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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
A. Goal: A Food Secure, Just and Peaceful Region
B. The GHAI Overarching Operational Framework
C. Strategic Objective One: Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food Security
D. Strategic Objective Two: Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict
E. Special Objective Three: Improved Access to Regional Analytical Information
The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994, following a visit to the GHA region* by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG should develop a new framework for and approach to addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world. "Breaking the Cycle of Despair," a concept paper (Annex B) setting forth the goals of the Initiative -- crisis prevention and food security -- was drafted later that year, and emphasized the importance of USAID's "doing business differently" in order to meet the challenges posed by events in the 10-country region stretching from Eritrea in the north to Tanzania in the south.
* The GHAI countries include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Rwanda and Burundi.
This Strategic Plan, the preparation of which was coordinated by USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), is USAID's contribution to a broader inter-agency exercise to move the GHAI beyond concept and into implementation. The GHAI USG Interagency Framework (Annex A) lays out the vision and expected outcomes for the Initiative. These will be supported by individual Agency strategies or action plans. The USAID Strategic Plan sets forth the Agency's goals and objectives for the Initiative over the next five years. It provides a vehicle for establishing the overarching operational framework through application of the GHAI's five core Principles and also identifies specific objectives aimed at addressing key constraints to food security and conflict prevention in the region. The Strategic Plan covers a five-year timeframe from FY 1998 to FY 2002.
Since the conception of the GHAI in 1994 and the original consultations conducted in the region and with donor colleagues, it has been clear that USAID and its partners in the GHAI share a general consensus regarding the nature of the complex development context in which the Initiative is being implemented. Much of this context is described in the original GHAI Concept Paper; events unfolding since that document was drafted only reinforce the analysis set forth there.
Several changes, many inspired by the end of the Cold War, have triggered the transformation of the development context into one in which the underlying theme is, in fact, change itself. Change necessarily entails opportunities and risks; these, in turn, demand thoughtful and innovative responses.
Like the change which defines it, the development context in the Greater Horn is neither fully negative nor fully positive. The Greater Horn includes Somalia, a country which gave rise to the concept of the "failed state," and Uganda, a country which not long ago was the world's leading symbol of horror but is today regarded as an economic and political leader. There is considerable tension between the Government of Sudan and many of its neighbors in the Greater Horn, but there is also a regionally-led Sudan Peace Process. There are continued food shortages across the region, but there are also new measures and policies aimed at fostering less dependence on food aid.
The challenge to USAID is to take advantage of the change unfolding in the region and in the international community by rendering itself able to respond to windows of opportunity as they arise. The challenge is easier in some cases than in others. For example, the increased flow of food aid to the region and, with it, an increased dependency on "free hand outs," has been expressed as a concern by a wide range of governments in the region; the region's Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its international partners are responding with a regional Food Aid Charter to be used as a guide for both regional and international actors. USAID is participating in the development of the Charter, and should thus be well-positioned to invoke it in its own operations. In the case of Kenya, however, the "window of opportunity" for USAID may not yet have been fully opened; as events unfold and local and/or regional partners identify creative means of preventing what appears to be a looming crisis, USAID's challenge will be to respond quickly and to embrace the innovations that may be proposed.
The "lessons learned" through GHAI consultations and its implementation thus far have given rise to the formulation of five GHAI Principles which will serve as the Operational Framework for the GHAI Strategic Plan. These are:
One of the challenges inherent in efforts to "institutionalize" the GHAI has been the question of whether the GHAI entails "doing business differently" with all resources flowing into the region or simply with dedicated GHAI resources. Another challenge has been clarifying the relationship between existing USAID programs in the region and those undertaken to date and/or proposed by the GHAI. This Plan's strategic objectives rely on overall USAID program synergy and convergence for their achievement. Convergence is the process by which USAID's bilateral and regional programs in the Greater Horn, including programs centrally-funded by the Global Bureau (G), the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), and the Office of Sustainable Development in the Africa Bureau (AFR/SD), will accommodate and more directly support the goal and strategic objectives of the GHAI.
The goal of the GHAI Strategic Plan is "a food secure, just and peaceful region."
Parallel to USAID's development of the GHAI concept, IGAD and the East Africa Community were defining their own revitalization processes. Other international aid institutions, ranging from multi-lateral agencies to private voluntary organizations (PVOs), were exploring the ways and means of adapting their approaches to a new era. Indigenous organizations and governments began an assertive effort to confront both crisis and food security in the region. The GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region, therefore, reflects the region's priorities as well as the aspirations of USAID's international partners.
The Strategic Plan includes two Strategic Objectives and a third Special Objective. In the spirit of the primary GHAI Principle of "African ownership," the Plan's Strategic Objectives are cast in terms of enhancing the capacity of the GHAI's regional partners. Each will thus be pursued in cooperation and close consultation with regional partners, including regional institutions such as IGAD, governments, technical networks and indigenous organizations, as well as with international partners.
SO1 is "strengthened African capacity to enhance regional food security." To achieve food security, attention must be paid not only to bilateral issues but also to regional issues. Long term projections of food availability show that even with a continuation of current favorable agricultural production trends in some countries, the number of food insecure people in the region will nearly double by the year 2010. A major reason for this is the level of poverty and low levels of productivity in the region. Increasing food security requires not only increases in agricultural production but also in the income with which people can access food and improved health and nutritional status.
SO2 is "strengthened African capacity to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict." Coupled with that taking place in the international community, the change unfolding in the region necessarily entails risk, but with that risk comes the opportunity to develop genuine partnerships aimed at ensuring that declining resources are invested towards the promotion of stability, peace and prosperity and that the region's dependency on the international community is reduced. This opportunity, however, represents a new area of engagement for USAID; as such, the SO allows for maximum flexibility, responsiveness and experimentation. This SO is designed to reflect the fact that practical experience will be gained and priorities best determined through a learning process. Through experimentation, testing and replication of best practices, USAID, in partnership with regional institutions and other partners, will maximize their respective comparative advantages in pursuit of this strategic objective.
SpO3 is "increased access to regional analytical information." One of the most glaring impediments to the formulation of regional policy approaches in the GHA is the shortage of data and analyses which assess the region as a whole. The quality of existing resource material, meanwhile, is mixed. As a consequence, regional factors are given insufficient weight, and regional approaches are too often defined on the basis of an amalgamation of national analyses as opposed to deliberate regional assessments. There is also a need to make existing information resources more widely available and accessible to stakeholders in the region. This aspect of the "information gap" affects both GHAI partners in the region as well as USAID and its international counterparts. SpO3 will seek to ensure that frequent and accurate reporting on the activities generated by SOs 1 and 2 is provided to the broadest possible range of GHAI stakeholders and also serve as the vehicle for identifying and addressing gaps and linkages between them.
GHAI-specific funds will provide flexible, catalytic support for program convergence as well as for application of the overarching operational framework. As achievement of the strategic objectives relies on improved linkages between existing and potential regional and bilateral programs, including those programs which are centrally-funded, GHAI resources alone will not, in most cases, lead to significant progress toward the proposed intermediate results. Rather, GHAI funds should be used to leverage other resources, both within USAID and with our partners, to achieve results.
| AA | Assistant Administrator |
| AF | African Affairs (Department of State) |
| AFR/SD | Africa Bureau Office of Sustainable Development (USAID) |
| ASARECA | Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa |
| BHR | Bureau for Humanitarian Response (USAID) |
| CPMR | Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response |
| DA | Development Assistance |
| DFA | Development Fund for Africa |
| EAC | East African Cooperation |
| EATI | East Africa Transport Initiative |
| ESABO | East and Southern African Business Organization |
| FFP | Office of Food for Peace (USAID) |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| G | Global Bureau (USAID) |
| GHAI | Greater Horn of Africa Initiative |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IGAD | Inter-governmental Authority on Development |
| IR | Intermediate Result |
| IRM | Information Resources Management Division (USAID) |
| ISP | Integrated Strategic Plan |
| LPA | Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (USAID) |
| M | Bureau for Management (USAID) |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| NRM | Natural Resources Management |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OFDA | Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID) |
| OTI | Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID) |
| OYB | Operating Year Budget (USAID) |
| PARC | Pan African Rinderpest Campaign |
| PPC | Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (USAID) |
| PRM | Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (Department of State) |
| PVO | Private Voluntary Organization |
| REDSO/ESA | Regional Economic Services Office for East and Southern Africa (USAID) |
| R4 | Results Reporting and Resource Request (USAID) |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SO | Strategic Objective |
| SPO | Special Objective |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USDA | United States Department of Agriculture |
| USG | United States Government |
| USIA | United States Information Agency |
The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994, following a visit to the GHA region* by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG should develop a new framework for and approach to addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world. "Breaking the Cycle of Despair," a concept paper (Annex B) setting forth the goals of the Initiative -- crisis prevention and food security -- was drafted later that year, and emphasized the importance of USAID's "doing business differently" in order to meet the challenges posed by events in the 10-country region stretching from Eritrea in the north to Tanzania in the south.
