



Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project

The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace:

A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Synthesis Report on Key Findings and
Lessons for Improving Practice

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The full report can be found at: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report synthesizes the findings and results of a project that examined the impacts of three generic approaches that are being taken by NGOs in the Greater Horn of Africa region toward conflict prevention, management and peace building. The project sought to find out what has been effective, and then draw lessons about why, so that effective practices might be identified for possible application in other situations.

A. Rationale and Content of the Study

A.1. Regional and Policy Context

The countries of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region have experienced an unusual number of intra-state or interstate conflicts¹ in recent decades. Each of these conflicts has taken a huge toll in terms of human lives lost, the suffering of refugees and internally displaced people, and the destruction of the social fabric, physical infrastructure, and natural resources. Especially as the end of the Cold War removed any strategic value that some of these conflicts may have held, the seemingly endemic nature of violent conflict in the region has led USAID and many other international development agencies to take a different approach to addressing conflict in the region. They have concluded that, unless the problem of conflict is addressed more deliberately and adequately, other than through providing humanitarian relief, these countries will not be able to develop economically or achieve full democracy, and the donors' development efforts will be continually subject to degradation or destruction. USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative illustrates this new impetus by encouraging the development of early warning systems; outlining conceptual, analytical and policy tools for responding to conflict situations; and authorizing activities aimed at regulating violent conflicts in the region.

Consequently, since the mid-1990's, relief organizations and other NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors, international financial institutions, and governments in the region have devoted increasing energy and resources to understanding the kinds of conflict affecting the region. They have launched a number of projects specifically aimed at resolving existing conflicts as well as preventing them from arising in the first place. Both on the local and national level, they are carrying out activities that seek to contain violence and encourage peace in active war zones, to rebuild societies recently ravaged by wars, and to respond to the early signs of conflict to keep them from breaking out. Interest is also being shown in how existing development programs may sometimes actually be contributing to conflict and how they can be more explicitly enlisted to manage and prevent it.

¹ The program terminology used by REDSO/ESA is conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR). For analytical purposes and to avoid confusion, this report will refer to the more conventionally used terms of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building.

Depending on sponsors' interests and capacities, recent conflict initiatives have used a considerable variety of approaches to try to influence conflict and build capacities for peace. These include conflict resolution training, local reconciliation projects, projects centered on women as peacemakers, natural resource management, and many others. With these countries, there have been created a number of new indigenous NGOs that receive assistance to implement conflict resolution and peace building programs. As a large number of projects have been implemented, a literature has mushroomed in the field of international conflict resolution and peace building. In numerous conferences, seminars and workshops the various approaches have been touted and discussed as possible ways to achieve some progress in reversing the trend toward conflict in the Greater Horn region.

Despite this new flurry of activity, conflict remains a serious problem in the region. Several longstanding destructive conflicts, such as those in southern Sudan and Burundi, have waged on and on; new conflicts have erupted, such as the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and other potential conflicts threaten to erupt, such as in Kenya and possibly Tanzania. Understandably, the increased international involvement in addressing conflicts juxtaposed with the tendency of conflicts to appear unaffected by these efforts has increasingly raised an important question: What kinds of approaches are actually effective in conflict prevention, conflict management or peace building?

Where significant results have occurred, sponsors have been eager to learn how they might be expanded or applied in other places. Other than statements of intention or anecdotal evidence of effects here and there, however, there has been little knowledge about the actual effects of these initiatives on the forces driving conflicts or on societies' ability to resist conflict. Data specifically on this question generally have not been systematically collected.

A.2. Aims of the Study

In this context, the Regional Economic Development Services Organization of Eastern and Southern Africa in USAID (REDSO/ESA) commissioned a study—the Peace Building Project for the Greater Horn of Africa—to examine the impacts of several types of existing activities in conflict prevention, management and peace building in the GHA region. Its purpose was also to draw lessons about what has been effective and why, so that the most beneficial practices might be identified for possible application in other situations. Based on settings that were found to be most conducive to such results, the study was to identify areas where promising opportunities and useful entry points might exist for introducing new initiatives. Finally, the findings were to be disseminated to USAID's NGO partners and other actors who can make the best use of them.

In particular, the study was to focus on four “priority areas” or “focal points” where specific kinds of activities, or initiatives, have been supported by USAID and other agencies. The four areas are as follows:

- ❑ Local Peace Processes that make use of traditional methods and institutions of dispute resolution,
- ❑ “Middle Level” Dialogues focused on national conflicts and contentious political and policy issues,

- Peace Radio, and
- Use of the Internet as a peace building tool.²

These different generic approaches to conflict were deemed to be of special interest in part because it was hypothesized that they had certain characteristics that might enable them to achieve especially good results. These characteristics included their being able to engender trust by being led by respected religious leaders, their drawing on the legitimacy of traditional elders, and their involvement of women, whose interests often cut across conflict lines. REDSO/ESA was also interested in analyzing the participation in peace processes from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) in working with existing and new institutions (such as Peace Radio) for new purposes. These cross-cutting factors appear throughout the general lessons learned and in the citations of effective practices found in the full synthesis report.

REDSO/ESA contracted Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) to establish the Peace Building Project for the Greater Horn of Africa and to formulate and apply a methodology for conducting the appropriate evaluations and analyzing the collected data.

A.3. Approach of the Study

This report presents the most important findings and policy implications that emerged from the project. In order to address REDSO's concerns, the project had to undertake four principal tasks and resolve certain corresponding methodological issues. These tasks and issues were as follows:

- Identify suitable concrete examples of initiatives in the priority areas of interest that could actually be studied. What are suitable and viable illustrations of the generic approaches about which useful data can be collected?
- Define criteria by which to judge the effectiveness of initiatives, specifically in terms of their achievement of conflict prevention, management and peace building objectives. What do we mean by "effectiveness" when it comes to preventing or managing conflicts and building peace?³
- Organize and carry out a process for collecting the appropriate data. How do we gather reliable information and data?
- Analyze the data in order to present findings and derive policy implications. How do we identify useful lessons to improve the initiatives and guide their application in new situations?

² This topic was subsequently defined as a survey of existing uses, not an evaluation of the technology on conflict.

³ The program terminology used by REDSO/ESA is conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR). For analytical purposes and to avoid confusion, this report will refer to the more conventionally used terms of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building.

The ways in which MSI handled these tasks are described briefly below:

Case studies: The MSI team identified examples of initiatives that both reflected the features of the types of approaches that were of interest and had operated in the GHA region long enough to have produced some results (at least one year). These selections were also widely presumed to be doing a good job in addressing conflicts. The cases that were selected for study and whose results are presented in this report are as follows:⁴

Local Peace Processes Drawing on Traditional Methods of Dispute Resolution:

- ❑ Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Northern Kenya,
- ❑ Inter-tribal Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), and
- ❑ The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda.

"Middle Level" Non-Official National Policy/Political Dialogues:

- ❑ Faith-based Facilitation of the Constitutional Review, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK),
- ❑ The Apostles for Peace (CAP) Project in Political Dialogue, Burundi, International Alert, and
- ❑ The War Torn Societies Project, Somaliland

Peace Radio:

- ❑ Studio Ijambo, Burundi, Search for Common Ground, and
- ❑ HornAfrik, Somalia

Criteria for Defining Effectiveness: To find out what was effective, the project first had to define the impacts that given initiatives would be observed to have if they were judged to be contributing significantly to reducing conflict or supporting peace building. Unlike existing program evaluations in the development field, this project specifically examined impacts of initiatives on *conflict and its peaceful management*. Conflict is a societal process that *can* be constructive if managed in non-violent ways, but that too often in this region has been violent and destructive, if not devastating. This required looking at an initiative's performance through a relatively novel lens of conflict and peace impact criteria.

⁴ For details on the selection criteria and projects, see Appendix A.

The indicators of impact used in the project were derived from the various causes of violent conflicts and the societal or institutional capacities that help manage conflicts without violence. That is, an initiative may be deemed effective to the extent that one can demonstrate that it has had some significant influence on the *sources* of a conflict—i.e., the main dimensions or forces that dispose societies and communities toward it and that provoke or perpetuate violent conflicts—or has strengthened a process or condition that has been shown to *prevent or contain* such conflicts.⁵

Initiatives may be effective in achieving conflict prevention and peace building in many possible ways besides ending violence. If ending violence was the only criteria by which one were to judge effectiveness in conflict reduction, few if any of the existing efforts that address conflict would be deemed successful—i.e., most would be failures. In this light, the questions “What is effective?” or “What works?” are simplistic, for they imply that a project is to be judged on a single criterion and the only task is to ascertain whether that criterion was met or not. Because conflicts are multi-causal and multi-dimensional and are played out on more than one plane, however, effectiveness in addressing conflict can be realized in more than one way. An initiative might be influencing several aspects of the conflict besides its level of violence. Hence, a given initiative is not likely to be found to be simply successful or unsuccessful. The more appropriate way to put the effectiveness question is as follows: “What are the apparent strengths and limits, and harmful effects, of a given initiative (and under which conditions do they typically occur)?”

As seen below, the possible impacts of initiatives are organized under broad categories which represent the various major possible sources of conflicts (or brakes on them), i.e., the several major underlying or obvious facets, or fronts, in which conflicts may be carried on and are manifested. These represent alternative foci or leverage points that initiatives may address and, therefore, upon which they may have some impact.⁶

A.4. Impact Criteria for Determining Effectiveness in Conflict Prevention, Management and Peace Building (based on factors that drive violent conflicts or preserve peace)

The project case-study investigators were asked to obtain evidence to answer this basic question: To what extent and how is an initiative affecting these conflict risk factors or peace capacities?

⁵ The impacts that were researched included not only those explicitly identified by the intervention’s objectives, but also unanticipated positive impacts, as well as unintended negative impacts. Programs found “effective” in terms of certain intended objectives would not in fact be effective if they also “did harm” because of other, non-negligible adverse consequences.

⁶ The significance of these criteria for conflict and peace is discussed further in Appendix B, which provides greater detail and some indicators of the impacts observed. Not all the questions applied to every type of intervention or every case of a type.

Structural Conditions (Predisposing Factors)

- ❑ **General economic assets:** Is the initiative improving the quantity and distribution of economic assets, such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets?
 - **Inter-communal relations:** Is it fostering more positive perceptions/attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to a conflict? Between large numbers of people from the differing identity groups (tribes, clans, ethnic groups) who constitute the mobilized constituencies in the conflicts of these countries?

Channels (Intermediary political processes and institutions)

- ❑ **Social and political mobilization:** Is the initiative increasing the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully?
- ❑ **Social innovation and organizational learning:** Did it introduce promising new methods for peace building and spread these techniques elsewhere?
- ❑ **Public formal governing institutions and processes (the state):** Is the initiative creating or strengthening political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution?
- ❑ **Top-level official political negotiations:** Is the initiative advancing the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among the leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process?

Triggers and Inhibitors (immediate actions and events)

- ❑ **Violent and other hostile behavior:** Is the initiative encouraging conciliatory statements or policy actions and deterring or reducing provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence?

Data Collection and Field Research

MSI's investigators each went to the field to examine one or two case studies of one of the three types of initiatives (i.e., local peace processes, middle-level dialogues, and peace radio). Over periods of between one and two weeks, they sought answers to a set of questions about the initiatives' possible impacts and the factors that might be contributing to whatever impacts were identified (See Appendix B). Depending on feasibility and appropriateness, data were collected through reviewing written materials, interviewing knowledgeable informants, convening a focus group, distributing a questionnaire, and/or doing direct observation.

Analysis

The study was to learn not simply whether the initiatives have been effective or not, and in what respects, but also why they were or were not effective. This required looking for various factors associated with an initiative's evident results, and thus might be the most important determinants of the impacts that were found. These associated elements could then be translated into practical lessons or guidelines for applying the initiative.

Actually, the project was asked to determine three kinds of effective practices or lessons:

- How can a particular case of a generic type of initiative be improved? This concerns effective practices within the process of implementing a specific initiative.
- How can the initiative be improved as a generic mode of addressing conflicts? This concerns effective practices within the process of implementing a given type of initiative.
- Which of the three generic types of initiatives works best? This concerns effective practices when choosing among several types of initiatives.

The second source of information for our effective practices and lessons learned is a USAID-sponsored workshop on the Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa in January 2001. In this workshop, representatives from NGOs throughout the region reacted to presentations of some of the case studies mentioned above, reported on additional initiatives, and offered advice for those who might try a new initiative in the future.

Results of the Analysis

The lessons the investigators derived about effective practices *within specific initiatives* are provided in the separate case studies attached to this report (See Appendix C).

Part I of this report provides a brief summary of the seven case studies conducted.

Part II of this report presents the evidence about the impacts of each of the *three generic types of initiatives* of interest, as found in the data collected about specific cases of each initiative. It also identifies the factors that make for the effectiveness of each type.

Part III compares the effectiveness of the three types with each other, and considers whether the same factors should be kept in mind when applying them or when different guidelines are necessary.

Part IV presents overall observations and policy recommendations regarding issues that may affect all the initiatives.

We present summaries of the findings from each chapter (Parts II-IV) in the remainder of this Executive Summary in the sections that follow.

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace

The following lessons and practices are derived from all of the case studies undertaken as a whole, and represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner.

- ❑ In many, if not most cases, the nature and location of the conflict predetermines whether the conflict prevention practice initiated will be useful. Knowing at what level the change needs to occur for conflict to be prevented is key. Trying lots of interesting things so that it looks like something is going on to prevent conflict may raise expectations, waste resources and most of all, distract energy from initiatives that might work better.
- ❑ Local peace initiatives using local authorities and traditional leaders will work best when the nature of the problem is locally caused. Lack of incentives for parties to talk to each other is difficult to overcome. Traditional processes for managing local conflicts may exclude some stakeholders to dominate (e.g., elders). Adapting traditional conflict management mechanisms so that they enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions in new ways can lead to achieving more durable conflict management outcomes.
- ❑ Religious leaders and religious organizations offer a number of assets for conflict prevention and peace building. In some circumstances, religious organizations can be perceived as neutral bodies, drawing on moral and religious power to facilitate intervention activities or discussions down to the level of communities and parishes when other options are not apparent. They can combine forces across faiths to initiate effective multi-faith efforts such as mediation forums, engage with government leadership in high-level dialogues and mobilize local peace efforts through community-based civic education. Neutrality can be difficult to maintain, however; once religious organizations engage in a peace building dialogue, for example, their role may shift from facilitation to advocating a position.
- ❑ Local peace initiatives exist in a “no man’s land” between governments and people. Local expectations are higher sometimes than a leader’s authority to deliver. These initiatives can open channels but they may not be sufficient to deliver peace. If local peacemakers become too popular, they can be perceived as a threat to the authorities that must ultimately implement the decisions reached.
- ❑ Peace conferences and meetings depend on long-term preparation to be considered legitimate. They cannot be driven by the timetables of outside conveners. When they work, it is because people are ready to talk and consider it in their own self-interest to do so. Preparing the groundwork for this kind of discussion can take a long time.

- ❑ Porous borders with greatly differing legal systems among neighboring states mean that local initiatives at peace using traditional community authority may work and that the spread effect throughout the region may be greater than between states with rigid borders. This can be particularly applicable to clan related conflict.
- ❑ Competition for scarce resources is at the heart of many of the regional conflicts studied. If this competition for land, water, grazing space etc cannot be addressed in the long term, conflict prevention may be only medium term at best.
- ❑ Outside actors are often key unseen players in local conflict prevention. They can either act on or destroy what local groups do to promote peace. Many locally based solutions depend on national level action to implement long term. This may mean resources, new legislation, amnesty or demilitarization. Insurgent groups have no reason to listen to local demands for peace when the stakes they seek are secondary to local needs. If they do not need local citizens for food, supplies or cover, they may be much less likely to honor requests to negotiate by local leaders. The place they really want to be heard may be many miles away.
- ❑ Transparency in selection of actors for dialogues at all levels is essential. Groups must see themselves represented and selected fairly to buy in to the process. People are more likely to participate if they do not feel a threat by doing so. The objectives of the dialogue should be clear to all participants for it to be effective. Even when they are not speaking for any group but just engaging in community problem-solving across ethnic or clan lines, the objectives must be known by all.
- ❑ Radio must be as independent as possible to be both credible and viable over time. Dependence on government owned infrastructure for transmission may hurt credibility of the programming.
- ❑ Adherence to strong ethical standards of reporting by journalists is essential to credibility. Using joint reporting teams to cover controversial stories in conditions of ethnic or clan bias is critical to program integrity.
- ❑ Two-way communication on radio or television on issues has proven very effective in promoting dialogue and for venting popular frustration. These formats can include call-in or town meeting shows. The entertainment value of programs that feature mixed groups working to solve problems can be a powerful message in societies with major cleavages.

C. General Lessons for Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives

The lessons that the investigators derived about effective practices within the process of implementing particular projects are provided in the separate case studies attached in Appendix C. Part III presents the evidence about the effectiveness of each of the three generic types of initiatives of interest, based on generalizations derived from the specific cases of each initiative that was studied. Though the initiatives are still relatively young, some useful lessons were identified.

C1. Local Peace Processes

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Economic sources of conflict that are often hundreds of years old are exacerbated in scarcity situations where natural resource depletion or population pressure make scarce resources even more valuable. Peace processes can do little to change competition for scarce grazing land, youth lack of employment, or recurrent drought.
- Local dialogue is most effective when the origin of the problem is based on local history or competition for resources. When the actors are largely outside the region and fueling the conflict for other reasons, local discourse can only serve as an example to national leaders that they should be acting to resolve the conflict. It will not by itself be sufficient to bring peace permanently.
- The ability of well-organized local initiatives to influence armed military groups of insurgents was limited in the cases studied. There was no incentive on the part of the outside groups to listen to local peacemakers. The best these initiatives can do is to lobby central government to negotiate with the insurgents.
- Working through existing groups with respected leaders in the community helps move the process along more quickly than initiating ad hoc groups with less community support. Multi-faith approaches can be effective in regions where there is sufficient religious differentiation to make this desirable.
- Groups that work pro-actively to involve large numbers of local stakeholders have met with success in local dispute resolution. Groups that practice proactive transparency in their work and make sure that the constituent members are representative of significant portions of the communities affected met with success. This argues for a largely locally led initiative that will have its own timetable and may not work at the pace that outside supporters in central government or internationally might prefer.
- “One-off” conferences, while still capable of providing major breakthroughs, are seldom sufficient to ensure a long-term peace process. They are often dependent on the authority of the conveners who may not be from the region or the countries and may not have local support for the next steps required. It is possible that the peace process can be continued if there is a follow-up plan of actions in which local and other stakeholders have ownership.
- In cases where the conflicts are largely local, where the instigators of the violence are known and where elders are given authority to act, de-escalating the dispute from clan to individual level may be effective. Even if reprisals have occurred, elders can intervene and try the initial triggering act (usually a murder or major theft) under local legal authority and then settle the reprisals with compensation and formal apologies.

