



Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project

APPENDIX B GHA PEACE BUILDING PROJECT CASE STUDY QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS

Appendix from the Report:

**The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives
in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace**
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

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http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf

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GHA Case-Study Questions to Address: A Simplified Outline

Explanation. The whole purpose of the GHA project has been to learn how to do conflict prevention/management and peace building effectively. To help answer that question, MSI has done case studies of several kinds of initiatives often used in the GHA region and elsewhere.

The first thing MSI needed to determine about each of them was whether the initiatives were effective in terms of certain impacts (effects) on conflict and peace, and this in what sense “effective”. How well did it do? Clues to possible impacts to look for were given in the detailed case-study framework that you received before doing the field studies. We also needed to find out why the initiatives had the particular impacts that they did. Where we find positive impacts, we want to be able to say why, and how, that occurred. Where there were no, or harmful, impacts, we also want to know why and how that occurred. In short, the basic question underlying each of the initiative case studies was: *What kinds of impacts did it have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

Bringing out the reasons for the impacts found can guide REDSO’s and others’ future choices about what kinds of initiatives to undertake (or to avoid), and how to do the best ones well. In other words, how to do conflict prevention and peace building most effectively!

Among the general reasons why an initiative was effective or not could be: a) the difficulty or manageability of the conflict the initiative addressed, b) the particular means/methods (the type of initiative) it used to intervene into that conflict, c) the way the initiative was implemented, and d) the contextual conditions that affected the intervention and its implementation. Therefore, what follows in this document are key questions for each case study to ask so as to identify those factors (this is a shortened, slightly revised version of the earlier case-study framework).

You will see this outline organizes the questions under 5 headings, corresponding to the focuses mentioned above. After a brief introductory section on the broad backdrop of the conflict and intervention, those concerns are:

1. The conflict: What was the conflict like?
2. The intervention: By what means/methods did the initiative intervene into the conflict, and how well was it implemented?
3. Impacts: What were its various impacts in terms of conflict prevention/management and peace building?
4. Conditions: What factors in the immediate environment of the initiative also shaped those impacts?
5. Policy implications: What specific factors that led to the impacts should be noted and applied when making future choices among initiatives, as well as in implementing particular ones?

But to reiterate, these 5 sets of questions simply are intended to get at the overall central question of the project: *What kinds of impacts did the initiative have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

Part I. Background: Broader Context Affecting the Conflict

Touch briefly on the most relevant global, regional or national historical, political, institutional economic, and sociological factors in the environment of the conflict and initiative, and how they defined the parameters within which they occurred.

Such factors might be, e.g.: ethnic demographics and ethnic politics in Kenya; the colonial legacy of north-south division in Sudan; the post-independence ethnic asymmetries in Rwanda and Burundi; the post-Cold War disengagement in Somalia and the Guurti system of councils in Somaliland; the Islamic backdrop in Wajir, a country's level of economic development and assets/shortcomings, the size and strategic importance or marginality of the country, etc.

Part II. The Conflict Addressed:¹ What are the Manifestations and Sources of the Conflict?²

A. Overview: scope, evolution and intensity

Provide a 1 or 2 page succinct chronological narrative of the key conflict events and developments that the reader should know unfolded prior and during the time the initiative responded to it, indicating the geographic area and societal scope within which the conflict was waged (the conflict zone or arena) and how the level of violence and other hostility may have fluctuated over the period.³

¹ Because conflict is inherent in society and not necessarily undesirable, "conflict" refers to destructive/violent conflict (actual or potential), not to political conflict that may be constructive.

² Part II maps the contours and aspects of "the problem" (destructive conflict) at which the "solution" (the intervention) was directed. The purpose of the map is not to describe the conflict fully for its own sake, but to provide a "baseline" of its parameters and main sources, against which to make your assessment in Part III about how effective the intervention was and how significant the impacts were in relation to the conflict's overall scope and scale. Thus, one can see which and how many sources of the conflict it addressed and which it ignored.

³ Regarding the level of hostilities, consider which of these typical levels and stages of conflict has it moved through:

- Latent conflict, but ongoing communication and interaction among groups in society with differing interests
- Emergence of tensions and signs of emerging divisions
- Unstable peace: polarization and intensification of tensions, acts of low-level violence
- Crisis: High tensions, confrontation, and escalating violence
- War: all-out organized use of violence/armed force,
- Military stalemate, de-escalating violent conflict or cessation of violence/armed force
- Negotiations of a settlement, accords

B. Actors

Who are the central protagonists and indirect stakeholders involved in the conflict, their respective subgroups, the constituencies on which they draw support, and their relationship to these constituencies. What is the comparative power of these parties socially, politically, and militarily (e.g., symmetric, asymmetric)?

C. Issues in dispute

Are there any substantive policy, political, legal, etc. issues that the core parties see as at stake for them, and thus constitute the ostensible reasons for the conflict? What positions are the parties taking on these issues?

