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# SOMALIA COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION STRATEGY (CDCS)

DECEMBER 2020 - DECEMBER 2025

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE  
SUMMARY**

**01**



**COUNTRY  
CONTEXT**

**04**




**33**

**MONITORING,  
EVALUATION  
AND  
LEARNING**

**STRATEGIC  
APPROACH**

**08**



**17**

**RESULTS  
FRAMEWORK  
NARRATIVE**



**35**

**ANNEX**



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following a sustained period of political and institutional progress since the establishment of the Federal Government in 2012, the coming few years represent a critical period for Somalia to continue its transition out of fragility and protracted crises. Somalia's federal and state governments have increased their capacity and legitimacy. The country is making progress towards establishing capable and accountable armed forces and police. And Somalia is nearing debt relief as a result of years of sustained economic reform. Despite this progress, al-Shabaab remains one of the world's largest and most dangerous violent extremist organizations. The country also remains in a complex humanitarian emergency, having suffered a large-scale famine in 2011/12 and again experienced a near famine situation in 2017. In light of this progress and mindful of the challenges, USAID developed a five-year (2020-25) strategy that aims to see **Somalia and its people more effectively withstand disruptions and increasingly drive their own development.**

Preventing and countering violent extremism is the United States' most important strategic interest in Somalia. In this strategy, the Mission has prioritized addressing the conditions that allow violent extremism to take root and spread by focusing on grievances arising from poor governance, the absence of justice, and exclusion from political, social, and economic opportunities. In addition to violent extremism, recurrent humanitarian crises have led to an unsustainable humanitarian caseload in Somalia. The Mission has developed a strategy to build individual, household, and community resilience to shocks and stresses. These priorities will be realized through the achievement of two development objectives (DO): (1) **Targeted local institutions govern in a more legitimate manner, diminishing influence of violent extremist organizations** and (2) **Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.** Making progress on these two issues is essential

to launching Somalia on its journey to self-reliance (J2SR).

The goal and DO statements emphasize that Somalia is only just beginning its journey to self-reliance. While Somalia's J2SR Country Roadmap (Annex 1) lacks sufficient data, existing data points and secondary analyses reveal that Somalia ranks below most countries in both commitment and capacity metrics. Data reveals that Somalia lags in freedom of expression, rule of law, and has a difficult business environment. Although data indicate constraints on freedom, Somalia is rated as having minimal threats to religious freedom per the International Religious Freedom report. Somalia also has a high poverty rate, lacks transparency, and has low net school enrollment. Despite such performance, the country has maintained increasing, though still limited, commitment in the security sector and on economic reform. USAID's strategy will be guided by J2SR principles, including leveraging the country's dynamic private sector and building the capacity of institutions foundational for Somalia to one day finance its own development agenda.

Throughout this CDCS, USAID articulates the value-add of a development program to the U.S. Government's national interests in Somalia. The Mission proposes to utilize development tools, as part of the wider U.S. Government Somalia strategy, to prevent and counter violent extremism and build resilience to mitigate the chronic humanitarian needs. The strategy further commits the Mission to target socially marginalized Somalis in a defined geographic focal zone and ensures that USAID works toward shared humanitarian and development objectives. USAID's strategy contributes significantly to and is aligned with the following four goals of the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Somalia to: (1) **establish a robust, permanent U.S. Mission presence in Mogadishu to enable U.S.**



Somalia remains in a complex humanitarian emergency, having suffered a large-scale famine in 2011/12 and again experienced a near famine situation in 2017.

## Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) goals



Robust, Permanent U.S. Mission Presence in Mogadishu to Enable U.S. Policy **Leadership Engagement with Somalis**



**Overcoming Violent Opposition** to the State



Building **Durable Foundations** for a More Stable, Democratic, and Prosperous Somalia



Expanding Inclusive **Economic Growth** and Improving Service Delivery


2

policy leadership engagement with Somalis; (2) overcoming violent opposition to the State; (3) build durable foundations for a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Somalia; and (4) expand inclusive economic growth and improving service delivery. These goals are aligned with the U.S. National Security Strategy, USAID/State Joint Strategic Plan, and the U.S. Africa Strategy.

This strategy also recognizes existing opportunities and strengths in Somalia. One example is Somalia's resilient and dynamic private sector which has continuously adapted to

Somalia's dynamic context. Additionally, over the decades of instability in Somalia, there have been positive efforts to reestablish local governance resulting in relatively stable pockets of administrative and security order. Challenges will continue to persist, but the perseverance and ambition of the Somali people creates opportunity to further progress. USAID will partner with Somalia on its journey to self-reliance so that **Somalia and its people more effectively withstand disruptions and increasingly drive their own development.**

# RESULTS FRAMEWORK



**GOAL:** BY 2025, SOMALIA AND ITS PEOPLE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITHSTAND DISRUPTIONS AND INCREASINGLY DRIVE THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT

**DO 1:** Targeted local institutions govern in a more legitimate manner, diminishing influence of VEOs



1.1: Political and economic governance institutions are perceived as more fair

1.2: Marginalized citizens' access to inclusive social and economic opportunities increased

1.3: Communities more effectively address grievances and manage local conflict



**DO 2:** Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses

2.1: Governing institutions more effectively plan for and respond to shocks and stresses

2.2: Livelihoods of marginalized populations are strengthened and diversified

2.3: Social capital of marginalized populations is strengthened

2.4: Human capital of women strengthened

## II. COUNTRY CONTEXT

### Overview

The Somali population is approximately 15 million people, with 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 2 million Somalis in the diaspora. Somalia's population growth rate is nearly 3 percent, with little indication of a decline as the average fertility rate is 6.9 children per woman. Somalia also has a predominantly young population with over 80 percent estimated to be under the age of 35.<sup>1</sup> Urbanization is quickly intensifying at an estimated annual rate of 4 percent,<sup>2</sup> and Somalis are almost equally split between urban (45 percent) and rural areas (55 percent).

Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in Africa, with nearly seven out of ten Somalis living in poverty<sup>3</sup> and per capita annual income estimated at approximately \$315 in 2018 (World Bank 2019).<sup>4</sup> Somalia's economy runs largely on agriculture and livestock which account for 65 percent of both the GDP and workforce employment. Somalia's health system continues to suffer from a lack of resources and adequate data to inform planning. This is particularly notable in reproductive health, an area largely dependent on the adequacy and availability of health services.<sup>5</sup> Somalia's complex education landscape also faces immense challenges. Only half of the population is literate, and in virtually all age-groups women have less educational attainment than men. Only about 33 percent of children aged 6-13 are enrolled in primary school. Limited access, lack of qualified teachers, poor school infrastructure, and general insecurity are some of the major challenges for education.<sup>6</sup>



- 1 The Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development. Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024. 2019
- 2 World Bank Group. Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment. 2019
- 3 World Bank Group. Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment. 2019
- 4 Directorate of National Statistics, Federal Government of Somalia. The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020
- 5 Directorate of National Statistics, Federal Government of Somalia. The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020
- 6 Federal Republic of Somalia. Somalia Economic Update: Building Education to Boost Human Capital. August 2019.



Chronic instability in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 has resulted in three decades of warfare and violence in Somalia. The decades of instability, intercommunal conflict, and humanitarian crises in Somalia were marked by numerous attempts at reconciliation, peacekeeping, stabilization, and international relief. Clan conflict, violent extremism, drought, famine, out-migration, and multiple failed central state governments have typified the obstacles facing a unified, independent Somali state capable of service delivery and crisis response.

Somalia is also grappling with fundamental governance issues such as power sharing struggles within the Government of Somalia (GOS), low state capacity, and incomplete democratization. Government efforts to build institutional capacity, grow the economy and revenue base, and augment service delivery, occur in a context marked by the continuous influence of violent extremism from al-Shabaab (AS), who appeared on the Somali scene in 2006. AS remains a formidable threat and continues to demonstrate the ability to launch deadly strikes against “soft targets” and innocent civilians across Somalia and beyond its borders. Somalia is also particularly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, both the immediate impact of the shock as well as its longer term effect on the economy, health system, and the ability of Somalis to recover in the coming years. Exports of livestock, which accounts for 75% of total exports, was affected due to the cancellation of the Hajj. At over \$1.3 billion annually and at least 20% of GDP, remittances are drying up as a source of capital for both individual households and financial institutions.

Somali women and girls face additional challenges. One-quarter to one-third of Somali households are headed by a woman<sup>7</sup>

and, according to the Federal Government of Somalia's ninth National Development Plan (NDP-9) 2020-2024, women “generate up to 70 percent of household income.”<sup>8</sup> Women are critical to family resilience, community cohesion, and national development. Nevertheless, they are systematically excluded from or under-represented in all levels of decision-making, including in community leadership, politics, and justice and conflict resolution mechanisms. Almost all teachers in Somalia are male<sup>9</sup>, and females in all geographic areas and demographic groups have lower literacy and education rates compared to males.<sup>10</sup> Women with no education have about twice as many children as women with higher education; only one-third of women give birth with the help of a skilled attendant; and the Somali maternal mortality rate remains almost double that of some neighboring countries.<sup>11</sup> Widespread early marriage and gender-based violence (GBV) – including rape, domestic abuse, and almost universal female genital mutilation (FGM)<sup>12</sup> – negatively impacts most aspects of women's and girls' lives.

Notwithstanding the challenges highlighted above, the Mission also recognizes opportunities and strengths in Somalia. Somalia has a resilient and dynamic private sector which has adapted through the worst years of the civil war. The private sector has demonstrated success in providing essential services and has been vital to Somalia's socio-economic and political development. The GOS has demonstrated commitment to economic reform, with debt relief on the horizon. As a result, Somalia's relationships with International Financial Institutions were “normalized” in early 2020, bringing much-needed additional resources for development investments. Somalia also boasts a large diaspora that is investing in Somalia's renewal and remittances are



women  
generate up to  
**70% of  
household  
income**

7 The Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020 (SHDS 2020), Directorate of National Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, Federal Government of Somalia, page 22. Separate UNFPA data indicates that one-fourth of households across all age groups are headed by women, including among displaced populations. Gender Equity: Hit or Miss in the Somali Population, UNFPA, December 2019, pages 33-34.