* The GHAI countries include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Rwanda and Burundi.
This Strategic Plan is USAID's contribution to a broader inter-agency exercise to move the GHAI beyond concept and into implementation. The GHAI USG Interagency Framework (Annex A) lays out the vision and expected outcomes for the Initiative. These will be supported by individual Agency strategies or action plans. The USAID Strategic Plan sets forth the Agency's goals and objectives for the Initiative over the next five years. It provides a vehicle for establishing the overarching operational framework through application of the GHAI's five core Principles and also identifies specific objectives aimed at addressing key constraints to food security and conflict prevention in the region.
USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA ) was mandated to coordinate the development of USAID's GHAI Strategic Plan. In doing so, REDSO/ESA drew upon several resources, including: the original and subsequent GHAI consultations with a wide range of partners and stakeholders; the experience gained by USAID thus far in implementing the GHAI and, in particular, the individual experiences of USAID Missions; the findings of the GHAI Transitions Team; and USAID's support to the revitalization of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the formation of the Joint IGAD-Partners Forum.
The task of the drafting teams was to take exciting concepts, a wealth of ideas, some significant accomplishments, a wide range of priorities, and the multiple goals of USAID operating units, and condense these into a manageable strategy for implementation. As such, the Plan is not "all things to all people," and reflects decisions based on an analysis of comparative advantage and the experience of the GHAI to date. Because of its unique nature, and with a view to identifying lessons learned and fine-tuning the Initiative during strategy implementation, a Special Objective for impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation has been established.
At a January 1996 meeting of USAID Mission Directors and U.S. Ambassadors to the region hosted by REDSO/ESA, it was agreed that USAID would take the lead in developing a GHAI strategic plan setting forth the aims, objectives and actions required to pursue the goals of the GHAI.
In late February, 1997, the GHAI Steering Committee determined that the structure of the GHAI Strategic Plan should be revised to accommodate the very different planning processes undertaken by the individual USG agencies participating in the GHAI. It was decided that each participating USG agency would attach its own plan for implementing the Initiative to an agreed-upon consensus document constituting the USG framework for the Initiative.
USAID's Strategic Plan also reflects the results of an interim review of the strategy conducted in June and July of 1997 by the GHAI Steering Committee. As a result of this review, more specific parameters were provided, including guidance for program "convergence" between bilateral and regional programs.
Since the conception of the GHAI in 1994 and the original consultations conducted in the region and with donor colleagues, it has been clear that USAID and its partners in the GHAI share a general consensus regarding the nature of the complex development context in which the Initiative is being implemented. Much of this context is described in the original GHAI Concept Paper (Annex B) and events unfolding since that document was drafted only reinforce the analysis set forth there.
Ten or even five years ago, the development context in the Greater Horn was one characterized by a sharp distinction between relief and development approaches, by a bilateral or national orientation, by a marked degree of aid dependency coupled with little effort to address causes, and by the isolation of relief and development efforts within the wider political arena.
Several changes, many inspired by the end of the Cold War, have triggered the transformation of the development context into one in which the underlying theme is, in fact, change itself. Change necessarily entails opportunities and risks; these, in turn, demand thoughtful and innovative responses. An overarching qualification must be made here, however. The magnitude of the region's problems is significant: millions of people remain food insecure; the region is home to some ten million refugees, displaced persons and recent returnees; and all of the region's countries are either engaged in or directly affected by armed conflict(s). As such, no outside agent, including USAID, can turn the situation around. What USAID and others can do, however, is take advantage of the openings that exist, support the region's efforts to consolidate positive gains, and foster the analytical and operational changes which will allow the Agency to effectively invest limited resources against growing challenges.
The factors triggering crisis -- and change -- in the Greater Horn are multiple, and commonly prioritized in accordance with the perspective of the person or organization doing the prioritizing. In fact all of a wide range of factors -- population growth, land tenure, centralized governmental and political systems, inappropriate policies, environmental conditions, the availability of arms, uneven terms of trade -- contribute to the emergence and spread of crisis and conflict in the region. It is the fact that each of these factors is at play, and that none can be de-linked from the others, which renders the development context so complex.
Change in the region is taking many forms and unfolding on all levels. In the humanitarian arena, there has been a shift from what were once fewer "disasters" to what are now more frequent "complex political emergencies." With this has come an alarming imbalance between the amount of assistance spent on emergency needs versus that invested in development, with USAID's humanitarian assistance normally far exceeding its development aid to the region.
The region has also seen a shift in the scope and nature of conflict, with, for example, the failure of the state in Somalia leading to seemingly interminable instability and the genocide in Rwanda spawning a region-wide military convulsion. This change has fostered new thinking in the international community. The majority of aid providers have found the traditional tools of relief and development woefully inadequate, as has been made abundantly clear in the Great Lakes region.
Other changes appear to be potentially more positive. On the economic front, the region is witnessing the liberalization of a majority of national economies and, with this, the expansion of efforts to foster regional and sub-regional trade and investment. Though the political environment is one which is far from perfect, the majority of the GHA countries can be said to be making considerable progress -- considering their starting points -- in the areas of democratization and good governance.
As a consequence of the dire negative effects of conflict, as well as a growing awareness of the need for expanded economic cooperation, there is also a new commitment to regionalism. IGAD has been substantively and organizationally revitalized in recent years, with the regional leadership investing far more time and effort in building regional cooperation than was the case in the past. The East Africa Cooperation (EAC) has been similarly re-established, with an invitation for membership recently extended to Rwanda.
Perhaps most significant of the positive trends emerging out of the region's tumult has been the emergence of new actors -- at the governmental and non-governmental levels -- determined to fashion solutions to their own problems and to take responsibility for their own mistakes. This growing determination to seize what the Initiative refers to as "African ownership" stems in part from a parallel desire to reduce the region's dependency on the international community for either its economic survival or its political growth. It also derives from what is a markedly more open atmosphere, within which the region's problems and possible solutions are subjected to increasingly public debate. Through this process, long-standing local and regional knowledge and perspectives are beginning to rise to the surface.
While growing food insecurity remains a constant in the region, the development context affecting food security has also changed significantly. Several of the region's governments are placing a new emphasis on the role of small farmers; coupled with the emergence of indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community associations, this means that the definition of "food security" is being expanded to include not only national production, but also access. At the same time, and in part due to improved regional transport and communications, the region is seeing increased cooperation between and among regional networks organized to conduct research and analysis and to link these efforts across national borders.
That food security is taking on a new regional dimension is also evidenced by the priority given to policy harmonization and trade promotion by the revitalized IGAD. IGAD's project profiles, meanwhile, include several activities aimed at improving regional infrastructure and information exchange. Parallel to this effort, regional governments, and some donors, are attempting to expand the use of regional grain surpluses to balance deficits elsewhere in the region, thus indirectly promoting trade. Finally, both governments and NGOs in the region, as well as some of the region's major food aid providers, have begun to explore the ways and means of using food aid as a development tool, thus decreasing its negative impact as a disincentive to production.
Like the change which defines it, the development context in the Greater Horn of Africa region is neither fully negative nor fully positive. The region includes Somalia, a country which gave rise to the concept of the "failed state," and Uganda, a country which not long ago was the world's leading symbol of horror but is today regarded as an economic and political leader. There is considerable tension between the Government of Sudan and many of its neighbors in the Greater Horn, but there is also a regionally-led Sudan Peace Process. There are continued food shortages across the region, but there are also new measures and policies aimed at fostering less dependence on food aid.
The opportunities for USAID in this environment are multiple. First, USAID can build upon the shared goals of its African partners and the many international aid institutions who, parallel to the evolution of the GHAI, have come to similar conclusions and identified similar goals as the impetus for change.
Second, the scope and breadth of change in the Greater Horn have meant that all of USAID's partners are engaged in debate and deliberation about the means of response. The World Bank recently adopted a Framework for Post-Conflict Situations; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is re-thinking its traditional support for governments in the context of "good governance" and regionalization; IGAD has included a Department of Political and Humanitarian Affairs in its new organizational structure; international NGOs are evaluating their roles in complex political emergencies; and, indigenous NGOs are examining their partnerships with international NGOs and governments. That each and every actor in the Greater Horn faces the same challenges posed to USAID means that there exists an enabling environment for change, as well as considerable room for pursuing the GHAI principle of "strategic coordination."
