Repeated occurrences of drought and high variability in precipitation have reduced the ability of many smallholders to maintain their assets or to respond when conditions are good. Other natural disasters such as pest infestations and periodic flooding destroy area-specific production levels. Analysis of these factors argues for an more effective weather and pest early warning system in the region.
Increases in agricultural production in the past in many of the Greater Horn countries resulted from expansion onto new lands; notable exceptions include parts of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, where land scarcity has led to intensified use of existing land. The movement onto new lands, without improvement of management techniques, has caused environmental deterioration. In several countries, there is little additional land to be brought into production -- but there exists potential for agricultural intensification. However, in many areas few incentives exist to intensify. Roads are inadequate, and market distortions are common due to poor policies, including pricing, land rights, and, in some areas, poorly targeted food aid programs. Arable land in Ethiopia exists, but required investments in infrastructure and malaria eradication would be costly. Unexploited water resources exist, but the potential has not been fully explored and can be costly. The current accounting shows that our knowledge of the region's natural resource endowment is less than adequate.
Lack of agricultural intensification and low agricultural productivity mean that many of those in rural areas remain subsistence producers, and, therefore, the large quantity of food at low prices which is essential for economic growth in urban areas is not available. Productivity increases and growth linkages both in rural areas and between urban and rural areas are a prerequisite to increased incomes and sustained access to basic foodstuffs. Other food sources that have been neglected and could provide these linkages include livestock and aquatic resources. Aquaculture could be enhanced, and the rational use of marine resources could be promoted (six of the 10 countries have access to marine resources). Livestock are also extremely important throughout the region, but continued difficulties in policies such as disease control, grazing rights and supply of important inputs inhibit production increases. A component of a successful regional food security strategy needs to focus on regional research and diversification in resource management, and growth linkages throughout these economies.
Economic and agricultural policies that distort prices of agricultural inputs and outputs adversely affect investment in agricultural production, marketing and storage, and incomes earned from these activities. While structural adjustment programs have improved some critical pricing and other administrative control issues, difficult policy problems remain, especially privatization, land tenure, access to critical inputs, and international and domestic trade. Policy reform is a high priority because it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for growth.
Weak market integration due to both poor infrastructure and domestic and international trade restrictions affect the ability of food surplus countries and regions to export to food deficit countries and regions. Public infrastructure, an important condition for both food availability and access, remains limited in all countries. For example, road systems do not reach the majority of the population in Ethiopia and are a woefully inadequate support to an active and extensive agricultural trade in Tanzania. The eight major railroad systems in the region are in various stages of disrepair. Cross-border trade restrictions as well as restrictions on internal movement of foodstuffs has prohibited the private sector from responding to shortages when and where they exist. Some progress has been made in lifting these restrictions, but additional policy analysis and reforms are needed.
Liberalization of marketing systems has encouraged the growth of small trading firms and entrepreneurs in several countries, but viable commercial enterprises throughout the food system (storage, assembly, processing and marketing) are lacking. The lack of development of efficient services is to some extent linked to the inadequacy of roads and the availability and cost of trucking. In many areas private traders are not able to respond to the liberalized markets because of lack of access to working capital. In addition to policy constraints, firms in this area need technology, financing and management support to increase food availability at low cost.
Population growth rates remain high because of poverty and accompanying problems of poor child survival rates. Limited access to or the absence of basic services such as health facilities and education has meant low contraceptive prevalence rates, poor bodily absorption of available food nutrients because of disease and high infant mortality. Illiteracy rates in the region, especially high for women, exceed the average for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and correlate closely with fertility and high infant mortality rates. Another urgent problem that transcends borders is the spread of HIV/AIDS throughout these countries.
These poor levels of health undermine increases in labor productivity and represent a considerable barrier to increases in growth. Improvements in health services and education, especially those targeted to women, will contribute to reducing population growth rates and average family size over time. A healthy and educated population will, in turn, contribute to productivity increases and economic growth.
Insecurity in the Greater Horn region ranges from full-scale warfare to cross-border clashes. In all cases, the militarization of the region during the Cold War era has contributed to the scale of conflict as well as to the tendency to resolve disputes by force. Governance in the Greater Horn region has for decades been characterized by autocratic rule and by extensive centralization required to maintain state power. This has, in turn, resulted in the growing political and economic disenfranchisement of the majority and in the retardation of the growth of democratic institutions in government or civil society. Armed conflict has evolved as the most readily available course of political interaction.