8 <http://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf>, page 22.

9 Somalia Economic Update: Building Education to Boost Human Capital, The World Bank, August 2019, page 23.

10 SHDS 2020, page 51. Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, The World Bank, April 2019, page xviii.

11 SHDS 2020, pages 76, 111, 276 and following.

12 SHDS 2020, page 213.

estimated to comprise 20 percent of GDP, similar in magnitude to international assistance. Lastly, over the decades of instability, there have been positive efforts to reestablish local governance resulting in relatively stable pockets of administrative order and security.

## USAID Country Roadmap Analysis

The most notable feature of Somalia's J2SR Country Roadmap is the lack of data. It only includes data on eight (out of 17) metrics, meaning there is insufficient data to aggregate Somalia's Journey to Self-Reliance commitment and capacity scores. The eight existing data points reveal that Somalia comparatively ranks below most countries. Given the absence of self-reliance data, the Mission performed a secondary analysis using proxy metrics. This secondary analysis further highlights poor performance, particularly in freedom of expression and association; rule of law; transparency; business environment; poverty rate; and net school enrollment.

The majority of capacity metrics in Somalia's Country Roadmap lacks data. However, based on limited J2SR data and secondary analysis, the Mission assesses low capacity across the board. In 2018, per capita GDP in current USD was \$314.50.<sup>13</sup> While Somalia has made great strides in recent years, recurrent economic shocks and ongoing conflict in some parts of the country undermine Somalia's economic recovery. A range of challenges erode Somalia's economic capacity, including unproductive and climate-vulnerable agricultural practices, fragmented markets, limited urban livelihoods, weak education and training leading to human capital deficits, and an uncompetitive business environment. In 2017, 69 percent of the population was living on less than the international poverty line of US\$1.90 at 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP).<sup>14</sup> Net school enrollment rate of the population aged 6-13

years is just 33 percent. These findings make it imperative for USAID to strengthen the capacity of individuals and targeted institutions to achieve this strategy's objectives.

The Mission also recognizes that Somalia has been trending upward in commitment in certain areas over the past eight years, albeit from an extremely low, virtually non-existent, base. Somalia's existing levels of commitment, particularly in the security sector and on economic reform, suggest an opportunity for USAID to partner with the GOS to advance shared objectives. Section III provides more details on potential areas of commitment between USAID and GOS.

Though the absence of data is a concern for evidence-based policy-making, progress is being made as demonstrated by completion of Somalia's first comprehensive household survey in decades, completion of a Health and Demographic Survey, and the recent establishment of an independent statistical body. These accomplishments offer opportunities for the Mission to support the GOS to launch its journey to self-reliance.

## Strategic Alignment To Partner Country Priorities

Somalia's development priorities are captured in its National Development Plan 9 (NDP 9) covering 2020-2024, which lays out the government's plan to reduce poverty and increase economic growth. NDP 9 articulates inclusive and accountable politics, improved security and rule of law, and improved economic development as necessary prerequisites for GOS to enable the government to provide social development (the fourth objective) and other government services.

In 2017

# 69%

of the population was living on less than the international poverty line of US\$1.90

<sup>13</sup> World Bank Databank. No data for 2019 or 2020  
<sup>14</sup> Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment

The 2019-2020 Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) for Somalia defines near-term benchmarks for the achievement of high-level commitments, such as those in NDP 9. The 2019-2020 MAF set of commitments for government include: ensuring inclusion of all sectors of society in political decision making, extension of justice to newly recovered areas, improvement of doing business indicators for Somalia, and increased allocation in 2020 GOS budgets for education.

As shown in the table below, USAID's priorities very much align with and support Somalia's national development priorities.

Somalia's development priorities are also reflected in the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Somalia, which prioritizes four goals to guide the U.S. Government's engagement, aligned with the U.S. National Security Strategy:

1. Robust, Permanent U.S. Mission Presence in Mogadishu to Enable U.S. Policy Leadership Engagement with Somalis
2. Overcoming Violent Opposition to the State
3. Building Durable Foundations for a More Stable, Democratic, and Prosperous Somalia
4. Expanding Inclusive Economic Growth and Improving Service Delivery

## Strategic Competition

Viewed through the lens of global power competition, Somalia is a success story for the United States with

Somalia turning to the United States as the partner of choice at the expense of China, Russia, and Iran. The U.S. Ambassador to Somalia carries out highly visible diplomatic engagements in support of the GOS's reform agenda. Somalia is also a high priority for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), which partners with the Somali government in its ongoing campaign against AS. USAID is the largest bilateral donor to Somalia, providing more than \$400 million of humanitarian assistance in each of the last three years, in addition to about \$60 million per year in development assistance.

While the U.S. Government's engagement has only increased in recent years, China's involvement in Somalia is limited thus far, and appears to be motivated primarily by commercial interests. For instance, China has signed oil exploration deals with the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and semi-autonomous state of Puntland. Chinese vessels have also secured fishing licenses to operate along the Somali coast. However, Somalia did sign a Memorandum of Understanding in 2018 to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), signaling a potential increase in Chinese involvement.

While China is not yet a major player in Somalia, it could become one once non-concessional lending becomes available following debt relief. In line with its work under the Financing Self Reliance (FSR) initiative, the Mission will continue to dedicate staff time and expertise to steer policy reforms that will incentivize the design of robust, sustainable Somali debt and public financial management systems. Durable systems with substantive checks and balances will make the Government of Somalia less susceptible to predatory loans and unsustainable debt after achieving debt relief.

NDP Priority Areas	CDCS Intermediate Results
<b>Pillar 1:</b> Inclusive and Accountable Politics and Reconciliation	<b>DO 1 IR 1.1:</b> Political and economic governance institutions are perceived as more fair
<b>Pillar 2:</b> Improved Security and Rule of Law	<b>DO 1 IR 1.3:</b> Communities more effectively address grievances and manage local conflict <b>DO 2 IR 2.1:</b> Governing institutions more effectively plan for and respond to shocks and stresses
<b>Pillar 3:</b> Economic Development	<b>DO 1 IR 1.1:</b> Political and economic governance institutions are perceived as more fair <b>DO 1 IR 1.2:</b> Marginalized citizen's access to inclusive social and economic opportunities increased <b>DO 2 IR 2.2:</b> Livelihoods of marginalized populations are strengthened and diversified
<b>Pillar 4:</b> Social and Human Development	<b>DO 1 IR 1.2:</b> Marginalized citizen's access to inclusive social and economic opportunities increased <b>DO 2 IR 2.1:</b> Governing institutions more effectively plan for and respond to shocks and stresses <b>DO 2 IR 2.3:</b> Social capital of marginalized populations is strengthened <b>DO 2 IR 2.4:</b> Human capital of women strengthened

## III. STRATEGIC APPROACH

With the 2020-2025 CDCS, the Mission has prioritized the value-add of development programming to the greater U.S. Government toolkit in Somalia.

Given the Somalia context, U.S. Government development tools and expertise are critical for two reasons: (1) to help protect the homeland and our interests in the wider Horn of Africa region against violent extremism, and (2) to reduce the cost of humanitarian response to the U.S. taxpayer. In response, USAID/Somalia's 2020-2025 CDCS proposes a strategy that is built around: (1) preventing and countering violent extremism as a part of the broader U.S. Government strategy, and (2) building household, community, and national resilience to shocks. Advancing these objectives is essential to launching Somalia on its journey to self-reliance.

The Mission must implement this strategy with a limited annual development assistance budget that has averaged a little over \$60 million<sup>15</sup> each of the last three years (FYs 2017-19). In addition to a limited overall budget, there is a high operational cost to working in Somalia. Essential yet premium services such as security, third party monitoring, and maintaining a U.S. Government facility in a non-permissive environment are a few examples of costs that ultimately limit the amount of funding that goes to beneficiaries.

Somalia is only just beginning its journey to self-reliance, though the GOS has very much bought into J2SR through its National Development Plan 9 (NDP 9). The Mission's approach to achieving these objectives will be guided by the principles of J2SR, including: fostering the Somali government's capacity to take advantage of Somalia's dynamic private sector; one of the country's greatest sources of strength; make informed decisions about its choice of development partners; and strengthen institutions foundational to Somalia's ability to one day finance its own development agenda.

**Target Population:** For the Mission to maximize its strategic impact, the Mission will target a specific population - the "socially marginalized". This population includes Somalis who are disproportionately affected by recurrent climatic and other shocks and reliant or likely to become reliant on humanitarian assistance, as well as populations who are vulnerable to recruitment, radicalization, and/or negative influence from violent extremist organizations.

<sup>15</sup> Though FY 17-19 levels were approximately \$60 million annually, the Mission's FY 20 budget allocation is \$45 million (roughly a 20 percent budget cut).

## A Story from the 2011 Famine<sup>16</sup>

Our family keeps cattle, some camels, and we farm. As a family, we have many people who are able and can work and we sell our labor to farms during the farming period. We had a good sesame harvest in gu 2010. In general, farming practices in Bay region have changed [in recent years] and the change was towards increasing growing of cash crops – sesame and groundnuts. Before the drought of 2011, livestock numbers increased too much but reduced to almost zero because of the drought, especially for cattle. I had invested to buy ten good-looking cows. I used a good amount of my money for my son's marriage and dowry. Yes, we had a relatively good amount of sorghum reserves. Things were well and in order.

Unfortunately, the 2010–11 deyr failed. From February to April 2011, there was a very hot jilaal [dry season]. Because there are no livestock feed stocks from sesame [as there is from the traditional sorghum crop], the cattle and goats had nothing to feed on. We had to give part of the sorghum we had and share it between people and livestock. When the sorghum supply was gone, we started giving the livestock the grass roof that was on our huts. Livelihood stress continued, number of meals and amount was reduced. This was the beginning of January 2011 and onwards.