C2. Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Middle level dialogue can be compromised by lack of linkages to non-elite groups and to key political actors beyond its group. Who represents whom in the dialogue can be tricky if criteria for selection are not transparent and the groups represented do not do their own selecting. Outsiders know best approaches are not well received and may hurt credibility for the efforts over time.
- Dialogue cannot really occur if some of the power holders are not present to receive and/or use the results of the middle level discussions. The idea of these discussions as an alternative track to formal initiatives only works if there is a group or set of decision-makers willing and ready to listen to the middle level outcomes. They can become contentious if representation is not transparent.
- Regular contact over time is needed for this kind of dialogue to work. One-time only events are probably of a more limited impact.
- Lack of immediate physical threat to participants can help foster middle level dialogue participation.
- To have real impact at the middle level, there should be a critical mass of participants who are distributed around the country, not just in the capital. All major groups in the country should be consciously represented and easily identifiable in the discussion groups. Transparency on this point is critical to legitimacy of the process beyond the group.
- Middle level dialogue benefits from the presence of stakeholders as represented by legitimate groups who can be asked to send representatives to the process.
- Participants in the dialogue should perceive their participation as part of a larger set of objectives that include peace building in the region or country.
- These dialogues can be seen as more effective if there is a perception that they are needed to influence actions beyond the group involved.

C3. Peace Radio Initiatives

Peace Radio: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Use community radio stations and independent transmissions and receivers as a way to avoid political or legal limitations.
- Be wary of the government's ability to control peace radio through its control of the necessary infrastructure.
- To the extent possible, keep the peace radio initiative as reliant on indigenous resources (and as least reliant on outside donor resources) as possible, so as to increase credibility, local acceptance, and the likelihood of sustainability over the long term.
- Where government is a key player in the conflict situation (either as a party to the conflict or as a mediating force), be careful to maintain a balance between peace radio's independence and objectivity and its potential for engaging the government in positive, peace building activities and opening of the political system.
- Avoid commercialization of the conflict—take care to ensure that the purpose of peace radio is not compromised or derailed by replacing substantive content with purely entertainment programming.
- At the same time, where possible, use relaxed forms of programming to get the message across; e.g., use “soap opera”-type dramas and situational comedy shows to entertain and inform at the same time.
- Conduct needs assessments among listener groups to determine content and formats that are most likely to be effective.
- Ensure that personnel—program developers, producers, reporters, actors, et al.—have the technical expertise to produce quality programs and package information effectively.
- Ensure that the content of peace radio programs is appropriate to the culture, language, and religion of the target population of listeners; produce the peace radio programs in the local language or dialect, to the maximum extent possible.
- Ensure ethnic diversity in programming and news reporting, so as to ensure that you reach all the audiences you are trying to reach, especially all opposing sides in the conflict situation.
- In news reporting, use journalists from the region or country, not outsiders, as outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting.
- Plan a regular schedule of radio programming, so that listeners know what to expect and when to tune in for favorite programs.
- Use peace radio for two-way communication through, for example, talk-show formats.
- Use peace radio to educate listeners about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict, about citizens' rights and responsibilities, about government's responsibilities, and so on.
- Use peace radio to highlight gender roles and dynamics in the peace building process.
- Use peace radio to inform listeners about the plight of other conflict-ridden communities, including the adverse effects that arise from conflicts that are not prevented and managed effectively.
- Use peace radio to publicize development activities, especially in rural areas, so as to enhance resource mobilization and attract additional development projects and donor attention.
- Use peace radio to disseminate early warning information, information on the status of cease-fires, and other timely information that can serve to prevent additional violent conflict.
- Use peace radio to publicize and provide live coverage of positive activities in peace building, such as conflict resolution meetings, statements of opinion leaders, etc.
- Encourage journalists to establish ethical standards for balanced reporting and maintain them.

D. Comparison of the Effectiveness of Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives in Conflict Prevention and Management

Part IV compares the effectiveness of the three types with each other and considers which factors should be kept in mind when applying any of them. It identifies effective practices in making choices from among the differing types of initiatives. Local peace processes had the most impact on more dimensions of conflict than either dialogues or peace radio. Mid-level dialogue was less effective than local peace processes in most respects. Peace radio was found to be the weakest of the three in most areas.

Why local peace processes were comparatively more effective than the other two approaches appears to arise from:

- ❑ The scale of the conflict addressed (e.g., cattle raids compared to combat between organized armies),
- ❑ The extent of cooperation possible between the project and the governing authorities operating at the same level,
- ❑ Whether the activity involved could exercise coercive police authority over the parties to the conflict,
- ❑ Whether the activity was directed at achieving some legally binding agreement on specific disputes or involved discussion of broader issues or general relationships of the parties in conflict, and
- ❑ Whether the activity had autonomy in relation to influential outsiders because it was either ignored, tolerated or supported.

In sum, local peace processes were relatively more effective than mid-level dialogue and peace radio because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the inherent capacity of the initiative involved in influencing it. In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, including policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

Although local peace processes may be able to affect more aspects of conflict than the other two, all three instruments tend to be the most effective with respect to the same dimensions of conflict. That is, while individual cases may shift the overall average performance of local peace processes above that of the other two instruments, they are strongest in the same areas as the

others are, and their weak areas tend to be the same as well. In particular, all these civil society approaches are similar to each other in that they all mainly mobilize agents for peace and introduce social innovation. They are less consistently influential in altering economic activity, governmental institutions and the level of violence. Apparently, civil society approaches are mainly good at strengthening various communication and organizational channels that operate outside governmental and the prevailing economic and political processes. Only under certain unusual conditions, do they appear to be able to make significant inroads into the sources of conflicts that arise from economies, social structures, governmental practice, political processes, and violence itself.

E. Conclusions and Recommendations

E.1. General Ingredients of Success

Most of the factors that were associated with more effective practice of each of the three instruments were specific to that approach, such as the elaborate consultative process that is used by traditional local peace settlements to reach consensus. However, a few factors can be found in some form in relation to at least two and sometimes three of the instruments. Distilling these common elements provides us with the most important factors to respect in order to achieve effective results, no matter which type of initiative is being applied.

Characteristics that were found to be associated with effective approaches more than once are as follows:

- Conflict Factors
 - The main stakeholders actually or potentially involved with the conflict are either already incorporated within the conflict prevention activity, or they believe that their interests are affected by it, and therefore take the activity seriously. At a minimum, they feel that their concerns are represented or reflected in the activity. In other words, the parties take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to benefit or harm their perceived interests;
 - The conflict that is addressed has not become violent and militarized.
- Design Factors
 - The planning and implementation of the activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness.
 - The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national).

- Implementation Factors
 - The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

Some of these factors, once stated, may seem obvious, and thus do not require research. But others are either not necessarily understood as important to keep in mind, or though obvious, may often be forgotten.

E.2. Implications for Further Research

The study provides suggestions regarding the kind of further research needed on effectiveness in conflict prevention. Research is needed that is able to probe more deeply into the magnitudes of particular kinds of impacts, the possible subsequent chains of causation that may or may not result, and the interactions of impacts on each other. This may suggest two kinds of research design:

- One research design that looks more in depth at individual representative cases, and several differing kinds of initiatives within such a setting, rather than examining only one type of initiative in several diverse cases. Such evidence would help greatly to verify the conclusions reached by these case studies, which have to be considered as preliminary hypotheses.
- One research design that looks at several different kinds of initiatives within a particular setting, but using a comparative approach across selected countries in different regions. This design would necessarily limit the depth of the examination in each country, yet nonetheless would yield valuable insights on the efficacy of distinct approaches, and how they do or do not work together, in diverse settings.

E.3. Possible Implications for USAID and NGO Decision-Making

Note that several of the general factors that are associated with effective results do not have to do directly with the more or less controllable aspects of an initiative, such as the design of the activity or its implementation, but rather with the less directly controllable factors such as the historical, socio-economic or political-military context and the nature of the conflict. This suggests that to the extent conflict impacts are to be expected, more attention should be paid to the settings in which initiatives are introduced and thus whether given approaches, and sets of them, are likely to be viable and efficacious in the settings in which they are introduced. To achieve this, certain procedures are advised in making choices.

At the individual project level: When considering inaugurating a particular type of project, a prior appraisal should be done to ascertain whether the setting is conducive to the particular kind of instrument that is being considered, and that it embodies the features that have been identified as important for effectiveness (as brought out in the checklists in Part III).

At the level of the conflict arena (local or national): Rather than asking whether a given project or type of initiative should be adopted in general, the primary question that should be addressed is what the scope and nature of a given conflict in a given setting is, and what are the various kinds of responses that the decision maker's organization and others might make that are appropriate to that situation.

I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES

A. Local Peace Initiatives: Drawing on Tradition

A.1. Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda

Since 1986, there has been ongoing civil war in Uganda between north and south. The Acholi conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) movement, led by Joseph Kony, stems from the perception by the Acholi population in Northern Uganda of economic and political marginalization. Negotiated peace talks collapsed in 1994 amidst government claims that the LRA lacked seriousness while the LRA charged that President Museveni was committed to a military solution. Following the collapse of the peace talks, the LRA resumed the war with the assistance of the Sudanese government.

In order to break the cycle of violence, Northern religious leaders -- from Muslim, Catholic and Protestant faiths -- organized a forum in which to mediate between the government and the LRA. Their intervention sought to draw from their moral and religious power, neutrality, and extensive organizational anchorage of churches, parishes, and mosques. By most estimates, 90 per cent of the Acholi belong to one of the three religious faiths, furnishing the leadership with strategic institutional networks to mobilize for peace and reconciliation.

A decisive breakthrough for the ARLPI was a meeting with President Museveni in 1998 in which the leaders presented a memorandum, "A Call for Peace and an End to Bloodshed in Acholiland", that marked the formal inauguration of the intervention. Its immediate objective was to contribute to the process of establishing peace and stability in Acholiland through effective mediation, consensus building, participatory involvement of all parties, and the cessation of hostilities. In engaging the Museveni government, the ARLPI's point of departure was forgiveness and reconciliation, the centerpiece of the campaign for a peaceful approach to the conflict. Key actors credit Museveni for acknowledging the concerns of the ARLPI, marking a significant departure from the past practice of militarism. Presidential imprimatur to the intervention was a critical first step in building confidence and acknowledgement of the centrality of alternative institutional avenues for engagement. More important, national recognition bolstered the ARLPI's position in the eyes of local government actors, in particular, the Local Councils and military authorities, which were to become partners in the peace initiatives.

The result: a reduction in rebel activity and increased government willingness to seek a non-military solution to the conflict. LRA rebels are decreasing opposition and expressing a greater degree of willingness to be reintegrated into society. The government is adopting this model in other parts of the country where there is rebel activity.

A.2. Traditional Elders' Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan

Within the broader context of the ongoing North-South Sudan conflict, the Dinka-Nuer conflict in Southern Sudan was triggered in the early 1990s by an internal political fissure within the SPLA/SPLM along Dinka-Nuer lines. The North-South divide over time has fueled a series of ethnic and racial conflicts, though each is primarily based on concerns of economic marginalization. Previously, the Dinka and the Nuer coexisted peacefully and shared critical water and pasture resources, yet these groups more recently have become flashpoints of conflict. The core argument of the conflict is a structural conflict over economic resources, made more complex by the issues of identity and power within the South. Arming of civilians on both sides has worsened the severity of the conflict.

The New Sudan Council of Churches initiated an effort to spur dialogue between the two groups by organizing meetings with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA/SPLM). The Council realized early on that unless a neutral body intervened to facilitate dialogues, southern Sudan was going to collapse. In turn, the Council mobilized local communities to hold periodic peace conferences that brought the conflicting parties together, providing them with the opportunity to address common concerns, such as children's safety. During these discussions, comprising people predisposed towards peace, underlying causes of the conflict and possibilities for its resolution emerged naturally, rather than being dictated by the organizers. Key to the success of the conferences was a strategy document, "Come Let Us Reason Together" (1998).

The Government of Sudan does not condone the conferences, since they are seen as a potential unifying force for the South in opposition to the central government. Given the role of the government in funding militias to fuel the war, the initiative has been hampered by its inability to address the fundamental conflict between North and South. Manipulation of parties in the South by the central government makes this initiative, in a larger sense, captive to forces that are beyond it.

During the course of the initiative, the Council has had to adapt the conferences to address new dimensions of the conflict as they arise. For instance, although consensus was developed during the conference for a reduction in the inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict, this theoretical agreement was not able to address the situation on the ground, where civilians were still heavily armed. The Council has been less successful in addressing problems of demilitarization and demobilization. As a result, there was actually an escalation of violence following several peace conferences.

A.3. Traditional Elders' Peace Process in Wajir, Kenya

The Wajir region is marginalized in terms of Kenyan politics, adding an interesting dynamic of relative autonomy from the national government in local communities. That said, state inattention also tends to foster greater innovation on the part of state functionaries engaging local actors on pertinent issues. The nature of the conflict in the Wajir is inter-clan warfare, based primarily on issues of water resources and grazing land. As new conflicts over administrative issues emerged in the 1990s, clan warfare took on a decidedly violent dimension. Further

fueling the conflict was intense resource competition in light of the 1992-1999 drought, during which time 12,000 people died.

Initiatives to mitigate the conflict and conditions that led to it have been multi-faceted and altogether successful. Its success can be in part attributed to the fact that a collaborative relationship was fostered between the state actors and the local community. Through this collaboration, a Rapid Response Team composed of the army, police, and local activists was created. In addition, the partnerships between community-based organizations (CBOs) and local government institutions proved particularly fruitful.

Another essential component of the initiative was the formation of a Peace Forum, embracing the roles of youth, elders and women in the peace process. Through local interest groups, many women worked to develop trust with elders and youth, and additionally, took the lead in reaching out to local government institutions. A positive set of relationships and channels of communication were established and have proven sustainable over the course of the initiative.

The most crucial aspect, however, was a meeting of clan elders that culminated in a negotiated framework document entitled, “Al Fatah Declaration”. This declaration constituted the basis for a peace settlement among the feuding clans. As a result of this initiative, bandit activities that brutalized the communities have been significantly curbed. Moreover, local neighboring communities such as the Garissa have invited the Wajir group to assist them in mediation of similar conflicts, showing the replicable nature of such work.

As the initiative expanded beyond the core activities, it has yielded fewer results. For example, an effort was made to establish a village polytechnic institute for youth, but the institute has yet to bear fruit. Similarly, the initiative created a peace prize to be awarded annually to the most “peaceful” community, but the prize has not materialized.

Overall, the initiative has contributed to peace through information gathering, creating early-warning systems, and setting up new norms of behavior for the community. And since the local government has bought into the value of the initiative, its likelihood for sustainability is quite high. The commitment of local government functionaries to the initiative has been exemplary by Kenyan standards, with the potential to be replicated across Northeastern Kenya.

B. Mid-Level Policy Dialogues: Taking Action at the National Level

B.1. National Dialogue in Kenya: Religious Organizations and Constitutional Reform

The National Council of Churches of Kenya and allied organizations have undertaken a significant role in facilitating dialogue between the government and opposition parties regarding the contentious and vital issues of reforming the Kenyan Constitution. These policy issues

concern the power of the presidency, laws affecting multi-party political competition, and the role of the state in society and the economy.

The initiative has apparently been crucial at critical points by offering an alternative channel for addressing the issues (although not resolving them), to that of collective violence on the streets. Violence has occasionally erupted and caused considerable concern about the breakdown of civil order. The restarting of the negotiations has in a sense saved the body politic from eventual, probably divisive conflict with little redeeming social value. A model of peaceful resolution of political issues has been established that has considerable visibility. Also, the religious leaders have played an influential role in keeping these issues addressed at high levels, and they have succeeded in opening them up to participation by civil society. This has helped to increase pressure on the government and opposition to make some progress in addressing the issues.

At the same time, however, these leaders have shifted their approach from initially acting as impartial mediators to increasingly becoming partisan advocates of constitutional reform, and in particular, the devolution of power from the Presidency. The increasing polarization of this issue to which this partisanship has contributed was reflected in the division between a faith-led process of local consultations that are being held on the issues and a similar, but separate government-led process. As yet, no “moderate center” has emerged that might be able to foster the needed compromises to achieve some acceptable compromises on the issues.

Recently, however, negotiations have been going on to create some linkage between the two processes. This has helped to save face for the government and move beyond the developing stalemate between these two processes. They may yet adopt some constructive division of labor or modus vivendi. But the many constitutional issues remain far from specific resolution. In sum, whether this faith-based project ultimately has been able to foster a successful process of peaceful management of this major public dispute is yet to be determined.

This issue reflects the great extent to which Kenyan politics is still driven mainly by ethnic affiliation and manipulation, since all the major actors – the KANU dominated government and parliament, the opposition parties, and even the reformer elites – either clearly draw from one ethnic base or other, or are perceived by the others as drawing support from certain ethnic constituencies and suspected of wishing to gain political power at the expense of the others.

B.2. Somaliland War-Torn Societies Project

Somaliland’s major conflict was resolved when it broke away from the collapsed Somali state, but after the reclamation of its sovereignty, the same conflicts that afflicted Somali became evident in Somaliland. The past decade has witnessed the struggle of the young state to resolve violent internal conflicts, to build sustainable peace among the different groups that constitute its population, to build a state that will sustain peace, and to rebuild an economy that will sustain the population. While significant progress towards accomplishing some of these aims has occurred, conflict over the issue of how authority would be created and shared persisted.

