off staff due to funding difficulties.

CSOs in many countries struggle to build constituencies, often due to lack of resources. In South Africa and Nigeria, there is a gap between larger urban CSOs and smaller rural CSOs, with larger CSOs exhibiting more success in building constituencies. In Malawi, service providing CSOs are generally able to mobilize their constituencies because of the benefits of their services, whereas CSOs working in governance, human rights and advocacy often face difficulties mobilizing local populations. Constituency building improved in Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. In Mozambique, CSOs’ increased their use of participatory monitoring tools, strengthening their relationship with constituents.
CSOs across Sub-Saharan Africa, except in Guinea, tend to have clearly defined missions and visions. However, in many countries, such as Angola, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, CSOs frequently veer away from their missions in order to respond to donors’ priorities. Lack of knowledge and precarious donor funding often make it difficult for CSOs to adhere to strategic plans. Smaller and rural CSOs consistently have the most trouble following their strategic plans. In several countries, such as Ghana and Liberia, CSOs develop strategic plans in order to meet donor requirements, but these plans may not reflect their intended strategic focus. Some CSOs in Nigeria and Tanzania received assistance in strategic planning in 2012.

CSOs in many of the countries assessed, particularly smaller and rural CSOs, continued to struggle with internal management and governance issues in 2012. In Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Malawi, and South Sudan, boards of directors are often observed to be weak or non-functional, and the founders or executive directors do most of the decision-making. In Guinea, Kenya, Sudan, and Zambia, boards of directors are active but often interfere in day-to-day management.

In most countries, CSOs find it very difficult to maintain permanent paid staff because of a shortage of funding and qualified applicants. Many CSOs in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal laid off staff in 2012 due to funding reductions. Due to the lack of institutional funding from donors, CSOs generally hire employees on a project basis. Many CSOs also rely on volunteers, although recruiting for unpaid work is difficult in countries with widespread poverty.

In many countries, larger, urban CSOs have greater access to basic office and IT equipment than smaller, rural CSOs. Internet access is becoming more affordable and expanding to rural CSOs in Ghana, Kenya, and Mozambique, among other countries.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

Financial Viability continued to be one of the weakest dimensions of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nineteen of the twenty-five countries in this year’s Index were in the Sustainability Impeded category. South Africa was the strongest in this dimension, while Guinea had the lowest score. Angola, Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia experienced deterioration in this dimension in 2012. In most of these countries, donor funding levels decreased, mainly due to the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis. In Ethiopia, directives issued in 2011 started to have an impact, placing large restrictions on CSOs’ abilities to earn income, seek foreign funding, engage in fundraising, and budget administrative costs. The DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Senegal...
experienced improvements in this dimension. In Mali and Senegal, financial viability improved despite declines in donor funding. CSOs in Mali reported an increase in local giving as a result of the coup. In Senegal, CSOs became more professional, developing strong and accountable management systems and technical expertise in program design and implementation in order to compete for more limited resources. In Ghana, there was a large increase in short-term donor funding to support election-related activities.

Most CSOs do not have multiple sources of support to sustain their operations for the long-term. They rely mainly on project-based funding from foreign donors. In the vast majority of countries assessed, the CSO sectors are unable to generate significant local support, including from private and corporate philanthropy, in-kind donations, or volunteerism. Much of this is due to poverty that constrains giving and to limited fundraising skills. There are a handful of exceptions, however. Private philanthropy is common in South Africa. In Mali, religious organizations and diaspora associations led several successful fundraising drives, raising significant cash and in-kind contributions from both citizens and businesses. CSOs in the DRC, Kenya, and South Africa also obtain substantial support from businesses, while organizations in Mali, Nigeria, and South Sudan are often able to mobilize volunteers.

Governments provide funding to CSOs in just a few countries included in the Index. In Kenya, government funding to organizations registered as NGOs increased by 54 percent between 2011 and 2012. In The Gambia, more organizations received subgrants of international funds from the government in 2012. In South Africa, however, funding to the sector was reduced in 2012 as a result of mismanagement. Government contracting is more common than grantmaking, though it is not typically a significant source of income. Governments most often contract with CSOs to aid in provision of basic services, such as education in the DRC and health in Liberia. In other countries, such as Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, government contracting is rare, while in Angola and The Gambia, CSOs are legally prohibited from receiving government contracts.

Income-generating activity is uncommon across the region. In Angola, The Gambia, and South Sudan, CSOs are restricted from engaging in such activity. CSOs in other countries earn minimal income through consultancies, sales, or rental property. Large CSOs in Kenya, however, have established hotels and ambulance services, and in Senegal, numerous CSOs earn income, including by operating health clinics and technical training centers.

Throughout the region, many CSOs lack sound financial management systems and cannot afford external audits. In Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tanzania, donor requirements and capacity building pushed more CSOs to establish sound financial management systems.

ADVOCACY

Advocacy continued to be one of the strongest dimensions, with all but four countries – Gabon, Guinea, Angola, and Ethiopia – scoring in the Sustainability Evolving category. As in the previous year, Advocacy improved in more than one-third of the assessed countries in 2012. Kenya and South Africa had the best scores in this dimension, while Ethiopia had the worst score. In Kenya, the national government invites CSOs to contribute to the development of policies in many fields. In South Africa, CSOs advocate on contentious issues, such as access to government information. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, CSOs have no formal access to government decision-making, and the law only permits a subset of the remaining CSO sector to engage in advocacy.

The degree of CSO cooperation with local and federal government varies significantly among the countries discussed in this report. For example, in Ghana, CSOs are invited by various levels of government to participate in policy and budget formulation. In Gabon and Malawi, on the other hand, governments only engage with CSOs that support them, and in Sudan and Botswana, CSOs are generally excluded from official decision-making mechanisms. In several countries, communication and collaboration with the government improved significantly in 2012. For example, in Tanzania, the government published guidelines for government ministries on engaging with non-state actors on service delivery. In 2012, for the first time in Rwanda, the government published a draft budget that CSOs were able to analyze before it was voted on by the parliament. In Senegal, a change in political leadership gave CSOs the opportunity to initiate the development of a new framework agreement for CSO-government relations.

The extent of advocacy activity in the countries examined in this report also varies widely. For example, in Burundi, CSOs advocated on a broad range of issues, including human rights, good governance, land reform, and agriculture policy in 2012. However, in Angola, where CSOs fear repercussions from the government for engaging in advocacy, apparently only one CSO conducted an advocacy campaign in 2012. Because most CSOs in Botswana are service providers, the sector does not typically respond en masse to issues that arise, and unfavorable laws often pass without CSOs’ input.

CSOs in some countries advocated to reform laws impacting the sector in 2012. For example, in the DRC, South Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, CSOs focused on laws pertaining to access to public
information. In Kenya, CSOs successfully lobbied for passage of the PBO Act. In other countries, there was little or no effort to push for legal reform for CSOs, in part due to lack of awareness of the benefits of a favorable legal framework. In Mali, efforts to reform the legal framework for CSOs were suspended due to the conflict.

SERVICE PROVISION

There was little change in Service Provision in 2012. A slight improvement was reported in Nigeria, while the situation deteriorated slightly in Burundi. Only Angola, Gabon, Guinea, and Sudan scored in the Sustainability Impeded tier, although several others had scores that placed them near the Sustainability Impeded threshold. South Africa had the best score in this dimension, while Angola had the worst score.

CSOs in the vast majority of countries provide a wide range of services, from basic services such as education, health, water, food, and hygiene, to areas such as alternative energy promotion, natural resources management, youth empowerment, and advocacy. In Angola, however, fewer than twenty CSOs provided basic social services during the year. In 2012, conditions in Nigeria and Mali prompted many CSOs to shift their focus to humanitarian relief, while funding constraints led to decreased services in Rwanda, Senegal, and Mozambique. In Sudan, the government’s de-registration of CSOs worsened the gap in basic services.

In most countries, CSO services are largely responsive to the needs of their beneficiaries. Often, CSOs determine community needs through needs assessments or participatory approaches to project planning. In 2012, CSOs in Mozambique increased their use of monitoring tools to ensure that services reflected community needs. On the other hand, services are frequently influenced by donor priorities, which do not always reflect communities’ needs.

Across the region, few CSOs engage in cost recovery by charging for goods and services. Beneficiaries generally cannot afford to pay for services and they expect them to be free. In South Sudan, however, some CSOs have developed cost recovery policies to generate in-kind resources. In South Africa, the difficult economic environment has caused many CSOs to charge for services.

Except in Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan, national and local governments tend to recognize CSOs’ value and contributions to service provision and seek their assistance and collaboration. Although government financial support to CSOs is uncommon, CSOs in the DRC, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda received at least some government funding during the
year. In 2012, the Liberian government appropriated $15 million for a youth development program implemented by CSOs. While government funding to CSOs is not typical in Sierra Leone, the government began making grants to monitor public finances in 2012. In Senegal, the government contracts with CSOs to deliver a wide range of services, such as healthcare and education.

INFRASTRUCTURE

There was little change in the Infrastructure dimension in 2012, with slight deteriorations noted in Angola and Ethiopia. The assessed countries were almost evenly split between Sustainability Evolving and Sustainability Impeded. South Africa had the best score in this dimension, while Angola had the worst score.

CSOs in most of the countries discussed in this report generally have access to only one or two resource centers. Resource centers are generally located in major cities, making them largely inaccessible to CSOs in rural areas. In Sudan and Tanzania, however, CSO networks and umbrella organizations serve as resource centers throughout the countries. In Kenya, CSOs increased their efforts to provide free information by establishing resource centers in their offices or launching online information portals. At the other extreme, some countries do not have functioning intermediary support organizations (ISOs) or resource centers. In Ethiopia, international organizations have not been able to operate as ISOs since a 2010 directive prohibited them from channeling funds to member CSOs. There were no ISOs in Burundi, The Gambia, or Mali in 2012. In The Gambia and Mali, the few remaining ISOs closed during the year.

The extent of local grantmaking varies. While Zambia has several local grantmaking organizations, there are none in Angola, South Sudan, or Sudan. Those grantmaking organizations that exist typically regrant funds from international donors. However, in the DRC, Mali, and Tanzania, some funds are generated locally.

The level of information sharing and coalition-building also varies. For example, in Tanzania, the number and capacity of CSO networks is rising, with geographical networks in every district and region. In Gabon and Malawi, more CSOs are using social media to exchange information. In Angola, however, there was less networking and information sharing among CSOs in 2012 due to decreased funding and to the general elections that prompted CSOs to avoid government attention. In Ethiopia, severe legal limits continue to disable CSO networks and consortia.
In most countries, only CSOs in major cities can easily access training, which is generally provided by international organizations and rarely offered in local languages. In the DRC and Tanzania, training opportunities are more readily available, including in strategic management, fundraising, and monitoring and evaluation. In Sierra Leone and Zambia, on the other hand, even basic training is rarely available. Enhanced training was being developed in Mozambique to include more advanced subjects, including media engagement and change management theory.

Intersectoral partnerships continue to develop in the region. Most frequently such partnerships are with government agencies, particularly in service delivery. Such partnerships are less common with the media and the private sector. However, Kenyan CSOs increasingly cultivate partnerships with all three sectors to launch peace campaigns. In Mali, more CSOs partnered with media to build awareness about the elections and security issues. In other countries, such as Angola, South Africa, South Sudan, and Zambia, intersectoral partnerships continue to be rare.

PUBLIC IMAGE

CSOs’ Public Image improved in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania in 2012 due to CSOs’ involvement in issues of national importance. At the same time, Public Image deteriorated in Zambia when media coverage shifted to the Patriotic Front when it came into power. Angola and Ethiopia are the only countries that scored in the Sustainability Impeded range. In both countries, CSOs seldom receive media coverage, and the government has a very negative perception of the sector.

Media coverage of CSOs and their activities varies. CSOs in Burundi, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone enjoy favorable coverage and have positive relationships with media. In Burundi, CSOs are featured regularly in media programs to address human rights, security, and governance issues. Media coverage is limited in other countries for a range of reasons. For example, in the DRC, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, coverage is costly; in Botswana and Kenya, media is uninterested in CSO issues; and in Angola and Sudan, state control of media deters coverage.

In at least one-third of the countries examined in this report, the public perception of CSOs is mixed. Communities that directly benefit from CSO services are more likely to have a positive view of CSOs. However, across the region many in the public suspect that CSOs are well-funded and use the funds for personal gain. In Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, public perception of the sector improved in 2012 due to CSOs’ involvement in visible initiatives. CSOs in Gabon have become more...
associated with addressing governance issues as political parties have lost credibility. Public perception in Malawi suffered in 2012 when CSO leaders joined quasi-government boards and stopped their advocacy.

In many countries, the government’s view of a CSO depends on its usefulness, either because the CSO is aligned with the government’s position or because the CSO provides a valuable service. Other CSOs, particularly those involved in human rights or governance, are often accused of misconduct or of being foreign agents. The government’s perception of CSOs improved in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda due to increased CSO-government collaboration in 2012. Businesses tend to interact with CSOs less than governments, varyingly perceiving CSOs as unprofessional in Mozambique and Uganda, as allies in Guinea and South Sudan, and as sources of information in Malawi.

CSOs’ efforts to promote their images or publicize their activities are still developing. In Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, CSOs rarely undertake efforts to promote their image. In Ethiopia and Sudan, CSOs keep a low profile in part due to fear of attracting adverse government attention. However, in many countries, such as Ghana and Kenya, the use of social media by CSOs to publicize activities is on the rise. In Angola, CSOs are utilizing the Internet because other media is state-controlled.

In at least a quarter of the assessed countries, leading CSOs publish annual reports. In Kenya and Tanzania, this practice is increasing. Self-regulation continues to grow gradually in the region. In most of the countries examined in this report, CSOs are subject to a network’s code of conduct or have developed their own codes. However, in Guinea and Sudan, there is still not a code of conduct for CSOs. In Burundi, a code of conduct was completed in 2012, but was only adopted by some CSOs. Uganda continues to expand self-regulation in the sector, certifying more and more CSOs through its Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism.

CONCLUSION

This annual assessment of the sustainability of the CSO sectors in 25 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates how political and economic developments have impacted CSO sectors in the region. It also highlights some of the accomplishments of civil society over the past year, as well as continued areas of weakness that impede long-term sustainability. CSO activists, policymakers, and the international community can use this data to track trends and determine priorities and approaches. While overall scores for CSO Sustainability across Sub-Saharan Africa generally remained stable in 2012, there were a number of important trends across several groups of countries: human security issues placed new demands on service provision in The Gambia, Sudan, Mali, and Nigeria; elections and leadership changes sparked political and social tension in Senegal, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe; difficult economic environments due to the global financial crisis impacted CSO resource availability in almost all the countries; and in several countries, CSO-government relations improved as governments in Botswana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia set up new policies or mechanisms to engage CSOs on critical issues. The country reports that follow provide an in depth look at the CSO sector in each of the 25 African countries covered by this report.
## 2012 CSO SUSTAINABILITY SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
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COUNTRY REPORTS

ANGOLA

Capital: Luanda

Government Type*: Republic; Multiparty Presidential Regime

Population*: 18,565,269

GDP per capita (PPP)*: $6,500

Human Development Index*: 148

2012 Scores for Angola

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CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.8

The sustainability of civil society in Angola continued to worsen in 2012. Donor funding continued to decrease and international CSOs continued to leave the country, exacerbating an already challenging funding and capacity building environment for Angolan CSOs. Local funding is almost non-existent, and there is no culture of philanthropy among wealthy Angolans. In addition, qualified staff continue to leave the CSO sector for better paying jobs in the government or business sectors. A number of Angolan CSOs, including Acção Humana, Luta Contra SIDA, and Associação Samuel Brace Coles, closed in 2012 due to a lack of funding.

The government views criticism from CSOs as a political threat and continues to publicly threaten to shut down CSOs that behave like opposition parties. However, no CSOs were shut down in either 2011 or 2012.

There is still no accurate data on the number of CSOs in the country. The government's CSO coordinating body,
Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária (UTCAH), has provided the same figures for the number of registered CSOs since 2007: 127 international CSOs, 464 national CSOs, twenty-five church foundations, and nineteen non-church foundations. However, it is estimated that fewer than twenty local CSOs are actually active in the whole country.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2012. Although the government passed a new Law on Associations in early 2012, many elements of the law—including the registration process—remain unchanged. One significant change in the new law is the extent to which CSOs are allowed to engage in advocacy activities. According to the new law, CSO advocacy activities cannot be political and CSOs cannot support political activities or parties. The clause is vaguely worded, leaving it open to broad interpretation. For example, in 2012, the government accused OMUNGA and individuals opposed to illegal evictions in Benguela of being members of the opposition party and acting as political parties. Although the government could not prove these allegations, a number of individuals were arrested and detained for days.

The CSO registration process remains lengthy, inefficient, and cumbersome. In order to register, an organization must obtain certificates from a notary and the Ministry of Justice and publish its bylaws in the Government Gazette (Diário da República). Registration must be done in person in Luanda, imposing a severe burden on local organizations. It takes CSOs at least five years to fulfill these requirements; some CSOs cannot meet them at all. Of the seventeen CSOs that World Learning works with, only three have completed the registration process. CSOs with government-aligned political affiliations or directors who are high-ranking members of the ruling party, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), receive preferential treatment in the registration process.

Only CSOs with Public Utility status, obtained through the Ministry of Justice, are eligible to receive government grants. The government sets millions of dollars aside in its annual state budget for Public Utility organizations. According to the World Learning’s 2011 study on the state of CSOs in Angola, only 13.2 percent of CSOs have secured this status, even though most CSOs meet the established criteria, including holding non-profit status and having a social mission, board of directors, and by-laws. The government routinely ignores organizations requesting information on the status of their applications.

CSOs run by high-ranking members of the ruling party are more likely to get Public Utility status. CSOs run by MPLA members with Public Utility status include AJA PRAZ, Fundação Lwini, Movimento Nacional Expontaneo, Criança Futuro, and President Eduardo Dos Santos’s Fundução Eduardo dos Santos (FESA). Most of these organizations operate government-friendly charity programs in fields such as sanitation, health awareness, daycare, and literacy, rather than social development programs.

The government did not threaten any particular CSOs in 2012, but continued to accuse the sector of being subversive in public speeches and newspapers.

Donors do not receive tax deductions for donations to charities. CSOs are not entitled to earn income from the provision of goods and services or to compete for government contracts. CSOs with Public Utility status are automatically entitled to receive funds annually from the government, although funding may be reduced or suspended based on performance.
Few lawyers in any part of the country are willing to challenge the government by offering legal support to CSOs. As a result, CSOs that are harassed or discriminated against have little legal recourse available to them.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

CSOs have had limited success in identifying and building local constituencies for their initiatives. Many The funding situation remained very difficult in 2012, impacting the organizational capacity of both Angolan and international CSOs. Few Angolan CSOs are functioning due to the lack of funding. For example, in 2012, only seven of the seventeen Angolan CSOs that World Learning worked with had funding between $50,000 and $200,000; the other ten CSOs operated with limited or no funding.

Most CSOs do not have the capacity to identify and build local constituencies, although a few organizations have had limited success in building constituencies for their initiatives. For example, ADESPOV created a public forum in the municipality of Cala in Huambo province where community leaders gather on a monthly basis to identify and discuss issues that are then brought to the attention of the Municipality Administrator, one of the few government officials who is open to input from civil society. Other CSOs have the capacity to identify and build local constituencies, but do not see the point in doing so as the government is not open to public discussions or tolerant of different opinions.

CSOs frequently alter their missions to fit donor priorities and have trouble developing strategic plans because of a lack of capacity and funding. Only a few international CSOs, such as World Learning and NOVIB-Holland, fund the development and implementation of strategic plans. In addition, most CSOs lack visionary leaders with strategic approaches because organizations do not have the funding to hire qualified people. Decisions therefore tend to be made on an ad hoc, short-term basis, based primarily on donor priorities.

Although CSOs are legally required to have boards of directors, boards rarely function. Board members expect to be paid for their services, and CSOs do not have the resources for this. According to the World Learning study, over 90 percent of boards only met when their CSOs were created. Instead, most CSOs are run by the executive directors, who are usually also the CSOs’ founders, with a limited number of staff.

CSOs have difficulty attracting and maintaining capable staff because of insufficient and unreliable funding. Trained and skilled Angolan personnel have left their jobs with CSOs to work in the government or business sector, which pay much higher salaries. The remaining staff is poorly qualified. Few CSO jobs are publicly advertised. Instead, they are given to relatives or friends without regard for experience or qualifications. The 2011 World Learning study found that only 0.12 percent of CSO employees held other jobs. Human resource management is also limited. It is rare for CSOs to have contracts, terms of reference, pay scales, or staff evaluations. The few organizations that use these tools develop them to meet the funding requirements of specific projects and do not incorporate them into their organizational practices.

CSOs find it difficult to recruit volunteers. The majority of people cannot afford to volunteer, since the cost of living in Angola is very high and they need to earn money to support their families. Wealthy individuals, on the other hand, do not see the value of contributing their time.

CSOs have limited technical equipment due to the lack of funding and scarcity of technological resources throughout the country. Of the 302 CSOs surveyed in the 2011 World Learning study, only 26.2 percent owned offices; 8.9 percent had no office, while the remainder rented offices or shared space with others.
About 87.7 percent had telephone service, while only 53 percent had email addresses, 69.2 percent had computers, and 65.2 percent had printers. Less than half of the organizations studied in this report had their own vehicles (28.1 percent), photocopy machines (39.1 percent), or Internet access (45.4 percent). Although more recent data is not available, the situation is likely to have worsened in 2012 as a result of the decrease of funding and closure of donor projects and international CSOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

Donor funding levels continued to decrease in 2012. International CSO personnel continue to face difficulties obtaining work visas, and many international organizations that used to provide sub-grants to Angolan CSOs have left the country. CARE International and Save the Children closed their operations in 2012. NDI and ChildFund announced that they will close in 2013, as they lack funding to continue operations in Angola. The German sustainable development organization GTZ is also planning to leave in 2013.

In 2012, USAID provided less than $1 million to CSOs to implement HIV/AIDS prevention projects. There is no funding available for education or any other social sector. The business sector in Angola is dominated by the political class and only funds social projects linked to political elites. According to World Learning’s 2011 figures, fewer than twenty CSOs in Angola have funds to implement social projects, typically between only $50,000 and to $200,000, which comes largely from foreign donors.

CSOs still do not systematically cultivate local financial support, partially because of entrenched poverty, and partially because there is no culture of philanthropy among the very rich. There is no culture of volunteerism, in part because the high cost of living makes it difficult for people to engage in unpaid work. As described above, only CSOs registered as Public Utility organizations receive government support.

Local CSOs do not have the funding to hire qualified people to maintain financial management systems or to conduct financial audits. Many CSOs request funding to carry out audits when donors require them, but donors frequently refuse to allocate funds for this activity.

**ADVOCACY: 5.7**

CSOs have limited understanding of the importance of advocacy, their capacity to shape policy, and the meaning and role of civil society. Lack of funding drove many talented people out of the sector in 2011 and 2012, leaving a large vacuum in knowledge and experience. Those who were hired in their place do not understand advocacy and how it shapes policy.

The government continues to disregard civil society participation. Only organizations with links to the MPLA have direct lines of communication with the government. UTCAH, the governmental CSO coordinating body, is supposed to serve as a mechanism to engage CSOs in decision-making processes. In practice, however, it functions as a controlling mechanism, frequently requesting financial and narrative reports from CSOs in order to monitor their activities and spending and ensure that CSOs are not involved in advocacy.
UTCAH publicly praises organizations that provide services and criticizes those that advocate. CSO advocacy efforts are also stymied by the fact that all print media is state-controlled.

CSOs’ limited funding is subject to intense scrutiny from the state. CSOs thus find it difficult to voice concerns or criticize the MPLA. The few CSOs conducting advocacy fear repercussions, such as harassment. Therefore, advocacy campaigns tend to be small and only raise issues that do not upset the ruling party.

In 2012, only one CSO conducted an advocacy campaign. OMUNGA’s “Don’t Tear Down My House” campaign continues to pressure authorities in the Benguela province to stop demolitions and illegal evictions. OMUNGA has fairly strong organizational capacities and exceptionally strong leadership, and is therefore better able to manage advocacy and engage with local policy makers. At the same time, the central government continues to threaten OMUNGA with closure because it exposes government officials who occupy community lands for their own economic interests. Although the government did not cease the demolitions and evictions, the mere fact that OMUNGA is speaking out on this issue is notable in the context of Angola, where brutality is regularly used to stop demonstrations, youth are arrested, and people have disappeared. ACC participated in similar advocacy work in 2011, but lacked funding to pay its staff to implement activities in 2012.

Although other demonstrations were also organized in 2012—on corruption, for example—they were organized by courageous individuals, not CSOs.

Legislative elections were held in Angola in August 2012. With the exception of a handful of CSOs engaged in civic education, CSOs were not involved in the elections. The government did not allow national or international CSOs to observe the elections and CSOs did not play an advocacy role related to election laws.

CSOs meet periodically with the government on specific issues, such as farmers’ need for agricultural inputs and the delivery of school materials for the beginning of the school year.

There is no widespread awareness of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability. No CSO promotes legal reforms and no funds are available to support such work.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3**

In 2012, fewer than twenty CSOs and CBOs provided social services to communities due to the lack of funding as well as the exodus of qualified staff from the sector. The few remaining social service providers work mostly on HIV/AIDS awareness, malaria prevention and treatment, polio prevention, elementary education, and water services.

CSO services are based on donor funding priorities, not on community needs assessments. Donors do not fund needs assessments, and CSOs cannot afford to undertake such assessments themselves. When CSOs do conduct needs assessments, donors do not take them into account, adhering to their agendas instead, even in cases when they required the assessments.

Local CSOs do not market their services to wider, external audiences and rarely publish reports to influence the policy agenda or increase awareness among populations and policy makers. CSOs do not have the capacity to monitor the impact of their work.

With the exception of Public Utilities, CSOs do not receive recognition or support from the government.
CSOs depend on international organizations for training and grants, as local organizations do not have the capacity or resources to offer such support. For example, with support from USAID, World Learning provides training to CSOs in ten provinces. Training provided by international organizations is rarely offered in local languages and is mainly based in Luanda. International organizations do not provide training on a systematic or continuous basis to reinforce capacity, and the quality is often poor. CSOs typically receive training once, either on organizational development or in technical areas, such as health, education, civic education, good governance, and water. There are no local grant-making organizations in Angola.

There were fewer events in the country in 2012 that allowed CSOs to meet with one another and discuss social, political, and economic issues, both because of decreases in funding and the 2012 general elections. CSOs avoided public events to ensure that the ruling party did not think they were aligned with any particular political party. In addition, there were no funds to support conferences, seminars, or other such events.

While UTCAH is responsible for coordinating CSOs at the national level, such coordination is limited. Other networks, including the Children’s Network, the Education for All Network, Agua para Todos, and the Land Rights Network, exist on paper, but do not function. Networks did not carry out any activities again in 2012. In general, networks only function if there are funds available from donors. Even when they do operate, networks play a very limited role in advocacy. CSOs in networks lack common agendas and are reluctant to share information or work jointly on projects because they view each other as competitors for scarce resources.

There are no examples of CSOs partnering with local businesses or the media in 2012. Most CSOs are not aware of the possibilities of such partnerships and do not pursue them. Similarly, true partnership between CSOs and the government is rare. Instead, partnership is defined as the government approving an activity that a CSO implements with donor financing. The government rarely contributes in-kind or financial resources.

CSOs affiliated with the ruling party receive favorable media coverage, including analysis. On occasion, the media will mention the projects of organizations unaffiliated with the ruling party. The media is almost entirely state-controlled, so most CSOs do not have a public platform to voice their concerns or attract public support. The ruling party has acquired all the private newspapers, and the president’s family owns all the private TV stations. Since early 2011, both public and private radio stations have been instructed not to report on demonstrations and social issues impacting the country, such as the lack of water and electricity. Radio Ecclesia, a private Catholic radio station that provides analysis and commentary, occasionally publicizes CSO activities, but is discouraged from operating in the provinces and thus has limited reach. No journalists were arrested in 2011 or 2012.
CSOs do not have the resources to develop clear media strategies. Most CSOs make little or no use of other media such as community newspapers or newsletters to publicize their activities. More CSOs are using social media—the only media not owned or otherwise controlled by the ruling party—to get their messages out. A few CSOs, such as OMUNGA—one of the only CSOs to promote its image actively—have blogs.

The public does not understand the role of CSOs and confuses them with for-profit companies. The government believes that any CSO that does not support it is against it, and therefore either ignores CSOs altogether or reinforces negative perceptions of CSOs in speeches, articles in the only daily state controlled newspaper Jornal de Angola, and other weekly newspapers in order to limit CSO influence. While the oil industry supports CSOs affiliated with the MPLA, the business sector avoids CSOs that are not aligned with government, because it does not want to be seen as anti-government.

Individual CSOs normally have codes of ethics and conduct. However, there is no sector-wide code of ethics or conduct to which CSOs adhere.
Botswana’s diverse civil society sector includes community-based, faith-based, small welfare, and national-level organizations, as well as international NGOs (INGOs). As of the end of 2011, approximately 4,500 CSOs were legally registered with the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs under the Societies Act. CSOs work in eleven sub-sectors: agriculture and environment; arts and culture; church development; disability; gender and development; health and HIV/AIDS; human rights; media; microfinance, credit and empowerment; science and technology training; and youth and children.

One hundred thirty organizations are affiliated with the Botswana Council of Non-governmental Organizations (BOCONGO). Affiliation with BOCONGO gives organizations access to decision-making and policy-making forums; coordination under the NGO Secretariat that advocates on behalf of BOCONGO members; and increased access to funding by donors that prefer to work with BOCONGO members.

During 2012, the government approved the establishment of an NGO Policy and Council. The NGO Policy is aimed at improving government-NGO relations, NGO sustainability, advocacy, and access to resources. The council will be responsible for implementing the policy.
**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.8**

Most CSOs in Botswana can register and operate relatively easily. CSOs register with the Department of Civil and National Registration within the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs under the Societies Act, except for environmental community-based organizations (CBOs), which register with the Ministry of Wildlife, Environment and Tourism. Registration of NGOs is required and, in practice, can generally be completed in fourteen days. The registrar of societies requires registered organizations to comply with the laws of Botswana and to file annual audited financial statements. Two social movements were refused registration in 2005 and again in 2012. One of these groups represents lesbian and gay persons, and the other group represents sex workers in Botswana.

Registration is more difficult for CSOs in remote areas. They are usually not aware that they can submit registration information to the national identification offices in their local regions, instead of traveling to urban areas. In addition, while templates of registration forms are available in both English and Setswana, registration officers prefer the English versions, which CSOs in remote areas find difficult to use.

The state has interfered with the operations of some CSOs that criticized government policy. In one case, the District Commissioner’s Office confiscated funds from CBOs, but later returned them with a letter of apology. In another case, an NGO director received a letter of caution for being critical of the government. An organization involved in health and HIV/AIDS reported that government agents confiscated materials from one of its informational meetings. At times, individuals associated with CSOs were also targeted for criticizing the government, deterring them from contributing to or publicly supporting their CSOs.

At times, the government gives less preferential treatment to certain types of CSOs. Unions are not allowed to use the Kgotla, a traditional consultative platform, yet government and other NGOs can access this platform for their meetings. The government has closed all but two orphanages in Botswana, and stringent measures prevent them from re-registering and new ones from registering. In contrast, organizations that have the President’s patronage usually receive government support, though they often need to adhere to the President’s views when carrying out their activities.

The Income Tax Act provides tax exemptions for religious, charitable, or educational institutions of a public character or trusts for nature conservation, scientific research, or similar public purpose. This exemption also applies to any association of individuals formed with a non-profit aim to promote social or sporting amenities. However, if the association was formed by a deed of trust, tax is imposed on the trustees, even if the association has a non-profit aim. Even when NGOs are eligible for tax exemption, tax deductions for donors may only be applied to contributions to an association, institution, college, or university for use in scientific research related to the donor’s business.

Foreign donations are exempt from taxation. CSOs are also given rebates for purchasing vans. While the government claims that the law provides appropriate tax exemptions for CSOs, CSOs have varied understanding of tax exemptions. Some CSOs believe that income other than that from grants is taxed. Other CSOs believe that no income is taxed but that CSOs are responsible for VAT and similar taxes.

Legislation allows CSOs to generate revenue, for example, through property rental, but the revenue must be invested into CSO operations or programming. However, CSOs are ineligible for trading licenses. CSOs are allowed to compete for some government contracts.
Although there are constitutional lawyers and lawyers working in human rights, no lawyers are trained in civil society legal issues. The University of Botswana does not provide courses on CSO law. In addition, lawyers tend to avoid controversial issues involving CSOs. Nonetheless, CSOs generally have access to legal advice, in most cases from private firms at reduced fees. In addition, some CSOs benefit from pro bono legal services provided by private legal firms. CSOs can also access legal aid through the University of Botswana’s legal clinic and the attorney general’s chambers. The government of Botswana continues to implement a legal aid project that provides funds to engage lawyers for CSO beneficiaries who otherwise would not have access to legal services because of financial constraints.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

CSOs continue to strive to identify and build local constituencies for their initiatives, but have limited success due to a lack of capacity.

Most CSOs have clearly defined missions and strategic plans, but generally do not adhere to them. CSOs often deviate from their missions to access resources.

Most members of BOCONGO have clearly defined and documented management structures, with a clear distinction of roles and responsibilities. However, these structures are generally not implemented. Boards of directors are powerful and sometimes overreach by assuming management responsibilities.

CSOs persistently experience high staff turnover, largely because they cannot compete with the corporate sector in terms of salary and job stability. Some CSOs are one-person organizations. Local CSOs generally lack job descriptions or adequate staff training. Talent is not adequately utilized or developed, driving CSOs to contract professional services. CSOs recruit volunteers, but have problems retaining them. In some cases, CSOs recruit participants in the national internship program for positions within their organizations.

Local CSOs generally have access to ICT and office equipment, though some equipment is outdated and needs repair. CSOs are fairly adept in using social media, but some CSOs, especially in remote areas, do not have access to ICT services and the Internet.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.6**

CSOs do not generate sufficient local resources to cover their expenses. However, corporate philanthropy might have improved slightly in 2012, as there was increased media reporting of corporate donations during the year. Letshego gives 700,000 pulas (about $84,000) to NGOs every year. Choppies Super Stores also donates to CSOs. Lady Khama Trust, Masiela Trust, Masire Foundation, FNB Foundation, Barclays Foundation, and PSI also engage in corporate social responsibility activities. One obstacle to more corporate philanthropy in the country is that businesses’ headquarters, where corporate social responsibility and investment policies are formed, are often not in Botswana. Individuals philanthropists donate to CSOs, but their contributions are not yet sufficient to impact the sector’s sustainability. Other individuals sometimes make in-kind contributions. The government provides some funding to NGOs and government social programs through the alcohol levy.
Funding challenges continue to prevail, and most CSOs only have guaranteed funding for the short-term. Many foreign, government, and corporate sponsors have withdrawn their funding to NGOs for various reasons, notably including recipients’ failure to account for their funding. Notwithstanding, CSOs continue to receive funding from donor agencies and the government.

CSOs tend to focus their fundraising on relief efforts because they appeal to donors. The funds raised, however, are almost always inadequate to support their operations. Membership-based organizations generally collect dues from members.

CSOs do not generally apply a business approach to their work. Many CSOs understand the principle of “not-for-profit” as prohibiting income generation. CSOs generally provide services to their beneficiaries free of charge. Some CSOs provide services to the private sector, but only for small fees.

CSOs’ financial management systems are generally inadequate. Some CSOs have systems in place, but cannot secure audits because they lack resources and capacity, leading donors to stop their funding. Even when CSOs can obtain funding to cover audit costs, they may still fail to account properly for their funding. Boards generally do not hold managers accountable for managing their organizations’ funds. CSOs do not generally take advantage of discounted (or even free) advertising space in the local media to publish their financial statements, usually preferring to publish this information on their websites.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

Direct communication between government and CSOs is almost non-existent, and, where it does exist, it is only ad hoc. Only in isolated cases have CSOs and the government tried to work together. CSOs typically cannot access meetings in which the government makes policy decisions.

Other coalitions have been formed through network organizations such as the Botswana Network for AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO). Sometimes the government establishes CSOs to support bills such as the Media Bill and the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) bill, while denying coalitions like LEGABIBO and Nkaikela the opportunity to register.

CSOs do not typically engage in advocacy in large numbers. Most CSOs are service providers and thus do not respond en masse to issues that arise. For example, in the run-up to Botswana’s first appearance at the African World Cup, there were questions as to whether the Botswana Football Association (BFA) would renew its contract with a local clothing company, All Kasi. CSOs were silent on this matter of national interest even though BOCONGO stated at their budget analysis meeting that more contracts should benefit domestic companies instead of international companies.

CSOs have advocated for a few policies and laws. For example, NGOs came together to initiate an abortion policy and a Freedom of Information Bill, but the government was indifferent towards these initiatives.

CSOs have had some lobbying successes. The coalition for the Maputo Plan of Action successfully advocated for integration of HIV programs into primary health care. The Botswana Coalition and Solidarity on Zimbabwe (BOCISCOZ), which supports human rights in Zimbabwe, and the Botswana CSO Climate Change Coalition, also had successes. In 2012, the government also formed a coalition with CSOs called
SESABO, whose mission is to address environmental issues. Generally, however, CSOs are poor lobbyists, and unfavorable laws are passed without their input. For instance, civil society did not have the opportunity to provide input to the Gender and Development Policy before it reached ministerial and cabinet review. Lobbying platforms exist, but CSOs do not know how to use them effectively. Another reason for CSOs’ ineffective lobbying is their inability to attend Parliament sessions and directly lobby parliamentarians.

Only a few CSOs seem aware of how favorable legal and regulatory frameworks can enhance their effectiveness. For example, some CBOs, as well as NGOs like the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA) and Khwai Trust, criticize the government over controversial legislation. BOCONGO does not sufficiently engage in lobbying. Thus, while it can access the Government/Private Sector High Level Consultative Forum, the Forum does not produce many policy issues for discussion.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6**

CSOs provide a wide range of services, especially in rural areas. Service fields include health, education, water management, and environment, although there is still need in these areas. The sector continues to overcrowd some areas of need, such as HIV/AIDS, while CSOs do not provide adequate support in other areas of need, such as gender-based violence. Other gaps in service provision include support and advocacy for gays and lesbians, women seeking abortions, and youth. Nonetheless, CSOs are making meaningful progress in many other areas, including humanitarian, poverty, and disaster relief as well as energy.

CSOs continue to provide services most needed by their communities. For example, in the Kazungula area, a CSO facilitated the availability of condoms for sex workers. Environmental services also address community needs, as most of the work is community-based or targeted to the communities. However, CSOs continue to struggle with the gradual withdrawal of donor support.

Goods and services are provided to a wide range of constituencies and clients. For instance, Lifeline Botswana has provided counseling and referral services for University of Botswana lecturers.

CSOs are unable to charge for their services, largely because communities expect services to be free, and because they are funded by donors and charities to complement government services. In addition, most CSOs are unable to forecast the demand for their services.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs in service provision. The District AIDS Multi-Sectoral Committee (DAMSAC) facilitates government interaction with civil society, especially through district level planning. The government, through the Office of the President, also continues to collaborate with the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) on HIV/AIDS related matters and supports networks such as Botswana Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (BONEPWA) and Botswana Christian Intervention Program (BOCAIP). However, government grants and contracts remain inadequate, especially for trade unions.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9

Various resource centers at the district level supply information to CSOs. However, CSOs need to submit requests to get information from some counties.

CSOs generally share information with one another, although resource constraints and limited access to email inhibit information sharing in some cases. Existing CSO coalitions are inadequate to promote effective information sharing and coordination of activities.

CSOs have access to a variety of technical programs. Networks, such as the Ngamiland Council of NGOs (NCONGO), have created partnerships with education institutions, such as the Botswana College of Distance and Open Learning (BOCODOL), to build CSO institutional capacity. Training is available in strategic management, accounting, and other leadership and management-related issues. However, these programs are not readily available to CSOs at reduced cost. CSOs are overly dependent on international training opportunities, especially from those provided by their donors.

Some networks, such as BOCONGO, receive funding from a government levy on alcohol that is used to fund CSOs and social programs. However, such networks often compete with their members to implement projects rather than coordinate them.

Intersectoral partnerships exist but are rather informal and not well-defined. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are also not well-defined. CSOs are not sufficiently aware of the opportunities for partnership or the benefits of such partnership, and do not actively seek them.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

CSOs receive some coverage from the local media, especially electronic media. Some local radio stations are beginning to take a keen interest in CSO community services. Yarona FM runs a program called “Community Corner” that covers community activities. Duma FM also generally covers CSO activities. E-Botswana has a slot for CSOs. Radio Botswana provides CSO news when it is urgent. Botswana Television is a potential partner because it regularly seeks local TV content. Most other media outlets are not interested in CSO activities, except where there is controversy. For instance, CSOs like BONELA enjoy wide media coverage whenever they challenge government decisions, and BOCONGO enjoys media coverage following its budget analysis speech and CSO socioeconomic policy dialogues.

CSOs engage in virtually no public relations activities. Most CSOs lack the capacity to coordinate or document their activities and do not invest much resources or energy into developing relations with the media or demonstrating their value. Some CSOs, such as those involved in HIV/AIDS and gender issues, have engaged the media by offering them training.

The public is not fully aware of CSOs and their activities, partly because CSOs do not know how to engage the media. CSOs do not try to improve their images or market themselves to the public. While the
government is supposed to work with CSOs, it does not always seek input from CSOs on global and regional matters. CSOs attract little attention from the corporate sector.

The process of self-regulation has only begun. Most CSOs have adopted individual codes of ethics, although they have difficulties implementing them. Some CSOs produce annual reports, but it is unclear how widespread this practice is. For only 2.50 pulas ($0.28), individuals can access annual reports of organizations and companies from the Department of Civil and National Registration.
BURUNDI

2012 Scores for Burundi

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<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
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Burundi celebrated its fiftieth anniversary of independence on July 1, 2012. Though government institutions remained stable, there were scattered instances of violence, which peaked in June and July. The violence was an alarming reminder of the proliferation of armed groups across the country. There were concerning signs of revived ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi, sparked in part by the decision of the Senate to conduct an ethnic census of public and semi-public institutions. Under Article 187 of the constitution, the Senate may conduct investigations “to ensure that no region or group is barred from receiving public services,” but the scope of the census was wider than mandated by the law and conducted without the appropriate discretion given the history of ethnic clashes in Burundi. A report on the outcome of the census was prepared but remains a state secret. The Chairman of the National Commission for Land and Other Assets (CNTB) further intensified tensions in April when he threatened to forcibly close camps for predominantly Tutsi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the political and ethnic violence in 1993.

Despite repeated calls by civil society, political groups, and international donors, the government has not

CSO Sustainability in Burundi

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Human Development Index: 185

Capital: Bujumbura

Government Type: Republic

Population: 10,888,321

GDP per capita (PPP): $600
opened negotiations with the armed groups in Burundi or with the extra-parliamentary opposition in the Democratic Alliance for Change. Instead, the government has ratcheted up pressure on civil society actors and media and condemned their collaboration with international human rights organizations which often publish critical reports on Burundi.

In 2012, civil society in Burundi continued to operate in a difficult legal context. Burundi has relatively stable institutions with a constitution that enshrines the freedoms of assembly and association, but the legal framework governing non-profit organizations has become obsolete and is poorly implemented. In particular, the current law is ambiguous in relation to certain kinds of organizations such as networks, platforms, and collectives. Although article 2 under the 1992 Law on Non-Profit Organizations should authorize these organizations to operate, the Ministry of Interior has been refusing since 2009 to register civil society networks, platforms, or collectives. A bill that would reform the legal framework was introduced in Parliament in July 2009 with contributions from civil society groups, but it has not yet been passed into law.

As of November 23, 2012, Burundi had 5,279 registered CSOs. However, many of these organizations lack permanent and skilled workers or offices. CSOs in Burundi have striking differences. Some organizations have access to financial resources, but most do not. The CSOs that have access to financial assistance still heavily depend on foreign donors. The resources generated from local constituencies and through membership fees are insufficient to guarantee the financial viability of CSOs over the long term. The government does not provide financial assistance to CSOs, consortiums, or networks. CSOs in Burundi advocate on a wide range of issues, including human rights and governance, anti-corruption, right to education, economic mismanagement, women’s rights to political participation and property, and the eradication of violence against women.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.0**

Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association, and the right to form associations and organizations in accordance with the law. Non-profit organizations are governed by Decree-Law No. 1/11 of April 18, 1992.

The requirements for an association to register are clear, but like most laws, the Decree-Law No. 1/11 is only available in French, making it inaccessible to many CSOs. Many CBOs, particularly those located in the provinces; face great difficulty registering because they are required to register in person at the Ministry of the Interior in Bujumbura, the capital. Furthermore, the cost of producing the numerous required documents for registration can be prohibitive. For example, CSOs must provide a copy of their criminal record in order for the governor of the province or the mayor of Bujumbura to issue a certificate of good conduct and moral character. However, the government has made an effort to improve the process of registering CSOs in 2012. On February 29, 2012, the Commission for the Registration of CSOs declared that it would adhere to a ten-day deadline for the review of CSO registration applications. To date, the commission has kept this deadline.

Efforts to revise Decree-Law No. 1/11 began in July 2009; in March 2012, the government invited CSOs to provide input on current draft revisions. At the end of the year, the draft bill was being finalized within the Ministry of the Interior. After approval at the Ministry, the bill will be submitted to the Council of Ministers for review and then put to a vote in Parliament. Through the reform, the government is planning to pass separate laws governing not-for-profit organizations and religious organizations. The second law was drafted by the Ministry of the Interior.
The government took actions in 2012 to limit CSOs’ freedom of assembly. On August 10, 2012, the government adopted a bill to repeal Decree-Law No. 100/187/91 of December 24, 1991 on public gatherings and events. Although the new bill purports to guarantee the freedom of assembly and the ability to hold public demonstration, CSOs complain that the bill imposes restrictions on the freedom of assembly.

In 2012, the government also submitted a draft bill to parliament that would place greater restrictions on the media. The bill requires journalists to reveal their sources; prohibits them from distributing information on monetary policy and national economy, state security, and “propaganda of state enemies,” imposes fines for violations ranging from 1 million BIF (about $650) to 8 million BIF (about $5,200); requires permits to operate radio and television to be renewed every five and ten years respectively; and requires journalists to have at least five years of academic training.