Cattle started dying by February 2011 and by the end of April, it was almost finished. By May, people started becoming IDPs, moving to different places. For our case, we divided the family in three groups: one group went to Dollo Ethiopia refugee camp, one group went to Baidoa, especially the weaker ones, and one group stayed or moved with the camels and few goats (because there were lactating camels). I was part of the Baidoa group. We moved to Baidoa during June 2011. I went to some clan members in Baidoa to assist me and save my family. They assisted me with some food that was enough for at least a month. I also found some aid that was done by Baidoa business group and AS. Later there was some aid from ICRC and AS. All my family members are in Baidoa district and I don't have any family members in other countries that I can cry to but there are some clan members in Baidoa town that I can cry to for some assistance.

**Children and old people were those who died most. I have seen myself a family with more than ten children, four of them dead in two days. People who have nobody to cry to, that is who don't have kinsmen to help, don't have a son or a daughter in the towns or out of the country to help. All such people have no ability to manage.**


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16 Majid, Adan, et al.: Narratives of Famine

**Geographic Focus:** Given limited resources, the Mission plans to focus implementation of its strategy within a limited geography, referred to as “the geographic focal zone”, to maximize impact in areas with high densities of marginalized populations. Implementation of this strategy will primarily focus on the geographic focal zone highlighted in the below

map, which includes Banadir; most of Southwest State, and extends to limited areas in Hirshabelle State and Jubaland State.

At least one-third of Somalia’s population live in the geographic focal zone, including the highest density of Somalia’s socially marginalized people.



This geography also contains the two largest concentrations of internally displaced people (Mogadishu and Baidoa) in Somalia, who present a chronic need for humanitarian assistance. Historically, these areas have experienced the most severe humanitarian crises, such as the famines of 1991 and 2011. The geographic focal zone is also where al-Shabaab maintains some territorial control and continues to exert its influence. While other parts of Somalia experience severe food insecurity and remain vulnerable to al-Shabaab influence, the geographic focal zone presents the greatest vulnerabilities to the effects of violent extremism and natural disasters. Within this geographical focal zone, USAID recognizes that dynamics are unique to each community.

**Institutions:** During CDCS implementation, USAID/Somalia will work to build the capacity of a targeted set of public and private institutions and informal or quasi-informal entities (e.g., clan elders, youth associations). Programs in Somalia will rely heavily on timely, targeted contextual analyses to provide critical information on key stakeholders in order to be successful. USAID will support contextual analyses at the community-level as a way to identify structures, institutions, or interlocutors. These findings will guide USAID partnerships and program implementation. In response to differences found in the analyses, USAID will be flexible, adjusting its engagement with institutions based on the nature and dynamics of marginalization unique to each community. This flexible approach is critical to effectively improve governance and build the legitimacy and capacity of institutions to become more inclusive of the marginalized communities they serve.

**Strategic Shifts:** USAID is implementing three primary shifts in this strategy:

- (1) The CDCS outlines an approach, through the implementation of two development objectives, that justifies U.S. Government development investments in Somalia. The strategy utilizes development tools and expertise to prevent and counter violent extremism and build resilience to mitigate the ongoing humanitarian crisis. This contrasts with the previous transition strategy that focused on simply proving that development programming was possible in Somalia. With this new strategy, USAID will not pursue the achievement of “typical” sector-specific development targets for their own sake.
- (2) This strategy outlines a plan for USAID to target socially marginalized Somalis in a specific geographic focal zone. USAID development assistance will not be implemented outside of the geographic focal zone unless Mission leadership grants an exemption to established Mission engagement criteria.
- (3) This strategy will work toward shared humanitarian and longer-term objectives by leveraging humanitarian investments in resilience and implementing development assistance to address the root causes of humanitarian crises. USAID will not operate in independent humanitarian and development siloes.

## I. Typical Rural Beneficiary Household



A typical poor household in rural Lower Shabelle has between 5-7 members in the family. This household does not grow cash crops or have any livestock (an important form of savings). It is reliant on the agricultural sector and a favorable climate because household members may earn day wages working on wealthier neighbors' farms. In addition to being highly dependent on agriculture, these households lack any form of savings. If they have access to land on which to farm, they consume the majority of their own crop and only sell off a small fraction of what they produce. The revenue they generate from casual labor and selling off their crops is used for purchases such as agricultural inputs, school fees, medical bills, etc.

## II. Typical Urban Beneficiary Household



The typical poor, urban household consists of six members and has few assets. Income is typically derived from casual labor, such as construction, and opportunities found outside of the city, such as artisanal fishing and charcoal production. When possible, poor households also engage in petty trade. Common shocks include insecurity, labor and commodity price fluctuations, and disease outbreaks. With little savings, poor households affected by shocks must aim to increase income through whichever source is least affected by the shock, or else reduce spending.

## III. Characteristics of a Typical AS Recruit

Interviews with disengaged combatants produced the following profiles, though USAID acknowledges that there are many different reasons for susceptibility to AS recruitment. The profiles are based on interviews with 189 disengaged combatants (179 male, 10 female). The respondents were primarily rural inhabitants.

“Interviewees reported that, prior to their recruitment, they were not confident in their own religious knowledge and felt in need of guidance from religious figures. They had significant concerns about security and feelings of vulnerability. This threat did not come from AS, but rather from other clans, militias, and/or the Somali National Army. They also felt marginalized because of clan-based grievances, specifically that their clan had suffered more hardships than others, faced more humiliation, and had not been treated as fairly as other clans. They had difficulty finding work, often dealing with prolonged unemployment and financial strain that affected the individual and their family. They reported feeling that they had fewer educational opportunities and less access to basic services at the time of their recruitment compared to other people they knew.

Even though the number of interviewed female disengaged combatants was relatively small, it allows for a limited analysis of main differences between the experience of men and women. Women are more likely to join AS through their family (i.e. knowing a family member within AS before joining or first finding out about AS ideology through their family). Women are much more likely to be recruited by a female recruiter who tends to use their personal grievances due to clan marginalization or economic and social vulnerability. Women also took a longer time in deciding to join AS. Lastly, marriage is a significant motivator for women to join AS, either voluntarily or because they are forced to do so.”<sup>17</sup>



## Host Country Relationship and Resources

**Redefining the Relationship (RDR):** As described in Section 2, the United States and the GOS have a deepening partnership, Somalia is only just beginning its journey to self-reliance, and the GOS has very much bought into J2SR through its own NDP 9.

USAID will identify existing local commitment to partner with us to advance this strategy's objectives and build Somali capacity to do so. One clear indicator of commitment to the partnership between USAID and the GOS was the 2017 signing of the Development Objective Assistance Agreement (DOAG), the first U.S. Government-GOS bilateral financing agreement in nearly thirty years. Another potential opportunity for partnership is around GOS commitment in advancing a broader evidence-based development agenda. This is demonstrated by Somalia's recent completion of its first comprehensive household survey in decades, which served as the basis for a very strong poverty analysis underpinning NDP 9. Somalia also recently completed a Health and Demographic Survey and established an independent statistical body.

USAID recognizes that capacity is universally low in Somalia, which indicates a high level of need across the board. This is also acknowledged in NDP 9. NDP 9 notes an important lesson from implementation of the previous NDP, namely that Somalia remains at an early stage of development and currently lacks the capacities needed to carry forward an ambitious and wide-ranging development agenda. USAID is well positioned to strengthen GOS capacity prioritizing the areas of security and economic reform, where commitment has been clearly demonstrated.

**Financing Self-Reliance (FSR):** Given Somalia's annual federal government budget of approximately \$450 million (2020), comparable to annual U.S. Government humanitarian spending in recent years, it is not realistic to expect the Somali government to invest in much more than keeping the machinery of government running. As a part of the country's journey toward debt relief, however, the government will prioritize a number of initiatives that fall within the pillars of the FSR Framework, including: improving domestic resource mobilization, strengthening public financial management, and enhancing fiscal transparency and accountability. The Mission intends to focus staff time and

expertise on steering policy reforms in these FSR Framework pillars as a leader within the international community.


## Private Sector And Civil Society Roles

**Private Sector Engagement (PSE):** Somalia has a resilient and dynamic private sector. Despite the challenges of insecurity, weak governance and increasingly frequent climatic shocks and stresses, Somalia's private sector has demonstrated success in providing essential services and has been vital to Somalia's socio-economic and political development. For example, private providers currently dominate the provision of education and health services. However, Somalia's private sector has been largely unregulated which leaves service delivery uneven. Those unable to pay for service provision face the risk of being left behind.

The Mission recognizes that Somalia's private sector must be an active stakeholder in the political and economic reform and recovery processes for Somalia to transition from insecurity to stability and resilience. The GOS agrees, noting in NDP 9, that its ability to fund the health, education, and social protection sectors is beyond the scope of NDP 9's timeframe. Given Somalia's low levels of capacity within the government to execute or deliver services, the near term focus will be on developing its oversight and regulatory capacity while looking to engage with development partners to ensure provision of services to vulnerable populations.<sup>18</sup> These are the types of building blocks necessary to facilitate Somalia's long-term path to self-reliance. USAID will support the GOS in strengthening its capacity to coordinate equitable service provision and set standards that promote a uniform quality of service provision.

As USAID implements its strategy, the Mission will prioritize engagement with the private sector in accordance with the following principles:

- *Principle 1: Engage early and often*
- *Principle 2: Incentivize and value PSE throughout planning and programming*
- *Principle 3: Expand the use of USAID approaches and tools that unlock the potential of the private sector*



more than 1/3  
of households  
are female-  
headed

- *Principle 4: Build and act on the evidence of what works, and what does not, in PSE*

**Civil Society Engagement:** Somalia's civil society has played an important role in service delivery. Similar to the private sector, civil society organizations (CSOs) stepped in to fill the governance and essential service delivery gaps created after the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991. Even as the capacity and legitimacy of Somalia's central and state governments has grown, CSOs have continued to demonstrate their value in delivering humanitarian and other services. Some groups are active as advocates for gender equality and for the marginalized and under-represented. However, Somalia's civil society faces institutional challenges, organizational weaknesses, knowledge and capacity deficits, internal disputes, and a lack of resources.