Finally, the increasing weight being given two of the GHAI's operational Principles -- African ownership and regionalism -- provide USAID with the opportunity not only to institutionalize these principles, but also to do so in a manner which can reinforce our partners' ability to institutionalize them, as well.
Operating in such a fluid environment is not without risk. The application of "African ownership" entails a different kind of dialogue than that employed in the past, and one which -- in an era and region of uneven political maturity -- risks USAID's entering into a politically-charged environment. Similarly, the expansion of USAID's involvement in the fields of relief and development to include conflict prevention, mitigation and response represents the Agency's venturing into uncharted territory. Additional risks emerge from the fact that time is of the essence (given, for example, the increasing possibility of major change and/or instability in Sudan and Kenya) but USAID has limited resources and expertise with which to "experiment."
Responding in the Greater Horn -- and implementing the GHAI -- thus entails marrying risk to opportunity. Ensuring that USAID achieves maximum impact requires that the implementation of the GHAI be characterized by the following approaches, each of which reflects the fluidity of this period of change in the region:
The challenge to USAID is to take advantage of the change unfolding in the region and in the international community by rendering itself able to respond to windows of opportunity as they arise. The challenge is easier in some cases than in others. For example, the increased flow of food aid to the region and, with it, an increased dependency on "free hand outs," has been expressed as a concern by a wide range of governments in the region; IGAD and its international partners are responding with a regional Food Aid Charter to be used as a guide by both regional and international actors. USAID is participating in the development of the Charter, and should thus be well-positioned to invoke it in its own operations. In the case of Kenya, however, the "window of opportunity" for USAID may not yet have been fully opened; as events unfold and local or regional partners identify creative means of preventing what appears to be a looming crisis, USAID's challenge will be to respond quickly and to embrace the innovations that may be proposed.
USAID's internal and external dialogue about the nature of the challenges in the Greater Horn, its development experience evolving from the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and its experience in responding to crises in the region, has made clear that specific "ways of doing business" can render the GHAI more effective:
These "lessons learned" have given rise to the formulation of five GHAI Operating Principles. These are:
African Ownership: This Principle aims to ensure that GHAI efforts continue to build upon and respond to the growing evidence of African leadership in the GHA. Where there is an absence of political will on the part of a government or other actor potentially involved in an activity, efforts should be made to ensure that the resultant U.S. leadership is rooted in local priorities and realities, and that activities are designed on the basis of widespread consultation. Further, it suggests that opportunities to respond to local, national and regional efforts be taken advantage of wherever possible, with an increased focus on capacity strengthening.
Strategic Coordination: This Principle entails not only the more effective coordination of all USAID assets and actions, but also coordination between USAID and other USG agencies and U.S., international and local partners. It aims to ensure that activities are undertaken within the context of a precise framework or set of agreed-upon parameters, that comparative advantage is maximized, that duplication of effort and contradictory actions are minimized, and that gaps are identified and addressed.
Linking Relief and Development: This Principle entails providing humanitarian assistance which reinforces longer-term development goals, and deploying development assistance in such a manner as to prevent or reduce potential crises and the attendant need for humanitarian assistance. It also aims to ensure that transitions are better understood and more effectively supported.
Regional Perspective: This Principle involves analyzing and responding to events within the context of a regional perspective, and ensuring that GHAI activities achieve optimal regional impact where possible. Further, it aims to promote joint activities (e.g. between GHA countries) where possible.
Promoting Stability: This Principle aims to ensure that all programming reflects an awareness of the fact that each of the GHA countries is vulnerable to significant economic and/or political change. As such, one of its purposes is to promote advance-planning and preparedness as well as flexible programming to respond should these changes occur. Further, this Principle aims to ensure that programs take advantage of opportunities to promote positive change in the midst of crisis.
The GHAI Principles described above will serve as the "overarching operational framework" within which the GHAI is implemented. The application of the Principles will lead to USAID's ability to "do business differently," and, importantly, better. Through practical tools and measurements described in Section IVB, application of these Principles to all USAID programming in the GHA region will be key to the success of the Initiative.
One of the challenges inherent in efforts to "institutionalize" the GHAI has been the question of whether the GHAI entails "doing business differently" with all resources flowing into the region or simply with dedicated GHAI resources. Another challenge has been clarifying the relationship between existing USAID programs in the region and those undertaken to date and/or proposed by the GHAI.
As suggested by the GHAI Steering Committee, this Plan's strategic objectives rely on overall USAID program synergy and convergence for their achievement. Convergence is the process by which USAID's bilateral and regional programs in the Greater Horn, including programs centrally-funded by the Global Bureau (G), the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and the Office of Sustainable Development in the Africa Bureau (AFR/SD), will accommodate and more directly support the goal and strategic objectives of the GHAI.
The GHAI's strategic framework is the starting point for convergence -- the initial "wedge" with which to begin the process. The achievement of the proposed intermediate results relies not only upon existing synergies between bilateral, regional and central programs, but also on collective efforts to identify those areas where greater convergence may be needed and adaptations can be made accordingly.
GHAI-specific funds will be used as a flexible resource to provide catalytic support for program convergence, including support for application of the GHAI Principles to USAID programming. For details on GHAI-resource funding criteria, see Section VI.
In a collaborative process to be formalized by and monitored through the GHAI Field Steering Committee, the GHAI Strategic Objective Teams will monitor progress toward these intermediate results, determining those areas where greater program synergy may be required, as well as any adjustments to the results themselves which may be necessary. This effort will be directly supported by the proposed Special Objective Three (SpO3) described in Section IV.
The Strategic Plan covers a five-year timeframe from FY 1998 to FY 2002. At the end of the five-year period, it is assumed that USAID's involvement in the region will reflect the GHAI Principles, derive from genuine partnership and consultation, and achieve more effective results in addressing the profound changes unfolding in the region. Internally, it is assumed that USAID will have developed the mechanisms and procedures required to sustain that greater effectiveness. Within the five year lifetime of the strategy, a degree of program convergence should be reached whereby the contribution of both GHAI and other USAID resources flowing into the region can be clearly measured for results against the GHAI strategic objectives. While complete harmonization of programs is unlikely during a five-year period, progress toward achieving such a harmonization should be evident.
Illustration 1: GHAI Operational Framework (12k)
Illustration 2: GHAI Strategic Objective 1 (19k)
The GHAI evolved concurrent to a parallel process in the region. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of some of the region's more autocratic governments, the GHA was, by the beginning of this decade, seeing the emergence of a regional vision and increased debate, by and among constituents, in and about the decision-making that affects them. The most visible manifestation of new regional thinking was captured in the revitalization of IGAD and its adoption of a new and far-reaching mandate which includes both food security and conflict resolution goals. Less visible but equally important have been efforts, particularly among indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to take on the new issues of regional economic cooperation, democratization and conflict resolution and forge regional partnerships in pursuit of these and other development objectives.
Since the inception of the GHAI, USAID has undertaken extensive consultations and worked jointly with a range of governmental and non-governmental partners in the region, each of whom is dedicated to laying the groundwork for positive change. Similarly, the international community has begun to focus less on the short-term gains borne of regional Cold War alliances and more on the long-term investments, and partnerships, that can yield durable solutions to the region's myriad problems.
As such, the GHAI has come at a good time. Parallel to USAID's development of the concept, IGAD and the East Africa Community were defining their own revitalization processes. Other international aid institutions, ranging from multi-lateral agencies to private voluntary organizations (PVOs), were exploring the ways and means of adapting their approaches to a new era. Indigenous organizations and governments began an assertive effort to confront both crisis and food security in the region. The GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region, therefore, reflects the region's priorities as well as the aspirations of USAID's international partners.
The indicators of progress toward this goal are key, as it is at the goal level where people-level impact will be measured. Improved nutritional status at the household level and decreased flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) serve as the goal level indicators.
The GHAI Principles of African ownership, strategic coordination, linking relief and development, applying regional perspectives and promoting stability, will serve as the overarching "operational framework" for the GHAI, reinforcing reengineering concepts and exemplifying new and better ways of doing business within USAID. Over the lifetime of this five-year strategy, various tools will be utilized to assist USAID in its efforts to apply these Principles to virtually all aspects of its programming in the GHA region. The Principles should become "enshrined" within USAID and serve as the norm for programs in the region.