D. Sources of the conflict

Besides the substantive disputes above, which of the following structural, political/institutional and immediate forces (“causes”) have been driving the conflict before and during the intervention? Consider that each of these kinds of factors might originate internally, externally in the region (e.g., from neighboring states), or externally from outside the region (at the global level).⁴

Structural Conditions (underlying, predisposing, latent factors)

1. Socio-economic competition: To what extent is there competition over scarce land, water, shelter, education, jobs or other income or wealth opportunities, and how these resources are apportioned among the conflict constituencies?
2. Inter-communal alienation: To what extent are the main ethnic or other identity groups separated or hostile towards each other in their everyday interactions and outlooks – such as reflected in their rank and files’ social and cultural practices and institutions (mainly non-political factors such as religion, language – see #3 below), economic activities/strata, and group attitudes/perceptions?

Channeling Factors (proximate inter-mediating sources)

3. Identity group political mobilization: To what extent have various identity groups actually formed into exclusive organizations that pursue their interests and grievances collectively through political action, including possibly coercive or violent action (e.g. nationalist ideologies, ethnic-based political parties)? This gets at whether differing societal interests have accumulated distinct funding, skills, leadership, technical means, ideologies, and arms to exert group influence through largely divisive and potentially violent means.

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- Settlement implementation
 - Post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation

⁴ Note that these sources generally parallel the areas or “entry points” described in Part III below where the initiatives may have impacts.

4. Captured or divided governing institutions and processes: To what extent are the social and political institutions, policy and decision making processes, and communication channels of the state (including the military) and wider society, including formal and informal ones -- which ordinarily should embrace different groups in order to transact public business and regulate/resolve societal conflicts and political disputes -- are either restricted to one or more politically mobilized identity groups, are divided up among differing interests, or largely inoperative?
5. Political leaders' interaction: To what extent are powerful public officials, the leaders of major identity communities, and/or professional elites from differing groups ignoring each other and thus not engaged in any political dialogues or negotiations about important policy/political issues, or stalemated in such discussions?

Triggers (immediate, manifest sources)

6. Leaders' mindsets: To what extent are distrustful attitudes, perceptions, fears, etc. held by key individual leaders and their immediate circles about their opponents fueling the conflict?
7. Conflict behavior: What specific violent public acts, speech, gestures, and collective events are perpetuating or escalating the conflict?

Part II: The Intervention (initiative or project studied)

A crucial task now is to identify those features of the intervention's design, formulation and implementation that may have contributed most directly to the positive or negative impacts that are to be identified in Part III below. If the impacts found there are positive, practitioners will want to know from Part II what kind of intervention they might replicate; if the impacts are nil or harmful, what kind of initiatives perhaps to avoid.⁵ In short, Part II helps to indicate the "what" about the intervention, its features and content, which may explain its success or failure in terms of the impacts found in Part III. (However, this Part should be done independently of looking for impacts in Part III.)

A. Basic operating features

- Who initially proposed the initiative?
- Who designed its features and conceived of the organizational structure?
- Who first took action to initiate it?

⁵ These questions also allow comparison to other types of interventions, so that the discovered impacts can be attributed to a certain type of intervention. That way, a body of knowledge can accumulate for practitioners that gives guidance regarding the likely respective impacts when they use different types of interventions.

- What does what: what are the respective roles of local, national and international actors in carrying out the initiative (e.g. funding, policy and administrative decisions, implementation on the ground, political support, etc.)?
- How much is spent on it? What level of donor support is provided, and for what purposes? What is the local contribution?
- What is the level of staffing?
- How many months has it been operating?

B. The initiative as a conflict strategy: what is the essential method of intervention for influencing the conflict? How was it formulated?

The intervention design: Describe briefly the essential logic of intervention into conflict that is embedded in the initiative, explicitly or implicitly. This refers to the causal process or mechanism through which the intervention applies certain means of influence (carrots, sticks, convening/negotiating venues, information/education, etc.) to certain actors or sources in the conflict in order to achieve certain primary and secondary intended objectives (i.e., impacts -- although the actual impacts achieved are to be identified in Part III). Because this intervention design or “theory” may be one reason for its effectiveness or ineffectiveness (if it is effectively implemented – see C below), it is important to provide here a verbal “model” that briefly exposits this causal logic. That logic can be identified by asking the following:

- What are the initiative’s short-term, medium term, and long term objectives? What do they imply as to the chief sources of the conflict or “points of entry,” foci, leverage points, into the conflict situation that represent the primary and secondary targets of the intervention – e.g., socio-economic conditions, actors or groups in society, practices, processes, institutions, behaviors, mental outlooks, or other aspects of conflict? What is the intervention trying to impact among these things, primarily and secondarily, and what notions of effective impacts are used? (See the conflict sources in Part II for some possible targets, although many initiatives will probably target “outputs” less directly related to the conflict itself, at least as primary objectives, rather than such conflict/peace “outcomes”).
- In view of these entry points, what timetable is inherently appropriate as to when such objectives could be realized (assuming favorable implementation and contextual conditions)? (For example, educating elementary school kids in conflict resolution norms is a long term conflict strategy because they have no effective political power and so will have little influence on a current local or national conflict, except on the playground!)

- What are the essential means, levers, or methods of influence (i.e., carrots, sticks, forums, etc.) that are being applied through the initiative to the various entry points above?⁶
- What is the domain or space within which its impacts will be realized or “spread”, in terms of geographic areas, numbers of people, population groups, institutions, etc.?
- What assumptions are entailed in this logic about the conditions in the intervention’s environment that are desirable for it to be implemented and achieve its objectives effectively?
- What normative “messages” or other substantive content is conveyed by the initiative (e.g., reconciliation themes in radio programs, policy rhetoric, etc.)?