The Mission will continue to identify CSOs with existing commitment related to the CDCS outcomes of interest and build their capacity to advance our CDCS DOs. For example, the Mission recognizes existing CSO commitment (as documented in NDP 9) to security, a key component of which is improving access to justice. To this end, the Mission will engage civil and justice institutions, justice actor networks, civil society advocates and academic institutions to strengthen their capacity to help communities address grievances.

## Gender And Youth

**Gender:** Somali women and girls face formidable, multi-faceted challenges. According to NDP-9, "women represent 56 percent of the population and generate up to 70 percent of household income but are under-represented in the formal labor force." At least one-third of households are headed by a woman, and more than one-third of women participate in the labor market. Their lives are governed by deeply patriarchal cultural norms, patrilineal clan systems, and Islamic Sharia law. They are disproportionately impacted by protracted conflict with and, in some locations, rule by Salafi jihadist extremists, as well as disruption and displacement caused by climate-related disasters.

A Mission Gender Assessment identified the following opportunities as having potential to make a difference in the lives of Somali women and girls:

- Engagement of women and female youth in local governance, enabling them to articulate gender-focused priorities in their communities and influence decision-making, including local budget allocations (IR 1.1);
- Partnering with public and private sector educational institutions to train and retain female teachers and to incorporate gender-related themes in school curricula, including to counter



**Principle 1:**  
Engage early and often



**Principle 2:**  
Incentivize and value PSE throughout planning and programming



**Principle 3:** Expand the use of USAID approaches and tools that unlock the potential of the private sector



**Principle 4:** Build and act on the evidence of what works, and what does not, in PSE

gender stereotypes, early marriage and all forms of GBV (IR 1.2, IR 2.4);

- Providing women and female youth information and other resources to engage in diverse income-generating activities based on gender-specific market analysis of agricultural and non-agricultural opportunities (IR 1.2, IR 2.2);
- Supporting justice reform efforts, including passage and enforcement of the Sexual Offenses Bill that protects the rights of women and girls; active roles for women in formal and informal justice systems; and facilitating women's increased access to justice, including for all forms of GBV (IR 1.3);
- Partnering with private sector health service providers to recruit and train female personnel, sensitize male health providers, and prioritize all aspects of reproductive health including countering all forms of GBV (IR 2.4); and,
- Activities with and messaging for men and boys intended to bolster female equality and empowerment, including related to gender stereotypes, early marriage, and GBV

In planning for specific initiatives, USAID is mindful of the potential risk for strong backlash from male clan leaders, VEOs, and others in response to increasing women's participation in governance, economic opportunities, education, and justice systems. Involving men, including clan and community leaders, in activity planning could help mitigate this risk.

**Youth:** Somalia also has a predominantly young population with over 80 percent estimated to be under the age of 35.<sup>19</sup> Somali youth have limited opportunities for education, training, and employment, and are vulnerable to exploitation from criminal organizations and violent extremist

groups. Exclusion from and discrimination in economic and employment opportunities, both real and perceived, have been cited as potential drivers of conflict.

A Mission Youth Assessment found that the youth experience in Somalia is largely driven by poverty, food insecurity, and lack of access to education and other services. Overwhelmingly, education is the number one aspiration of younger youth (15-25), while employment is the number one aspiration of older youth (25-30), especially if they already have some education. Major barriers to employment include lack of skills and experience, tribalism or nepotism and corruption, insecurity (lack of freedom of movement and access to land and businesses), and gender discrimination.

The Youth Assessment identified the following opportunities as having high potential to make a difference in the lives of Somali youth:

- *Livelihoods development:* obtaining the requisite tools, opportunities and resources (e.g., access to finance) to engage in productive employment and self-employment activities (IR 1.2, IR 2.2);
- *Education and skills for work-readiness:* practical, skill-based training and social-emotional learning so youth can be competitive in the labor market (IR 1.2, IR 2.4);
- *Youth engagement in community and government:* obtaining access to opportunities and increased voice to influence decision making spaces (IR 1.1); and
- *Leadership roles in access to justice:* obtaining access to platforms and increased voice to contribute to justice reform efforts (IR 1.3).

**80% of the youth population is estimated to be under the age of 35**



*Education is the number one aspiration of younger youth between*  
**(15-25)**



*Employment is the number one aspiration of older youth between*  
**(25-30)**

## Efforts Of Other U.S. Government Actors

The U.S. Government's Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Somalia has four goals: (1) Mission Presence in Somalia, (2) Overcoming Violent Opposition to the State, (3) Building Durable Foundations for a More Stable, Democratic, and Prosperous Somalia, and (4) Expanding

Inclusive Economic Growth and Improving Service Delivery. USAID's development assistance plays an important role in working towards Goals 3 and 4, with humanitarian assistance contributing to Goal 4. The Department of State and USAID closely collaborate to engage with the GOS on creating enabling conditions for stability and citizen security, strengthening effective, accountable, and representative governance institutions, and increasing political participation and trust in political processes.



# IV. RESULTS FRAMEWORK NARRATIVE

## Goal Statement and Narrative

USAID/Somalia's CDCS goal, ***“By 2025, Somalia and its people more effectively withstand disruptions and increasingly drive their own development,”*** recognizes that Somalia is only just beginning its journey to self-reliance. USAID's engagement therefore focuses on strengthening the foundations that Somalia needs to launch its journey to self-reliance: (1) preventing/countering violent extremism, and (2) building resilience.

Implementation of USAID's transition strategy, 2016-2019, demonstrated the feasibility of implementing a development assistance program despite considerable security, political, social, and economic challenges presented by Somalia's particular context. Over the course of the transition strategy USAID signed its first bilateral financing agreement (DOAG) with the GOS in nearly 30 years and formally re-opened the Mission in Mogadishu in June 2019. These are significant milestones indicative of the deepening development partnership between the U.S. Government and the people and government of Somalia.

The Mission acknowledges that Somalia remains extremely fragile and the gains that have been made are tenuous. The United States continues to invest heavily in Somalia's security, support the fight against violent extremism, and deliver more than \$400 million a year in humanitarian assistance in response to needs created by recurring climate and weather-related disasters, including droughts, floods, and locusts, population displacement due to conflict, and now the COVID-19 global pandemic.

Countering violent extremism is the U.S. Government's highest foreign policy priority

in Somalia. Because VEOs generally gain traction in conflict-affected countries where government institutions have been hollowed out and state-society relationships are fractured, USAID is uniquely placed to address some of the structural factors and community dynamics that allow violent extremism to spread in Somalia. These include poor governance, lack of justice, and exclusion from political, social and economic opportunities. USAID will focus on promoting more legitimate and inclusive institutions; improving citizen-responsive governance; and expanding opportunities to increase the agency and empowerment of previously excluded populations, including but not limited to women, youth, and minority clans.

Likewise, as the largest humanitarian donor to Somalia, USAID is well-positioned to address the chronic humanitarian emergency in the country. In addition to saving lives, USAID will focus on building individual, household, and community resilience to shocks, such as climatic disasters, locust infestations, disease outbreaks, and conflict, with women at the heart of many of these efforts. In doing so, USAID will reduce the cost of humanitarian response to the U.S. taxpayer and will help communities and households in the targeted geographical zone more effectively manage disruptions.

The Mission will support progress towards the CDCS Goal by advancing two Development Objectives (DOs) described below. Achievement of both objectives will launch Somalia on its journey to self-reliance while advancing the U.S. Government's most important strategic interests.



One clear indicator of commitment to the partnership between USAID and the FGS was the 2017 signing of a Development Objective Assistance Agreement (DOAG).

# Development Objective Results Statements And Narratives

## Development Objective I (DOI)

*DO I, Targeted local institutions are perceived as governing in a more legitimate and inclusive manner, diminishing influence of VEOs*, addresses the United States' most important strategic interest in Somali-preventing and countering violent extremism-and is a necessary condition for the launch of Somalia's journey to self-reliance.

**Development Hypothesis:** If (a) targeted public and private institutions (e.g., local and district administrations, local courts, private sector education "umbrella" associations, business associations) and informal or quasi-informal entities (e.g., clan elders, youth associations) are perceived as being more inclusive of the marginalized communities they serve and (b) individuals are provided with opportunities to increase their voice, agency and influence within their communities, then trust between these institutions/entities and communities they serve will be strengthened. Increased trust will contribute to communities' perception of enhanced legitimacy of these targeted institutions, which is essential to diminishing the influence of VEOs.

**Link to Goal:** The presence of VEOs continues to disrupt Somalia's ability to drive its own development. Somalia is deeply affected by nearly three decades of internal conflict, which has largely destroyed the country's economic, education, and justice infrastructure, and frayed the social fabric to the detriment of personal safety. The continued impact of VEOs' influence has further eroded the legitimacy of Somali governing institutions and fractured state-society relationships. DOI supports the CDCS goal by building more inclusive communities and systems; improving citizen-responsive governance and justice; and providing opportunities for previously excluded populations, such as women, youth and minority clans to increase their voice, agency, and economic and educational empowerment. In addressing the conditions that allow violent extremism to take root and spread, in the CDCS geographic focal zone, USAID will enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand the disruptions caused by VEOs and drive their own development.

VEOs, such as AS, remain a formidable threat that continue to exert influence throughout Somalia. AS, in particular, has caused significant instability through its ongoing attacks against institutions and individuals. This instability exacerbates state weaknesses. AS's resiliency is rooted in a strongly entrenched organizational structure that relies on decentralized networks capable of adapting to local community dynamics. While coercion and fear are crucial instruments, AS also sustains control at a local level by understanding community interests, incentivizing collaboration, and addressing issues that matter most to communities (e.g., lack of rule of law and justice and limited access to social and economic services).