The War-Torn Society Project (WSP) approached Somaliland to examine the reconstruction process. WSP program objectives in Somaliland include ensuring that international assistance contributes to building peace and does not contribute to renewed conflict, promoting the

Participatory Action Research (PAR) program as a vehicle for democratizing development and empowering communities and disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national and local government and civil society organizations to contribute to state-building and reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the sustainability of a successor body, namely the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development (SPCD). Through its research capacity, the WSP provides a neutral forum for reconstruction activities to take place. The WSP serves as a flexible policy-oriented research unit that remains committed to backstopping community efforts, while also operating at the macro level.

A research center that engages the community in multi-channel dialogues on issues of contention, the SCPD assists communities in taking charge of political agendas and draws upon the expertise of the SPCD staff to address concerns. The SCPD: 1) helps create a venue within the nation to explore different ideas about reconstruction; 2) provides a forum for peaceful articulation of interests in a society that is still framing its formal institutions; 3) allows voices of the marginalized to enter the consultative process; and 4) assures a channel for two-way communication between the government and citizens.

In a particularly interesting project by SCPD, researchers traveled for six months to speak with communities across the country, meet with women, government officials and NGOs. Their final report, called a “Self-Portrait” in order to emphasize the collective production process and local ownership, is a blueprint for development priorities in the country. The report stresses governance, livestock regulation and family as key on the development agenda. The role of media in re-building Somaliland was also pinpointed as critical to achieving development objectives and resolving conflict through free information flow.

The WSP dialogue process has contributed significantly to the empowerment, and in some cases the mobilization, of groups who have much to contribute to building the types of polity, economy, and society, that will achieve a sustainable peace, but who have more often than not been excluded from the processes of state-building and reconstruction. The empowerment of these groups promises to have a positive long-term impact on government policies and on the political culture of Somaliland.

B.3. Middle-Level Dialogues in Burundi

Burundi, like its neighbor Rwanda, is a country that has been at war with itself. The conflict in Burundi has been going on for four decades. Since 1962, when the country became independent, there have been at least four major clashes between the Tutsi and Hutu, resulting in the death of almost one million people, with other hundreds of thousands of Burundi being exiled in neighboring countries. The center of the conflict has been the struggle for the control of the state. Control of the state determines the control and distribution of societal resources. While the fact of competition is a normal political process, the intensity of the struggle for control of the state in Burundi is also informed by the crushing poverty that characterizes the Burundi political economy.

Intervention in the form of promoting middle-level, inter-ethnic dialogue is an initiative promoted by International Alert. The operational objectives of International Alert in Burundi are principally to encourage and facilitate dialogue between political and ethnic antagonists, as a

necessary prelude to ending violent conflict and furthering peaceful exchange. It aims to accomplish these objectives by enhancing the capacity of Burundi in peace making by strengthening the knowledge and skills of individuals, and the capacities of groups and organizations, to work for a just and durable peace.

One of the activities supported by International Alert is the CAP Group: Compagnie des Apotres de la Paix (Apostles for Peace). CAP now comprises about fifty active members. The middle-level dialogues promoted by the CAP Group has produced fairly significant results, especially in Bujumbura, the capital. It has had an appreciable influence in bringing individuals and groups of people together to address critical questions regarding political development in Burundi. CAP members have served as important role models for others in the country. They have jointly appeared on national television and radio, and have led public fora to influence public opinion that “the other camp are not monsters.” There is evidence that CAP messages through television and radio have also had an impact on the Burundi diaspora in the region (Tanzania and Kenya), and in Europe where most of the educated Hutu live.

Several other NGOs have sprung up in response to the need to promote dialogue as well, and have subsequently been supported by International Alert. The NGOs have conducted several activities and have programs aimed at peace and reconciliation through dialogue. One of these groups is the Collective Women’s Organizations (CAFOB), which promotes a women’s peace program. CAFOB organizes seminars for women both in Bujumbura and a few selected sites outside of the capital city to increase women’s political awareness. CAFOB successfully promoted the acceptance of women at Arusha negotiations, and there was a clear increase of women being represented in most of the delegations at the Arusha 2000 meeting.

These activities provide a parallel process to political level negotiation among groups who vie for state power. In essence, middle-level dialogue actually “grounds” the political dialogue by concretizing it among the non-political elite, who in the long run may hold in their hands, the future of peace in Burundi.

C. Peace Radio Initiatives

C.1. Search for Common Ground’s Studio Ijambo, Burundi

Studio Ijambo, translated as “wise words” in the local language of Kirundi, was established as Burundi’s first independent radio studio in May 1995, by Search for Common Ground in Burundi and Common Ground Productions. The studio was created in a region where an estimated 85 percent of the population has access to radios, and at a time when hate radio was playing an inflammatory role in fueling violence in neighboring Rwanda.

For the past six years, the studio has employed Hutu and Tutsi staff and produced about fifteen hours a week of news, public affairs and cultural programming. In addition, the studio produces a radio drama that portrays the daily struggles of a Hutu and Tutsi family living as next-door neighbors, and their efforts to reconcile their differences. It is estimated that Studio Ijambo reaches twelve million people throughout the Great Lakes region. Studio Ijambo is also credited

with aiding in the decentralization of the media in Burundi and building local capacity for news coverage.

There are several ways that Peace Radio effectively promotes conflict prevention and peace building:

- ❑ Reaches out to illiterate populations to disseminate information, generate public dialogue and debate, advocate for specific issues, provide civic education and mobilize public support for particular actions or events.
- ❑ Conducts needs assessments of rural communities, such as World Vision's work with the Pokot and Turkana.
- ❑ Educates individuals about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict.
- ❑ Publicizes border harmonization meetings in rural areas.
- ❑ Airs live strategic meetings between elders and other political leaders.
- ❑ Informs communities about the plight of other conflict-ridden areas, including the adverse effects and destruction that arise from conflicts.
- ❑ Propagates early warning information and current cease-fire status information.

II. EFFECTIVE PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Summary of Chapter Contents

This chapter begins a detailed look at each of the three initiatives that were examined: Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

The Introduction to the chapter, Part A, discusses the means by which the effective practices and lessons learned were derived. It also provides a guide to reading and understanding the tables that follow in Part C of this chapter.

Part B reports on general lessons and effective practices for initiatives aimed at preventing or managing conflict and building peace, across the three types of initiatives that are the focus of this study. They represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner.

Part C reports on our findings about effective practices, and lessons learned that are specific to each of the three types of initiatives. In a table format, it presents information on effective practices, as they relate to the three types of conflict risk factors (or sources of actual conflict) that a type of initiative might try, in a strategic sense, to influence in order to prevent or manage conflict and build peace. Illustrative examples are provided from the case studies. Finally, it includes a discussion and explanation of three types of risk factors—structural conditions, channels, and triggers and inhibitors—that were used in assessing the impacts of various specific initiatives when we conducted the case study research.

A. Introduction

In this part of the report we present some effective practices and lessons learned for practitioners who are considering undertaking or have already begun a local or national effort to prevent or mitigate conflict and build peace in the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHA). It is important to note that these effective practices and lessons learned come from a limited number of cases. By necessity, these numbers are small, because current experience in peace building in the region is still maturing as a practice area. These effective practices and lessons learned were derived primarily from two sources of information. The first source is a set of in-depth case studies of nine recent initiatives undertaken in the region by groups that set out to address specific conflict situations. The initiatives were chosen on the basis of their having been in operation long enough to produce some results (at least one year) and their reputations for having had positive impacts on their particular conflict situations. The initiatives are grouped under three major types: Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

The second source of information for our effective practices and lessons learned is a USAID-sponsored workshop on the Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa

in January 2001. In this workshop, representatives from NGOs throughout the region reacted to presentations of some of the case studies mentioned above, reported on additional initiatives, and offered advice for those who might try a new initiative in the future.⁷

As we have learned over the past year, effective practices and lessons learned can be identified in a variety of forms and at several levels of practical intervention. Some can take the form of considerations to take into account about a particular conflict situation when deciding, at a broad strategic level, whether to undertake one type of initiative or another, e.g., whether to undertake a community-based peace process or a middle-level non-official national dialogue. Other effective practices or lessons learned can take the form of more detailed approaches to achieving a particular objective while operating within a specific type of initiative. Still others can be identified as simple principles in the form of “do’s and don’ts,” with some that apply regardless of the type of initiative one might undertake, and others that apply to only one or another type of initiative. In this section of the report, we include all of these types of effective practices and lessons learned in the hope that every practitioner will find something of value to consider and apply when choosing, designing or implementing one or another of the three types of initiatives we studied.

In section B, we present a set of generic lessons and advisable practices that would appear to apply to any initiative aimed at preventing or managing conflict or building peace. Section C provides, in three sub-sections, effective practices and lessons learned that are specific to each of the three types of initiatives, namely, Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace

The following lessons and practices are derived from all of the case studies undertaken as a whole, and represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner. Effective practices and lessons learned are further delineated by type of intervention later in Part C of this chapter.

- In many, if not most cases, the nature and location of the conflict predetermines whether the conflict prevention practice initiated will be useful. Knowing at what level the change needs to occur for conflict to be prevented is key. Trying lots of interesting things so that it looks like something is going on to prevent conflict may raise expectations, waste resources and most of all, distract energy from initiatives that might work better.

⁷ Reports of the nine case studies are presented in Appendix 3 of this report. A full report of the NGO workshop is provided in a separate document, “Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the GHA: What Can We Learn from Experience to Improve Practice?” available from USAID/REDSO.

- ❑ Local peace initiatives using local authorities and traditional leaders will work best when the nature of the problem is locally caused. Lack of incentives for parties to talk to each other is difficult to overcome. Traditional processes for managing local conflicts may exclude some stakeholders to dominate (e.g., elders). Adapting traditional conflict management mechanisms so that they enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions in new ways can lead to achieving more durable conflict management outcomes.
- ❑ Religious leaders and religious organizations offer a number of assets for conflict prevention and peace building. In some circumstances, religious organizations can be perceived as neutral bodies, drawing on moral and religious power to facilitate intervention activities or discussions down to the level of communities and parishes when other options are not apparent. They can combine forces across faiths to initiate effective multi-faith efforts such as mediation forums, engage with government leadership in high-level dialogues and mobilize local peace efforts through community-based civic education. Neutrality can be difficult to maintain, however; once religious organizations engage in a peace building dialogue, for example, their role may shift from facilitation to advocating a position.
- ❑ Local peace initiatives exist in a “no man’s land” between governments and people. Local expectations are higher sometimes than a leader’s authority to deliver. These initiatives can open channels but they may not be sufficient to deliver peace. If local peacemakers become too popular, they can be perceived as a threat to the authorities that must ultimately implement the decisions reached.
- ❑ Peace conferences and meetings depend on long-term preparation to be considered legitimate. They cannot be driven by the timetables of outside conveners. When they work, it is because people are ready to talk and consider it in their own self-interest to do so. Preparing the groundwork for this kind of discussion can take a long time.
- ❑ Porous borders with greatly differing legal systems among neighboring states mean that local initiatives at peace using traditional community authority may work and that the spread effect throughout the region may be greater than between states with rigid borders. This can be particularly applicable to clan related conflict.
- ❑ Competition for scarce resources is at the heart of many of the regional conflicts studied. If this competition for land, water, grazing space, etc. cannot be addressed in the long term, conflict prevention may be only medium term at best.
- ❑ Outside actors are often key unseen players in local conflict prevention. They can either act on or destroy what local groups do to promote peace. Many locally based solutions depend on national level action to implement long term. This may mean resources, new legislation, amnesty or demilitarization. Insurgent groups have no reason to listen to local demands for peace when the stakes they seek are secondary to local needs. If they do not need local citizens for food, supplies or cover, they may be much less likely to honor

requests to negotiate by local leaders. The place they really want to be heard may be many miles away.

- ❑ Transparency in selection of actors for dialogues at all levels is essential. Groups must see themselves represented and selected fairly to buy in to the process. People are more likely to participate if they do not feel a threat by doing so. The objectives of the dialogue should be clear to all participants for it to be effective. Even when they are not speaking for any group but just engaging in community problem-solving across ethnic or clan lines, the objectives must be known by all.
- ❑ Radio must be as independent as possible to be both credible and viable over time. Dependence on government owned infrastructure for transmission may hurt credibility of the programming.
- ❑ Adherence to strong ethical standards of reporting by journalists is essential to credibility. Using joint reporting teams to cover controversial stories in conditions of ethnic or clan bias is critical to program integrity.
- ❑ Two-way communication on radio or television on issues has proven very effective in promoting dialogue and for venting popular frustration. These formats can include call-in or town meeting shows. The entertainment value of programs that feature mixed groups working to solve problems can be a powerful message in societies with major cleavages.

C. Effective Practices and Lessons Learned in Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives

This section is divided into three sub-sections, one for each type of initiative. In each sub-section, we offer two sets of effective practices and lessons learned in two separate tables. The first is a list of general lessons learned about planning and implementing the type of initiative being considered. The second table requires some explanation. It is a table of effective practices, as they relate to the three types of conflict risk factors (or sources of actual conflict) that a type of initiative might try, in a strategic sense, to influence in order to prevent or manage conflict and build peace. These three types of risk factors—structural conditions, channels, and triggers and inhibitors—were used in assessing the impacts of various specific initiatives when we conducted the case study research. In the table, they are listed in the first column as possible strategic objectives that a new initiative might try to accomplish. Briefly, the risk factors/objectives are defined as follows:

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons

and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions.

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and “top-level” official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people.

In the second and third columns of the table, respectively, we list effective practices in terms of tactical approaches one might take in order to achieve an objective in the first column, and operational examples and details of that approach taken from the case studies. Please note that there are some blank cells in this table for each of the three types of initiatives. This means that our research did not generate any specific tactical approaches or case-specific details for a particular risk factor/strategic objective.

C.1 Local Community-Based Peace Processes

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Economic sources of conflict that are often hundreds of years old are exacerbated in scarcity situations where natural resource depletion or population pressure make scarce resources even more valuable. Peace processes can do little to change competition for scarce grazing land, youth lack of employment, or recurrent drought.
- Local dialogue is most effective when the origin of the problem is based on local history or competition for resources. When the actors are largely outside the region and fueling the conflict for other reasons, local discourse can only serve as an example to national leaders that they should be acting to resolve the conflict. It will not by itself be sufficient to bring peace permanently.
- The ability of well-organized local initiatives to influence armed military groups of insurgents was limited in the cases studied. There was no incentive on the part of the outside groups to listen to local peacemakers. The best these initiatives can do is to lobby central government to negotiate with the insurgents.
- Working through existing groups with respected leaders in the community helps move the process along more quickly than initiating ad hoc groups with less community support. Multi-faith approaches can be effective in regions where there is sufficient religious differentiation to make this desirable.
- Groups that work pro-actively to involve large numbers of local stakeholders have met with success in local dispute resolution. Groups that practice proactive transparency in their work and make sure that the constituent members are representative of significant portions of the communities affected met with success. This argues for a largely locally led initiative that will have its own timetable and may not work at the pace that outside supporters in central government or internationally might prefer.
- “One-off” conferences, while still capable of providing major breakthroughs, are seldom sufficient to ensure a long-term peace process. They are often dependent on the authority of the conveners who may not be from the region or the countries and may not have local support for the next steps required. It is possible that the peace process can be continued if there is a follow-up plan of actions in which local and other stakeholders have ownership.
- In cases where the conflicts are largely local, where the instigators of the violence are known and where elders are given authority to act, de-escalating the dispute from clan to individual level may be effective. Even if reprisals have occurred, elders can intervene and try the initial triggering act (usually a murder or major theft) under local legal authority and then settle the reprisals with compensation and formal apologies.

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective
Structural conditions: To improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets (such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets).	Promote the resumption of established pre-conflict trading relationships. Leveraging outside resources to support local economic activity.	In Sudan the local peace initiatives led resumption of trade patterns among the peoples of the West Bank of the Nile. Grazing in shared areas was re-established. Agricultural production increased. In Uganda the ARLPI was able to get the central government to increase investment in the affected regions and to interest donors in more support for local efforts to return services and economic activity.	Economic stability is a key condition; any improvement in availability of goods and re-establishment of trade among disputing parties can reinforce the need to remain peaceful over time. Stable markets encourage increases in agricultural production since the unmet demand for food and other goods is high. Bringing resources to devastated communities for other than relief can help people see that a return to normal life may happen.

**Local Community-Based Peace Processes:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Structural Conditions**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective
<p>In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors...</p>	<p>By considering the following tactical approach...</p>		
<p>Structural Conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to the conflict (e.g. tribes, clans, or ethnic groups).</p>	<p>Increasing inter-communal contact and group involvement in peace making efforts and support.</p>	<p>Improving day-to-day relationships can work when the competing groups are not dispersed geographically. At a minimum, a trickle down effect can be noted. More contact can occur in markets, border towns and schools if formal and informal institutions continue operating. (Kenya and Sudan)</p> <p>Peace efforts, followed by some kind of restitution, were effective in Kenya and Sudan in beginning to normalize contact between groups.</p> <p>In Northern Uganda, not all groups are involved in each conflict, so limited improvements between groups that find themselves mutually affected can occur. The ARLPI in northern Uganda has improved relationships among formerly estranged segments of the population even though these are not the armed insurgents who are causing the conflict. It has also focused national discourse on the problems of the north and been able to mobilize discussion beyond the area on solving its problems.</p>	<p>Regular contact outside the specially convened group meetings is needed to reinforce that peaceful daily contact is desirable and beneficial. Practicing tolerant behavior and cooperation helps solidify the group decisions to do so.</p> <p>People view attempts at restitution as proof that the conflict will continue to be avoided. The enforcement of consequences helps individuals feel that “wrongs” have been “righted,” encouraging normalcy of relations.</p> <p>Since these problems are not of the making of the local populations, increasing dialogue in other venues can help to resolve the conflict over time. Political sectarianism and regionalism are weakened in the process. Local relationships among NGOs, military and civilian authorities, local government and other key actors has improved as a by-product of the peace process of engaging the national government in dialogue with insurgents.</p>

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and “top-level” official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Channels: To increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions for new purposes.	<p>In Kenya (Wajir) and Sudan, the councils cut across clan lines and were selected in a transparent manner. Declarations were produced in Wajir to settle inter-clan disputes. Traditional structures were re-oriented to be used for conflict resolution. By scaling down the crimes from clan acts to individual acts that could be dealt with under the formal legal system, elders were successful in de-escalating reprisal situations. Traditional means such as financial compensation and ritual apology were then used to counter harm done during reprisals.</p> <p>Special conferences give voices to segments of societies that are not often heard and allow them to participate in public discourse on peace. (Sudan)</p>	<p>A combination of formal legal measures that punished the original act of violence along with traditional compensation (overseen and adjudicated by a multi-clan group of elders) was accepted by the communities involved as an alternative to continued violence.</p> <p>The diversity of actors in the conference setting increased the flow of information into the community about its results.</p>
Channels: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.	Use existing structures and organizations as the base and graft on new norms and objectives to work for the peace process and for longer term development goals of the community.	NSCC in Sudan used the same inter-tribal conference methods in several places. In the Wajir (Kenya) case, it led to offshoot activities including rapid response teams to end conflicts, training district officers, a peace school and other training institutions for youth.	Using organizations and individuals trusted by the community hastens the likelihood that their authority will be respected and that their intervention might be effective. The Wajir model of elder intervention was studied by other communities in Kenya for replication.