Decision making: It is also useful to find out if possible how and why the initiative (and thus consciously or not, the strategy of intervention) was chosen, rather than alternatives. This may bring to light biases or political or organizational constraints that influenced the selection.

- Was this design developed through some quasi-“rational” process of diagnosing the sources of the conflict or other problems, defining certain objectives, and considering a range of options as possible responses? Or what conflict sources/problems were implicitly seen as the occasion for action?
- What was at stake organizationally, or even personally, for those who were instrumental in choosing the intervention?

C. Implementation: How well was the intervention actually carried out?

Whether or not the intervention’s design was or was not appropriate to conflict sources or chosen in some way informed by analysis of the conflict, another reason why the

⁶ A list is given in the “toolbox” in Appendix A of the kinds of methods, tools, or instruments that might be reflected or embodied in the core activity or activities of an initiative. (A given initiative may involve some mix of such instruments and thus incentives, etc..) These instruments tend to use differing kinds of incentives, disincentives or other kinds of influences to exert influence or leverage on sources of the conflict, such as by:

- Providing material support (financial support, in-kind benefits)
 - Unconditionally provided (outright assistance)
 - Conditionally provided
- Fostering forums, venues, processes, channels or other communication opportunities (e.g., through facilitation)
- Supplying education, skills, information, advice, ideas, or analysis (e.g., as in technical assistance)
- Exercising pressure:
 - Moral suasion, condemnation
 - Exposing behavior publicly (e.g., through observers)
 - Imposing restrictions, deprivations (e.g., diplomatic or economic sanctions)
 - Unconditionally (outright)
 - Conditionally

intervention had whatever impacts it did might have to do with how it was actually put into operation:

- Did any training go into the activity and did it inform the implementation?
- Were the authorizing decision making bodies able to reach consensus and take needed actions?
- Was this strategy understood and accepted among the various implementers?
- What problems, constraints, obstacles, difficulties were encountered in implementation? Were they overcome? For example:
 - Were the expected resources provided by funders that were needed to do the intervention?
 - Were they sustained?
 - Was the intervention able to recruit competent staff and leadership?
 - Was the leadership able to take the needed actions to achieve the intervention's objectives?
 - Was there sufficient cooperation between headquarters and field staff or other levels of the implementing organizations?
 - Were there unexpected reactions among the targeted parties or implementers to the intervention that caused a change to the implementation process?
 - Were opportunities for shifting directions and revising approaches taken in response to new developments, so appropriate flexibility was exercised?
- Was the intervention coordinated with other important interventions of local or international actors, so that it did not work at cross-purposes and was complementary or supplementary to these other activities?
- What personal styles of key leaders or other individuals were significant in helping or hurting the implementation?

Part III. Impacts of the Intervention:

How effective was the intervention in achieving conflict prevention, mitigation or resolution? Did it have any unintended side-effects in worsening conflicts or weakening capacities for peace?

The most important focus of the case study for determining an intervention's effectiveness is its results -- as "measured" by explicit conflict and peace impact criteria. The questions below seek to ascertain whether and which among a range of possible conflict prevention/management results/impacts occurred, or did not occur.⁷

⁷ Each set of impacts should be used to identify possible: a) beneficial impacts, intended and unintended; b) harmful impacts (presumably unintended); and c) null effects. Programs that are found "effective" in terms of certain intended objectives are not necessarily effective if they also "do harm" due to significant

What is effectiveness in achieving conflict prevention and peace building? Interventions may be effective in several possible ways, direct and indirect, besides the obvious notion of simply ending violence. In judging effectiveness, it is crucial to use several standards, even though achieving only one or two such impacts are usually insufficient for completely ending or managing a conflict. (Few initiatives will be able alone to control a given conflict, but their respective contributions to peace need to be identified, for they may be the several building blocks for building a sustainable peace.)

The impact criteria below have been drawn mainly from several known sources or causes of violent conflicts (i.e., major underlying and more manifest facets or “fronts” in which conflicts may be generated and manifested), as concluded in the empirical conflict and early warning research literature. To refer back to Part II, these sources of conflict also represent various distinguishable “entry points,” foci, or leverage points, that interventions may address and influence.⁸

We assume here that an intervention can be presumed effective in preventing or managing conflict to the extent that it has had some significant effect on the most important sources of a given conflict. Positive impacts may also be found if an intervention has strengthened a peace process or condition that addresses the sources of a conflict and thus has been associated in other literatures to be associated with prevention or containment of violent conflicts. Thus, the possible impacts of initiatives are organized below under broad categories representing the various possible underlying, intermediate and immediate sources of conflicts. These categories here are roughly the same as were outlined in Part II, except we add a new category dealing with social innovation and social learning.

In sum, the investigator needs to ask about the extent to which the intervention had any impacts such as the following in the areas and communities affected by the conflict.⁹ The questions under each heading provide clues as to what to look for in the data as to those impacts.

Possible Impacts of the Initiative

Possible Impacts on Structural Conditions (underlying, predisposing, latent factors)

A. On socio-economic assets:

negative impacts. Also, impacts include not only those explicitly identified by the initiative’s formulators, but also impacts that may not have been consciously sought, positive as well as negative. So these should also be identified. For each overall set of factors, I list a few questions about positive impacts. For brevity’s sake, I put some corresponding questions about negative impacts in the Appendix.