The premise of this DO is that VEOs, like AS, effectively exploit grievances created by widespread marginalization to undermine state authority and increase their legitimacy. While the causes of violent extremism are complex and multifaceted, evidence demonstrates that, in Somalia, unresolved grievances associated with systems perceived as unfair contribute to individuals joining VEOs.<sup>20</sup> VEOs work to undermine confidence in government and institutions in order to shore up their own legitimacy. They do this through violence and coercion on one hand, while offering a few limited services, like security and justice, and playing on perceptions of corruption and injustice connected to state authority on the other. Some of the existing and/or historical institutions of state authority (e.g., SNA or militias) have contributed to the perceptions of injustice and corruption that create feelings of marginalization that AS manipulates. For example, women cite personal security and implementation of *Sharia* law in AS-controlled areas as positive factors compared to the harassment, violence and capricious traditional justice (*xeer*) they experience in non-AS areas.

In addition to military intervention, countering AS hinges on the consolidation of accountable political and economic governance, credible political and conflict mitigation processes, and equitable distribution of economic and social resources. These efforts depend on strengthening legitimate, local systems and institutions and creating inclusive economic and education opportunities for women, youth and other marginalized populations most at risk of succumbing to VEO influence.

<sup>20</sup> Office of Transition Initiatives - Somalia Stabilization Initiative. From Engagement to Sustainable Reintegration: An In-Depth Analysis of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia

**Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism:** Somalia's progress toward becoming a stable, democratic, and prosperous state remains uniquely threatened by VEOs. USAID understands that what drives people to affiliate with VEOs is complex and requires multiple USAID interventions as well as consistent support and interaction with the State Department and other U.S. Government actors. The Mission also recognizes the importance of coordinating targeted Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) investments with other U.S. foreign policy and security objectives to achieve meaningful and sustained impact. In implementing this CDCS, USAID will prioritize interagency coordination specifically as it relates to State Department policies and other U.S. Government

actors. It will also implement CVE programming in line with the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security<sup>21</sup> and the U.S. Strategy to Support Women and Girls at Risk from Violent Extremism and Conflict<sup>22</sup>.

DO I represents USAID's contribution to the wider U.S. Government strategy to overcome violent extremism by improving the credibility and responsiveness of Somali state authorities and Somali-led consultative, inclusive political processes. Through DO I, the Mission will contribute to the wider interagency approach by focusing on extending credible government presence in rural and hard to reach areas and increasing community resilience to VEO influence.



21 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WPS\\_Strategy\\_10\\_October2019.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WPS_Strategy_10_October2019.pdf)

22 U.S. Strategy to Support Women and Girls at Risk from Violent Extremism and Conflict. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-strategy-to-support-women-and-girls-at-risk-from-violent-extremism-and-conflict/>

**INTERMEDIATE RESULTS:**

**Intermediate Result 1.1:** Under IR 1.1, *Political and economic governance institutions are perceived as more fair*, USAID will engage with formal and informal institutions that impact women and men's access to political and economic resources in targeted communities. Examples of institutions include: Local and District Administrations, FMS institutions, Federal Ministry of Local Government and Reconciliation, peace committees and private sector associations. For many different reasons, including the institutions being overwhelmingly male-dominated and institution-capture by a particular clan or demographic, significant populations end up being excluded from political and economic decision making, creating cleavages among communities that VEOs exploit.

USAID will partner with formal government institutions (e.g., Office of Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning, State Presidents, Regional Governors and District Commissioners), select State and National Ministries (e.g., Ministries of Interior Federal Affairs And Reconciliation, Youth and Sports, and Local Government and Reconciliation), women's civil society organizations, and informal and quasi-formal entities (e.g., peace committees, clan elders, and public and private associations that control access to important resources) to create platforms and opportunities for more citizen engagement. In parallel, USAID will support female and male community members to ensure they have the necessary knowledge, skills, and values to effectively and meaningfully engage in these decision-making fora. Activities may include organizing neighborhood town hall meetings between government leaders and community members - both mixed-gender and separate meetings for women - to identify development priorities, ensuring that some of the priorities articulated by women are included in local plans and budget. Activities may also include strengthening the capacities of government and community leaders to effectively interact and work together.

USAID recognizes that opening up decision making processes will threaten entrenched interests. USAID will work to identify partners who embrace the principles of inclusive politics, understanding that these partners will differ in each targeted geography and community.

**Intermediate Result 1.2:** Under IR 1.2, *Marginalized citizen's access to inclusive social and economic opportunities increased*, USAID will partner with the GOS and the private sector, in targeted communities, to strengthen marginalized groups' access to economic opportunities and social services. Inadequate provision of services creates a vacuum that VEOs can exploit by capitalizing on excluded groups' grievances stemming from inequitable access to social and economic resources.

Regarding strengthened access to economic opportunities, USAID will support women and men in marginalized groups to enhance their economic agency and ability to fully participate in the local economy. This will include promoting access to the economic tools and resources, especially for women (e.g., appropriate financial services and education, micro-entrepreneurship and business development services, and soft skills) needed to invest in their own economic well-being. USAID recognizes that, in order to empower marginalized people to invest in their own economic well being, the market system needs to be reformed to incentivize inclusion, and economic institutions (government, private sector, and community-based) need to be accessible and accountable to marginalized groups.

During implementation, USAID will support gender-focused market research and consult with other actors to propose possible solutions to address these system wide challenges. The Mission recognizes that this is an opportunity for learning and it will be incorporated in the Mission's MEL Plan.



Schools in areas currently or previously controlled by AS use AS-developed curricula that promote intolerance, hate of specific groups, and extreme ideologies. To counter this negative influence, and to enable students from marginalized groups to tap into greater education opportunities, USAID will support the GOS (e.g. Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education) to expand education access, quality, and governance. Leveraging emerging political will to reform the public education system, USAID will strengthen the capacity of GOS to regulate the non-formal education sector in targeted communities, with special focus on retention of girls in secondary school, countering gender stereotypes and school-related GBV through curricula and policy reform, and redressing the dramatic gender imbalance among teachers. This includes strengthening oversight and registration of schools, improving the quality of teaching and learning in these schools, and supporting communities to retain the students and teachers in the school system. Such initiatives will mitigate challenges with the existing educational system which is largely private or non-state, with umbrella associations serving 250,000 students through over 1,000 schools.<sup>23</sup> This also means that the educational system is largely inaccessible to children and youth who are unable to afford the educational fees and other costs to attend these schools.

**Intermediate Result 1.3:** Under IR 1.3, *Communities more effectively address grievances and manage local conflict*, USAID will target change within three domains: at the community level, within justice institutions, and for the aggrieved parties who represent the end-users of the justice system. USAID will partner with community level informal justice systems and formal justice institutions to strengthen their capacity to support individuals' access to and navigation of formal and customary justice systems. In Somalia, evidence shows that communities have highlighted security and justice as their two most important needs.<sup>24</sup> AS is viewed as a competitor to GOS in the administration, delivery, and enforcement of justice. By providing access to reliable justice, AS continues expanding its influence and progresses in its efforts to challenge the GOS's legitimacy. Combating this narrative requires strengthening the capacity of justice systems to improve the provision of justice services. GOS has signaled its commitment to full participation of women in the development of the rule of law and reform of the justice sector. USAID, similarly, will support women as key actors in shaping justice services and laws, enabling women to be more effective in addressing grievances that drive conflict.

USAID will support a range of co-creation and accountability structures, from justice/peace committees to court user committees, to create gender-sensitive justice institutions that are both responsive to societal needs and perceived by individuals to adjudicate fairly. USAID will support the development of justice services within the spectrum of legal pluralism in Somalia by engaging civil and justice institutions, justice actor networks, civil society advocates, women's organizations, and academic institutions. In addition to strengthening justice institutions' sustainability and capacity to help communities address grievances, it will also be important to strengthen their coordination to address the low quality of legal services and limited access to justice. Lastly, USAID will focus on ensuring that aggrieved parties are supported to better navigate available pathways to securing justice by increasing awareness of justice options and by providing legal assistance and referral services, including especially for GBV and other gender justice issues.

<sup>23</sup> World Bank. Study on understanding the role of non-state education providers In Somalia

<sup>24</sup> Office of Transition Initiatives - Somalia Stabilization Initiative. From Engagement to Sustainable Reintegration: An In-Depth Analysis of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia

**Linkage to USAID Country Roadmap:** Somalia is only just beginning its journey to self-reliance, starting from low levels of both capacity and commitment. In the **Commitment dimension**, DOI will be focused on enhancing the capabilities of formal and informal institutions to be more inclusive and legitimate (Open and Accountable Government: Open Government). This is critical in addressing the grievances that arise from exclusion from political, social and economic opportunities.

In the **Capacity** dimension, DOI, specifically IR1.2, will strengthen the expansion of government presence by improving citizen responsive governance (Government Capacity: Government Effectiveness). Improved citizen responsive governance will contribute to communities' perception of enhanced legitimacy of the targeted governing structures, which is essential to diminishing the influence of VEOs.

**Host Country Priorities:** As described in the Strategic Approach (Section III), DOI is closely aligned with the NDP 9 through its focus on building more inclusive communities and systems; improving citizen-responsive governance and justice; and providing opportunities for previously excluded populations, such as women, youth and minority clans. DOI will also advance the GOS National Stabilization Strategy (NSS) and Wadajir Framework objectives.

Somalia's NSS is built around commitment to a whole of government approach across four interconnected areas: (1) community recovery, (2) social reconciliation, (3) local governance, and (4) rule of law. The Mission's DOI aligns with the NSS's focus on engaging communities in dialogue to help them address their legitimate grievances and promote inclusivity, particularly at the State and District levels to increase Government legitimacy, and supporting justice services to all groups to demonstrate the extension of legitimate state authority.