Although USAID has on occasion demonstrated its capacity for applying these Principles, they are yet to be incorporated into all aspects of USAID programming in the region. USAID staff are not sufficiently trained to be able to apply the Principles to their day-to-day work and USAID's internal policies and procedures are not always inherently geared toward their application. Thus, this strategy seeks to assist USAID in establishing the overarching operational framework through analytical work, technical assistance and policy and procedural adjustments in support of the GHAI Principles.
The GHAI suggests several kinds of actions or "tools" to assist in the practical application of the Principles to USAID programming. In most instances, the "tools" do not require program resources, but rather a willingness on the part of USAID operating units to commit human resources to the effort.
Examples of suggested tools are as follows:
Measuring Progress
Since the overarching operational framework is about "doing business differently" within USAID and with USAID partners in the region, progress will be measured in large part through changes in USAID processes. The GHAI's Special Objective Three (SpO3), described later in this Section, will monitor and evaluate not only progress toward the strategy's strategic objectives, but also toward establishing the operational framework. Examples of measuring progress are:
This Strategic Objective focuses on enhanced regional food security and incorporates three dimensions:
Availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.
Access by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.
Utilization of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation and health care.
The Nature of Food Insecurity in the Greater Horn
The Greater Horn of Africa region has suffered more than its share of sub-Saharan Africa's food insecurity. In the early 1990s close to 50% of the population was estimated to be chronically food insecure, with a significant proportion of the population dependent on food aid. Over the past decade, the region has suffered from devastating droughts exacerbated by civil strife and conflicts.
Over 80 percent of the population in the region depends on agriculture for its survival. The region's agricultural sector is characterized by widespread dependence on subsistence production of food crops and livestock, which suffer regularly from the vagaries of the region's climate. Currently, small farmers (both male and female entrepreneurs) produce the bulk of the region's food within an agricultural system beset by a variety of problems. As a result, the transition from basic agrarian societies to modern diversified economies is unfolding slowly and unevenly across the region.
Even though the countries of the region have tremendous variations in natural endowments, weather and degree of political stability, the Greater Horn of Africa region as a whole has the natural and human resource capacity to feed itself. However, the region, and most of its individual countries, have failed to achieve this capacity, and increased levels of food aid and commercial imports have resulted. The high volume of food aid provided for relief purposes contributes to short-term improvements in food security, although it potentially limits the region's ability to achieve long-term self-sufficiency. Costly commercial imports and the region's extremely high transport costs place a heavy burden on governments and consumers.
Infant and child mortality rates in the Greater Horn of Africa region are among the highest in the world. It is estimated that over 50% of this mortality is directly linked to undernutrition. Improving the nutritional well-being of the Greater Horn's population will reduce mortality, significantly improve learning capacity, increase labor productivity, and reduce health care expenditures. Improving nutrition has been linked to reduced pressure on marginal lands, which in turn reduces a society's risk of civil strife.
Root Causes of Food Insecurity
A variety of adverse trends, shocks, and policies are at the root of food insecurity at the regional, national and household levels in the Greater Horn of Africa. These include: poor economic policy environment (both macro and agricultural); droughts and environmental degradation; inadequate physical infrastructure; high population growth rates; civil strife within countries and across borders; and inappropriate international response.
Economic Policy Environment
Although there was a moderate trend in the 1980s and 1990s away from state-owned monopolies to more market-oriented policies, government controls continue to impede the attainment of food security. Inappropriate tariffs, trade barriers and price controls still exist in most GHA countries.
Drought and Environmental Degradation
The regular occurrence of drought and other natural disasters, combined with a lack of mitigation activities and delayed or inappropriate responses, has reduced the coping ability of traditionally resilient populations. Drought, poor agricultural practices and the prevalence of armed conflict, in turn, have and will continue to exacerbate environmental degradation.
Physical Infrastructure
The transport, communication and marketing infrastructure in most of the Greater Horn region has been neglected due to war, inappropriate economic policies, and ineffective maintenance. This has a negative impact on food security in the region because it impedes the distribution of agricultural inputs, both within countries and across the region, reduces the flow of food from surplus to deficit areas, constrains marketing, and discourages agricultural investment.
Population Growth
Prior to 1950, population growth rates in the region were relatively low. Population tripled between 1954 and 1994, from about 61 million to approximately 186 million, and today the current average annual population growth rate in the Greater Horn region is 2.9%. This rate of growth approaches and in some cases exceeds the carrying capacity of fragile environments in the region. As a result, the region has suffered a reduction in the duration of fallow periods, the increased cultivation of marginal lands, increased pressure on grazing land for livestock and, in some cases, conflict between pastoralists and sedentary populations.
Civil Strife
Civil strife has greatly impeded the attainment of food security in the Greater Horn region. Agricultural production has been disrupted by conflict and war-induced mass migrations, and the prioritization of defense over agricultural and social sector expenditure has caused production to lag. The region is dotted with refugee camps which are home to enormous and unsustainable food-insecure populations. The region's civil instability has also prevented an efficient marketing system from developing, resulting in increased poverty and widened income inequalities.
International Response
The response of the international community to the crises in this region has frequently exacerbated problems on the ground. Even in a post-Cold War world, the international community has emphasized rapid emergency response over and above responding to the root causes of food security.
The USG's Programs to Date
There is a growing recognition that the vast quantity of USG humanitarian assistance expended over the last ten years, while contributing to saving lives, has not adequately addressed the root causes of food insecurity. Many USG development programs have been well-designed and well-implemented, but the gains have all too frequently been lost within weeks, months, or years, either because of conflict or drought or because other sectors of the economy were not coordinated to reinforce these gains.
With countries in the region currently in different phases of development, USG bilateral efforts to address the root causes of food security necessarily differ. Within USAID, for example, the Tanzania strategy emphasizes investments in rural infrastructure and the role of the private sector. The strategy for Kenya emphasizes commercialization of smallholder agriculture and enhancing the role of the private sector. In Uganda, the emphasis is on increasing rural household income; a similar approach is being taken by Eritrea, which is focusing on rural enterprises as a way of increasing household income in targeted areas. USAID programs have also supported the development of nationally "owned" strategies rather than developing competing strategies. For example, USAID/Uganda supported decentralized public fora to vet the government's food security strategy, while the strategy for Eritrea is a reflection of dialogue with the Eritrean government and an expression of their national food security objectives.
To achieve food security, attention must be paid not only to national but also to regional issues. Long term projections of food availability show that even with a continuation of current favorable agricultural production trends in some countries, the number of food insecure people in the region will nearly double by the year 2010. A major reason for this is the level of poverty and low levels of productivity in the region. Increasing food security requires not only increases in agricultural production but also in the income with which people can access food and improved health and nutritional status.
While the GHAI cannot address all of the root causes of food security in the region, it can support the institutions and activities which promote regional collaboration and specialization, policy harmonization, information exchange and the development and transfer of regionally-appropriate technologies. While there is considerable individual capacity to address food security in the region, the institutionalization of this capacity has been weak, especially at the regional level. The revitalization of organizations like IGAD and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the emergence of groups like the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA), suggest that support to these institutions is necessary and that the potential exists for them to have a major impact on food security in the region. In addition, support should be provided to assist the various regional organizations to rationalize their sometimes conflicting roles and responsibilities.
Achievements cannot be gained, however, without adequate conservation of the region's natural and human resource base. A focus on improved nutrition at the household level will help determine if food security is being achieved and if the welfare of the people of the region is improving.
Within the five year lifetime of this strategy, regional capacity should be sufficiently strengthened to more effectively analyze regional comparative advantage, exchange information, and develop and transfer regionally-appropriate technologies on a sustainable basis.
Within the USG, in addition to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, two additional complementary initiatives have been launched: the African Food Security Initiative (AFSI) and the African Trade and Investment Initiative (ATRIP)*. The GHAI focus on strengthening African capacity is complementary to these two other initiatives, reinforcing efforts which will collectively contribute significantly to improve food security in Africa.
*AFSI builds on USAID's extensive experience in agricultural development to help countries reverse the decline of funding to agriculture. ATRIP seeks to expand the number of African countries attractive to foreign investors as well as accelerate private sector response to reform efforts.
The development hypothesis guiding this Strategic Objective is that while national-level technical advances and policy reforms can contribute to enhanced national or sub-national food security, the strengthening of regional ties and consequent results are key to the GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region.
This Strategic Objective rests on the assumptions that African individuals, governments and institutions will increasingly act on the need to identify regional solutions to food insecurity, and that the USG will continue to expand its outlook beyond national-level programming.