⁸ This research is inter-disciplinary but has been done mainly by political scientists, sociologists, economists, conflict resolution specialists, and some anthropologists. A bibliography will be given in the integrative study.

⁹ Of course, not all the sections or questions will necessarily apply to every type of intervention or every case of a type. But do consider them.

Has the intervention improved the total volume or distribution of important socio-economic assets, and without provoking either violent backlash from the “haves” or violent revolution from “have-nots”? Does it increase the total amount of community-wide socio-economic resources and thus public welfare (“public goods”) that are available to all or most of the population, such as land, water, shelter, education, jobs or other income opportunities? Does it make an existing gross mal-distribution of these resources more equal among major societal groups (whether they are mobilized or not), but without causing a radical shifting or redistribution of the resources from a privileged powerful group to a less privileged group? These kinds of effects should also be considered with regard to non-essential but valued assets, such as exportable oil, key minerals, or rare stones.

Such impacts are important in several ways: they can displace violent means to pursue one’s livelihood, reduce group competition over valued resources, limit the leverage for manipulation of prejudices by conflict entrepreneurs who may seek to exploit differences among groups, and restrict the means/resources that can be used to pursue the conflict (e.g. money to buy arms).

Desired impacts: Has the intervention:

- Increased the aggregate amount available to the general population of arable land, water, housing, employment, health and sanitation, educational opportunities, and agricultural, commerce or trade opportunities for pursuing a livelihood?
- Increased the general population’s access to income from valuable, exploitable natural resources such as oil, minerals, and scarce gems?
- Increased the educational opportunities and work skills available to large unemployed segments of the population or areas of the community in particular, such as the male population between the ages of 15 and 25, urban unemployed, residents of shantytowns, and former war combatants?
- Reduced the numbers of people living in an area who are competing for the resources?
- Reduced disparities in the distribution of, or access to, these resources and/or services among social groups that are actually or potentially at odds?

*Illustration:*¹⁰

By providing water and sanitation facilities that attracted men and women back to their villages and provide limited employment opportunities, the European Commission Rehabilitation Programmes in Liberia in 1996 created the minimal incentives needed for demobilized soldiers to give up the idea of returning to armed activity (Brusset, 68)

¹⁰ These illustrations of impacts are taken from studies of a different type of initiative (inter-communal local development projects) than we studied in the GHA.

B. Impacts on inter-group relations at the “mass” level:

Has the intervention increased positive perceptions and peaceful interactions and relationships between the rank and file members of the main communities or constituencies in the conflict? When crises or violent incidents arise, they might not escalate into worse conflict, depending on the degree of mutual toleration and peaceful behavior that prevails among the major social, economic, and cultural groups at the “mass” level, even though they may have conflicting interests (“giving the benefit of the doubt”). This in turn is shaped by the extent of pre-existing social integration at the middle- and “grass roots” levels of the society and widely shared mutual attitudes. The extent of integration/segregation is revealed in the extent that the prevailing social and cultural practices and institutions of daily life allow everyday contact and communication.

Desired Impacts: Has the intervention helped build bridges such as:

- Reduced attitudes and perceptions of suspicion, distrust, fear and insecurity that the groups generally hold toward each other, or increased positive attitudes and bolstered a sense of mutual security?
- Increased the amount of social contact, interaction and cooperation and created new relationships among the members of the conflicting groups, such as women or other segments of the population, through involving them in non-political social, cultural or economic activities that serve their groups’ common interests?
- Reduced everyday tensions and irritations between the groups, or daily policies and practices that had alienated them from each another?

Illustrations:

Infrastructure rebuilding programs have increased the movement of goods and people among the Bosnian political entities, and thus helped to economically integrate them and create some inter-dependence.

The World Vision International Area Development Programmes (WVI ADP’s) were found to have the indirect impact of increasing meaningful interaction and interdependence among different groups, and thus were seen to “have the capacity” to increase mutual understanding and trust between their members (O’Reilly, 2).

Possible Impacts on Channeling Factors **(proximate inter-mediating sources)**

C. Impacts on social and political group mobilization:

Has the intervention increased the ability of particular groups to organize themselves in order to pursue their interests in peaceful ways, or discouraged the organization of coercive or violent collective action? General societal structural conditions such as in A and B above will not lead to a conflict unless some collective action is taken about them. Such collective action can take coercive and violent forms

or channel grievances and interests into peaceful forms of protest and social and political action. The ability of the parties to act collectively is determined by their development of specific skills, finances, technical means (including weapons), leadership, and mobilizing ideologies (e.g., ethno-nationalist programs) and their usage of these resources for peaceful purposes.

Thus, the intervention may be effective to the extent that it enables various groups, either within the society or the state, that have competing interests to articulate them, to organize to express their demands, and to pursue political action and strategies, in ways that are peaceful and constructive rather than violent. Such action can rectify social and political power imbalances among conflicting parties, and allow entry of marginalized non-groups into the wider political process and thus thwart desperate extremism.