The Wadajir Framework is a foundational document that outlines the GOS's approach to establishing a local government framework that is based on the principles of community involvement and inclusion. The Wadajir Framework recognizes that decentralized governance and service delivery are pivotal in building incremental trust between citizens and federal, state and local government, and contribute to increased perceptions of legitimacy.

Key GOS counterparts to advance this DO include: Office of Prime Minister, Ministry of Interior Federal Affairs

and Reconciliation, Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education, Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, and the Office of the Chief Justice of Somalia. Given the target geographical zone of this strategy it will also be essential to work with the governing administrations of Southwest State, Jubaland State, Hirshabelle State, Banadir Region (Mogadishu), and other relevant district and local authorities.

**Other Development Actors:** USAID is committed to promoting local leadership and strengthening local capacity through the implementation of this objective. USAID anticipates working closely with the GOS and private sector in coordinating delivery of economic and education services under IR 1.2. Private sector education "umbrella" associations are an example of a key private sector actor that must be engaged given the quasi-governmental role they fulfill in the Somali education landscape by setting minimum standards for member schools, developing curricula, and facilitating teacher training. Umbrella associations are the most important non-state actors in the Somali education landscape. However, these networks are overwhelmingly male dominated, requiring concerted effort to change attitudes and policies related to female teachers and gender-focused curricula. USAID will also engage with academic institutions, civil and justice institutions, legal aid providers, justice actor networks, and civil society, contributing to their capacity to work with the Agency in a more expanded future role.

Under DOI, USAID anticipates close working relations with the United Kingdom, World Bank Group, United Nations, European Union, Sweden and Norway. USAID leads the Education Donor Group, which includes the European Union, Germany, Canada, World Bank, the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy and the Global Partnership for Education. Several of these donors have taken the lead in support of integrated gender focused initiatives, including on GBV and early marriage. Nevertheless, all USAID programming related to women's civic and political participation, social and economic opportunities, and access to justice contribute indirectly and directly to addressing harmful cultural practices. USAID will participate in the Human Rights and Gender Working Group, now co-chaired by Canada, to ensure coordination and synergy on gender-focused efforts.

**New Modalities:** Under this DO, USAID will implement new modalities focused on key self-reliance concepts including Redefining the Relationship (RDR) and Private Sector Engagement (PSE).



**Redefining the Relationship:** As described in the Strategic Approach (Section III), the Mission's approach to RDR is to seek out commitment where it exists to advance DOI and build local capacity to do so.

Though there is existing and demonstrated GOS commitment to improved security, the Mission assesses capacity as low. This is also reflected in NDP 9 which notes that needs, within this sector, remain immense, requiring both investments in institution building and strengthening the security sector's capacity to serve the expectations of its citizens and the purpose of ensuring security and stability. As part of its approach to RDR, under DOI, USAID will leverage this demonstrated commitment through activities targeted at increasing public trust in government. Future USAID investments could revive the private sector and agricultural infrastructure to grow the Somali economy or create jobs for young people.

**Private Sector Engagement:** Under DOI, the Mission views the private sector as a key vehicle for expanding access to economic and social opportunities. For example, under IR 1.2, USAID will engage the GOS in supporting structural changes that encourage a more inclusive market system in targeted sectors. In order to empower the previously excluded social groups, such as women or youth, to invest in their own economic well being, USAID recognizes that the market system needs to be reformed to incentivize greater inclusion, and economic institutions (government, private sector, and community-based) need to be accessible and accountable to women, youth and minority clans. During implementation, USAID will consult with other actors to propose possible solutions to address these system wide challenges. The Mission will use PSE Principle 2 to incentivize and value PSE throughout planning and programming. One example would be to conduct gender-focused market research in order to provide data regarding the income generation and consumption needs of women to allow private sector companies to quickly understand this subset of the population.

## ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS:

### Assumptions:

- The GOS will continue to lack full control and influence, particularly in south-central Somalia, and will be unable to provide key basic social services without foreign assistance. Structural marginalization will further limit access by some groups to essential services. Security and access to justice will remain

limited, with higher negative impacts on women, youth and minority clans. Corruption will continue to be a significant challenge within the GOS.

- Demand for increased accountability of formal government institutions and select State and National Ministries does not create unmanageable backlash from GOS and sub-national governments.
- While commitment to Inclusive Politics (an NDP 9 pillar) is assessed as low, there are "pockets" of commitment and reform "champions" that USAID can identify and partner with to make progress toward the DO.
- GOS will continue to make progress, without any major breakdowns, on outlining and agreeing on how roles, responsibilities, and resources will be apportioned between the federal center and federal states.
- Disagreements between FMS and the GOS will be handled through political engagement and not open conflict.

### Risks:

- Opening up decision making processes to women, youth and minority clans will threaten entrenched interests. The same is true for more inclusively addressing grievances and justice deficits. This risk will need to be managed and mitigated by identifying partners who embrace the principles of inclusive politics, understanding that these partners will differ in each targeted geography and community.
- Activities that directly and indirectly address sensitive gender themes – including harmful cultural practices like early marriage, FGM and other forms of GBV – have the potential to incite backlash.
- Supporting women's economic empowerment can disrupt family dynamics, including men's dominance in family decision-making, leading to increased GBV.
- Leadership changes within GOS and the ministries (e.g., Ministry of Justice) threaten continued progress against DOI results.
- GOS does not plan for or allocate funds to sustain security sector reforms. Security sector reforms are under resourced and do not advance.

- GOS struggles to provide the necessary "hold" forces - recruit and train legitimate and capable local police - to sustain security in the geographic focal zone.

## DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE 2 (DO2):

USAID has developed a strategy, encompassing both development and humanitarian efforts, to build individual, household, community, and system-wide resilience to shocks and stresses through DO 2, ***Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.***

**Development Hypothesis:** If (a) marginalized Somalis have more diverse livelihood options and enhance their social and human capital, and (b) governance improves, then marginalized Somalis will be better equipped to withstand disruptions and drive their own development.

USAID will seek to build or strengthen resilience capacities that avert new waves of displacement among rural populations and provide more durable solutions for the large displaced populations in urban areas. Essentially, rural households must be able to withstand the next climatic disruption and urban populations must productively integrate into urban society. To achieve this, USAID has developed a strategy, encompassing both development and humanitarian efforts, to build individual, household, community, and system-wide resilience to shocks and stresses through DO 2, ***Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.***

**Link to Goal:** In addition to climatic shocks, weak governance, conflict, lack of livelihood options, deficient social networks, and a lack of education, health, and sense of well-being disrupt the ability of Somalis to drive their own development. Socially marginalized populations are the most likely to fall into the humanitarian caseload because they possess the weakest resilience capacities and because political and social systems fail to provide the required support. DO 2 builds the resilience of marginalized households and communities by focusing programming on improving crucial resilience capacities: good governance, diversifying livelihoods, strengthening social capital, and enhancing the human capital of women. By building the capacity of state and local institutions to more effectively and inclusively plan for and respond to disasters, these institutions will be more likely to help communities to withstand the next disruption. Influencing policies that increase access to finance, especially for women;

strengthening agricultural value chains; and encouraging the creation of micro-enterprises empowers Somalis to more effectively drive their own development. Incentivizing social linkages that are crucial to getting help when shocks arise and leveraging women's ability to make and implement proactive and informed choices builds the resilience of households and their wider communities.

Environmental and conflict shocks drive recurrent humanitarian need and continue to be one of the most significant problems facing Somalia. As a result, the U.S. Government has contributed over \$400 million in humanitarian assistance each of the three years immediately preceding this CDCS.

The 2016-2017 drought, partly caused by the Indian Ocean Dipole,<sup>25</sup> is the most recent example of a major climatic shock which had devastating immediate impacts. One in two Somalis faced acute food insecurity as a result of this disaster. But the displacement of over 1.6 million Somalis and loss of nearly \$2 billion in livestock and crops (30 percent of GDP) had long-lasting effects. The repeated shocks - COVID-19 being the most recent which coincided with intense flooding and a once-in-a-generation locust invasion - have weakened the resilience of affected populations. As a result, sensitivity to further shocks and stresses has increased, and the time frame during which households can recover and rebuild has become shorter. Combinations of shocks have led to the aforementioned urban IDP crisis. They have also caused women to shoulder increasing burdens at home - such as traveling further and at greater risk to their personal safety to gather household food, water, and fuel - and in terms of generating income outside the home to help meet their families' basic needs. Females also experience food insecurity and lack of family resources most acutely because mothers will eat last if there is not enough, prenatal health care is an expensive luxury, and girls will be taken out of school before boys.

Shocks and stresses impact rural and urban communities in different ways. Urban centers tend to withstand climatic shocks relatively better due to lower reliance on climate-dependent livelihoods. They are instead more vulnerable to irregular shocks, such as losing a wage income, and the stresses of urban competition for resources. Because of this core difference, there are two primary need profiles in Somalia. These need profiles are found in two distinct populations, and further define this objective's target population.

<sup>25</sup> Dipole: the 'Indian Niño' that has brought devastating drought to East Africa. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/16/africa/east-africa-drough-el-nino/index.html>


- **Rural Hangers-In:** Rural populations at risk of losing their traditional livelihood and migrating to urban areas to access alternative livelihoods, including aid, as a result of a disruptive event such as the 2016-17 drought.
- **Urban Moved/Dropped Out:** Urban populations living on the periphery of cities, most commonly as a result of displacement from rural areas, who are unable to productively join the urban society as a result of social exclusion and extreme poverty.

Within these need profiles, further vulnerability exists based primarily on varying dynamics of social connectedness.<sup>26</sup>

**Link to Humanitarian Assistance:** USAID is uniquely positioned to implement a resilience objective because of its ability to deploy humanitarian assistance in the short term, while supporting systems and building the capacity of institutions that address the root causes of humanitarian crises. The below graphic depicts a simplified version of the options available to a typical rural person or household. Throughout DO 2, USAID will meet immediate emergency needs through humanitarian interventions that keep populations from simply “dropping out” of their livelihoods. These humanitarian interventions will also aim to strengthen resilience capacities where feasible. DO 2 interventions will utilize development resources to build institutional capacity and work at the system level to increase opportunities for populations to “step up” by strengthening their livelihood, or productively “move out” to diversify their livelihood.