CSOs in Burundi are authorized to operate throughout the country, but they are required to obtain a work permit from the Ministry of Interior before they can operate outside the capital. Occasionally, the Ministry refuses to grant permission to an organization to perform an activity for seemingly arbitrary reasons. In 2012, the mayor of Bujumbura created a requirement that before a hotel or other venue can rent out a conference room to a CSO, the CSO must provide a written approval from the mayor for that activity. This restriction is in place in several other provinces, and the governors of certain provinces insist on being invited to an event before approving it.

In 2012, the government of Burundi continued to harass some CSOs identified by government officials as political opponents, particularly those advocating for good governance and the protection of human rights. In February, the authorities jailed the president of the Association for Dialogue and Action for Awareness and Behavior Change (PARCEM) because he denounced corruption in the appointment of magistrates. He was released on bail a week later, but the authorities continued legal proceedings against him and PARCEM. In July, he was given a five-year prison sentence by the anti-corruption court. PARCEM was given a fine of nearly $10,000.

Tax exemptions are granted only to international CSOs, who are required to sign an agreement with the Ministry of External Relations and Cooperation. Under that agreement, the government may accord tax exemptions for goods and services necessary for projects if the goods and services are acquired in Burundi and the organization has received authorization from both the Ministry of External Relations and Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance.

Non-profit organizations are not permitted to perform income-generating activities, though local CSOs may raise funds from local and foreign donors. CSOs can respond to tenders from the government, but there are no specific laws pertaining to this.

There are no lawyers trained in laws relating to CSOs in Burundi. No lawyers provide pro bono services to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9**

In 2012, CSOs in Burundi continued to have weak organizational capacity. Of the 5279 CSOs registered in Burundi, only 217 (4.11%) submitted activity reports at the end of the year as required by law, indicating a low level of professionalism among CSOs in general. Only a small fraction of CSOs operate on a national scale and have an office, equipment, and skilled staff. In 2012, the European Union’s Support for Civil Society Organizations (OSCAR) replaced the Support and Capacity Building for Non-State Actors project (ARCANE) as the primary program building the institutional capacity of CSOs in Burundi. However, there has yet to be significant improvement in organizational capacity.
As in previous years, some organizations, such as the Forum for Strengthening Civil Society (FORSC) and the Cooperative of Women’s Associations and CSOs in Burundi (CAFOB), have established local constituencies and structures that help them meet their goals at the local level. CSOs are increasingly building alliances with the media to deliver activities with common objectives. For example, in 2012, CSOs and journalists mobilized communities against the high cost of living. Such alliances with other local partners enable CSOs to improve their outreach and the impact of their activities. In general, however, CSOs are making slow progress in establishing local constituencies.

The small minority of professional organizations have clearly defined management structures, particularly general assemblies, executive committees, supervisory boards, and executive secretariats with permanent staff. In such organizations, boards of directors are genuinely involved in governance and management. They make strategic and operational plans, have laws governing their operation, regularly cooperate with external financial audits, and produce regular narrative and financial reports. The vast majority of CSOs, however, lack transparent management practices and governing documents, such as statutes, rules and regulations, administrative and financial procedure manuals, strategic plans, and operational plans. Such organizations are generally run by only their founders.

Many organizations have no permanent staff or offices. They function poorly and lack any form of democratic governance. The permanent workers in CSOs do not have adequate professional skills, and most of the organizations lack the resources to sufficiently train them. The majority of CSOs also lack the resources to upgrade their office equipment or access the Internet. More CSOs in large urban centers have obtained access to this equipment, but others work in areas without electricity and thus cannot access the Internet.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

The financial position of CSOs in Burundi varies widely. The few organizations that have access to substantial funding depend heavily on foreign donors and international organizations, which decreased funding to CSOs in 2012. For example, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace and the Canadian International Development Agency reduced the number of local organizations they fund in Burundi. Consequently, some Burundi organizations have reduced or terminated their activities. For example, Dushirehamwe, Iteka, and many other CSOs engaged in HIV/AIDS issues experienced such difficulties during the year. This decrease in funding can be attributed partly to the ongoing effects of the global economic downturn, but in other cases, donors hesitate to renew contracts with local recipients because of their weak financial management systems.

CSOs raise little money from local philanthropy or membership fees since the population is generally poor and cannot make cash contributions. However, communities sometimes organize themselves and make in-kind contributions and provide volunteer services to support CSO activities, particularly for the construction of infrastructure such as schools, health centers, and hospitals. As not-for-profit organizations, CSOs do not typically charge fees for their services or sell other products or services to raise funds.
The government does not generally provide financial assistance to CSOs. However, in accordance with donor guidelines, the government is increasingly working with CSOs to implement programs and projects funded by World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), and the European Union.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

With the exception of sensitive issues, such as corruption and impunity, CSOs are able to participate in the design and monitoring of many public projects. As in previous years, organizations active in this area include the Observatory of Government Action (OAG), the Burundi Economic Development Institute of Burundi (IDEC), and the National Center for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention (CENAP). However, in 2012, more organizations have emerged that are working in this area including the Association for Dialogue and Action for Awareness and Behavior Change (PARCEM) and The Forum for Conscience and Development (FOCODE).

In 2012, CSOs worked with the government to advocate for donor support to Burundi’s second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II) at the Donors Conference in Geneva, Switzerland in October 2012. CSOs also worked with the government to implement the National Strategy for Good Governance and Fight Against Corruption (SNBGLC). Following conditions imposed by donors, the government has invited CSOs to sit on several steering committees including the steering committee responsible for monitoring the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the government included CSOs in national consultations on transitional justice, public procurement, labor, and social security.

CSOs continued in 2012 to advocate actively on issues of human rights, good governance, corruption and economic mismanagement, gender sensitivity in government policy and strategic programs, gender parity in elective bodies, inheritance rights for women, education for all, violence against women, land reform, and agriculture policy. Many of the advocacy campaigns active in 2011 continued into 2012. For example, several organizations continued to advocate for policies that would support family farmers and increase funding for agricultural development. Controversial advocacy against impunity also continued in 2012. CSOs gain support for their advocacy denouncing extrajudicial assassinations from the Independent National Commission on Human Rights. CSOs continued to campaign for justice in the case of the 2009 assassination of Ernest Manirumva, an anti-corruption activist. CSOs continued to advocate for greater independence of the judiciary in 2012. While the Ministry of Justice had agreed to hold a conference on judicial reform, it was not held in 2012 as planned due to lack of funding and disagreements between the Ministry of Justice and unions over the agenda for the conference. This was a major setback for CSOs, which hoped that this conference would be the occasion to debate the fundamental issues of judicial reform in Burundi.

CSOs are closely monitoring progress on draft amendments to the legal framework for CSOs, introduced in Parliament in 2009. In 2012, CSOs organized a reflection workshop on these proposed amendments. CSOs have also led demonstrations against the high cost of living, which prompted the president to lift taxes on imported necessities. CSOs have also advocated for a law to protect human rights activists.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6

In 2012, CSOs continued to provide services in many areas, such as governance, information sharing, the protection of human rights, health, education, affordable housing, water supply, and environmental protection and food safety, including the development of agriculture and livestock. In some technical areas, such as energy, very few CSOs have the resources or expertise to provide high quality services.

Beneficiaries of CSOs programs often participate in the design and monitoring of programs, ensuring that the programs respond to their needs. As the global economic downturn has aggravated the already widespread poverty in Burundi, the demand for social services has grown and exceeded the capacity of CSOs. CSOs are limited by a lack of funding and expertise. For example, in 2012, The Global Fund reduced funding to CSOs due to their weak financial management. As a result, CSOs involved in HIV/AIDS prevention had to reduce or terminate their activities.

CSOs provide products and services to beneficiary communities and other organizations, but few CSOs have studied market trends and the habits of those who use their services in order to charge fees for services. Many CSOs are establishing and building local constituencies in the form of collectives or platforms to support them in providing services more effectively.

CSOs produce reports and other publications on a regular basis. They distribute these products at subsidized rates or free of charge. Universities, churches, and other institutions receive CSO reports and publications regularly.

The government recognizes CSOs’ contributions to service delivery, but does not directly fund CSOs.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

In 2012, CSOs had very few opportunities to receive training and technical support. There are some active CSO platforms and networks, but these are located mostly in the capital city of Bujumbura. The networks help share information and enhance the skills of their members through training programs, discussion groups, and outreach workshops. The networks are becoming better structured, and some have created websites and published newsletters. There were no intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing such services at the community level.

Some CSOs have hosted workshops on management and leadership, negotiation, communication, and conflict resolution. The majority of these workshops are conducted in local languages. In 2012, a dozen CSOs, including FORSC, OAG, Ligue Iteka, ISANGANIRO and OAP, partnered with Oxfam Novib and received training on information and communications technology (ICT) and fundraising. Other CSOs received training in advocacy.

Few CSOs work in partnership with businesses or the government; they are more prepared to work with the media. CSOs are aware that partnerships have the benefits of mutual ownership and sustainability. In 2012,
CSOs and the government worked together on implementing the National Strategy for Good Governance and Fight against Corruption, resulting in the execution of ten UNDP-funded projects. Throughout 2012, the government and CSOs also worked together to mobilize funding for the Second Strategic Framework for Growth and the Fight Against Poverty (CSLP II).

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

CSOs in Burundi receive positive coverage of their activities from national and local media thanks to the positive partnership they have established. CSOs represent preferred sources for journalists on a range of issues.

CSOs work closely with the media on social issues. In 2012, CSOs worked together with the media to address issues of security, human rights, and governance. CSOs benefit from regular programs in the media which are dedicated to covering their activities and reach a large audience. In addition, the media supports CSOs’ advocacy campaigns and regularly invites CSOs to participate in debates and panel discussions on issues relevant to the public.

The public understands and supports the work and commitment of CSOs, which is reflected in praise from beneficiaries on radio programs. The public also participates in CSO activities by contributing to infrastructure projects.

The government has a mixed perception of civil society. Although relations between the government and CSOs often vary with the context, the situation has improved compared to 2011. Government authorities work closely with CSOs in steering committees and leadership groups that monitor policies, coordinate sector-based initiatives, and liaise with the coalitions established by donors. On the other hand, the government also continues to regard some CSOs, particularly those advocating for human rights or good governance, as allies of the opposition parties.

Businesses have varying perceptions of CSOs, depending on whether CSOs’ actions are supportive of their activities or working against their interests.

In 2012, a Code of Conduct for CSOs was adopted by some but not all CSOs. Some CSOs issue annual reports and send them to the Ministry of Interior and donors.
In 2001, the Congolese voted in the second multiparty legislative and presidential elections in the country’s history. In 2012, CSOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continued to operate in a context of ongoing crisis. A colonel in the army led an insurrection in the Kasai Oriental province, and armed conflict continued in the provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, and Katanga. The March 23 Movement (M23), a militia made up of soldiers formerly in the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), intensified fighting in the eastern provinces. Numerous special summits were held in Kampala, Uganda during the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to search for a solution to the conflict.

The elections in 2011 were marred by numerous irregularities, which created an ongoing atmosphere of distrust between the majority and opposition political parties, and between the government and the people. The government postponed the provincial, urban, municipal and local elections that were scheduled to take place after the presidential and parliamentary elections, leaving the provincial deputies and senators in place even though their mandates had expired.

The trial initiated by a military court against the alleged assassins of Floribert Chebeya, the human rights advocate who was assassinated on June 1, 2010, remained in appeals.
after several delays. Certain human rights groups refused to accept the legitimacy of the trial, since only lower level officials were indicted.

Despite the difficult context, CSOs had numerous opportunities for civic engagement in 2012. The International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), a club of French speaking countries, held its 14th Summit in the DRC in 2012, and CSOs participated in discussions with the President of France and the chairman of the OIF. CSOs also led advocacy campaigns which resulted in the adoption of a gender parity law and a law that restructured the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) to provide CSOs a role in the CENI.

CSOs faced many of the same challenges they faced in previous years. Registration was difficult for CSOs located outside of Kinshasa, and few CSOs had diverse sources of funding, relying instead on the major CSO networks, the government, and donors for short-term grants. CSOs working in the east have faced additional challenges as donors have halted their activities because of conflict and instability.

The only study on the number of CSOs in the DRC was conducted by the National Council of Development NGOs (CNONGD) in 1996. According to that study, there were about 5,000 development CSOs in the country at the time. However, these numbers are out of date, and did not include important groups of CSOs such as labor unions, human rights organizations, and self-help organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The law 004 of July 20, 2001 provides a legal framework for not-for-profit organizations, faith-based organizations and foundations. The constitution guarantees the freedoms of association, expression, and worship, and law 96-002 of June 22, 1996 establishes guidelines for the exercise of the freedom of press.

Though law 004 is generally favorable to CSOs, registering a CSO can be a long process and must be done in person in Kinshasa, which creates a significant obstacle for CSOs located in the provinces. Some CSOs, particularly human rights organizations and media groups report facing administrative impediments and harassment.

Law 004 provides tax exemptions for CSOs, but in practice, only reputable faith-based organizations receive these benefits. There are no legal barriers preventing CSOs from selling goods and services and bidding on government contracts. However, CSOs are often unable to successfully compete for contracts because they have weak financial management systems that have never been audited and they lack technical expertise. The government procurement process can also be highly opaque; the government often withholds information, gives extremely short deadlines, and requires excessive paperwork. But despite these obstacles, CSOs won several notable contracts in 2012, including work on sanitation in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.

An increasing number of lawyers specialize in civil society law and support CSOs working in the provinces and at the national level. Still, CSOs typically do not have the funds to hire a lawyer when they need to seek redress in court.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

Many CSOs work closely with their beneficiaries to plan, implement, and monitor projects. However, many organizations do not have sufficient grassroots presence to engage with their beneficiary communities.

Every CSO must have a mission defined in its statutes and internal operating procedures when it registers. CSOs rarely employ strategic planning techniques, but donors increasingly condition their funding on sound strategic planning and provide assistance to CSOs to undertake strategic planning.

CSOs are required by law to clearly define a division of responsibilities between a general assembly, board of directors, and executive management. However, CSOs often fail to establish a functioning board of directors, and executive managers tend to run their organizations without any oversight.

These weaknesses do not apply to the small group of well-established CSOs working on a national level. These organizations generally have short and long-term strategic plans, which are approved by the board of directors, and they hold regular general assembly meetings.

The majority of CSOs lack the resources to purchase modern office equipment or internet services, and they are unable to retain skilled, salaried employees. Most organizations rely on volunteers and associates hired under short-term contracts for specific projects. However, widespread poverty in Congo makes it difficult for CSOs to find volunteers who are able give their time to projects without compensation.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6

In 2012, CSOs in the DRC continued to face financial difficulties. Only religious organizations and charities are able to collect membership dues and contributions from their members and mobilize volunteers. Instead, CSOs generally seek short-term grants from foreign funders. In turn, the communities that benefit from CSO activities understand that this is the source of CSOs’ funding, and they see no need to contribute to these organizations.

There were several calls for proposals by the government and international organizations in 2012. Notably, the British government created a fund for girls’ education, and the World Bank funded a program to promote good governance in the mining sector. Both were awarded to international NGOs as donors often believe that local organizations lack the capacity to absorb significant funding. However, local CSOs received grants from international NGOs under several projects. The USAID/DAI Good Governance Program (PBG) issued grants to the CSOs in Bandundu, Katanga, South Kivu and Maniema. CSOs in nearly all the provinces also received funding through the Civil Society Fund, which is financed by the British and Swedish governments and managed by Christian Aid, COSI, and Diakonia. The CSOs that receive sub-grants under these programs, generally also receive training on financial management and administration.

The government increasingly calls on CSOs, particularly faith-based organizations, to implement programs or projects. For example, because of CARITAS-DRC’s grassroots presence in remote communities, the
government engaged them to manage payments to teachers in areas that do not yet have banks. Individual donations to CSOs are sporadic, but businesses such as Bralima, Bracongo, Vodacom, and Tigo make charitable donations. This is typically considered to be a part of their marketing. Some CBOs create and sell crafts and agricultural products, as well as reports and research. But they generally earn little income through these activities.

Most CSOs do not have reliable financial management systems, with the exception of the small group of well-established CSOs working at the national level. These CSOs submit to independent financial audits and produce annual reports for their partners.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

In 2012, CSOs became increasingly vocal on many issues of national interest and worked with the government on a number of issues. CSOs took part in debates on the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and on the DRC’s compliance with the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). The government and CSOs worked closely together on the evaluation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and on the implementation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

In some cases, CSOs play the role of a watchdog and represent the interests of the population as a third party; however, in cases such as the EITI, civil society had an equal position in negotiations with the government and extractive industries.

CSOs led several important advocacy campaigns in 2012. They called for the reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), which led Parliament to adopt a new law that gives CSOs a prominent role within the CENI. Of the thirteen members of the CENI, three must now be from civil society including one as president. CSOs also played an important role advocating for a parity law which requires that 30% of the seats of the National Assembly be filled by women. CSOs also advocated for mining sector reform in the DRC, which led to tripartite discussions between the government, civil society and mining companies. CSOs also led a campaign to advocate for greater transparency in the budget process, and the government responded by consulting civil society on the budget.

Several civil society leaders are registered as lobbyists to parliament and advocate for democratic reforms. CSOs lobbied parliament to pass a law on access to public information, a law on mutual health insurance companies, and to ratify a convention on the rights of people with disabilities.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs provide a variety of services to communities in the DRC including affordable mutual health insurance, education and housing for poor families, clean water infrastructure in rural and peri-urban areas, promotion of new sources of energy, and reforestation and prevention of soil erosion. These services correspond to the needs and priorities of constituencies. CSOs produce publications through their work with beneficiary communities which are increasingly used by other NGOs, universities, and students in their research.
Most CSOs do not fully recover the costs of their services. Often, CSOs support their services with funding for a project, but in some cases, notably mutual health insurance organizations, services are funded through membership fees.

The government recognizes the value of the services CSOs deliver in the areas of health, agriculture, education, and literacy, among others. The government increasingly consults with CSOs and makes small grants to CSOs, though the grants are generally worth less than $5,000 and often support one-off activities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

There are several training centers and institutes of higher education that offer CSOs high quality trainings on a range of topics. For example, Umoja Développement Durable, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Axyom, and Inades provide trainings on strategic management, responsible entrepreneurship, accounting, human resource management, marketing, and organizational management. However, the trainings are often prohibitively expensive for CSOs. Trainings are typically taught in French or English rather than local languages and most of the centers are located in the capital or other primary cities.

Community foundations and ISOs provide grants with funds raised locally or by re-granting funds from international donors. Churches and mutual insurance organizations sometimes respond to natural disasters and conflict by mobilizing membership dues, and cash and in-kind donations to assist displaced populations and others in need. Other CSOs support local initiatives with funds raised from international donors. Such organizations include The National Center for the Support of Development and Community Participation (CENADEP) in Kinshasa, the organization of Farmers of Bas-Congo, and the Organization of Fishermen in Inongo, which have supported respectively Socialist Solidarity, SOS FAIM, and WWF Belgium.

CSOs tend to work more successfully with the government and media than with the private sector. CSOs have partnered successfully with the media and the government to disseminate important messages to prevent HIV/AIDS and malaria.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

The public image of CSOs did not improve in 2012. As in previous years, media coverage of CSO activities was problematic. The media generally require CSOs to pay for coverage of their activities. Only community radio stations such as Radio Okapi and international media such as the BBC, CNN, VOA, and RFI do not request payment for coverage. The press does not distinguish between commercial advertising prices and public service announcements. They generally do not publish analyses of CSOs’ activities and their impact.

The public often holds a mixed view of CSOs. Many believe that CSOs receive significant donor funding but do not use the funds to improve their well-being. However, the communities that benefit from the services of
CSOs have an increasingly positive image of these organizations and the work they do. CSOs for their part do not sufficiently promote their own image with the public.

The government is increasingly aware that it must work with CSOs to implement programs and projects, though this is often a condition of funding from bilateral and multilateral donors. In 2012, the government consulted CSOs on a number of important, political issues. CSOs participated in peace negotiations between the government and the M23. The government also consulted CSOs on the restructuring of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral process at the provincial, district, and municipal levels, the decentralization process, and human rights issues.

CSOs that work at the national level usually produce narrative and financial reports for their members and donors. The law requires CSOs to send a copy of activity reports to the ministry overseeing their activities and to the Ministry of Planning. CSOs have a code of conduct that has been adopted by several CSOs, but the code is not enforced or monitored.
ETHIOPIA

2012 Scores for Ethiopia

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Capital: Addis Ababa

Government Type:
Federal Republic

Population:
93,877,025

GDP per capita (PPP):
$1,200

Human Development Index: 174

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.7

The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on August 21, 2012, sparked significant concern about Ethiopia’s political stability due to the power vacuum it seemed to create, as well as ethnic rivalries and infighting within the ruling coalition. The coalition ultimately maintained the country’s stability and a smooth transition of power took place. However, the new Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, repeatedly warned that political reform should not be expected.

The CSO sector can be divided into two broad categories: charities, which mainly serve others, and societies, which mainly serve their members. They are further divided into five sub-categories based on their funding sources, membership, and place of registration. These include Ethiopian charities or societies, Ethiopian resident charities or societies, and foreign charities. Only Ethiopian charities and societies can work on human rights and good governance issues, but they are restricted in the amount of funding they can receive from foreign sources.

In 2012, the number of CSOs registered as charities and societies increased by 390, reaching 2,709. This number does not include CSOs, CBOs, faith-based organizations, and traditional associations registered by regional states, for which no data is available. Around 64 percent of CSOs are registered as resident charities, which can access foreign funds to work in development and service provision.
Approximately 13 percent of registered CSOs are foreign charities, another 13 percent are Ethiopian societies, and just 4 percent are Ethiopian charities.

According to the Charities and Societies Council of Ministers Regulation No. 168/2009, charities and societies must be active. If they do not implement any projects for two years, they will be shut down. Some 253 CSOs (almost 10 percent of the sector) did not implement any projects in 2012, primarily due to a lack of funding. A total of fifteen organizations were closed in 2012—ten voluntarily and five by the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA). The CSA also sent written warnings to 476 CSOs in 2012 for not complying with other laws and regulations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.5**

Article 31 of the Ethiopian Constitution recognizes the freedom of association, but requires the formation of a legal entity in order to enjoy the freedom. The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and the Charities and Societies Council of Ministers Regulation stipulate the process for registration. The requirements are cumbersome and subjective, giving the CSA extensive discretion to refuse registration. CSOs that register as resident or foreign charities, which constitute 83 percent of registered CSOs, cannot appeal the CSA’s decisions. The registration process appears to disfavor organizations working on human rights and advocacy issues, given the lengthier registration process and higher rate of denial these organizations face. Furthermore, the CSA has serious capacity limitations that have led to uneven application of the registration rules. Despite these difficulties, the number of charities and societies registered increases every year.

The CSP provides rules for internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial and activity reporting, and dissolution of charities and societies. However, the CSP’s provisions are vague and grant broad discretion to the CSA to implement the law. For example, Article 14 of the CSP lists the scope of permissible “charitable purposes” for charities, but the CSA still has broad discretion to determine “charitable purposes” through its directives. The law also outlines grounds for dissolving a CSO but gives substantial discretion to the CSA to interpret and apply them. The legal framework is applied most stringently at the federal level, while more progressive regulation is observed at lower levels of government. Most organizations perceive that they have better relationships with regional and local government structures than federal ones.

According to the CSP, Ethiopian charities and societies cannot accept more than ten percent of their funds from foreign sources, while other categories of CSOs have no restrictions on their access to foreign funds. Ethiopian charities and societies are also the only groups permitted to work on human rights and good governance issues. Therefore, human rights organizations are generally limited in their ability to access foreign funds, although there are exceptions. For example, in 2012 the European Commission and the Ethiopian government signed an agreement to implement the EC Civil Society Fund II, which will be considered a local fund and can therefore be accessed by both Ethiopian charities and societies, including those working in human rights. In addition, the CSA allowed four organizations registered as resident or foreign charities to work on advocacy issues using foreign funds, although the legality of these exemptions is highly questionable.

Seven directives issued by the CSA in 2011 began to impact the operation of CSOs in Ethiopia in 2012 by strengthening the CSA’s control and further restricting CSO access to and use of funding, especially for consortia. For example, the Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization (known as the 30/70 directive) requires that administrative costs, which are very broadly defined, must be
kept at or below 30 percent of an organization’s total budget. The Directive on the Establishment of Consortiums limits the types of organizations that can belong to individual consortiums, the sources of funding, and the activities in which consortiums can engage. Other directives focus on income generating activities, public collections, and reporting requirements.

Reports of CSA officers harassing CSO representatives continued without substantial improvement in 2012.

Charities and societies are exempt from taxes on grants but are expected to pay other taxes, such as Value-Added Taxes and Turn-Over Taxes. The CSP allows charities and societies to engage in profit-making activities that are incidental to their core activities, but income from these activities is taxed on par with similar businesses. Both individual and corporate donations are eligible for tax deductions, although there are strict conditions regarding the permissible amount of donations and the organizations entitled to receive such donations.

Many legal practitioners are familiar with the laws pertaining to CSOs. However, the 30/70 directive considers legal fees as administrative costs, thereby limiting CSOs’ ability to pay for legal support.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Except for national associations formed by the ruling party, such as women’s associations and youth associations, most CSOs do not define themselves by their memberships or constituencies.

Organizational capacity of CSOs was heavily affected by the 2011 CSA directives. According to the CSA’s 2011/2012 annual report, 253 registered charities and societies (approximately 10 percent of the sector) were not operational during the year due to financial constraints and other reasons. Article 22(3) of Council of Ministers Regulation No. 168/2009 states that these organizations may face mandatory closure if they fail to implement a project in the subsequent year.

Almost all charities and societies have basic documents identifying their visions, missions, goals, and objectives. In many cases, these are embodied in multi-year strategic and operational plans. CSOs must renew their licenses every three years and must provide these plans in order to renew. However, project-focused funding that provides no institutional support curtails CSOs’ ability to work according to their visions and missions. This is a problem especially for smaller organizations.

The internal management structures of CSOs, including the roles and responsibilities of the governing bodies and management, are mostly defined by the regulatory regime. Thus, charities and societies routinely establish the necessary structures and organizational documents as part of the registration process, and the periodic reporting requirements generally ensure that these structures are maintained. However, the actual implementation and effectiveness of these structures varies. Typically, the executive director plays the most dominant role in an organization, often controlling the board of directors. Boards of directors, or general assemblies in the case of societies or consortiums, tend to have limited roles in governance.

The capacity of charities and societies to maintain permanent paid staff is severely curtailed by the 30/70 directive, which considers salaries and benefits of most staff to be administrative costs, and therefore subject to the 30 percent limit of total costs. The CSP’s enforcement of this directive has triggered an exodus of highly qualified project staff, including accountants, IT managers, and lawyers, from the sector. For example, Merry Joe Ethiopia, a renowned charity, reported that it had to lay off around 100 staff due to the directive.
After analyzing the directive’s impact, the CSA exempted some CSOs working on HIV/AIDS, disability issues, and water issues. Charities and societies are required by law to have internal auditors. The recruitment and engagement of volunteers is hampered by the lack of a culture of volunteerism.

Established charities and societies generally have modernized basic office equipment including computers, printers, copiers, fax machines, and Internet access. While these basic office facilities may not be universally available to smaller and newer organizations, they are not considered major impediments for the sector as a whole.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

A study conducted in 2012 by the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA) on the impact of the 30/70 directive revealed that its members are becoming reluctant to operate in remote areas far from their project offices, as crucial program expenses such as fuel and per diem are considered administrative costs. In addition, since the majority of expenses associated with training are considered administrative costs, most CSOs have stopped providing capacity building interventions for the communities in which they work. Costs related to project monitoring and evaluation are also considered administrative costs, which has reduced follow-up on project implementation.

Local resources, including volunteers and local philanthropy, constitute an insignificant percentage of CSOs’ resources. The lack of local funding has led many advocacy CSOs, which are typically registered as Ethiopian charities or societies and therefore cannot receive more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign sources, to readjust their objectives and re-register as service delivery CSOs or resident charities. Despite the legal limits on foreign funding, according to the CSA’s 2011/2012 annual report, at least sixty CSOs registered as Ethiopian charities or societies received more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign sources. These CSOs received warnings from the CSA.

As mentioned above, almost 10 percent of the sector did not implement any projects in 2012, primarily due to a lack of funding. Most charities and societies depend on a single source of funding, typically a foreign donor. A report by the Addis Ababa Bureau of Finance and Development indicated that there was a decline in the amount of foreign funds mobilized by CSOs in 2012, though the reason for the decline was unclear. A small proportion of organizations have developed relationships with multiple donors, making them more viable in the short term. Only a few organizations have funding arrangements for multiple projects and multiple years.

Small organizations and those with limited or no experience with donors find it more difficult to develop cores of loyal donors. Ethiopian charities and societies, which are obligated to raise 90 percent of their funds domestically, conduct membership outreach and philanthropy development programs with limited success. These activities must be conducted within the framework of the CSP and the Directive to Provide for Public Collection by Charities and Societies (No. 5/2011), which impose stringent requirements and penalties with respect to receiving permits, conducting public collections, using funds, and reporting. The laws also deem public collections as a last resort, barring CSOs with other resources from engaging in such activities. Membership organizations collect nominal membership fees that are insufficient to support their activities.

The CSP and the Directive to Provide for Income Generating Activities by Charities and Societies (No. 07/2011) allow income-generating activities but impose prohibitive restrictions. There are stringent requirements to secure permits to conduct income-generating activities, which must be incidental to the...
CSOs’ objectives. CSOs also must raise capital and expenses needed for the activities from their administrative costs, and profits may only be used for operational costs. While organizations may compete for contracts with government and businesses with the CSA’s permission, CSOs do not seek such contracts.

The financial management systems of charities and societies must meet the requirements described in the CSP and CSA directives, such as the Directive to Provide for the Submission of Audit and Activity Reports of Charity and Society or Charity Committee (No. 8/2011). Requirements include submitting annual statements of accounts, audit reports, and activity reports to the CSP. While much of the sector satisfies these and other requirements, limited capacity still undermines compliance. In 2012, the CSA investigated 1,549 charities and societies and found that more than half failed to submit their annual plans, annual reports, and audit reports. Almost 80 percent did not submit their lists of assets or comply with the 30/70 administrative cost rule.

**ADVOCACY: 6.1**

CSOs and their consortiums have no formal access to government decision-making structures or processes, thereby curtailing civil society’s capacity and willingness to engage in lobbying activities. In some cases, however, the government may invite CSO representatives to give input on major policy issues. Civil society and government representatives have jointly designed and implemented projects, but these arrangements mainly occur at the local and regional government levels. However, at the end of 2012, the CSA started to require all charities registered at the federal level to have project agreements with at least one government institution in order to renew their licenses.

CSOs and government occasionally come together to address issues related to the operating environment for CSOs. For example, the GO-NGO Forum, usually sponsored by CCRDA, conducts city hall meetings focused on the relationship between CSOs and regional and local governments. In addition, the Civil Society Support Working Group includes representatives of government, donors, and CSOs, and focuses on high level CSO-related issues. The board of the CSA also includes two CSO representatives.

The legal framework severely limits the ability of CSOs to conduct advocacy campaigns. First, the CSP only permits Ethiopian charities and societies to engage in advocacy campaigns and limits the amount of foreign funding they can receive. Second, the directives on income generating activities and public collections further restrict the capacity of advocacy organizations to raise funds locally. Finally, the Directive to Provide for the Establishment of Consortiums of Charities and Societies (CSA Directive No. 1/2010) precludes the formation of issue-based coalitions among CSOs, as described in greater detail below. The CSA initiated some forums in 2012 to discuss the directives, but these were mainly aimed at popularizing them.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

Generally, CSOs operating in Ethiopia have a diverse product line. CSOs are extensively engaged in social services provision, particularly in health and education, as well as economic empowerment and environmental protection.

CSOs’ goods and services are responsive to the needs of beneficiaries and also sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes and input from communities. However, as expenses...
for needs assessment, monitoring, and evaluation are considered administrative costs, most CSOs have now ceased these activities despite the important role they play in project success.

Most CSOs are not strictly membership organizations, so their products are inherently provided to constituencies broader than their own memberships. CSOs strive to make their products available to other organizations and persons as capacity permits. However, the limited capacities of most CSOs and weak relationships with mass media hinder the accessibility of such products.

Due to their limited capacity and the restrictive legal framework, CSOs find it very difficult to engage in cost recovery schemes. Some CSOs, particularly those working in the areas of health and education, require communities and beneficiaries to cover some costs. The CSA is in the process of issuing a directive on cost recovery.

Government bodies do not generally provide grants or contracts to charities and societies or recognize the sector’s contributions to service delivery. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission previously regranted funds from the Democratic Institution Program to a few Ethiopian charities and societies to implement legal aid programs, but in 2012 the Commission ceased doing so due to capacity limitations.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

International organizations have provided information, technology, training, and technical assistance to their local partners, and helped CSO coalitions establish resource and training centers. Some CSO networks and umbrella organizations also establish resource and training centers to serve their members and the sector as a whole.

These institutions, however, have not operated fully since the CSP and subsequent regulations and directives were adopted. International organizations, which used to play an intermediary role in channeling funds to local CSOs, are now required by the CSA to implement projects directly, otherwise all of their expenses, including channeled funds, will be considered administrative costs. Similarly, the Directive for the Establishment of Consortiums of Charities and Societies (No. 1/2010) and the directive on administrative costs essentially permit umbrella CSOs only to channel funds, rather than build their members’ capacity or engage in monitoring and evaluation activities.

CSO networks in Ethiopia were nascent even before the CSP. While the CSP was lauded as the first legislation granting consortiums legal status, it places three severe limitations on their formation and operation. First, the directive prohibits Ethiopian organizations from forming consortiums with Ethiopian resident or foreign organizations, and charities from establishing consortiums with societies. This effectively rids existing networks of most of their members and precludes the formation of national or sector-wide coalitions. Second, the new regulatory regime severely curtails the role of consortiums in capacity building, as previously discussed. Third, consortiums’ finances must come from the administrative costs of their member organizations. Since administrative costs may not exceed 30 percent of total costs, and administrative costs are broadly defined, consortiums cannot function meaningfully. As a result, most consortiums were forced to downsize their staffs and drop their capacity building programs.

Since international organizations can no longer channel funding to local CSOs, the only remaining local grantmaking programs are supported by multilateral organizations allowed through specific agreements with the government, such as the European Commission’s Civil Society Fund; the World Bank Social Accountability Program; and the Civil Society Support Program, a pooled fund established by several donors, including the UK’s Department for International Development, Irish Aid, and the embassies of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Netherlands. The Civil Society Support Program is a capacity development program.
for Ethiopian CSOs with a particular focus on people affected by social marginalization, geographic remoteness, lack of resources, and neglected development issues.

The recent CSA directives limited training, which was previously provided by international organizations and CSO networks and umbrella organizations. A few private institutions now provide similar training services.

CSOs frequently form partnerships with other sectors, especially local and regional government agencies. The CSA requires resident and foreign charities to sign project agreements with government counterparts depending on their area of work. Though not as common, CSOs have also partnered with the private sector on child labor, HIV/AIDS, and other issues. The private sector has also been a minor source of funding and support for local CSOs. While CSOs appear to understand the utility of forming partnerships with other sectors, the reverse does not appear to be true.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1**

National and local media coverage of CSOs and their activities is very limited. Apart from news coverage, CSOs must pay the media to promote their activities, which is very costly. Except for Muhaz magazine, currently in its second year of publication, there are almost no mass media outlets dedicated to civil society issues.

Most CSOs do not have media relations strategies or policies, and CSOs seldom promote their activities through mass media. CSOs are furthermore often reluctant to advertise their activities for fear of attracting adverse attention from government entities. Although some organizations and networks have tried to publicize their activities and promote their public images, these efforts are usually limited to the distribution of newsletters and brochures through mailing lists, websites, and relevant events.

The public perception of the sector differs depending on the type of organization. Beneficiary communities are more likely to have a positive view of organizations that serve them. However, some CSOs are perceived as offering extravagant salaries. While comprehensive studies and survey information are not available, it appears that the private sector suspects charities and societies of engaging in misconduct and self-enrichment.

Government perception of civil society varies. On the one hand, officials often openly accuse the whole sector of misconduct, belittle its role in development and democratization, and portray CSOs as paying lucrative salaries but providing little benefit to communities. On the other hand, regional and local level officials regularly express positive views of the role and contributions of organizations working in their localities and more frequently view charities and societies as community resources and sources of expertise.

Some leading CSOs publish annual activity and financial reports in print, electronic, and other media, as well as on their own websites. The civil society sector has undertaken initiatives to adopt codes of ethics. In July 1999, a Code of Conduct was produced, but several revisions followed. At the end of 2011, CCRDA, the Code Observance Committee, and the Civil Society Taskforce coordinated a revision process to align the Code with the CSP. Efforts also continue to establish an implementing body to enforce the Code.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4

The sustainability of CSOs in Gabon continued to deteriorate in 2012. The unfavorable legal environment continued and the gulf between organizations with pro- and anti-government tendencies widened. Civil society continued on its trajectory of becoming increasingly politicized as public debates in nearly every sector were viewed in political terms. Many CSOs associated themselves with the opposition or with the government, and even neutral CSOs were seen by the public to be tied to one side or the other.

CSOs were also constrained by their own organizational weaknesses. CSOs on both sides of the political divide understand the role they can play to improve governance in Gabon, but they lack the expertise and funding to do so. Many CSOs are essentially one-man shows with no paid staff, and they depend on a small group of donors for funding. Despite these obstacles, CSOs are able to conduct some activities with the meager resources they have, which helps build support for their work among the public.

In 2009, The Strengthening Non-State Actors in Gabon Program (PROGREANE) identified approximately 500 CSOs officially registered with the Ministry of the Interior and found at least 700 operational CSOs in its fieldwork. While official figures are not available, it is thought that this number has significantly increased since then.
The Law No. 35/62 governs not-for-profit organizations in Gabon. The provisions in the law do not specifically restrict CSOs from registering, but there are major problems with the law’s implementation. The Ministry of the Interior conducts background checks on applicants, and the ministry sometimes creates additional bureaucratic hurdles and delays for applicants it perceives to be close to the opposition or critical of the government.

The law also restricts CSOs’ sources of funding. While CSOs are allowed to collect membership dues and own an office, all external donations must be approved by the government. The law makes no provisions for CSOs to receive foreign funding and all donations above 10 million XAF ($19,000 USD) must be approved by the Council of Ministers. Likewise, the law limits membership fees to 10,000 XAF ($19 USD). The law has become outdated. Passed in 1962, it makes no reference to NGOs or CSOs. All not-for-profit organizations are treated as charities, which prevents CSOs from developing professional systems.

The law gives the government the authority to dissolve CSOs for a wide range of offenses including actions the government considers “contrary to public decency,” and actions it determines will “undermine the integrity of the national territory,” “endanger public safety,” or “discredit political institutions.” While the government did not dissolve any CSOs in 2012, the dissolution section of the law is frequently used to intimidate CSOs. The offenses of “disturbing public order” and “offending public decency” are particularly vague and can be used to justify extensive and arbitrary government intervention. The chilling effects of the law can be felt in the absence of debate on key issues such as the embezzlement of public funds, illicit wealth, and transparency in the extractive sector and mismanagement.

While the government normally limits its actions against CSOs to publically threatening to dissolve a CSO, it sometimes resorts to more coercive actions. During the first annual New York Forum-Africa held in Libreville in June, 2012, the government prevented the Forum of the Outraged of Gabonese (FIG) from organizing a counter forum. A number of CSO leaders were arrested and held in custody under the pretext that they were disturbing public order.

The government treats CSOs very differently depending on the sector they work in. CSOs working on HIV/AIDS, education, and basic capacity building are generally allowed to operate freely. But those that work on more contentious issues such as democracy and human rights face more difficulties and the risk of persecution by the government. CSOs working to expose and dismantle ritualized killing by secret witchcraft circles also faced government impediments. The government uses CSOs’ own internal statutes to prevent certain activities. For example, they may tell an organization that works in environmental protection that their mission does not include advocacy and lobbying.

Gabon’s tax code is silent on taxation of CSOs. Generally, only international organizations that have negotiated headquarters agreements with the government consistently receive official tax exemptions. Apart from foundations with a close connection to the government, Gabonese CSOs do not receive official tax exemptions. They generally register with the tax service as for-profit companies. However, they rarely pay taxes and when the government attempts to assess back taxes because CSOs cite a statute in the tax code that says that public services are exempt from taxation.

Gabon has lawyers who understand the laws governing CSOs even if they are not specialized in the sector. Few have the courage to engage on controversial issues, and few are interested in working on a pro bono basis. Only a few CSOs can afford legal services.
CSOs often fail to build local constituencies because of the lack of cohesion of civil society in Gabon. Recognizing their own internal weaknesses, some CSOs have attempted to better coordinate their activities by creating platforms and networks. However, these platforms and networks have been limited by weak leadership and divisions among the CSOs.

CSOs generally have by-laws that define their missions and areas of intervention. However, even CSOs that plan strategically when they are founded are restricted by the limited sources of available funding. Most CSOs in Gabon take an opportunistic approach, aligning their activities with international funding opportunities rather than on their own strategic plan.

Most CSOs have weak management systems. Aside from “suitcase CSOs,” which is represented by a single individual, many CSOs lack basic management systems. Many CSOs have no offices, staff, or internal management structures. Only a small number of CSOs have a board of directors and hold annual board meetings. Few CSOs effectively collect membership fees and conduct audits. CSOs that receive grants generally are not monitored by their members.

Very few CSOs can afford permanent salaried workers. For many CSOs, the founder is the only paid staff. Only a small number of CSOs have basic modern offices.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

Most CSOs cannot diversify their sources of funding and rely on a small group of donors such as USAID and the European Union. Only a few well-known organizations with charismatic leaders are able to mobilize volunteers and other in-kind support from the communities they serve. Though CSOs have increasingly devoted resources to promoting their activities, there is practically no philanthropy in Gabon. Businesses occasionally support CSOs as in the case of Olam, which funds CSOs to participate in socio-economic studies in the areas where it operates. Most CSOs are small and have few assets, so they are unable to raise additional income through rental income or investments. They do not conduct other income-generating activities and rarely collect dues from their members.

While there are local sources of funding available to pro-government organizations, CSOs that are critical of the government have little access to these funds. They even face indirect pressures from foreign donors when their actions embarrass the government. In order to manage relations with the Gabonese government, donors sometimes suggest more conciliatory approaches to organizations that sharply criticize the government.

Some local government bodies and central government agencies work with CSOs on basic services such as sanitation, prevention of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, and environmental education. However, this support is rare and limited to a narrow range of activities.

Given their limited and irregular funding, CSOs typically are unable to develop stable financial management systems. Only the few CSOs that receive donor funding are subjected to financial controls and audits.
ADVOCACY: 5.1

The government only collaborates with CSOs that support it, even if others have greater expertise in a particular policy area. There are no permanent forums for dialogue between CSOs and the government, but the government consults CSOs to develop certain programs and strategies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The World Bank and IMF require CSO participation for the PRSP, and indeed, collaboration with CSOs is often a condition imposed by international donors. Government consultations with CSOs often take the form of a validation meeting after the government has already designed a policy or strategy.

The government also consults the Social Economic Council (CES) to develop policies and prepare the budget. However, the organizations representing civil society in the CES are generally considered to be close to the government. When the membership in the CES was renewed for the period of 2012-2017, the process led numerous CSOs to file complaints with the Constitutional Court.

CSOs led several important advocacy campaigns in 2012. Following the elections in 2011, civil society held a meeting in Paris with leaders of the opposition and the Gabonese diaspora to seek a peaceful and democratic solution to Gabon’s governance problems. The meetings culminated in a proposition to hold a sovereign national sovereign conference, and CSOs launched a campaign to advance that goal. In July 2012, CSOs also launched another campaign branded “Gabon, My Land, My Right,” which sought to educate the public on the impacts of agro-industrial plantations and their property rights to the land. This has led communities to organize in defense of their rights.

A small number of CSOs have expertise in lobbying, but given the contentious political climate, most lobbying efforts either fail or become confrontational. One win for CSOs was a freeze on iron mining operations in Bélinga by a Chinese company. CSOs lobbied for the company to be subject to normal controls to mitigate the impact on the environment and local communities.

Though CSOs recognize the problems with the law and regulations governing CSOs, they are not actively seeking to improve the law at this time because of the tense political environment. Revisions to the legal code proposed by the European Union’s Strengthening Non-State Actors in Gabon Program (PROGREANE) stagnated with the close of the program. Because of the internal divisions among CSOs there has not been strong advocacy for these reforms.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1

CSOs provide a diverse range of services such as consulting, training, and advocacy in numerous sectors including health, education, environmental protection, and good governance. Though they adapt their interventions to the realities on the ground, CSOs’ choice of services is limited by the available sources of funding.

One important area of CSO intervention is civic education. There is a gap in the public’s understanding of their rights and responsibilities as citizens. CSOs use this work as a vehicle to build constituencies and support among the public, but work in this area also highlights the divisions within civil society.
CSOs generally do not charge fees for their services, and when they do charge fees, their rates are generally insufficient to cover their costs. Very few CSOs recognize that they can sell goods and services directly to consumers. Thus, they typically provide services free of charge to their beneficiary communities.

The government understands the impact that CSOs have had in civic education and look on it with suspicion. Because of CSOs’ work in this area, the public have become increasingly conscious of their rights and have tried to hold their elected representatives to account. In some cases, the government has responded defensively, casting doubt on the motivations of CSOs and accusing them of acting as a conduit for foreign manipulation.

Local government bodies are more open to working with CSOs. Some CSOs even receive grants for work in areas such as environmental protection and conservation, sports, leisure and culture.

**INFRASECUTURE: 5.2**

There are few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) in Gabon, but the foundation set up by the president’s wife, Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, continued to function in 2012. The few local foundations in Gabon do not provide grants to CSOs. They typically receive funding from the government and conduct the own activities. The donations they make are typically in-kind contributions to beneficiary communities rather than grants to CSOs.

CSOs have several platforms to share information on specific sectors such as health, environmental protection, education, and labor. But the platforms are not managed systematically and are subject to the divisions between organizations with pro and anti-government tendencies.