Desired Impacts: Has the intervention:

- Helped to articulate or reinforce beliefs that the contending parties are part of a larger, more embracing community that have common bonds and interests (e.g., citizens of a single nation)?
- Helped to dilute beliefs or ideologies that view certain groups as distinct “ascriptive” identity groups that are based on inherent, deeply-rooted characteristics which are unalterably opposed to those of other groups, such as ethnicity, religion, class, language, region, historical experience or future destiny (e.g., as superiors or perennially oppressed)?
- Encouraged expression of interests through new channels or normal accepted methods such as petitions, elections, peaceful demonstrations, interest associations, political parties, peaceful tribal or cultural movements, or legitimate political party or other opposition movements?
- Weakened, out-maneuvered, or pre-empted alternative efforts to pursue conflict through violence, such as by inspiring the members of conflicting groups with the idea that specific peaceful solutions are possible, and that disagreements can be expressed in non-violent, manageable ways?
- Fostered the formation of “cross-cutting” identity groups, i.e. that link members from across the main lines of political cleavage (so-called “civil society”), and who thus can counter-balance the partisan pressures coming from the contending parties in a conflict by advancing alternative views, thus reducing the influence on members of the conflicting groups to join one side or another?
- Increased the supply of money, personnel, skills, knowledge, technology, or other resources going to organized bipartisan groups who support conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation processes or other peaceful efforts (e.g., “peace constituencies”), so these organizations become more effective advocates or implementers of these goals?

- Strengthened key leaders who voice toleration and neutrality?
- Disseminated objective, non-partisan information or implicit messages that evoke mutually positive perceptions and reduce inter-group anxieties?
- Moved specific issues onto the policy agendas of appropriate public bodies and authorities so that the issues are taken up for consideration in a legitimate accepted and peaceful way?
- Stimulate the activation of ethnic kindred or other groups in other regions (outside the immediate arena) of the conflict to come to the aid of one or other party to the conflict so as to render additional peaceful influences on the process?

Illustrations:

Interethnic Bosnian business associations often are voices for moderation, such as seen in the IABBH's lobbying for policies favorable for business (USAID, 17f)

WVI ADP's created coalitions and forums that operated above the level of the village or parish, through which common concerns such as natural resource management issues could be discussed and common positions advocated. (O'Reilly, 4)

D. Impacts on political elite negotiations

Has the intervention advanced the resolution of specific substantive issues in dispute among the leaders engaged in a bargaining process dealing with the conflict? The intervention may be effective in improving relations among the official leaders and middle-level elites (e.g., religious leaders) of different groups who are participating in high or middle-level negotiations processes that are going on (e.g., official “track-one,” or non-official “track-two”, or “track- two and a half”) and in assisting them to achieve agreement on particular policy or conflict issues, grievances, and problems.

Has the intervention:

- Identified and encouraged the opening of communication channels among opposed top-level political officials or middle level elites, or keep such channels from breaking down, such as by engaging them in new contacts or dialogue and encouraging conciliatory gestures?
- Increased attitudes of trust that the leaders hold toward one another?
- Introduced specific new substantive ideas and options into the dialogue processes that are seriously considered or adopted as solutions of outstanding disputes?
- Affect top-level leadership active in the conflict, such as in any “track-one” negotiations? Were any “track-two” activities well received by track-one actors and did they influence them? How were these linkages made?

- Facilitated efforts to reach actual agreements on specific disputes and public policy issues, such as new constitutions, peace agreements, etc.?
- Elicit signs of actual cooperation across the conflict lines on specific common problems among the leaders of the contending groups?
- Establish new agreements or peaceful relations among minor, less salient actors, which nevertheless reduce the scope of the larger problem of conflict?
- Brought about more unity within the ranks of the opposed sides so they constitute a more reliable bargaining partner, and individual leaders are less subject to leadership struggles and "ethnic outbidding"?

E. Impacts on integrative governing institutions and processes:

Has the intervention created or strengthened the accepted formal political processes and governing institutions of the state so the conflicting parties and issues are incorporated into ongoing peaceful decision making and conflict resolution procedures that follow agreed-on rules and procedures? Social and political institutions, policy decision making processes, judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms, public policies, laws, and public communication channels that operate within the state and society, both formal or informal, are significant determinants of conflict or its effective management. These factors can regulate conflict in several ways: they can give voice to or block the expression of different groups in a society, can engage or exclude the respective leaders of differing groups, thus suppressing legitimate conflict (and thus possibly perpetuate it). They can aggregate and force compromises among competing demands and thus reconcile differences, including by "hiving off" or "fractionating" (sidelining) certain issues and activities to remove them from divisive and partisan pressures (e.g. through autonomous bodies, decentralization, checks and balances, etc.), and thus relieve pressure on central political institutions by reducing the scope of conflict. Or they can keep interests segregated and balanced but not engaged or un-reconciled. They can (as in the police, military and law enforcement institutions) protect citizens against coercive, criminal and conflict behavior by each other, by the state that lie outside the bounds of accepted rules, or by non-state actors. Or they can use the usual monopoly of the means of coercion by the state to advance some interests against others by carrying out violence or accentuating it.

Did the intervention:

- Create new ongoing forums, mechanisms, institutions, or significantly strengthen existing ones, that can be or are being used to handle disputes?
- Open up political processes and institutions to the participation of larger numbers of people and their leaders, who thus can be engaged in a managed process for resolving the conflicts and are less mobilizable by political entrepreneurs behind violent ways to resolve the issues?