DO 2 will also utilize opportunities to link development interventions geographically and sectorally to humanitarian interventions. This considers USAID Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) commitments to deliberately build resilience by increasing the predictability of humanitarian programming, initiating targeted capacity building efforts, and more deliberately promoting service delivery activities that contribute to system strengthening.

**Building Resilience (DO 2):** USAID's BHA has developed the Agency's first multi-year humanitarian strategy - for Somalia. While maintaining its primary objective of providing life-saving assistance, BHA is committed to aligning its approach with DO 2 by building resilience to shocks and supporting durable solutions to protracted displacement for the CDCS target population. Specifically, BHA will ensure humanitarian interventions are maximizing opportunities to build resilience capacities and will deliberately seek out opportunities to link short-term emergency interventions with longer-term objectives. BHA-supported initiatives typically engage women disproportionately as participants because women have primary responsibility for family nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and health. Some, but not all, BHA partners are highly-focused on gender-based issues, including women's leadership in IDP communities and addressing GBV through integrated programming. Finally, BHA will seek opportunities to implement multi-sectoral and/or multi-year programming. DO 2 not only directly aligns with BHA's Somalia strategy; its achievement depends on BHA's strategy.



26 Resilience Evidence Forum Report, April 2018

**INTERMEDIATE RESULTS:**

***Intermediate Result 2.1: Governing institutions more effectively plan for and respond to shocks and stresses.*** The underlying causes of Somalia's vulnerability to livelihoods crises are connected to complex political, conflict, and cultural dynamics. Research into the 2011 famine reveals that the majority of those who perished came from historically marginalized communities. This highlights the role of social, political, and economic marginalization as a contributing factor to the high mortality rates affecting certain groups of people. Through this IR, USAID will build the inclusive community-based planning and disaster management capacity of state governments, governing institutions such as local and district administrations, and less formal groups such as clan elders, female community leaders, and local women's organizations. USAID will support these same institutions to develop durable solutions to the urban IDP crisis.

By institutionalizing inclusive processes for disaster risk reduction and durable solutions planning at the state and local levels, governing institutions will become more oriented to the needs of all citizens, including women and marginalized communities. While it is not realistic to expect these types of institutions to finance their own response in the timeframe of this strategy, developing a plan provides a framework for clearly articulating the financing need. This makes the response more efficient, which along with increased capacity for inclusive processes, builds the resilience of households, communities, and the disaster response system and, therefore, enables marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.

BHA will undertake a gender sensitive and an evidence-informed process that assesses current disaster risk reduction (DRR) requirements, efforts to date, and existing gaps. BHA Somalia will then prioritize critical DRR actions to address, as funding allows, either through standalone activities or through mainstreaming within existing emergency response programming.

***Intermediate Result 2.2: Livelihoods of marginalized populations are strengthened and diversified.*** Most rural Somalis are dependent on the agro-pastoral sector for their livelihood, activities which are highly vulnerable to the recurrent climatic shocks in Somalia. There is also a significant demand for urban livelihoods as approximately 20 percent of the Somali population are IDPs and there is an increasing number of rural Somalis migrating or becoming displaced to urban areas. USAID will partner with the private sector, reform public policy, strengthen agricultural systems, and explore innovations to improve rural livelihoods and support urban livelihood diversification.

Economic opportunities and livelihoods sit within the context of complex market systems. While Somalis living in informal settlements may often lack the skills to be able to productively integrate into urban economies, market systems also need to become more inclusive so that new skills can be utilized through casual labor or by starting a micro-enterprise. The Mission will therefore support market analysis (including on women's engagement), business development services, and link microenterprises to financial products, improved technologies, and/or alternative markets in order for IDPs to start, expand, and sustain enterprises. USAID will leverage existing research on topics such as economic opportunities for women and conduct new research into how to incentivize economic institutions (government, private sector, and community-based) to be more inclusive of marginalized groups.

USAID will also strengthen agricultural systems to protect the food security and nutrition of rural households by incentivizing climate sensitive production of staple cereals, nutritious crops, and dairy, food preservation, as well as promoting diversified asset-holdings and market integration. Finally, marginalized groups, in particular women and youth, have limited access to financial services, including savings accounts, business loans, and insurance products to protect against risks. USAID will work to reform the financial system to promote transparency and inclusive access to services. This reform would enable marginalized people to access the financial services and resources needed to support small and medium sized enterprises to expand and sustain their operations.

These system-level development interventions will provide opportunities for targeted groups to move into commercial agriculture and value-addition food preparation and increase opportunities to access finance and start a micro-enterprise. While humanitarian assistance enables these same groups to maintain their current situation, humanitarians have also committed to improving the predictability of cash transfers (approximately \$200 million annually), especially for female-headed households. Increased predictability will allow beneficiaries to better incorporate expected assistance into household planning. This further enables beneficiaries to increase access to finance through participation in a savings and loans group, which are common in Somalia and especially attractive and accessible to women. This complements and provides the foundation for development activities to reduce barriers to accessing more formal financial services.

BHA has also committed to (where feasible and in response to emergency needs) implementing agricultural interventions, including skills building, provision of agricultural inputs, and livestock management. Development programming will build off these activities to incentivize improved production of staple crops and dairy products. Development activities will also leverage humanitarian interventions to strengthen seed markets.

Activities within this IR will be nutrition sensitive, prioritizing nutrient dense crops and animal products for value chain support and aiming to translate increases in income into more nutritious, diversified diets through linkages with IR 2.4 and social behavior change communication messaging.

**Intermediate Result 2.3: Social capital of marginalized populations is strengthened.** Evidence from the 2011 famine reveals the importance of risk diversification within social networks, notably through kinship and clan networks transcending both rural and urban areas. In 2011, households with strong clan-linked business networks avoided excess mortality, while those without these networks did not - including, especially female-headed households excluded from patriarchal social networks. Evidence further details how social obligation can emerge during major disasters and exposes the extreme inequalities between and within the Somali clan structure. Community-level common values, beliefs, and behaviors have the ability to foster the development of formal and informal networks that enable residents to support each other in times of need - a critical need in Somalia and resilience capacity utilized in the past.

USAID will focus on three key factors: 1) increasing cohesion and inclusion of community groups; 2) improving linkages between urban and rural communities; and 3) increasing the capacity of social networks to respond to shocks and stresses. To deliver this result, USAID will support the establishment, or strengthen the capacity of, marginalized sub-groupings of economic structures (e.g., women's arm of the Chamber of Commerce).

USAID will also utilize existing community organizations - including community education committees and women's groups - to increase marginalized groups' access to economic resources and advocate for their diverse economic interests. Finally, USAID will prioritize reforming the market and economic institutions (government, private sector, and community-based) to be more inclusive of marginalized groups.

**Intermediate Result 2.4: Human capital of women strengthened.** Social indicators in Somalia remain among the lowest in the world. This is demonstrated by low school enrollment rates (three-quarters of women aged 15-49 have never attended formal school), poor quality of learning, and high infant and maternal mortality rates. Yet human capital—the aggregated skills and knowledge of a population—is the most significant driver of global wealth, reflecting the ability of populations to adapt, innovate, and perform competitively in markets.



Evidence demonstrates that households with empowered women have greater household dietary diversity and are more likely to be resilient to food security shocks<sup>27</sup>. With this IR, USAID is focusing on women's ability to make proactive and informed choices and is seeking to strengthen female engagement in productive decisions.

USAID will build household resilience by equipping women with the knowledge and skills they need to improve their own futures and those of their families. This starts by developing basic, foundational literacy and numeracy skills at the primary level, as well as social-emotional skills for better decision-making. Building on this foundation, USAID will then focus on skills development; psychosocial functioning, including aspirations and self-efficacy; and good nutrition, health, and hygiene behaviors and practices. USAID will also create and support self-help groups and other similarly scalable strategies that build the human capital of women and in turn multiply impact for their wider households. Implementation will further create linkages between private sector and government actors in education delivery to increase the supply and quality of education services.

While these interventions address critical education and psychosocial support needs, women's physical health is also a vital factor strengthening human capital. Three-quarters of women say they face barriers in accessing health care, including almost two-thirds who cite the distance to a health facility. USAID will address women's health by integrating nutrition services, including prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition, with maternal and child health interventions and WASH activities supported with humanitarian assistance. BHA will also support and promote activities that contribute to long-term health system strengthening. For instance, activities will build health staff capacity and strengthen integrated community case management. Development assistance will complement these interventions by encouraging preventive health-seeking behaviors, particularly those related to women's reproductive health. Such family planning interventions, combined with investments in girls' and women's education, are critical to addressing underlying cultural and gender issues that compromise human capital development and perpetuate the vulnerability of future generations.

**Linkage to USAID Country Roadmap:** In the **Commitment** dimension, DO 2 will be focused on economic and social gaps affecting the socially marginalized (Inclusive Development: Social Group Equality and Economic Gender Gap). DO 2 also seeks to leverage progress on economic reforms to incentivize the financial system to be more inclusive of marginalized groups (Economic Policy: Trade Freedom and Business Environment).

In the **Capacity** dimension, DO 2's focus on diversifying livelihoods and building social and human capital will lay the groundwork for reducing the poverty rate and increasing education and health outcomes (Citizen Capacity: Poverty Rate and Education Quality). DO 2's work with governing institutions on disaster risk management and internally displaced persons will build local government capacity (Government Capacity: Government Effectiveness).