**Local Community-Based Peace Processes:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
<p>In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors...</p>	<p>By considering the following tactical approach...</p>		
<p>Channels: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution.</p>	<p>Approaches vary with the nature of the conflict and the level of the authorities involved. Some cases involve insurgents who are not members of any formal country or government.</p>	<p>The Wajir project worked closely with local authorities in Kenya. Accused law violators were turned over to local authorities thereby reinforcing rule of law in the area.</p> <p>Sudan peace conferences had no relation to local or central authorities. They did contribute governance functions to the SPLM rebel movement with all that this can imply. This alliance led to peaceful resolution of disputes within the SPLM areas.</p> <p>In Uganda, ARLPI initiatives led to greater dialogue between central government and the region. It also competed with local service providers for resources. Pressure was put to initiate an Amnesty Law by the government.</p>	<p>In general, reinforcing rule of law when it is not repressive can increase public confidence in legal measures and avoid reprisals in local conflicts.</p> <p>Extra-governmental means are sometimes the only way to promote a peace process where there is no national interest in resolving the war.</p> <p>National action to institute amnesty can be an important first step in resolving disputes that involve actors from beyond the borders who have support within certain regions by anti-government groups.</p>
<p>Channels: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.</p>	<p>Negotiating peace agreements.</p> <p>Moderating positions of key actors in the conflict.</p>	<p>In Wajir, the Al Fatah declaration (which formed the basis for peace settlements in the region) was completed and accepted by the communities.</p> <p>NSCC in Sudan negotiated the Wunlit pact which decreased violence within the SPLM controlled areas.</p> <p>ARLPI moderated the GOU approach to the conflict and pressed for peace negotiations but was not able to bring the parties to that point. Intent to sign a ceasefire was pronounced by the government. No settlement has occurred.</p>	<p>Perceived legitimacy and transparency of the elders to negotiate the agreements.</p> <p>Acceptance of the convening authority of the conferences and the public support for some kind of peaceful result.</p> <p>National and international publicity on ARLPI work encouraged increased government attention and participation in the process.</p>

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Triggers and Inhibitors: to promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	Choose methods and approaches that are available to each group and are determined by structures within the communities.	<p>Wajir is an example of effectiveness in preventing escalation (rather than stopping initial violent incidents). Rapid response teams and elder intervention in a timely way have been effective.</p> <p>Wunlit and other NSCC conferences have reduced the amount of cattle theft and abductions in the region by peaceful negotiation.</p>	Initiatives have had different results largely determined by the scale of the conflict and access to key players in each case.
Triggers and Inhibitors: To reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Support/encourage peace agreements.	<p>Having Al Fatah and Wunlit agreements in place gives conflicting parties a reference point.</p> <p>The intention to sign a ceasefire if negotiated keeps public opinion on the Ugandan government side more easily.</p>	<p>The agreements represent an accomplishment for each of the groups and help the people they represent feel that progress is being made and that they have a reason to try to avoid conflict in the future.</p> <p>The Ugandan government is more ready to negotiate that it was before the intervention.</p>

C2. Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Middle level dialogue can be compromised by lack of linkages to non-elite groups and to key political actors beyond its group. Who represents whom in the dialogue can be tricky if criteria for selection are not transparent and the groups represented do not do their own selecting. Outsiders know best approaches are not well received and may hurt credibility for the efforts over time.
- Dialogue cannot really occur if some of the power holders are not present to receive and/or use the results of the middle level discussions. The idea of these discussions as an alternative track to formal initiatives only works if there is a group or set of decision-makers willing and ready to listen to the middle level outcomes. They can become contentious if representation is not transparent.
- Regular contact over time is needed for this kind of dialogue to work. One-time only events are probably of a more limited impact.
- Lack of immediate physical threat to participants can help foster middle level dialogue participation.
- To have real impact at the middle level, there should be a critical mass of participants who are distributed around the country, not just in the capital. All major groups in the country should be consciously represented and easily identifiable in the discussion groups. Transparency on this point is critical to legitimacy of the process beyond the group.
- Middle level dialogue benefits from the presence of stakeholders as represented by legitimate groups who can be asked to send representatives to the process.
- Participants in the dialogue should perceive their participation as part of a larger set of objectives that include peace building in the region or country.
- These dialogues can be seen as more effective if there is a perception that they are needed to influence actions beyond the group involved.

C.2 Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Structural conditions: to improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets.	None of the dialogue initiatives were designed to effect this change.	N/A	N/A
Structural conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to the conflict (e.g. tribes, clans or ethnic groups).	People are brought together as a main focus of the strategy on a regular basis.	<p>Press and other media coverage of the dialogue can help reinforce that greater tolerance between different groups is possible, and that people are committed to moving toward peace (Kenya, Burundi, Somalia) The diaspora in other countries is made aware of the dialogue through press coverage.</p> <p>In Somalia, the WSP group brings together women, the independent media, livestock traders, nomads, residents of remote small towns, educated professionals, intellectuals, elders, and even MPs, for non-confrontational dialogue to examine and discuss important issues of shared concern. The WSP group is also seen as one of the few with a balanced view towards clans.</p>	<p>Modeling behaviors that promote interaction can increase tolerance of different groups.</p> <p>The creation of national and local venues that engage, on an equal footing, many kinds of citizens, reinforces the norm of democratic inclusion.</p>

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and “top-level” official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Channel: to increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Provide fora for people to discuss community interests that affect them all.	<p>In Kenya and Somalia, these dialogues give greater voice to people who may have been ignored. People in Somalia use the groups to discuss concerns that affect everyone (corruption, use of stimulants).</p> <p>In Burundi, efforts to organize groups outside the capital may be one of the few attempts to engage marginalized stakeholders seldom heard such as women, inhabitants of small towns, etc. The CAFOB women’s spin-off initiative has stimulated awareness of political processes and economic issues of interest through organized seminars with women outside of Bujumbura. CAFOB’s efforts resulted in a clear increase in women delegates at the 2000 Arusha meeting.</p> <p>The group discussions in Kenya and Somalia showed that there are differences in interests and view points that are not clan dependent, but that may depend on the individual’s or clan’s role in society or its economy.</p>	<p>New segments of society were mobilized and empowered through these fora. (Kenya, Somalia, and Burundi).</p> <p>Clan or personal identity may not be the only factor that affects someone’s view of a problem. This realization can be an important first step to preventing conflict on solely clan lines.</p>

**Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...		
Channel: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.	Introduced new models for problem-solving and discussion.	<p>In Kenya the Ufungamano process receives lots of attention and is considered a national vehicle for constitutional dialogue.</p> <p>In Somalia, the participatory action research program provided a more balanced and neutral vehicle for determining the causes of conflict and the issues surrounding specific problems, as well as a means for discussing the identified issues.</p>	<p>It provides an alternative focus to what the central governments may or may no be doing.</p> <p>The participatory action research program fostered an increased common understanding of issues affecting the actions of diverse parties in the conflict, thereby contributing to a reduction in tension and feelings of hostility.</p>
Channel: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions.	Fill vacuums created by lack of state processes that are inclusive.	<p>In Kenya, the Ufungamano process promotes the idea that constitutional reform is key to the process of peaceful political change. It is regarded as a major national vehicle for addressing constitutional and underlying political issues and the intervention restarted the process of constitutional reform.</p> <p>In Somalia different groups have a way to come together to discuss what will be needed to recreate a society that works for everyone. The WSP process identified several issues that have found their way onto the national policy agenda, and its country report influenced the content of the new constitutions.</p>	Can be an effective alternative when there is a stalemate or lack of ability on a national level, and brings other voices from civil society organizations into the debate for resolution of serious problems. However, it may also widen the gulf between people and government if and when government feels their power is threatened (Kenya).
Channel: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.	Keep national discussions and processes going when official groups may have stopped the dialogue at an impasse.	In Kenya, NCCK was principally responsible for restarting the official constitutional reform process national dialogue on the constitution when it stalled, and has kept the national review process going and opened it to wider audiences and input.	The impasse was broken by the actions of the NCCK because it provided an organized means for established reform-oriented NGO groups and oppositions parties to voice their desire for the review, and pushed government to take action. There is more likely to be a resolution of the constitutional impasse in Kenya if people keep up some kind of public dialogue on it.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
		Triggers and Inhibitors: To promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	Initiate mid-level non-official dialogues that includes aggrieved stakeholders denied an audience and voice before violence erupts, or in general, within conflictual settings to promote conciliatory discussions between parties.

**Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Triggers and Inhibitors**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Triggers and Inhibitors: to reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Offer alternative means of discussion that operate in a neutral way to allow discussion.	<p>In Kenya, the Ufungamano dialogue evolved into a partisan pressure group for constitutional reform thereby giving up its facilitative role for a more proactive one.</p> <p>In Somalia, WSP created a neutral forum for careful research and articulation of key issues and problems affecting the country through the participatory action research process, and a vehicle for discussion of the results among diverse stakeholders.</p> <p>In Burundi, the process brought together people who previously did not talk to each other into a dialogue about the future of the country.</p>	<p>It is not clear whether this shift will ultimately be better for the cause of peaceful change.</p> <p>The WSP process of iterative action and reflection creates a setting that fosters common understanding among segments of society.</p> <p>The dialogue has created an alternative to conflict, and provides less opportunity for political elite manipulation of differences between ethnic groups.</p>

C.3 Peace Radio

Peace Radio: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Use community radio stations and independent transmissions and receivers as a way to avoid political or legal limitations.
- Be wary of the government's ability to control peace radio through its control of the necessary infrastructure.
- To the extent possible, keep the peace radio initiative as reliant on indigenous resources (and as least reliant on outside donor resources) as possible, so as to increase credibility, local acceptance, and the likelihood of sustainability over the long term.
- Where government is a key player in the conflict situation (either as a party to the conflict or as a mediating force), be careful to maintain a balance between peace radio's independence and objectivity and its potential for engaging the government in positive, peace building activities and opening of the political system.
- Avoid commercialization of the conflict—take care to ensure that the purpose of peace radio is not compromised or derailed by replacing substantive content with purely entertainment programming.
- At the same time, where possible, use relaxed forms of programming to get the message across; e.g., use “soap opera”-type dramas and situational comedy shows to entertain and inform at the same time.
- Conduct needs assessments among listener groups to determine content and formats that are most likely to be effective.
- Ensure that personnel—program developers, producers, reporters, actors, et al.—have the technical expertise to produce quality programs and package information effectively.
- Ensure that the content of peace radio programs is appropriate to the culture, language, and religion of the target population of listeners; produce the peace radio programs in the local language or dialect, to the maximum extent possible.
- Ensure ethnic diversity in programming and news reporting, so as to ensure that you reach all the audiences you are trying to reach, especially all opposing sides in the conflict situation.
- In news reporting, use journalists from the region or country, not outsiders, as outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting.
- Plan a regular schedule of radio programming, so that listeners know what to expect and when to tune in for favorite programs.
- Use peace radio for two-way communication through, for example, talk-show formats.
- Use peace radio to educate listeners about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict, about citizens' rights and responsibilities, about government's responsibilities, and so on.
- Use peace radio to highlight gender roles and dynamics in the peace building process.
- Use peace radio to inform listeners about the plight of other conflict-ridden communities, including the adverse effects that arise from conflicts that are not prevented and managed effectively.
- Use peace radio to publicize development activities, especially in rural areas, so as to enhance resource mobilization and attract additional development projects and donor attention.
- Use peace radio to disseminate early warning information, information on the status of cease-fires, and other timely information that can serve to prevent additional violent conflict.
- Use peace radio to publicize and provide live coverage of positive activities in peace building, such as conflict resolution meetings, statements of opinion leaders, etc.
- Encourage journalists to establish ethical standards for balanced reporting and maintain them.

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Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Structural Conditions: To improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets (such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets).	N/A	N/A	N/A

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Structural Conditions**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
<p>Structural Conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to conflict (e.g., tribes, clans, or ethnic groups).</p>	<p>Produce and air programs that emphasize the things that unite people, e.g., similar day-to-day problems and issues, and that provide positive examples of members of both groups involved in the conflict.</p>	<p>Burundians from both ethnic communities have been particularly positive about Studio Ijambo's 'soap opera' called "Our Neighbors, Our Selves," and the magazine show "Pillars of Humanity," popularly known as "Heroes." When asked to name programs that helped them modify, and/or change their attitudes, and/or behavior towards members of other ethnic groups, if any, most of the participants identified these two shows, more than any of Studio Ijambo's other 15 programs at the time of the study. As the first independent radio production program in Burundi, Studio Ijambo has helped change how the government and people view and treat the media. For example, Studio Ijambo correspondents who had previously worked for the government-owned radio station said they could see a big improvement in the extent to which opposition members accepted them when they started covering the Arusha negotiations and in covering Parliament. Even members of the Burundian armed forces, who have had the least favorable attitude toward Studio Ijambo's programs, have shown more tolerance toward the media.</p>	<p>By avoiding preaching about problems, these programs allow people to identify with persons like themselves and to consider peaceful ways to interact. The format is entertaining and offers alternatives to state media programs. People become familiar with the characters in the programs and see them evolve and find solutions over time. Modeling independent newscasting helps media credibility as long as it comes from a source recognized as not under state or factional control.</p>

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and “top-level” official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Channels: To increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Provide airtime for civil society messages	Both Studio Ijambo and HornAfrik Media give programming time to social and economic messages of civil society groups. Studio Ijambo was seen as a means for NGOs to reach their audiences. The Women’s Center, also funded by Search for Common Ground, enjoyed a close relationship with Studio Ijambo and used airtime to get its messages across. In Somalia, HornAfrik Media provided free airtime to civil society organizations to inform people of the public services they provide in the absence of public institutions.	By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik Media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves particularly in talk shows and call in shows. The effectiveness of the warlord’s propaganda was reduced by the alternative competition. Warlords participated in discussions and had to answer to people in public for the first time. Over time the radio stations run by factions were forced to close because of the competition by the independent media group.

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
<p>In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...</p> <p>Channels: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.</p>	<p>By considering the following tactical approach...</p> <p>Early on, develop a policy regarding the application of the principles of openness, comprehensiveness and objectivity in reporting news, especially news that has the potential for increasing conflict and violence.</p>	<p>Some of the key journalistic values and principles, such as openness and objectivity, by which a peace radio should be guided to be credible and effective, may be unacceptable in societies that value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else. Studio Ijambo experience is that such culturally-based challenges must be overcome or at least minimized early through rigorous training and innovative investigative approaches so that the local correspondents can function in an effective and credible way.</p> <p>On the other hand, reporting all the news—including news of violence that has the potential of inciting retaliatory violence—may not be the effective approach. Horn Afrik, a privately-owned radio station, has consciously chosen not to report volatile news in cases where it felt the news would have additional violent consequences by leading to escalation.</p>	<p>Teams of journalists that represent all groups help build public trust in the information source. People want to see themselves represented in the media. This calls for locally based programming in some countries instead of programming that is nationally based.</p> <p>If carefully done, conscious censoring of volatile news in situations of high tensions and conflict may be able to stop escalation because this step denies further fuel for the violence. But this statement is made in absence of evidence to the contrary in the case of HornAfrik. A warning is necessary. Conscious censoring may hurt a station's credibility over time if transparency is compromised.</p>
	<p>Provide open access to NGOs and civic groups to radio production.</p>	<p>In Burundi, many of the local and international NGOs have had access to the radio production studio and have been using it as a vehicle to reach their targeted sectors of the population. Studio Ijambo has also been serving as a forum for civil society, which, like the rest of society, is itself, divided along ethnic lines. In Somalia, HornAfrik provides free air time to CSOs. Since they are the primary means of service delivery in the absence of public programs, their messages are critical to overall welfare.</p>	<p>Diversity in programming is key to maintaining interest. Featuring a range of organizations is also a way to promote balance and model ethnic diversity. Giving a voice to otherwise marginalized groups helps them to feel less so.</p>

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
<p>In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...</p>	<p>By considering the following tactical approach...</p>	<p>Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches, which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone—has created and maintained a broad audience for its productions in Burundi. Such innovative approaches are critical for radio to be effective, not only as a source of credible news and information, but also as an instrument of social and political mobilization for the purposes of peace building.</p> <p>In Somalia, HornAfrik uses town meeting formats and viewer or listener call-in programs to make warlords and other leaders accountable.</p>	<p>Quality of programming is key to maintaining interest in content. Diversity of programming actors, topics and situations models messages of co-existence and cooperation. Unmet need for public discourse makes programs with exchange of views with leaders an important way for citizens to express dissent of dissatisfaction.</p>
	<p>Use team reporting across ethnic lines.</p>	<p>Through team reporting (which includes members of both of the ethnic groups in conflict), Studio Ijambo has helped raise the level of professionalism through systematic and conscious efforts to protect its programs from being contaminated by ethnic bias. In a society where there is so much hatred at close quarters between the two main ethnic groups, it is very difficult to avoid such contamination. However, there is no question that its innovative team reporting practice has sensitized the rest of the media and has shown to what extent a news organization must go to deliver balanced, fair and objective news and information to its audience.</p>	<p>Journalists commit to team reporting and media use it consistently across a range of programs. This reinforces a new ethics in journalism that can extend beyond the immediate peace radio venue.</p>

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
	Use innovative approaches in programming, training and general practices of journalism to draw and sustain an audience large enough to influence public opinion. Keep reinventing in order to overcome professional and cultural challenges to capture and sustain the critical mass necessary to effect meaningful change in conflict situations.	Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches-- which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone--has created a broad audience for its productions in Burundi. HornAfrik's use of 2 FM radio stations, 2 TV channels and a webpage maximize reach. These are the first independent media in Somalia. People like the interactive call-in and town meeting formats. Drama shows show the consequences of war beyond the immediate clan devastation.	People show increased interest in programming and listenership stays high. Peace is underlined in drama programs that show the consequences of violent conflict.