- Expand, establish or maintain political forums or other formal opportunities (“political space”) for neutral, unrestrained discussion of contentious issues by shielding them from divisive pressures of partisan conflict, thus providing venues and mechanisms through which outstanding disputes and issues can be addressed by the protagonists?
- Strengthen the potential political power and influence of marginalized groups by increasing their representation in executive, legislative, or civil service, or military positions, or by changing policies that will enhance their power, or strengthen the ability of state institutions to hear underrepresented interests and accommodate them in policies?
- Increase access to basic government-provided services by aggrieved groups and discourage policies and social practices that favor some groups and discriminate against other such groups economically, socially or culturally?
- Build autonomous spheres of social power that cross-cut identity groups and are active outside the official organizations of both government and opposition political parties and organizations, and thus which can take on some of the social responsibilities shouldered by the state and provide alternative channels for broad public debate (“civil society”)?
- Create new or strengthen existing official procedures or mechanisms through which specific issues are adjudicated and justice enforced according to agreed-on rules, or help to make certain formal established decision processes to be perceived as more legitimate as a medium of interaction?
- Strengthen the ability of the state to perform basic public functions and provide public services thus removing possible causes of conflicts, including enabling security forces to play responsible accountable roles in protecting the public?

Illustrations:

The EC Rehabilitation Programmes in Liberia were found to have significant and relevant impacts at critical moments of post-conflict transition. By ensuring water supplies right after a rebel military offensive had failed, for example, the EC sent the signal that it was ready to contribute to improving the political situation. Along with the support of other actors such as ECOMOG, this was observed to have significantly improved the climate of confidence at the state and societal levels (Brusset, 67).

An overall impact of EC rehabilitation projects in several African post-conflict countries was to help local communities to organize themselves better and establish minimum structures that enabled them to cope with immediate crises, that might otherwise increase tensions and provoke violence. In Angola, for example, such projects were observed to create a climate of optimism and initiative for local actors that encouraged them to seek solutions for their problems (Pisa-Lopez, 63-64).

Possible Impacts on Triggers **(immediate, manifest sources)**

F. Impacts on mass or elite conflict behavior:

Has the intervention deterred or contained provocative rhetoric or divisive speech and acts of violence or coercion or other overtly hostile behavior of the parties, or encouraged accommodating and conciliatory statements and actions?

Politically significant deliberately hostile public acts, policy decisions, speech, gestures, or use of deadly force, whether by state or non-state leaders or civilian rank and file, directly escalate or de-escalate the level of hostilities or peace, the sense of physical security, and thus the degree of a society's cooperation or polarization. Whether key elite leaders of the contending communities seek to cooperate across conflict lines, or instead manipulate their respective followers to take hostile action, is especially important.

Did the intervention:

- Soften the stridency and tone and increase the moderation of public rhetoric, or helped establish certain implicit norms, moral messages, or an operative code of peaceful behavior that become accepted?
- Reduce divisive and alienating public interpretations of past conflicts and the current conflict situation?
- Improve the amount and informed quality of public discourse and debate?
- Helped the making of positive, conciliatory “tit-for tat” reciprocal gestures that can begin to engender trust?
- Deter the outbreak of apparently imminent acts of violence or keep initial outbreaks of violence from escalating?
- Reduce instances of lawbreaking and arbitrary acts from any side or contain low-level violence by seizing opportunities to stop the agents of violence or potential violence?
- Restrict the human and material means for violence (e.g., embargo small arms)?
- Protect vulnerable groups from likely attacks of violence, thus limiting its scope?
- Did local initiatives have any positive or negative effect on larger conflicts of which it may have been a part?

G. Impacts on organizational and social innovation and learning

Did the initiative help to capacitate its implementers or other specific actors through gaining better ideas, information, skills, contacts, networks, and other support, so that the impact of an intervention might be amplified or multiplied?

- Increase the ability of (“empower”) the implementers to tackle tasks that, were they continued, could eventually make more progress, or if enlarged, improve the larger society?
- Did the intervention establish an innovative and fruitful method for handling social and political tensions and addressing conflict and building peace that became accepted and respected as a serious, credible, and trusted initiative? For example, did it attract more people to participate in the intervention’s own activities?
- Produce models that demonstrate new constructive behavior and approaches and symbolize new values?
- Did it convey to large numbers of people positive ethical messages?
- Stimulate, “breed,” spawn, or spread the intervention technique within the same or other organizations to other sites of this conflict or to other conflicts?
- Reinforce or complement the conflict resolution initiatives of other domestic or third party actors?
- Help create coalitions, networks or other wider linkages to parties or other actors at local, national or international levels, other than that in which the conflict was being waged and the initiative was implemented?
- Create supportive linkages with other local or national, or international activities that pursue similar purposes in the area of the conflict and thus leverage additional resources for these efforts?

H. Summary of Impacts

Provide a brief summary of the main ways the intervention affected the conflict and where it appears to have had little impact. Indicate any harmful impacts.