A growing number of CSOs are taking advantage of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs to disseminate information. In 2012, CSOs used social media for the advocacy campaign against ritual crimes, for the campaign for a sovereign national conference, and for the "Gabon, My Land, My Right" movement.

Because CSOs lack the resources to hire experts in their areas of intervention, it is important for CSOs to pool their resources. For example, most CSOs cannot afford lawyers or accountants, and they rely on affordable trainings on legal issues and financial management. However, the government often marginalizes the few organizations that have expert staff.

Trainings are available to CSOs in project management, but these courses are not consistently available due to limited funding. CSOs that are supported by foreign donors also receive specialized training in strategic planning, accounting, financial management, fundraising, and volunteer management. Training materials are generally not available in local languages, except for high-profile sectors such as HIV/AIDS prevention.

Though the media and private sector recognize the benefits of partnerships with CSOs, the government’s stance toward CSOs sometimes impedes such partnerships.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

Many CSOs have positive relationships with journalists working for privately owned media. One positive development in 2012 was the creation of a Club of Green Journalists, initiated by Brainforest and the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). A first in Gabon, this partnership between media and CSOs is designed to encourage coverage of the activities of the Gabon Environment Platform and the "Gabon, My Land, My Right" campaign.
While privately owned media in Gabon attempt to objectively analyze the activities of CSOs, the state-owned media tend to be biased against CSOs that are critical of the government. For example, the state-owned media did not cover the CSO campaign to denounce the agro-industrial activities of Olam, but they covered CSOs that supported Olam. These media also frequently accuse civil society organizations of working for the political opposition. They responded to CSOs’ campaign for a national conference by insisting that leaders of the campaign form a political party rather than claiming to speak for civil society. Because of the pressure from the government, many journalists and reporters in the private media also self-censor and avoid publishing critical views of the government.

The government and businesses have a positive perception of CSOs that support their policies and programs, but they are critical of CSOs that threaten their interests. For example, CSOs face fierce criticism for asking the government to publish their contracts with extractive industries. The government calls on CSOs for their expert advice in some cases.

Despite the negative press, CSOs’ grassroots activities have begun to change public perceptions. For example, through the “Gabon, My Land, My Right” campaign, some CSOs helped vulnerable populations take steps to avoid being dispossessed of their land. As political parties have lost credibility, CSOs have begun to fill an important role taking on good governance issues. Some have begun to see civil society as an alternative source of positive change, but public opinion remains highly divided. Though CSOs attempt to promote their image, they generally lack a sound public relations strategy and sufficient resources.

CSO platforms sometimes have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that guides the conduct of their members. Some CSOs have created an internal code of conduct; however, those that receive funding from the government generally do not. A small number of CSOs publish activity reports, including the organizations that receive funding from foreign donors.
THE GAMBIA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.5

The Gambia is a developing country with an agrarian economy and a budding service industry that rapidly is becoming the largest contributor to its GDP. The country faces major challenges, including poverty, high taxation, youth unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, and poor and erratic delivery of basic social services. In 2011 and 2012, the country faced a major food crisis due to inadequate rainfall, leading the government to declare a state of emergency. International CSOs, such as ActionAid International and Catholic Relief Services, led a major relief effort, while local CSOs also delivered relief supplies to communities.

The Gambia is politically stable. However, there are concerns about the government's apparent disregard for human rights, rule of law, and good governance. For instance, in 2012, the main opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary elections, claiming that the tenure of the Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission was unconstitutional and the Commission itself was blatantly biased towards the ruling party. Nonetheless, the elections went ahead and the ruling party won nearly all seats.

CSOs face challenges related to management, governance, and operations, and continue to engage in capacity building to enhance their service delivery and overall performance. Fundraising from local sources is limited by the small private sector base and the conservative tax system, which offers few incentives for philanthropy.
Government–CSO relations remain largely cordial, with each side appreciating the other’s role and contributions to national development. The government, at both central and local levels, regularly partners with CSOs in the formulation of policies and programs. CSOs also sit on the steering committees and task forces of several government departments and agencies, providing them with opportunities to contribute to and positively influence public policies. However, the government, especially the presidency, is hostile to CSOs that raise human rights and governance issues. The President and members of his cabinet frequently accuse CSOs of relaying information to foreign agencies about the state of affairs in the country to tarnish the image of the country. Therefore, CSOs often avoid making direct and open comments or conducting activities that are critical of government.

The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in The Gambia (TANGO), the largest CSO coalition in the country, has seventy-five members including local and international NGOs and CBOs. Other theme-based CSO coalitions include the Child Protection Alliance (CPA), Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG), Network against Gender-based Violence (NGBV), and Education for All Network (EFA).

Government, communities, and other partners have positive perceptions of CSOs and CSO relations with the media and the private sector are generally good.

The CSO community in The Gambia continues to expand rapidly in terms of size, quality of work, and scope and diversity of interventions. All CSOs must register as charities with the Attorney General's Chambers and the Ministry of Justice. However, the Ministry’s poor recordkeeping makes it impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the sector’s size. Estimates of registered organizations range from the hundreds to the thousands. A CSO can also register as an NGO with the NGO Affairs Agency. Currently, 125 organizations are registered as NGOs in the country.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

CSOs are required to register. First, a CSO must register with the Ministry of Justice to become a charitable organization in accordance with the Companies Act of 1955. Then to get NGO status, which provides no clear benefits, the organization must register with the NGO Affairs Agency. This second level of registration is more rigorous and can only be pursued two years after the initial registration. NGOs are required to re-register annually under NGO Decree 81 of 1996. The proposed NGO Bill, which was drafted in 2010 to bring the NGO law in line with the 1997 constitution, maintains this requirement. Parliament has not yet reviewed this bill.

The NGO Decree clearly spells out the scope of permissible activities for NGOs, as well as the requirements for internal management and financial reporting. The NGO Decree gives the state unrestrained control and power over NGOs. For example, Part VII of the Decree gives the Minister of Interior and the NGO Affairs Agency the power to refuse registration or re-registration or close down an NGO. Both the Decree and the Bill require NGO activities to be aligned with the policies and priorities of the government. Article 18 of the Bill gives the NGO Affairs Agency arbitrary powers to close any NGO whose activities are not “in conformity with the government’s development agenda or [are] detrimental to the integrity of the government and the peace and stability of the country.” In practice, however, CSOs, with the exception of those engaged in human rights or democracy work, can operate with a certain degree of ease.

There have been cases of government interference in CSO work. For example, during the food crisis, ActionAid International The Gambia was upbraided for not following the government’s approach to food
distribution. Furthermore, not all matters of public interest can be freely and publicly debated or criticized. Many CSOs practice self-censorship because they fear state reprisal or persecution for expressing dissenting opinions. For example, in 2012, the government suppressed criticism of the execution of nine death row inmates while views in favor were encouraged and promoted. Two journalists who sought police permits to have a peaceful protest against the execution were arrested and detained, and the government closed down two newspapers and a radio station, allegedly because they gave space to dissenting voices.

CSOs can sell goods and services to earn income for operational purposes, but cannot distribute profits. CSOs receive tax exemptions on income from grants and other income generation activities and enjoy waivers on duties on materials imported for their work and the personal effects of expatriate staff. Salaries of expatriate NGO staff are not taxed. Neither corporations nor individuals can deduct donations to CSOs from their tax bases. CSOs do not compete for government contracts, but a few NGOs in the education sector, such as Future In Our Hands (FIOH), are awarded government contracts to build schools through non-competitive means.

Local lawyers are familiar with CSO legal issues, although most have not been trained on NGO laws. Legal advice is more readily available to CSOs in urban areas than those in rural areas.

However, a climate of fear has made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to gain legal representation, as the rate of arbitrary arrests, detentions, and disappearances has increased.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9

CSOs, both old and young, identify targets and beneficiaries, but lack the financial resources to build or sustain them. Many CSOs have clearly defined visions and missions, which can be found in their constitutions and are followed strictly. Many CSOs develop strategic plans to satisfy donor demands, but do not implement them. Smaller and more informal community-based organizations (CBOs), however, lack both the financial resources and knowledge to develop strategic plans.

CSOs increasingly define and refine their internal management structures. The typical CSO has a board of directors and management team. Roles and responsibilities are usually defined in organizational constitutions, as well as board manuals or bylaws. Several CSOs have developed or are developing various management tools, including staff or service guidelines, performance appraisal forms, attendance registers, vehicle use policies, equal employment policies, and ICT policies. During 2012, several CSOs and coalitions, including TANGO, trained staff and board members on management and governance. Since these trainings, an increasing number of CSOs now hold annual general meetings, create staff contracts, and produce financial and annual reports.

There are huge differences in the staffing structures, working conditions, salaries, and incentives between established CSOs and smaller organizations. By and large, CSOs’ ability to recruit and retain highly qualified staff on a permanent basis depends on the availability of funds. As a result, many organizations increasingly rely on volunteers and interns; some are even developing internal policies on internships. Volunteers are usually university students or young graduates seeking an introduction to development work. Some training institutes require their students to participate in internships as part of their studies.

CSOs often lack the funds to organize annual general meetings at which they submit annual reports, audited accounts, and activity and financial reports. While many of the more established national and international NGOs are able to acquire modern office materials and equipment, smaller local organizations struggle to do so. Most smaller CSOs do not have computers or Internet access beyond the use of Internet cafes.
Most CSOs do not have multiple sources of funding or sufficient resources to remain viable for the short-term future. The majority of CSO funds come from international donors. The level of international funding did not change significantly in 2012. Select international NGOs such as Action Aid International The Gambia and Concern Universal provide funding to CSOs. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria is also active in The Gambia. Other entities, such as the World Bank, provide funds to the government through poverty reduction programs. As donors insist on CSO participation to ensure effective delivery and better use of funds, the government administers these funds to CSOs through calls for proposals. While these grantmaking agencies are usually under the purview of a government ministry, CSOs sometimes sit on their boards.

Local philanthropists rarely channel their funds to CSOs, although many CSOs attract volunteer and other non-monetary support from communities and constituencies. Rather than give to CSOs, the private sector usually makes major donations to government institutions, such as the office of the President or hospitals, schools, and the police, in order to curry favor with the government. In 2012, CSOs, including TANGO, made efforts to tap into the funding potential of the private sector, mainly telecommunications companies and banks. Consultative meetings have been planned with the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry to engage the private sector. Many membership-based CSOs raise funds from membership dues, but these are insufficient to fund their operations.

CSOs are legally prohibited from earning and distributing profits or bidding for government contracts. However, many CSOs sell products and services such as farm produce or handicrafts made by their members or rent their facilities and use the revenue to support their continued operations. In addition, some CSOs get non-competitive government funding to provide services. For example, Pro-PAG receives support from the Ministry of Finance to train lawmakers on budget reviews, analysis, and forecasting.

With the exception of large national and international NGOs, most CSOs have limited financial management capacities and tend to lack the internal financial control systems that would ensure transparency and accountability. Some CSOs are developing financial tools, such as financial manuals and procurement guidelines. Audit fees are generally quite high for most CSOs.

**ADVOCACY: 5.0**

CSOs have lines of communication with local and central government ministries, departments, and agencies. CSOs are represented in various government committees, task forces and meetings, such as the Gambia Emergency Agricultural Production Project, Gambia Refugee Commission Board within the Ministry of Interior, MDG Acceleration Framework expert group, and Aid Coordination Committee at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. However, in many cases the voices of CSOs are ignored.

CSOs in The Gambia have formed a number of issue-based coalitions, but they tend to advocate in passive and non-confrontational ways. Because of the hostile legal and political environment, CSOs do not generally engage in protests, naming and shaming tactics, or submission of demands to the government, instead using meetings, seminars and other interpersonal engagements with government to pursue their advocacy goals. This approach has been ineffective and lobbying and advocacy successes are few and far between. In addition, issue-based coalitions and broad-based advocacy campaigns tend to avoid open engagement in human rights work or demand for quality public services lest they be seen as anti-government.
Some advocacy campaigns are sustained over long periods of time. For example, a loose coalition of mainly women's rights organizations has been campaigning to popularize the Women's Act 2010 and advocating for greater respect, protection, and fulfillment of the rights of women. In 2012, this effort culminated in the drafting of a Sexual Offences Bill. Complementing these interventions are efforts to strengthen the voices of women and increase their participation and representation in decision-making processes and public institutions. For example, CSOs advocated for gender quotas, the nomination of women, and their election at various levels. CSOs also trained and sensitized selected women leaders on how to support and campaign for women candidates.

CSOs are aware of the benefits of legal reform. The Gambia Press Union actively seeks reforms on media and human rights laws. TANGO has been making efforts to raise interest in and support for far-reaching legal reforms in the social, economic, and political spheres through its bi-annual policy dialogue forums. However, no advocacy took place around NGO or CSO legal issues in 2012.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services in almost all sectors and parts of the country. Services in the health, education, agriculture, water, and sanitation sectors are widespread. CSOs also provide training in livelihood skills and agro-forestry, and strengthen the capacities of communities and professionals in both the private and public sectors. These interventions are largely geared towards alleviating extreme poverty in the country and enhancing self-help and self-employment initiatives. For example, following the government’s declaration of a food crisis in March 2012, NGOs contributed over $50,000 in materials, cash, and other equipment both to the government and communities in various parts of the country. Furthermore, NGOs established an emergency and relief account through TANGO in preparation for future disasters. The goods and services CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of constituents and communities and are in line with government's development objectives and the Millennium Development Goals.

Most CSOs offer goods and services to communities beyond their members, although some CSOs concentrate their services within particular villages and districts. Trade unions and professional bodies focus primarily on their members, while other membership associations, such as farmers’ associations, women’s groups, and youth groups, are open to anyone.

The vast majority of CSOs do not engage in cost recovery efforts simply because their mandates are to serve the general public and they receive funding for these activities. In addition, beneficiaries cannot generally afford to pay for the goods and services CSOs provide. Most CSOs do not have knowledge about market demand. However, some CSOs do sell publications, farm produce, and other items at minimal cost. For example, Concern Universal sells produce to the public through a farm project, the YMCA operates a hostel and conference facilities, and Worldview The Gambia runs a multimedia organization that provides video and documentary production.

National and local governments generally recognize the contributions and value of CSOs in the provision of goods and services. Although the government rarely gives grants or contracts to CSOs to provide these
services, it has engaged some CSOs to provide services. For example, EFANet and the Gambia Teachers Union receive support to conduct teacher monitoring and research on access to education.

**INFRASCTURE: 5.4**

Most CSOs have some access to relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance within the country. Since the European Union’s two-year Non-State Actors Strengthening Program (NSASP) closed in 2012, there have been no ISOs in the country. However, some larger NGOs continue to offer training, materials, equipment, and financial support to smaller CSOs.

CSOs train their members as well as members of the public and private sectors in various areas such as management, governance, and development issues. Training materials are generally in English, not local languages.

Local grantmaking organizations include the President Jammeh Foundation for Peace, the Deyda Hydara Trust Fund, and the Rotary Clubs of Banjul and Fajara. However, these institutions do not fund CSOs, instead providing direct support to beneficiaries in the form of educational sponsorship, water facilities, and payment of medical bills.

CSOs have formed several coalitions, such as the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP) Gambia, Child Protection Alliance (CPA), Gender Action Team (GAT), Network on Gender-Base Violence (NGBV), Education for All Network (EFANet), and Pro-PAG, around areas such as gender, children, education, and human rights. TANGO has created thematic working groups to improve information sharing, raise the profile of CSOs, and enhance the sector’s ability to influence public policy. It also recently institutionalized a bi-monthly policy dialogue to discuss and engage on national development issues.

Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are still rare. However, during 2012, a number of banks approached TANGO seeking partnerships that would provide funding to CSOs in exchange for more business. No deals have been made yet.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

CSOs enjoy favorable coverage from both the public and private media. During 2012, there appeared to be a marked improvement in media coverage of women's rights issues, especially female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), which was seldom discussed or written about in the media in previous years. However, the media rarely provides critical analysis of the work of CSOs or conducts investigative reporting on the governance and management of CSOs.

CSOs regularly engage journalists and the media to get positive coverage of their activities. With the proliferation of community radio stations, many CSOs buy airtime to talk about their interventions and activities. Despite its high cost, many CSOs also turn to the country's only television station, GRTS, for coverage of special events or occasions. However, CSOs do not seek to engage the media as partners in advocacy campaigns.

The general public has a positive perception about CSOs. Most people think CSOs complement government efforts to meet national development objectives. A study commissioned by TANGO in 2012 on the Impact
and Perception of NGOs in National Development indicates that respondents feel that, “NGOs are relevant and invaluable in the fight against poverty, food insecurity, gender inequalities, lack of quality and parity in education of the girl-child and visually impaired, youth unemployment and low income generation activities.”

The government has mixed perceptions about CSOs. Some CSOs have cordial working relationships with certain government departments and are regarded as partners in national development, while other CSOs are perceived as foreign-backed agents bent on destabilizing the country or undermining the culture and way of life of the people. The government is particularly likely to have a negative perception of CSOs addressing human rights and good governance issues.

Self-regulation remains a challenge for CSOs. While many organizations have codes of conduct and constitutions, these are not usually fully enforced. TANGO is only now developing a code of conduct and ethics for its members that sets standards for management, governance, and operations in order to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability and performance. CSOs generally produce annual reports although these are not widely published and shared due to limited funding.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

Ghana’s democratic political regime guarantees civil and political liberties, which has contributed to the growth of a vibrant CSO sector at both national and local levels.

In 2012, Ghana was rife with political and social tension in advance of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in December. Although the country has a record of relatively peaceful elections, there was widespread violence during voter registration from March to May 2012. The security services and other stakeholders led by religious and traditional leaders efficiently addressed these sporadic cases of violence, but sensational media reports led to public anxiety and uncertainty about the elections. The creation of forty-five new electoral constituencies by the Electoral Commission barely three months before the elections also heightened political tension, generating controversy and suspicion. In July, sitting President John Evans Atta-Mills passed away, partly quelling the political tension as the country dealt with its grief.

Despite these tensions, the elections were generally heralded by local and international observers as one of the most peaceful in the country’s history, in part because of targeted interventions by CSOs. Nevertheless, the opposition disputed the results of the presidential elections. The Supreme Court was still reviewing the election results at the end of the year.

The CSO sector is diverse but continues to depend mainly...
on foreign funding. Few CSOs have institutional funding, as most donor grants are project-specific. CSOs operate across the country and in almost all sectors. Most larger and well-funded CSOs operate in national and regional capitals, while smaller CSOs operate in rural and sometimes remote communities. The number of CSOs registered at the Department of Social Welfare increased from 5,232 to 5,714 in 2012. However, many inactive CSOs remain registered.

The overall sustainability of CSOs remains unchanged despite marginal improvements in financial viability and public image resulting from increased funding and CSO interventions in the 2012 elections.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

Ghana has not promulgated a specific law for CSOs, despite continuous advocacy for a not-for-profit organization (NPO) bill. CSOs register under the Companies Code of 1963 (Act 179) as NPOs limited by guarantee, with members acting as guarantors.

The liberal political environment in the country allows CSOs to register and operate easily. The state facilitates registration and does not interfere in CSO activities. CSOs in Ghana are not subject to systematic harassment and can actively participate in national debates and provide informed perspectives to enlighten public discourse and educate the public.

As not-for-profit entities, CSOs are barred from openly engaging in commercial activities without authorization by the relevant government agency. CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions, mainly on imported items, subject to the provision of relevant documentation. However, some CSOs are not aware of the procedures for accessing tax exemptions. CSOs do not receive tax deductions on grants or other funds received for their activities. Based on their expertise and competence, CSOs can compete for government contracts to provide consultancies and other general services.

Since there is no CSO-specific law, CSOs access legal assistance from a range of general legal practitioners and legal specialists on the Companies Code. However, not all CSOs can afford these services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

Both large and small CSOs in urban and rural areas have mission statements that define their range of activities. Mission statements are generally informed by beneficiaries, which support CSOs and engage in their activities in different ways.

Smaller and rural CSOs increasingly develop clearly defined strategic plans in order to meet donor requirements. Occasionally, however, these CSOs are influenced by donors’ funding priorities and venture into areas outside their strategic focus in order to attract long-term funding.

The internal management structures of larger and urban CSOs differ widely from those of smaller and rural CSOs. While larger, urban-based CSOs have well-functioning boards and governance structures that guide their operations, smaller, rural-based CSOs have weak boards that fulfill registration requirements, but play little or no role in organizational management.
CSOs generally have little ability to maintain permanent staff. Because funding is project-specific, most staff members are contracted only for the duration of certain projects. Therefore, when projects end, CSOs lose staff with valuable experience. CSOs have basic human resources practices such as payroll systems, leave policies, job descriptions, and performance evaluations. CSOs tend to engage accountants to meet strict financial reporting requirements, as well as information technology (IT) managers and technicians. In the run up to the 2012 elections, IT specialists helped some governance CSOs to add social media activities to their websites. For example, the IT group Blogging Ghana helped CSOs improve online dissemination of information on their activities. Although volunteerism is on the decline, CSOs engage the services of interns and volunteers to help with project implementation.

Most CSOs use IT equipment like computers, printers, and scanners. Urban-based CSOs are generally more endowed with IT equipment than their rural counterparts. However, with the expansion of Internet facilities across the country, rural CSOs that do not have their own equipment can still access IT through commercial services.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

The financial viability of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2012, largely due to increased funding for election-related activities. Despite the effects of the ongoing global financial crisis on donor funding, many foreign missions and development partners still provided support to Ghana to sustain its democracy. Despite the general improvement of the financial situation of CSOs during 2012, the focus on elections led to a short-term rather than long-term influx of resources. Beyond these election year inflows, development partners increasingly channel their support to projects in the oil and gas sectors.

Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana)—a multi-donor funded pool that combines resources from USAID, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the European Union, and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)—remains an important source of funding for CSOs in Ghana. Between April 2011 and May 2012, STAR-Ghana disbursed $8.8 million in support of CSO initiatives in health, education, oil and gas, and CSO sustainability, including $4.8 million to about forty-five CSOs to implement election-related activities over a period of one year.

Most funding for CSO activities continues to come from foreign donors, since there are few recognizable local sources of funding for CSOs. Telecommunications companies have set up foundations, but they focus mainly on service sectors such as education and health. CSOs are able to mobilize volunteers to support their activities. For instance, the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers and the Civic Forum Initiative together mobilized a total of over 5,000 volunteers, including individuals from religious groups and community-based organizations, to observe the elections.

CSO fundraising activities are generally limited to appealing to recognized donors or responding to calls for proposals. Larger CSOs are better than smaller groups at raising funds from major funders due to their greater organizational capacities. There are no major CSO initiatives to raise funds through membership outreach or philanthropy development programs.

Very few CSOs earn income from services or products, such as the sale of books or consultancy services to government and private bodies. The collection of dues by member-based organizations is usually low.
Most urban and some rural CSOs have good financial management practices, including annual audits. CSOs are required to provide financial reports to donors but usually only well-funded CSOs based in the major cities or regional capitals publish annual reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

The level of CSOs’ advocacy did not change significantly during the year. While CSOs played a key role in passing major legislation—such as the Presidential Transition Act—in 2012, other long-term advocacy initiatives—such as those focused on passing the Right to Information (RTI) bill and drafting an NPO bill—made little progress during the year. The Media Foundation for West Africa’s so-called “naming and shaming campaign”, which opposed politicians’ use of inflammatory language, received regular media coverage and prompted public discussion. Similarly, anti-corruption agencies, such as the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII, the national chapter of Transparency International) and the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) monitored and reported on abuse of political positions.

Various entry points allow CSOs to participate in government decision-making processes at the national and local levels. At the national level, policy makers in government ministries, departments, and agencies invite CSOs to participate in policy formulation and reviews. For instance, CSOs participated in producing the annual government budget and the Annual Progress Report on the implementation of the government’s medium-term development plan. In the run-up to the elections, the Electoral Commission invited CSOs to participate in major discussions on the elections, including demonstrations of equipment to verify voters on Election Day. In preparing national budgets, the Ministry of Finance solicited input from CSOs through public advertisements. Some CSO representatives serve on committees set up by government. At the local level, CSOs participate in public hearings on the preparation of district composite budgets prepared by the District Assemblies.

CSOs were very involved in election-related activities during the year. Interventions focused on addressing the threats of violence, mediating disputes between political parties, and educating the public on the electoral process. A particularly significant accomplishment was the historic and widely-publicized signing of the CSO-initiated Kumasi Declaration, wherein the 2012 presidential candidates and parties agreed to promote a peaceful election campaign period. CSO activities around the 2012 elections received extensive media coverage.

CSOs regularly form sector-based networks and coalitions to undertake advocacy initiatives. Notable groupings, such as the RTI Coalition and the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas, continued their advocacy campaigns during the year.

CSOs’ lobbying activities have not been very effective, both because of the highly partisan political environment in the country and CSOs’ lack of sophistication in this area. For instance, the RTI Coalition was unsuccessful in persuading parliament to pass the RTI bill. Despite the awareness of most CSOs of the importance of a favorable legal and regulatory framework, the National Consultative Group has not been successful in lobbying the Attorney General’s Department to produce an NPO Bill for consideration by the Cabinet.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8

CSOs in Ghana operate in almost all fields and provide a diverse range of services in areas such as water, health, education, and sanitation, as well as disaster relief, environmental protection, human rights, and governance. The range of CSO activities reflects community and national needs. For instance, since the discovery and extraction of oil in Ghana, the CSO Platform on Oil and Gas has been instrumental in ensuring some transparency in the use of oil resources. Most CSOs engage communities in the identification and implementation of their activities.

CSOs make their products, including reports and expertise, available to the public and media; play an important role in providing informed analysis on important political, social, and economic issues; and are widely consulted by the media and government. For example, in 2012, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) organized the Presidential Debate; Imani Ghana issued position statements on political parties’ policy options; the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) organized parliamentary debates; and the Ghana Network for Peacebuilding (GHANEP) and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) issued security alerts and engaged in peace mediation. Although some CSOs earn income from the sale of publications, cost recovery among CSOs is generally low.

The government provides limited contracts to CSOs, but does not provide institutional support for CSOs.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

CSO infrastructure remains weak, with few intermediary support organizations (ISOs), coordination platforms, or local grantmaking organizations in the country. The World Bank’s Public Information Center in Accra is the only recognizable center that provides valuable information and publications to CSOs on a range of social, economic, and political issues. The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) provides information and training for CSOs, and has also developed an electronic database of CSOs across the country.

STAR-Ghana serves as the main local grantmaking program in the country. In 2012, STAR-Ghana supported projects of both large and small CSOs related to elections, education, health, and oil and gas.

Due to competition for funding, CSO coalitions generally do not share information among their members, which sometime leads to duplication of efforts. Networks and coalitions, such as the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers (CODEO) and the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI), were actively engaged in implementing activities throughout the country to ensure that the elections were credible and peaceful. Despite this, many CSOs implemented similar election activities.

CSOs can access training from either public or private institutions in the capital city and some secondary cities. Offerings range from basic training on CSO management to more advanced interventions on strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, and proposal development. For instance, on an annual basis, WACSI offers training courses for CSOs on financial management, fundraising, and lobbying and advocacy, among other issues. These training programs are sometimes tailored to different actors.
CSOs generally have more productive partnerships with the media and government than with local businesses. For example, the media and state agencies, such as the judiciary, Security Services, and the National House of Chiefs, were instrumental in the historic signing of the Kumasi Declaration. This partnership was widely publicized in the context of the 2012 elections.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

The public image of CSOs improved marginally in 2012 due to their role in ensuring successful elections. The media—both print and electronic—recognized and provided extensive coverage of CSOs’ role in the elections. The media makes a clear distinction between public service announcements and corporate advertisements and does not charge for CSO coverage.

Although there were no polls on this topic, the public perception of CSOs seems to have improved in 2012. For instance, in April 2012 when a member of parliament reportedly used provocative language and hate speech targeting certain ethnicities, there was a widespread public call for civil society to rise up against politicians’ attempts to disturb the peace of the nation. Similarly, some political leaders called on CSOs to educate the public to avoid violence during the elections.

The government perception of CSOs is generally positive. The government relies on CSOs’ expertise in policy formulation and review. For example, the government regularly invites CSOs to participate in consultative group meetings. Although the business sector has a positive image of CSOs, it generally does not engage CSOs like the government does.

Generally, only urban and well-resourced CSOs invest in their public relations capacities. For instance, some CSOs have communications officers and newsletters to publicize their activities. During the elections, some CSOs extensively used websites and social media platforms to publicize events and disseminate information to the public.

Leading CSOs publish annual reports that typically include information on the roles of their boards, sources of funding, and use of funding. There is no sector-wide code of ethics, but some organizations have developed their own codes of ethics.
GUINEA

Capital: Conakry
Government Type: Republic
Population: 11,176,026
GDP per capita (PPP): $1,100
Human Development Index: 178

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.5

The political deadlock in Guinea continued for most of 2012. Over the past two years, the government and opposition have been unable to find common ground regarding the legislative and municipal elections that were slated to take place six months after the 2010 Presidential elections. Twenty-four months later, the legislative elections have still not taken place. The National Transitional Council (CNT), formed in February 2010, serves as the temporary legislative body. The CNT is comprised of a broad range of civil society actors and is mandated to manage the country’s transition to civilian rule until an elected legislature can be put in place. In September 2012, the CNT approved new legislation governing the composition of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). In addition, the CNT held consultative meetings throughout 2012 with socio-political stakeholders to build consensus on a date for the parliamentary elections.

The situation took a positive turn in late 2012. In early November, the President announced the appointment of Bakary Fofana, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the new Chairman of the CENI. Some in civil society saw this as a positive step given Fofana’s previous ties to Guinean civil society. On December 11, 2012, the CENI announced a May 2013 date for legislative elections.
December 21, 2012, the European Union (EU) announced its resumption of development cooperation with Guinea, which had been suspended since December 2008.

Despite the EU’s announcement, Guinean CSOs continue to face financial difficulties. In particular, CSOs have limited funds for institutional capacity development. Funds from donors such as the EU and French government were focused on electoral support services such as civic education and “get out the vote” campaigns in 2012.

CSO registration was recently transferred to the National Service for the Regulation and Promotion of Associative Movements (SERPROMA). As a result, limited data is available about the number of CSOs in the country or the total number of applications for CSO registration in 2012.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

CSOs are governed by the law L2005/013/AN of July 14, 2005. Until 2012, the National Service for Assistance to Cooperatives and Coordination of CSOs Activities (SACCO), an autonomous public institution, was charged with regulating CSOs and CSO registration. During 2012, however, a Presidential Decree was issued transferring authority for CSO registration and regulation to SERPROMA under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD). The rationale for the shift was due to the growing diversity of CSOs operating in the country at the national, local, and community levels. It is unclear, however, whether SERPROMA has the resources and capacity to effectively play this new role.

The procedure for registering CSOs did not change and continues to be straightforward. CSOs can register at the national level or with decentralized authorities within sub-prefectures, prefectures, or provinces. However, registration fees are not publicized, resulting in potential abuses. The operational requirements for CSOs are clearly defined in the law.

The 2007 Law on Finances grants CSOs and public interest organizations certain tax exemptions for goods and services provided to the population. Despite these exemptions, the tax system is still very burdensome on CSOs and there have been accusations of corruption among the officials in charge of facilitating the exemption.

A few law firms specialize in the laws and regulations governing CSOs. However, most CSOs do not have the financial resources available to retain the services of an attorney.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

When implementing a project, CSOs in Guinea often create a group that simultaneously builds support for the project in the community and serves as a project management committee.

Very few CSOs have the human or financial capacity for strategic planning. As a result, few CSOs have clear mission statements that guide the implementation of their activities. Due to limited resources and their dependence on donor-funded projects, CSOs typically are not able to hire and
retain permanent staff. CSOs therefore rely on volunteers, but few CSOs have volunteers that can provide managerial support.

Few CSOs have the tools necessary for the transparent management of their activities. Typically, CSOs have the required legal documents including statutes, internal regulations, and registration, but do not have procedures manuals.

There is often significant overlap between the boards of directors and the executive management of CSOs, even though this is not permitted by CSO regulations. Activity reports are generally submitted to the president, treasurer, and the vice-president of a CSO, while other members only receive cursory reports that may contain inaccurate information. General assembly meetings are held infrequently according to the whims of the president.

CSOs often lack access to modern technology due to limited funding. In addition, frequent power outages make it difficult to use technology properly.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

The EU’s resumption of development cooperation with the government of Guinea (GoG) lays the groundwork for future improvements to CSO financial viability. In addition, in June 2012, the EU funded an election preparation campaign that included a civil society component entitled “Citizen Mobilization Around Legislative Elections in Guinea.” The program focuses on developing a core of local election observers.

President Alpha Condé announced early in 2012 that the GoG, through the UN Peace-Building Fund (PBF), would create a microfinance program to support women and youth revenue-generating activities as part of a larger effort to increase economic opportunities for women and youth in the country. In preparation for the launch of the fund, a number of women and youth CSOs in Guinea began to position themselves to lead revenue-generating activities. However, limited funds had been disbursed by the end of 2012.

The public has limited ability to provide direct financial support to CSOs. As a result, local support for CSOs is virtually non-existent. CSOs receive limited and irregular support from their members, whose living conditions are unstable. Donors that support local CSOs require cost share of 8 to 10 percent in the form of in-kind donations.

Guinean CSOs remained heavily dependent on foreign donors for support of their activities in 2012. CSOs do not have the independence or resources to respond to emergency requests; therefore, projects are abruptly stopped when financing comes to an end. If development partners suspend their cooperation due to a lack of progress with the legislative elections, it would gravely impact CSOs’ work, or even force them to close down.

Certain professional CSOs implement projects for the government and private businesses. Notably, large consortium companies in mining areas fund local development projects that are implemented by CSOs. CSOs also receive funding for campaigns to promote peaceful cohabitation among ethnic groups and campaigns against HIV/AIDS.

Few CSOs undergo financial audits or publish annual financial reports as they lack good financial management practices and respect for the basic principles of good governance. In addition, CSOs are often forced to pay bribes to win grants and contracts.
CSOs in Guinea have networks that in theory should enable them to maintain open channels of communication with the state. Several mechanisms exist for dialogue and critique of public policy on questions related to development, including the CSO Forum for Sustainable Development and the National Council of Civil Society in Guinea (CNOSCG).

A number of CSO networks work with the state to implement their activities. For example, the Coordination of Feminist NGOs in Guinea (COFEG) works with the government to promote women’s rights and policies. The Guinean National Coalition advocates for the adoption of a family code.

In recent years, Guinean CSOs have been at the forefront of the fight for the return to constitutional order. CNOSCG continues to lead advocacy efforts to finalize the transition towards transparent legislative elections at both municipal and community levels.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

CSOs offer a diverse range of services in Guinea including income generating activities, infrastructure development, and microfinance. However, many CSOs are unprofessional, and the quality and efficiency of their services is often inadequate. Only a few CSOs are interested in analytical work. These CSOs often face difficulties distributing their products, not only among CSOs, but also at the government level.

All communities in Guinea have local development plans (LDPs) which help orient service delivery toward the needs of the community. Most CSOs favor a participatory approach within this framework, but CSOs occasionally undertake activities that do not respond to the needs of the population. These activities generally fail.

CSOs working in particular domains are able to recover the costs of their services. The government awards very few contracts to CSOs to provide or monitor public services. Foreign donors, however, sometimes require that the government contract with CSOs, particularly to monitor the implementation of infrastructure and construction projects.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

SACCO was intended to function as an intermediary support organization (ISO) and resource center for CSOs with local branches throughout the country. However, since donors cut off funding to Guinea, it has been severely underfunded and unable to fulfill its role. SERPROMA replaced SACCO as the primary ISO in Guinea in 2012. However, it has played a limited role as an ISO and resource center so far due to its own financial and technical limitations.
The United Nations has created local information centers to support youth groups. The centers provide trainings and workshops in project design, management, social awareness, project monitoring and evaluation, and project planning. However, they are only available in the capital.

Some organizations and private businesses provide training and technical support to emerging CSOs. However, the trainings are not organized systematically, and there is no organization that certifies the quality of the training. There is also no institution at the national level specialized in providing training in financial management, accounting, grant proposal writing, volunteer management, or establishing boards of directors. Some organizations and consultants offer trainings in these areas, but they are offered in French rather than local languages. In addition, most CSOs struggle to access information about current training opportunities and online resources because of the intermittent electricity and poor connection to the Internet.

CSOs that are affiliated with a network share information among themselves. However, there is no single organization or committee through which all CSOs can advocate jointly for their interests. CNOSCG brings Guinean CSOs together to a certain extent. However, given the current political situation, the organization is mainly focused on advocacy and lobbying for a successful political transition.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

The public image of CSOs in Guinea did not change in 2012.

CSOs received wide media coverage in 2012, particularly with the emergence of private media outlets including radio, TV, newspapers, and online media. CSOs generally receive good media coverage locally and nationally, and the media offers them preferential rates. Because local communities participate actively in the implementation of CSO projects, the media often presents CSOs in a positive light. With the diversification of media outlets, media coverage of CSOs is widely distributed.

The government and private sector have generally positive perceptions of the roles and activities of CSOs. They call on CSOs for social mobilization, awareness-raising campaigns, conflict prevention, environmental preservation, and many other worthy causes.

There is no CSO code of ethics. Some CSOs publish activity reports and financial reports, but generally only to satisfy donors’ contractual requirements.
**KENYA**

- **Capital:** Nairobi
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 44,037,656 (July 2013 est.)
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,800
- **Human Development Index:** 143

### CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 3.9

2012 was a memorable year for Kenyan CSOs. After three years of negotiations and consultations between CSOs, the government, and other stakeholders, parliament passed the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act in 2012, which was signed into law in early 2013. The PBO Act seeks to provide an enabling environment for the regulation, establishment, and operation of PBOs. CSOs expect it to improve the environment and operations of CSOs in Kenya markedly in the coming years.

The past year also witnessed extensive legislative activity. CSOs in various sectors, such as land and gender, actively participated in national policy and legislative making processes aimed at implementing the 2010 constitution. Government recognition of CSOs and their contributions increased, leading to improved collaboration between the two sectors. The operating environment remained largely conducive for CSOs, courtesy of the constitution and widespread efforts to implement its provisions.

In general, the relationship between CSOs and donors improved during the year. However, in order to implement constitutional provisions, donors channeled more funding to commissions established under the constitution, such as the Kenya National Human Rights Commission and the Commission of Administrative Justice, at the expense of CSOs that previously championed reforms in those areas.

Kenya has a variety of CSOs. Approximately 6,500 active...
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are registered with the NGO Coordination Board. In addition, there are over 300,000 community-based organizations (CBOs), which are informal and operate with or without certificates of recognition. Other types of CSOs register and operate under weak regulatory regimes. Societies, which include faith-based organizations (FBOs), are the most plentiful, with over 30,000 according to the Registrar General’s office. In addition, some CSOs register as non-profit companies limited by guarantee and trusts. Though NGOs are a small part of the larger CSO sector, they are the most visible, operating in various sectors, including health, HIV/AIDS, children, education, agriculture, water, and governance.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.0**

The legal environment improved considerably in 2012, with the passage of the PBO Act. This new law is the result of over four years of consistent efforts by CSOs to realize a more enabling legal environment and will significantly buttress the provisions of the constitution. The PBO Act calls for a PBO Regulatory Authority to register and regulate PBOs. It will have a governing board appointed by merit through transparent procedures. The Act provides clear procedures for registering PBOs with an explicit timeline for processing registration applications. Further, it gives clear grounds for canceling or denying registration. The Act was passed by parliament in 2012 and signed by the President in January 2013.

In 2012, the registration process for NGOs became simpler with decentralization. NGOs can now have their applications processed at the district level. As a result, more NGOs (959) registered in 2012 than in 2011 (786).

CSOs are generally able to operate without state interference. However, there were a few incidences of state harassment in 2012. In July, an environmental rights defender faced criminal charges as a result of a protest she organized in April against EPZ Metal Refinery Ltd, a lead-processing plant. She was charged with “threatening breach of the peace or violence” and “incitement to violence and disobedience of the law” under the Penal Code. The police also arrested seventeen others and charged them with organizing an illegal protest.

According to the Income Tax Act, CSOs that are registered as charities can receive tax exemptions. However, CSOs claim that these exemptions are almost impossible to access. In 2010, the Revenue Authority decreed that CSOs must renew their tax exemption statuses every three years, but has been reluctant to issue exemption certificates unless CSOs have special connections to the Minister of Finance because it is under pressure to meet tax collection targets. As a result, NGO tax exemption claims have dropped precipitously since 2010. According to the NGO Coordination Board, NGOs claimed tax exemptions of just KES 22,354,133 (about $260,000) in 2011-2012 compared to KES 2.3 billion (about $27.8 million) in 2010-2011 and KES 8.4 billion ($101.6 million) in 2009-2010. Under the new law, the PBO Regulatory Authority will grant PBO status, which automatically confers tax exemption.

The Income Tax Act also allows individual and corporate donors to receive tax deductions for donations to CSOs that have income tax exemption certificates. However, since most CSOs face challenges renewing or obtaining tax exempt status, few donors submit claims for deductions.

Though the law allows CSOs to generate income, most CSOs still do not know about or have not used the relevant provisions to their advantage.
Most law firms are based in major cities and do not practice civil society law. There are still few experts in CSO law, and they are too expensive for most CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

Through coalitions, CSOs mobilize their constituencies around a wide range of issues, including peace, land, and judicial reforms. In comparison to 2011, more CSOs sought input from their constituencies in 2012. FBOs retained their strong connections with constituencies.

In 2012, many CSOs realigned their strategic plans to ensure that they remained relevant in the changing context. For example, many CSOs realized that they need to focus more on strengthening the capacities of citizens at the county level to empower them to demand accountability and effective delivery of services from their county governors. While many CSOs formulate strategic plans, few implement them faithfully.

The relationship between governance bodies and management is still blurred in most CSOs, with boards often interfering in day-to-day management issues. While most NGOs have fairly well-developed management structures on paper, only a few large NGOs apply them in practice. The majority of other types of CSOs have poorly developed management structures.

In 2012, many NGOs defined jobs and organizational functions, like monitoring and evaluation, separately from projects. Though more CSOs resorted to contracting specialists or technical advisers for projects, many CSOs remained understaffed and relied heavily on volunteers and part-time staff because of their modest financial resources. In 2012, almost all CBOs relied entirely on volunteer support.

CSOs still acquire technology according to the availability of donor funds and not organizational priorities. Nonetheless, in 2012 more funders allowed the purchase of basic office equipment. The offices of most NGOs, unlike CBOs, remain fairly well-equipped with basic equipment and IT support. However, only 28 percent of registered NGOs that submitted reports to the NGO Coordination Board in 2012 reported that they own computers, down from 62 percent in 2011. More CSOs were able to access the Internet in 2012, as the prices of smart phones and Internet services continued to decrease. Many NGOs endeavored to be technologically savvy, using social media like Twitter and Facebook to communicate and mobile technology like M-Pesa, a mobile-phone based money transfer and microfinance service, to raise funds.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

CSO financial viability improved slightly in 2012.

FBOs invested heavily in mobilizing local support and volunteers, and almost 100 percent of CBOs relied entirely on volunteer support. In contrast, NGOs generally attract little local financial support as the public still views them as being well-endowed. Many NGOs still find it difficult to communicate their missions in a way that resonates with the public. There were a few instances, however, where communities contributed to NGOs. For example, in Chavakali and Wajir, some NGOs were set up and fully supported by financial, volunteer, and in-kind contributions from the communities. Similarly, in Narok, Mwingi, Siaya, and Malindi, NGOs mobilized
resources for different causes through the “1 Shilling for 1 March” campaign. The public was highly receptive to the concept that even one shilling can make a difference and twenty-six NGO partners of the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) are utilizing this concept to promote their goals. Though there were additional philanthropic initiatives in 2012, none could replicate the success of the Kenyans for Kenya campaign in 2011, given the extensive effort that it required to mobilize Kenyans from all sectors in a very short time.

Many NGOs still rely heavily on grants and donations from one or two foreign funders. Few have regular or predictable streams of income. Nonetheless, there was a 14 percent increase in donor funding in 2012.

According to the NGO Coordination Board, government funding to NGOs increased by 54 percent between 2011 and 2012. Part of the increase in funding was due to the need for civic education prior to the elections.

More CSOs diversified their sources of income in 2012. Large FBOs have started investing in real estate, conducting training courses, and renting out meeting space. CBOs engage in a range of income-generating activities. Large CSOs and international CSOs, such as Kenya Red Cross Society and African Medical and Research Foundation, have set up creative income generation mechanisms, like five-star hotels, training centers, and twenty-four hour ambulance services. CSOs also obtained support from the private sector through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives and from corporate foundations. Some corporate foundations establish CBOs to carry out social development initiatives. Several NGOs have sub-granted to CBOs. The few CSOs that collect membership dues cannot rely solely on this revenue source.

CSOs continue to emphasize the importance of meeting the financial accounting requirements imposed by donors and the NGO Coordination Board in order to maintain access to funding. Most NGOs have developed or adopted finance manuals at the insistence of their donors. In 2012, more NGOs worked to establish sound financial systems, although others resisted change. However, only a few larger NGOs share their financial reports with the wider public or other stakeholders. Unfortunately, in some cases, especially in rural areas, CBOs allowed poor financial practices to take hold.

ADVOCACY: 3.4

More CSOs were involved in legal and policy making processes in 2012, thereby enhancing the quality of a significant number of laws. During the year, communication and collaboration between the government and CSOs improved significantly, especially in formulating laws and policies to implement the constitution. For example, the national government invited CSOs to contribute to various decision-making mechanisms, like the Medium Term Plan Sector Working Groups (SWGs), which include representatives from government, CSOs, and other stakeholders and work closely with relevant ministries to develop policies in many fields, including agriculture and rural development, tourism, trade and industry, public safety, law and order, and information communication and technology. In one instance, the government requested CSOs in the SWG for Environment, Water, and Sanitation to devise systems to monitor water service delivery. CSOs were also active in developing the National Medium Term Plan 2013-2017, by participating in SWGs at the national level and in county forums all across the country.