Strengthening African capacity (both governmental and nongovernmental) occurs throughout all of the activities supporting the following intermediate results (IRs) and is also supported through a number of activities which are cross-cutting in support of SO1. For example, strengthening the capacity of IGAD is a priority area which cuts across many of the IRs as does support for indigenous non-governmental organizations, including the private sector. An aggregation of these IRs, combined with the cross-cutting emphasis on capacity-strengthening, yields the following SO level illustrative indicators.
Increasing agricultural productivity in the Greater Horn region has been a long- standing objective of government, donor and NGO programs. Support to regional activities that strengthen African capacity to create and share agricultural technology through a variety of partnerships is necessary. A regional approach to cross-border transfer of technologies, commercialization of technology development and regional policies to support the flow of technologies and inputs across borders would complement bilateral efforts and help achieve food security at the regional level. A concurrent improvement in transferring technologies to farmers, as well as in ensuring that research and technology development are demand-driven, is also needed.
An important approach to achieving this result will be through the creation of nontraditional partnerships between private sector/NGO groups and private sector/regional agricultural research networks. These nontraditional partnerships will be incorporated under activities in support of this IR.
a) support sustainable, regional agricultural research and technology transfer and policy networks;
b) support private sector efforts at transfer of inputs and technology across borders;
c) promote sustainable production of drought tolerant high yielding crop varieties (IGAD Project 6.1); and
d) support transboundary livestock disease control and vaccine production (IGAD Project 6.2).
Food security in the Greater Horn region has traditionally been sought through efforts to achieve increased national production and to promote income-enhancing activities. Thus far, trade has not been vigorously pursued as a policy option for achieving national or regional food security, although increasingly governments are referring to strategies of "self-reliance" rather than "self-sufficiency." Self-reliance strategies rely more on a country's gains from economic specialization, derived from natural resource conditions and trade, than on meeting total national food needs through production.
Governments such as Eritrea recognize the impossibility of relying on internal production, and seek a diversified economic base, built on trade, to complement increases in agricultural productivity. Uganda and Kenya both promote the production of non-traditional food and export crops, and the former's agricultural base should enable it to be become a major food exporter in the region.
The hesitancy of some governments to move toward specialization and reliance on trade stems from fears that food needs may not be met reliably by the private sector. These fears, along with the desire to gather revenues from taxation, led many governments to set up parastatals and adopt other inward-looking policies which appear contrary to conventional economic and international trade wisdom. Kenya, for example, follows a self-sufficiency policy for maize despite neighboring Uganda's apparent comparative advantage in the supply of this commodity.
Despite many barriers, informal cross-border trade has been shown to be very important to meeting food security needs during times of peace and conflict in the region. Recent analyses have shown that the magnitude of private informal trade is much greater than formal trade, with the informal sector capable of moving large quantities across borders despite serious bureaucratic constraints which tend to escalate the transaction costs.4
Regional policy harmonization in the trade and transport areas, focusing on the reduction of trade barriers, is critical to increasing agricultural trade and food security in the GHA region. Reducing transport costs will not only enhance exports, but will also reduce the costs of food (both commercial and aid) imports. Based on existing analyses conducted under GHAI, transportation costs could be significantly reduced through the implementation of "non-infrastructure" related reforms.
a) support for regional policy harmonization on regional trade and movement toward a common market area; and
b) support for implementing transportation sector reforms which will lead to a significant reduction in transportation costs.
An important trend in response to crises in the region has been increased quantities of externally provided food aid, for both emergency and development purposes. Although food aid imported into the region provides a major economic resource, it is not a benign resource. Its increased use over the past ten years has provoked an emerging debate over the real long term benefits - and costs -- of traditional food aid programs. Recent statements by governments of the region have acknowledged that new approaches to food aid should be taken, i.e., those that encourage local production and marketing capabilities, including those related to livestock. Drought mitigation efforts which focus on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with stress have been emphasized by both African governments and many NGOs. Some of these approaches are already being implemented as part of USAID bilateral programs in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.
At the regional level there is a need to design and test new food aid approaches such as regional monetization -- which could lead to effective utilization of increased local production and to a stronger private sector role in meeting food needs for targeted populations. Related to the longer term perspective of the region, efforts have already been initiated with the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to develop methodologies for long term estimates of food imports into the region based on differential income distribution within countries. This should provide more realistic estimates, taking into account regional trade and the impact of market liberalization efforts currently underway in the region. Efforts to target food aid more effectively and assess vulnerability to food insecurity in a regionally comparable manner are also necessary. For example, as a follow-up to the Rome World Food Summit, a Food Aid Charter is being developed by the region which will detail responsibilities of both donor and recipient countries.
a) support activities focusing on the role of livestock and crops in the region's food security;
b) design and implement a regional food aid monetization activity;
c) analyze short and long term food import needs;
d) conduct participatory vulnerability assessments;
e) support IGAD in development of a Regional Food Aid Charter;
f) reexamine the role of food aid in the GHA; and
g) facilitate the reestablishment of traditional trading routes.
Recent analyses have underscored the vital role that the African private sector, including large- and small-scale investors and the region's small producers, can play in achieving food security for the region. Governments' economic policy formulation processes often ignore the views of the private sector. Despite the mistrust existing between private and public sectors, however, there is a growing realization of the need for partnership with the private sector by both donors and governments. Consultations with many businesses and business associations throughout the region indicate that the private sector seeks commercial opportunities in the food sector, especially in "down-stream" activities which will stimulate production. The enabling environment for establishment of formal private/public sector fora on policy reforms that affect food security must be improved. Without private sector representation, even well intentioned reforms rarely lead to increased levels of production, trade and investment. Regional fora to complement those already established at the national level (such as the Uganda National Forum) would improve the quality of the policy debate on market reforms needed to stimulate national and cross-border food production and trade. Improved information on trade and investment opportunities would facilitate private sector participation in food security in the region.
Useful experience has been gained from USAID bilateral programs on the effectiveness of microenterprise programs in enhancing income growth and food security (e.g. Kenya). Encouragement of microenterprise development, especially in transferring lessons from one country to another, could be a major contributor to achieving food security in the region.
a) collect and publish information on private sector investment opportunities in food security;
b) support dissemination of improved regional commodity market information;
c) conduct lessons learned and pilot activities in microenterprise development; and
d) establish a regional commercial food policy forum.
Over the last 20 years, the prevalence of childhood undernutrition has declined in all regions of the world, except for sub-Saharan Africa. Most African countries have experienced either no change in the prevalence of childhood undernutrition or, in the case of the Greater Horn region, an overall increase in its prevalence has occurred.
Nutrition is the critical link between the various food security components, regardless of sector (agriculture, humanitarian assistance, health). An emphasis on the quality and safety of diets through improved processing and storage techniques, food fortification and micronutrient supplementation means more nutritious and better utilized foods.
Several important trends in African countries need to be considered and built upon by GHAI activities. Increasingly, nutrition, health and other strategies must be consistent with trends in Africa toward integration and decentralization of services. Capacity development and logistics systems are particularly affected by both integration and decentralization. The trend in Africa toward adoption of minimum health packages including key services and interventions can provide an opportunity for nutrition -- regional approaches can provide important lessons for countries in the formulation of these interventions. Partnerships with communities and NGOs, another trend seen in African countries, are essential for sustainable nutrition improvement.
Improved nutritional status is crucial to the attainment of the GHAI goal and it is therefore essential to include an emphasis on improved nutrition at the household level. Improved availability and access to food in themselves do not necessarily translate to improved childhood and maternal nutrition. To improve nutrition at the household level in the Greater Horn, it will be necessary to develop and improve institutional and individual capacity in the region to a) improve the implementation of nutrition and other child survival interventions and b) to improve policy and program coordination in those sectors relating to food security in the GHAI.
Programs in the area of nutrition can contribute significantly to the GHAI goal, both through directly contributing to increased food security as well as providing the means to monitor and verify positive changes. The GHAI can play an important advocacy role for nutrition in regional institutions, and promote coordination between international, regional and national organizations. Specific activities which contribute value-added to USAID's bilateral programs will be developed jointly with African and other partners.
a) regional assessment of iodized salt markets outside of Eritrea and Ethiopia;
b) microenterprise trials of the development and marketing of fortified foods;
c) inventory of nutrition programs in the region, both governmental and nongovernmental; and
d) pilot activities adding child survival interventions to food distribution schemes.
Food production is largely dependent on the conditions of the resource base. To achieve sustainable increases in agricultural and livestock productivity, improved management of the natural resource base as well as sustainable agricultural and grazing practices are necessary. Variable rainfall, steep lands and other biophysical characteristics, compounded by population pressures, have led to land degradation, soil erosion, fuelwood scarcity, expansion of cultivation into unsuitable marginal lands, loss of biodiversity, and in particular, deterioration of the very resources upon which food security depends. War and civil strife, coupled with refugee displacement (and recently refugee repatriation) have exacerbated demands on the resource base, especially along borders.