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
<p>In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...</p>	<p>By considering the following tactical approach...</p>	<p>This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...</p>	<p>And this is why it was effective...</p>
<p>Channels: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution.</p>	<p>Provide civic education for communities on citizens' rights and government responsibilities.</p>	<p>Studio Ijambo was instrumental in influencing some policy changes pertaining to several issues, but especially the internally displaced. It was the first to bring to light killings of Hutu refugees returning from Tanzania by Burundian government soldiers in 1997. The camps were closed a year later. Studio Ijambo also produced a series of programs from 1996 to 2000 on the plight of the internally displaced in the camps around the capital, especially the very young. This is believed to have contributed to a mass return from what some describe as "concentration camps" to their homes in Bujumbura's neighborhoods. Ijambo has been using the weight of public opinion to force the government to respond to several of its exposes regarding the camps and other issues.</p> <p>In one non-conflict area, HIV/AIDS, Studio Ijambo's weekly information program presented a series of reports on critical condom shortages in the country. These reports prompted quick government action to import more condoms.</p> <p>In Somalia, HornAfrik investigation of human rights abuses was the first in Somali journalism.</p>	<p>The media information highlighted important problems and issues not addressed by government, and moreover, the news programs were credible because of the use of balanced investigative reporting methods. Thus, the listening public brought pressure (directly or indirectly) on government to act responsibly.</p>

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives	Tactical Approaches	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	By considering the following tactical approach...	<p>Another important lesson from the Studio Ijambo experience and impact is that independence from government control—at least in its operation—is a necessary precondition for a mass media intervention to obtain the necessary results in peace building. One of the primary functions of such an intervention is to serve as a reliable forum for all sides to the conflict. For such a forum to be effective, it must be viewed by all sides as being impartial and credible.</p> <p>In the Burundian experience, the state-owned media's unwillingness to give Nelson Mandela's historic speech a full play at the very start of the negotiations in Arusha once again made it clear how indispensable the independent channels of communication are in a peace process. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated it into Kirundi, the Burundian national language, and produced it. A few of those interviewed recalled listening to the Kirundi version aired over what was then Radio Umwizero.</p>	<p>Without the perception of independence and some credible examples, public confidence in media will be limited.</p> <p>As cases of media balance grow, people are more likely to listen and continue listening over time. They will listen to sources they find consistent and credible.</p>
Channels: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.	Educate individuals about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict.	Through its cultural and dramatic programs and editorials, Studio Ijambo has strengthened the belief of many people on both sides of the ethnic conflict that dialogue is the only rational alternative for Burundi at this time.	By spreading its effect, over time, radio can contribute to a climate of dialogue. A critical mass of programming in several formats is required to achieve this.

**Peace Radio:
Effective Practices and Lessons Learned
Related to Channels**

Strategic Objectives In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	Tactical Approaches By considering the following tactical approach...	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
	Promote peace building discussions between mid-level leaders for public consumption. E.g., air live strategic meetings between elders and other political leaders.	<p>Studio Ijambo opened up new channels of communication for those who did not have access to the government-owned media, and as result, provided a reliable forum for an indirect dialogue between the parties and ethnic blocs. In fact, the project was founded on the premise “that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse.”</p> <p>HornAfrik in Somalia used call-in formats and public meetings to hold warlords accountable.</p>	<p>Part of the reason Studio Ijambo was so effective was because it exposed Burundian people to the different political visions and platforms the parties have been debating among themselves. This educational function of the media, which encourages informed participation from the people, naturally affects the negotiation process in a positive way.</p> <p>By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves, particularly in talk shows and call-in shows. HornAfrik provided an alternative to faction-controlled radio shows, and over time the competition forced these radio shows to close down, thus reducing the ability of warlords to spread propaganda.</p>

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors...	Tactical Approaches By considering the following tactical approach...	Operational Approaches	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives...	And this is why it was effective...
Triggers and Inhibitors: To promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	N/A		
Triggers and Inhibitors: To reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Provide accurate information about events in a timely way.	<p>As an independent and credible source of verified news and information, Ijambo has become instrumental in the fight against a recurring source of ethnic tension: rumor-mongering, which can have catastrophic consequences in such a highly polarized society torn by mistrust and fear. For example, the 1988 massacre of Tutsis by Hutus was triggered by a false rumor that the former was preparing to attack the latter.</p> <p>In Somalia, the presence of two radio stations and two TV stations plus a webpage increases the likelihood of public access to real and balanced information in time of crisis.</p>	Public trust in media must be present for it to have a mitigating effect in time of tension or potential conflict. This may take time to develop and credibility is not won quickly.

III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OR PEACE BUILDING

This chapter draws together the findings regarding the three differing generic types of NGO initiatives that were examined by the project. These three forms of intervention are:

- ❑ Local Peace Processes Involving Traditional Institutions
- ❑ Middle-level, Non-official, National dialogues
- ❑ Peace Radio

A. Local Community-Based Peace Processes

This approach to conflict management seeks to involve the parties to a local conflict in a process of negotiating a settlement by drawing to some extent on traditional procedures, cultural norms and actors. The belief is that using respected local traditions is often especially effective in reaching a settlement because of the legitimacy and ties that the shared values and rituals engender. The three individual projects that reflect features of this approach and thus were studied are:

- ❑ The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), Northern Kenya,
- ❑ Inter-tribal Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and,
- ❑ The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda.

A.1. Findings about Impacts

How effective are local traditional peace processes for conflict prevention, management or peace building?

- ❑ Economic Improvement: **Did they expand economic resources?**

Positive: All three initiatives helped stimulate some degree of increased local economic activity.

The three initiatives aimed principally at ending the violence of the conflicts they addressed, chiefly through stimulating dialogue or negotiations among key parties to those conflicts. Only the ARLPI initiative viewed local socio-economic development as an objective at the outset. However, some signs of new economic vitality followed all the initiatives, such as (depending on the case) renewed local business; new local building; restored inter-tribal trade; returning projects and new investment by donor agencies, international NGO's or the government; more regular bus schedules, or other travel to and from the area; and increased

local contributions for new local social infrastructure such as schools. The exact extent of improvement is not known, but it seems clearest in the Wajir case, somewhat less evident in the NSCC case, and least evident in the ARLPI case.

The Wajir and NSCC processes have achieved economic improvement mainly because their peace talks and subsequent projects helped to end local violence and thus restore a sense of security to the affected communities, thereby encouraging renewed local market, trade, commercial and development activity. The ARLPI has contributed to local economic activity not by increasing security, for violence has continued. But the initiative itself lobbied the central government and donors to increase the amount of aid that was already flowing to some extent to northern districts.

Limits. However, none of the initiatives have significantly altered underlying economic sources of conflict, such as the local scarcity of basic economic resources and inter-regional disparities. These conditions include the recurrent effects of drought, the dependency on traditional means of livelihood such as cattle breeding, perennial competition over grazing land, lack of access to wealth-generating natural resources (e.g. oil in southern Sudan), and lack of job opportunities for youth.

□ **Inter-Communal Relations: Did they increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

Positive impacts: Through a trickle down effect, all initiatives probably have improved relationships and attitudes between various groups living in the areas of the local conflict. These closer relations involved the communities who were opposed in the conflict in two cases, Wajir and NSCC. In Kenya, the Wajir process accomplished this by the introduction of community-level dialogue and legitimate enforcement; reorienting the actions and attitudes of local state actors; and generally, increasing local capacity to address immediate problems of violent conflict. In Sudan, the NSCC focused on reconciliation between the Nuer and the Dinka through a process based on age-old traditions of conflict resolution focused on dialogue between chiefs and elders. However, in this case, the traditional model was used to foster dialogue among people who have been fighting. In contrast, the case of ARLPI involved, not the parties from northern and southern Uganda who were engaged in the conflict to which the initiative was addressed, but only the parties who increasingly found themselves on the one side of the conflict, in Acholiland. Specifically, local councils, Resident District Commissioners, and the military were brought together for dialogue through both the Kitgum Joint Peace Forum and the District Reconciliation and Peace Team. These processes have fostered a great improvement in working relationships and attitudes between civilian and military leaders in Acholiland.

In large rural areas, the dispersion of most members of clans or tribes over vast regions and the pattern of people living in largely mono-ethnic territories place inherent limits on the amount of contact that is normally experienced among the ordinary members of differing groups, except in the markets, small border towns and schools. In any case, changed mass attitudes are also difficult to ascertain, and no data samples were gathered directly on whether the views of rank and file clan members have changed toward each other.

Nevertheless, in the Sudan and Northeast Kenya region, presumably more favorable mutual attitudes were engendered among the respective ordinary members of groups whenever the specific peace settlements that the conferences fostered between clan or tribe leaders after specific instances of violence, then were followed by the return of stolen goods, abducted women and children, or payment of compensation. The Sudan study suggests, for example, that Nuers and Dinkas were linked at least symbolically when their violent disputes were resolved. The reported increased local economic activity may have increased the amount of inter-group contact in border towns and other areas.

The improved relationships in those cases involved distinct ethnic communities (clans or tribes) who were also the parties directly involved in the conflict. In northern Uganda, however, the ARLPI has improved relationships mainly between several kinds of groups only a few of which were directly involved on one side or other of the local conflict. It affected mainly groups on one side of the conflict who have shaped the climate in which the conflict was approached.

The violent conflict in Acholiland is not between ethnic groups, but between an estimated several hundred armed insurgents, on the one side, and the Government of Uganda and its military and security forces (GOU) -- as well as increasingly the victimized local Acholiland communities -- on the other side. It is perhaps true that the ARLPI's successful lobbying for the Amnesty Bill and the consequent establishment of the Amnesty Commission opened a door through which a few individual members of the rebel forces have felt encouraged to return to their communities. The local psychosocial programs the ARLPI fostered have presumably helped some of the young former combatants who were abducted to be reconciled with their families and villages.

The ARLPI has had some of its most significant impacts in inter-group reconciliation by encouraging better relationships between many formerly estranged segments of the local and national population, but these groups do not represent the opposed sides in the northern conflict. It has also reportedly improved local relationships between the local military and local civilian authorities and population, between local government and NGO's, and between local Acholi leaders and expatriate Acholis. Its influence on the GOU to moderate its strictly military approach to the conflict has probably helped to bring more of the local population psychologically on the government side by overcoming some of the legacy of government repression.

In addition, at the level of Ugandan national society, it has improved relations between local Acholi officials and central government authorities by improving the discourse about the North, which had been viewed as the source of the LRA insurgency. The ARLPI also seems to have reduced the sectarian rivalries between Anglicans and Catholics that have divided Ugandans to some extent politically, both in Acholiland where Catholics are the largest denomination, and throughout the country. This may have reduced some latent North-South animosity and weakened the legacy of political sectarianism that Milton Obote had perpetrated.

The significance of this for the conflict itself lies with the potential that might now exist for these increasingly reconciled groups to form a more unified political and psychological front

against the LRA. The ARLPI has mainly helped to create the potential for more of a common bond and feeling of resolve among various groups that could become more unified behind an anti-LRA effort, but not between the LRA and the LPDF and army who are actually in combat.

Limits. Whether an armed guerrilla movement such as the LRA is likely to be readily influenced by such increased pressure, even if it materializes, is not at all clear. Any observable impact on the local armed conflict that may have arisen from the reconciliation that has occurred among the various groups mentioned above is not evident so far. The ARLPI has publicly urged a ceasefire and lobbied the GOU to negotiate with the LRA and the GOS, but it has not brought the LRA as a whole any closer to either the GOU or ordinary Acholilanders.

□ Mobilization: **Did they mobilize new agents of peace?**

Positive: All three initiatives enlisted people from different walks of life -- such as traditional elders, civil servants, women, youth, educators, intellectuals, diaspora -- into old institutions that were redirected to new purposes or into new local activities that served new community-wide purposes.

In Wajir and southern Sudan, the more frequent conferences of elders or the new councils, respectively, cut across the conflicting communities. The Al Fatah Declaration established a new inter-clan ongoing framework for dispute resolution, as did the Wunlit and Waat settlements regarding various Nuer and Dinka peoples. The Wajir and NSCC processes helped to re-orient traditional community (clan or tribal) structures that often supported conflict to act instead as agents of intergroup dispute resolution, if not reconciliation.

For example, when rapes, thefts, or other violent acts were inflicted by members of one clan on another in the Wajir area, the initiative met with the elders who led the clans involved. Though clans are traditional structures within which the normal responses might be revenge and thus the likely escalation of conflict, the elders were encouraged to act instead as positive “spin doctors,” so to speak, of the episodes. By characterizing the actions as individual crimes, rather than harms aimed at the clan, the elders interpreted the meaning of these events to their clans in ways that short-circuited the usual cycle of retribution. They also used clan channels to locate the individual culprits and turn them over to the state authorities. The Wajir initiative also appears so far to have created a local constituency specifically for peace that may be self-sustaining.

By giving local professionals and other groups specific roles on local committees and other consultative or decision-making structures, or distinct tasks in the peace conferences, all three projects also enabled hitherto largely non-participating segments of society to participate in community affairs to an extent they had not been able to do in the past.

Limits: Being largely one-time events in different locations, the Sudanese peace conferences have not created to the same extent any ongoing local programs or constituencies promoting peace. The one-shot nature of each peace conference and their differing sites may limit the extent they can achieve a locally generated momentum. The diverse social agenda of the

ARLPI may have dissipated the amount of focus on peace in the conflict itself or other smaller-scale conflict issues.

None of the local projects has been able to join with others to lead to a broad national constituency or coalition for peace.

- **Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: Did they create new organizational capabilities or social techniques?**

Positive: All the initiatives encouraged new ways of using old institutions in their respective local settings, and all these institutional innovations led to some replication of their approaches in other settings. Two of the initiatives also organized several new types of mechanisms for local decision-making and social action that began to address other local problems besides conflict.

All projects started mainly with traditional institutions or other existing customs, but grafted onto them new norms and methods for handling local clashes, so the results are actually hybrids. The NSCC fostered the same inter-tribal conference technique in new places. The Wajir and ARLPI initiatives also have stimulated other virtually unprecedented types of institutions, such as more inclusive local forums for resolving disputes or for expressing and discussing grievances and community problems. The offshoot activities that Wajir spawned to tackle problems besides clan violence included the committees for women and youth, rapid response teams, the training of district officers and briefings for new ones, the plans for a “peace school,” a polytechnic school, and other projects. Similarly, the ARLPI set up several kinds of new community activities such as KJPF and DPRT policy dialogues among different local leaders and officials, quasi-official decision making committees and bodies, public education programs, training of community volunteers, and the like.

The Wajir approach to organizing local elders as champions of inter-clan peace was studied by visitors as a model for their own communities. The initiative leaders were invited to Garissa and Madera, held negotiations with other elders in Ethiopia and Somalia, and had their methods discussed in a regional workshop. The ARLPI’s model of interfaith collaboration is also being viewed as a possible model by other communities.

Limits: The NSCC model worked quite well as a local dispute resolution mechanism in several sites, but it did not generate momentum to set up other kinds of local projects in those sites. It may have been limited in the kinds of new activities it could try by the necessarily temporary, “tent” nature of the conferences (due to the security risk), and perhaps the lack of sufficient initiative and leadership from the tribes themselves.

- **Governing Institutions: Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

Positive: The impacts of the initiatives in strengthening the ongoing structures of local and central government differed greatly because of their very different political relationships with the existing authorities.

The Wajir project deliberately collaborated with, and often co-opted, local government officials, and thus it was ultimately supportive of the formal institutions of the Kenya state. Wajir implicitly helped to legitimate the local institutions and rules of the Kenya government by working frequently with the District officials. The elders who formed the Al Fatah became the leading local force in dispute resolution and promoter of peace-building in Wajir district, and thus they investigated crimes within the clans. But they turned over accused law violators to state authorities. The Wajir initiative also helped establish a new organizational infrastructure of local policymaking and coordinating bodies, such as the informal traditionally based “constitution” represented by the Al Fatah Declaration and the four working subcommittees.

The Sudan traditional peace conferences had no relation to the local or central authorities of the GOS, and in fact had to avoid possible government air attacks. However, they do form local structures that help to implement some of the governing functions of the SPLM rebel movement, which has become the functioning government in much of southern Sudan. This has been achieved by helping to achieve peace among local tribes within areas controlled by the SPLA and thus consolidating their military and political control. Broadly, they were part of the political movement to create some autonomous governing entity in the South, and thus an alternative state, *de facto* if not *de jure*.

The ARLPI initiative has invigorated existing governing channels so they deal more adequately with the conflict and problems in the northern districts. It sought and achieved to some extent a presidential endorsement for its local work. Along with the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG), it has been successful in acting as a pressure group on the central government to enact policies responsive to local needs and sentiment in the north. In particular, it apparently significantly influenced the passage of the crucial “blanket” feature of the very important amnesty law and the establishment of a new governmental institution, the Amnesty Commission.

Limits: The ultimate nature and direction of the momentum that the Wajir and ARLPI quasi-public processes have generated is unclear, and thus their sustainability. Will they become the normal infrastructure for doing local government business or persist as an adjunct set of advisory or community bodies? They also have not made significant efforts to influence districting decisions and other national legislation that ultimately will affect the Wajir and other northeastern districts.