More CSOs engaged in lobbying in 2012, after developing their capacities to organize and lobby for the passage of laws in 2011. CSOs took advantage of numerous opportunities for public participation in formulating policy and law. For example, CSOs submitted memoranda to the Parliamentary Committee on Lands and Natural Resources and the Parliamentary Budget Committees during public hearings across the
country. As a result, parliament passed three land laws that incorporated many of the CSOs’ proposals. Many CSOs also mobilized their constituents to analyze and discuss proposed legislation and policies, including the County Governments Bill (2012), the Public Finance Management Transition Bill (2012), and the Leadership and Integrity Bill (2012).

CSOs often establish loose coalitions to advocate for various causes. In general, coalitions were more active in 2012. Active advocacy coalitions include the CSO Reference Group, which lobbied and advocated for the passage of the PBO Act; the Decentralized Governance Non-State Actors; the Freedom of Information Network; the National Peace Policy Advocacy Network; Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, which works on human rights, governance, and rule of law; and the CSO Leaders Forum.

CSOs also come together on particular issues, including the nation’s epidemic of violence, recruitment for new agencies established under the constitution, and self-enrichment by members of parliament. Others engaged in public interest litigation. For example, Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) asked the High Court to declare controversial amendments to the Political Parties Act (2011), the Elections Act (2011), and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act (2011) unconstitutional. Seven CSOs also sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on implementing the two-thirds gender representation principle under the constitution. The rule, which is meant to increase women’s participation in politics, states that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender. The final verdict by the Supreme Court ruled that the gender rule should be implemented progressively as it could not be enforced immediately.

There were instances, however, when the government hampered efforts to generate laws to implement the constitution. For example, the draft of the Leadership and Integrity Bill that the Cabinet presented to parliament was vastly different from the version that CSOs reviewed. For example, the Cabinet’s revisions sought to insulate state officers from the stringent accountability requirements imposed by constitutional provisions regarding integrity. Parliament ultimately passed the revised bill.

CSOs have expressed concern that there is no specific law to guide public participation, even though the constitution provides the right to participate in formulating laws and policies. Whether the public is invited to participate thus relies heavily on the will of government officials. Following consultation with local and international actors, the Constitution Implementation Commission (CIC) therefore started developing a policy framework for public participation in 2012.

Lobbying tends to be dominated by the few CSOs that have the necessary skills and clout with the new government. While many CSOs show marked improvement in analyzing laws, lobbying, networking, and engaging with media, they sometimes find it difficult to bring widespread political pressure to bear on the legislative process. Some CSOs also find it difficult to balance the efforts needed to provide technical input and those needed to mobilize enough support from their constituencies to obtain sufficient legitimacy for their advocacy. Due to limited resources, many CSOs had less capacity to mobilize widespread support and remain involved in the legislative process long-term.

The PBO Act was a significant milestone for CSOs, which worked tirelessly throughout 2012 to advance the law through parliament. The sector as a whole, however, is less aware of the need for enabling laws for civil society.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSO service provision improved nominally in 2012, but not enough to result in a score change. Most NGOs involved in service provision focus on facilitating service delivery to arid and urban poor areas, as well as developing new ways to improve living conditions in poor and marginalized communities. They also work with the private sector. For example, NGOs involved in agriculture and renewable energy connect rural farmers to the private sector to promote the farmers’ use of helpful technologies. The largest proportion of registered NGOs works in health, disaster relief, and HIV/AIDS.

While CSOs provided fewer health and education services in 2012, many NGOs provided direct support to CSOs and communities in diverse fields such as water, energy, natural resource management, agriculture, and education. For example, NGOs involved in agriculture provided information and resources to farmers. Some implemented schemes that helped communities access resources to start businesses. NGOs involved in energy implemented biofuel programs in rural areas and promoted the development and use of solar technologies. In the water field, CSOs helped form community water groups and equipped communities with skills to participate in policy formulation processes and engage with water service providers, leading to marked improvements in water service delivery. CSOs significantly reduced their investment in sexual and reproductive health and disability services during the year.

The bulk of international donor support for development was channeled to the government through the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy 2007-2012. The strategy focuses on improving the delivery of basic services to the poor, especially health, education, water and sanitation, and social protection; raising the productivity of agriculture; and promoting environmental conservation and management of natural resources. Through various ministries and departments, the government provided financial support to CSOs via grants and contracting of services. For example, the National Livestock Extension Program (NALEP) provided funds and extension services to CSOs. While government funding to service-providing CSOs increased this year, financial support to these CSOs continued to be short-term.

The government’s appreciation of CSOs improved in 2012 and led to more collaborative efforts. For example, the Ministry of Justice National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs partnered with seventy-three NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs under the Kenya National Integrated Civic Education program to provide civic education in advance of the elections. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission also collaborated with CSOs, accrediting thirty-three CSOs and other organizations to carry out voter education nationally. Government funding to registered NGOs increased by 54 percent in 2012.

CSOs provide services to various clientele and constituencies. In the agriculture sector for instance, beneficiaries include agriculture sector groups and enterprises, and organizations that support farmer groups. CSOs involved in water serve water user groups, regulators, and private service providers. CSOs in the renewable energy sector reach out to producer organizations and professional associations like the Association of Masons. While NGOs generally continue to determine their activities based on financial resources, many adopt participatory approaches to design their programs with the active involvement of target communities.

Apart from the agriculture and energy fields, most CSOs still remain reluctant to venture into cost recovery, preferring to provide free or heavily subsidized goods and services. Communities have come to expect that basic services should be provided for free, making it difficult for CSOs to charge for such services. Some
CSOs engaged in dialogue with donors and the government about the resources they need to deliver services and cover costs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6**

CSO infrastructure improved somewhat in 2012. CSOs increased their efforts to provide free information to the public by establishing resource centers in their offices and online. For example, in September 2012, the Kenya Civil Society Portal for Health was launched, providing comprehensive online information on health and social service CSOs in Kenya. Several regional and national non-profit organizations provided training, technical assistance, and related capacity building services to CSOs. Some include the African Medical and Research Foundation, Center for African Family Studies, International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, Poverty Eradication Network, Act Change Transform!, Participatory Methodologies Forum of Kenya, Red Cross, Regional AIDS Training Network, and MildMay.

Some of the larger international NGOs, like CARE, ActionAid International Kenya, and Plan International, also have their own training and technical assistance units in Kenya. International CSOs and development partners, such as Pact, FHI360, and DAI, also send international and local consultants to provide technical assistance and training to grantees. Academic institutions, such as Institute of Development Studies at University of Nairobi and Kenya Institute of Management, have specialist groups of consultants and trainers. In addition, new institutions were established in 2012. For example, several CSOs set up Ustadi, a local and affordable capacity development facility.

Many CSO networks promote information sharing. For example, the Kenya Association of Fundraising Professionals and the East Africa Association of Grantmakers (EAAG) held their annual conferences and several forums during the year to promote resource mobilization.

Local grantmaking organizations, including family foundations and corporate foundations, work closely with local CSOs to implement various development projects. For example, KCDF partnered with Nkoilale Community Development Organization to construct a school for children from a pastoralist community, matching funds raised by the community. According to a 2011 survey conducted by the EAAG, revenue from local foundations and trusts makes up approximately 17 percent of the revenue received by NGOs and CBOs.

Intersectoral partnerships grew in 2012. Many partnerships proliferated between CSOs, the government, and the private sector to launch peace campaigns, such as the My Kenya campaign, Uwiano Peace Platform Project, and Kenya One. Several corporate foundations also continued to implement CSR initiatives by partnering with development organizations. Safaricom Foundation gave the Kenya Red Cross Society 10 million KES (about $120,000) to rebuild houses and livelihoods of people affected by conflict in the Tana Delta. Banks also partnered with CSOs in a variety of long-term programs, such as the MasterCard Foundation and Equity Group Foundation’s Wings to Fly Scholarship Program. In 2012, Chase Bank Foundation partnered with ZanaAfrica Group to establish the Nia Network, a mobile application to coordinate national sanitary pad distribution.
**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

The sector’s public image improved somewhat in 2012. As a result of the heightened political activity during the pre-election year, CSOs had to compete with political parties for media and public attention. CSO stories received insignificant attention from the mainstream media, and many press conferences by CSOs received no air time at all. CSOs also frequently have to pay for media coverage. They therefore increased their focus on and presence in social media, community radio, and local magazines. For example, many Kenyans learned about the Center for Human Rights and Civic Education’s efforts to raise local awareness about government plans for a coal mining project through social media. Some CSOs contracted media or image experts to help them use social media technology effectively. Although still not a widespread practice, CSOs also used social media to mobilize support for their causes. For example, the Leadership and Integrity Bill was a trending topic on Twitter in 2012, which led to attention from mainstream media.

The public, government, and business perception of CSOs is mixed. In light of increasing collaboration, the government’s perception and appreciation of CSOs improved markedly. However, the business perception of CSOs remained more or less the same. Some private sector entities still view CSOs as strategic partners and seek opportunities to work with them, while others do not value them. The widespread efforts of numerous CSOs in civic education, peace building, and humanitarian efforts, all of which served the public interest, boosted the sector’s public image.

Self-regulation in the sector continues to evolve. Viwango, an independent standards setting and certification organization for CSOs in Kenya, was established two years ago and is still developing certification mechanisms for CSOs. The new PBO Act brings hope that the sector will be able to regulate itself more effectively by establishing self-regulation forums. In addition, the Act provides good governance and accountability requirements for PBOs. More CSOs were willing to share information about their work through annual reports and other information, education, and communication materials, raising the level of accountability for CSOs.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

Liberia’s reemergence as a nation state was progressing steadily after a decade and a half of bitter civil strife and three decades of poor governance. Following democratic elections in 2011, several relatively young leaders were appointed to senior positions in key ministries such as Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Labor. For the first time, the national budget included a $15 million line item exclusively for youth development programs, and CSOs were invited to bid for programs to work with youth groups.

The government has made immense efforts to strengthen all facets of Liberia’s democracy, particularly with respect to the rule of law. In 2012, a broad consultative process that included CSO representation led to the adoption of a national strategy for development, Vision 2030. Vision 2030, which prioritizes investment in human capital, aims to develop a roadmap for national reconciliation by providing equal opportunities and a better future for all citizens. The government is mandated to involve CSOs in implementing Vision 2030, showing recognition of CSOs’ role in development.

In 2012, two developments related to the national economy significantly benefited CSOs. First, the Central Bank of Liberia established a $5 million credit facility for small and medium business enterprises. The loan facility empowered small businesses in the counties to procure goods in larger volumes to sell locally. With improved access to goods, organizations and businesses operating in rural communities did not need to travel to Monrovia, the commercial capital,
to purchase goods. Second, the government waived taxes on the importation of agriculture equipment in 2012, which allowed small farmers to access farming tools at considerably lower costs. This boosted farming activity, while also benefiting CSOs working in the agricultural sector.

Through the Ministry of Finance, the government introduced the Open Budget Initiative (OBI) to foster transparency in the national budgeting process. As part of the OBI, public hearings for budget formulation and mid-term review were organized to invite input from the general populace. The government, in collaboration with the Liberia Media Center, also launched a nationwide outreach initiative to introduce OBI to communities to ensure citizen participation in the process. CSOs were encouraged to form coalitions to explain aspects of the budget to community groups. Workshops for university students and community leaders were also organized as part of this initiative.

Although the CSO sector continued to develop, considerable needs remained in terms of building the capacity of CSOs, especially at the community level. Most organizations depend heavily on foreign support. Nevertheless, CSOs continue to deliver diverse services and make efforts to involve communities in their activities. CSO relations with government also showed signs of improvement. The number of registered CSOs increased from 1,238 in 2011 to 1,347 in 2012, although some international CSOs terminated their activities.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

Some aspects of the legal environment governing CSOs continued to be problematic in 2012. Most notably, the NGO Policy, issued in July 2010, has not been fully implemented. The NGO Policy was intended to serve as a unified mechanism for registering and accrediting all CSOs operating in Liberia, and as a framework for monitoring and evaluating CSOs. The policy was also intended to ensure that CSO activities were consistent with and supported the government’s development policy and programs. However, most organizations have not met the reporting requirement, and the government is not monitoring CSOs as envisioned.

CSOs are required to register in order to operate in Liberia. Registration can take a month or more to complete, depending partly on the founders’ capacities to meet the requirements in a timely manner. CSOs must also seek accreditation on an annual basis in order to carry out certain functions.

CSO registration and accreditation are centralized in the NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Planning. Each CSO must travel to the capital, to register, which is costly and burdensome for CSOs based outside of Monrovia. The longstanding plan to introduce online registration has still not been implemented. During the year, a proposal was advanced to merge the Ministry of Planning into the Ministry of Finance. Although the merger was not implemented by the end of 2012, some activities at the Ministry of Planning, including the NGO Coordination Unit, remained in a state of confusion. This confusion did not affect registration, however.

CSOs recognize the usefulness of the Liberia Business Registry, also called the National Registry, as a one-stop facility that expedites the incorporation and registration of organizations. The registry ensures that all entities in Liberia are formed legally. CSOs must submit documents issued by the National Registry when they seek accreditation at the NGO Coordination Unit. The Registry consolidates processes at a single location and removes redundancies in the registration process. For instance, registration at the Registry eliminates the need for CSOs to go to the Ministries of Finance and of Foreign Affairs.
In 2012, the NGO Policy became increasingly ineffective in regulating and monitoring the sector. For example, although registration and accreditation are mandatory, many organizations operated without meeting these requirements. Further, other ministries were beginning to accredit organizations, contrary to the policy’s aim to centralize registration and accreditation.

CSOs were generally allowed to operate freely in 2012, although many practiced self-censorship mainly as a result of competition with other organizations for donor funds. For example, when CSOs were bidding for projects, they avoided or delayed submitting reports to the government, suspecting that the reports might disclose privileged information that could be helpful to competing organizations. In contrast to 2011, CSOs did not report any state harassment in 2012. Though the relationship between CSOs and the government has improved, some organizations were denied access to public information in 2012. For example, an advocacy group had difficulty obtaining financial information from authorities.

Local legal capacity continued to be limited, especially in the remote counties, despite the national bar association's efforts to create local branches throughout the country. Although all counties now have bar associations, no specialized CSO legal services exist at the national or county levels. Most law firms offer general legal services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

Most CSO activities are donor driven and thus are not necessarily based on community needs. CSOs’ approach to project implementation does not allow adequate time to consult with local beneficiaries. However, CSOs made some progress during 2012 in mobilizing communities to participate in their projects. In one community, Lofa, an international CSO working with farmers to improve technology successfully garnered material contributions from the community to construct bridges between the community’s access road and a main highway.

Many organizations lack strategic plans and organized management structures. Positions are not clearly defined, and there are still instances where differences in pay rates appear difficult to justify. Mission statements are often only implied in articles of incorporation, and plans to implement missions are weak or non-existent. Most organizations only engage in strategic planning when required by an international partner. The Ministry of Planning has a monitoring and evaluation team that is supposed to follow up with registered CSOs on their operations, but this is not done effectively.

At the community level, many CSOs implement projects with minimal institutional support, making it difficult to maintain staff. Most CSOs can only afford to employ staff during donor-funded activities, which usually last six to twelve months. Many CSOs rely on short-term volunteers.

Because of the limited organizational capacity in the country, external assistance is often directed at building the capacity of some CSO administrative staff, rather than at funding technical equipment. However, a few CSOs that partner with international organizations have modern offices and adequate equipment. Many CSOs have computers, though their maintenance is often a problem. Internet access is limited. Most CSOs, especially in rural areas, still use Internet cafes.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

Most CSOs continue to depend on foreign support, and the loss of support from a donor often threatens an organization’s existence. For example, an implementing partner to the government in the health sector had to eliminate staff and field offices in 2012 after failing to obtain a contract. In general, however, the level of foreign support did not change to the extent that it affected CSOs’ operations.

Most organizations lack the ability to raise resources locally, and fundraising efforts are minimal. The philanthropic culture is still lacking. However, due to the visibility of CSOs in development issues, rural populations are getting involved in community activities, often on a volunteer basis.

Many international and local CSOs have government contracts to manage county-level Health and Social Welfare Teams. One international CSO, for example, had a contract with the Ministry of Health to operate county health services in Bong, and in June 2012 it was awarded a contract to manage the health systems in Nimba County. Another international CSO operated facilities in the southwestern counties of Cape Mount and Bomi. A third international CSO managed the health services in several southeastern counties. Similarly, local CSOs have secured government contracts to deliver services. A local organization specializing in farm technology and support systems was subcontracted by Oxfam on behalf of the European Union to implement an integrated agriculture project in the southeast of Liberia.

The generation of income from the sale of goods or services is not very common among CSOs. For CSOs engaged in income-generating activity, the income earned constitutes an insignificant portion of their gross revenue.

Most organizations continue to lack sound financial management systems. However, a few CSOs have developed sound financial management systems in order to partner with international CSOs. In most of these cases, international CSOs provide financial management training to enhance cooperation. Most CSOs did not conduct external audits. Only direct subsidiaries of international organizations audit their accounts and publish the results in the media. In such instances, however, the audits are consolidated accounts of the organization’s global activities and do not show separate statements of account for work conducted in Liberia. The 2012 audits for several international CSOs were consolidated in this way.

ADVOCACY: 4.0

CSOs have developed coalitions and are building relationships with the government. In 2012, CSOs and the government collaborated to pass legislation and policies on several issues, such as anti-corruption, freedom of information, and decentralization. For example, the National Integrity Forum worked with the government on anti-corruption and budgeting. Through this collaboration, concessions that did not publish their annual accounts were identified in print media. (A concession refers to the government’s grant of land, a resource, or a service in return for stipulated use of the resource or specified services to the government.) Most importantly, CSOs and the government worked together to develop and adopt Vision 2030, the national strategy for development. The
vice chairperson for this national effort came from civil society. Additionally, CSO representation is required on major government committees such as Community Sensitization and Youth Empowerment.

More CSO networks are emerging and influencing government decision-making. With support from UN agencies and other international development organizations, the Sustainable Development Institute and other CSOs successfully pressured the government to ban Private Use Permits (PUPs) in the forestry sector. In a letter to the Managing Director of the Forestry Development Authority on July 12, 2012, these organizations argued that PUPs were issued indiscriminately and amounted to pillaging the country’s forests. The coalition’s efforts prompted an independent investigation and the eventual dismissal of several government officials. Coalitions also formed to advocate for a larger share of benefits from oil and gas contracts for host communities. This effort led the national legislature to suspend the issuance of concessions for oil exploration and to review previous agreements.

CSO networks also provide platforms for debate and contribute to policy reform, including the publication of policy papers such as the Freedom of Information Act, Transparency in Education, and Publish What You Pay. These publications are expected to be released annually.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

CSOs continued to deliver many services in 2012 at both the national and local levels, empowering communities. These services included road construction, agricultural programs, peace building, skills development, health service delivery, education, human development, and enterprise training. For example, the Liberian Agency for Community Empowerment provided numerous services such as road construction, renovation of market buildings, and construction of health facilities in many counties across the country. Donors continued to fund CSOs to offer professional services to government institutions. Acting as implementing partners for donor institutions, CSOs provided management support to the county health teams in at least six of the fifteen counties. CSOs sometimes design their interventions based on community needs.

More than 10,000 youth benefited in 2012 from the Youth Empowerment Services (YES), a short-term, government employment program. The program provided students with jobs performing community activities during their vacations. Building on this experience, the government expanded the YES program with a budget appropriation of $15 million to support an integrated youth development program involving training and skills development. CSOs were contracted to train youth groups to organize placement into agencies where their skills can be utilized.

The Ministry of Health supports CSO involvement in the health sector because there are few national and local providers, compared to the number of international providers. The Ministry prioritizes applications from CSOs, faith-based organizations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are representative of the population to be served. When these organizations cannot adequately assure quality services and management, the Ministry encourages them to partner with international health care providers to jointly provide services and build the capacity of the national provider.

The Land Commission worked with CSOs to raise awareness on land issues throughout the country. This program, supported by the Norwegian Refugee Council, promotes awareness of these sensitive issues and helps document cases that authorities have not redressed. The program additionally facilitates a mediation process between claimants and urges them to seek settlement without going to court.
There was continuous collaboration between the Carter Center and the Justice and Peace commission (JPC) on the Legal Aid program in southeastern and central Liberia. This program enables the JPC to provide free legal service to individuals and communities within these regions.

Most CSOs did not fully recover the costs for services provided in 2012.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

There were no new developments related to intermediary support structures for CSOs in 2012. The major resource centers available to CSOs were the Development Education Network/Liberia (DEN/L), Resource Center of NARDA, and the Liberia Media Center. The DEN/L center is located in central Liberia and regularly provides training in various aspects of development work. The New Africa Development Research Agency (NARDA), a CSO umbrella organization, has a resource center that offers research assistance and Internet services to member institutions. The Center is located in Monrovia and offers services to the regional chapters of NARDA. The Liberia Media Center facilitates the dissemination of news to CSOs and the general public.

Informal and formal networking allows CSOs in different fields to share information, coordinate programmatic activities, and build their capacities. For example, the Transitional Justice Working Group is a consortium of CSOs focused on issues surrounding transitional justice.

In 2012, NARDA provided specialized training in sustainability, fundraising, and organizational development for its members for the first time. Encouraged by the positive response, NARDA was considering providing this training to CSOs that were not members of the network, with the ultimate goal of spreading access to training from Monrovia to the regions. CSOs operating outside Monrovia had limited access to training in 2012.

Local grantmaking was limited in 2012. Under the Health Sector Pool Fund, grants provided by donor institutions and bilateral organizations were awarded to local and international CSOs to help implement aspects of health care delivery. These arrangements enabled the Health Ministry to deliver critical services by drawing on the expertise of organizations with the relevant experience and a track record of good performance.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7**

CSOs received both positive and negative coverage from the local and national media in 2012. There were instances when CSOs were recognized for their accomplishments. When the PUPs were suspended in the forestry sector, most of the media applauded the organizations that advocated for the suspension. Nonetheless, there were still instances where the media perpetuated negative perceptions and did not sufficiently analyze the role of CSOs. The situation worsened in 2012 when the public perceived that CSOs were linked to politicians or were otherwise supportive of the government.
In general, if a CSO compliments the government’s efforts, the public may view it as biased towards the government. On the other hand, if a CSO voices community concerns, the public might view that CSO as a detractor that does not appreciate the government’s efforts.

Overall, the public perception of CSOs remained unfavorable in 2012. The public does not understand the concept of CSOs and perceives them as agents of foreign interests and as having significant wealth that does not benefit communities.

The government had mixed views of CSOs, depending on whether CSOs were aligned with the government’s positions. During the debate on increasing oil revenue shares, the government viewed CSOs as agitators. However, the government viewed CSOs that supported the Open Budget Process as partners, and sought to utilize their networks to reach the general public. The business sector’s view of CSOs varies. Large international businesses view CSOs as allies, while smaller businesses might view CSOs as competitors or as potential clients.

CSOs do little to build their image and rarely publish communications material in the local media to inform the public of their activities and accomplishments.

A code of conduct applies to most CSOs but not the entire sector. The code does not apply to CBOs that are not registered or accredited, and are therefore not expected to submit reports to the government. Little progress was made in creating a sector-wide code of conduct. CSOs rarely published annual program and financial reports in 2012.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

CSOs in Malawi encountered a new political climate in 2012. In early April 2012, then President Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika suddenly died, prompting an abrupt change in political leadership. In accordance with the Malawian constitution, his Vice President, Dr. Joyce Banda, replaced him.

Before this change in leadership, relations between the government and CSOs engaged in human rights and governance were strained. The autocratic leadership limited human rights and freedoms of expression and association through threats and arbitrary arrests of CSO leaders. On the other hand, CSOs offering services in fields such as education, health, and agriculture enjoyed a relatively cordial relationship with the government.

The change of political leadership provided CSOs with the opportunity to initiate a new dialogue with the government. The government recruited some CSO leaders into leadership positions and appointed others to the boards of quasi-governmental entities like water boards and electricity commissions, which provide public services but are run independently from government line ministries. Much of the public viewed this as an attempt by the government to silence CSOs that were vocal during the preceding government, while others thought it allowed CSO leaders and government to collaborate better on governance and service delivery.

Other CSOs, particularly those focused on governance and advocacy, were unsure how to approach the new
government. Since 2010, they had exercised an aggressive strategy toward the Bingu Wa Mutharika government in response to the government's repressive approach to human rights and governance issues. The sudden change of regime forced CSOs to re-define their strategies towards the new government. This proved difficult, however, as CSOs found the situation too unstable and complex to develop long-term approaches. Despite the change of government leadership, the legal and policy framework, general operating environment, and willingness of government to cooperate have unfortunately remained the same.

Malawian CSOs continue to engage in a wide range of activities, including advocacy and lobbying, human rights, democracy and governance, capacity building, gender and development, and media development. CSOs provide services in areas such as food security and agriculture, construction and infrastructure development, disaster management, education, energy, environment, land and natural resources, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and youth empowerment, among many others. More CSOs continue to form coalitions in response to both emerging and perennial challenges.

Currently, 300 local NGOs are registered and active, while another 200 local NGOs are registered but not active. In addition, almost 200 international NGOs are registered and actively operating in Malawi. According to the Council for Nongovernmental Organization in Malawi (CONGOMA), an additional 200 local NGOs have their registrations pending.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

Many CSOs consider the NGO Act of 2000 to be unfavorable. Registration is difficult, as the Act’s requirements are unclear. The Act mandates a cumbersome, three-stage registration process. First, an NGO must become a member of the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOMA), a non-governmental umbrella body of all domestic and international NGOs operating in Malawi. Once it has become a member of CONGOMA, a new NGO must then sign an MOU with a government line ministry, as well as submit letters promising not to participate in “electioneering” and “partisan politics,” terms that are ambiguous and subject to broad interpretation, though they have not been used to prevent NGO activities. Finally, an NGO submits its application, including a copy of its membership certificate from CONGOMA and MOU with a ministry, to the NGO Board. However, as of 2012, the NGO Board, as well as other key institutions contemplated in the NGO Act such as the NGO Registry Office, had not been established due to lack of agreement between the government and CONGOMA. CONGOMA nominated members for the NGO Board in 2012.

Registration is required to operate and mobilize resources. Therefore, most new organizations register as limited companies while their NGO registration is being processed. Registering a limited company is much faster, sometimes only taking a day, while registering an NGO has a minimum timeframe of almost a year.

While the government touts the NGO Act for creating an enabling environment for CSOs, CSO leaders, especially those involved in human rights, governance, and advocacy, have not been allowed to operate freely. The current government has also crippled the operations of some CSOs by co-opting CSO advocates into the government advisory system. Many of these former CSO leaders have failed to hold public debates or express criticism on governance weaknesses.

The NGO Act of 2000 does not adequately protect CSOs from state intrusion. Presidential pronouncements are often implemented to the detriment of civil society, and incendiary comments by political leaders hamper freedoms of association and expression. In 2012, the government leadership and its political machinery continued to threaten CSO leaders without any recourse to the NGO Act. For example, in political platforms,
some CSO leaders of CONGOMA were accused of receiving funding from foreign missions to topple the government. A presidential directive therefore ordered all District Commissioners to collect updated records of the CSOs operating in their districts to start tracking their activities.

There is no law specifically providing tax benefits to CSOs. However, the Public Financial Management Act empowers the Minister of Finance to determine tax waivers for not-for-profit institutions like NGOs and churches on a case-by-case basis. These waivers take a long time to receive, however. CSOs registered as service providers or suppliers, including those that provide education and health services, can compete for government contracts from both local and central governments. CSOs can earn income, as long as it is used to pursue not-for-profit activities.

There are no lawyers specifically trained in CSO law because the University of Malawi and other universities do not offer such courses. However, most lawyers are adequately familiar with the NGO Act and legal advice is available in the capital city and secondary cities. These services are frequently provided at minimal charge and sometimes pro bono to help CSOs protect their rights.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

Malawian CSOs are able to identify their constituencies but are rarely successful at engaging them. Service providing CSOs are generally able to mobilize their constituencies because of the benefits their services provide. Local faith-based organizations (FBOs) also have stable constituencies. For CSOs in governance, human rights, and advocacy, however, mobilizing local populations remains difficult. This could be due to the lack of immediate impact and benefits for local communities from such advocacy initiatives, especially given the fact that the government is frequently unresponsive to these initiatives. CSOs engaged in human rights and governance work became more detached from local communities in 2012. Many groups that were vocal in 2011 were conspicuously silent in 2012, creating the perception that their previous advocacy was not genuine. Most CSOs are based in urban areas and have weak linkages to rural constituencies. In addition, most CSOs conduct their workshops in urban or semi-urban areas, with less reach in rural areas. Workshops are usually organized in English, minimizing the participation of illiterate citizens.

Most CSOs have mission statements and strategic plans to which they try to adhere. However, because of inadequate resources, most CSOs divert from their strategic directions to pursue funders’ objectives. CSOs also generally find it difficult to design new strategic plans due to a lack of funding for capacity building and operational support.

Most CSOs have clear management structures on paper, but adherence to corporate governance practices is sometimes challenging. This is especially true in networks where board members often interfere with the roles of staff members. Some CSOs rely on one leader, often the founder, without any visible management structures.

Due to severe financial constraints, most CSOs found it difficult to mobilize the resources needed to maintain qualified staff and utilize professional services in 2012. This deterioration in staffing in turn worsened CSOs’ future funding prospects. CSOs’ abilities to recruit volunteers vary. CSOs in service delivery easily find volunteers, while CSOs in human rights and governance work find it challenging. Moreover, because most citizens are poor it is difficult to mobilize them to volunteer without incentives such as allowances, shirts, or bicycles.
Urban CSOs have relatively modern offices, equipment, and Internet access. However, most rural CSOs lack the resources to have modern office space and equipment. Most rural communities have almost no local Internet access, so CSOs must travel to district centers for such services.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

CSO financial viability deteriorated in 2012. The global financial crisis continued to deteriorate funding for CSOs and contract the local economy. In addition, some donors withdrew funding from the country due to Malawi’s poor human rights record and weak governance processes. At the same time, the huge devaluation of the Malawian currency from April to September 2012 increased the cost of CSO operations.

CSOs continue to depend primarily on donor and foreign funding. Local resources are very limited as local philanthropy and philanthropic organizations are largely undeveloped. Corporate philanthropy is emerging but still at a nascent stage. Only a few institutions like Press Trust and Dosani Trust operate and support CSOs and community work.

Only registered CSOs are allowed to mobilize resources locally and internationally. Very few CSOs have multiple sources of funding. Funding opportunities are shrinking faster than in previous years partly due to donors shifting their priorities to other countries, such as South Sudan, and to other issues, such as climate change, rather than governance. While some new funding opportunities, such as for HIV/AIDS interventions, are being created and other foreign agencies are continuing their regular funding, these sources do not provide support for core functions and personnel costs, jeopardizing the short-term viability of CSOs.

A few local institutions provide funding for CSOs. For example, the National AIDS Commission supports HIV/AIDS interventions, and the Democracy Consolidation Program supports governance and democracy interventions. In addition, the Tilitonse Fund, which is internationally funded but managed by a local Malawian team, supports accountable and transparent governance. Contributors to the Tilitonse Fund include Irish Aid, DFID, Norwegian Aid, and the EU Malawian offices.

Very few CSOs generate revenue through service provision. However, sometimes the government contracts CSOs to provide services, such as education and healthcare. CSOs charge minimal fees for their services. Very few CSOs have assets like offices or houses that can be used to generate income. Membership dues are also insufficient to support core CSO functions.

Although sound financial management systems exist, most CSOs are only transparent to their funding partners, not to the public. Most financial audits are project-based; overall institutional audits are rare. Even CSOs that advocate for transparency and accountability from the government do not publish annual narrative and financial reports, despite being required to do so by the NGO Act. This could partly be due to the lack of institutions to implement the law, like the proposed NGO Board, as well as the lack of enforcement mechanisms within CONGOMA.
**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

Service providing CSOs continue to have effective communication and collaboration with the government, despite the change in leadership. District and national-level CSOs collaborate and interact with both central and local government structures. For instance, CSOs participate in local government development meetings and consultations on development policy framework. In some cases, however, CSO participation is only cosmetic and the government does not reflect the issues raised by CSOs in its final policy documents. In addition, CSO involvement is often driven by donor pressure on the government to engage CSOs.

At the same time, some national level government structures continue to be hostile to CSOs focused on governance and human rights issues. The levels of cooperation at the district or subnational level is often positive, in part because such cooperation is focused on service delivery, not advocacy. At the subnational level, the government only implements policy, whereas the central government crafts the policy. Much advocacy work therefore is at the national level, where CSOs encounter hostility from the government. In 2012, the arrival of a new President with some background in civil engagement brought hope that the relationship between CSOs and government would transform, but this has not happened.

Formal and informal CSO networks and coalitions focus on education, health, economy, and human rights issues, and new networks are emerging on climate change, gender-based violence, and minority rights. Because of the dramatic political and economic changes in 2012, coalitions could not conduct effective advocacy campaigns during the year.

Various CSO platforms have also emerged and are engaging government on citizen service charters, which are government-citizen agreements on the delivery of basic services. In addition, more local funding organizations like Tilitonse required CSOs to form coalitions and alliances to apply for funding in 2012. Although it is difficult to unite CSOs for joint advocacy because they desire individual visibility, these donor demands could prompt sustained CSO collaboration.

Opportunities exist for CSOs to lobby. For example, parliamentary committees are easily accessible and are utilized by CSOs focused on health, education, mining and energy, security, finance, and economic policy. CSOs most often interact with parliamentary committees during the annual parliamentary budget hearings, when they lobby for increased funding and legal reforms in their respective fields. In 2012, however, few of these efforts were successful partly due to the weak economy.

As a result of CSOs’ limited knowledge of the problems with the NGO Act, CSOs did little in 2012 to push for legal reforms that would improve the environment for civil society.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs continue to provide diverse services, including advocacy and lobbying, human rights, democracy and governance, capacity building, gender and development, and media development. Social services focus on food security and agriculture, construction and infrastructure development, disaster management, education, energy, environment, land and natural resources, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and youth empowerment.
Some services do not reflect constituent needs. For example, while female condoms can protect Malawian women from HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies, CSO efforts to distribute condoms to rural populations have not taken male-dominated power relations into account. As a result, although female condoms are being distributed in rural areas, they are seldom used as most decisions related to sex and reproduction in Malawi are made by men. Donor influence continues to determine most interventions, although not all donor-driven interventions are inconsistent with local people’s needs.

While most CSO products target the public, some interventions and products aim at specific audiences. For example, FBOs target their relief items and infrastructure development to their members. Most CSO services are provided free of charge because they have not explored effective cost recovery methods.

The government both at national and subnational levels recognizes CSOs’ contribution to service delivery and often views CSOs as development partners. However, government officials are less receptive of CSOs monitoring government service delivery. Many government officials are reluctant to receive feedback on their services and therefore do not create feedback mechanisms.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The lack of resource centers, training centers, and access to technology and relevant information remains a critical challenge for most CSOs in Malawi. Resource centers and training centers have not been established, and access to technology is still limited in most rural areas.

Information sharing among CSOs also remains a challenge. CSOs working in the same field or funded by the same donor share information through networks and regular meetings. There is limited information sharing between CSOs working in different fields and with different partners. Some online blogs and social media platforms like CivSoe are creating forums for CSOs to discuss emerging issues. For example, research reports on various developmental and governance issues were shared electronically among CSOs in 2012.

Pursuant to the NGO Act of 2000, CONGOMA is responsible for overall coordination and capacity building of the NGO sector in Malawi. Members must pay sign-up fees and annual fees that support the operations of the CONGOMA Secretariat.

Private institutions like the Malawi Institute of Management (MIM) and the government’s Staff Development College offer CSO training programs. However, these training sessions may not be tailored to CSO-related issues and are never in local language. In addition, these institutions are located in cities and charge for the training; thus they are not accessible to most rural CSOs, and their services are not in high demand. During 2012, most advertised training programs were cancelled at the last minute due to the small numbers of registered attendees. For example, MIM postponed training on project management for CSO leaders because of a lack of applicants. Donors also provide capacity building sessions for the few CSOs that they support. In 2012, funding partners like the Tilitonse Fund organized training sessions in political economy analysis, advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation to their funded partners for free. While there are individual experts in CSO capacity building in Malawi, they charge for their services. Some donors have used these local experts to train their partners.
CSO partnerships and cooperation with media, lawyers, and the private sector have improved. Such partnerships often focus on information sharing and joint advocacy initiatives. For example, in 2012, print and electronic media provided coverage to many CSOs for minimal cost.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

Malawian CSOs continue to enjoy both print and electronic media coverage at the local and national levels. Those in service delivery have continuous support from all media houses, while CSOs working on governance and advocacy are only supported and covered by private media outlets. Public media houses frequently operate as government mouthpieces and seem to dislike accountability issues raised by CSOs.

In general, the public has a positive perception of CSOs, although communities have varied understanding of CSOs, and the public still harbors suspicions about their intentions and financial accountability. Public image did suffer, however, when CSO leaders joined quasi-governmental boards and advisory committees during the year. The sudden silence of these CSO leaders on governance issues led some citizens to believe that their previous advocacy was not genuine.

The sudden change of government leadership in 2012 shifted many CSOs’ strategies from antagonism towards the old government to engagement with the new government. Some CSOs developed a wait-and-see approach towards the new government. In general, in 2012, government at the national level, including the presidency, has shown appreciation for and improved relations with CSOs. However, towards the end of the year, the emerging vigilance of some CSOs on national issues like fuel prices and devaluation of the local currency made the relationship more tense, although still not as bad as the situation in 2011.

The business sector continues to appreciate CSOs and considers them more credible providers of information than the government. Some CSO policy advocacy initiatives benefit the private sector. For example, in 2012 CSOs and the private sector collaborated to advocate for a reduction in some taxes and to demand fair trade among investors in Malawi.

Malawian CSOs do not publish annual reports and are not transparent in their dealings, despite the reporting requirements of the NGO Act and the CONGOMA code of ethics, because there are no enforcement mechanisms for either.
In 2012, Mali’s CSO sector was significantly impacted by the climate of political turmoil. In the beginning of the year, a separatist movement in the north of the country gained momentum following their capture of the village of Aguelhok in January. As the rebels advanced southward, and many in the country lost faith in the government, junior soldiers led a coup d’état in March, 2012. In the ensuing period of instability, the separatists captured the three major northern cities, and democracy was not restored for the rest of the year.

Civil society had strong, but mixed reactions to the coup and a number of new organizations were formed as a result. The Front for Democracy and for the Republic, a coalition of opposition political parties and CSOs, condemned the military coup and supported the return to constitutional order, but others such as the Coordination of Patriots of Mali, the Patriotic Movement of 22 March, and the Yérèwolo Ton Association supported the coup and called for real reform. Others, including the Collective for Northern Citizens, the Lasartareï Association, and Cri de Coeur, took a more neutral stance, calling for peace, dialogue, and reconciliation.

CSOs reoriented their activities towards humanitarian relief at the expense of other services that CSOs typically provide as donors cut funding to the nondemocratic government. Religious and northern organizations in particular collaborated with the government and humanitarian
agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the Red Cross to raise funds and assist the populations in the occupied zones and IDPs. However, CSOs were forced to cut service provision in water, health, hygiene, sanitation, and other sectors. This was in spite of the launch of the second phase of the Support Program for CSOs (PAOSCII), which was then delayed due to instability.

CSOs also organized to mitigate the effects of the crisis. At the local level, the Residents Association for the Development of Douentza established a crisis committee in Douentza to protect the population and negotiate with occupiers to limit theft, pillaging, robbery, rape, and other crimes. Youth coordination organizations in Gao and Timbuktu organized brigades to protect persons and property against armed groups. The Consultative Committee of Sedentary people in Gao worked to reopen schools and reinstate basic services such as electricity, and drinking water. The group created specialized commissions to manage social services such as health, water, electricity, and education.

At the national level, several major CSO networks participated in talks with international mediators and helped bring together diverse players in the crisis for talks. Women’s groups advocated to include the major networks of women’s organization in negotiations between the government, the rebel movements, and international organizations. Several CSOs participated in an inter-Malian dialogue mediated by ECOWAS. As CSOs have taken on the role of defending the interests of citizens, they have denounced gender-based violence and lobbied for humanitarian assistance for the people in the occupied areas.

In addition to the 1,254 registered CSOs in Mali, there are numerous informal, traditional groups, which are typically mosque associations or groups that follow a particular traditional religious leader. No statistics are available on informal, religiously-affiliated CSOs, but based on the assumption that each of Mali’s 13,000 villages has two or three informal CSOs, it is estimated that there are approximately 20,000 to 40,000 such CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The existing laws related to associations and cooperatives remained in effect in the unoccupied parts of the country. Law 04-038 of 2004 governs NGOs; Law 01-176 of July 2001 regulates cooperative societies; and Law 93-044 of August 1993 regulates the Regional Chambers for Agriculture (ARAM) and the Permanent Assembly of Agricultural Chambers (APCAM), which is a public institution set up by the state with representatives from rural associations. Law 21 governs the Consular Chambers. Labor unions are governed by the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s convention 87 of 1948 and convention 98 of 1949. However, there are still no laws that specifically regulate foundations. Foundations currently operate with only a receipt like any other association. The only exceptions are the two foundations which belong to the families of former presidents and were created by acts of the Council of Ministers: the Sharing Foundation and the Youth Foundation. Though the requirements for a CSO to register are not overly burdensome, delays persist in delivering receipts of declaration for certain CSOs, especially human rights organizations.

In the occupied regions of the north, associational life was severely restricted in 2012. Islamists practicing strict sharia law banned any gathering of men and women together, effectively revoking the freedom of assembly. They enforced this measure and punished offenders with whipping.
The Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MATCL) oversees all CSOs through the Local Development Support Unit (CADB), and the technical ministries provide additional oversight. However, because of the crisis, the CADB did not complete its routine monitoring visits of CSOs’ programs or hold its annual consultation with CSOs to discuss interventions, and the fiscal and regulatory framework.

CSOs face numerous barriers to receiving tax exemptions. Many CSOs simply don’t understand the procedures. The law exempts CSOs from direct taxes and income taxes. Certain CSOs also sign a framework agreement with the government under which the CSO agrees to align its activities with the government’s development policy in return for an exemption from paying VAT and import tariffs. There are currently 1,254 CSOs in Mali that have signed a framework agreement with the government. In order to apply for this status, a CSO must be active for three years and submit more extensive documentation on their interventions and financial records. The Ministry of Finance also sometimes exempts organizations when they submit a request supported by a foreign donor, but these exemptions are not made systematically. Agricultural cooperatives are not subject to taxation. The tax code does not allow businesses to deduct charitable donations from their taxable income. CSOs are allowed to raise revenue by competing for grants and contracts and by raising funds from their members or selling goods and services.

There are still no legal experts in Mali who specialize in the laws affecting CSOs. CSOs must go to general practice law firms when they have legal needs. CSOs that specialize in human rights, especially those that focus on the rights of women and children, offer legal advice to victims of human rights abuses through legal clinics. These organizations have become increasingly active because of the human rights violations which have accompanied the crisis, including rape, violence, and mass displacement.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

With CSOs’ focus in 2012 on humanitarian assistance and mediation of the crisis, CSOs had notable successes building constituencies in 2012. Through their activities providing basic goods and services to victims of the crisis, demonstrating for peace and reconciliation, and mobilizing players in the crisis to negotiate, CSOs garnered significant support and participation from Malian citizens.

However, CSOs’ usual activities providing basic services and implementing development projects have been drastically reduced in favor of humanitarian relief. This has forced many organizations to lay off employees or close their office. The situation was worse in the northern regions where the regional coordinators of many CSOs were forced to move to the surrounding areas. CSOs made little progress acquiring modern office equipment except for a small number of CSOs that received equipment as part of a training on information technology or other related areas.

As in previous years, CSOs’ strategic plans focused on project activities since less funding is available to finance institutional capacity building. Donors often require CSOs to have a strategic plan in place in order to receive grants or loans, and donor programs such as PAOSC I have helped build capacity for strategic planning. Those organizations that were not forced to stop their activities have maintained normal organizational controls such as conducting internal and external audits.

The Agency of Employment Promotion of Youth (APEJ) runs an internship program, which places young graduates with CSOs as volunteers. However, because of the political instability, there was less funding available and fewer young graduates were willing to volunteer for CSOs. While 5,000 were recruited in 2011 for 2012, only 3,000 were recruited in 2012 for the year 2013.
CSOs’ lack of transparent governance remains a critical issue. CSOs rarely change leadership or employ transparent financial management systems. There is also little systematic sharing of information between the leadership of a CSO and its members or employees.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

Many CSOs remain dependent on donor financing, and in 2012, several donors suspended their funding to Mali due to the undemocratic change in regime. However, religious associations and Malian diaspora associations led several successful fundraising drives in collaboration with the government and humanitarian agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and the Red Cross. These drives collected significant cash and in-kind contributions to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those in the occupied zones. Notably, Orange Mali, Malitel, and the Group for Grain Distribution in Mali donated 500 million FCFA ($1 million USD) for relief. After that donation, other businesses and banks made a donation of 1 billion FCFA ($2 million USD) through the National Council of Employers of Mali. Many citizens made in-kind contributions or volunteered their time to assist IDPs and refugees.

Fundraising drives are made annually in October, which is known as the month of solidarity. In 2012, artists and associations held benefit concerts to raise money for women with fistulas, people with disabilities, and people displaced from the north. Certain foundations also organized telethons and demonstrations to raise funds, often in partnership with the government. While these activities supported a diverse range of issues, support for refugees, IDPs, and victims of the crisis dominated fundraising efforts in 2012. The military successes of the northern separatists also revealed that the army was extremely ill-equipped, and many were moved to contribute directly to the army. Malian citizens and diaspora associations donated nearly one billion FCFA ($2 million USD) to rebuild the army. Despite these increasingly regular fundraising efforts, mobilization of local funding remains largely insufficient compared with the level of need.

As in previous years, CSOs demonstrated their ability to mobilize volunteers, particularly youth and women, to make in-kind contributions to the maintenance of local communities. These activities included cleaning and paving roads and picking up garbage. This volunteer labor was vital in efforts to clean up villages and neighborhoods damaged by flooding from the exceptional rainfall in 2012. CSOs also worked with mining companies, which provided funding to build schools, health centers, and environmental protection centers. Finally, some professional associations continued to raise revenue by selling products and by renting office space, buildings, and equipment.