The region's resources have more potential for suitable and sustainable use when taken as a whole rather than taken individually. Hence, it is critical to link management of the transnational natural resource base with food security. Use of transboundary resources in a region where pastoralism remains important and where most rivers cross several countries aggravates conflict and contributes to food insecurity.
The management of transboundary resources requires the cooperation of all countries in which it occurs. Lake Victoria cannot be managed by any of the three countries in which it occurs without the cooperation of the other two. The management of natural resources must also be based on an adequate understanding of the natural resources at hand. Adequate ecological knowledge must form the basis upon which multinational protocols for the management of transborder resources are negotiated.
The sustainable management of the region's natural resources hinges on the ability of African policy makers and technicians to analyze the behavior of the resources and the consequences of their manipulation. Only then will countries be able to enter into well-informed and objective dialogue over the management of transboundary resources, and collaborate in the management of common resources.
a) support for capacity building in integrated water resources management (IGAD Project 8.1);
b) promotion of community based land husbandry (IGAD Project 8.2); and
c) follow-up to GHAI Natural Resources Management (NRM) stakeholders meetings.
Central to determining how this SO is implemented is defining our partners and means of coordination. During the extensive consultation process in the region which has preceded and continued through development of the strategy, key partners have been identified. Through the implementation of the strategy new partners and partnerships will also be identified and developed. It is clear that there is considerable momentum in the region and acceptance of the approach that GHAI is following through application of the GHAI principles.
The GHAI will continue to build upon its growing partnership with IGAD as well as other regional entities including the East Africa Transport Initiative (EATI). There are also a number of private sector-oriented networks including trade organizations, dairy and seed producers as well as networks related to disaster preparedness and management (e.g., Eastern and Southern African Business Organization [ESABO], the Organization of African Unity-Pan African Rinderpest Campaign [PARC] Livestock Network).
The nature of governments in the region, as well as USG relations with them, is quite diverse. At one end, the more forward-looking approaches of the Governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Uganda and Rwanda, have been key to the development of the Initiative. The Government of Tanzania might also be considered in this grouping, although given its parallel role in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) its involvement in the Initiative has been relatively limited this far. The Governments of Burundi and Sudan, given the ongoing crises in those countries, pose unique but not unsurmountable challenges, while the Governments of Kenya and Djibouti have been much more active in recent regional developments such as the revitalization of IGAD. Finally, the fact that there is still no government in Somalia and that the USG has no official relations with the as-yet unrecognized "Somaliland Republic" mean that the involvement of Somalia is having to be sought in new and creative ways.
USAID's primary partners are IGAD and its members, the East Africa Cooperation Secretariat (EAC) and regional technical networks. Emphasis will also be given to a growing number of indigenous organizations engaged in fields relevant to the implementation of this SO.
This Strategic Objective aims to build African capacity to enhance regional food security, not to enhance food security through donor-driven, nationally-based activities. Its sustainability demands a real and continuing commitment on the part of the USG, and other development partners, to the often difficult process of building local capacities. If that commitment is forthcoming, the newly- strengthened African capacity will make a sustained contribution to the achievement of the GHAI goal.
Complex economic, social and political realities in the GHA region pose significant challenges to efforts to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict. Continued instability in the region is simultaneously characterized by cross-cutting thematic issues including: failed states and states in transition; variable approaches to democratization; efforts to both manipulate and address ethnic and religious divisions; and increased pressure on resources. At the same time, each of the GHA countries suffers from its own specific internal constraints. At both the national and regional levels, efforts are underway to address conflict and the wide range of causes giving rise to them. Whether it be at the national or regional level, however, institutional capacity to deal with these challenges is as yet insufficient to meet the needs.
Two obstacles impede the ability of the region and its international partners to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict in the GHA region. First, while regional actors have taken considerable initiative to transform local knowledge into concrete measures to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict, there is as yet insufficient institutional capacity to ensure that the region's people and governments do, in fact, "own" and guide the process of change in the region.
Second, the sheer magnitude of the region's problems is such that regional and international efforts -- however well-inspired -- may prove insufficient to the task. As such, and because it is evident that a stable and prosperous region will be some time in coming, this SO aims not to prevent, mitigate or resolve each conflict that may unfold in the region, but instead to increase the capacity of both the region and its international partners to respond to them and, where possible, wrest positive change out of those conflicts.
Coupled with that taking place in the international community, the change unfolding in the region necessarily entails risk, but with that risk comes the opportunity to develop genuine partnerships aimed at ensuring that declining resources are invested toward the promotion of stability, peace and prosperity and that the region's dependency on the international community is reduced. This opportunity, however, represents a new area of engagement for USAID, and has thus led to considerable internal analysis and discussion.
The term "crisis," for example, has been used in reference to both natural disasters as well as manmade problems and in recognition of the linkages between the two. In addition, the "prevention," "mitigation" and "response" terms together imply a host of interventions, ranging from technical interventions to promote seed multiplication activities and thus mitigate the effects of drought, to diplomatic initiatives to bring warring parties together. The identification of the most appropriate starting point is the subject of heated debate as well.
In light of the wide range of opinion on both the issue of crisis prevention, mitigation and response and how USAID should address it, this strategic objective focuses on "conflict" as opposed to "crisis" because: a) the choice of conflict reduces potential redundancies between this GHAI framework and other frameworks (e.g., the BHR/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistant [OFDA] framework) which seek to capture results related to more traditional crisis prevention, mitigation and preparedness activities; and b) although complex interrelationships exist between conflict and other forms of crisis, e.g., food-based crises, making the distinction between the two is seen necessary so as to more clearly focus the SO.
Given these complex interrelationships, there are clear linkages between this Strategic Objective and SO1 and SpO3 that should be noted. For example, efforts to improve African research and the use of appropriate technologies under SO1 could be considered a conflict prevention approach in some circumstances. Another example is development and dissemination of drought resistant seeds in the region, which could help assure food access in times of drought and avert a resource-based conflict.
This SO is designed to reflect the fact that practical experience will be gained and priorities best determined through a learning process. Through experimentation, testing and replication of best practices, USAID, in partnership with regional institutions and other partners will maximize their respective comparative advantages in pursuit of this strategic objective.
The intermediate results outlined below are based on input from GHAI field missions and other operating units, as well as consultations with IGAD and other regional governmental and non-governmental partners. The first two intermediate results, for example, directly support IGAD's priorities.
The development hypothesis is that innovative and locally-owned approaches to conflict prevention, mitigation and response, when applied as an integral part of relief and development programming, will help to prevent conflicts and thus lead to a more food secure, just and peaceful region.
This Strategic Objective rests on the assumptions that the prevailing trend towards greater African responsibility for managing regional problems and identifying solutions will continue, and that USAID will remain committed to using its resources to help meet broader U.S. foreign policy goals related to conflict management.
There is considerable individual capacity in the region to analyze conflict [and food security] issues, but institutionalization of this capacity is weak, including at the regional level. As with other indigenous organizations, those addressing conflict need to: acquire better management and advocacy skills; increase their capacity to produce analysis and share information; and, enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of governments and external actors in the region. Activities that focus on strengthening these skills could complement capacity-strengthening activities at the bilateral level. Activities which seek to improve dialogue and cooperation between governments and indigenous organizations in GHA countries can also be complemented at the bilateral level. Organizations can be supported to share lessons learned in addressing conflict which should result in faster dissemination of successful techniques.
This IR will strengthen African capacity for several reasons: first, it aims to build the capacity of a regional organization, as opposed to providing external expertise; second, it supports the institutionalization of indigenous knowledge and research, and hopefully, its wider utilization by both the regional and the international community; and third, IGAD's work in this area marks the first time that what were heretofore considered the internal affairs of states are now considered to be issues of regional concern.
a) strengthen the institutional capacity of IGAD secretariat in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR);
b) policy harmonization support for IGAD (ex. applied research and analysis, case studies, information dissemination and policy summits);
c) support for regional capacity building in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and management (IGAD Project 9.1);
d) grant-making and institutional strengthening program for regional African non-governmental organizations; and
e) support strengthened capacity in regional disaster management (IGAD Project 10.1).
There are an estimated 10 million refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and recent returnees either in, or originating from, the GHAI countries. These populations are both the result of and a cause of conflict in the region. The existence of these populations costs the donor community millions of dollars per year, creates internal and cross-border tensions within and among GHA countries, disrupts economies, destroys local and national infrastructure and causes serious environmental damage.