Possible Negative Impacts: In theory, the ARLPI initiative was supportive of formal government, but it competed to some degree with governing processes such as local representation and social services. The ARLPI helped support the formal apparatuses of the state such as through improving local civilian-military relations. But complaints were heard that the ARLPI’s expanding activities, policy statements, institutionalization, and becoming the “conscience” of the local area, as well as its increasing international visibility and funding acumen were leading it to possibly usurp roles that should be played by local and indeed national government officials. Local officials felt they should be responsible for peace negotiations with the LRA, and the APG felt that its M.P.s should be Acholiland’s principal advocates and representatives before the central government.

□ **Peace Negotiations and Pacts: Did they advance political negotiations?**

Positive: Regarding the local conflicts they sought to end, the Wajir and NSCC initiatives not only fostered negotiations over several specific episodes of the local violence, they also achieved peace agreements. The ARLPI moderated the approach of the government side to the conflict, and pressed both sides for peace negotiations, but did not bring them about.

In Wajir and Sudan, respectively, specific local peace agreements were reached, such as the Al Fatah Declaration and the Wunlit and other inter-tribal peace pacts. The Al Fatah elders have adjudicated inter-clan disputes by arresting and trying accused persons for murder and dealing with other killings under Somali traditional procedures, which included apologies, compensation and blood money payments. Wajir also made some progress in helping to mediate inter-clan disputes in other local districts. The women from the PDC along with two elders helped to resolve a dispute over water resources in the village of Berjanai, leading to an agreement to share the resource

In the third case, northern Uganda, the ARLPI was able to coax Museveni in 1998 to express his intent to sign a ceasefire, reportedly helped sway the GOU and local NRM and LDF forces away from a strictly military approach to the conflict with the LRA, and met with some rebels. However, the ARLPI has not been able to establish even informal contacts between the GOU and the leadership of the LRA, such as Joseph Kony.

Regarding national actors or other states that are supporting the local conflicts, the Wajir district is unique because national politicians such as MP's or the government have not as yet sought to fan the local conflicts, as they had in the ethnic clashes in western Kenya in the early 1990's. Whether or not the reputation for success of the local initiatives has helped deter outside interference is unknown. But the initiative has not sought to influence the local MP with regard to national legislation or policies that might benefit these conflicts' resolution.

Limits: In the southern Sudan and Acholiland conflicts, supra-local military forces or states provide support to the local combatants (i.e., the GOU, SPLA, and other outsider states versus the GOS, and the GOU and the GOS, respectively). In both instances, higher level contacts and negotiations have gone on, but have been conducted by IGAD and the Carter Center, respectively. The latter achieved a GOU-GOS agreement that has been implemented to some extent, although the LRA was not involved in the talks. But except for the ARLPI's possibly improving the GOU's openness to compromise, the local initiatives have not significantly influenced these higher-level actors and their negotiations.

The ARLPI has not been able to convene any talks and thus reach any settlements. Regarding the national or inter-state conflicts within which the Sudan and Acholiland conflicts were embedded, neither initiative has advanced negotiations. In fact, the Sudan inter-tribal conferences most likely strengthen the SPLA side in its struggle with the GOS, by helping to consolidate its grass-roots influence in the areas it controls. On its part, the NSCC, although an activity of religious leaders who in theory are concerned with peace and reconciliation as an un-divisible public good, has not actively promoted SPLM-GOS rapprochement.

- Violent and other hostile behavior: **Did they prevent or stop violence or reduce armed capacities?**

Positive: The initiatives have differed greatly in their ability to stop local violence, due to the very different scales of the conflicts and whether they have had the capacity to control armed activity. The Wajir and NSCC efforts have been quite successful in stopping inter-clan attacks, but the ARLPI initiative has been unable to end the armed insurgency of the LRA.

The Wajir initiative has not been able to prevent fresh outbreaks of violence among members of different clans. In several instances, however, it has succeeded in averting the escalation of violence that ordinarily would result from the cycle of revenge and retaliation. After a young man from one clan killed another from another clan over a gun, for example, the clans struck back at each other in a cycle of escalation that left seventeen people dead. But the Al Fatah elders persuaded the clans to accept a ceasefire. It then adjudicated the original dispute by arresting and trying the first man for murder and dealing with the subsequent killings under Somali traditional procedures, including apologies, compensation and blood money payments. Similarly, the elders were not able to stop the Bagalla massacre, but they restrained the Dagaden clan that had been attacked from seeking revenge. They have also been able to coax clans to turn in their guns. The effects of such interventions over time apparently have improved the sense of security in Wajir town, where people had not felt safe walking around in the evenings. In a similar way, the Wunlit and other NSCC conferences each reduced the amount of cattle rustling and abductions among the tribes that were parties to these episodes.

In 1998, the ARLPI was able to coax President Museveni to express his intent to sign a ceasefire and supposedly has helped sway the GOU away from a strictly military approach to the conflict with the LRA. Despite this and other initiatives, the level of the LRA's armed attacks on civilians in Acholiland has continued at a high level, and has even increased during the past year. It may be argued that, over time, the various ARLPI and APG efforts might reduce some of the factors fueling the conflict. The efforts might bring the Acholi people and leaders more into line against the LRA. The Amnesty might wean individuals away from Kony's ranks, and local economic opportunities might reduce the number of individuals that the LRA is able to recruit. Such efforts might thus help shift the balance of preponderant incentives and disincentives in the government's favor. The LRA has increasingly neither sought nor necessarily depended on local popular support to continue its guerrilla activities, however, and whether the LRA leadership is psychologically amenable to such pressures it is not clear. In any case, it is a long-term strategy. It is not clear whether the GOU military's actions have become significantly more temperate in the area.

Possible Negative Impacts: By undertaking resolution of domestic squabbles, the initiative may reduce the amount of time, energy and resources the SPLM requires to maintain control over the southern territory and thus strengthening its position in the military conflict. It is very difficult to judge whether this serves to perpetuate the larger war by strengthening their side, or helps to maintain a balance of power that, if translated into a perceived "mutually hurting stalemate" could hasten the negotiations to resolve that war.

Thus, the reconciliation that has occurred among the various local groups mentioned that may have arisen from the initiatives has not had any observable impact so far on the governments and other outside parties that are supporting one or other side in the local armed conflict. The ARLPI has publicly urged a ceasefire and lobbied the GOU to negotiate with the LRA and the GOS, but it has not restrained the armed activity of the LRA or the GOU.

A.2. Conclusion: Summary of Impacts

Having examined what three particular examples or cases of this generic method of intervention perform on our various impact criteria, we now seek to generalize about the impacts of this intervention method of local inter-communal peace processes as a whole. In what respects does this method tend to help to prevent or manage conflict and build peace? What are its limits? Does it have any harmful effects?

While keeping in mind that we are using only three cases for our evidence, we can generalize about the effectiveness of this overall approach in dealing with conflicts – its central tendency, what it tends to be “good for” or do well, and what it does poorly – by looking at those elements or dimensions of conflict that it most consistently affects positively, and those aspects of conflicts that it influences less consistently or may even affect negatively.

All three initiatives can claim success in facilitating specific bilateral or unilateral steps toward peace by the parties to the conflicts. The estimated impacts of the three initiatives are outlined in the table 1, which summarizes the data presented in the narrative above by giving various verbal scores to each project’s performance on all the seven criteria. Based on these three cases, local peace processes have the ability in specific applications to affect all the major aspects or dimensions of conflict, but clearly they do not consistently do so. The approach is apparently more effective in achieving certain kinds of effects better than others. Specifically, the kinds of impact where application of this approach have the most consistent positive impacts, or the highest scores, are in:

- ❑ Mobilizing agents for peace;
- ❑ Introducing and spreading social innovations; and interestingly,
- ❑ Improving local economic activity.

All three cases showed some positive impacts on those three dimensions, with the fostering of social innovations being the area of strongest impact.

Because there is considerable unevenness across the three cases with regard to the other criteria, however, we can generalize that this approach is apparently weaker, and possibly harmful at times, with regard to achieving:

- ❑ Closer inter-communal reconciliation,
- ❑ Strengthening governing institutions,

- Advancing political negotiations, and
- Actually controlling violence.

Arguably, its weakest impacts have to do with controlling violence and achieving closer inter-communal ties. Nevertheless, specific applications of this approach can achieve each of these kinds of impacts, although few applications of the approach achieve all of the impacts.

Estimated Impacts of Local Community-Based Peace Processes. Table 1

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	Wajir	NSCC	ARLPI
Expand economic activity? • Commerce, trade, aid	High	Medium	Low to Medium (pressed for more aid)
• Resource base	None	None	None
Improve relations between communities affecting conflict? • Groups participating in the local conflict?	Plausible (between hostile clans)	Plausible (between hostile tribes/subtribes)	None (between LRA and Acholis, army)
• Other groups influencing the conflict?	None	None	Medium (diaspora)
CHANNELS	Wajir	NSCC	ARLPI
Mobilize local agents for peace?	High , possibly institutionalized	Medium , possibly temporary	Medium
Introduce and spread social innovations?	High , multifaceted	Medium (single technique)	High , multifaceted
Strengthen governing institutions? • Local	High	Medium (SPLM); None (GOS)	Possibly negative
• National	None	None or possibly negative (ambiguous)	Low
Advance political negotiations? • Local conflict	High	High	None
• Higher level conflict	None	None or possibly negative (ambiguous)	None or low
TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	Wajir	NSCC	ARLPI
Reduce violent behavior? • Local conflict	Medium	Medium	None
• Higher level conflict	NA	None or possibly negative	Low
Overall Efficacy <i>To date, which initiative has exercised the greatest overall leverage against the conflict within its context? Leverage? Command?</i>	High	Medium	Low to medium

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
 Medium data suggests some impact
 Low data suggests a little impact
 None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
 Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
 Not known insufficient data
 NA Not applicable

A.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

The previous section identified how effective Local Community-Based Peace Processes are in reducing various sources of conflict and strengthening various peace capacities. The ultimate purpose in gathering those findings is to help us improve these and similar initiatives in conflict prevention, management and peace-building. In particular, we want to know the following:

- ❑ How can the positive results that were obtained be replicated in the three specific settings or in other settings?
- ❑ How might the poor results of these initiatives, and any harmful results, be avoided?

To answer these questions, we need to probe into the *reasons* why the positive and negative impacts found above occurred. What were the ingredients that were associated with relative success, where was it achieved? What elements apparently led to relative weak performances (failure), or perhaps even harm? If we can arrive at conclusions about important correlated factors, they can provide us with lessons or guidelines as to how to choose, design and implement similar initiatives of this same type in other situations, as well as how to improve these particular initiatives.

As indicated previously, there are several reasons why a given intervention may produce given results:

- ❑ The nature of the *problem* that was tackled (in this case, a conflict) may have been either relatively difficult or easy.
- ❑ Features in the basic *design* of the intervention may have been important.
- ❑ The ways the intervention was *implemented* may have been crucial.
- ❑ The immediate *context* into which the intervention was introduced and it operated was favorable or unfavorable.

Therefore, in order to replicate an effective initiative in a second setting (or in the same setting in the future) and expect to have the best chances of achieving the desired results, it is essential to look into all the kinds of factors on which effectiveness apparently depends, and whether they are present in the situation one faces. All need to be considered -- or at least should be kept in mind -- in making future choices. In effect, these factors become the criteria for identifying the kinds of new opportunities or situations and useful entry points where this type of initiative is likely to work best.

Hence, the following table (table 2) seeks to provide useful guidelines as to the factors that ideally should be optimized in future settings in order to obtain the best results possible. To arrive at these factors, the three cases of this type of initiative were probed and compared to ascertain what kinds of ingredients of the four general kinds listed above were associated with the results and thus appear to be the key determinants of those outcomes. The conclusions are given below in the form of a checklist of key questions that should be asked when considering

whether to apply this type of initiative in a given situation. In some instances, evidence is cited from the case studies to illustrate how the cases were similar or different in that respect.⁸

⁸ It would go way beyond the capacity of this study to do a survey of all the places and conflict situations in the Greater Horn of Africa where this type of initiative might be promising to apply. But these guidelines provide a decision support tool for examining many such specific situations to see if they are conducive to achieving positive results.

**Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing
Local Community-Based Peace Processes*: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist**

Table 2

<p>Regarding the nature of the conflict: How tractable or intractable is the conflict being addressed?</p>	<p>To what extent are outside actors controlling major political and military events affecting the local area?</p>	<p>In the Wajir District of Northern Kenya, violent conflict between communities can arise over competition for scarce resources, especially in periods of drought. Outside actors are not a factor in affecting the local area. Although the WPDC process cannot affect climate patterns of drought and scarcity, it was able to find ways to deal with conflict successfully and reduce incidents of retaliation, and tensions, between communities and clans.</p>
<p>Regarding the basic design of the initiative (activity): <i>Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?</i></p>	<p><i>Are peace agreements being sought between specific institutions that represent the distinct communities that are in conflict, or is it a broader process of general public education, community problem-solving, etc.?</i></p>	
	<p><i>Is the initiative working through the existing channels of an established local institution?</i></p>	<p>The WPDC and NSCC processes both used the traditions of local community leadership by male elders and of inter-group peace councils. The ARLPI worked through the local organizational hierarchies of the three faiths in the area: Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim.</p>
<p>Regarding the implementation of the initiative: <i>(How well is it implemented?)</i></p>	<p><i>Is the activity initiated by educated skillful professionals?</i></p>	<p>WPDC was spurred by educated local women in business or the civil service. The NSCC and ARLPI projects were started by men and women clerics and other church professionals.</p>
	<p><i>Are the initiators actively creating support and cooperation from significant local groups?</i></p>	<p>The WPDC met early on with civil servants, elders, teachers and local government officials. The NSCC engaged in extensive prior consultation with tribal representatives before organizing peace conferences. In contrast, however, the ARLPI first sought presidential support, as a way to legitimize itself with local officials and subsequently held the Bedo Pliny consultation and a subsequent consultation to achieve local consensus.</p>

	<i>Is a methodical grass-roots process being followed to designate representatives of the local communities, and are lengthy consultations used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions?</i>	The WPDC and NSCC both followed careful rules for identifying local representatives for the council of elders and delegates to peace conferences, respectively, and the AI Fatah Declaration and intertribal peace agreements were reached after lengthy meetings that reached a broad consensus through following detailed agreed-upon procedures. In contrast, the ARLPI did not follow either procedure.
Regarding the immediate context: <i>Was it placed in fertile ground?</i>	<i>Has some similar activity of this general nature operated before in the area?</i>	Each of the case-study areas had received the attention of the same sponsoring organizations or others through somewhat similar earlier projects.
	<i>Is the activity “tapping into” any articulated intensely felt local needs, such as evoked by recent violent events, or is it motivated primarily by ulterior agendas?</i>	Following an incident in which many people were killed, the WPDC circulated a petition. The NSCC activity was motivated by recurrent intertribal clashes and the desire of tribal leaders to resist manipulation by SPLM factions and the GOS. The two most successful peace conferences addressed the tribes’ concerns rather than wider politics. However, it arose as well from the NSCC’s vision of a southern Sudan civil society. It is also less clear whether the ARLPI responded to specific deeply felt local anti-war feelings or instead sought to cultivate them through war sensitization and peace education. It also sought to improve the perceived lack of attention by the central government to northern problems.
	<i>Are the local institutions that the peace process is creating able to encompass the parties that are engaging in violent conflict and to control the behavior of those who are using deadly force through effective sanctions?</i>	The AI Fatah council of clan elders, in conjunction with the local Kenyan government police, were able to capture, judge and punish those responsible for local incidents of violence; and the inter-tribal conferences set up enforcement machinery, including monitors, to ensure compliance with their agreements. (The possible role of the SPLM as enforcer is not known.) The ARLPI however could not discipline the LRA or the LDF and the Army in its process.
	<i>Do local government and local political authorities have relative autonomy from central government and do they support and work with the initiative?</i>	
<p>*To pinpoint the most important factors that explain the observed impacts, this process was followed: Where all the cases had similar positive impacts, they were compared for common elements, as these are most likely to explain the similar impacts. Where the initiatives had differing results, they were examined for the differences among them, as these are likely to explain those results.</p>		

B. Middle Level Non-Official National Dialogues

Three initiatives, which fall into the type called Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogue, are convening unofficial forums in which public officials and leaders in society discuss important national-level political and policy issues facing their countries. These issues may be social and economic issues and political or military conflicts of widely varying intensity. In these cases, the conflicts involved varied in their intensity from unresolved fundamental policy debates in the would-be state of Somaliland to periodic outbreaks of violence over elections in Kenya to continuing civil war in Burundi. The initiatives are sponsored by international donors or NGOs and carried out by religious leaders and other professionals. The specific cases are as follows:

- ❑ Faith-based Facilitation of the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK),
- ❑ The Apostles for Peace (CAP) Dialogue Project, Burundi, International Alert, and,
- ❑ The Action Evaluation and Dialogue Project in Somaliland, The War Torn Societies Project (WSP).

The generic approach is variously called track-two diplomacy, track one-and-one-half diplomacy, pre-negotiation and interactive conflict resolution. As with the other types of initiatives, the application of unofficial dialogues has an explicit or implicit theory behind it.

The underlying notion is that major contentious political and policy issues, including open conflicts, can begin to be resolved when key officials together with politically influential individuals at the middle level from across the lines are able to meet outside the formal channels of government and politics. Acting at least to some extent in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of the parties to a conflict, these middle-level players can develop closer relationships and exchange views and positions with less pressure to be partisan. The dialogues may be sponsored and facilitated by various third parties and may or may not explicitly apply specific conflict resolution techniques (such as the procedures of problem-solving workshops that have been developed by Herbert Kelman and John Burton and applied in many international settings over the last thirty years).

B.1. Findings about Impacts: How effective are non-official national dialogues in conflict prevention, management or peace-building?