Financial management remains a bottleneck for the CSO sector. CSOs that receive grants from the government, foreign donors, or international NGOs are sometimes subject to audits by the government or by external auditors. But many CSOs still lack transparent financial management systems and fail to submit technical and financial reports in a timely manner.
One of the major consequences of the political and institutional crisis in Mali was the emergence of distinct groups of organizations for and against the military junta. The Front for Democracy and for the Republic, a coalition of opposition political parties, CSO networks, and unions, condemned the military coup and supported the return to constitutional order, but others such as the Coordination of Patriots of Mali, the Patriotic Movement of 22 March, and the Yèrèwolo Ton Association supported the coup and called for reform. A third group, including the Collective for Northern Citizens, the Lasartareï Association, and Cri de Coeur, took a more neutral stance, calling for peace, dialogue, and reconciliation. Religious organizations often took a leading role, bringing together key players in the crisis for negotiations. This included talks between the army and the government, talks within the army, and talks between political groups. Major CSO networks such as the High Council of Islam (HCI), the National Council of Civil Society (CNCS), and the CSO Forum (FOSC) were included in talks with ECOWAS, the EU, the AU, and the UN. The High Islamic Council successfully negotiated with the military junta to secure the release of ousted president’s ministers and other political prisoners.

Communication between the government and CSOs through the previously existing channels for direct communication intensified due to the crisis. These channels include the Regional and Local Steering Committees for the Coordination and Monitoring of Development Operations (CROCSAD/CLOCSAD) and the Humanitarian Cluster, a regular tripartite meeting between the government, international organizations, and CSOs on humanitarian issues.

CSOs also led several important advocacy campaigns in 2012. With support from UN Women, the Network for the Peace and Security of Women in the ECOWAS zone advocated for the participation of women’s organizations in the negotiations in Bamako and Ouagadougou led by ECOWAS and the AU. The Collective of Northern Malians (COREN), Cri de Coeur, and other CSOs led advocacy campaigns involving sit-ins, marches, conferences, and debates with the objective of mobilizing citizens in support of liberating the occupied regions, opening negotiations, and mobilizing humanitarian assistance for victims of the crisis. The National Civil Society Coalition for Peace and the Fight against the Proliferation of Light Weapons (CONACIPAL)'s work conducting research to combat the proliferation of small arms was officially recognized by the UN Representation in Mali in 2012.

The Forum of International NGOs in Mali (FONGIM) led a campaign advocating for foreign donors to lift their suspension of funding to Mali. Several national CSOs and networks such as the Advocacy and Lobbying Network (RPL) and Budgetary Monitoring Group (GSB) collaborated with FONGIM in this effort.

The Network for the Peace and Security of Women in the ECOWAS Zone, the Youth Association of Mali, and the Malian Women’s Rights and Citizenship Group (GP/DCF) and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) advocated for enforcement of UN resolutions 1820, 1888, 1325, and 1889, which concern the protection of women and children during a period of conflict. The National Federation of Rural Women (FENAFER) developed an advocacy and lobbying strategy to ensure rural women’s security of land rights. As a result of these activities, women leaders have been included in land commissions at the communal, regional, and national level. Human rights organizations initiated an advocacy campaign to create a law protecting the defenders of human rights.

CSO leaders recognize the necessity to make the legal framework more favorable for CSOs, but these effects have been largely put on hold due to the crisis. The initiative to revise the law 04-038 on CSOs, which began in response to a study led by the Aga Khan Foundation and workshops held by RPL, was interrupted due to the political events. However, RPL successfully lobbied CADB to begin reviewing the law internally.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

As donors and international NGOs reoriented their funding toward humanitarian relief in 2012, local and national CSOs were forced to learn new approaches and tools. This concentration on humanitarian services in the north combined with the departure of several foreign donors drastically reduced the services that CSOs normally provide in development and basic social services. In the north and in the zone around Mopti, it was difficult to provide even basic services in education, health, and electricity. Activities supporting governance, the environment, and economic development generally declined.

CSOs made notable advances aligning their activities with the needs of communities, particularly by basing their activities on the local Programs for Social, Economic, and Cultural Development (PDSEC). The focus on humanitarian relief in 2012 reflected the priority needs of the populations in the crisis zones and those displaced from the north. Humanitarian relief focused largely on women and children and those in poverty since they were most vulnerable in the crisis. Despite reduced funding and instability, many CSOs were able to continue delivering services in 2012, with support from many who understood the gravity of the situation in Mali and were moved to volunteer.

The government recognizes the value added by CSOs in their service delivery. Local government bodies in particular collaborate with CSOs to implement projects. However, CSOs are rarely able to recover the costs of their services by charging fees. Because many of CSOs’ beneficiaries are in poverty, they cannot afford to pay for services.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

With the closure of the Djoliba Centre in 2012, there is no longer a general ISO or CSO resource center in Mali. The Djoliba Center previously had a presence in every region except the 3 in the north and provided training and support to CSOs. However, there are specialized centers focused on areas such as capacity building for project management, community mobilization, sensitization and facilitation, artisanal production, gender, and youth. Most are located in Bamako and a few other cities in the south of the country. These centers include resource centers run by the Association of Municipalities in Mali (AMM), which train elected officials and encourage civil society participation in governance; the Nyéléni de Sélingué Center, which trains rural agricultural organizations on production technologies and techniques, and marketing; and the Fréderich Hebert foundation and the Center for Interparty Dialogue and Democracy (CMDID), which provides trainings on civic engagement. There are also specialized research centers that provide training in project management and evaluation. Finally, several CSOs specializing in human rights and the protection of women, children, and rural populations have developed tools that they have made available to other CSOs. However, many CSOs cannot afford these services, or else they cannot use the training materials because their management is illiterate or they don’t have computers. Many training materials are not available in local languages, which is particularly problematic for CBOs.

Over the past several years, numerous public and private centers such as Agency for Information Technology and Communication (AGETIC), Local Information Centers for Communication (CLICs) and Community
Multimedia Centers (CMCs), as well private cybercafés, have increasingly provided CSOs with access to computers and the Internet. This has been accelerated by the widespread and expanding access to mobile phones.

The Sharing Foundation, Orange Foundation, Youth Foundation, Salif Keïta Foundation, Pathfinder Foundation, and Oumou Sangaré Foundation provide grants to CSOs. These foundations continued to raise funds locally and abroad and to re-grant funds to CSOs to provide basic goods, water, and health care. In 2012, they devoted more funding to humanitarian relief. Malian Diaspora Associations further contributed to humanitarian relief efforts. They provide electricity to villages under occupation, including financing three months of fuel for electricity in the cities of Douentza and Tombouctou. They further provided medicines and volunteers to the hospital in Gao, and supported education in Kayes.

Intersectoral partnerships also focused on humanitarian relief in 2012. Local radio stations worked with the government, donors, and CSOs to sensitize the public on the preparations for the elections, though they ultimately were not held. International NGOs partnered with networks of journalists to disseminate information on a range of issues including proliferation of small arms, water, sanitation, health, human rights, and security.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

In 2012, several CSOs appeared on television news programs on ORTM, Africable, and TM2 to promote documentaries on their interventions. For example, the Shea butter production cooperative, Zantiébougou, released a documentary, which highlighted its achievements refining a local product and boosting production, and giving the women who are members of the cooperative the opportunity to build skills and increase their income. Generally, CSOs have a positive relationship with the media, and many organizations have contracts with local radio to disseminate information or to host debates of certain topics.

While overall coverage of CSOs was positive in 2012, the media continued to demonstrate a poor understanding of CSOs and the role they play in society. The media focus exclusively on services delivered by CSOs, passing over their contributions mobilizing citizens and leading advocacy movements. There is a discount rate for CSO advertisements, particularly in written media. However, TV stations such as ORTM and Africable charged CSOs the same price as for-profit businesses to air documentaries, advertisements, and public service announcements during prime hours. In 2012, ORTM relegated most news, announcements, and broadcasts of workshops or seminars related to CSOs to a specific section of programming called “continued education.”

Public perceptions of CSOs progressed somewhat in 2012. Religious associations and umbrella organizations were highly visible on the radio and television due to their involvement in meetings and mediations on the crisis. These activities generally improved the public’s view of CSOs.

The government recognizes the important role CSOs play in local development. However, collaboration is not always easy, and CSO participation is often imposed by donors. For example, the government often includes CSOs in tripartite dialogue between the government, CSOs, and donors to develop policies and strategies. But the government is forthcoming in many cases. The General Direction of the Budget regularly shares information with the Group for Budget Monitoring (GSB). Some CSOs also implement projects for the government, and the government funds the National Council for Civil Society (CNSC) to conduct civilian
monitoring activities. Generally, the government considers CSOs to be central players in society and treat them as partners for the delivery of services.

In the private sector, mining companies often have a positive view of CSOs, especially those that receive grants to manage natural resources in a mining area in partnership with a CSO. However, CSOs can clash with mining companies when they lead advocacy efforts against the adverse effects of mining on the environment and local communities. Other private companies that provide basic social services see CSOs as competitors and consider their tax exemptions to be an unfair advantage.

There was no improvement in CSOs’ self-regulation in 2012 despite the existence of a code of ethics which FOSC and CNSC use as a tool to evaluate its members. Many CSOs still fail to publish annual reports and complete internal and external audits. Organizations with grants or contracts with the government or donors tend to do a better job following these regulations.
**MOZAMBIQUE**

**Capital:** Maputo  
**Government Type:** Republic  
**Population:** 24,096,669  
**GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,200  
**Human Development Index:** 184

![Map of Mozambique](image.png)

**CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.7**

Mozambique found itself in a modern-day “gold rush” in 2012. The recent discovery of large amounts of natural resources including coal and oil has sparked a rapid influx of large multinational companies into the country. In the process, many communities have been dislocated to make way for the extractive industries. Both the government and CSOs were unprepared for the scale and speed of growth and are struggling to monitor the situation. The International Monetary Fund recently raised its forecast for the country’s economic growth to 7.5 percent in 2012. The increased growth is attributed to aluminum and coal exports, the latter which began in 2011.

Mozambican CSOs are becoming more vocal and active in monitoring and advocacy work. CSOs, such as Estamos, Concern, and Cultural Association for Sustainable Development (ACUDES), have increased their use of participatory monitoring tools and approaches, helping them to gather better evidence and improve their advocacy interventions.

CSOs still struggle with their sustainability. Funding from traditional donors continues to decrease, while potential funding from the rapidly expanding Mozambican private sector has not yet materialized. The central government is open to working with CSOs, but local government officials are still wary of CSOs working on governance issues. Sporadic cases of heavy-handed government interventions and silent pressure continue to occur. In addition, CSO
participation in government consultation institutions is occasionally undermined.

The only official estimate of the number of CSOs in Mozambique is from a 2003-2004 survey carried out by the Mozambican National Institute for Statistics. This study cites 4,853 CSOs in the country, although the number has certainly grown since then.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

Mozambican CSOs operate under the Law on Associations (Law No. 8/91). While organizations are now better informed about the registration process, registration is still very costly and time-consuming, especially for community and district-based organizations. In order to register, CSOs must travel to the capital of their province, as well as to Maputo City to obtain copies of members’ criminal records and publish their constitutions. CSOs working on topics considered to be sensitive are subject to long delays in registration. For example, the Mozambican Association for Sexual Minority Rights has been waiting to have its registration approved since January 2008.

CSOs in Mozambique are largely free to express criticism of the government. However, in 2012, there were more cases of government interference in associations’ work. For example, in October 2012, the president of the Municipality of Manica allegedly ordered the closure of the community Radio of Macequeque, which is owned by the Manica Macequeque Community Association, after participating in a radio debate with a representative of one of the opposition parties. The National Community Radio Forum sent a delegation to resolve the conflict, and the Media Institute of Southern Africa issued a press release demanding the reopening of the radio. The radio was reopened after a few days. Community and district-level associations working with activists and journalists on governance issues also felt other less visible pressure. For example, activists or journalists involved in such issues who are also government employees are less likely to be promoted.

Only CSOs registered as public utility institutions receive tax exemptions. This designation requires authorization by the Council of Ministers and is generally only granted to well-established local foundations. CSOs are permitted to sell goods and services and compete for government contracts, as long as all profits go back into the organization. Unfortunately, most organizations still mistakenly believe that being a not-for-profit organization means that they are barred from generating any kind of income.

CSOs lack access to affordable local legal assistance. The Institute for Sponsored Legal Assistance, created under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, is supposed to offer free legal assistance, but often charges for its work. While the Institute provides legal assistance to CSOs, it does not have specialists in CSO law. Most trained lawyers are based in the capital city. District and community-level CSOs have little or no access to legal assistance to mitigate problems with the registration process or government harassment.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Organizational capacity continued to improve during 2012. Increased capacity development and mentoring support on the use of participatory monitoring tools, such as social auditing, community score cards, citizens score cards, and budget monitoring, are strengthening the relationship between district and community-based organizations (CBOs) and their constituents, as these tools require organizations to consult and involve communities in their work and engage in dialogue with the government.
Larger, professional organizations develop and follow five-year strategic plans. Many of these organizations, such as the Governance and Development Institute (GDI) and SEKEKALANI, create their plans in response to donor funding requirements. Many smaller organizations divert from their original constitutions, which outline both their general and specific objectives. A limited number of consultants at the provincial and district levels provide assistance in strategic planning, but their services are expensive and therefore inaccessible to district-based CSOs.

Elite organizations, such as the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), the Center for Public Integrity of Mozambique (CIP), Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA), and Forum Mulher, were able to secure high quality staff in 2012 as they have longer-term funding (three to five years) in place. On the other hand, the lack of long-term funding and, in many cases, decreases in funding have left district-based organizations with few or no full-time staff. Instead, they rely on volunteers or part-time staff. Some media CSOs such as Radio Catandica utilize volunteers as community journalists, supplying transportation costs in exchange for training and work experience. In general, however, CSOs cannot recruit enough volunteers to meet their needs, as local populations live in poverty and have limited free time to dedicate to such endeavors.

Professional services, such as lawyers, are inaccessible for most organizations. Even larger CSOs only engage these kinds of specialists for specific tasks when their projects cover the costs.

Through increased training and mentoring on internal governance by larger international CSOs and intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as Centro Cooperativo Sueco (CCS), Íbis Moçambique, and FHI 360, CSOs are more aware of the need to develop democratic structures. However, CSOs struggle to put lessons learned into practice. Elite organizations typically have the necessary systems and procedures in place and steering committees, which function as boards of directors, fulfill their mandates. In comparison to less developed organizations, members in elite organizations are more aware of their rights and demand a certain level of organizational transparency. Donors also pressure these organizations to develop democratic and transparent practices. Smaller organizations, on the other hand, tend to have fewer employees and less clear divisions of responsibilities, systems, and procedures. Instead, these associations are often led by strong directors—often the founders—in coordination with only the president of the association. Such organizations share little information on their finances with their members.

Most organizations, even at the district level, can now access computers, mobile phones, and email. Internet access continues to be weak at the district level, but has improved with the growing access to smartphones and mobile modems. A new phone company, MOVITEL, now offers CSOs greater access to mobile phones and Internet services at the district level, though its Internet service is still unaffordable for many organizations.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0**

CSOs continue to depend on foreign funding. With 50 percent of the population living in poverty, citizens have little ability to provide financial support to CSOs. As such, the public tends to provide material support only during emergencies. Local government funding for CSOs at the district level is often allocated to newer organizations with strong links to the ruling party. CSO efforts to gain support from local businesses are often frustrated by local governments, which also ask private companies for funds for infrastructural and other projects.
CSOs in Mozambique can be divided into three groups that correspond to their levels of financial sustainability: elite national-level players, provincial-level organizations, and district and community-based groups. The elite, such as IESE, CIP, the Mozambique Human Rights League (LDH), and Mozambican Debt Group (GMD), often have multiple donors and can afford qualified human resources. Provincial and district-based organizations generally only have one or two donors and depend on short, year-long projects. Community-based groups rarely have donors, instead relying on limited support from either larger, local CSOs or international CSOs for immediate activities.

In a recent meeting with ten district platforms across the country, all stated that funding opportunities for CSOs continued to decrease in 2012. This decrease is due to the impact of the international financial crisis, as well as the fact that Mozambique is gradually being taken off of donors’ lists of priority countries because of the country’s economic growth and increasing political stability. The rapid influx of large, multinational companies involved in the extractive industries has not yet resulted in any funding to CSOs, even for those that work in affected areas.

CSOs rarely sell their services, although IESE earns some income by selling copies of its yearly publication Challenges for Mozambique. CSOs never charge for the training they offer to other institutions, including government, because recipients are unwilling to pay. Membership fees are not enough to cover even the most basic organizational costs.

CSOs have become more transparent in their reporting. International organizations have provided mentoring and technical support to CSOs to ensure implementation of administrative and financial systems and procedures. Auditing is costly and is thus only done by larger organizations. Few audit companies have offices outside of Maputo, so auditing services are generally inaccessible to CSOs outside of the capital.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

CSOs made progress in advocacy in 2012 by enhancing their participation in the national and provincial development observatories—government council meetings that set, implement, and review community development objectives—and engaging in successful district-level advocacy.

Mechanisms for civil society to engage in dialogue with both donors and government exist at different levels. For example, provincial and national development observatories allow government, donors, and CSOs to monitor the government’s implementation of its poverty alleviation strategy. However, as consultative forums, these observatories do not offer follow-up mechanisms or oblige the government to act on the findings. Consultation institutions at the district and community levels are supposed to facilitate community participation and consultation in the district planning process, but they still lack accountability, effective decision-making processes, and transparency in selecting CSO representatives.

CSO platforms also help elevate district and community concerns to government for debate. These consultative platforms do not directly lobby for change, but raise awareness in the media and with donors, who can pressure the government to make policy or legislative changes. The results of the platforms’ monitoring are used in the provincial and national level development observatories by G20, a platform that represents civil society at the provincial and national levels. In 2012, the leadership of G20 passed to the Mozambican Debt Group, which has made better use of the evidence collected at the community and district
levels. The CSO platforms in Nampula and Niassa provinces were also instrumental in elevating district and community concerns.

CSO-government initiatives at the national, provincial, and district levels remain uncommon due to the distrust between the two sectors. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which began in May 2011, is a rare example of government-CSO collaboration. Within its broad advocacy and research agenda, Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Mozambique supports the National EITI Coordinating Committee to ensure that the extractive industry supports sustainable development and benefits the general population. PWYP Mozambique members help deepen the debate on economic and social policies and push forward EITI implementation. CIP, for example, has conducted research on forests and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of extractive sector companies, and advocates for financial transparency between companies and government in the sector. IESE, another PWYP Mozambique member, focuses on the link between the extractive sector’s revenue, local governance, and development.

In 2012, informal coalitions at the provincial level were very active in gathering opinions of both CSOs and citizens on the right to information law and the law for the protection of the elderly in preparation for the consideration and debate of these two laws in parliament in 2013. However, many CSOs consider a single workshop, seminar, book launch, or press conference at the end of a project sufficient advocacy. CSOs also rarely follow up on monitoring or investigative journalism work, ultimately leading to little change.

New internationally funded research-based organizations, including the Observatory for Rural Development (OMR), emerged in 2012. These groups could introduce new policy perspectives and approaches based on political economy analysis, and strengthen the existing work of organizations and thematic forums.

CSOs achieved some lobbying successes in 2012. For example, lobbying, advocacy, and monitoring efforts by CSO district platforms resulted in improvements to the accessibility of drinking water and improved sanitation for the citizens of Chitima town.

CSOs also continue to push for improvements to the legal framework for civil society. In 2012, CSOs reactivated the working group on the NGO framework and NGO Code of Conduct. However, parliament has still not responded to the draft proposal put forward by CSOs in late 2010.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs continue to provide a diverse range of services, and increasingly monitor the quality and quantity of services. For example, in 2012 the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) launched the Citizens Engagement Program, which will focus on monitoring and advocacy of health and education services. CSOs see the shift from direct service delivery towards more monitoring and advocacy as positive, as they can now monitor the government’s use of resources. In addition, the growing use of monitoring tools, such as social auditing and community score cards, ensures that CSOs represent the needs of the communities they serve.

Due to shifting donor priorities, CSOs increasingly focus on human rights and governance instead of direct service delivery. More CSOs, such as Campanha Terra Viva, Justiça Ambiental (JA!), and Association for the Environment, are working on land tenure and environmental issues in response to communities displaced by the extractive industry.
CSOs generally provide services to the broader community. Services are provided free of charge due to beneficiaries’ inability to pay, as well as the expectation that CSOs should not charge for the services they provide.

The government is open to working with CSOs, especially those that provide basic services. For example, the government may provide a community-based school with teachers, school books, and other material support. However, the government is less open to supporting CSOs working on human rights or governance.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

Access to information has improved, although accessibility is still much better for organizations based in Maputo and provincial capitals.

There are no resource centers in Mozambique specifically focused on providing information or training to CSOs. At the district and community levels, the Community Information and Communication Support Center (CAICC) IT initiative, funded by MASC and IBIS, offers community-based organizations access to information about the constitution, laws, and local and international news, as well as space for discussion. In 2012, IESE produced a website and CD dedicated to research, media coverage, and online library resources for provincial and national level CSOs. Community radios also help inform CSOs and citizens of their rights.

There are over fifty networks and coalitions in Mozambique that bring CSOs together either geographically (by province or district) or thematically (around issues such as women, children, the disabled, and HIV/AIDs). In addition, district and provincial platforms unite smaller CBOs to coordinate their efforts, identify common problems, and advocate jointly for change at the district level. More district platforms emerged in 2012, including in Changara, Guro, Barue, and Gorongosa districts in central Mozambique. Still, while networks, coalitions, and platforms facilitate information exchange among their members, individual organizations tend to guard their information and projects for fear of other organizations copying their projects.

National CSOs and ISOs provide training at all levels. Training is largely based in Maputo and typically conducted in Portuguese, not in the local language, but most CSO representatives can understand Portuguese. Training is generally funded by donors or international organizations, such as MASC, DIAKONIA, OXFAM, IBIS, CCS, and FHI 360. New areas of training in 2012 included media engagement, change theory, and monitoring the quality of roads and infrastructure. Capacity development in 2012 gradually moved away from traditional stand-alone workshops to hands-on approaches, such as mentoring and learning by doing.

Approximately twenty-five local funders and foundations operate in Mozambique. The most visible are Foundation for Community Development (FDC), Lourdes Matola Foundation (FLM), and Joaquim Chissano Foundation (FJC). These groups mostly re-grant funding and capacity development support from international donors.

Larger, well-established organizations in Maputo are increasingly coordinating with the private sector and media, including jointly organizing and promoting conferences to debate issues related to gender, children, management of natural resources, and others. Many larger companies working in the natural and mineral resources area also support CSO initiatives as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.
The public image of CSOs is still mixed. The increased use of social auditing tools has enhanced the public image of CSOs, as CSOs are seen as elevating community interests and priorities. At the same time, however, the public is more likely to recognize a CSO’s director, not the organization itself, which can give the impression that the organization represents and benefits an individual, not the community.

The government continues to be skeptical about working with CSOs, particularly those working on human rights and governance. The central government is more likely to understand the work, role, and rights of CSOs in planning and monitoring government performance. In contrast, community and district level governments are more likely to see CSOs as troublemakers or opposition, and therefore have a more negative perception of the sector. Businesses tend to think that CSO staff members are not very professional and that CSOs are created to pursue personal interests.

The relationship between media and CSOs continues to be difficult. On the one hand, national and provincial media have very limited human and financial resources, so they are generally unable to cover events at the district or community levels or carry out investigative journalism. Environmental organizations, such as JA!, have great difficulty maintaining journalists’ interest in long-term advocacy on issues such as pollution in Mozal. On the other hand, CSOs have very limited experience working with the media or promoting their work, although larger organizations such as WLSA, Forum Mulher, and Rede da Criancas, manage to receive coverage. More organizations, mainly those based in the capital, are setting up their own web pages and using social media, mainly Facebook.

Media coverage of CSOs’ work is greater at the community level, as community radio stations cover the work of local organizations. At the provincial and national levels, the media focuses more on political and sports issues than CSO work. CSOs in Mozambique still tend to rely on print media, rather than electronic media, although the reach of such media is very limited outside of Maputo.

In 2012, MASC continued to lead a debate on a sector-wide code of conduct. Nationwide consultancies and the eventual production of a final draft are expected in 2013. Leading CSOs produce annual reports, but they are primarily sent to donors and affiliated CSOs. Annual reports are not published in the media due to the costs involved.
NIGERIA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

Nigeria’s return to democracy since 1999 has opened political space for CSOs to flourish, and the government continued to have a generally cordial attitude towards CSOs during 2012. During the year, the government, particularly at the national level, consulted with CSOs on many issues, such as public security and constitutional amendments, suggesting that governmental trust of the sector is growing.

Some northern parts of the country continue to be plagued by sectarian conflict involving a group called Jama’atul Nasrul Islam Lidda’wati Wal jihad, otherwise known as Boko Haram. Although the group has been operating since 2009, its activities increased in 2012. The resulting security challenges led to the closure or relocation of some CSOs in areas affected by the conflict. In addition, the situation led many CSOs to focus more on peace building, security, and good governance. Some CSOs based in northern Nigeria called for dialogue with the insurgents to resolve the conflict in 2012.

CSOs continue to work on diverse issues, such as human rights, environment, and women’s and youth empowerment. Throughout the year, professional associations, including the Nigerian Bar Association, participated in debates around the constitutional review and submitted memoranda.
proposing amendments to the 1999 constitution. At the local level, CBOs focused on service provision, such as vocational training programs for women and youth.

CSO sustainability in Nigeria remained largely stable in 2012. The only improvement noted was in the area of service provision. There were over 57,000 CSOs registered at the national level in 2012, an increase of more than 3,000 since 2011. It is difficult to ascertain the number of CSOs registered at the state and local levels because many state and local governments do not maintain databases of registered CSOs. Many CSOs remain unregistered, but no estimate of the number of unregistered groups is available.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change notably in 2012. The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 still regulates the registration and operation of both CSOs and for-profit organizations in Nigeria. CSOs working at the national level must register with the Corporate Affairs Commission, a process that can be completed in about a week. State and local-level CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) must register with the relevant authorities in their area, which usually takes about a month. A CSO may only operate at the level at which it registers. CSOs working on certain issues must also register with relevant government ministries and agencies. For example, national CSOs working on issues related to women and girls must register with the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs. There are no known instances of CSOs being denied registration for arbitrary or political reasons.

Although not legally mandated, the National Planning Commission (NPC) also requires international CSOs to register with it, a step that some groups, such as ActionAid of Nigeria, have completed. Though not a new requirement, the government has become more serious about enforcing this policy recently due to the growing fear that CSOs are being used to launder money for terrorist activities. However, international CSOs that have not registered with the NPC are still allowed to operate freely.

CAMA stipulates the activities in which CSOs can engage. It also prohibits CSOs from doing certain things, such as paying dividends or bonuses to association members. The Act requires CSOs to submit annual reports to the Corporate Affairs Commission, but the law is poorly enforced and many CSOs fail to do this. CSOs are generally protected from political or arbitrary dissolution by the state. A CSO can only be dissolved by a court decision based upon a petition by the governing council, the Corporate Affairs Commission, or the majority of the CSO’s members.

CSOs in Nigeria can operate freely within the law and engage in public debate of government policies. However, the police sometimes harass civil society members who are engaged in public protests. For example, in January 2012, the police arrested, detained, and beat up some CSO members who participated in the fuel subsidy campaign in Kano, Lagos, and other parts of the country.

Income from grants is generally tax-exempt, but CSOs must pay taxes on profits from economic activities. In 2012, the Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) Foundation paid 17 million Naira (about $107,400) in taxes on income from book sales and rent of assets. The Personal Income Tax Act, amended in 2011, levies Pay-As-You-Earn tax on salaries of CSO staff. Companies donating to CSOs benefit from tax deductions, but individual donors do not.

CSOs can earn income and compete for government contracts at all levels. However, certain procurement requirements, such as evidence of tax payments or submission of tax exemption certificates, make it difficult
for CSOs to compete for these contracts. Many CSOs, especially at the local level, do not have tax exemption certificates because they do not know how to obtain them.

Lawyers familiar with CAMA render legal advice to CSOs around the country. However, there are no true specialists in CSO law because CAMA also regulates for-profit organizations. CSOs do not have access to pro bono legal advice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7**

CSO organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2012. During the year, CSOs in major cities across the country succeeded in building constituencies around peace building, security, and constitutional review, among other areas. At the local level, however, CSOs are generally unable to build constituencies due to their limited capacities.

Although many CSOs at the local level do not have strategic plans, in 2012, ActionAid of Nigeria, the African Center for Leadership Strategy and Development, and other large CSOs in major cities provided training to local CSOs to increase their awareness of the need for such plans. ActionAid also directly helped small CSOs develop strategic plans. The International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Nigeria, the Transition Monitoring Group, and other large CSOs contracted consultants to develop strategic plans.

Large CSOs in major cities have clearly defined management structures, and their boards of directors meet annually to make major decisions regarding organizational activities. However, CBOs do not generally have clearly defined management structures; instead, decisions are made by the executive directors.

Staff members of many CSOs across the country were forced to seek employment elsewhere due to reductions in foreign funding during the year. Some CSO staff moved to the civil service, and others were employed by international NGOs. CSOs increasingly rely on part-time, project-based staff and volunteers to carry out their activities. Many CSOs at the national and local levels have human resource policies.

Only large CSOs in major cities can afford professional services like lawyers and accountants, or technologically advanced office equipment. Small local CSOs cannot generally afford office equipment or Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

CSO financial viability did not significantly change from 2011. CSOs still depend largely on foreign donors for support. However, many CSOs received less grant funding from foreign donors in 2012. Some donors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), are decreasing their programs in Africa, while other donors, such as USAID and DFID, increasingly contract international organizations instead of local CSOs. In addition, donors are reducing the level of institutional support they provide to CSOs.

In-kind support and individual philanthropy to CSOs is still very low in Nigeria, although CSOs are able to mobilize volunteers from their communities successfully as a result of the high rate of unemployment (almost 24 percent) in the country.
Between fifteen and twenty local philanthropic organizations exist in Nigeria, including the TY Danjuma Foundation, Mobile Telecommunication Network Foundation, and Guarantee Trust Bank. Some philanthropic organizations re-grant foreign funds, while others provide their own grants to CSOs as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. For example, in 2012, ActionAid of Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding with MultiChoice and Guaranty Trust Bank regarding support for ActionAid’s activities. However, the level of funding from the private sector to CSOs is still very low and CSOs rarely approach private enterprises for support.

Many CSOs across Nigeria have few sources of income, as they do not have financial supporters or engage in membership outreach or philanthropy development programs.

Only a few CSOs, such as the CLEEN Foundation and Nigerian Bar Association, supplement their income with revenue from services, products, and rent of assets. The government, especially at the national level, continues to provide contracts to CSOs for services. For example, during 2012, the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) continued to lead other CSOs in monitoring the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) projects in the country with the support of the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on MDGs. The government rarely provides grants to CSOs.

Membership organizations are supposed to collect dues, but few are up-to-date with collection. For example, the Transition Monitoring Group, a membership organization with over 300 member organizations, only collects 10,000 Naira (about $60) in dues annually. On the other hand, professional associations and unions like the Nigeria Labor Congress and the Trade Union Congress remain relatively viable by collecting membership dues and impose sanctions on members who do not pay.

Many CSOs still do not have effective financial management systems, although some have started developing such systems to meet donor requirements. Even though the law requires CSOs to submit annual financial reports to the Corporate Affairs Commission, this requirement is poorly enforced. Only large CSOs in major cities publish financial reports. Small, local CSOs do not have the resources to conduct financial audits or publish annual reports.

**ADVOCA C Y: 3.7**

CSO advocacy did not change significantly in 2012. The federal government and some state governments continue to maintain effective channels of interaction with CSOs. However, government collaboration with CSOs is more prevalent at the central level than at the state and local levels. For example, the Federal House of Representatives has a committee on CSO matters. CSO and government representatives also worked together on several projects in 2012. CSOs at all levels collaborated with the government to amend the constitution. The presidency organized a retreat for CSOs in September 2012 to gather their input on the constitutional amendment process. The National Assembly also organized town hall meetings on the constitutional amendments around Nigeria, in which CSOs participated. In addition, the Human Right Agenda Network collaborated with the Ministry of Justice to reform the country’s justice system.

Some Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) are now registering CSOs in order to collaborate with them on broad-based advocacy and awareness campaigns on particular issues in the country. Such MDAs include the Ministry for Youth and Social Development in various states, the Federal Ministry for Women’s Affairs, the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency, and the National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons.
Broad-based CSO advocacy campaigns were more widespread and substantive and received more public support in 2012 than in 2011. For example, in January 2012, professional associations, trade unions, CBOs, and other CSOs launched a nationwide protest to denounce the government’s removal of the petroleum subsidy and the increase in the price of gasoline. The government responded by reducing the price of gasoline from 120 Nigerian Naira (about $0.75) per liter to 97 Naira (about $0.61) and restoring 50 percent of the subsidy. In addition, CSOs formed the Kick Them Out in 2015 coalition to educate citizens on the need to vote out corrupt leaders in the 2015 general elections.

Some CSOs in Kano State, one of the northern states affected by the insurgent attacks in 2012, called on the government, through workshops, seminars, and reports, to engage in dialogue with the insurgents to put a stop to the attacks. However, the government did not initiate a dialogue in 2012.

CSOs made few attempts to introduce new laws or amend existing laws in 2012. The Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative and other CSOs lobbied for the passage of the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Bill. It was presented for a third reading before the committee of the House of Representatives in September 2012 and was referred to a sub-committee for further consideration. CSOs did not engage in much advocacy at the state and local levels in 2012 because of the limited capacities of CSOs working at these levels.

In 2012, CSOs made few efforts to reform laws impacting civil society, although they did oppose remarks by government officials, like those in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, on the need to further regulate CSO activities.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

Service provision improved slightly in 2012. CSOs provided more diverse services in 2012 than 2011. In addition to providing services in traditional areas like health, education, and governance, CSOs branched out to other areas, such as the environment and disaster relief, and policing and security, partly in response to mass flooding and the spate of insecurity in some parts of the country in 2012. For example, the CLEEN Foundation conducted a survey on crime victimization, and the Women Environmental Project conducted several programs on environmental protection. The Society for Family Health provided free insecticide treated nets to communities to prevent malaria. The Center for Applied Economics in Enugu and the Ngozi Okonjo Iweala (NOI) Polls based in Abuja also conducted studies on economic development in Nigeria. ActionAid of Nigeria initiated the Unpaid Care Work program to encourage men and boys to support women and girls in domestic chores in Jiwa village, Abuja.

Many CSOs are starting to realize the importance of implementing projects that address community needs. In most cases, CSOs receive requests for such projects from communities in need. For example, because Kiyuzhi village in Kuje, Abuja had only one toilet for thirty-three households, the African Leadership Strategy and Development Center of Abuja provided training for community members on hygiene and empowered the community to build toilets in 2012. As a result of the training, each household now has a toilet.

Professional associations and a few CSOs charge fees for some of their services. For example, Women Empowerment and Reproductive Center and Women in Business (WinBiz) charged women fees to attend empowerment training in 2012. CSOs generally disseminate their publications and other products to academia, the government, and other CSOs free of charge because the publication costs are usually covered by donor grants. When fees are charged for publications, they barely cover costs.
National and local governments still recognize the value of CSOs in service provision and thus collaborated with CSOs in 2012. For example, the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs contracted the Gender and Economic Initiative in Abuja to educate women on poverty alleviation and land rights. In addition, the central government contracted the CLEEN Foundation to build the capacity of the Nigerian police in 2012. The government rarely provides grants to CSOs for services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

CSO infrastructure did not change notably in 2012. A few intermediary support organizations and CSO resource centers exist in Nigeria, primarily in major cities such as Abuja, Lagos, and Port Harcourt. These centers provide training and information to CSOs, among other services. Local CSOs and CBOs outside major cities have little access to relevant information and technical assistance. Resource centers earn income from fees to supplement their operating costs. Large CSOs in major cities, such as ActionAid of Nigeria, sometimes re-grant international donor funds.

As in 2011, the only CSOs that provide management training are located in major cities. In 2012, the African Center for Leadership Strategy and Development and ActionAid of Nigeria provided training to NGOs and CBOs on strategic planning. Very few advanced trainings in financial management, fundraising, or volunteer management are available in Nigeria. Most training meets the needs of large CSOs that can access them. However, small CSOs and CBOs cannot typically afford the costs of training, and training materials are generally only available in English.

CSO coalitions, such as the Transition Monitoring Group, share information among their members. In 2012, CSOs formed a few thematic coalitions, such as the BLUF Campaign Group, which was created in January 2012 in response to the government’s fuel subsidy removal. Different networks, such as the Legislative Action against Violence against Women, also facilitate information sharing among different CSOs.

Intersectoral partnerships continued to increase in 2012. Many development agencies partner with the government and some local business membership organizations to achieve common objectives. For example, Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment worked with some government ministries and agencies, as well as business membership organizations and research-based CSOs, to improve the business environment in Nigeria. Religious bodies also partnered with the government on security issues in northern Nigeria.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

The public image of CSOs in 2012 was largely similar to that of 2011. CSOs in Nigeria enjoyed massive media coverage due to their strategic role in the petroleum subsidy campaign, security issues, and the constitutional amendment process. In 2011 and 2012, the media mostly covered CSO activities as public service announcements and thus did not charge CSOs for coverage. CSO representatives are also invited to discuss national issues on television and radio. Newspapers also cover CSO activities, and some newspapers such as the Daily Trust have columns focused on CSO activities.
Although no recent studies have been conducted, the public perception of CSOs in the country is generally positive. The role of CSOs in the subsidy campaign in January 2012 enhanced the public’s understanding and appreciation of the sector. The business sector’s perception of CSOs is also positive, although partnership between the two sectors remains minimal.

National and local governments have an increasingly positive perception of CSOs, which has resulted in increased CSO-government collaboration. However, some government officials expressed negative views in 2012. For example, following a spate of terrorist activities in 2012, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission claimed that some CSOs were being used to launder money and finance terrorist activities.

CSOs in major cities make efforts to publicize their activities by using social media and inviting journalists to cover their events. Many CSOs have established relationships with journalists. In 2012, security challenges led journalists to seek relationships with members of mainly research-based CSOs to get their expert analysis of the situation.

Most CSOs have not adopted codes of ethics for self-regulation. However, a few groups, including professional organizations, have codes of ethics regulating their members. In addition, in 2012 a few youth CSOs formulated a code of ethics for their activities with support from the International Republican Institute. Leading CSOs publish annual reports.
Rwanda has a population of about 11 million. According to the World Bank, Rwanda has performed relatively well economically over the last decade. Between 2001 and 2011, the Rwandan economy grew by an average of 8.2 percent a year, making Rwanda one of the ten fastest growing countries in the world. The poverty rate fell by 14 percent during the same period, and more than one million Rwandans were lifted out of poverty.

CSOs in Rwanda are now regulated by the Law Governing the Organization and the Functioning of National Non-Governmental Organizations (Law No. 04/12), which was adopted in February 2012. The government has required CSOs to adapt their organizational structures, operations, and internal statutes to the new law’s requirements by April 9, 2013.

The CSO sector in Rwanda is steadily evolving. CSOs operate in a wide range of all fields and all parts of the country. The political environment is generally favorable and the government generally considers CSOs as partners in development, especially in service delivery. Although the government is often receptive to CSO recommendations, few CSOs are active in policy formulation. According to the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), only 150 CSOs have received certificates verifying compliance with the new law, out of the approximately 1,000 that have applied for certification. Around 2,500 CSOs were registered under the old law.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2

The legal framework for CSOs in Rwanda underwent comprehensive reform in 2012. On February 17, 2012, Law No. 04/2012 was promulgated to govern the organization and functioning of NGOs. The Law grants the newly established RGB the responsibility to register and monitor the activities of local NGOs and faith-based organizations. All CSOs need to comply with the new law by April 9, 2013. The law classifies NGOs into three broad categories depending on their main objectives and the nature of their membership: (1) organizations serving the public interest, which carry out development activities in various sectors like civil society, economy, social welfare, culture, science, and human rights; (2) common interest organizations, which are aimed at benefiting their members; and (3) foundations, which establish a fund or collect funds, manage, and use them to provide beneficiaries with support.

The law also made two other changes. First, CSOs are no longer called non-profit organizations and may conduct commercial activities if profits are used for the organization’s objectives. Second, the law gives CSOs more autonomy to resolve their own internal conflicts. Previously, the Ministry of Local Governance would try to resolve conflicts arising within organizations, sometimes even disbanding boards of directors.

On paper, the registration process is simple. In practice, however, CSOs have experienced difficulties registering under the new law and few CSOs had begun the process of re-registering by the end of 2012, despite the fact that the deadline for re-registration under the new law was in April 2013. Although the law’s new requirements are published online, CSOs need time and financial resources to organize general assemblies to adopt new statutes in accordance with the law. Furthermore, the RGB only has a few legal experts, so it will take time for the government to process applications. Under the new law, CSOs only have to register once, in contrast to the old law, which required groups to renew their registrations annually, a time-consuming and expensive process.

Most CSOs do not suffer from any state harassment and can express criticism of government policy. They can participate in any activity that helps them fulfill their missions or goals. CSOs are required to submit annual reports to the RGB.

Article 28 of the new law provides national NGOs with the right to enjoy tax exemptions. In practice, however, it is very hard to access these exemptions, which impedes CSOs’ efforts to deliver services to their beneficiaries.

Although CSOs can get legal advice, few lawyers in Rwanda specialize in CSO law. Legal advice, which is generally quite expensive, is more accessible in cities than in rural areas.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5

The support provided by different programs in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the organizational capacity of many CSOs. Most organizations now have well-defined management tools, such as strategic plans that clearly state their visions, missions, and objectives. While some CSOs adhere to these strategic plans, others are driven to change direction frequently in order to accommodate donor priorities. CSOs have had to adapt to the increasingly stiff competition for funds by proving they are well-organized.
There is still a considerable capacity gap between the relatively sophisticated CSOs in Kigali and the smaller CSOs with fewer resources outside of the capital. Most CSOs in the country are focused on service delivery. Most national-level organizations, however, have their headquarters in Kigali to engage in national advocacy and have regular contact with donors and international NGOs based in Kigali.

All CSOs in Rwanda must have internal management structures in place to meet registration requirements. An organization’s general assembly elects the board of directors, the board of internal auditors, and a body for conflict resolution. The roles and responsibilities of each body are laid out in an organization’s constitution and internal rules and regulations.

Staff turnover within CSOs is high as a result of the unpredictability of foreign funding, on which all local CSOs depend. Contracted short-term often staff lack motivation and seek better jobs in other sectors. Few people volunteer with CSOs, although some international NGOs based in Kigali engage volunteers.

Rwandan CSOs make efforts to reach out to their constituencies and serve them better. However, civil society activities are still typically identified by implementing CSOs, donors, or government structures, with little involvement of other constituents. As a result, beneficiaries do not feel ownership of the services they receive.

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has helped build the capacity of around ninety CSOs by providing them with training, equipment, and other office materials. Most CSOs in Rwanda have basic equipment, such as telephones, Internet facilities, computers, printers, and furniture.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3**

The financial viability of most CSOs in Rwanda remains precarious. There are almost no local philanthropic sources—from individuals, businesses, or foundations. Very few CSOs are able to mobilize member dues or contributions from their members or other local sources. Very few local CSOs have assets such as conference rooms or restaurants that they can use to supplement their incomes. Some CSOs try to sell products or services. The government does not provide grants or contracts to CSOs.

CSOs still rely on foreign grants to function and focus their fundraising efforts on applying to calls for proposals from international organizations, especially the European Union. However, competition for these funds is high. Donor funding opportunities decreased tremendously in 2012 due to the global financial crisis, and the budgets of some international CSOs that have traditionally supported local CSOs in Rwanda also continued to decrease. Among the donors that decreased their funding during the year are UN Women, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization, Catholic Relief Services, and various embassies. Most donors only support short-term projects rather than programs with long-term strategic objectives, making local CSOs even more financially vulnerable. CSOs are finding it even more difficult to have their own offices because donors no longer provide support for CSOs to invest in buildings.

Partially in response to the stiffer competition for the diminishing pool of donor funding, CSOs have greatly improved their internal financial management, including budgeting, procurement, reporting, and general...
accounting procedures, in order to attract and maintain donor funding. Although community-based organizations still have very weak financial management capacities, most other CSOs are now equipped with accounting software. In 2012, Norwegian Peoples Aid through the Public Policy Monitoring and Advocacy project provided at least fourteen local partner organizations with accounting software, trained their accountants and financial managers on its use, and offered one year of coaching support to all partner organizations. Many CSOs conduct independent audits, but few publish annual narrative or financial reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

Engagement between CSOs and the government continues to improve, and CSOs have set up networks to maintain engagement with the government on citizen welfare issues. For example, the Policy Monitoring Group, a network of fifteen CSOs, analyzes the government budget and meets with members of the budget commission in the parliament to provide feedback on the public budget. In 2012, for the first time in Rwanda, a draft budget was published before it was voted on by parliament, primarily due to the advocacy of this group.

At the district level, CSOs participate in the Joint Action Development Forums (JADF), which were created in 2007 to promote cooperation between the private sector, civil society, and the public sector in order to spearhead development at the local level. CSO participation has helped to create synergies between CSOs and other sectors and avoid duplication of efforts, especially at the district level. Unfortunately, some CSOs cannot afford the fees to participate in the JADF or feel that they should not have to pay. CSOs are also represented in various national boards and commissions, such as the National Labor Council, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program.

In 2012, CSOs conducted several advocacy initiatives. One successful initiative reduced penalties for abortions that fall outside of permitted exceptions to the general ban. Another success was the decriminalization of homosexuality and sex workers in March 2012 as a result of advocacy that began in 2011. In response to the increasing number of unwanted pregnancies and the high risk of HIV/AIDS infection, CSOs conducted an advocacy campaign to make condoms available in secondary schools. Although this goal was not achieved, the campaign raised public awareness of this issue.

The Civil Society Platform of Rwanda conducted an advocacy initiative and engaged the Ministry of Agriculture and provincial governors to reform a land use policy that forced citizens to grow only a few types of crops. As a result of this initiative, the government expanded the permitted crops in certain parts of the country. For example, citizens from the Northern Province can now choose what to cultivate from a list of twenty crops, whereas previously they could only grow maize, beans, wheat, and potatoes.