The structures of governance in the region have not only arrested popular participation in political decision-making and spawned armed conflict; they also have directly affected development. Weak, unstable or highly centralized governance structures have proven inadequate to the task of responding to food crises, even in cases where early warning indicators might have allowed for famine mitigation or prevention. The militarization and centralization of governance also has meant that the social sectors, including, for example, education, have received low priority. Illiteracy rates for the region are among the highest in Africa. Total illiteracy is above 50 percent for all countries but two, and in three countries, illiteracy rates for women exceed 85 percent. A healthy, well-trained labor force is a prerequisite for increased economic production; and at the same time, education is both a means and an end to a responsible citizenry.
There are cases for both optimism and pessimism in the potential for resolution of these crises in the region. In some parts of the Greater Horn the tide has turned. The 30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been resolved. Uganda has emerged from a past of terror and armed conflict. However, the Greater Horn region has seen -- in Somalia and Rwanda -- the emergence of "failed states".
Donor involvement in the region has often been duplicative, conflicting or conducted without local participation. No mechanism comparable to the Club du Sahel exists that could improve collaboration among donors, and integrate actions of donors and African organizations. In-country donor coordination is often limited to the exchange of information after implementation. Not only is a regional coordination forum lacking, but no national structure exists for joint problem identification and joint resolution with donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Societies of the region lack recognition of the benefits that accrue to nations from regional coordination. National organizations need to move beyond their preoccupation with national-level solutions where efficient and effective regional approaches can be formed.
This analysis is only illustrative, and the focus on growth in food production does not imply that countries in the Greater Horn region should be food self-sufficient. Economic growth options in other areas that would provide capacity for countries to import also need to be analyzed. Annual food production growth rates of 4 percent in the next decade are, however, difficult to conceive, given past performance. Yet, there is cause for optimism as such rates are, in fact, possible, according to recent analyses. Until 1990, the region experienced increases in food production of over 4 percent every third or fourth year. Precipitous declines in Somalia because of conflict have contributed to the negative trends; similarly, productions levels have dropped in Rwanda and Burundi, but both countries experienced consistently positive national food balances until the late 1980s.
There are two important issues that a regional analysis masks. First, even in countries with national surpluses such as Tanzania and Uganda, nutritional indicators reveal considerable food insecurity for a large proportion of the population. Country-level statistics in Table 1 show unacceptably high infant mortality rates in these countries. Issues of access to food and other important basic needs within countries also must be addressed.
Second, dividing the region into a Northern and Southern tier reveals the production diversity of the region, which also indicates that there may be a partial solution to food problems through an expansion of regional food and livestock trade. Whereas countries in the Northern tier (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) tend to have structural food deficits, the Southern tier countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) were as a group experiencing food surpluses until the end of the 1980s (either through domestic production or through the capacity to import). Although without concessional food neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia would make it through a "normal" year without a food crisis (Ethiopia has an annual structural food deficit usually in excess of 1 million metric tons), Sudan experiences considerable surpluses of sorghum every three years. These surpluses are frequently difficult to export. Absent political conflict, this production potential could be increased to three out of every five years. Several Southern tier countries experienced food surpluses until the end of the 1980s. Kenya was a food surplus country until 1988 but may be facing a continuing structural food deficit requiring significant commercial imports. In fact, Kenya is currently importing cereals from Uganda, as well as from outside the region.
Although the pressure on food availability for the region as a whole is growing, the individual country analyses indicate that there is still considerable scope within the region for increases in productivity and that regional trade can be a contributing factor in stimulating this production. In the short term, the Greater Horn region will require considerable assistance to raise consumption levels, but policies that promote sustained growth in agriculture through intensification and which emphasize comparative advantages can contribute to increasing regional and national food security.
The preliminary description of the food security problems and the analysis of the magnitude and root causes of this insecurity suggest the following as a possible framework for addressing this humanitarian crisis. It is a broad framework that starts with food security as the opening wedge to international and regional cooperation to break the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn of Africa region.