- ❑ Economic Improvement: **Do they expand economic resources?**

Positive: Only the WSP initiative had economic effects, but these were indirect and potential, rather than observable. By highlighting certain economic needs and pointing out needed changes in economic policies, the dialogue might reap some added economic efficiency and thus increased resources in the medium term. One of its local workshops, for example, alerted national and local officials to the hardship caused by the monopolistic practice of livestock exporters to pay livestock producers at inflated prices.

Limits: None of the dialogue projects led directly to any increase in the economic resources enjoyed by the countries involved or to definite prospects for such benefits. The Kenya constitutional review process was not intended to improve the economic assets or economic health of Kenya, nor could it be expected to do so directly. This was not the purpose of the Burundi CAP dialogue process either. Here the focus was on the promotion of peace.⁹

Missed opportunities: Though not an economic development project, the WSP initiative was criticized by some interviewees for not involving international donors more directly in its discussions. This may have resulted in missed opportunities to channel donor aid specifically into the priorities and programs that have received the benefit of the WSP's inclusive process of consensus building and vetting. To others, this exclusion simply reflects the project's primary aim of cultivating a home-grown dialogue, so that it should not be viewed as a traditional development project.

Although the NCKK process focused on the country's constitutional rather than economic reform, when some consensus is achieved on issues or even procedures, arguably this achievement should be publicized more explicitly with donors as a sign of progress and a process they should continue to watch. This might raise the stakes for the players themselves and contribute to improving the climate for business investment and aid, thus reversing the current economic decline. The case study noted no efforts or impacts of this nature so far, however.

□ **Inter-Communal Relations: Did dialogues increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

Positive: The Kenya, Burundi and Somaliland dialogues, as well as the sponsoring organizations themselves, deliberately bring together individuals from differing ethnic groups. By definition, however, these individuals are, by and large, members of the professional and political elites in their countries, not ordinary citizens. Because the three dialogues have all received some newspaper and television coverage, however, their cross-lines composition may convey the message symbolically to a larger population that inter-group discussions that cross-cut the main cleavages in society are currently focusing on key national issues. Although public opinion data were not collected to test this hypothesis, the examples below demonstrate that such publicity might help to instill the notion that conflicts

⁹ However, the extensive existing research on other cases of dialogues and their methods (e.g., problem-solving workshops) makes virtually no reference to direct impacts on economic resources or the immediate prospects of gaining them. Two comprehensive reviews of the research literature on interactive conflict resolution (problem solving workshops, etc.) mention no evidence of economic impacts (d'Estree, et. al., 2000; Fisher, n.d.). The lack of evidence may reflect not only the fact that dialogues may not usually have economic results as primary objectives, but also, that the disciplinary perspective of dialogue researchers leads them to look mainly for impacts in terms of changes in the dialogue participants' attitudes, relationships, and other consequences that are internal to the dialogue process. Or at most, impacts may be sought on other official negotiations. But outcomes for society at large are not envisioned except indirectly. Still, this does not necessarily mean such outcomes do not ever occur. Although this literature does not document any such impacts, it reveals expectations that dialogues can lead in the long term to economic benefits and other concrete outcomes, if and when these dialogues are able to achieve agreements, create coalitions and relationships, and empower cooperative decision processes.

between interests can be addressed in a serious and peaceful manner, not only through coercion or violence.

- The Kenya dialogue's continual effort to press for the peaceful resolution of vital constitutional questions and its demonstration that they can be addressed in a consultative way may be helping to buttress the declining notion of a Kenyan national identity. The dialogue operates in the midst of a political process that generally operates on the basis of narrower allegiances and in which some talk is heard of "majimboism," or dividing the country into ethnically and politically distinct areas. An inclusive Kenyan national identity is reinforced by the dialogue's symbolizing, in a very public and prominent way, the idea that such constitutional questions are vital to the national interest and thus affect all Kenyans. The process of grass-roots consultation to hear ordinary citizens views, sponsored by the Ufungamo Initiative and the government, also are now bringing local citizens together.
- The Burundi dialogue process has brought together individuals from differing parties and ethnic groups who are solely from the small middle class in Bujumbura, and thus an elite group. Although this process only represented the middle class, CAP is able to convey the idea of, and model the practice of, inter-ethnic cooperation to a wider audience through the occasional television appearances of its members who are shown working together. The study also suggests that this process of dialogue has influenced the Burundi diaspora in the region and in Europe.
- The WSP process also deliberately includes a broad spectrum of interests from Somaliland society—differing clans, women, businessmen, and professionals. This may help cultivate the sense of, and "buy-in" to, a common national identity through participation in a Somaliland-owned process. The inter-clan WSP staff were seen by some as being fair-minded toward all clans.

Limits: Although the Kenya and Somaliland dialogues are convening public discussion forums in local communities that might mix members of differing ethnic groups, no specific evidence came to light that dialogues directly altered everyday interactions and reduced social distance at the general mass or grassroots level.

- The Kenya constitutional dialogue by itself has little potential for impact on the day-to-day relationships of large numbers of members of different ethnic groups. The dialogue focuses on constitutional reform, and not on the quality and peacefulness of relationships between members of different communities and ethnic groups.
- Although working more consistently at the grassroots level, the Somaliland dialogue also cannot by itself substantially improve clan and sub-clan linkages at the grassroots level. This would require more sustained effort and dialogue through additional types of interventions focused on such linkages beyond the issue driven workshops sponsored by the WSP process.

- Although a “culture of dialogue” may exist in some non-governmental circles in Bujumbura, it is not known what attitudinal or behavioral impacts their publicized activities may have in the countryside.
- Other cases and research reviews suggest that dialogues do have the potential to indirectly foster improved interactions between communities in conflict. One workshop aimed to encourage participants from conflicting groups to explore cooperation that could be transferred back to their communities. They saw this occurring indirectly, however, and provide little if any concrete evidence of whether and how this occurs.¹⁰

Negative: In the highly visible Kenya dialogue, the question of what interests should be represented in the meetings has frequently become a contentious issue in itself. This may reinforce the aura of political combat among competing interests, rather than circumvent it. Similarly in Somaliland, but to a lesser degree, local resentments were stirred up in a few instances on the matter of which groups had been selected to participate in a dialogue.

□ **Social and Political Mobilization: Did dialogues mobilize new agents of peace?**

Positive: The Kenya and Somaliland dialogues have created forums and processes that give a greater voice, vis-a-vis government officials, to unrepresented interests from those groups that have not been politically active, such as women and individuals from small towns. In this way, they have increased the potential for the mobilization and empowerment of new segments of the population.

- The Kenya initiative was principally responsible for restarting the official constitutional reform process by voicing the desire of established reform-oriented NGO reform groups and opposition parties’ for the review and pushing the government to take action. In addition to bringing the religious leaders and some number of their respective followers at the grassroots, together with other reform organizations in an ongoing process, this and the more recent local consultations have created an ongoing role for non-governmental actors and ordinary citizens to participate in the review process by giving their views about constitutional and other issues.
- Although the Burundi Apostles for Peace apparently have not stimulated any broad-based citizen action, the CAFOB women’s spin-off initiative represents something analogous but smaller, through its effort to organize seminars with women as much as possible outside of Bujumbura. These urge women to strive for economic independence and

¹⁰ Fisher’s (manuscript, n.d.) model of the possible transfer effects of interactive conflict resolution sees the possible influence of such dialogues on “inter-societal relations” as occurring not through any direct impacts on inter-communal processes, relationships, or institutions created or existing between the groups themselves. Rather it might occur indirectly, through the influence that the representatives of the opposed communal groups who meet in a dialogue may each subsequently have on their respective constituencies when they return to them from the dialogue. This literature highlights another possible re-entry effect: the increased interaction that may result between communities if better relationships and trust arise between the members of dialogues may encourage these participants to go on to establish new networks or coalitions across communal lines and carry out activities in pursuit of specific mutual interests and needs.

avoid being manipulated by the competing political factions. They hope that women then can become a pressure group on behalf of their own distinct interests and that of peace.

- The Somaliland dialogue does not aim at mobilizing broad segments of the general population to take political action or even to advocate specific policies in an organized way. It does create national and local venues that engage, on an equal footing, many kinds of citizens who share certain everyday policy concerns (e.g., the impact of qaat and the problem of bribes), but who have been largely ignored or marginalized by national politicians and government officials. This reinforces the norm of democratic inclusion. These groups include women, the independent media, livestock traders, nomads, residents of remote small towns and rural areas, educated professionals, intellectuals, elders, and even MP's. By creating non-confrontational dialogue for examining important issues affecting them, as well as enhancing communication and policy analysis skills, the dialogues have given a voice to groups that have not been empowered. They have also helped synthesize a citizenry-oriented representative process that is Somaliland-wide and indigenously-owned.
- The dialogue also highlights many issues and interests in society that cut across hitherto dominant clan identities. The Somaliland study suggests that the dialogue has served to bring out into the open differences that are not clan-based, such as between traditional and more Westernized worldviews uncovering new cross-cutting societal interests. Although these non-clan differences are new sources of conflicts, they cut across, and may counteract, clan identities.¹¹

Limits: None of the dialogues as yet has stimulated the formation of mass-based popular movements or organizations, such as a broad people's peace or reconciliation campaign, that can exert significant influence on political leaders involved in the respective national political and policy conflicts that are the subject of the dialogues. Indeed, they may act as buffers or safety valves vis-a-vis more radical action, rather than as channels for broad-based peaceful mobilization. The influence of the Kenya process remained reliant implicitly on the threat of violence from more radical elements. The wider literature envisions that participants transfer their own sense of empowerment to non-participants in the form of launching new efforts on behalf of peace (d'Estree, 2000a, 38, 45). But there is no mention of instances where such energy actually has been transferred to non-participants and led to collective action.

- **Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: Did they create new organizational capabilities or social techniques?**

Positive: All three projects introduced into their societies unprecedented mechanisms for addressing political and policy questions. By demonstrating that issues can be addressed constructively, these processes that cross over conflict lines have established new constructive models for societal problem-solving and symbolized new collaborative values.

¹¹ Literature summarizing the results of track-two dialogues and the like mentions that individual participants themselves feel more personally empowered as a result.

- The Kenya Ufungamano process in particular is receiving a lot of public attention and is regarded as a major national vehicle for addressing constitutional and underlying political issues.
- Previously applied in Guatemala and Mozambique, the WSP action evaluation method of creating a venue for peaceful articulation of social interests and discussion of policy options through an iterative and orderly process is being studied as a model by analysts and is being considered for application in southern Somalia.

Limits: These dialogues by themselves have not encouraged other uses of dialogue through spreading or spawning similar activities in other sites.

□ **Governing Institutions: Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

Positive: To varying degrees, all the dialogues appear to have created para-governmental channels which filled the vacuums left by their countries' weak and exclusionary formal representative processes (such as elections), weak or non-existent opposition parties, and parliaments. By feeding unorganized views held by broad publics specifically to government officials or addressing governing processes themselves, they tacitly endorse the idea of legitimate governance and come to the aid of the state and its institutions.

- Besides promoting the idea of constitutionalism itself, the Kenya religious leaders' convening of constitutional dialogue between reformers and the government in 1997 helped break a stalemate and fostered a climate that allowed a framework to be agreed on for continuing the review and allowing the December elections to proceed.
- The WSP process primarily links local leadership and middle level leaders, not the latter and government officials. Yet it apparently has helped open an additional channel to ministers and MP's, and thus legitimize the central government beyond the immediate sphere of its control. It helps define a national agenda of problems that are based on the issues raised during the dialogues, such as taxation and corruption, and it produces reasoned policy papers that document these issues and propose policy options. The government participants forward these ideas to the government and parliament.

To some extent, it also creates a two-way channel between government and groups of lay citizens. WSP provides an orderly process for engaging differing elements in the Somaliland region to come together to identify and discuss the complexities in building a state and society and to articulate and examine differing options. This helps establish a political safety-valve, for it requires many citizens to face up to policy trade-offs and reach some consensus on otherwise non-addressed and possibly divisive issues. It also has to operate within the approved parameters of the authorities, such as the assumption of Somaliland sovereignty.

In particular, the Somaliland case study argues that the dialogue improves the capacity of national institutions and economic policy by seeking to achieve a prior consensus among Somalis about their own economic priorities as a society before dealing with donors, rather than going wherever donor money is available. Further, the increase in the

decision-making cohesion of national leaders and the integrity of their policymaking institutions may even reduce dependency on donors.

- Proponents argue that problem-solving workshops can influence the creation or reform of political institutions that embody the values of collaborative conflict resolution, rather than of elite rule, legal norms, and power-based negotiations. Though little evidence of such outcomes has been gathered, one study of local inter-ethnic projects in Bulgaria found that participants saw them as means to create a culture of democracy and dialogue (d'Estree, 2000, 48).

Limits: While the dialogues clearly provide additional channels for popular representation, they have not necessarily directly improved the formal representative institutions of popular politics and the state. Nor do they appear to have strengthened executive institutions, such as the central and provincial administration, or judicial institutions, such as the courts and police.

- While the Kenya dialogue helped to keep negotiations alive, this only excused the formal electoral process; it did not lead to reform of the elections process or legitimate it. Nor has the process had any apparent impact on government business as usual in the executive and judicial branches.
- The Burundi study did not refer to any impacts on the strengthening of Burundi governing institutions, but this question should be pursued further.

Possible Negative Impacts: The two most influential initiatives seem to have circumvented or displaced to some extent the regular roles that formal institutions of government are expected to play in aggregating society's interests.

- When Kenyan religious leaders launched their own separate review process, this may have discredited and displaced somewhat the representative functions ideally more appropriately played by the political parties and parliament, notwithstanding their obvious weaknesses. It may have widened the gulf between civil society and the state.
 - Ultimately, the WSP dialogue is not an ongoing policy think tank or a formally representative political process that can substitute for a parliament and elections; nor can it serve as a fully operative system of pressure group politics. Yet it may have displaced some investment in making the civil service professional, and it did create strain with some local authorities over who should play the role of local representatives.
- On Political and Peace Negotiations: **Did they advance official political negotiations?**

Positive:

- The NCKK initiative has clearly kept the constitutional review process going and led it to open up to wider influences. The determination of the Ufungamano group to run a grassroots consultation parallel to that of the government's eventually elicited negotiations between the two processes for some kind of compromise joint process.

- The WSP process has identified several issues that have found their way onto the national policy agenda, and its country report influenced the content of the new constitution.

Limits:

- After several years and taking several forms, the NCKK process has not led to any specific legislative or policy changes in the constitution.
- The Burundi CAP initiative yielded no evidence that it had influenced the ongoing official Arusha negotiations through any of the expected track two routes, such as pushing it to resolve issues, improving relationships and trust among the principal leaders, or inserting substantive ideas.
- So far, the Somaliland initiative's parallel channels have influenced the government policy processes only modestly. By not engaging officials directly, and not generally following up on their own policy inputs, the parallel channels still have relatively limited influence on officials. It is not clear whether their policy analyses substantively resolve tough public policy issues and reconcile conflicting interests, or simply express competing demands, nor how much they have shaped the substance of national laws and policies. The initiative also has not addressed some serious unresolved issues of Somaliland domestic policy (e.g., decentralization) and external policy (e.g., sovereignty).

□ Violent behavior: **Did the dialogues stop violence?**

Positive: The Kenya dialogue helped deter or discourage specific violent acts and other hostile behavior and encouraged conciliatory behavior, and thus restrained the escalation of a conflict. The Kenya process appears to have moderated the potential for more collective violence, such as when it stemmed the violence after the 1997 elections. By offering an alternative process for addressing issues, it mollified those who would seek to incite their followers to violent mass action.

Limits:

- The CAP process did not exert any influence over any of the parties to restrain themselves from armed actions.
- The WSP process does not see its role as launching a lobbying effort toward political actors. Instead, it has been engaging middle level actors in the discussion of issues, and it might find it difficult to criticize the government if, for instance, if the government committed human rights abuses.

Possible Negative Impacts: The Kenya process's influence was due in part to the fact that it became a vociferous player in the process and gave up a strictly facilitative role. The Kenya case study suggests that the Ufungamano dialogue evolved into a partisan pressure group in itself, thus moving away from the role of unofficial arbiter of a consultative process. But the increased polarization it thus created between an activist NGO community and government officials may at times have created a political vacuum in which more radical violent action is

encouraged. Also, in Kenya as well as in Somaliland, there also may be some a risk of raising popular expectations of what is possible to achieve by way of political change that exceed the capacities of the existing political system to deliver, thus further destabilizing society.

In Somaliland, there may be some risk that, especially since the Arta conference has created another would-be government in the South, the implicit popular support for Somaliland state-building that the WSP musters may worsen north-south or other unresolved regional conflicts.

B.2. Conclusions: Summary of Impacts

Just as we did with regard to local peace processes, the aim here is to use a small number of cases to discern any central tendency in this instrument -- what it does well, and what it does poorly -- by looking at those elements or dimensions of conflict that it most consistently affects positively, and those aspects of conflicts that it influences less consistently, or may even affect negatively. The table following summarizes the areas in which dialogue processes helped to prevent or manage conflict and build peace or had any harmful effects. It gives the various verbal scores of each project's performance on all the seven criteria.

Based on these three cases, although dialogues have had all the impacts in at least one case, many of these occasional impacts are very slight in many instances. Specifically, the kinds of impact where application of this approach have the most consistent positive impacts, or the highest scores, are in the following areas, ranked in order of significance:

- Introducing a social innovation, though not spreading it,
- Mobilizing agents for peace, and
- (weakly) Improving relationships between divided communities.

Less consistently, and surprisingly, middle-level national dialogues affect governing institutions and official political negotiations. This occurs when dialogues are able to feed unorganized views held by a broad range of civil society organizations as well as by other unrepresented voices in society, directly to government officials. By addressing governing processes themselves, dialogues tacitly endorse the idea of legitimate governance and come to the aid of the state and its institutions. Middle level dialogues can also maintain or promote official negotiations when these processes within the government itself are in danger of reaching an impasse. Dialogues sometimes help to suppress violence, but they also may exacerbate it. They have little or no effect on improving local economic activity.