The electoral law was also improved during the year due to consideration of the Rwanda Civil Society Election Observation Mission’s recommendations to make the election process more transparent and credible. In addition, the Rwanda Civil Society Platform and the Rwandan National Electoral Commission (NEC) signed a memorandum of understanding to allow civil society to conduct civic education activities.

Despite these efforts, challenges and weaknesses continue to hamper CSO advocacy. CSOs do not generally have the resources and skills to conduct surveys and other research needed to conduct evidence-based advocacy. Furthermore, although there has been some progress over the past few years, information sharing, coordination, and networking among CSOs are not yet sufficient. Another weakness in CSO advocacy is that CSOs do not fully involve constituents in their efforts.

CSOs did not advocate in 2012 to improve the legal environment for the CSO sector.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0

Most CSOs in Rwanda are highly involved in service provision, working nationwide in areas such as health, agriculture, education, environment, infrastructure, human rights, capacity building, youth employment, and handicrafts. The provision of services in 2012 decreased somewhat due to reduced donor funding.

Although the government does not provide grants to CSOs, it does tend to value CSO contributions focused on poverty alleviation. Local leaders appreciate such efforts because CSO service delivery supports the achievement of performance contracts between local governments and the President, as well as District Development Plans. On the other hand, capacity building of CSOs, awareness raising of citizens, and human rights work, are not appreciated.

CSOs do not have a system to recover costs for services they deliver. Even though about one million Rwandans have been lifted out of extreme poverty over the past decade, most beneficiaries remain too poor to pay for services they receive, and their participation in CSO work is minimal. CSO activities are still identified by implementing CSOs, donors, or government structures, with little involvement of other constituents. As a result, beneficiaries do not feel ownership of the services received, and the services might not reflect actual needs.

INFRASCTURE: 5.0

Umbrella organizations still operate as intermediary support organizations. In addition, CSOs throughout the country provide capacity building in various domains, such as human rights, conflict resolution, agriculture, advocacy, project cycle management, financial and human resource management, good governance, microfinance, productivity and youth employment, and gender-based violence.

However, these umbrella organizations still depend on foreign donors, and competition for funding between umbrella organizations and their members is still high. Donors still prefer to channel their large projects through international organizations rather than directly to umbrella organizations and networks, which inhibits the capacity and legitimacy of these organizations.

CSOs operate through several thematic networks focused on human rights, gender, media, civil society development, youth, HIV/AIDS, marginalized groups, and survivors of the genocide. However, information sharing within networks is still weak. Networks offer some training, but their offerings are limited due to a lack of funding.

CSOs are forming more intersectoral partnerships with government and media in areas such as development, human rights, health, justice, education, gender, and energy. However, these partnerships tend to be informal and based on personal relationships and interests. Partnerships with local businesses are hampered by businesses’ focus on immediate financial gain.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

CSOs still do not effectively market themselves or their work to the wider public. They focus on implementing their activities, and thus only their beneficiaries are aware of their work. CSO activities sometimes get media coverage; however, this is costly. Radio and print media are more affordable than other types of media.

The public’s perception of service provision, human rights, and advocacy CSOs is generally positive, but the public’s knowledge of CSOs is still limited. Most CSOs make some effort to publicize their work through radio, newsletters, websites, radio talk shows, and theater. Very few CSOs make use of social media to promote their work. The number of CSO beneficiaries continues to increase, especially among the most vulnerable and marginalized populations. They see CSOs as a source of relief, particularly in reducing extreme poverty and improving their livelihoods.

The government’s perception of CSOs is improving due to partnerships between CSOs and some government institutions. CSOs are also very involved in various sectoral working groups, the JADF in different districts, and evaluations of performance contracts between local governments and the President. CSOs are also represented on various national boards and commissions, such as the National Labor Council, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program. This representation elevates the public image and visibility of CSOs.

The business community in Rwanda does not yet understand the possible benefits of engaging with CSOs, including expanding the market for their products. Therefore, partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are very rare.

Only a few CSOs publish annual reports and publicize their achievements to the wider public. Most would rather present these reports to their general assemblies, for which the media typically provides coverage. CSOs tend to have individual codes of conduct, but there is not yet a movement to create a sector-wide code.
Senegal’s contentious presidential election in early 2012 shaped the national context during the year. The incumbent, President Abdoulaye Wade, competed in the election for a third term despite the two-term limit specified in the Senegalese constitution. The public outcry against this violation of constitutional law gave strength to the opposition and a protest movement, which had already forced President Wade to withdraw the draft constitutional amendments that he submitted to the National Assembly on June 23, 2011. The amendments would have created a vice president position and lowered the required margin of victory for the first round of the presidential election to 25 percent. Protests and violence escalated in the first quarter of 2012 before the election, which the opposition candidate, Macky Sall, won with 65 percent of the run-off vote. To many, the transfer of power signaled the viability of democracy in Senegal.

The political tensions in early 2012 slowed the implementation of public programs and aggravated existing gaps in the delivery of basic social services. Agriculture, which employs roughly 60 percent of the workforce, was significantly affected by a series of poorly planned government programs and inappropriate land management practices. Despite a crisis in agricultural production in 2011...
which led Senegal to seek international relief, the government made no preparations for the agricultural season at the beginning of 2012.

CSOs played a pivotal role in organizing and mobilizing people to preserve the principles of democratic governance in Senegal during the first quarter of 2012. While the successful transfer of power appeased the public, the new administration found the public finances in a precarious position because of poor management of public resources under the previous administration, raising shared challenges for the new government and civil society.

In this context, CSOs faced many ongoing challenges. Restrictions put in place by the former regime continued to impede CSOs’ activities and create uncertainty about the legal and regulatory framework governing CSOs. Donor funding was generally unpredictable. However, the successful transfer of power opened up new opportunities for CSOs toward the end of the year.

While there are approximately 500 CSOs registered with the government as NGOs, Senegal’s civil society encompasses a wider set of organizations. Associations, which were originally governed by France’s 1901 law on associations and only have to declare their existence, are the most common CSOs, with 8,200 declared in 2004. Precise figures for 2012 are not available, but many believe the number has surpassed 10,000. There is also a category of informal community-based organizations (CBOs). Because these organizations are neither registered nor declared with the government, there are no estimates available on the number of CBOs in Senegal. Finally, numerous labor unions are registered with the government.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

Decree No. 96-103 of February 8, 1996 provides the basic legal framework for CSOs in Senegal. In 2010, this Decree was amended by Decree No. 2010-1490, which increased government control over CSO resources and transferred the oversight of CSOs to the Ministry of the Interior. The modifications also subjected CSOs to annual financial reviews, including a review of funding sources, by the Ministry of Finance and Economy.

This decree continued to create obstacles for CSOs in 2012. When the oversight of CSOs was transferred from the Ministry of Family to the Ministry of the Interior in 2010, no measures were taken to ensure a smooth transition. A new office called the Direction of Partnerships was created in the Ministry of the Interior to manage relations with CSOs, but it had only two staff members, a director and an assistant.

This bottleneck caused significant delays in the registration of CSOs and approval of tax exemptions. Under the law, the process for registering a CSO is simple: the organization submits an application, which is reviewed by an inter-ministerial commission that includes civil society representatives. This body submits a technical assessment of the application to the Ministry of the Interior, which approves the registration. Similarly, in order to receive tax exemptions, CSOs must develop an investment program which is reviewed by another inter-ministerial commission with civil society representatives and then approved by the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of the Interior. However, because of the lack of resources and the inexperience of the Direction of Partnerships, neither commission met in the first half of 2012.

In early 2012, the government continued to restrict the activities of CSOs through seemingly arbitrary controls. In 2011, the government had suspended international NGOs’ headquarters agreements, which prevented them from receiving tax exemptions, registering vehicles, or bringing in expatriate staff. This suspension remained in effect in the beginning of 2012. Without their normal tax exemptions, international
NGOs such as Plan International, World Vision, and Counterpart International effectively faced an 18 percent increase in costs.

After the election, the Council of Nongovernmental Organizations (CONGAD), a national network of CSOs, worked with the director of the inter-ministerial commission in charge of reviewing investment programs to successfully organize two sessions in June and July, during which all outstanding investment programs were reviewed. CONGAD also met with the Prime Minister’s office, and secured an extension to the international NGOs’ headquarters agreements, which went into effect in July.

In 2012, the government reformed the General Code of Taxes with support from the IMF, which may be a more damaging and permanent change in the legal framework for CSOs. The reform was driven by a study that found that the annual cost of tax expenditures had reached nearly 400 billion FCFA ($812 million). The reform did not distinguish between tax exemptions for not-for-profit organizations serving public interests and other tax expenditures, and could therefore jeopardize the tax exemptions that both local and international CSOs receive. CONGAD submitted a draft framework convention to the President and Prime Minister which would retain CSOs’ tax exemptions, but it has not yet been signed.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

Because of the volatile political climate at the beginning of the year, many CSOs were unable to receive tax exemptions, while also facing other administrative constraints. Coupled with a scarcity of funding opportunities, this has put CSOs in a precarious position financially and put a strain on their capacity. There has been a continuing exodus of the most qualified employees from CSOs, as they seek work in other sectors with better pay and conditions. Many CSOs also lack the resources to purchase modern office equipment.

At the same time, CSOs have faced growing demand for their services, further stretching their capacities. During the crucial period surrounding the 2012 election, CSOs faced an urgent need to engage in the political process by supporting citizen engagement and promoting democratic principles. This work was supported by several donors, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), USAID, the European Commission, and the Open Society Institute for West Africa (OSIWA). At the same time, CSOs continued to face increasing demand for basic social services from vulnerable populations in rural, urban, and peri-urban areas.

Those CSOs that survived these challenges have consolidated their planning and management systems. They have made use of a range of strategic planning tools, and developed methods for generating income and building partnerships. The most successful CSOs typically have human resources departments, use employment contracts with job descriptions, and utilize professional services such as accountants. Only the largest CSOs are able to afford more specialized services such as legal assistance.

Though some CSOs do not have functioning boards of directors, there is normally a recognized division of responsibilities between boards of directors and management. In the most professional CSOs, boards are truly committed and execute their duties and responsibilities in a transparent manner. Boards report to the general assemblies on the implementation of strategic plans and on the use of the resources which they monitor by approving work plans and expenditures.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9

In 2012, available funding and institutional support from international donors declined. For example, the International Development Research Center (IDRC), which had provided significant funding to CSOs for sustainable development, closed its office in Dakar. The government also stopped approving CSO investment programs in the first half of the year, which prevented CSOs from receiving significant tax exemptions. In some cases, international organizations have also started directly implementing activities that would normally be implemented by local CSOs. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) employed local CSOs to conduct a needs assessment, but then provided food aid directly without the support of CSOs. In addition, more resources went directly to government for budgetary support during the year.

As funding has become scarcer, competition among CSOs has intensified. In order to win grants and contracts, CSOs must have strong and accountable management systems and technical expertise in program design and implementation. Since many donors require CSOs to provide cost-share of up to 15 percent of the total value of a grant, CSOs also must have the ability to raise money locally. To some extent, this competition has raised the professional level of CSOs. Many hire external experts to help develop technical proposals, while others have formed consortiums to combine their comparative advantages and strengthen their abilities to respond to calls for proposals.

Numerous CSOs generate income that they reinvest in their activities, including several notable CSOs that operate health clinics. The Union for Solidarity and Mutual Assistance runs eye care clinics; the Senegalese Association for Family Wellbeing runs reproductive health clinics; and the Association for Community Development runs community health clinics that provide mammograms among other services. In professional development, the CSO Youth, Culture, Techniques, and Social Interventions runs a training center which provides remedial courses for youth out-of-school and professional training in welding, metalworking, electrical or structural engineering, and sewing. The Union for Solidarity and Mutual Assistance operates a training center for health professionals and artisans. CSOs such as the Association for Consulting and Action charge CSOs fees for consulting in institutional diagnostics, institutional development, strategic planning, and project design.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

After a long period of deteriorating relations between the government and CSOs, there were encouraging developments in the second half of 2012 that could potentially mark the beginning of a new partnership between the sectors. In addition to working with the government to restart the work of the inter-ministerial commission that reviews investment programs, CSOs initiated a process to develop a new framework agreement for CSO-government relations. CONGAD held working sessions with the President and Prime Minister’s offices to build support for replacing the existing system of government oversight with a partnership relationship. After a sustained campaign, the Prime Minister met with CONGAD and agreed to organize two consultations with CSOs and asked CONGAD to take the lead in developing a draft framework agreement. This led to the
creation of a commission with equal representation by the government and CSOs, and the creation of three technical commissions representing both members and non-members of CONGAD. After several rounds of consultation with the government, civil society, and legal experts, CONGAD produced a draft framework agreement and sent it to the Prime Minister for his signature.

The draft framework agreement includes new provisions for cooperation to be managed by the Prime Minister's office. For example, there would be regular harmonization meetings between CSOs and local government officials, a quarterly meeting between the Prime Minister and the inter-ministerial commissions charged with reviewing registration requests, investment programs, and headquarters agreements, and an annual meeting with the President, in which a delegation representing CONGAD's members as well as non-member CSOs would present a monitoring report on the implementation of the framework agreement.

Members of Senegalese CSOs sit on several steering committees that monitor public projects designed to pursue the Millennium Development Goals as well as other policy objectives. For example, CSOs contributed to the 2013-2017 National Economic and Social Development Strategy and the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. The Ministry of Environmental Protection worked closely with the Network for the Environment and Development and CONGAD's branch offices to prepare workshops, select participants, mobilize local public services, and organize inter-regional consultations.

In 2012, CSOs also led several important advocacy campaigns. Many CSOs fought to support and preserve democratic governance in Senegal. The African Conference for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), for example, played an important role in organizing protests to pressure Parliament to reject the former President's proposal to create the position of vice president and to lower the required margin of victory for the first round of the presidential election to 25 percent. As a result of the citizen mobilization, President Wade was forced to withdraw his bill. CSOs participating in the June 23 Movement continued to educate and mobilize the public throughout the pre-election period and contributed to the ultimate rejection of Wade’s bid for an unconstitutional third term.

Beyond the election, CSOs continued to advocate for good governance. In 2009, a broad group of CSOs and political parties led a national consultation process, which culminated in the promulgation of a charter on good governance and the formation of a secretariat to act as a watchdog group. Though outgoing President Abdoulaye Wade was hostile to the initiative, in 2012, incoming President Macky Sall called on the secretariat to conduct a participatory consultation to reform government institutions. This process was still in an early phase at the end of 2012.

CSOs were also instrumental in promoting gender equality, particularly through sustained advocacy for the complete implementation of a 2010 law on gender parity in elective institutions. The law mandated all elective institutions to have complete parity between men and women. This is enforced through a provision requiring candidate lists to alternate by gender. The results have been encouraging: the current National Assembly is composed of 43 percent women, up from 23 percent in the National Assembly elected in 2007. Women also hold four of eight vice president positions in the Bureau of the National Assembly.

CSOs also continued advocacy efforts to protect the land rights of small farmers. In March 2012, the government issued two decrees to lift restrictions on part of a natural reserve near Saint-Louis and allocate part of the land to an agro-industrial project. The local communities fiercely protested the decision, but the firm went ahead with plans to develop the land. CSOs have reacted to this and similar cases by advocating for better protection of land rights and sustainable rural development. The Initiative for Rural and Agricultural Development (IPAR), the National Council for Rural Dialogue and Cooperation (CNCR), and CONGAD met with each of the presidential candidates to encourage them to support broad-based rural development.

Ongoing advocacy to eliminate the stigma faced by people living with HIV or AIDS gained traction in 2012 as well. CSOs such as HIV Service and the Society for Women and AIDS in Africa (SWAA) have led a sustained campaign with support from the National Alliance against AIDS, the principal recipient of the
Global Fund in Senegal. In 2012, the Health, AIDS, and Population Network (RESSIP) consolidated these activities and led a campaign to raise awareness and mobilize social action. In reaction, the Health Commission of the National Assembly issued a written statement decrying the stigmatization of people living with HIV/AIDS.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

CSOs faced several financial and legal constraints in the first half of 2012 that reduced the quantity of services they provided. In the first half of the year, the government did not review any investment programs, preventing CSOs from receiving tax exemptions. Compounding this problem, foreign donors continued to reduce funding and to require CSOs to provide significant cost-shares.

CSOs continue to provide a diverse range of goods and services, including basic social services in health, education, and access to water; environmental protection including adapting agricultural practices to climate change, improving access to renewable energy, and improving irrigation; and civic engagement, monitoring of public services, and anti-corruption.

As in previous years, CSOs continue to design their interventions largely around the priorities of foreign donors. Donors rarely provide funding to implement a CSO’s strategic plan, even if it was developed in response to the needs of local communities. Rather, donors provide most funding through grants and contracts designed to achieve their own objectives.

CSOs rarely cover their costs by charging users of their services fees, relying instead on contracts and grants from the government, local authorities, or donors. The government at both national and local levels recognizes the value that CSOs can add in delivering and monitoring social services. While the government does not issue grants to CSOs, it does have contracts with CSOs to deliver a wide range of services related to healthcare and literacy, access to clean water, and erosion in coastal areas, among other areas of intervention.

For example, in 2012, the Ministry of Health called on RESSIP to participate in the process of developing a national policy for community healthcare. The Ministry of Health then called on RESSIP along with the Gavi Alliance to implement an action plan to build the capacity of the community healthcare system.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

Several organizations in Senegal provide services to CSOs. The Association for Action (ACA) develops and disseminates best practices for institutional development, planning, and organizational management. The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation provides volunteers to organizations to help build skills. Africa Consultants International helps build skills in advocacy and fluency in local languages and English, and works to improve CSOs’ access to information and modern technology. Other local organizations such as IPAR and the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning also provide services to CSOs.
However, there are several gaps in the services available to CSOs. No community foundations support the work of CSOs, and the networks that share information on specific thematic areas have limited resources. The private sector only provides limited contributions to CSOs to implement small stand-alone activities. The National Council of Employers in Senegal, for example, sponsored a stand at the Youth Job Fair in 2012 for associations of persons with disabilities. The Hewlett Packard Foundation initiated a working group on corporate social responsibility, but to date, it has had little impact on the work of CSOs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.7

CSOs’ role in mobilizing citizens and promoting democratic principles has raised their public profile and given them greater recognition in the public sphere, particularly with foreign donors and with people who participated in the June 23 Movement.

CSOs played an important and visible role monitoring elections in 2012. A coalition of CSOs created an election monitoring unit, which coordinated the activities of numerous election observation teams throughout the country and analyzed the data in order to disseminate credible information on the election process and improve the transparency of the process.

CSOs working on land reform have improved their public image by establishing themselves as credible partners to the government and advocates for the people. The government created a commission in December 2012 to lead the process of land reform, and CSOs began to conduct research to support this process. At the same time, organizations have supported the land rights of individuals. For example, the Pan African Institute for Citizenship provided legal assistance to a group that disputed the properties rights of an agro-industrial farm which had encroached on their land. The members of the group were arrested for destroying part of the fence around the property. With legal assistance, the members of the group were provisionally released. Their case is pending.

As relations between the government and CSOs improved in the second half of the year, the government took a cooperative approach with CSOs and collaborated on a number of issues including the provision of social services and good governance. CONGAD’s work with the incoming government to develop a new legal framework for CSO-government relations has also helped improve and consolidate the government’s recognition of the sector’s contributions.

While collaboration with the private sector remains limited, there have been some instances of cooperation. CSOs worked with the private sector to advocate for preferences in government procurements for Senegalese organizations or firms. The private sector and CSOs also worked together to include protections for the agricultural and industrial sectors in the charter on democratic governance.
SIERRA LEONE

2012 Scores for Sierra Leone

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Capital: Freetown

Government Type: Constitutional Democracy

Population: 5,612,685

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,400

Human Development Index: 177

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

In August 2012, Sierra Leone held its third multi-party presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections since the civil conflict ended a decade ago. Although the elections were hailed by local and international election observers as credible, free, and fair, they did not alter the nature of politics or civic activism in the country. Since Sierra Leone returned to a multi-party democracy in 1996, political parties, as well as state and non-state actors, have generally respected civil society’s space and role. In return, civil society has not indulged in partisan politics or become involved in other activities of which the government would disapprove.

In 2002, the National Election Watch (NEW) was created as a platform to engage civil society in ensuring credible, free, and fair public elections in Sierra Leone. In 2012, the platform received £2 million of support from the British Department for International Development (DfID) for its election work during the year—the largest grant ever given to a single civil society platform or local CSO in Sierra Leone. The project, called Civil Society Engagement in Electoral Processes, covered voter education, safety and security, and organizational development.

The environment in which CSOs operate and the way CSOs conduct their affairs did not change in 2012. CSOs continued to work in diverse areas including democratic activism, environmental protection, youth development, women’s empowerment, and entrepreneurship, among many
others. The government demonstrated respect for civil society by including CSOs in the articulation of critical national development policies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The legal environment continues to offer CSOs significant flexibility to operate. CSO organizational capacity and financial viability remain weak. Non-membership organizations remain entirely dependent on foreign grants for their existence. CSOs have limited access to resource centers and CSO management training. Although issue-based policy advocacy platforms are active in the country, many of them work on the same issues.

Although no precise figures are available, the number of CSOs in Sierra Leone is estimated to be around 2,000. Coming up with an accurate number of CSOs in the country is complicated by the fact that not all organizations register and those that do can register with a number of different registration authorities. The Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (SLANGO) has 317 member organizations, but not all organizations register with SLANGO.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

There is no single piece of legislation in Sierra Leone that regulates CSO operations in the country. The 2009 Government Policy Regulation on the Operations of Non-Governmental Organizations provides rules and guidelines for CSOs registered with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), but does not apply to CSOs registered with other state agencies.

CSOs can register with a number of state institutions, including MOFED, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, and the District Councils. These bodies do not have uniform requirements for registering CSOs, but have general criteria that organizations must meet, including having constitutions or articles of association, office space, bank accounts, and boards of directors. The 2009 Government Policy Regulation on the Operations of Non-Governmental Organizations requires an organization to be a member of SLANGO to be registered with MOFED. CSOs are not required to register, and many community-based mutual benefit organizations operate without registration. However, registration with a state institution confers credibility and is often a requirement for receiving donor or government grants or contracts.

The various state bodies that register CSOs have different regulatory criteria regarding the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and dissolution of CSOs. CSOs registered with MOFED, for example, must submit annual audit and project reports to renew their registrations. While CSOs are not explicitly protected under the law from arbitrary state control, the state does not interfere in CSOs’ internal management, financial accountability, or related issues, and it is extremely rare for a CSO to be dissolved by a state body.

CSOs are allowed to operate freely within the law. Neither the central government nor local councils place restrictions on fundraising, geographical scope of operation, or issues on which CSOs work. Organizations registered with MOFED, however, are not allowed to display religious, political, or ethnic bias. In general, CSOs can freely address matters of public debate and express criticism without fear of intimidation. However, the 1965 Public Order Act does place some restrictions on freedom of expression by criminalizing libel. The Public Order Act also limits freedom of assembly by requiring the organizers of assemblies or public demonstrations to obtain permits from the police. Although the government has refused some organizations’ requests to hold public demonstrations, this requirement is not generally enforced.

There is no tax regime specifically for CSOs. In practice, CSOs do not pay taxes on grants and endowments, but this is not stipulated in the law. Fees and income from economic activities, however, are taxable. The law does not provide tax deductions for individual or corporate donations to CSOs. CSOs can get exemptions
from customs duties for goods imported to promote their work, but this waiver is mostly granted to CSOs that provide direct social and development services such as education, medical treatment, agricultural inputs, and water and sanitation services; such exemptions are discretionary.

CSOs can earn income from the provision of goods and services. Government institutions occasionally announce competitions to provide CSOs with contracts and procurement of social goods, such as building schools, clinics, and public facilities.

Legal training in Sierra Leone does not include non-profit law. As a result, very few lawyers are familiar with laws pertaining to civil society.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8**

CSOs in Sierra Leone fall into three categories: new city-based organizations, socially embedded forms of collective action, and rural peasant associations. The new city-based organizations are generally involved in work around good governance and human rights, or the provision of educational, rural infrastructure, and health and sanitation services. Socially embedded forms of collective action, which include professional organizations and artisan groups, cater exclusively to their members, while peasant associations include rural, membership-based, and mutual benefit credit unions, cooperatives, trading, and farmers associations.

In general, CSOs do not actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives. Socially embedded forms of collective action and peasant groups tend to focus more on securing benefits for their members, while city-based, non-membership organizations are more focused on implementing projects for their external funders. Because these CSOs move from one project to another, they do not really represent or have contact with established constituencies. Even when engaging in advocacy and lobbying, CSOs do not generally create community-level structures such as groups of concerned citizens or representative bodies.

Most CSOs articulate mission statements in their articles of association or constitutions. However, CSOs rarely follow these mission statements, instead pursuing any project for which funding is available. CSOs do not generally have strategic plans, even when they follow their mission statements. CSOs’ internal accountability is mixed. The boards of large, professional membership groups generally exert accountability and oversight, while boards of non-membership CSOs do not provide effective oversight. Non-membership CSOs are largely one-man operations.

Because of their unstable financial situations, most CSOs cannot maintain permanent staff, attract the most qualified personnel, or invest in staff development. CSOs commonly engage part-time employees whose positions are tied to specific projects. While some organizations offer internship opportunities to students, this practice is not well-developed. CSOs develop contracts and job descriptions, but most do not have documented personnel policies and procedures. CSOs utilize accountants, lawyers, and information technology technicians when needed, but cannot afford to retain such staff on a regular basis.

CSOs in the capital typically have basic office equipment, such as computers. Fax machines and Internet access are rare luxuries that only a handful of city-based organizations can afford. Outside the capital, cell phones are the only reliable equipment available to CSOs.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

Socially embedded organizations and peasant groups rely almost exclusively on their members’ dues. For other organizations, local sources of funding are a negligible source of income. CSOs involved in service delivery and democratic activism, for example, do not raise money by any means other than grant proposals to international donors. Businesses have corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, but they do not benefit CSOs. Philanthropy is limited to individual donations to churches, donations by individuals and alumni associations to schools, and corporate donations to schools and communities, which are generally directed through community and political leaders. CSOs rarely seek or receive volunteer or non-monetary support from local communities and constituencies. Volunteerism at the grassroots levels is not channeled through CSOs or CBOs.

CSOs typically do not have diverse sources of funding and most CSOs do not have long-term support. Nearly all grants are for a period of one year. Membership associations occasionally engage in fundraising activities, such as annual dinner and dance parties, to bring in extra resources. CSOs involved in service delivery and democratic activism have no interest in local fundraising activities. CSOs in Sierra Leone do not generally supplement their incomes with revenue from services, products, or rent from assets because of a lack of capacity and know-how. The government occasionally contracts CSOs to deliver services. However, with decentralization complete and Local Councils now largely in charge of service delivery, the level of government contracts to CSOs has declined significantly over the past three years.

Only large membership organizations, such as professional associations and some other associations in urban areas, have sound financial management systems, including finance departments with relatively qualified bookkeepers that conduct financial transactions according to established financial management procedures. In general, CSOs cannot afford independent financial audits or are not interested in them. Very few large membership organizations produce annual reports, and even these do not include financial statements.

ADVOCACY: 4.4

Although still unpredictable, CSOs’ engagement with the government on policy matters has been increasing, and established spaces for CSO-government interaction, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Sectoral Committees and the National Youth Council, have emerged. CSO representation is legally required in certain commissions and on the boards of certain public institutions. The National Commission for Privatization, the National Social Security and Insurance Trust, and the Sierra Leone Export Promotion Agency all have mandated civil society representation, which is respected in practice.

CSOs are generally comfortable with the concept of lobbying and use their relationships with members of parliament or submit position papers to parliamentary committees to influence legislation. Over the past five years, civil society networks have pursued two significant legislative outcomes. The Freedom of Information Coalition has been pushing for enactment of a Freedom of Information Law, while the Women’s Solidarity Support Group has been leading the campaign to enact legislation guaranteeing women 30 percent of elective and appointive public offices. In 2012, the government produced drafts of both pieces of legislation.
Networks are also active on other issues. The Budget Advocacy Network managed to get the allocation to the health sector increased from 7.4 percent of the national budget in 2012 to 10.5 percent in 2013. Advocacy by Natural Resource Governance and Economic Justice led to the adoption in 2012 of natural resource management as a pillar in the Sierra Leone’s third post-conflict Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, known as the Agenda for Prosperity (2013-2017).

The wider CSO community is not aware of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSOs’ effectiveness and sustainability. There is little discussion within the sector on improving or creating laws that would benefit CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSOs provide diverse services including essential social services, democracy building and human rights, environmental protection, youth development, women’s political empowerment, and entrepreneurship, among many other areas.

Goods and services are often based on participatory needs assessments involving constituents and communities. However, it is also very common for CSOs to deliver goods and services as dictated by grant providers and funding opportunities.

CSOs rarely provide goods and services beyond basic social needs, such as training, expert analysis, studies, and publications. When such products are produced, they are not often marketed to other CSOs, religious institutions, academia, or government. CSOs rarely charge fees to recover the costs of the goods and services they produce due to the poverty of their constituents.

The government recognizes the important role CSOs play in providing services, but does not historically provide grants to CSOs. In 2012, however, the Ministry of Finance began making grants of between $5,000 to $20,000 to CSOs to monitor public finances with support from the World Bank through the Non-State Actors project. In addition, the government occasionally contracts CSOs to undertake service delivery work.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

Enhancing Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State (ENCISS) runs a CSO resource center in the capital that has information communication technology facilities and a library of print resources. CSOs can also use the center to hold meetings free-of-charge. However, the resource center is little known within the CSO sector. SLANGO also runs a resource center for CSOs in Freetown.

No organizations provide grants from locally-raised funds. ENCISS re-grants funds from DfID, but these grants only address needs predetermined by the donor.

SLANGO was established in 1994 to facilitate networking among its member CSOs and between CSOs, prospective donors, and government. SLANGO attempts to be a sector-wide umbrella organization, but most local organizations are disinterested in SLANGO, charging that membership offers no real benefits. International organizations constitute a third of SLANGO’s 317 members.
There are many active issue-based networks and platforms for advocacy, information sharing, and cooperation in areas such as water and sanitation, elections monitoring, mineral extraction, health services delivery, education, land, and human rights. Many of them, however, work on the same issues. This is particularly true of platforms and networks working on land rights and natural resource issues. In 2012, Accountability for Land Rights, Natural Resource Governance and Economic Justice, National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives, and Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food all worked on these issues. Several individual organizations are members of two or more of these networks. Platforms in Sierra Leone are often hijacked by their leadership, leading to a loss of the collective agenda and disintegration. In 2012, the National Forum for Human Rights collapsed under such circumstances.

CSO management training, including both basic and advanced training, is seldom available in the capital city or secondary cities. SLANGO claims to offer CSO management training; however, such training is not offered regularly and is not well-known by CSOs. Many international organizations provide remedial basic training to their local partners in areas such as monitoring and evaluation, financial management reporting, and research. Educational institutions do not offer CSO management training courses. In 2012, a number of CSOs benefitted from training offered by the West African Civil Society Initiative, a program of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa. Trainings covered project management, policy advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation.

CSOs frequently form partnerships with government agencies. The government recognizes the advantages of such partnerships and even initiates some, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission’s Civil Society Monitoring Groups. CSOs and government also work together within sectoral partnerships formed by CSOs, such as the Child Rights Coalition. CSOs do not form partnerships with local business or the media, and the sectors do not seem aware of the possibilities or advantages of such partnerships.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

Both print and electronic media provide largely positive coverage of CSO activities, contributing to a positive public image of the sector. The media in Sierra Leone is largely interested in political and scandalous news, and does not consider coverage of CSOs as particularly newsworthy. Therefore, CSOs generally have to pay for media coverage and the media does not distinguish between public service announcements and corporate advertising. The media does not provide in-depth analysis of the role of CSOs.

The 2006 CIVICUS Civil Society Index for Sierra Leone showed that the public generally has a positive perception of CSOs, supports their activities, and understands the concept of CSOs. There has not been any scientific re-assessment of the public’s perception of the sector since 2006.

In general, the government has a positive image of civil society. The government has made policy commitments to work with CSOs in the key national development and poverty reduction framework documents produced after the civil conflict in Sierra Leone. The National Recovery Strategy (2002-2003) articulated that civil society is an essential counterpart to government, and has a fundamental participatory role to play in reconciliation, security, promotion of good governance, and policy development. Local Councils, however, have not made it a practice to work with CSOs.

CSOs rarely undertake activities that directly promote their image, such as branding. The vast majority of CSOs do not have websites and the use of social media is almost non-existent among CSOs. CSOs maintain relationships with journalists to report their activities.
Although some large CSOs have codes of conduct, most CSOs have not attempted to self-regulate. SLANGO has an NGO Code of Ethics that applies to its members, but no sector-wide code of conduct exists. The government has not articulated its views on CSOs’ integrity. CSOs produce reports on projects for the interest of their foreign donors, but generally cannot afford to maintain websites or produce newsletters and annual reports.
Now in its eighteenth year as a constitutional democracy, South Africa faces new political, economic, and social challenges as the wave of democratic optimism wanes. By all measures, South Africa remains a vastly polarized nation, with a small wealthy and educated minority and a large majority that is poor and uneducated. Social protests, some organized by formal or informal CSOs and others purely spontaneous, take place almost daily, as South Africans vent their anger against the government for not delivering essential services, such as water, sanitation, electricity, and infrastructure.

The country experienced heightened labor unrest, often supported by CSOs, in 2012. The two-week long truck driver’s strike in the fall crippled the delivery of essential food and fuel to many parts of the country, resulting in violence and deaths. Unrest and instability within the mining sector has led international credit rating agencies to downgrade South Africa, causing consternation among mining investors.

Taxpayers are increasingly concerned with the mismanagement of government finances and rampant corruption. South Africa’s performance on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which measures the perceived level of public sector corruption, worsened yet again, falling from 64 out of 183 countries in 2011 to 69 out of 176 countries in 2012. A number of African countries rank above South Africa, including Botswana (30), Cape
CSO sustainability remains precarious due to a lack of funding. International donor funding continues to be directed to the government, rather than to civil society. In addition, the ongoing effects of the 2008 global economic downturn continue to depress funding for CSOs.

As a result of this situation, the sustainability of many influential CSOs is seriously compromised. To mitigate these challenges, the Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilization implemented a research and advocacy program aimed at creating a more enabling funding environment for CSOs in South Africa. The program focused on the National Lotteries Board (NLB) and the National Development Agency (NDA), the major conduits for civil society funding. The research confirmed that local donor agencies do not coordinate their activities and made recommendations for improving the funding environment.

Civil society in South Africa is comprised of diverse institutions, ranging from grass-roots community-based organizations (CBOs) serving specific local needs to professional CSOs with international reach. An April 2011 report by the Department of Social Development (DSD) shows a rate of growth of registered CSOs of over 15 percent, from 65,633 at the end of 2010 to 76,175 at the end of March 2011. In 2012, however, 36 percent of CSOs were de-registered for non-compliance, including failing to submit annual financial or activity reports, leaving just 48,906 registered CSOs as of November 2012. By January 2013, the number was further reduced to 29,070. In descending order, the largest percentages of CSOs are engaged in social welfare, development and housing, religion, health, and education and research. A mere 2 percent of CSOs focus on law, advocacy and politics, and just 1 percent focuses on the environment and the development of philanthropy and volunteerism. There are no reliable estimates of the number of unregistered organizations in South Africa.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

Several laws impact the CSO sector, including the Trust Act, the Companies Act, the Non-Profit Organizations Act (NPO Act), the Friendly Societies Act, the Income Tax Act, and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act. The sector’s legal framework did not change significantly in 2012.

The registration process is slow and arduous. It often takes a CSO between six and eighteen months to get its registration approved by the relevant government department. Although a CSO is not legally required to register, an unregistered CSO cannot open a bank account, which can stymie operations.

There is little state interference in the internal administration of CSOs, and little evidence of direct state harassment. However, acts of police intimidation and brutality are often reported at public demonstrations. The Marikana Commission of Inquiry was established by the President in August specifically to inquire into the events that led to the killing of miners in Rustenburg that month. The government closed the bank account of the Al Aqsa Foundation in response to a demand by the US Treasury under South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Center Act (FICA).

CSOs must submit annual audited financial statements to the DSD NPO Directorate. If they fail to do so, the DSD de-registers them, and they can no longer access funding from government donors, such as the NDA or NLB. However, CSOs that are de-registered often simply continue to operate as if they were registered, as the DSD does not inform organizations in a timely manner about their compliance status or the threat of de-registration.
In mid-2012 the DSD issued a discussion document on proposed amendments to the NPO Act setting out a policy framework on non-profit organization law. The document considers the formation of non-profit organizations; a risk-based approach for monitoring compliance; standards of good governance; and self-regulation and accountability. The document also suggests the establishment of a South African Non-Profit Organization Regulatory Authority (SANPORA), a tribunal, and a technical advisory committee to monitor NPOs’ compliance with the law.

CSOs can earn income, which may be taxable depending on the amounts earned and the source of income. The Income Tax Act provides tax deductions for both individual and corporate donors under certain conditions. In addition, a regulatory system has been developed under the Black Economic Empowerment Act for corporations to earn preferential procurement points for donations to CSOs.

All law students receive some training on non-profit law and a number of legal practitioners in both primary and secondary cities provide services to the CSO sector. These services are often too expensive for CSOs, although fees can be negotiated.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

Although all South African CSOs are plagued by poor planning, constant leadership changes, lack of long-term vision, and high staff turnover, civil society in the country is increasingly fragmented and polarized. The gap in organizational capacity between larger and smaller CSOs, including the ability to deliver quality products to beneficiaries and stakeholders, continues to expand. Smaller and less professional CSOs lack training and resources to operate effectively, plan strategically, or build their capacities. They also find it more difficult to secure funding than larger CSOs. Professional CSOs have better access to resources and more capacity to organize.

Over time, the sector has shifted from employing full-time staff to engaging part-time consultants. As a result, a number of former staff members now work as consultants, providing support on strategic planning, internal management structures, and financial sustainability. This trend has weakened the overall internal capacity of the sector.

CSO staffing remains a problem, as universities do not provide regular management programs that would train students for future employment in the sector. However, a number of non-South African residents are finding employment in the sector.

Although the price of computer equipment in the country has been decreasing, many organizations operate without proper office structures. Broadband Internet in the country remains very expensive, placing it out of the reach of many CSOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.2**

The financial viability of the entire civil sector deteriorated drastically in 2012, reaching a crisis level as the effects of the economic recession continue to impact the country. While there are no current or reliable statistics on funding to the sector, most organizations rely on a combination of diminishing international funding, corporate social investment, donations from individuals, and some income generation, often in the form of government contracts.
The economic recession exacerbated CSOs’ need for international development assistance. At the same time, however, South Africa’s new classification as a middle-income country by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has disqualified the country for assistance. Some major foreign donor funding agencies, such as the Mott Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, and DANIDA, have reduced their global funding, in some cases reportedly by as much as 30 percent. As a result of these budget cuts, several CSOs have scaled down operations and laid off staff. For example, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) closed in March 2013.

CSOs’ financial problems are exacerbated by donor policies. Donors do not provide long-term funding or contribute towards CSO administrative costs, including salaries, asset acquisition, or pension and medical benefits. In addition, donor priorities change frequently depending on changing policies in their home countries, rather than needs on the ground. Finally, there is a general lack of coordination among donors, both local and international.

Meanwhile, mismanagement within the NLB has reduced the local funding available to the sector. The NLB frequently loses documentation and responds to queries, approves grants, and makes payments belatedly. In addition, the NLB no longer makes multi-year grants, and has stopped setting aside grants for traditional welfare sectors such as children, the aged, or the disabled. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has publicly circulated a discussion document calling for a review of the NLB, including its lengthy grant-making process. However, no bill addressing this matter was presented to parliament in 2012.

CSOs earn limited revenue by providing services for fees. Government tenders and procurements are sometimes based on personal relationships, as opposed to merit, rendering efforts to win procurement bids even more arduous. CSOs perceive the government as uncaring and nonchalant in its approach to the CSO sector. For instance, the CSO sector has not benefited from the government’s Black Business Empowerment schemes, which are designed to empower disadvantaged non-white South Africans.

The private sector invests billions of Rand in civil society through corporate social investment (CSI) initiatives every year. According to the Trialogue Survey, CSI expenditure grew to around R 6.9 billion (approximately $680 million) in 2011/12, an 11 percent increase in one year. Corporations primarily support CSOs working in the health, education, and social welfare sectors. Private philanthropy is also common in South Africa and is now extending to high net-worth black individuals such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, and Patrice Motsepe.

Financial management systems are reasonably well-developed and are linked to an organization’s size, maturity, and capacity. While there are some public reports of fraud and corruption, these are not rampant and do not reflect negatively on the sector as a whole.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

Many CSOs advocate against contentious issues as they arise. The Right2Know Campaign, for example, addressed the Protection of State Information Bill, which aims to regulate the classification, protection and dissemination of state information. The proposed bill was the subject of various parliamentary hearings and CSOs consortiums, fearing that the bill will restrict media access to government information, organized vigorous protests and demonstrations against the bill throughout the country. The bill was still pending in parliament at the end of 2012.
When the Department of Basic Education failed to deliver textbooks to thousands of Limpopo province primary and high school students, Section 27, a coalition of local and national CSOs, took the matter to court and won a judgment forcing the department to provide the required textbooks.

During the various labor strikes around the country during the year, CSOs organized support services for workers and provided legal assistance. Faith-based organizations such as the South African Council of Churches, the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, and the Anglican Church provided funeral services as well as humanitarian assistance to the families of the deceased.

Despite their active advocacy in some areas, CSOs remain silent on other issues. For example, CSOs have not challenged the Judicial Services Commission’s (JSC) efforts to appoint more black and women judges, which many believe is being done at the expense of merit and competence. This reluctance may be based on CSOs’ fear of jeopardizing their funding relationships with government donors. In some cases, CSOs may not speak out on matters because of the ANC’s unrivaled political power in the country.

Several coalitions advocate for more sustainable funding for the CSO sector. For example, the Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilization published a report in 2012 analyzing the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund and the NDA, and made recommendations to improve government grant-making and investment in the sector. The research report recommended that CSOs continue their creative efforts to access funds and hold the NLB and NDA accountable. It also encouraged the state and CSOs to commit to a cooperative, systematic reform process.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2**

CSOs provide services in areas ranging from disaster relief to mental health care. Some CSOs deliver services where the government is unwilling or unable to do so itself. Most CSO services are provided by volunteers, mainly unemployed youth seeking work experience. Despite high volunteer turnover, the quality of CSO services remains high and services are consistently provided to the public.

In many areas, such as HIV/AIDS support and other health services, CSOs supplement and complement government-rendered services. Although the government provides grants and contracts to CSOs for service provision, the government wants to retain power and control over the development agenda in South Africa, and therefore tends to see the CSO sector as a competitor, rather than a possible partner in service delivery. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that CSO services tend to be more affordable and of better quality than government-provided services. In addition, many government employees are unqualified to deliver services and reportedly corrupt. Due to budget cuts, CSOs at the provincial level often receive reduced payments on contracts already signed, creating grave financial difficulties as CSOs have to seek additional funding to make up the shortfalls.

Although most CSO services are still provided for free, the tough economic climate has driven many CSOs to charge limited fees for their services to supplement their incomes. These fees remain a burden to the beneficiaries of services due to the endemic poverty in the country; 40 percent of the population remains unemployed.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in South Africa has been directly affected by the sector’s declining financial sustainability. Intermediary support organizations and CSO resource centers continued to operate in 2012, but do not generally try to meet the needs of CSOs in a proactive manner. There are few local grant-making organizations, and they are often limited to specific geographic areas and/or beneficiaries. For example, the Human Rights Foundation provides European Union funding through the Department of Justice for short-term interventions on such issues as child abuse or trafficking of women. Grant-making organizations do not follow strategic investment policies and are therefore constantly searching for additional funding.

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, several international CSOs have established local offices and operate in the same terrain as local CSOs. These international CSOs have resources far exceeding local resources.

There is no sector-wide coordinating body, but CSOs with similar aims do create effective networks and coalitions. In 2012, the Right2Know Campaign did impressive work on the Protection of State Information Bill, while Section 27’s efforts focused attention across the country on educational resource materials for children at school. However, cooperation among CSOs remains an issue. The fierce competition for resources, lack of CSO coordination, and duplication of services continue to strangle the sector’s sustainability.

Intersectoral partnerships are limited, and those that exist are mainly focused on advocacy work.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6

CSOs’ public image varies across the sector. While some CSOs, such as Gift of the Givers—an indigenous relief organization operating across Africa—have an excellent public image, other CSOs are unable to attract media attention.

High CSO salaries have sometimes attracted media attention and created a negative image for some CSOs. Sometimes internal disputes around personalities, management, and the allocation of resources flow over into the public arena. In a few instances, these internal disputes had racial overtones.

Media attention is linked to a CSO’s ability to market itself to other sectors of society as a professional organization. CSOs increasingly use technology and many CSOs have created websites to advertise their work and promote giving. Recently, many conservation organizations have emerged, and they market themselves to the public very successfully.

The public generally lacks awareness of the CSO sector and its operations, partly because the sector does not measure its impact. However, in some instances where CSOs have supported communities with a local crisis, they have developed partnerships and obtained public support for their activities. Relief organizations such as the Gift of the Givers, human rights organizations such as Lawyers for Human Rights and the Pro-Bono Legal Resources Center, and organizations working on migration issues have gained the trust of the communities in which they work.
The business sector only sees CSOs as potential partners when it can benefit from the partnership. Some limited partnerships are being established in the environmental sector, especially in providing awards to successful CSOs undertaking conservation work.

CSOs lack a sector-wide code of conduct, and there is no clear concept of accountability and transparency in the sector. The organization Inyathelo has developed a code of conduct for CSOs, but it has only been signed by forty-three organizations. A range of CSOs publish annual reports, many of which are made available on CSOs’ websites.
SOUTH SUDAN

Sudan and South Sudan fought a protracted war that ended with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. After a historic referendum in 2010 in which 98 percent of voters expressed their support for secession from Sudan, South Sudan emerged as Africa’s newest nation on July 9, 2011. About three months after independence, the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan deteriorated significantly. In 2012, the government of South Sudan (GoSS) started accusing the Khartoum government of stealing its oil and imposing high transit fees, whereas the latter accused the GoSS of backing northern rebels in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. These mutual accusations eventually culminated in South Sudan shutting down the oil pipelines to Khartoum in 2012.