Part V. Favorable/unfavorable conditions in the immediate context

Extremely important for drawing out policy implications are the contextual and situational factors in the local, national, regional, or global environment and circumstances that surrounded the initiative – but that are not impacts from the initiative. Because this immediate setting may also explain in part the impacts found, identifying its relevant features helps to specify the situations in which this initiative’s impacts may be feasible and achievable, or where it might run into serious constraints. This informs the policymaker about what kinds of situations to look for where future replications of the initiative are more likely to produce effective results, and which conditions are not conducive.

For example, as noted below, other peace building initiatives or programs may have been operating in the same area and had beneficial impacts. Also, cultural or other restraints/inhibitors of violence and capacities for peaceful management may be “built

into” the society (e.g., a strong state-wide sense of common nationhood) that supported or reinforced the initiative. Other possible “braking” factors on conflict, or supportive factors for peace, are suggested below, derived from research that has identified ingredients involved in effective conflict prevention and management.

Describe whether the following kinds of conditions and circumstances were found to be associated with the above implementation and impacts:

Conditions arising from the conflict itself

- At what point in the conflict life cycle was the intervention introduced, i.e., the level or stage of conflict hostilities such as potential violence, mid-violence, post-violence (see footnote #3, Part II)?
- To what extent were the leaders or armed forces of the conflicting parties consciously or unconsciously looking for a way out, having become exhausted with their struggle (i.e., was it “ripe” for resolution due to its reaching a “mutually hurting stalemate”)?
- Were peace proposals or legal frameworks already in effect that also helped to resolve the issues?
- Did larger conflicts going on in the environment of the conflict addressed affect the intervention’s ability to achieve its impacts?

Conditions in the immediate institutional, political and socio-economic environment affecting the impacts and implementation of the intervention (but not part of it)

- What underlying economic interests do identity groups share in common?
- Are there active commercial relationships that bind ethnic communities?
- Do already existing and locally originated (“endogenous”) political and institutional channels, procedures and peace capacities already operate between the parties? Are certain moral or cultural norms and institutions shared in common?
- What popular moods and public climate were associated with the impacts or implementation (e.g., a mood of war weariness, indifference or apathy, etc.)?
- To what extent did the leaders on the conflicting sides actively support the intervention, or tolerate it, rather than oppose or resist it?
- Do political parties or social movements embrace members of potentially conflicting communities?
- Was the activity interrupted by powerful political events, or other uncontrolled factors besides the violent conflict itself?
- Were there any infrequent, unusual public or uncontrollable natural events that affected the results?

- The extent of coordination among donors or other third parties?
- Certain effective leaders affecting the situation (other than among the implementers)?

Conditions involving other initiatives (but not in the control of the implementers of the one studied)

- What other important interventions addressing this same conflict may have had significant positive impacts?
- What other interventions or actions by other local or international third parties (e.g. diplomacy, aid, military agreements, trade, arms supplies, etc.) may be promoting peace and thus contributing to achieving the identified impacts?

Part VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications

A. Summary of Findings

Each case study that applies the outline of questions above to an initiative should present here its overall conclusions on the central question stated at the outset: *What kinds of impacts did the initiative have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

In particular, we want to inform REDSO and other readers:

- In what respects was it effective and in what respects not?
- Why? Why was the initiative effective in those respects, and why was it not in the others? For example:
 - How did the features of the conflict affect the results?
 - How did the features of the type of conflict intervention produce those results?
 - What was important for the outcome in the way it was implemented? What aspects of its context were crucial to its effectiveness?
 - In view of the above, what “do’s and “don’t’s” should be kept in mind when considering using this kind of initiative in other settings?

B. Wider Recommendation and Observations

The author is also encouraged to draw out other policy relevant conclusions and recommendations that have been observed and may be useful.

- What opportunities exist within this conflict zone for further beneficial impacts using this initiative, by the same or other actors? Specifically how and where should resources be invested? How can positive impacts be supported and negative impacts avoided?
- What opportunities exist within this conflict zone for applying other kinds of initiatives, by the same or other actors?

- What other promising potential partners, particularly African, exist in the conflict area, and how could linkages with these partners be set up?
- How can the linkages of the initiative to track-one or other wider diplomatic, development, political, regional and other processes be increased/improved?
- What other further steps might be taken by USAID to improve conflict prevention and management in the GHA region?
- What other insights and observations would be helpful to offer the supporters of this study or others engaged in peace building?

Suggestive Questions about Possible Undesired Impacts

On socio-economic assets:

- Decreased the aggregate amount broadly available to the general population of basic material resources on which groups are vitally dependent, such as arable land, water, housing, employment, health and sanitation, educational opportunities, and agricultural, commerce or trade opportunities for pursuing a livelihood?
- Restricted the general population's access to the income opportunities afforded by the existence of valuable, exploitable natural resources such as oil, minerals, and scarce gems?
- Blocked or reduced the income opportunities available in particular to large unemployed segments of the population or areas in the community, such as the male population between the ages of 15 and 25, landless peasants, urban unemployed, residents of shantytowns, former war combatants, or failed to make good on benefits that were promised to such groups?
- Increased the numbers of people competing for the existing resources in an area, thus increasing the potential for competition over them (e.g., such as by irrigation projects easing up land use and thus attracting more settlers into an area who compete for the land)?
- Created or widened the disparities in the distribution of or access to such resources among different social groups' that are actually or potentially at odds?
- Caused, or threatened to cause, such a rapid redistribution of resources from "haves" to "have-nots" that the insecurity of the former is increased, thus inviting violent backlash, or the "have-nots" are enticed to use violence to obtain even greater redistribution?