**Host country priorities:** As described in the Strategic Approach (Section III), DO 2 is closely aligned with NDP 9 through its focus on livelihoods (economic development pillar), as well as governance, social capital, and human capital (social and human development pillar), with gender equity as a cross-cutting imperative. Although DO 2 broadly aligns to NDP 9, the Mission's focus on building resilience more directly aligns with the GOS's Resilience and Recovery Framework (RRF) and the Municipality of Mogadishu's Durable Solutions Strategy.

- **Resilience and Recovery Framework:** USAID will significantly contribute to three of the RRF's five strategic objectives: (1) Strengthen government capacities for inclusive drought recovery and disaster risk planning, management, and risk (IR 2.1), (2) Sustainably revitalize, strengthen and diversify economic sectors, livelihoods, and key infrastructure (IR 2.2), and (5) Improve basic service delivery in (affected) urban and peri-urban settings (IR 2.4).

<sup>27</sup> What Really Matters for Resilience? Exploratory Evidence from Southern Somalia, Mercy Corps (2013).

- **Mogadishu Durable Solutions Strategy:** USAID will directly coordinate and collaborate with the Municipality of Mogadishu on two of its strategic objectives: (1) Improve local government accountability through improved government coordination (IR 2.4); (4) Systematically enhance and diversify access to employment sectors and labor market for IDPs (IR 2.2)

Key GOS partners for this objective are: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development. Given the target geographical zone of this strategy it will also be essential to work with the governing administrations of Southwest State, Jubaland State, Hirshabelle State, Banadir Region (Mogadishu), and other relevant district and local authorities.

**Other development actors:** USAID is committed to promoting local leadership and strengthening local capacity through the implementation of this objective. USAID must work with local private sector associations, local small business cooperatives, and industry organizations to strengthen the resilience of the financial system. USAID further anticipates that it will work with local NGOs and learning and research institutions, contributing to their capacity to work with the Agency in a more expanded, future role. By partnering with local institutions, USAID will identify creative and innovative approaches to building resilience for marginalized groups.

Throughout the implementation of this objective, USAID anticipates close working relationships with the United Kingdom, World Bank Group, United Nations, European Union, Sweden, and Norway. It will also be essential to collaborate and learn from key resilience consortia such as, Building Resilient Communities in Somalia Consortium (BRCiS), Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP), DANWADAG Durable Solutions, Somalia NGO Consortium, and Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS).

**New modalities:** Under this objective, USAID will implement a number of new modalities focused on key self-reliance concepts including Private Sector Engagement, Redefining the Relationship, and Financing Self-Reliance.

**Private Sector Engagement:** Given the outsized role that the private sector plays in Somalia's development, engagement with the private sector is an essential strategy that will be employed throughout this objective. USAID will prioritize access to finance, strengthening value chains, lowering barriers to starting new enterprises, and incentivizing the private sector to expand services to the marginalized and women in particular. Although USAID has significant experience working with the private sector under its previous strategy, the Mission will conduct further analyses to determine how to adapt its implementation and incentivize the private sector to align its work with these intended results. USAID will collaborate with a diverse set of private sector actors to, for example, sustainably expand basic services into low income areas and to become more responsive to potential market disruptions. This approach links directly with the Mission's RDR strategy in which USAID focuses on supporting the government to develop its oversight and regulatory capacity versus its own service delivery capacity.

**Financing Self-Reliance:** Though Somalia's financial system is slowly developing, it is still poorly regulated by the Central Bank of Somalia and is vulnerable to systemic failures and financial crises. Through the debt relief process, the GOS has committed to key financial sector reforms. USAID will leverage this commitment to strengthen the slowly developing financial system by increasing the capacity of key financial institutions, including the commercial banks and microfinance institutions, increasing financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and increasing financial literacy and management among marginalized groups, in particular women and youth. This system level work to promote transparency and inclusive access will ultimately allow marginalized people to build their resilience to risk through access to savings accounts, business loans, and insurance products.

#### **Assumptions and Risks:**

##### **Assumptions:**

- Somalia will continue to experience severe climatic events, such as cycles of drought and flooding, that will erode livelihoods and coping mechanisms of vulnerable populations, leading to periodic spikes in acute food insecurity, waterborne diseases,

malnutrition, and displacement - with the heaviest burdens often borne by women.

- Somalia's dynamic private sector can be incentivized to invest in economic sectors and expand services that are important to improving and diversifying the livelihoods of some of Somalia's most marginalized populations.
- Conflict will result in short-to-medium term displacement and multi-sector humanitarian needs. However, the majority of the displaced population in Somalia will remain long-term, protracted IDPs.
- While COVID-19 will have wide-reaching and long-lasting impacts on Somalia, it will not fundamentally change the development hypothesis of this DO.

**Risks:**

- A catastrophic shock hits at the beginning of the strategy, overwhelms household resilience capacities,

and undermines the willingness of Somali stakeholders to make longer-term investments in their development.

- The population impacted by USAID interventions is too insignificant to achieve this DO.
- The private sector is unwilling to invest in opportunities targeting women.
- Male clan elders are unwilling to include women in disaster risk planning and other consultations and interventions.
- Lack of commitment from the GOS to mainstream and build disaster risk management capacity in their institutions.
- Shocks or conflict prevent vulnerable populations from accessing social services and/or humanitarian support.



# V. MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

USAID's approach to monitoring, evaluation, and learning for the 2020-2025 CDCS is grounded in the program cycle principles of evidence-based decision making and adaptive management, including ensuring that MEL processes, approach, and the learning agenda are gender sensitive.

This CDCS is focused on strengthening the foundations that Somalia needs to launch its journey to self-reliance. Given the existing low levels of commitment and capacity, the Mission will seek out existing commitment to advance our objectives and then build capacity in those areas where local commitment exists.

## Learning

USAID's Learning Agenda will include, but not be limited to, the following five main themes:

1. Factors contributing to individual and community attitudinal and behavior change as related to:
  - Perceived legitimacy of targeted institutions (DO1)
  - Utilization of resilience capacities (DO2)
2. Identifying conditions for fostering sustained private sector engagement in the provision of equitable economic and social services
3. Determining how youth engagement advances Somalia's DOs
4. Assessing whether an intentional focus on women advances the Mission's DOs (especially resilience)
5. Identifying effective approaches for advancing political and economic inclusion of the socially marginalized

USAID/Somalia will finalize Learning Agenda questions during the preparation of the Performance Management Plan (PMP). The PMP will include a range of indicators for tracking progress towards achieving CDCS results and monitoring the operating context as well as critical assumptions. The PMP will also discuss existing Mission systems such as the MEL platform that provides a variety of support including monitoring and verification of USAID activities.

## Monitoring

The Mission's CDCS MEL approach will center around a portfolio measurement system for each DO to: (1) manage progress towards each DO, (2) increase use of evidence for adaptive management within each DO, and (3) assess effectiveness of programming within each DO. Under DO 1, the Mission plans to use a perception survey alongside complexity-aware monitoring approaches that will assess community perceptions of structural conditions that allow violent extremism to spread. The Mission plans to administer the perception survey at least three times during strategy implementation. Under DO 2, the Mission intends to implement a resilience measurement system that will assess utilization of resilience capacities at the individual and household levels. USAID will ensure there is a linkage between these DO measurement systems and activity level measurement systems.

Consistent with USAID policy requirements and recommended approaches, USAID/Somalia's MEL approach integrates several Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) approaches, such as:

- **Conflict Sensitivity through Ongoing Analyses:** The Mission recognizes that Somalia is a dynamic and complex context. It requires continuous learning and adaptation as well as tailored approaches to local socioeconomic, cultural, and political environments. To this end, the Mission plans to use ongoing community-level conflict and contextual analyses, integrating gender considerations, to tailor development interventions. Two examples of how the Mission will ensure that its activities deliver their intended results without doing harm, even as relationships and circumstances change are:
  - The Mission plans to integrate iterative applied political economy analyses (PEA) in its economic growth activities. PEAs will be conducted to identify the behavior of actors within the activity focus sectors. This will help the activity understand the underlying reasons for why things work the way they do and identify the incentives and constraints impacting the behavior of actors, particularly the private sector.
  - The Mission plans to conduct an informed risk analysis in its education activities to better understand the private sector's incentives and disincentives for reform. USAID will use the findings of the informed risk analysis to explore partnerships with the private sector to advance quality standards and increase access to education, particularly for those students who cannot afford education costs.
- **Complexity Awareness Monitoring Approaches:** Given Somalia's dynamic and complex context, the Mission plans to utilize complexity aware monitoring approaches such as most significant change, outcome harvesting, contribution analysis or stakeholder dialogue, ensuring representation of women, youth, and minority clans. By adopting these approaches, USAID will ensure its learning approach also addresses unintended results, other actors or factors contributing to outcomes, and non-linear change.
- **Collaboration across Development and Humanitarian Assistance:** To foster collaboration, the Mission will leverage the resources, knowledge and networks across humanitarian and development assistance. For example, with the DO2 Measurement Framework (described above), USAID/Somalia will partner with the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to co-design and monitor implementation of the baseline, endline, and recurrent monitoring surveys included within this effort.

### Evaluation

USAID/Somalia will plan evaluations to meet USAID's and stakeholders' learning needs, with an emphasis on examining USAID contributions to CDCS results and systematically testing the underlying development hypotheses. For example, the DO measurement systems (described above) will include baseline assessments and end line evaluations and address the first Learning Agenda theme. As part of its evaluation plan, USAID will look for opportunities to strengthen the capacity of local evaluation firms.

# Annex I: Journey to Self-Reliance Country Roadmap




## SOMALIA JOURNEY TO SELF-RELIANCE: FY 2021 COUNTRY ROADMAP



### LEGEND




### LOW- & MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY SNAPSHOT




## COMMITMENT


### OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE



### INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT



### ECONOMIC POLICY




### RISK OF EXTERNAL DEBT DISTRESS




## CAPACITY


### GOVERNMENT CAPACITY




### CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITY



### CITIZEN CAPACITY



### CAPACITY OF THE ECONOMY





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