South Sudan’s economy is now struggling, as oil refineries previously provided 98 percent of the national revenue. The resulting harsh austerity measures ushered in by GoSS have led to a decrease in public services—including in health and education—that could undermine political stability. CSOs are struggling to fill the gaps left by government cuts to services. CSO activities were limited in 2012 as donors were primarily focused on saving the government from collapse.

CSOs struggle to remain viable and be recognized by the government. Although the GoSS and CSOs worked together to ensure a free and fair referendum on the issue of secession, the government does not fully accept or trust CSOs as true partners on policy matters. For example, the government excluded CSO representatives from the first constitutional review committee in 2010. Nonetheless, CSOs successfully pressured the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs to include three civil society representatives in the 2012 constitutional review committee. CSOs also demanded other reforms, including the introduction of anti-corruption

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4

Capital: Juba
Government Type: Republic
Population: 11,090,104
GDP per capita (PPP): $1,000
Human Development Index: N/A
measures and the enactment of the NGO Bill. However, CSOs have not had any significant impact on policy regarding the worsening relationship between Khartoum and Juba.

Cooperation between the government and CSOs deteriorated in 2012 when civil society activists started to hold the government accountable for some of its actions, most notably the misappropriation of public funds and the deterioration of security in the northern and western parts of the country, as well as Juba. As a result of the lukewarm relationship, the government excluded civil society from discussions on oil agreements and other debates related to government funding by external partners. As a result of government behavior and CSO responses towards such actions, the relationship between the sectors has deteriorated significantly, to the point that the government often views CSOs as traitors and agents of foreign influence.

There are approximately 200 registered CSOs in South Sudan, between ninety and 100 of which are registered members of the NGO Forum, a body that coordinates both national and international coordinating body of national and international NGOs in order to help them more effectively address the humanitarian and development needs in South Sudan.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

When the transitional GoSS was established in 2005, it began working on temporary legal provisions, most of which were borrowed from Sudan. In 2009, the government enacted the Company Registration Act, which also regulates CSOs. Although new bills are currently under consideration, CSOs still operate under the provisions of the Company Registration Act.

Under the Company Registration Act, CSOs must register at the national level, with both the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs and the Ministry of Disaster and Humanitarian Affairs. Each ministry levies a fee, making registration expensive. CSOs operating at lower levels must also register at the state and county levels and pay the related fees. After CSOs operating at the lower levels complained about the multiple registrations, the NGO Forum raised the issue with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, which resolved the issue. However, some government line departments at the county level still request re-registration.

CSOs continue to advocate for the 2009 NGO Bill, which was reviewed in 2010 and 2011. The NGO Bill provides operational principles for NGOs, including requirements for registration, scope of activities, reporting, financial obligations, and other government monitoring provisions. In 2010, the NGO Forum asked the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to review the bill, and a working group was formed. However, the process stalled in 2011 because the government was opposed to the amendments proposed and the title of the bill. Because of donor pressure, the government reopened discussion of the bill in 2012 under the name Voluntary and Humanitarian Organizations (VHO) Bill. Discussions were ongoing at the end of the year.

CSOs find the operating environment at the state level confusing because state governments have a high degree of autonomy. Each state government has its own constitution and standing orders that must be followed by all entities operating in the territory. These conditions place serious burdens on CSOs, especially those with unreliable sources of funding, because every demand has financial implications.

State harassment of CSOs is rampant due to the lack of strong law enforcement institutions and rule of law in the country. Many incidents occurred in 2012, including the abduction and torture of the chairperson of the CSOs Alliance after he led a demonstration at Parliament against the alleged theft of $4 million by prominent government officials. Also in 2012, government forces in Wau County of western Bhar el Ghazal State killed or arbitrarily arrested many unarmed demonstrators protesting against the transfer of Wau Payam (county) headquarters to a remote location. CSOs in Wau appealed to the international community and donors to hold
the government accountable for breaching the demonstrators’ freedoms of association and expression. State government agencies also intimidate CSOs. For instance, in 2011 the state government in Central Equatoria ordered all CSOs to re-register with the relevant ministries and report their budgets, although their disbursements are already supervised by the directors general of each relevant ministry. This practice is even more rampant in Bhar el Ghazal and other states.

Taxation in South Sudan is marred by operational irregularities and a lack of standard policies. Between 2007 and 2010, CSOs received tax exemptions, primarily on imported goods for health and other humanitarian needs. When austerity measures were introduced in 2012 after the oil refineries were shut down, access to tax exemptions became unpredictable. In some cases, CSOs secure tax exemptions based on personal relationships with the tax authorities. The NGO Forum has engaged with the relevant government departments on these inconsistencies. The government repossesses all tax-exempt assets once an organization closes down.

Any income generated by a CSO must be reinvested in CSO projects. Only a few CSOs earn income from government contracts for provision of health services due to a lack of technical capacity.

The legal field in South Sudan is still developing. General practitioners handle lawsuits and to some extent registration of CSOs or enterprises, but there are no specialized lawyers trained in CSO law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Most CSOs, especially service providers, have the support of the communities they serve. Having started at the grassroots level, many CSOs have cordial relationships with their beneficiaries. Faith-based organizations have garnered respect across the social divide due to their participation in the peace talks.

Many CSOs have written vision and mission statements to guide their operations, but do not adhere to them because they rely on donors with diverging interests and missions. Strategic plans require professional expertise, which CSOs cannot afford. Thus, most CSOs have operational plans rather than strategic plans.

Although CSOs typically have formal organizational management structures, founders often interfere with decision-making processes, sometimes controlling all aspects of their organizations, including finance, logistics, and administration. Because board members in South Sudan are given allowances to participate in board meetings, many CSOs organize board meetings infrequently, sometimes not for many years. Therefore, boards may not have any significant influence on governance. However, according to data from the NGO Forum, many CSOs are improving their organizational structures through training organized by international organizations.

Because of financial constraints, CSOs find it difficult to retain qualified staff. As illiteracy is high in South Sudan, there are few qualified candidates for jobs and CSOs cannot afford to compete for qualified staff with international organizations. Most CSOs recruit people with only primary school educations and provide them with on-the-job training.

CSOs that partner with international CSOs or donors may have advanced equipment like new computers, copiers, and printers, as well as Internet access, while others typically do not. CSOs that are supported by international organizations sometimes receive second-hand equipment. Most senior CSO staff have cell phones.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9

Financial viability continues to be a primary challenge to CSO sustainability. Because the war destroyed the country’s social and economic infrastructure and the population is impoverished, CSOs cannot expect any financial support from communities. Most people are focused on survival and are unwilling or unable to do voluntary work. However, CSOs are often able to mobilize people to do work in the community, like building rural roads or flood dykes, in exchange for in-kind payments, for example, food. In addition, CSOs often benefit from the help of Western volunteers.

There are a few South Sudanese foundations, including the Kiir foundation, Sudan Peace Foundation, Ajiek Africa Foundation, and Foundation for Youth Initiatives. However, little is known about their activities. Some CSOs receive financial and in-kind donations from the diaspora. Members of the diaspora have also reportedly established foundations, but these have not led to visible financial support for CSOs on the ground.

Most, if not all, CSOs depend on foreign donor support and do not yet have the capacity to fundraise or diversify their funding sources. Most CSOs only raise funds by writing proposals. In 2012, seven donor countries, including the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Denmark, and Ireland, created the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) for South Sudan. Donor contributions in 2012 amounted to over $118 billion, which is distributed to both national and international CSOs, as well as UN agencies, for humanitarian projects. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated another $40 million for emergency humanitarian responses. Other major donors include UNICEF, USAID, UNHCR, and CHF International.

CSOs do not own property or engage in income-generating activities. The 2009 Company Act does not allow non-profit organizations to engage in business-like activities. A few organizations, primarily in the health and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sectors, access government contracts. Membership fees are an insignificant source of funding for CSOs.

Many CSOs that receive donor funding have established financial management systems to meet the requirements of donors and audit firms. CSOs that receive CHF or CERF funds participate in courses on financial management.

ADVOCACY: 4.9

Advocacy is challenging for CSOs in South Sudan. CSOs have not yet developed effective techniques to engage with the government, and the government is not interested in CSOs engaging in political issues or holding the government accountable, as evidenced by the frequent harassment of civil society activists in Juba.

CSOs still struggle to define their role in policy advocacy. Many CSO activists are merely reactive to events instead of acting in a more proactive way towards the government. For instance, in mid-2012, when President Salva Kiir demanded that seventy-two prominent members of Parliament and executive government staff return stolen government funds, some CSOs marched to the parliament and the president’s office to deliver a letter asking him to prosecute these officials. Similarly, CSOs demonstrated in support of the invasion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and repossession of Heglic in the contested areas north of South Sudan.

CSOs have not yet united to pressure the government to recognize the sector’s importance. In July 2010, an attempt was made to merge vibrant CSO networks into the Civil Society Alliance (CSA) to represent the sector as a whole, but this effort was unsuccessful due to dissatisfaction with the CSA’s leadership. The
CSO activists in various fields try to get the government to open up space for CSO participation in decisions affecting civil society. In 2012, the NGO Forum met with several donors and EU Parliamentarians to discuss the role of civil society in South Sudan, requesting the international community to pressure the government to expedite discussions on the NGO Bill and Media Bills. CSOs also wrote to the President's office to lobby for inclusion of CSO representatives in the interim constitution review committee. As a result, the government increased the number of CSO representatives from one to three.

CSOs at the national level lobby for amendments to the VHO and Media Bills and for the reconsideration of Article 139 of the interim constitution, which grants broad powers to security operatives to arrest anyone perceived as a threat to the state.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

CSOs provide various humanitarian services in areas including WASH, education, and food security. Emergency interventions have grown since South Sudan’s independence due to the ongoing violent conflict. For example, the conflict between the northern rebels, the SPLA-North, and the government in Khartoum has resulted in over 300,000 refugees fleeing to South Sudan. More than ten national CSOs work hand in hand with international organizations to provide needed services to these refugees.

The services provided by CSOs are determined by needs assessments conducted by government representatives, international CSOs, UN agencies, domestic CSOs, and community representatives. In addition, the Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment, which is conducted by the World Food Program and the Food and Agricultural Organization with representatives of government and CSOs, establishes needs through stakeholder participation.

CSOs also provide some information and expertise, including on local culture, traditions, and taboos, to their partners through workshops, seminars, coordination meetings, and joint site visits. Beneficiaries of these services include international NGOs, the UN World Food Program, UNICEF, and the government’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

Most CSO services rely on donor funding. CSOs providing humanitarian services do not charge fees for their services. Some CSOs involved in development projects have cost recovery policies, which generally only recoup in-kind resources. These goods are then used to generate additional support for the project. For instance, CSOs working in food security and livelihood will request cash or produce from beneficiaries for the tools supplied and then sell the produce to raise money for additional services.

CSO service providers receive recognition and moral support from the government because they fill gaps in state service provision. However, the government rarely awards contracts to CSOs because it expects CSOs to receive donor assistance to provide services that the government cannot provide.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

The sector generally lacks intermediary support organizations (ISOs) or resource centers that provide training, information, and networking. The NGO Forum, which unites over 150 international CSOs and 100 domestic CSOs, plays the role of an ISO at the national level. Forum members have access to a variety of capacity building and information sharing services. The Forum annually elects a seven-member steering committee to...
work with the Secretariat to enhance coordination and information sharing, as well as formulate action plans for CSO capacity building. The Forum has developed several tools to enhance CSO capacities on strategic planning, internal governance, and financial management, the key areas highlighted in a capacity assessment exercise conducted by UN Habitat in 2009. A representative of the steering committee also attends meetings on behalf of the Forum and disseminates information to all CSOs via SMS. In addition, the Forum invites government officials to speak on specific issues. For example, in 2012, the Forum invited the Director General for NGO Affairs in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to explain why the NGO bill has not been passed yet.

The NGO Forum also hosts sectoral groups on issues such as food security and livelihood, health, protection, and policy formulation. CSO networks, including the South Sudan Human Rights Group and South Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections, have formed a consortium, but it does not yet unite the entire sector.

There are no local grantmaking organizations in South Sudan. Most CSO funding comes directly from foreign donors or through intermediary international organizations.

Most training opportunities for CSOs are provided by international CSOs. Courses include protection of civilians, financial management, security, project planning and management, procurement processes and advocacy, among others. However, some courses are too expensive for CSOs to afford so they have minimal impact on the sector. In 2012 RedR, an international NGO, started providing courses for CSOs in South Sudan, which are more affordable and often free. Straight Consultant Nile Valley Consults also provides training on strategic management systems, but only well-funded CSOs can afford these trainings. In addition, the NGO Forum established a national CSO capacity development project to be administered by Pact-South Sudan, which will begin in 2013.

Before independence, CSOs, the government, and the private sector worked together in the effort to secede from Sudan. Traders contributed money and materials for the working committees that were responsible for educating the rural population about secession. After independence, however, this relationship soured. Intersectoral partnerships are currently more limited and include the joint advocacy of CSOs and the Union of Journalists and the Association for Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) for enactment of the media and other bills.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9

CSOs must pay for media coverage, which is expensive and unaffordable for many CSOs. However, media often covers CSO events for reduced rates when the media can also make presentations or promote themselves at the events, or if the event is otherwise beneficial to society as a whole.

When they can afford coverage, CSOs publicize their activities through print media and radio talk shows. CSOs are featured for free in Miraya FM, a well-known UN-funded media house. Similarly, Eye-Radio, a private radio station in Juba, provides free weekly air time to the NGO Forum. However, the standard of journalism is very low in South Sudan, and investigative journalism is non-existent. Therefore, most people prefer foreign news, meaning that CSO efforts to publicize their work have limited impact.

The public acknowledges the role of CSOs during the recent years of struggle and has come to appreciate them, as evident from the positive public response at CSO organized village development committee meetings. However, some people believe that CSOs make money for personal gain.

The business community and CSOs have some common objectives and mutual respect for each other. For example, during demonstrations, some merchants close their businesses to join CSOs. While the central and state governments perceive CSOs as agents of foreign entities and treat them with suspicion, it also values
their contributions to service provision. For example, the government provides security and logistics support to CSOs providing emergency relief services to victims of ethnic violence in remote areas in Jongole.

Individual CSOs have codes of conduct or other self-regulation tools. The NGO Forum’s CSO Capacity Development Working Group is considering adopting a self-assessment quality assurance mechanism similar to Uganda’s NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM).
Until the 1970s, civil society in Sudan was dominated by trade unions and charity groups. Following the Sahelian drought of the 1980s and the revival of civil war that displaced millions of people in what was then Southern Sudan, many modern organizations emerged. Most focused on service provision, although a few worked on environmental, children’s, and women’s issues. Following the military coup of 1989 and the adoption of economic liberalization policies, a large number of CSOs concerned with rights and poverty alleviation emerged. However, more continued to work in service delivery to fill the gap created by the state’s withdrawal of support to vulnerable groups and the decline of activity by international CSOs. The 2002 signing of the first ceasefire agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) marked the beginning of CSOs working on peace and reconciliation.

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Abuja Agreement, and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement between 2005 and 2006, the number of CSOs increased rapidly, mostly in the areas of peace building, advocacy for civil rights, and democratic transformation. The number of registered CSOs in Sudan grew from less than fifty in the 1970s, to about 350 in 1990, and to over 3,200 in 2006. Officials from the Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC) estimate that the total number of organizations registered nationwide, including community-based organizations (CBOs), tribal associations, and regional groups, was over 10,000 in 2012. HAC officials, however, have not shared the official register.
Civil society in Sudan consists of various types of organizations. First are the organizations registered by the HAC, which are mostly urban-based organizations initiated by educated groups and elites. Some of these are independent organizations and others are government-initiated or supported. Second are cultural groups registered under the Cultural Groups Law. Other official groups include geography-based organizations that are formally registered in a particular region or area; tribal associations, some of which are registered as regional groups; trade unions and professional associations, registered under the labor laws; students unions and associations; and sports associations and clubs. Finally, there are unregistered but socially recognized religious groups, the largest of which are the Sufi sects.

Starting in 2009 after the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Sudanese political figures, the government began attacking independent CSOs, particularly those working on rights, democratic reform, and civic education. In March 2009, the government expelled thirteen international CSOs, including Oxfam Great Britain, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children, and de-registered two national organizations. During the second half of 2012, the government launched another wave of expulsions and bans of CSOs, de-registering ten organizations, including international and national CSOs, mostly cultural and civic education entities. The only reason given for de-registering these organizations was the fact that their operations were not in line with the country agreements that they had signed.

Persecution of independent journalists has also risen considerably, with at least fifteen journalists detained in 2012 and many more harassed. The government has instructed all newspapers to publish only official government statements about demonstrations or military operations.

Sudan confronted a host of challenges in 2012. Armed conflict continues in Darfur and has resurfaced in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. Much of the population has been displaced and the resulting humanitarian crisis has raised the demand for CSOs’ assistance. At the same time, the country was dealing with an economic crisis resulting from the loss of oil revenues following South Sudan’s secession and the subsequent failure to reach an agreement with South Sudan on oil and border issues. High inflation, unemployment, lack of freedoms, and government failure to sustain cooperation with opposition parties have prompted intermittent demonstrations, mainly by youth groups and affiliates of opposition parties.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

CSO registration is governed by several laws and institutions including the 1996 Cultural Groups Act and the 2006 Act on Regulating Voluntary and Humanitarian Work. The Cultural Groups Registrar at the Ministry of Culture is in charge of cultural groups and mainly functions in Khartoum state. The notorious 2006 Act is implemented by the HAC, which is under the control of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). The Act provides the HAC with absolute discretion. According to the law, thirty persons can form a general assembly to establish an organization once they draft a constitution setting objectives, methods, area of work, sources of funding, and other information. However, the general assembly cannot be held unless a HAC representative approves and attends it, so registration applications might be delayed for years. The constitutional court has not yet responded to the 2006 challenge by CSOs to the law’s constitutionality.

CSOs are required to report periodically to various governmental bodies, including the HAC, the Cultural Groups Registrar, and NISS. The HAC regularly forces international and donor organizations to work with certain partners or fund certain activities. It also disrupts or stops ongoing activities or programs or refuses permits for certain activities. In particular, the HAC and NISS closely monitor and control service-providing CSOs in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states. In addition, the HAC imposes significant obstacles to the work of CSOs focused on human rights, democratic transformation, and constitution-making.
The HAC and NISS interfered with or shut down many CSO operations in 2012. First, the HAC and NISS closed the offices, seized the assets, and froze the bank accounts of SudanAid and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). SudanAid remains closed, and three SudanAid staff members continue to be detained by NISS in South Darfur. Second, the HAC ordered seven of the thirteen international CSOs with significant reach in Eastern Sudan to close their operations. Third, the HAC froze the accounts of Christian Aid because it funded a national organization, the Gender Center, that is not registered with the HAC and hence not subject to its control. Fourth, several national organizations, including some focused on human rights, were banned. CSOs and networks involved in issues that the authorities do not consider threatening, such as climate change, breast cancer, and child protection, worked without interference in 2012.

CSOs do not enjoy tax exemptions or deductions on income from grants, donations, or economic activities. According to the law, CSOs are entitled to exemptions on customs duties, but they are not applied equitably to all organizations. Most CSOs do not request these exemptions because the process is time consuming, the results are not guaranteed, and they are hesitant to promote their visibility to government officials.

Independent CSOs do not compete for government contracts or procurements at the local or central levels. However, some government-supported organizations are awarded contracts and are allowed to operate commercial projects to support their organizations.

Most large, urban-based national CSOs have legal advisors, who are engaged on either a paid or voluntary basis. Activists and human rights defenders generally depend on volunteer legal counsel. However, their effectiveness in cases of a political nature is limited. CBOs and smaller organizations do not have formal legal advisors.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2

Many national CSOs with close ties to the donor community over the last ten years have started to become more professional, developing their own visions, missions, objectives, strategic plans, methods of work, annual plans, and measurement and evaluation systems. Some are driven by donor priorities, while others are driven by community needs. The scope of work of smaller CSOs and most CBOs, on the other hand, is limited. Few smaller organizations have been exposed to strategic planning techniques and most lack the resources to hire planning consultants to help apply them.

CSOs usually hire staff on a project basis. Most donors do not provide resources for institutional building. Most small and medium CSOs lack a clear division of responsibilities between board members and staff, leading to board member interference in day-to-day business. Large national organizations remain under the scrutiny of the media and the state. Therefore, most of them are meticulous about holding their general assemblies on time, submitting their audited accounts and annual activity reports, and holding elections.

Technical capacity varies considerably. Most urban CSOs have rented offices, office equipment, at least one computer, telephone service, and Internet access. Some larger organizations also have their own means of transportation. On the other hand, very few organizations in rural areas have these facilities. Few CSOs have their own websites, are linked to international CSO networks, or have access to networks.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

Except for personal contributions from members, CSOs are heavily donor-dependent. Other than pro-government CSOs, few CSOs receive local support. Because of the extreme poverty in the country, local donations are rare. Support from institutions such as the Zakat Chamber is limited, provided to a select few organizations, and oriented to service delivery. Although some local businesses contribute to building
schools, mosques, and other facilities, business contributions are generally limited to sports and other popular or government-promoted activities.

Receipt of foreign funding must be approved in advance by the HAC as part of a formal agreement between the HAC and the donor organization. The expulsion of international CSOs has impacted CBOs negatively. For example, since Oxfam Great Britain was expelled in 2009, only two out of the twelve CBOs in the Red Sea state that Oxfam supported continue to operate. The same applies to CBOs in Darfur where a larger number of international CSOs were expelled.

Most CSOs are dependent on one or two donors. Donor support is generally project-based. Certain events such as the sixteen-day campaign against Violence Against Women, Human Rights Day, or the African Child Day receive generous international donor support. Some thematic issues, such as elections and constitution-making, also receive wide donor attention. Most CBOs in rural areas operate intermittently, depending on the availability of resources.

Very few CSOs earn modest income through fundraising. However, ethnic and geography-based organizations tend to receive support during crises or for specific activities, mostly from Sudanese working abroad in the wealthy Gulf countries.

No CSOs earn income through the provision of goods and services because they perceive their non-profit status to prohibit them from doing so. Except for associations initiated or supported by the government, no CSOs compete for government contracts or procurements at the local or central levels. Before the 1990s, several organizations depended on membership fees, donations, and material contributions to support their activities. Given the increased poverty, however, income from such sources is now nominal.

Most professional CSOs and some CBOs have sound financial management systems to meet donor requirements. Sudanese law requires registered CSOs to present audited financial reports and narrative reports at their annual general assembly meetings, which are attended by HAC representatives and required in order to renew registration. Most CSOs follow these requirements.

**ADVOCACY: 4.7**

Independent CSOs’ interaction with central and state governments is generally limited to mandatory reporting. The National Human Rights Commission under the Ministry of Justice and some state assemblies support and coordinate CSO initiatives on the constitution such as the Sudanese Initiative for Constitution-Making (SICM), implemented by a network of CSOs. CSOs, academia, and the media continued their efforts in 2012 to raise public awareness on the process and substance of the forthcoming constitution at both local and national levels. The various constitution-making initiatives started to work with political parties, including the ruling party. The process is still at the stage of general discussion. Although some parties have prepared drafts, most CSOs are focused on the process rather than the content of the constitution.

Advocacy organizations address specific issues, including violence against women, family law, peace building, and HIV/AIDS. The few successful national advocacy campaigns conducted by CSOs include the Sudanese Women Empowerment group’s campaign against the Khartoum State Wali Decree of 2000, which banned employment of women in gas stations and restaurants; the campaign against Article 149 of the criminal code that called for child sexual abuse to be referred to Family and Child Courts; and the campaign for increased female representation in decision making, which led to a constitutional amendment requiring a 25 percent quota for seats in Parliament for women.
Despite these successes, the role of CSOs in advocacy and lobbying remains limited because of the restrictive Humanitarian and Voluntary Act, the lack of adequate resources, and the absence of long-term efforts. In general, CSOs are excluded from official decision-making mechanisms in various levels of government. In addition, several strong campaigns during the last decade, including those addressing female genital mutilation and early marriage, were rejected by the President, the Parliament, and other government bodies. Some of these efforts not only failed to produce positive results, but resulted in the harassment of many CSOs, including the closures of the Khartoum Center for Human Rights and the Khartoum Human Rights Monitor “Mersad” in 2009 and the closure of the Al-Khatim Adlan Center in 2012.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2**

Successive violent conflicts and environmental degradation, both of which increased the number of people needing services, led to a focus on service delivery by both the donor community and many CSOs. The most affected areas are Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and East Sudan, in addition to Khartoum, where most of the displaced persons settle. The 46 percent poverty rate and high rate of unemployment have shifted the focus of service providers to new areas, such as microfinance, income generation activities, adult education, social counseling, and peace building, and to particular social groups, including women, youth, and the disabled. Most international assistance is humanitarian in nature, and most international organizations work in social services, such as water, health, relief, and support to local food production. The expulsion of international organizations in 2009 and the de-registration of additional organizations in 2012 resulted in a gap in services. For example, Goal-Ireland provided all health services, in addition to some water services, in two rural areas in Kassala State (Talkok and Hamishkoreib), while Oxfam GB supported most of the health and water services and all relief operations in localities in North and South Tokar in the Red Sea State from the 1980s to the time of its expulsion.

While there are geographic, tribal, and ethnic-based CSOs that limit services to their members, most national CSOs provide services according to need and eligibility, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or gender.

CSOs do not earn income through the provision of goods and services. Most CSOs working on credit or microfinance follow a revolving fund approach aimed at expanding their coverage. CSOs consider market demand when designing vocational training and income generation projects.

In general, the government’s approach to supporting CSO service provision appears to be politically motivated. No independent CSO receives grants or contracts from the government. In addition, the government has expelled some organizations, and senior government officials continue to accuse others of collaborating with foreign powers to overthrow the regime. Most large-scale humanitarian assistance provided by international organizations, such as that in Darfur, is also delivered through pro-government organizations.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

The number of CSO resource centers is very limited. In addition to one center registered as a CSO, there are two units in universities. Commercially-operated training and consultancy offices also offer support services to CSOs, including training on CSO project cycle management, strategic planning, and measurement and evaluation. Almost all of these entities are Khartoum-based, but will provide training in other regions when contracted. These offices perform the important role of translating and adapting international training materials. They also adopt interactive, participatory and action-oriented approaches. The most significant role in building CSO capacity is played by large CSOs with connections to international networks and more access to information, such as NCF, the Sudanese Environmental Society (SECS), and the Babiker Badri Society. These groups regularly transfer knowledge and expertise to their partner CSOs in states outside Khartoum.
The Human Rights and Legal Network (HRLAN) has a media center. A group of network members trained in recording and editing film uses the well-equipped center under the supervision of a professional TV director. The center aims to promote awareness of human rights and document human rights violations. However, the NISS disrupted the activities of the center in 2012, and all training and documentation activities were stopped.

Although there are some charity organizations that directly fund projects, such as the digging of wells or building of schools, clinics, or mosques, none give money to CSOs. CSOs therefore depend heavily on international organizations and UN agencies.

Many thematic networks unite CSOs on topics such as poverty alleviation, climate change, breast cancer, women’s empowerment, and human rights. For example, SECS unites environmental groups, the National Civic Forum (NCF) focuses on civic education, Azza focuses on women and rural development, and Mutawinat and Al-Manar on legal aid. However, information sharing between member organizations is limited, and they are often more competitive than cooperative. National CSOs also frequently establish coalitions when they encounter hindrances from the government, such as restrictive legislation. In such cases, there is better flow of information and stronger cooperation. International organizations also have their own well-structured networks and methods of information sharing.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1**

The media generally avoids covering potentially controversial topics. If a newspaper covers an issue or activity that the government objects to, the NISS confiscates copies of the publications. In 2012, the regime accused CSOs of collaborating to overthrow the regime. Media outlets either echoed the accusations or distanced themselves from CSOs. Media, however, covers CSO interventions in non-threatening thematic areas, such as health and environment.

Although the media is more restricted in Khartoum, some CSOs manage to publish stories in newspapers at a cost. For example, in 2012 the SICM contracted a leading newspaper to devote a full weekly page to constitution-making issues.

The general public’s perception can be divided into three main categories. First, rural communities where little or no services are provided by the state often directly benefit from or are familiar with CSO services. As a result, they perceive CSOs positively and support their interventions. Second, urban populations often understand and appreciate CSO activities and services and also view CSOs as a source for employment. Finally, those who are influenced by government media perceive CSOs as traitors and collaborators with foreign forces. While this is a small minority of the population, it typically has access to government media and decision-makers. On the other hand, except for the ruling party and its allies, most political parties consider CSOs as important allies in the pursuit of democratic transformation, peace, and respect for human rights.

Local and central government officials who deal with CSOs regularly, such as those in the ministries of social welfare, education, health, and agriculture, realize the value of services provided by CSOs. The HAC and NISS, on the other hand, continue to be hostile toward CSOs, as demonstrated by their disruption of CSO activities, dissolution of organizations, confiscation of assets, and detention of CSO activists and staff.

The business community’s relationship with CSOs is rather limited, both because of the profit-making focus of businesses and their fear of antagonizing the state. A few large companies support some CSO activities within their social responsibility allocations. These tend to be focused on direct social service delivery and environmental campaigns. They do not support activities for human rights or democratic transformation. The
Wealthiest companies also promote themselves by funding sports, music, and poetry competitions in Khartoum.

In general, most CSOs, except for advocacy, civic education, and media-related groups, keep a low profile to protect themselves against state interference. Limited resources, state-controlled media, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms are major obstacles to CSOs’ promotion of their public image.

To protect themselves against state interventions, the sector has made several attempts to draft a code of conduct since 2005. However, none of these attempts were successful as a result of the sector’s general instability, as well as the political affiliations and personal interests of some activists. All registered CSOs are legally required to present annual narrative reports on their activities and audited financial reports to their general assemblies, which are attended by HAC representatives. Although very few organizations publish these reports online, many provide their international partners with their audited accounts and annual reports.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2

CSOs continue to influence social, political, and economic development in Tanzania. Dialogue between the government and CSOs improved in 2012. Following the adoption of the Constitutional Review Act, the Constitutional Review Commission worked with CSOs to collect citizens’ opinions on the new draft constitution. However, some tensions remain between the sectors, particularly on governance and accountability issues. In addition, two years after the national elections, political tensions between ruling party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) remain high. Some CSOs got caught in the middle of these disputes, and were accused of supporting one of the parties or having political ambitions. In addition, doctors’ and teachers’ strikes caused widespread disruption during the year, with CSO activists demanding that the government address their demands.

Tanzania continues to struggle economically, partly because of the global financial crisis. The weak economy limited both government and private sector funding for the CSO sector in 2012. Private donations, membership fees, and other contributions remain minimal.

Civil society in Tanzania is composed of several types of groups: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, professional associations, farmers groups, media organizations, community-based organizations (CBOs), women and youth groups, disability organizations, trade unions, trusts, and foundations. Functionally, CSOs focus on lobbying and advocacy, service delivery, and public
policy awareness. Thematically, they work on HIV/AIDS and the interests of special groups such as orphans, women, youth, the disabled, the elderly, farmers, and pastoralists. CSOs increasingly extend their services and programs to remote populations.

Studies estimate that at least 10,000 CSOs are registered in the country. Reports from 2011 and 2012 by the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) estimate that there are about 7,000 active registered CSOs, in addition to another 500 unregistered groups that are active mostly in rural areas. The CSO sector is growing rapidly, adding an average of 800 new CSOs each year. However, the institutional, technical, and financial capacity of many CSOs remains relatively weak, with rural-based CSOs facing the greatest problems. There is generally no significant difference between the sustainability of CSOs in Zanzibar and on the mainland.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4**

Under CSOs in Tanzania can register under various laws including: the NGO Act (2002); the Societies Act (1954); the Cooperatives Societies Act (1991); the Trustees Incorporation Act (2002); the Companies Act (2002) for companies limited by guarantee; and the National Sports Council Act (1967) for sports and recreation clubs. In Zanzibar, CSOs register under the Societies Act No. 6 (1995). Generally, CSOs find the laws enabling, but challenges arise from limited understanding of the law by CSOs, civil servants, and politicians alike. While allowing CSOs to register under multiple laws provides some level of freedom, it also causes confusion, particularly among small and remote CBOs. Some CSOs register under certain laws because they are unaware of other possibilities. In addition, constitutional reform may widen the space of CSOs. Specifically, the new constitution recognizes sign language and Braille as official languages, increasing access by people with disabilities to information and participation in development processes.

Each act stipulates the procedure and requirements for registration. The complexity of registration depends on the law under which an organization registers and whether the organization intends to operate on a national, regional, or district level. Registration is sometimes subject to bureaucracy, delays, and financial requirements. On average, it may take up to three months to register a CSO at the national level.

The NGO Act allows the Registration Board to deny registration to a CSO if its activities are determined not to be in the public interest or contrary to law; if the application has false or misleading information; or if the National Council of NGOs (a government entity) recommends that it be denied. The Act allows CSOs to appeal registration decisions to the Minister of Community Development, Gender and Children. Although there are no notable examples of the Registration Board denying registration to CSOs on these grounds, HakiElimu, a vibrant advocacy group, was once threatened with deregistration. Therefore, some advocacy CSOs choose to register under the Companies Act rather than the NGO Act.

CSOs registered under other laws can also choose to comply with the NGO Act by acquiring a Certificate of Compliance from the NGO Registrar.

CSOs may only operate at the geographic level at which they register. For example, a CSO registered at the district level may only undertake activities in that district. International NGOs or CSOs whose operations span more than one region must register at the national level. CSOs operating beyond their registered areas may be suspended or have their certificates of registration cancelled.

State harassment of CSOs was less in 2012 than 2011, as the state increasingly recognized CSOs’ space to participate in national issues, such as the constitution making process. Nevertheless, advocacy CSOs were subjected to some state harassment during 2012. For example, when doctors went on strike to demand
improvements to their working environment, the police briefly detained CSO activists advocating for the doctors. In Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Society Act No. 6 (1995) provides the Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Justice excessive power to take legal action against CSOs and threaten them with dissolution. For example, after Zanzibar-based CSO Mwamsho spoke out against changing Zanzibar’s autonomy in relation to the mainland in 2012, it was threatened with dissolution under Article 5 of the Act on the grounds that its activities were incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order, and good governance.

In the 2011/2012 national budget, the government eliminated tax exemptions to all CSOs except FBOs and CSOs serving vulnerable groups. The situation remained the same in 2012. All CSOs are required to pay VAT and all other duties and levies.

The NGO Act allows NGOs to earn income through the provision of services, capacity building, and consultancies, as long as the income is not redistributed and the activities are aligned with the mission and objectives of the organization. CSOs registered under other Acts are also allowed to earn income through the provision of services. In addition, CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts.

Many trained and qualified lawyers and legal officers work in the sector and advise CSOs. Some national NGOs, such as the Legal and Human Rights Center, Women in Law and Development in Africa, National Organization for Legal Assistance, Tanzania Women Lawyers, and Tanzania Media Women Association, provide legal support to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

The Organization Capacity Assessment and the Annual Report on the State of CSOs released in 2012 by FCS both show that CSOs’ capacities to address constituents’ needs are increasing. Nonetheless, CSOs remain dependent on donors and still tend to orient their activities towards funders’ priorities. Rural and unregistered CSOs continue to have less capacity to address constituents’ needs.

As a result of capacity-building interventions, CSOs increasingly recognize the need to create and adhere to strategic plans. FCS provided funding to at least 173 CSOs to implement capacity building projects in 2012. FCS also continues to help new CSOs develop strategic plans by coordinating training sessions and linking organizations with regional facilitators for follow-up support. In 2012, FCS supported the efforts of sixty-eight CSOs to develop strategic plans. Some small, mostly rural-based CSOs, however, continue to have difficulty incorporating strategic plans in decision-making processes. For instance, while such groups may develop strategic plans following pressure from donors, they often diverge from the plans in order to access donor funding.

Many well-established CSOs in both urban and rural areas have clear chains of command and boards of directors. Small, rural, and new CSOs, however, usually do not have boards of directors. If they do have boards, their functions and responsibilities overlap with those of management. Some rural-based CSOs are led by retired civil servants.

Well-established CSOs are gaining momentum in attracting qualified staff due to donors’ focus on staff recruitment as well as capacity-building interventions from FCS and other partners. Many CSOs, particularly small ones without sustained funding, hire employees on a project basis. Small CSOs and those based in rural areas typically hire staff without job descriptions or contracts.

Because of financial limitations, some CSOs have only voluntary staff. Volunteerism is more common in rural areas than urban areas. CSOs commonly engage volunteers, including current and retired civil servants. In
some cases, this might lead to conflicts of interest, especially in CSOs’ efforts to promote government accountability. To attract qualified personnel to the sector, FCS organized internships with CSOs for at least forty university students across the country. Some organizations have also independently hosted university students for internships.

Each year, many more CSOs, mainly in urban areas, obtain computers, access Internet facilities, and create their own websites. Some rural CSOs still face difficulty obtaining offices, IT, and office equipment.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

There was no significant change in the funding available to CSOs in 2012.

Because the economy did not grow much in 2012, local funding levels did not change significantly. CSOs continue to rely on funding from FCS, the leading grantmaking organization in the country. In 2012, FCS granted over $9 million, up from the more than $7 million that was disbursed in 2011. There is no formal mechanism for CSOs to get funds from the government, although a few large CSOs with greater technical and institutional capacities do receive government support. For example, research CSOs, such as the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and Policy Research for Development (REPOA), continued to work with the government in monitoring and evaluating poverty reduction initiatives. These types of groups may also receive contracts from businesses. Membership-based CSOs continue to seek member contributions and fees, but the amounts are insufficient to finance organizations’ activities.

Philanthropy is still a new concept in Tanzania and remains undeveloped. While individuals give in support of social functions such as family parties, weddings, and funerals, they do not give to CSOs. Corporate philanthropy is also nascent. Local fundraising opportunities are not yet fully explored partly because of the sector's limited fundraising skills. In-kind support to CSOs is not yet common in the country.

The level of international donor funding did not change significantly in 2012. International donors continued to provide general budget support to the government, which meant fewer funds directed to CSOs. International funding remains insignificant, and only a few CSOs access funds directly from international donors. CSOs continue to depend on local grantmaking organizations that receive funds from international donors.

In general, CSOs have improved their financial management capacities. The 2012 FCS report shows an improvement in financial management in 2012 compared to 2011 as a result of ongoing capacity building programs. For instance, the number of grantees with weaknesses in accounting systems declined from 59 percent in 2011 to 23 percent in 2012. The number of CSOs without financial manuals decreased from 20 percent to 5 percent, while CSOs with errors in financial reports declined from 32 percent to 6 percent.

Strong organizations have financial management systems, guidelines, and personnel, and publish financial reports. Nonetheless, CSOs struggle to be more financially accountable and transparent to their constituencies and other local partners. Financial management remains a challenge to many small CSOs, which have less access to funding; thus they do not produce annual reports or obtain independent financial audits.
CSOs are increasingly recognized as important players in development. The government often consults and engages CSOs, particularly at the national level. To improve the environment for partnership between government and non-state actors, including CSOs and the private sector, in 2012, the government published and began implementing Guidelines and Operational Manual for Effective Engagement of Ministries, Independent Departments, and Executive Agencies (MDAs) and Non-State Actors in Public Service Delivery. At the national level, the government interacts with national level CSOs or networks. At the local level, the government interacts with well-established CSOs, networks, or personal contacts.

The government and CSOs continue to collaborate at different levels. About 110 CSO representatives participated in a National Policy Dialogue with high-level government officials, development partners, legislators, and the private sector. In addition, CSOs worked with the government to develop a Joint Assistance Strategy to harmonize aid from different donors. Through the Constitutional Review Commission, the government worked with CSOs to collect citizens’ opinions on the new draft constitution. The government also sought CSOs’ input in various policies, such as the gas policy.

Despite this collaboration, communications between CSOs and the government at all levels are not institutionalized and there are no clear rules for when, how, and for which issues government must consult or engage with CSOs.

CSOs continued to promote legal and policy reform at the local level in 2012. For instance, Saidia Wazee Karagwe advocated at the grassroots level to implement the National Aging Policy of 2003, thereby increasing the rights and entitlements, and decreasing violations of rights, of the elderly. CSOs have also advocated for implementation of the National Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act to ensure women’s land rights, particularly in rural areas. In addition, CSO activists joined doctors and teachers who went on strike to demand that the government improve their working conditions.

CSOs regularly form advocacy-oriented coalitions. For example, through the Constitutional Forum, CSOs have been able to monitor the constitutional review process and communicate issues to the public. In 2012, for instance, coalitions of disability organizations were very active. These groups successfully advocated for increased budget allocations for disability-related issues and for the enactment of regulations for the People with Disabilities Act. Furthermore, they promoted awareness of the Convention on Disability Rights, resulting in better treatment towards people with disabilities, such as allowing them to avoid waiting in line to access social services. Nonetheless, due to limited advocacy skills, CSOs are reactive and remain challenged in developing advocacy strategies.

The CSO community understands how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability. Last year, Zanzibar CSOs, led by the Association of NGOs in Zanzibar ( ANGOZA ), advocated for amendments to the Societies Act (1995) to match the Zanzibar NGO Policy (2009). While the policy strives to create a supportive environment for the sector to grow and prosper, the Societies Act remains a tool of control. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has not yet responded to these issues.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSOs in Tanzania provide services in the fields of health, education, inclusive education for children with disabilities, and provision of basic goods to vulnerable and needy groups, among others. The traditional role of CSOs in Tanzania is to supplement government efforts in service provision, give a voice to the voiceless, and hold the government and private sector accountable. Shifts in donor funding from CSOs to general budget support for the government have somewhat decreased the funds available for service provision interventions.

CSO service provision is largely demand driven, although also influenced by donor priorities. CSOs work to address the needs of their constituents. For example, CSOs that serve victims of HIV/AIDS and orphans supply food, clothes, and medicine. Environmental organizations work on sustainable distribution of trees. Recipient communities also frequently participate in CSO activities.

CSOs do not charge for most of their services or recover costs because many people believe these services should be free. Some CSOs sell publications, but prices are generally low. Both national and local governments appreciate the value of CSOs in development. Government officials at different levels participate in and support CSO activities. For example, the government continued to work with REPOA to monitor the implementation of poverty reduction initiatives. Government support to CSOs in 2012 remained at roughly the same level as in 2011.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

While the number of resource centers across the country is unknown, most of the centers are hosted and funded by well-established CSOs based in urban areas. As a result, rural-based and remote CSOs have limited or no access to such centers. On the other hand, CSO networks, which serve as mini resource centers where local CSOs can access publications and funding-related information, exist in all regions and most districts of the country. Some CSOs, like FCS, have electronic mailing lists through which they share information. Other umbrella organizations such as ANGOZA and National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) also serve as resource centers, providing their members with access to various publications, information related to funding, and capacity building services.

The number and capacity of CSO networks are rising. Geographical CSO networks exist in each administrative region and district, and some new ones were registered during the year. There are also thematic networks addressing issues such as land, education, water, environment, disability, and HIV/AIDS. Networks share information among their members and others and promote issues of common interest. In addition, they increasingly mobilize their members to advocate on issues of common interest. For instance, as part of the constitutional review process, about ninety-eight geographical CSO networks across the country worked with member organizations to organize dialogues with government officials and legislators in their respective areas. CSOs also used these platforms to enable citizens to discuss climate change and the accountability of legislators to their constituencies.
Several local organizations provide capacity building opportunities and grants to CSOs. Most grantmaking organizations, including FCS, REPOA, Rapid Funding Envelop, ILO (Tanzania) PATH, and Tanzania Media Fund, are located in large cities, primarily Dar es Salaam. These organizations mostly re-grant international donor funds. In addition, a few foundations, such as Vodacom Foundation (a branch of a mobile communications company), grant locally generated funds. Many CSOs, including FCS, Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE), MS-Training Center for Development Cooperation (MS-TCDC), and TRACE, provide training to CSOs on project cycle management, organization management, fundraising, and monitoring and evaluation.

CSOs continue to establish partnerships with the government, media, and local businesses. As mentioned above, CSOs work with the government in policy processes and the delivery of services. One of the most visible CSO-government partnerships was between the local CSO Tanzania Mission for the Poor and Disabled (PADI) in Songea and the Local Government Authority (LGA) to implement the Elder People Policy. The LGA allocated staff to work with PADI on this project. CSOs also partner with the media to publicize their activities. Local businesses continued to support CSOs in implementing projects. However, such partnerships are still informal and based on personal contacts.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

CSOs’ public image continued to improve in 2012. The participation of activists in doctors’ and teachers’ strikes and the active engagement of CSOs in the constitutional review process during the year promoted a more prominent and positive public image of CSOs. However, some people still distrust some CSOs because of their low level of transparency, particularly regarding their funding.

Both the government and business sectors see CSOs as important actors in development, in particular service delivery. As discussed above, CSO cooperation with the government improved during the year and CSOs continued to dialogue with the government on development and governance issues both at the local and national levels. The participation of government officials in CSO activities also improved in 2012.

CSOs are in contact with journalists in their localities. In addition, the media covers the award ceremonies for the CSOs Excellence Award, through which FCS celebrates and rewards the activities of well-performing CSOs across the country.

CSO coverage in print and electronic media is increasingly positive. Local CSOs increasingly use local and community radio to publicize their interventions. Meanwhile, national level and urban-based CSOs rely on national electronic, print, and social media and websites to promote their activities. In most cases, CSOs must pay for media coverage. CSOs generally also disseminate newsletters, leaflets, brochures, and other communication materials. In Zanzibar, ANGOZA organized CSO exhibitions to publicize CSO work to legislators and the public. National-level CSO exhibitions were also organized in Dar es Salaam.

Increasingly, large CSOs in both rural and urban areas produce and publish annual reports, which help enhance the image of the sector. Furthermore, guidelines were developed in 2012 to promote transparency and accountability within civil society.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

CSOs in Uganda continue to provide valuable social, political, and economic contributions amid government corruption, increased political tension, and an unpredictable policy and political environment created by conflict between the government and the legislature. At the same time, the quality of public and social services is declining.