Impacts on inter-group relations:

- Increased attitudes and perceptions of suspicion, distrust, fear and insecurity that the groups hold toward each other, increased positive attitudes or bolstered a sense of mutual security?

- Increased stereotyping and increased favorable images of the conflicting groups appearing in the public media or in statements of leaders
- Reduced the amount of contact, interaction and cooperation among the members of the conflicting groups, such as women or other segments of the population, through involving them in non-political social, cultural or economic activities that serve their groups' common interests?
- Increased everyday tensions and irritations between the groups, or daily policies and practices that had alienated them from each another?

Impacts on social and political mobilization:

- Helped to stimulate or reinforce beliefs that the conflicting parties are members of distinct, unchanging "identity groups" that have inherent characteristics based on ethnicity, religion, class, language, region, historical experience, or other deeply rooted factors; that share a distinct group status and historical destiny (as superior or underling) fostered by a group ideology; and that share their interests that are ineluctably opposed the interests of other groups?
- Fostered the formation or activation of groups inclined to violence by increasing or allowed the supply of money, personnel, knowledge, arms, technology, leadership, or other resources going into particular violent groups or violent actions by the state?
- Weakened the voices of tolerance and neutrality and increased the pressure for the members of the conflicting groups to join one partisan side or another?
- Disseminated partisan information or implicit messages that evoke mutually hostile perceptions such as "enemy images," increase the tendency to treat groups as scapegoats, and increase anxieties?
- Institute radical, rapid changes that provoke armed backlash and political entrenchment by threatened groups or elements in a regime?
- Raised expectations that beneficial results were to follow but failed to follow through, thereby increasing cynicism and distrust of any peaceful approaches?
- Elicited the raising of new grievances and divisive issues that increase the unmanageability of the conflict?

Impacts on public institutions and processes:

- Reinforce policies and social practices that favor some groups and discriminate against other such groups, and thus increase the motivation of politically entrepreneurial leaders to emerge and define the contours of new political divisions?
- Reduce the potential political power and influence of particular groups by reducing their representation in executive, legislative, or civil service, or military positions, or by changing policies that enhance their power?

Impacts on political negotiations.

- Become discredited as an ineffective, intrusive and unreliable initiative that merely increases frustration?
- Discourage the opening of communication channels among opposed top-level political officials or middle level elites, or keep such channels from breaking down, such as by engaging them in new contacts or dialogue and encouraging conciliatory gestures?
- Increased attitudes of distrust that the leaders held toward one another?
- Introduced few substantive ideas and options into the dialogue processes that are seriously considered or adopted as solutions of outstanding disputes?
- Led to further antagonism across the conflict lines on specific common problems among the leaders of the contending groups, so as to create a new set of interests that compete with partisan aims?
- Inhibited or delayed efforts to reach actual agreements on specific disputes and public policy issues, such as new constitutions, peace agreements, etc.?

Impacts on violent behavior:

- Stimulate the collective expression of interests and grievances in extra-legal violent ways, overt or covert (e.g., assassinations, bombings, raids)?
- Increase the state's use of force in ways that lie outside the bounds of legitimate coercion?
- Contribute to the escalation of violence?
- Exonerate instances of lawbreaking and arbitrary acts by foregoing opportunities to stop or punish agents of violence or potential violence, thereby encouraging them?
- Were these actions timely in relation to the stages and course of the conflict, and opportunities that existed to possibly make a difference?

Impacts on organizational and societal learning, innovation, and social capital

- Did the initiative create more rivalry and competition among implementers of various initiatives?

A “Toolbox” of Conflict Prevention and Resolution Instruments

Official and Non-official Diplomacy

- mediation
- negotiations
- good offices, consultations
- conciliation
- use of UN Charter Article 99
- “track two” dialogue facilitation
- diplomatic inducements and sanctions
- economic sanctions
- fact-finding missions,
- special inquiries, commissions of inquiry
- “friends groups”
- contact groups

Democratization and Effective Governance

- electoral assistance
- election monitoring
- political party development
- civil society capacity building
- executive and civil service assistance
- legislature assistance
- constitutional and legislation assistance
- judicial and legal assistance and reform
- local government assistance and reform
- decentralization
- autonomy
- federalism

Humanitarian Assistance

- food, medicine and other relief in conflict areas
- conditional relief aid
- refugee and IDP assistance
- refugee education programs
- reintegration programs
- rehabilitation and reconstruction projects
- promulgation of humanitarian law

Development

- food security programs
- targeted anti-poverty programs
- small enterprise, job creation and micro-credit projects
- inter-group development projects
- inter-group women’s cooperation
- natural resource (e.g., water, land) management projects
- structural adjustment programs
- conditional aid
- land reform

peace media (radio, TV)
indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms
peace commissions

Security and Human Rights

preventive deployment, protective forces
post-conflict peacekeepers
international police
military reform
civilian police
police reform
human rights monitors
civilian volunteer “witnesses”
human rights assistance
confidence and security building measures
arms control
demobilization
mine clearance

Justice and Reconciliation

arbitration
adjudication
wars crime tribunals
truth and reconciliation commissions