Response to these conflicts in the region has been characterized by the fact that in most cases, more resources are made available to deal with emergency needs than in addressing the long-term consequences of humanitarian crisis, including the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons IDPs. In most of the region, refugee populations languish long past the point when international attention to a given crisis fades. The international community has yet to effectively link conflict response to refugee solutions, but is partially impeded by the fact that there exists no locally-defined framework for doing so. While there are many political and security issues to be sorted through, there is a core of African leadership, including some of the member states of IGAD, committed to finding durable solutions for the region's refugee and displaced populations.
There exist at least two specific tools for addressing these issues in the region, including a joint IGAD-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) project, the elaboration of which included GHAI involvement, to undertake pilot projects in which refugee needs and conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) goals are linked. Second, many of IGAD's members were signatories to a Declaration at the 1992 Summit on Regional Humanitarian Issues which includes a call for a new regionally-based framework for addressing refugee issues. Both IGAD and many of its partners have indicated an interest in resurrecting this Declaration as the impetus for moving forward on this issue.
Given that crises can emerge out of either man-made or natural causes, and are usually the consequence of both, there will necessarily be some overlap between the activities undertaken here and under SO1.
a) support development of regional mechanisms for the sustainable reintegration of refugees (IGAD Project 10.1);
b) support reintegration programs for population groups outside IGAD sub-region; and
c) support regional mechanisms which develop creative and lasting solutions to political problems (IGAD Project 9.1).
There are many new organizations and many as yet untested methodologies being proposed to address conflict. Innovative ideas are emerging from these organizations in response to conflict situations. Therefore, USAID can be most responsive in this new field by establishing a mechanism for prompt support to promising pilot activities. Timely evaluations of these activities, as well as those undertaken earlier by the GHAI and others, will accelerate the learning curve on what works in the region. As "best practices" are established (and unworkable mechanisms identified and discarded) over the next two years, the priority activities in the SO will be refined.
Perhaps one of the most exciting yet difficult challenges to the GHAI will be response to the situation in Sudan, where a major transition is possible and where USAID has been authorized to implement an inter-agency decision to support local-level governance and democratization through capacity-building. USAID will be utilizing the GHAI to both test the degree to which USAID can prepare for and facilitate a smooth transition in Sudan -- should circumstances so dictate -- and to examine whether and how USAID can support local-level capacity building, and with it democracy and good governance, during a conflict, as opposed to only when armed conflict has ended.
Decisions regarding the final allocation of the USD three million dollars in Development Assistance (DA) allocated for Sudan are pending. For the purposes of the strategy, a portion of the Sudan allocation is intended to support pilot activities through those actions which can be defined as innovative, facilitative and instructive to the Agency's efforts to institutionalize new approaches toward conflict prevention and transitions in the region. The remainder of the Sudan allocation will be used as follow on to these initial efforts. Though GHAI resources are not normally meant to replace a Mission's operating year budget (OYB), the uniqueness of the Sudan situation, combined with the opportunity to apply all of the GHAI Principles to this new DA funding, have led to the decision to place the entire Sudan DA commitment within the GHAI.
a) Establishment of a quick response conflict-management fund, managed by REDSO/ESA, and available to a wide range of entities, including bilateral missions, with sufficient funding for evaluation and write-up of results;
- this fund is not meant to replace nor serve as humanitarian assistance. Rather, it will be utilized to fund African participation in one-time or limited activities, such as summits or peace conferences, which seek to prevent, mediate or resolve conflicts. Over time, the fund might be expanded to provide other types of conflict-related support;
b) continued support for Karamoja peace process, initiated to devise ways and means of preventing inter-ethnic clashes (USAID/Uganda);
c) support to PVOS/NGOs for conflict resolution activities, including training (USAID/Somalia);
d) support for locally based NGOs involved in CPMR on a regional level, assisting in capacity strengthening and participation in regional workshops and conferences (USAID/Tanzania);
e) design and implement Sudan contingency and D/G plans in collaboration with USG and regional partners; and
f) support for peace dialogue among tribes within and across the northern Kenya borders, including Ethiopia and Sudan (USAID/Kenya).
Given that this IR is intended to support pilot activities in a new field, it is inappropriate to define indicators which might prescribe certain activities as opposed to allowing the GHAI to respond flexibly to creative initiatives that may be proposed. The proposed Special Objective Three, with a focus on impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation, will be key to establishing appropriate indicators for this result. Possible indicators might include increased initiative by bilateral Missions to promote these kinds of activities, and the sharing of lessons learned, both within USAID and between USAID and GHAI partners.
The commitment of USAID's partners to achieve this Strategic Objective is significant. It can be argued, in fact, that this Strategic Objective derives in large measure from USAID's desire to respond to the region's own effort, initiated parallel to but not as a result of the GHAI, to increase its capacity to address and manage its own problems.
At the level of the international community, recent joint studies, including the Multi-Donor Assessment of Rwanda and the United Nations' War-Torn Societies Project, have made clear the willingness of the international community to evaluate its practices. As illustrated by international involvement in the Joint IGAD-Partners Forum, the international community is demonstrating a new understanding of the need to tackle both regional conflicts and partnership in a new way.
Challenges posed by the complex political emergencies in the GHA region have similarly caused some members of the international PVO community to reflect on their roles and approaches in the field of conflict prevention. At the regional and national levels, both official and private institutions are giving increased attention to researching and addressing the root causes of conflict and linking their findings to more traditional development models, exploring the nature of their own partnership and cooperation with international counterparts striving to tackle conflict-related issues in the region. During the last three years alone, the region has spawned government-led efforts to address conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. The GHA countries which are members of IGAD have signed a new IGAD Charter which specifically includes conflict prevention and response as a central component.
The capacity of the GHAI's regional partners, including IGAD, is mixed. There is considerable knowledge about the ways and means of assessing, preventing and resolving conflict within the region, but lesser institutional capacity to transform this local knowledge and perspective into concrete initiatives. There is also little capacity in the region to network and share experiences and approaches within and across borders, nor to utilize local knowledge to inform the national, regional and international decision-making that shapes conflict prevention efforts. The capacity of the GHAI's international partners is mixed, as well. Among both donor governments and PVOs, new and often ground-breaking analysis is not being consistently translated into new and effective approaches.
The sustainability of results of this Strategic Objective is heavily dependent on the inter-relationship between and among various aspects of crisis, namely, food security, political, social and economic dimensions of conflicts. The comprehensive approach promoted under the GHAI, including integrated strategic planning and convergence of both substantive issues as well as resources, will contribute to the sustainability of results.
When considering the sustainability of results, it is important to understand that the GHAI aims to help increase the capacity of its African partners to prevent, mitigate and respond to their own conflicts while at the same time enhancing the ability of USAID, as a primary member of the international community, to adapt its own operations to better address conflict-related issues in the region. As such, real results should be seen less in terms of the cessation of conflict in the region, and more in terms of the increased capacity of both the GHAI's African partners and USAID to prevent or respond to them more effectively.
Sustainability will derive from the degree to which both African and USG participants in the GHAI institutionalize this new capacity. Based on GHAI efforts to support IGAD, as well as some of the pilot activities undertaken, there is already evidence that the existence of institutions, mechanisms and communication facilities can and do enhance the effectiveness of both those living in the region and those aiming to support them.
One of the most glaring impediments to the formulation of regional policy approaches in the GHA is the shortage of data and analyses which assess the region as a whole. The quality of existing resource material, meanwhile, is mixed. As a consequence, regional factors are given insufficient weight, and regional approaches are too often defined on the basis of an amalgamation of national analyses as opposed to deliberate regional assessments. There is also a need to make existing information resources more widely available and accessible to stakeholders in the region. This aspect of the "information gap" affects both GHAI partners in the region as well as USAID and its international counterparts.
Equally significant, at both the national and regional levels, is the parallel problem that, despite increased efforts to analyze food security and crisis prevention issues, these tend to be viewed sectorally rather than holistically.
Food security and conflict prevention are seen to relate to at least three distinct processes: economic development; social/political development; and ecological sustainability. Addressing any one sector in isolation from the others risks (and may in fact guarantee) failure to achieve goals in the selected sector. The "information gap," in this case, has more to do with the failure to make the linkages between food security and conflict prevention -- by looking at them in isolation from one another -- than with the unavailability of information.