Although the political environment and economic conditions in the country continued to be difficult in 2012, relations between CSOs and the government improved, as demonstrated by the official launching of the NGO Policy and subsequent meetings to popularize the policy around the country. CSOs’ relationship with the NGO Registration Board also improved during the year. CSO infrastructure and organizational capacity continued to improve through the proliferation of national, regional, and district-level networks, coalitions, and platforms that create space for CSOs to collectively strategize and engage around common issues. Advocacy efforts continued to grow in 2012, and CSOs increased their monitoring of government programs for service delivery effectiveness, especially the National Development Plan (NDP). The sector’s public image remains mixed, but the government increasingly acknowledges its contributions to the country’s development. The sector’s financial viability remains vulnerable due to continued reliance on donors and shifts in donor priorities. Internally, CSOs continue to embrace quality assurance mechanisms like the NGO Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure the quality of institutions and programs.

According to the NGO Registration Board, at the end of 2012, there were over 10,000 NGOs registered in Uganda,
an increase from about 9,500 in 2011. However, the NGO Registration Board lacks updated statistics on the number of registered, operational, and failed organizations. Reliable statistics are also not readily available for other types of CSOs, including Companies Limited by Guarantee or Trustees. The actual numbers of registered and unregistered CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and self-help groups are believed to be much higher than currently recorded. According to the NGO Registration Board, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will begin a program in 2013 to update these statistics, digitalize the register, and harmonize registration processes.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

The legal environment worsened somewhat in 2012, despite the fact that the Prime Minister launched the NGO Policy in 2012. The NGO Policy establishes principles and decision-making processes for regulating and overseeing the operation of NGOs in Uganda and calls for the NGO Act to be amended to reflect these principles.

The NGO Act and its 2009 regulations continue to constrain the work of NGOs, imposing many bureaucratic procedures and violating the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of expression and assembly. The government applies regulations with broad terms such as “interest of the people,” which CSOs sometimes interpret as making a distinction between state interests and donor interests. Government officials furthermore exercise considerable administrative discretion, such as requiring the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) to endorse registration applications of all NGOs.

Before NGOs can operate, they must complete a complicated registration process. The registration process also generates confusion, as NGOs can register at three locations: the National Registration Services Bureau; the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development; and the NGO Registration Board. Other changes in the registration process have led to uncertainty about whether an organization must register as a Company Limited by Guarantee before registering with the NGO Registration Board. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs pushed for an amendment to the NGO Act to clarify these points, the process remained at a standstill in 2012. Once registered, an NGO must also seek permission from the local police or security agencies to operate in a given locality. Registration is particularly cumbersome for village-based CSOs, as it is difficult to receive permission to work in rural areas.

A 2006 amendment to the NGO Act prevents an organization from making “any direct contact with the people in the area of operation in Uganda unless it has given seven days’ notice in writing…” The government has used this power to sanction several CSOs, such as the Uganda Land Alliance, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment, OXFAM Great Britain and at least twenty-three NGOs perceived to promote non-heterosexual orientations, ordering these CSOs not to issue reports without the government’s prior review. The NGO Act also grants the state power to de-register NGOs perceived to be a “nuisance” to the government.

Advocacy CSOs experienced considerable state harassment in 2012, although less than in 2011. State security agencies threatened several grassroots advocacy organizations with closure, especially CSOs in the Bunyoro region advocating for oil policy reform and CSOs of the Black Monday Movement fighting against rampant government corruption.

Although CSOs can receive tax exemptions on grants, endowments, and economic activities, these exemptions are difficult to access. CSOs must negotiate with the Revenue Authority to receive tax exemptions, which are at the discretion of the Minister. Some CSOs do manage to receive tax exemptions on social service goods such as medicine and education and emergency supplies. The Employment Act also provides tax exemptions to organizations employing at least five disabled staff, but the process for accessing...
these exemptions is also cumbersome, and most CSOs, especially local ones, either do not know about them or do not understand the procedures.

CSOs with demonstrated capacity can win local or central government contracts. CSOs are permitted to charge for goods or services they provide, but only to recover the costs of providing them.

There are no NGO law courses in Uganda. Legal redress against state harassment and other CSO matters is limited because there are not enough specialists in non-profit litigation.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8**

CSO organizational capacity improved in 2012. Most NGOs have well-defined strategic plans that clearly state their missions, visions, and objectives. This has attracted funding from donors interested in supporting the implementation of longer-term strategic plans. However, many CSOs continue to develop strategic plans that do not necessarily reflect their missions. CBOs generally have clear annual work plans.

Internal management improved slightly this year, with more CSOs adopting quality assurance mechanisms. In 2012, the QuAM Committee certified thirty-seven NGOs, a significant increase from 2011 when just eleven NGOs were certified. As many steps are involved in the certification process, including a self-assessment and verification by the Committee, the rise in certification could indicate more confidence among NGOs in their internal systems. Despite this positive development, a 2012 survey conducted by the Development Network for Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) showed that most NGOs’ boards of directors have no clear leadership qualities and low understanding of their roles.

The sector continues to rely on volunteers and part-time staff whose pay is often incommensurate with their work. In addition, the NGO Registration Board has accused NGOs of paying expatriates higher salaries than Ugandan staff receive. In 2012, the Board highlighted this issue in the media and at a meeting with the NGO Forum and Minister of Internal Affairs.

CSOs expanded their constituencies in 2012 and garnered the support and trust of their beneficiaries. CSOs recruit members and create partnerships, alliances, and consortia through their activities and programs.

All NGOs have basic equipment, such as mobile telephones and computers, but those in the capital have far greater technological resources than those in remote areas. Most NGOs have Internet access, but network failure and electricity disruptions are frequent in more remote areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1**

The financial viability of the sector remains precarious. Most CSOs rely on grants, yet grant opportunities remain inconsistent. Overall, less donor funding was available to CSOs in 2012. Donors continue to shift their funding to basket funds and consortia, such as the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), the Independent Development Fund (IDF), and the European Union fund. This ultimately decreases the number of funded CSOs and thus makes donor funding increasingly competitive. Because of difficult economic conditions and the low incomes of Ugandans, local support remains limited. It mostly consists of the government and international NGOs sub-granting funds to NGOs for programs in health and education. Domestic corporate philanthropy in Uganda is not a significant source of support. Volunteerism is not yet well-developed in Uganda, and most volunteers are seeking employment with the organizations.
Most CSOs do not seek to diversify their funding or develop innovative funding strategies. CSOs at the district level and below lack the capacity to write proposals, the main tool for accessing funding. To remain viable, CSOs sometimes resort to implementing small activities for the local government or join larger consortia to apply for grants. The few grantmaking organizations in Uganda often experience delays in disbursing grants.

In 2012, more organizations participated in public-private partnerships and received sub-grants of international donor funds from the government. Some of these grants are unrestricted and can be used at an organization’s discretion. For example, the Uganda National NGO Forum benefited from the UN capacity assessment grant, and the Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives benefited from EU funding granted by the Human Rights Defenders. Government grants for HIV/AIDS, on the other hand, are earmarked.

Some CSOs earn income through consultancies. Others, such as the Human Rights Network and DENIVA, collect membership fees, but these account for less than 5 percent of total annual income.

Most CSOs in Uganda do not have sound financial management systems. Smaller organizations, in particular, face problems with financial management as they cannot afford to hire expert accountants or financial managers. Donors favor the few CSOs that have well-developed financial systems.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy in Uganda improved slightly in 2012. In general, CSOs were more active advocates in 2012. The most robust CSO campaigns during the year included the Black Monday Movement (an anti-corruption campaign) and advocacy for quality public education.

Other anti-corruption campaigns included the Return Our Money campaign, the flagship campaign to demand that the government prosecute officials implicated in corruption scandals and recover the stolen money. CSOs within the Citizens Coalition of Electoral Democracy also focused their advocacy initiatives on corruption. Anti-corruption advocacy has generated significant attention from the government, as well as members of the donor community, such as the European Union, Germany, Britain, and Ireland, who have suspended funding to Uganda amid the corruption allegations.

CSOs also targeted several other issues in 2012. Besides anti-corruption, CSOs within the Citizens Coalition of Electoral Democracy also advocated for restoring presidential term limits. As a result, parliamentarians began calling for a constitutional amendment to restore presidential term limits. In addition, the oil consortium aimed to influence the government’s policies on oil and gas, and a group led by OXFAM in Karamoja aimed to improve communal land ownership among Karamojong.

Efforts by civil society and the government to strengthen and institutionalize their relationship were sustained in 2012 and included the launch of the NGO Policy. In addition, CSOs and the parliament signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to foster good relations and information sharing. CSO-government partnerships are becoming more prominent and stronger. Even at the grassroots level, community parliaments are largely platforms for citizen engagement. The Public Affairs Center-Ugandahas launched Disability Citizen Parliaments in Teso to build community-level advocacy on disability issues.
Collaboration between the government and civil society occurs through official frameworks of ministries, departments, and agencies, with clear and structured guidelines. In practice, the government collaborates substantially with NGOs engaged in service delivery, but is hostile to NGOs involved in governance, transparency, and accountability issues. NGOs participate in sectoral government committees, such as the CSO-Parliamentary interface, a platform for accountability monitoring and MOUs between CSOs and districts. All levels of government consult with CSOs on policy decisions, and CSOs have helped to monitor the implementation of the National Development Plan and district development plans.

More governance and service delivery CSOs are working collaboratively with local and central governments to pursue common interests, such as social and political accountability. Such partnerships include the Advocates Coalition for Development & Environment and local government; the Uganda Local Government Association on local government monitoring; and the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform on the Citizen Manifesto and Leadership charters.

While national-level organizations continue to lead in advocacy and lobbying, smaller grassroots organizations slightly improved their advocacy and analytical skills on development issues. In 2012, district CSOs operating at the grassroots level were more engaged in governance and accountability work, especially under the umbrella of national coalitions. For example, grassroots CSOs were involved in the Citizen Manifesto.

CSOs are increasing their lobbying efforts. At the national level, CSOs participate in the various Sector Working Groups (SWGs) in government ministries. CSOs have also established special lobby groups to influence specific agendas, such as the policy for the nascent oil sector. However, these initiatives have not yielded much due to political dynamics that hamper law and policymaking.

The Uganda National NGO Forum spearheaded efforts to push the government to reform the laws on NGOs. However, apart from the privileged few in the capital and regional cities, most CSOs do not appreciate how a regulatory framework affects their work.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

CSO service provision declined slightly in 2012, although not enough to affect the score for this dimension. CSOs have increasingly shifted from traditional church-based services in education, health, spiritual guidance, and social development to advocacy work. Whereas CSOs have historically been core partners with the government in delivering services in health, education, water, sanitation, humanitarian aid, environmental conservation, agriculture, and legal aid, advocacy for the government to improve service delivery has often led to clashes with government.

CSOs, NGOs, and CBOs are often formed and driven to respond to community needs. Participatory development and governance approaches are key features of NGO response mechanisms. Community responsiveness to the work of CSOs was slightly lower due to the influence of state propaganda maligning CSOs and their role in society.

CSOs often provide services where the government is unable to due to financial and logistic constraints. For example, in the Moroto district in northeastern Uganda, CSO service delivery funded by donors provides about 60 percent of the local council budget. However, in 2012, government officials in the Office of the Prime Minister embezzled massive amounts of money intended for the Peace, Recovery and Development Program in Northern Uganda. This affected subgrants to CSOs to deliver education, health, and water to Karamoja, one of the least developed regions of Uganda.
CSOs are expanding outreach and service delivery beyond their usual memberships and constituencies. Apart from CBOs that help only the immediate community, CSOs generally serve the wider community beyond their memberships. Some CSOs provide training to government agencies and institutions such as schools and hospitals. CSOs also share publications and annual reports with academia, churches, government, and the population at large. However, CSO outreach is limited by financial constraints, as producing and publishing reports can be costly. Many CSOs would like to recover their costs, but find it difficult to charge poor communities for basic service delivery. One exception, however, is CSOs that provide medical and general healthcare services for fees.

While the government is hostile to CSOs engaged in advocacy on governance, transparency, and accountability issues, it increasingly recognizes the importance of CSOs in service delivery, especially as citizens increasingly demand better services from government in the face of dwindling government resources. The government continues to publicly acknowledge the contribution of CSOs to service delivery, especially in hard-to-reach areas, such as Karamoja. The government at both the central and local levels awards grants and contracts to CSOs for a variety of programs, including special post-conflict programs like the Peace, Recovery, and Development Program and the Karamoja Integrated Program.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6**

CSO infrastructure did not change significantly in 2012.

Information sharing is high among CSOs, particularly youth and women’s organizations. District-based NGO forums and networks, like the Uganda National NGO Forum, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives, and the Uganda Women’s Network, continue to work on issues such as the environment, oil sector transparency, and youth. Many networks, consortia, and partnerships within civil society work together to foster grassroots-level advocacy, and more coalitions and networks emerged in 2012 to spearhead joint advocacy campaigns. For example, in the Teso sub-region, there has been a collective campaign to improve local government service delivery. In 2012, over 1,000 CSO staff and over 5,000 others attended the second annual National Civil Society Fair, where CSOs showcased their projects and innovations, shared ideas and information, and networked.

The Development Research and Training NGO offers training on research, and Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) has a policy research resource center. Uganda Rural Development and Training (URDT) offers capacity-building services for NGOs. However, apart from the CSOs based in the capital city, most CSOs cannot access these resource centers or technical assistance. Donors are reluctant to provide capacity building; instead they provide funding for CSO projects, particularly those focused on governance.

The Support Program for Advocacy Networks, a national program hosted by the Uganda National NGO Forum and funded by DGF, provides sub-grants to CSOs in four regional advocacy networks and thirty-five district networks to develop services for CSOs and build capacity through training, community mobilization, and support mechanisms. Many international CSOs, such as Action Aid International, Care, Adra, and World Vision, also award sub-grants to smaller organizations to implement projects for them.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

In contrast to 2011, CSOs benefited from immense positive media coverage in 2012 by focusing on issues of national significance, such as oil policy, the abuse of human freedoms and liberties, and empowerment of citizens to participate in social and political accountability.

CSOs and the media increased their level of engagement in 2012. For example, Uwezo, a CSO-led East African initiative that assesses education, continued to attract tremendous media attention, leading to national and district-level debates. CSOs also continued the massive Return Our Money campaign, which engaged grassroots participants across the country. The campaign led print media, radio talk shows, and television to widely cover the subject of corruption, generating national and local civic debates and discussions. The 2012 National Civil Society Fair further led to greater media coverage and raised the image of CSOs all over Uganda. According to the opening ceremony speech of the Minister of Internal Affairs, the government, CSOs, the private sector, donors, and individuals now have a deeper appreciation of the sector’s development work and increased trust in the sector. Despite the increased coverage this year, the media still often ignores CSO activities in favor of stories considered more newsworthy and generally only covers the work of well-connected CSOs.

Public perception of the sector also improved in 2012 despite some state propaganda. Apart from some political leaders who think CSOs are trying to undermine the government, government agencies generally have a positive perception of the sector. The NGO Board and many local governments have collaborative relationships with wider civil society. Businesses, on the other hand, regard CSOs as unprofessional, partly because CSOs provide services for free, and relations between the two sectors are fairly cold.

CSOs’ public relations efforts are growing significantly. Although CSOs typically have to pay for coverage, the media covered the Citizen Manifesto, and national and local TV and radio programs featured CSO leaders for free. On average, major FM radio stations in the eastern part of the country offer eight hours per week of free programming on governance and democracy, which CSOs utilize. Because it can be costly to hold press conferences, CSOs often pool their resources to hold joint press conferences on key issues. National level CSOs in urban areas also utilize social media to promote their work and causes.

Self-regulation in the sector has progressed this year. The NGO Registration Board requires CSOs to publish annual programmatic and financial reports. The QuAM has been adopted and the National Certification Council has been established, but implementation at the district level has not been addressed. While the popularity of QuAM has grown slowly since it launched six years ago, in 2012 it enjoyed great publicity and promotion. Thirty-seven NGOs completed certification in 2012, with hundreds more in the process. In addition, most national CSOs have adopted individual codes of conduct that guide their operations. The Civil Society Accountability Platform, established in 2009, has also helped the sector coordinate accountability efforts and active CSO participation in the post-Busan Civil Society Development Effectiveness agenda.
ZAMBIA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

The political situation in Zambia was calm in 2012 as citizens waited to see if the Patriotic Front (PF), which won elections in September 2011 from the incumbent Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), would deliver on its promises to fight corruption, reduce poverty, create jobs, and cut government expenditures. At the beginning of the year, the government swiftly moved to strengthen anti-corruption laws by reinstating a law on the abuse of office that had been removed by the previous government. In addition, the new government replaced personnel thought to be corrupt and appointed more women into decision making roles, under the belief that women are less corrupt than men. On the other hand, the government failed to deliver on its promises to promote freedom of speech and access to information. For example, several opposition political parties trying to meet with the electorate or demonstrate their opposition to certain government positions were denied police permits. Economically, Zambia continues to report growth, although this has not translated into economic development or widespread improvements in social conditions. Poverty levels remain high, particularly among rural households.

Various stakeholders continue to recognize civil society in Zambia as a vital player in the country’s development. In line with the recommendations from the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, South Korea in 2011, the Zambian government established an Annual Mutual Accountability Review Platform with CSOs to assess the government’s progress in meeting its commitments on aid and development effectiveness. As part of this process, a
meeting was held in December 2012 between the government and various CSOs to establish a new Joint Policy Dialogue Framework that would bring CSOs and government together to address development effectiveness.

Based on a 2012 mapping exercise conducted by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health, there are just 442 registered NGOs in Zambia. Community-based organizations (CBOs), cooperatives, community clubs, and faith-based organizations (FBOs) were not included in this exercise because they do not fall within the definition of NGO provided in the NGO Act of 2009. According to the Zambia Council for Civil Society Development (ZCSD), there were more than 10,000 CSOs registered with the Registrar of Societies in 2003.

Most CSOs have clear missions and operate within their mandates, which are based on local constituencies’ needs and priorities. CSOs generally depend on international donor funding, and very few CSOs generate resources locally. Limited funding sources spur competition among CSOs.

CSOs have formal space to engage with policy makers through Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), Provincial Development Coordinating Committees (PDCCs), and District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs). Many CSOs continue to campaign through coalitions on broad-based issues. As a result of advocacy campaigns, in 2012, the government addressed issues of taxation, amended the Education Act and the Anti-Corruption Act, and approved the Freedom of Information Bill at the cabinet level.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

The NGO Act of 2009, which was intended to replace the Societies Act of 1974 and the registration of CSOs with the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), provides rigid structures and stipulations on how CSOs should operate and be regulated. The Patriotic Front government was supposed to repeal the NGO Act, which infringes on the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly guaranteed in the Zambian constitution, as well as international human rights instruments to which Zambia is a party. The NGO Act gives the government excessive control over NGO registration and operations. For instance, Section 7(b) of the NGO Act gives the NGO Board, which is responsible for registering NGOs, the right to refuse registration to an NGO if the Board does not approve of the geographic area in which the organization will work. Furthermore, the Act denies the vital role CSOs play in national development. However, the Act has not been implemented due to legal impediments. For instance, the Act requires all existing NGOs to re-register, which contradicts existing laws.

Amid the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the NGO Act, CSOs continue to register and operate under the Societies Act and PACRA. Registration with the Registrar of Societies and PACRA is easy and inexpensive. PACRA generally finalizes registration within two days, and the Registrar of Societies within one week.

Under the Societies Act and conditions provided by PACRA, CSOs generally enjoy the freedoms of association and expression and can operate freely, although there have been instances of the state harassing CSOs focused on governance issues. For example, the state police intimidated the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), the Southern Africa Center for Constructive Resolutions of Dispute (SACCORD), and other CSOs that spoke out against the Public Order Act, which establishes restrictive rules for public gatherings. The government uses the Public Order Act to deny some CSOs and other stakeholders the rights to freedom of speech, expression, and assembly. For instance, towards the end of the constitution making process, the government prevented CSOs from holding meetings with the public on the process. As
a result of this harassment, some CSOs focused on governance and human rights were cautious in addressing matters of public debate during the year. On the other hand, SACCORD, which had faced closure since 2004 pending the resolution of a court case, had their case dismissed and is now able to operate, although they still experience some harassment. State harassment of CSOs in 2012 was less than in 2011, when tensions around the elections were high and the ruling party harassed many advocacy CSOs.

Tax treatment of CSOs did not change substantially in 2012. CSOs generally pay Value-Added Tax (VAT), income tax, Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax on employee salaries, wages, and benefits, and withholding tax. Some CSOs, such as FBOs and CSOs dealing with disability issues, enjoy some tax waivers. At the request of these CSOs, the Ministry of Finance provides discretionary tax exemptions on medical and disability equipment. There is a dearth of expertise and research on CSO taxation in the country.

The law allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services, as long as the CSO uses the income to further its objectives. A few CSOs, mostly national organizations, are allowed to compete for certain government contracts.

Legal practitioners offer legal support to local and national CSOs based on their knowledge of the law. However, local educational institutions do not offer courses on CSO legal regulations; therefore, there are no legal specialists or experts trained specifically in CSO law. Legal support is still unaffordable to most CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2**

Most CSOs actively seek to build local constituencies for their interventions. However, these efforts were slightly less successful in 2012 due to limited funding.

Most CSOs have clear missions and mandates to which they adhere. The majority of national CSOs and well-established local CSOs have written mission statements, plans, and policies, although they do not always adhere to them. On the other hand, most local CSOs, such as CBOs and clubs, think that it is too difficult and time-consuming to create these documents. Strategic plans are quickly put together for fundraising purposes without much reflection on constituents’ needs.

Local CSOs and CBOs still have difficulty distinguishing between the roles of staff and members. National CSOs generally have clear management and board structures, although there have been a few cases of CSO leaders manipulating governance and management processes. For example, the media reported that the relationship between the FODEP board and management was antagonistic.

A few well-established CSOs, mostly national groups, are able to retain staff. Other organizations, however, experienced higher staff turnover in 2012, with many employees leaving the sector to join donor organizations or the government due to the financial challenges the CSOs faced. Local CSOs have insufficient staff and fail to utilize professional services due to limited funding. There is some dependence on volunteers especially among grassroots CSOs, but volunteers expect to receive incentives, like transportation allowances, t-shirts, bags, and name tags.

Large, well-established CSOs have sufficient resources from donors to acquire modern office and IT equipment. Smaller CSOs are less able to obtain this equipment. Larger CSOs are also more likely to have Internet access.
Funding sources for almost all CSOs decreased in 2012, with only a few well-established CSOs enjoying access to multiple sources of funding. Most CSOs continue to rely on foreign donors, but find it difficult to consistently maintain donor funding and meet its conditions. Some CSOs, such as Capacity Building for Civil Society Organizations, the National Organization for Agriculture Development Communities, the Central Province Community Empowerment Initiative, and the HIV/AIDS Technical Support Foundation, closed down in 2012 when they lost core financial supporters. Due to limited funding, most CSOs experience difficulties covering their administrative costs.

Diversification of funding is poor. Most funding for the sector comes from international donors, which are dwindling in number due to the global financial crisis. In particular, funding for governance and accountability work has decreased. CSOs are largely unable to attract funding from local sources as philanthropy is virtually non-existent. A few CSOs organize public fundraising events, like carwashes or exhibitions at trade fairs or agriculture shows. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is starting to develop, but does not yet benefit CSOs.

Through the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health, the government provides small grants to CSOs spearheading work in social protection and community development, such as the Program Against Malnutrition, Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities, the Matero After Care Center, and the Fountain of Hope Street Children’s Program.

Membership outreach is also a challenge. Some branch CSOs fail to meet their membership fee obligations to their central organizations. Some CSOs at the grassroots level get sub-grants through churches, faith-based organizations, and umbrella organizations such as the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC).

Some CSOs earn income by providing consulting services in their fields of expertise. A few CSOs, mostly national organizations, are allowed to compete for certain types of contracts that do not result in profits. For example, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) approached Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) to conduct a study on corruption. The Disaster Management Unit also provides some contracts to CSOs to distribute relief food.

A few CSOs have invested in real estate and other assets to supplement their incomes. For example, NGOCC generates some income for administrative costs through investments in Azimayi and the Zambia Alliance for Women.

Most CSOs operate in a transparent manner. Well-funded CSOs undertake audits and publish the findings. Organizations with fewer resources cannot afford to undertake audits because they are prohibitively expensive, but try to show their work to funders through field visits and review meetings. Most CBOs have simple financial management systems, while more established CSOs have sound financial management systems.
CSOs and policy makers use SAGs, PDCCs, and DDCCs to review, discuss, and make decisions on relevant developmental issues, such as decentralization, governance, and health projects. For instance, through the Decentralization Secretariat, the government invited SACCORD, Caritas, FODEP, and ZCSD to help revise the Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP). The government also engaged CSOs in the Mutual Accountability Review Platform in December to further the dialogue on the effectiveness of the development agenda for Zambia. Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) worked with other organizations such as Action Aid Zambia and the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR) to develop and present an issues paper covering economic and social governance issues that the government adopted and prioritized.

The Civil Society Constitution Coalition, the Zambia Tax Platform, and the Zambia Public Procurement Coalition are just a few of the many coalitions that CSOs, both at the national and local levels, have formed. Coalitions address issues ranging from the national constitution review process, decentralization, procurement, and tax justice to access to information, access to education, legal aid, and immunizations.

At the end of 2011, the government appointed a Technical Committee to come up with a draft of a new constitution. As part of the process, the Technical Committee initiated public consultations to seek input; a final draft will be presented in 2013. Although the government blocked CSOs from holding public meetings towards the end of the process, the Civil Society Constitution Coalition effectively conducted outreach work on the constitution review process that attracted broad citizen participation around the country earlier in the year.

CSO advocacy campaigns resulted in the amendment of several pieces of legislation or legal provisions in 2012. These include the tax on mining royalties, which was increased from 3 percent to 6 percent; the Education Act; the Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which reinstated the Abuse of Office clause; and the Freedom of Information Bill.

Most CSOs are strongly aware of the importance of a favorable legal framework to support civil society, as demonstrated through well-coordinated advocacy campaigns on the Freedom of Information Bill and the NGO Act. In addition, the constitution review process, which involves many national and provincial level CSOs, provides an opportunity to promote legal reforms that will enhance the work of CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs provide a wide variety of services. A mapping exercise conducted by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health found that the most abundant CSO goods and services are in the fields of agriculture, education, economic development, empowerment, gender, health, HIV/AIDS, human rights, social welfare, youth activities, land, governance, disability, environmental protection, and trade.

Most CSOs identify interventions through intensive
engagement with constituents and communities. CSOs also engage communities in implementation and monitoring.

CSO goods and services are limited to their proximate communities, constituencies, and clientele in order to limit operational costs. Well-established CSOs with strong financial bases market their products and services to other CSOs through various channels, such as workshops and radio programs.

CSOs usually do not have cost recovery plans in place for the services they provide, largely because services are generally targeted to the poor or disadvantaged. Typically, only ISOs charge for capacity-building services.

The national government recognizes the value of CSOs in monitoring basic social services. For example, the Platform for Social Protection works with the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health to monitor social protection programs, and Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) works with the Ministry of Health to monitor health services around the country. The government tries to consult CSOs on key decisions, such as appointments to certain government positions. Local governments are less likely to recognize the role of CSOs in providing or monitoring services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

Only a few ISOs and CSO resource centers exist. ISOs are primarily located at the national level and provide limited services, such as access to information. The Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF) and the Civil Society Environmental Fund provide more extensive services, including grants, training, and technical assistance. ISOs meet the needs of local CSOs, but most organizations do not utilize resource centers, which offer information, education, and communications materials, due to their lack of proximity. CSO resource centers are mostly located in provincial capitals.

Several ISOs, such as the NGOCC, CHAZ, ZGF, Keeper Zambia Foundation, and Civil Society Environment Fund, re-grant funds from international donors to address locally identified needs.

There is no sector-wide network that facilitates information sharing among CSOs, but CSOs do share information through issue-based alliances and networks in urban areas. CSO forums at the provincial and district levels aim to gather all CSOs to facilitate information sharing, promote local level interests, and encourage discussion. At the national level, umbrella networks such as NGOCC, ZCSD, CSPR, and Zambia Land Alliance all have some level of cooperation and information exchange.

There are very few CSO management trainers in Zambia. Formal training is not tailored to CSO management, and is too expensive for most CSOs. Materials are not readily available in local languages.

Apart from the SAG meetings, intersectoral partnerships with private entities and the media are uncommon and in most cases established on a short-term basis. The private sector and government make no effort to establish beneficial partnerships. Instead, intersectoral partnerships are initiated or demanded by CSOs.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

Media coverage of CSOs decreased significantly in 2012, diminishing the public image of CSOs to some extent. Almost all of the big private media houses that provided space to CSOs in 2011 were major supporters of the PF. When the PF came into power towards the end of 2011, media coverage shifted almost entirely to the government, and CSO press statements, especially those that portrayed the government in a negative light, were largely shunned. Media coverage in remote areas also decreased in 2012 due to state harassment of rural radio stations. CSOs tried to create new relationships with the media to compensate for this virtual blackout. For example, CSOs have tried to promote their images through web-based social networking.

Due to the limited media coverage of CSO work, the public believes that CSOs have abrogated their responsibilities as watchdogs and advocates on certain issues. At the same time, however, the public generally understands the concept of CSOs and supports CSO activities, as demonstrated by the massive citizen participation in the CSO-driven constitution review process.

Though the government is very reactive to criticism from CSOs, it still relies on CSOs as community resources. For example, through the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the government utilized JCTR’s analysis on the basic needs food basket to support its proposal to increase the minimum wage. Further, some proposals from the CSO Tax and Non Tax Budget working group regarding the 2013 national budget, such as reducing the turnover tax to provide relief to small and medium entrepreneurs, were reflected in the Minister of Finance’s budget speech. The private sector rarely interacts with CSOs, except during meetings organized by government such as the SAGs or advisory committees. As a result, the private sector has a limited perception of CSOs, but is generally trustful.

The sector began to create a code of ethics in advance of the NGO congress that was held in December, but the process stalled due to a lack of consensus. Most CSOs, however, have their own codes of ethics and publish annual reports.
Since the 2009 Global Political Agreement, Zimbabwe has been led by what is known as an inclusive government comprised of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The two parties have very different attitudes towards civil society, with ZANU PF being hostile to civil society and MDC being more open to CSOs.

The tenure of the current administration is coming to an end, with elections likely in 2013. The possibility of elections led to a deterioration in the overall sustainability of CSOs in 2012. Government hostility towards CSOs before elections is common, and ZANU PF began the process of systematically harassing CSOs that it perceives to be supporting the opposition during the year. CSOs throughout the country were subject to intimidation, arrests, and raids of their offices. Despite this harassment and intimidation, civil society continues to formulate initiatives targeting their constituencies and form coalitions to carry out local and regional advocacy work.

During 2012, the country was also consumed with the drafting of a new constitution. Civil society continued to organize civic education and awareness campaigns on the draft constitution and lobby policy makers on both procedural and substantive issues.

The majority of CSOs rely primarily on international donor funds. Thus, the global economic recession has not spared Zimbabwean civil society, and the sector’s resource base...
continues to shrink. Local sources of philanthropy have not emerged for fear of reprisals from ZANU PF, which accuses CSOs of being regime change agents.

Civil society continues to benefit from positive coverage in the private media, but is under constant attack by the state media, which ZANU PF still controls. Civil society has also started using social media to enhance its image. Despite the uneven media coverage, the public remains confident and appreciative of civil society’s role in development.

There is no centralized registry that can provide the exact number of CSOs in the country, but the total number is estimated to be over 5,000. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare estimates the number of organizations registered as private voluntary organizations (PVOs) as slightly over 1,000.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

The laws affecting civil society in Zimbabwe did not change in 2012, but the increase in harassment of CSOs led to an overall deterioration in the operating environment. CSOs that carry out humanitarian work that is not deemed “political” can register and operate under relatively favorable circumstances. However, CSOs that provide services or advocate for democracy, governance, or human rights issues have difficulty registering and operating if their work is deemed threatening by ZANU PF.

CSOs can register either as trusts through the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs or as PVOs through the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. CSOs prefer to register as PVOs in order to access tax exemptions and waivers on customs duties, but the process is cumbersome, especially for organizations advocating on governance issues. Most CSOs therefore register as trusts, a process that can be completed by any practicing lawyer. CSOs can also register by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant ministry.

Harassment of CSOs was rampant in 2012 due to the possibility of elections in 2013. Rule of law in the country is weak and allows the government to ignore constitutional protections. In November 2012, police raided the offices of the Counseling Services Unit (CSU), a registered medical clinic, and arrested five employees and a Daily News photojournalist. Other organizations—including the Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe (YIDEZ); the Election Resource Centre (ERC); the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum; and the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ)—were also harassed during the year. In addition, two staff members of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) were arrested. As of December 2012, the police were still pursuing the Director of ZimRights.

In 2012, the Provincial Administrator of Masvingo Province, Titus Maluleke from ZANU PF, banned fifty CSOs—including Care International Bikita, World Vision, Plan International, Jairos Jiri and the Zimbabwe AIDS Network—from operating in the province. The governor accused the CSOs of providing food aid to starving villagers in order to support his bitter rivals in the shaky coalition government. The National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO), the umbrella body of CSOs, criticized the move for hurting the rural population that relies on these organizations to survive. Work permits for expatriates employed by international CSOs have been difficult to obtain as a result of the negative perceptions of CSOs by the ZANU PF side of the inclusive government.

Organizations that are registered as PVOs are exempt from taxation and can earn income through the provision of goods and services. Trusts can receive exemptions on the import of goods through a cumbersome process with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA).
There are no lawyers specialized in CSO law. However, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), which has offices in the capital city and other secondary cities, provides legal support to local CSOs. ZLHR specializes in human rights law but has provided important support to CSOs and CSO leaders under threat.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

CSOs in Zimbabwe have actively identified niches for their initiatives. However, the legal and operating environment, coupled with inadequate funding from donors and government, hinder progress in building constituencies. In some areas, supporters of ZANU PF may intimidate CSOs and even engage in violence, making it difficult for CSOs to carry out activities. In addition, some citizens do not openly participate in CSO activities despite identifying with the causes for fear of reprisals.

CSOs have clearly defined missions and cooperate with other organizations that share the same visions. However, some organizations diverge from their missions due to donor influence and funding priorities. Many organizations develop strategic plans for periods of one to three years. Most CSOs, both large and small, have boards of directors that provide policy direction, while secretariats led by directors preside over daily operations. With few exceptions, boards of directors operate transparently and ensure that resources are used appropriately. In most CSOs, board members are signatories to organizational bank accounts, allowing them to provide direct oversight over the organization’s resources.

CSOs in the capital and bigger cities are able to maintain fully paid staff, as well as volunteers and community mobilizers. In contrast to bigger organizations in major cities, CBOs and CSOs in smaller cities have limited resources and are thus unable to maintain permanent paid staff or attract professionals that demand higher salaries.

Most larger CSOs in urban areas have personnel policies that outline procedures for contracting, hiring, and dismissing staff, as well as annual leave, in order to attract professionals to work for them. To meet donor requirements, CSOs—mainly larger organizations with donor funds—obtain professional services, such as accountants to carry out their audits and IT personnel to help with online advocacy and other technological initiatives, through consultancy agreements. Many CSOs in the main cities rely on legal assistance from ZLHR.

With donor assistance, some organizations have conducted organizational capacity assessments (OCAs). However, CSOs continue to face problems securing the resources needed to carry out the resulting institution-strengthening plans.

CSOs in urban centers generally have modern equipment, while CSOs in remote areas find it difficult to access modern equipment and technology. Some areas of the country do not even have electricity or Internet access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

The majority of CSO funding comes from international donors. CSOs are generally unable to raise funds from local sources. The government does not give grants or contracts to CSOs, and local philanthropists and businesses are uncomfortable being associated with the work of CSOs for fear of reprisal from ZANU PF. Still, the potential for philanthropy exists and has been tapped in support of humanitarian causes. For example, the owner of a leading telecommunications service has a foundation that runs an orphanage. In addition, a few environment-related organizations have attracted corporate support. Communities support
CSO initiatives through volunteering and in-kind support. CSOs have not established philanthropy development programs.

The global economic crisis greatly reduced the resources available to civil society from international donors. For example, the European Partnership for Development greatly scaled down its operations. In addition, some of the donor money previously available to civil society is now being channeled through the government. However, most CSOs remain viable in the short-term. The majority of larger CSOs in urban areas have multiple donors, and some have developed business plans that allow them to generate revenue through the provision of goods and services. For example, ZLHR generates revenue by renting out part of its office space, while some organizations charge consultancy fees to conduct research. Few organizations collect membership fees.

Most of the bigger CSOs in urban areas have sound financial management systems, carry out independent audits, and produce annual reports. Smaller organizations, especially in rural areas, struggle to maintain sound financial management systems due to their inability to attract trained personnel.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

Since the current administration came to power in 2009, CSOs have been able to establish direct channels of communication with the MDC-controlled component of government. However, the ZANU PF component of government has little tolerance towards civil society. CSO-government cooperation deteriorated significantly in 2012, partly due to the tensions created by the election. As a result, there was limited communication between civil society and ministries controlled by ZANU PF.

Government and CSOs conduct joint initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Health and Plan International run joint projects targeting malaria and HIV/AIDS. ZimRights held an interactive meeting with the Ministry of Justice and journalists to emphasize the need to track the progress towards the operationalization of the Human Rights Commission (HRC). Government leaders attend CSO-organized platforms, while CSOs attend government initiatives and participate in government programs. This has been more pronounced in the sectors that do not threaten the political interests of ZANU PF, such as health and education. For example, the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation, and Integration is frequently in touch with civil society about its initiatives and the possible roles civil society could play.

During the year, civil society successfully lobbied the MDC component of government on various policy issues, such as amendments to the electoral laws that were adopted in 2012. In 2012, civil society also successfully lobbied the Constitution Select Committee (COPAC), a parliamentary committee mandated to spearhead the constitution-making process, for 150 extra seats in the second constitutional all-stakeholders conference, a milestone in the constitution-making process. Civil society also embarked on civic education initiatives aimed at raising awareness of the substantive and procedural issues in the constitution making process.

Civil society continues to advocate against legislation that hinders freedom of assembly and association such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) as well as repressive legislation regulating the conduct of journalists and media houses, such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA).
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSO service provision did not change significantly in 2012. CSOs continue to provide a diverse range of products and services, in basic social services such as health, education, and food aid, and in socioeconomic areas such as debt, youth empowerment, resource distribution, accountability, and environmental protection.

CSO services generally respond to the needs of communities and constituencies as expressed in strategic planning sessions with them. CSO service providers collaborate in several ways, including sharing information through the virtual platforms Kubatana and Sokwanele, which house a database of CSO activities in Zimbabwe. There are also communication platforms for civil society and academia.

CSOs usually distribute their materials for free because their constituents have limited disposable income. Some organizations, however, try to recover costs by selling their products. For example, Chidawanyika Development Association, a local CSO in Manicaland Province, partially supports an irrigation scheme by selling agricultural produce.

Although the government publicly criticizes CSOs, it is aware of the importance and relevance of the work of civil society. Ministries often approach CSOs for assistance in fields such as health and education. For example, Care International and World Vision provided food aid to areas affected by drought in 2012.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

The presence of intermediary support organizations (ISOs) has been instrumental in helping CSOs access funding, receive training, and enhance their capacities. ISOs depend on support from international donors. There was no change in the number of ISOs or the general scope of their services in 2012. These facilities continue to be located in the two main cities, Harare and Bulawayo, with limited access for CSOs in Gweru, Mutare, and Masvingo. CSOs in other cities do not have access to resource centers, training, or technology.

CSO management trainers exist, and many funding partners have provided training in basic results-based management. Most training is fairly basic and is not conducted in local languages. Local grantmaking organizations mainly re-grant foreign funding.

CSOs cooperate extensively with each other and have formed coalitions, such as the Women’s Coalition and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. Other key networks focus on elections, education, health, media, and the arts. NANGO is the umbrella body for all CSOs in Zimbabwe. Cooperation even extends beyond borders as CSOs engage in regional advocacy to lobby other nations to push for reforms in Zimbabwe. When members of civil society were being harassed and arrested in Zimbabwe, many CSOs supported them by attending their court proceedings and forming groups on social media platforms, such as the Free Cynthia Manjoro Campaign.

CSOs form partnerships with some arms of government, and various sectors are aware of the benefits of partnerships with CSOs. For example, in 2012, ZimRights and the Ministry of Education, Sport, and Culture organized a music competition for children to promote peace in view of the likely 2013 election.
The media in Zimbabwe remains highly polarized in its attitude towards civil society. The private media provides positive media coverage of civil society. The state media, on the other hand, refuses to report on the work of particular CSOs and even castigates organizations working on democracy, governance, and human rights issues, accusing them of being aligned with the opposition and acting as puppets of the West. CSOs working on service delivery initiatives that are not considered contrary to the state’s interests enjoy positive coverage in both the state and private media.

In 2012, the government granted licenses to two independent radio stations: Star FM, owned by ZimPapers, the parent company of the state’s newspapers; and Z FM, owned by Supa Mandiwanzira who is sometimes described as a ZANU PF apologist. Although the independence of these radio stations is questionable, they have provided some positive coverage of CSOs’ work. The stations invited CSOs to speak on their programs and granted them advertising space and interviews. However, the news sections of the radio stations remain clearly aligned to ZANU PF. The two stations’ coverage continues to grow beyond Harare.

CSOs have developed cordial working relationships with members of the private press to promote their images. CSOs also use other mediums such as websites, social media, and brochures to market themselves and the work they are doing. Private media provides special coverage of important civil society events, such as the sixteen days of activism against gender-based violence and the World Press Freedom Day.

Generally speaking, the MDC component of government views CSOs positively while the ZANU PF component is hostile towards civil society. Despite the polarization in the media, the public values CSO goods and services and appreciates civil society’s contributions to development. The sector’s public image improved in 2012 due to the role CSOs play in the constitution making process. In addition, the raids on civil society in 2012 increased public empathy towards the sector as CSOs were perceived as victims of a brutal regime. At the same time, however, the public assumes CSOs are more richly funded than they are because the typical salaries of CSO staff seem high relative to average salaries in the country. In addition, parts of the population continue to view CSOs as puppets of the West because of the state media, which has greater reach and is the only source of information in some areas.

The business sector also has polarized views on civil society. Many businesses are aligned with the state, and are therefore often critical of CSOs. Because of the perception that CSOs have a lot of funding and highly paid staff, many businesses are unwilling to offer financial or material support to the sector.

Leading CSOs publish annual reports and largely demonstrate transparency in their operations. In 2004, CSOs adopted a code of ethics, although it is not widely known through civil society and has had little practical impact on CSO operations.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

I. OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector’s performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, the Aga Khan Foundation and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the stage of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the implementing partner and local expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s score recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

II. DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs’ effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.
Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector's ability to engage in constituency building and strategic planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.

Financial Viability

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

Advocacy

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs' record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

Service Provision

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

Infrastructure

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary that can provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

Public Image

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs' ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media's coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the
public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs’ public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.

III. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index.

1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts.

Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. The panel may include representatives from the USAID Mission, but they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores. They are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

- local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary civil society support organizations (ISOs);
- local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business, or media;
- think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users groups;
- international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and other local partners.

It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. To the extent possible, panelists should be representative of women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise.

The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and
analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

It is recommended to distribute the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it may be useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners chose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. We would appreciate implementers recording and submitting any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool to MSI and US Agency for International Development (USAID).

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

4. At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the CSOSI should be scored according to evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events.

The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every rating awarded should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

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<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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5. Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description.

For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

6. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.
Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

7. **Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C.**

The DC Editorial committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may request adjustments in scores and/or additional justification to support scores.

8. **Prepare a draft country report.**

The report should cover the calendar year. The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to USAID to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as we do not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts and their organizational affiliation who served on the panel with the report. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public.

While the individual country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. In addition, we will introduce a public launch event or electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) to promote the release of the report in implementers’ countries.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to MSI. Please copy USAID.

The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content.

9. **In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and draft country reports, and will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer.**

The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.” If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

**IV. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE**

As a final step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC. This committee is chaired by a USAID Civil Society Advisor and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Office for
Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG), USAID/Office of Development Partners and Private and Voluntary Cooperation (ODP/PVC), and from USAID Democracy and Governance foreign service officers. The committee also includes a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated Financial Viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, and most importantly, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores.

All final scores are discussed with drafting CSOs. USAID/Washington has the final say on all scores.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare their scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be fewer differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes an adequate explanation for a score will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

Step 1: Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

<table>
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<td>Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”</td>
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Step 2: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

Step 3: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.

Step 4: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 5: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion.

SCORING SCALE:

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector's sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector's sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector's sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector’s sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector’s sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.
VI. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

The following section is the worksheet that members of the Expert Panel use to keep track of the scores they propose for each indicator of each dimension. Each panel member should rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

- **REGISTRATION.** Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?
- **OPERATION.** Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?
- **ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT.** Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?
- **LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.** Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?
- **TAXATION.** Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?
- **EARNED INCOME.** Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

- **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.** Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?
- **STRATEGIC PLANNING.** Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?
- **INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.** Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?
• **CSO STAFFING.** Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

• **TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT.** Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

• **LOCAL SUPPORT:** Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

• **DIVERSIFICATION:** Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

• **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:** Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

• **FUNDRAISING:** Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

• **EARNED INCOME:** Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

**ADVOCACY**

• **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.** Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

• **POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES:** Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOBBYING EFFORTS:** Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

• **LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM.** Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?

**SERVICE PROVISION**
• **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water, or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

• **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

• **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government?

• **COST RECOVERY.** When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

• **GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.** Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

• **INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOs) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.** Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

• **LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS.** Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

• **CSO COALITIONS.** Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

• **TRAINING.** Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

• **INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.** Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

**PUBLIC IMAGE**
• **MEDIA COVERAGE.** Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

• **PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?

• **GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

• **PUBLIC RELATIONS.** Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

• **SELF-REGULATION.** Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

**VII. RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK**

The following section goes into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and stages are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic stages: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced stage, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving stage corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded stage, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.
Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. At this stage, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

ADVOCACY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation;
2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this stage of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries at this stage have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

SERVICE PROVISION

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow
community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors’ forum are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** This stage is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental," "nonprofit," or "civil society," including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
## 2012 CSO Sustainability Scores

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<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
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