One of the most influential trends of the Cold War was the superpower support for centralized and authoritarian regimes that were highly militarized and whose activities fueled the burgeoning arms trade on the continent. Military expenditures outpaced social spending in many of the countries of the Greater Horn. Production was not geared to meet basic needs, but to sustain governments and to pursue wars. Inevitably, as conflict escalated in much of the region, food security decreased.
Another consequence of this period of misplaced priorities was a relentless economic decline. The confluence of armed conflict, failed policies, poor leadership and the increasing disenfranchisement of the citizenry undermined economic and social conditions in most of the region. This led to the collapse of market systems; the deterioration of tax and other revenue-collection systems; corruption and patronage; substantial military and other debt; increased food aid and Official Development Assistance (ODA) dependency; population growth in excess of economic growth; massive population displacement and, thus, shifting trade and labor patterns; an increase in black market trade both internally and across borders; a severe reduction in the village-level and household asset base; an increase in the number of female-headed households; a decline in the delivery of social services; growing risk-aversion on the part of subsistence producers; the continuation of inequitable land tenure systems; and, significantly, a sharp rise in the percentage of national populations considered vulnerable to external shocks.
As strategic interests in the Greater Horn region have declined, donor resolve to assist countries of the Greater Horn is being tested by the immense costs of recurrent crises, especially complex ones of a man made nature (Figures 2 and 3). U.S. expenditures in Somalia alone from the start of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 to the present have been about $1.6 billion. This is equivalent to two years of U.S. development assistance to all of sub-Saharan Africa. The European Union increased by five times its external humanitarian expenditure between 1990 and 1993, and many other foreign assistance agencies are experiencing similar trends.
The post-Cold War period has seen a shift in the basis of relationships between donors and recipient countries and a leveling-off of development assistance flows. Official Development Assistance to the Greater Horn in current dollars net of food aid and emergency assistance rose from $25 per capita in 1985 to $36 per capita in 1990 and then dropped to $27 per capita in 1992. While donors remain committed to provide relief for major humanitarian and development needs, demonstrable progress toward sustainable development should be paramount in consideration of future flows.
For many of the reasons described above, government development policies have not been implemented, and investments have not resulted in significantly increased capacity of national governments in the region to address the social and economic needs of their populations. Similarly, relief assistance, while undoubtedly saving lives, has fostered a dependency mentality among many recipients and has not contributed to addressing causes of recurring crises. In contrast to the Cold War era, donors increasingly recognize the limits on their ability to effect change without constructive leadership in recipient countries. Experience in Somalia over the last two years has further driven home lessons about the limits of successful donor intervention.
Though in its early stages, both donors and leaders in the region have embarked on a new and different approach, marked by greater power and authority being vested in Africans. Donors and regional leaders are structuring better partnerships. Development is characterized by efforts to ensure popular participation and the involvement of indigenous organizations. Host governments are expected to take the lead in development and economic reform programs in a new effort to achieve sustainability.
In recent years, the emphasis has begun to shift to the identification and implementation of local solutions and to more practical mechanisms for regional cooperation. In 1992, the leaders of five states in the region met in Addis Ababa to draft a regional framework on humanitarian principles. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1993 became the umbrella for a regionally supported peace process in Sudan.
While constructive leadership in the region is necessary for improving returns on development investments, donors also must meet the challenge of applying foreign assistance resources differently. Political and social factors need to be better incorporated in planning. The "relief-to-development continuum" concept is a good example of this new approach to assistance. Relief should address a wider set of issues to prevent humanitarian crises and reinforce investments aimed at sustainable development. Similarly, development aid should facilitate emergency prevention and response but focus on ameliorating the root causes of food insecurity and instability. All resources should be integrated to achieve the greatest impact with the least duplication.
A recommitment is needed to address the combined problems of the region and the international community. At the regional level, this means tackling the challenge of achieving food security with the ultimate objective of reducing economic and political vulnerability; at the international level, it means developing integrated approaches that are driven from the ground up.