The third aspect of the information gap has to do with the GHAI itself. The Initiative's innovative nature is such that USAID will need to make mid-course modifications; impact assessments, monitoring and evaluation are necessary to both measure results and adjust implementation.
The GHAI Strategy therefore proposes a Special Objective very similar to one presented by USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA). This SpO, "Improved Access to Regional Analytical Information," is intended to develop, both within the GHAI and in the region as a whole, a coherent and wide-ranging basis for accurately assessing "regional" interests and impacts at the regional level.
This SpO will ensure that frequent and accurate reporting on the activities generated by Strategic Objectives One and Two, including regional analyses, studies, activities, etc. is provided to the broadest possible range of GHAI stakeholders. Similarly, results of monitoring and evaluation, undertaken in collaboration with African partners, will also be shared widely.
Through additional analyses and other relevant activities, this SpO will also augment the analytical work, information-sharing and capacity-strengthening activities suggested by the other Strategic Objectives. This SpO will serve as the vehicle for identifying and addressing gaps and linkages between the SOs, thereby contributing to the holistic, regional perspective needed to achieve the GHAI goal.
This Special Objective will also serve as the overall mechanism by which USAID will monitor its progress toward achievement of both the Strategic Objectives and establishment of the Overarching Operational Framework.
Through the approaches described above, SpO 3 should contribute significantly to filling the information gaps described above.
This Special Objective is highly experimental, in part because it entails rendering public much of the program analysis usually considered to be internal. Success is by no means certain: the difficulty of communication and of obtaining information, the unfamiliarity of the approach, the lack of institutional capacity and the great differences in the needs and resources of the countries of the region are but a few of the many obstacles that the GHAI and its partners must overcome to achieve this Special Objective.
Many decision-makers in and working with the region, whether in government, business or civil society, have recognized the value and necessity of closer regional cooperation and are therefore already taking "regional" factors into account in their decision-making. Moreover, regional bodies such as IGAD are institutionally oriented toward a region-wide perspective. However, there is little regionally-based information and analysis from which to fashion new approaches.
Critical Assumptions
A critical assumption is that African private and public sector policy-makers would take well-founded and unbiased information and analyses on regional trends into account in their decisions if this information were more widely available to them. A second assumption is that such work would also provide an authoritative common reference point for discussions among donors, were it available to them. Finally, it is assumed that both regional and international approaches toward food security and conflict prevention in the region would be enhanced, and rendered more sustainable, were they to be based on regional as opposed to national-level information and analysis.
The GHAI recognizes the importance of information-sharing among stakeholders. Consistent with the dynamic nature of the region and the development process, the GHAI will also help facilitate improved accessibility to regional information resources by various groups in the region, including: governments, the private sector, civil society at large, private citizens' groups, non-governmental organization, as well as by USAID and other donors.
One of the Initiative's top priorities during the first year of strategy implementation will be to make information more readily available to its partners. To ensure that systematic and frequent reporting on the GHAI and related activities and analysis is established, GHAI is undertaking the Greater Horn Information and Outreach Service (GHIOS) activity. In its first year, the GHIOS will focus primarily on improving coordination and dissemination of information relative to the USG's GHAI-related programs in the Greater Horn of Africa.
Beginning in Year Two, GHIOS will expand its information base to include activities which are not necessarily supported directly by the GHAI, but which are related to its goal and objectives. This expansion will entail significant networking with external partners. In addition to hard copy information, the GHAI website will be revived and maintained.
IGAD has also placed a high priority on developing and maintaining integrated information systems. With greater access to the internet and communications technologies in the region, information flows can be enhanced and decision making improved. Creating and sustaining regionally compatible information systems will also ensure that there is accurate and relevant information upon which to base technical and policy decisions affecting regional food security and conflict management.
An important aspect of this result will be the complementarity between GHIOS and IGAD's proposed Regional Integrated Information System.
a) establishment of GHIOS; and,
b) support implementation of Regional Integrated Information System (IGAD Project 5.1).
The activities pursued under this IR will augment similar activities undertaken through SO1 and SO2, with a view to addressing research and analytical needs required to link the two. Through broad dissemination of the analyses, research and other activities supporting these linkages, this IR will contribute directly to creating a regional capacity to view food security and crisis prevention more holistically.
Illustrative activities and indicators under this intermediate result will be a function of the gaps and linkages identified between SO1, SO2 and the operational framework.
African participation will be sought in the monitoring and evaluation of the GHAI. This will in part strengthen the capacity of individual Africans and regional African institutions to provide the sort of rigorous analysis required in the region and by its partners. It will also ensure that USAID's efforts are evaluated on the basis of a regional as well as external perspective. It is recognized that this process will take time, but the GHAI is committed to the process of strengthening African capacity, both through this Special Objective, and through activities in the other SOs.
a) continuous monitoring of SO1 and SO2 and Operational Framework from Year Two of the strategy; and
b) overall GHAI evaluation at the end of Year Three (late FY 2000).
The GHAI is by definition a cross-cutting Initiative which supports all five Agency goals. The GHAI also reinforces Agency reengineering efforts by seeking to change the way USAID and its partners work by using the Operational Framework to assimilate the five GHAI Principles: African ownership, regional approaches, strategic coordination, linking relief and development and promoting stability. Combined with the GHAI approach of overall USAID program convergence in the region, the Initiative's Operational Framework thus lends support to all USAID goals.
Strategic Objective One, "Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Food Security," contributes directly to the following Agency Goals: broad-based economic growth; protecting the environment; stabilizing world population; saving lives; reducing suffering; and reinforcing development potential. The GHAI Principle of Linking Relief and Development also contributes directly to the latter goal. Strategic Objective Two "Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict," directly supports the Agency's Goal of building sustainable democracies.
All of the GHAI-specific resources will provide flexible, catalytic support for program convergence as well as for application of the overarching operational framework, i.e., the GHAI Principles. As achievement of the strategic objectives relies on improved linkages between existing and potential regional and bilateral programs, including those programs which are centrally-funded, GHAI resources alone will not, in most cases, lead to significant progress toward the proposed intermediate results. Rather, GHAI funds should be used to leverage other resources, both within USAID and with our partners, to achieve results.
With the exception of management, monitoring and evaluation and operational framework costs, the following are the proposed criteria for GHAI funding, defined on the basis of consultation with GHAI operating units. A proposed activity must:
a. demonstrate its relationship to one or more of the GHAI Strategic or Special Objectives;
b. promote/demonstrate use of GHAI Principles; African ownership; regional perspectives; strategic coordination; link relief and development; and promote stability;
- respond to African priorities, be managed and implemented by African institutions or strengthen the capacities of African institutions;
- comply with one of the following definitions of regionalism:
- an activity that is implemented for a public or private regional organization, based on mutually agreed upon objectives, either for its own strengthening, or for the benefit of two or more of its members;
- an activity that is implemented by one country or an organization in one country, with clear, direct, equitable benefits for at least 3 countries in the region; an entity within one country acts as the "agent" for the activity; and/or
- a number of similar activities implemented in more than one country in the region at the same time, to achieve structured comparative experiences for the region - often to test alternative efficiencies, cost savings, or impacts in different national contexts;
- demonstrate strategic coordination (i.e.improve collaboration and partnership between institutions; prevent duplication of effort and contradictory approaches; complementary; not redundant to other USG, IGAD, donor, multilateral, host government, university or PVO/NGO activities);
c. represent innovative approaches:
- support non-traditional methods and unforeseen targets of opportunity; lead to the adoption of new tools and practices; focus on root causes as opposed to symptoms of problems; manage existing resources differently and more effectively; promote structural change within traditional development institutions, including the public sector; engage and support historically under-represented development agents and stakeholders; ensure development efforts are rooted in indigenous initiative and respectful of African realities and priorities;
d. catalytic, facilitative, and value-added:
- focus on capacity-building and the sharing of lessons learned; lead to development of common strategies and frameworks for approaching complex issues; support indigenous leadership; expand the knowledge base around priority issues; leverage additional resources; has the potential for broader replication; lead to improved and harmonized policies; foster the formation of networks of individuals, organizations and governments with common interests; support multi-sector approaches.
e. limited in duration: not to exceed 24 months; and
f. does not exceed $500,000.
Successful implementation of the GHAI requires the reallocation of existing staff and/or the recruitment of new staff and the establishment of new management mechanisms. The estimated "start up" time for these efforts is 10 months from the time of strategy approval. With the shift of GHAI implementation from Washington to the field, the top priority for FY98 will be ensuring that staff and management mechanisms in the field are in place to launch this strategic plan.
Go to Annex A: GHAI USG Interagency Framework
Go to Annex B: GHAI Concept Paper
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