Impacts of Dialogues. Table 3

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	NCKK	CAP	WSP
Expanded economic activity?	None	None	None to Low (identifying issues)
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Groups participating in the conflict? Other groups influencing the conflict? 	Low (symbolically) and sometimes possible negative NA	Low (symbolically) Low (diaspora)	Low (symbolically) and sometimes possibly negative NA
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	NCKK	CAP	WSP
Mobilized agents for peace?	High (linked NGOs localized)	Low	Medium
Introduced and spread social innovations?	High	Medium (project itself)	Medium (project itself)
Strengthened governing institutions?	Medium and possibly negative	None	Low to Medium and possibly negative
Advanced political negotiations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On lowest level On higher (e.g., regional) level 	Medium NA	None None or not known	Low None
ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	NCKK	CAP	WSP
Reduced violent behavior? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On lowest level On higher (e.g., regional) level 	High Possibly negative (through polarization) NA	None NA	None or NA and possibly negative NA
Overall Comparative Efficacy <i>To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?</i>	High	Low	Low to Medium

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
 Medium data suggests some impact
 Low data suggests a little impact
 None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
 Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
 Not known insufficient data
 NA Not applicable

B.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

As with Section A.3, for Local Community-Based Peace Processes, this section lays out the lessons that can be learned from the three middle-level dialogue initiatives. The lessons are laid out in the form of a checklist of key questions that should be asked when considering whether to apply this type of initiative in a given situation.

Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing Non-official Dialogues *: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist <i>Table 4</i>		
<p>Regarding the nature of the conflict: <i>How tractable or intractable is the conflict being addressed?</i></p>	<p><i>Is the conflict a largely non-violent one over political and policy issues (and therefore more tractable), or a militarized one involving active armed combat, such as a civil war?</i></p>	<p>If the conflict is less tractable, then mid-level dialogues initiative processes can be more effective. For example, the ability of the Kenya and Somaliland dialogues to encompass diverse groups and engage in substantive discussions that have some influence is undoubtedly attributable in part to the considerably lower levels of hostility of their conflicts and the lack of immediate threat to their participants. These factors can be contrasted to the greater polarization and recurrent violence surrounding the smaller and less influential activity of the CAP group.</p>
	<p><i>Is there a rough balance of equal power between the parties to the conflict and yet a political stalemate, so that all sides to it have something potentially to gain by engaging in the dialogue?</i></p>	<p>In Kenya, due to the equation of violence described above, despite the fragmentation of the opposition parties and leaders, the government could not clearly defeat the opposition through violent action without incurring other high political costs such as the loss of international support.</p>

<p>Regarding the implementation of the initiative: <i>How well is it implemented?</i></p>	<p><i>Can the dialogue process get social and political support from a significant portion of national civil society and/or generate support from an established grassroots constituency in the broader public?</i></p>	<p>Due in part to the greater vitality of civil society in Kenya, the NCKK process included in one way or another a large number of people representing possibly 40 different NGOs, so that it could gain attention and exert pressure to attend to the issues of the dialogue. The Burundi process, however, involved only about 50 people from different entities but who came largely as individuals. The WSP process also sought to involve individuals, not organizations, and could draw on far fewer established NGOs. In addition, the NCKK was able to use the influence that ministers, priests and imams had with the members of their churches and mosques, respectively, in keeping broad attention focused on the process and on educating a segment of the general public about the issues. In contrast, the WSP did not try to educate groups outside the process itself, and the CAP has no counterparts for grassroots linkages.</p>
<p>Regarding the implementation of the initiative: <i>How well is it implemented?</i> (continued)</p>	<p><i>Was the dialogue initiated solely by inside actors or did outside third parties take a significant lead?</i></p>	
	<p><i>Did some technique of conflict resolution training inform the way the dialogue was conducted?</i></p>	<p>The Kenya process did not use professional facilitators or techniques of track-two diplomacy, problem-solving workshops and the like. The Burundi process was influenced by the norms of track-two diplomacy as carried out especially in South Africa, and the WSP process applied a certain methodology that its sponsors have been developing in different country contexts.</p>

	<i>Is the dialogue process clearly directed by nationals in the countries concerned?</i>	The Kenya process was stimulated by professionals in the country and the Somaliland process was addressing issues of interest to the political elite of an aspiring state. In Burundi, however, while it was useful for the dialogue partners to speak to the political elites and to have them participate in a symbolic process, it is not clear they saw the dialogue as a major way to address the conflict and promising of enough results to warrant their greatest energies.
	<i>Is the activity initiated by educated, skillful professionals?</i>	
	<i>Are the initiators actively creating support and cooperation from significant local groups?</i>	
Regarding the basic design of the initiative (activity): <i>Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?</i>	<i>Is the non-official dialogue itself actually quasi-official because it encompasses the representatives of the key parties to the actual or potential conflict in the country, and thus its decisions can be crucial to them?</i>	The Kenya dialogue included the main players in the political struggle over control of the state, such as the Attorney General and the representatives of opposition parties. Because they had considerable authority for making decisions on behalf of their respective constituencies, the initiative was actually closer to being track-one negotiations than track-two dialogue or track “one and a half” dialogue. The Burundi dialogue did not include as many key players, and the WSP process, by design, was even less political.

<p>Regarding the immediate context: <i>Was it placed in fertile ground?</i></p>	<p><i>Is the dialogue process regarded as vital to thwarting possible violence, so that the parties to the conflict feel they have a lot riding on whether it occurs and makes some progress?</i></p>	<p>Notwithstanding the Kenya conflict's generally peaceful nature, the influence of the dialogue process was helped by the fact that violence had occurred over the legitimacy of the elections and a breakdown of law and order due to popular unrest occasionally threatened unless the ruling party was seen to be addressing the issues being raised. The increasing use of violence by the state and local politicians also lay in the background, so that a genuine anxiety about whether Kenya, up to now thought to be immune from the conflicts in the region, might follow the course of neighbors such as Somalia and Uganda. In the other two contexts, however, the political leaders did not need the dialogues. In the case of Somaliland, war weariness over the past conflicts made the prospect of violent conflict no longer as likely as it once was. In the case of Burundi, the conflict was out of control, so that the respective dialogues did not effectively influence the course of national politics.</p>
	<p><i>Is the government in which the dialogue is taking place significantly subject to public opinion through a competitive multi-party system, regular elections, and vigorous media?</i></p>	<p>A significant reason that the NCKK process had to be respected by both government and the opposition was that they had to compete to some extent for popular support through the media and periodic elections. In Burundi, opposition parties wield relatively less influence over the conduct of the conflict, since it is between the military and insurgent groups, and In Somaliland, the regime is held together mainly through a power-sharing arrangement that has been brokered among the leaders of the major clans and subclans, and politically significant political parties and electoral politics have not emerged.</p>
	<p><i>Has some similar activity of this general nature operated before in the area?</i></p>	

	<i>Is the activity “tapping into” and articulated intensely felt local needs, such as evoked by recent violent events, or is it motivated primarily by ulterior agendas?</i>	In Burundi, the CAP group taps on the desire of most people to resolve the decades-long political crisis and violence through a search for peace.
	<i>Is a methodical grass-roots process being followed to designate representatives of the local communities, and are lengthy consultations used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions?</i>	The WSP in Somaliland made a conscious effort to include the voices of all clans in its processes and products. During the first phase of the process, WSP held focus groups with members of all the clans of Somaliland, and by the end of the second phase, have held workshops in locations in which most, but not all, clans traditionally reside. While lengthy consultations and discussions were not used specifically to achieve consensus for major policy decisions per se, this process has promoted common understanding of issues of concern to all.
	<i>Are peace agreements being sought between specific institutions that represent distinct communities that are in conflict, or is it a broader process of general public education, community problem-solving, etc.?</i>	Through implementation of the participatory action research process, the WSP in Somaliland creates a broader process of general public education and problem-solving that do not necessarily only represent the concerns and interest of distinct communities.
<p>* To pinpoint the most important factors that explain the observed impacts, this process was followed: Where all the cases had similar positive impacts, they were compared for their common elements, for these are most likely to explain the similar impacts. Where the initiatives had differing results, they were examined for the differences between them, for these are likely to explain those results.</p>		

C. Peace Radio

The use of popular media which aims messages of peace, toleration, and reconciliation is seen as a way to counteract the inflammatory influence of rumor or messages of hate and provocative incitements to violence by leaders who may influence certain sub-communities in a population, to break the monopoly on information about the events and issues at stake in conflicts that one side or other may represent (usually because of state-controlled and partisan media), and to persuade the members of separate communities that they often have common interests that are maximized by peace. The assumption is that audiences provided with such information and moral messages are less subject to manipulation by leaders on one side of a conflict or another and will be more supportive and accepting of efforts to achieve peace. Radio, in particular, is seen to be most useful in rural African societies where most of the inhabitants do not own televisions sets.

The Greater Horn of Africa cases examined for this analysis include:

- ❑ Studio Ijambo in Burundi, organized by Search for Common Ground (later Common Ground Productions), and
- ❑ HornAfrik Media, a private sector media company in Somalia with two FM stations, two television channels and a web page.

The analysis also draws also on a study of Common Ground Radio in Bosnia, and an analysis of media in Sierra Leone conducted by Common Ground Productions.

C.1. Findings about Impacts:

How effective is peace radio in conflict prevention, management or peace building? Most of the data on radio's impact relates to attitude changes. Little data could be collected among these limited cases on what impact the medium may have had on behaviors of the listening audiences. Parallel research on knowledge-attitude-practices (KAP) done by health and education programs might be useful sources for inferences about effectiveness of radio messages.

- ❑ Economic Improvement: **Does peace radio help to expand economic resources?**

This impact is unknown because no evidence was collected.

- ❑ Inter-Communal Relations: **Did peace radio increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

Positive: For the study of Studio Ijambo in Burundi, 270 individuals from several categories in society were consulted on the impact on them of the studio's programs. Two programs in particular were repeatedly cited by those consulted as helping shape attitudes and behaviors towards cross ethnic understanding. These programs were "Our Neighbors, Ourselves," a soap opera about two families trying to live in peace with each other across the ethnic divide and "Heroes," which told the stories of people who saved others outside their ethnic group

during the massacres. People attributed (4.5 out of a possible 5 score) these programs with changes in attitude and insight.

There is also some evidence that the mere existence of the programs contributes to a climate that encourages dialogue and negotiation rather than violent alternatives. People were able to cite the Studio Ijambo motto “ Dialogue is our future” or other statements from programs that support the view that dialogue is the best way to resolve differences.

In other surveys conducted by Search for Common Ground, listeners responded favorably to programs across ethnic lines. They did not unduly favor one program over another, lending credibility to the perception that the programming is balanced and ethnically neutral. Studio Ijambo produces programs for a range of age groups and targets groups not readily served by state media, thus increasing the numbers of likely listeners. Programming is diverse in its format for the same reason.

Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated Nelson Mandela’s speech about the negotiation framework into Kirundi to inform a larger audience. State channels broadcast this information mostly in French, which reaches only 15% of the population.

□ Social and Political Mobilization: **Did peace radio mobilize new agents of peace?**

Positive: In Bosnia, local journalists are trained in conflict resolution methods as part of the preparation for broadcasting. The training is multi-ethnic and provides a setting for cross ethnic contact and dialogue as well as learning about techniques to promote non-partisan reporting of events. Some of those trained now form a network of journalists available to assist with the radio work in several cities across Bosnia.

Both Studio Ijambo and HornAfrik Media give programming time to social and economic messages of civil society groups. Studio Ijambo was seen as a means for NGOs to reach their audiences. The Women’s Center, also funded by Search for Common Ground, enjoyed a closer relationship with Studio Ijambo that it used to get its messages across. Some NGOs felt that specific social messages on prostitution and AIDS should have gotten more exposure on the programs. In Somalia, HornAfrik Media provided free airtime to civil society organizations to inform people of the public services they provide in the absence of public institutions.

By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik Media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves particularly in talk shows and call in shows. The effectiveness of the warlord’s propaganda was reduced by the alternative competition. Warlords participated in discussions and had to answer to people in public for the first time. Over time the radio stations run by factions were forced to close because of the competition by the independent media group. HornAfrik has a commitment to helping people make informed decisions that it promotes in town meetings and other open dialogue settings. The importance of peace is underlined in the drama programs that show the consequences of war on the people.

- **Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: Does peace radio create and spread new organizational capabilities or social techniques that have peace building capacity?**

Positive: Professionalization of media is a product of the intervention. Team reporting across ethnic lines as a means of balancing reporting was recognized as a breakthrough, and as an example, at Studio Ijambo. Personnel who formerly worked for government owned media found themselves more accepted as credible once they became journalists with Studio Ijambo. Sources sought them out when they worked for Studio Ijambo that had not agreed to talk to them when they were working for the government media. Many reporters admitted to some self-censorship so that programs would actually be broadcast over the government controlled airwaves. In Somalia, HornAfrik's systematic documentation of human rights abuses was a first in Somali journalism.

In terms of the proliferation of this innovation, in Bosnia, a panel on media on Common Ground Productions radio program Resolutions Radio attracted 10 media outlets. After the program, the group decided to hold weekly press conferences. This kind of dialogue was unprecedented in the post-war period. The radio program served as a catalyst to expand dialogue among key media players. As a result, the Simply Women program also produced by Common Ground was expanded to another city in Bosnia. Although it is not known if it has spawned other media activity in Burundi, Studio Ijambo provides programming regularly to international media such as VOA, BBC, Reuters, and Radio France International, Deutsche Welle, Channel Africa, and Associated Press and thereby becomes a principal source for the rest of the world on Burundi.

- **Governing Institutions: Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

Positive: In Burundi, a program on AIDS reporting the shortage of condoms in the country led to ministry action to import more condoms and to get the word out about the shortage. The reporter was asked to stop reporting on the shortage now that evidence had been provided that condoms were available. It seems clear that the reporting led to government action and that the programs were perceived at least by government as being important enough to try to influence.

Studio Ijambo broke the story on killings of refugees returning from Tanzania and had it broadcasted on VOA very quickly. Some think that this programming might have influenced government decisions to close the camps later.

As the first attempt at independent radio in Burundi, Studio Ijambo may have contributed to a climate of greater tolerance toward independent media. Its strongest impact may be on media credibility as a neutral source of information. Burundi state radio asserts that the high standards of journalism on Studio Ijambo forces higher professionalism among state-controlled media. Although audiences' estimates are imprecise and hard to determine, the popularity of programs with an independent stance obviously influenced the attitudes of governing institutions. As the independent press grew in size, Studio Ijambo gained more access to government and influenced government decisions for the greater good of the Burundian people.

Possible Negative: While it is not easy to attribute negative impacts to this kind of intervention, the close symbiosis sometimes required between the radio production and transmission can be problematic. If the only transmitters in the affected areas are government controlled, there is often an uneasy truce between the peace radio promoters and the government means of transmitting the programs. Having an independent transmitter may seem like the solution, but it puts the peace radio program in place as a competitor to government run media rather than an alternative voice. The most effective compromise on this point is not easy to determine.

- On official political and peace negotiations and pacts: **Did they advance political negotiations?**

Positive: Although Studio Ijambo reported the progress of the Arusha negotiations as part of its news coverage, how its programs themselves may have affected the several ongoing national and regional negotiations among the Burundi government, the opposition parties and the various insurgent factions is not known because no data was collected on that impact.

- Public acts and collective behavior: **Did the dialogues stop violence?**

Positive: The investigation of human rights abuses in the news programming has been a deterrent. Interventions like HornAfrik Media in Somalia consciously manage news reporting to avoid igniting the tensions in the society. It is not clear whether this selective reporting technique will build confidence in peace over time or lead to public mistrust. Under reporting could be perceived to be in contradiction to the independence of the media.

Limits: The limited impact of radio in influencing directly whether people engage in armed conflict may be suggested by the response of soldiers. Of those consulted for the impact study, the soldiers seemed to disagree with Studio Ijambo content the most. Even if they did not agree with the content, however, they considered the programs an important source of information.

C.2. Conclusions: Summary of Impacts

Here again, the instrument of Peace Radio is effective in some areas much more than in others. As seen in the following table, peace radio clearly can create an innovative presence with a new message in a conflict setting, and it has been used effectively to assist other organizations to get their message out and recruit members. It is plausible that it sets a tone that over time improves the climate of inter-communal relations, although it is difficult to know how this is actually translated into increased intergroup tolerance and more amicable behavior. In some instances, it also establishes an independent source of news and thus creates an alternative to state media that over time can upgrade state practices. Less consistently shown is its influence on ongoing official negotiations and its ability, by reporting on human rights abuses, to deter violence by its peace-promoting broadcasts in a potential escalated situation. It has had no apparent impact on economic activity.

Impacts of Peace Radio. Table 5

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	Studio Ijambo	HornAfrik	Other Cases
Expanded economic activity?	Not known	Not known	Not known
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict?	Plausible	Plausible	Plausible
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groups participating in the conflict? • Other groups influencing the conflict? 	None or Low	None or low	None or low
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	Studio Ijambo	HornAfrik	Other Cases
Mobilized agents for peace?	Low to medium	Medium	Low to medium
Introduced and spread social innovations?	Medium (project itself)	Medium (project itself)	Medium (project itself)
Strengthened governing institutions?	Low to medium	NA	Not known
Advanced political negotiations	None or not known	None or not known	None or not known
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On lowest level • On higher (e.g., regional) level 	None or not known	None or not known	None or not known
ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	Studio Ijambo	HornAfrik	Other Cases
Reduced violent behavior?	Not known	Plausible	Not known
Overall Comparative Efficacy <i>To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?</i>	Medium	Medium	Medium

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
 Medium data suggests some impact
 Low data suggests a little impact
 None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
 Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
 Not known insufficient data
 NA Not applicable

C.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

The following factors help to make peace radio effective, and thus need to be kept in mind when trying to apply the initiative elsewhere.

Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing Peace Radio*: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist <i>Table 6</i>		
Regarding the nature of the conflict:	<i>Which conflict situations are most easily influenced?</i>	The level of fighting and polarization that exists may be a serious constraint. Since radio fed the fire in Rwanda, it seems clear that it might be used to douse it in Burundi where similar conditions existed and continue to exist. But it is not clear whether radio was able to affect the level of violent conflict in Burundi. Similarly, in Bosnia, the multi-ethnic nature of the conflict makes programming very challenging.
Regarding the basic design of the initiative:	<i>Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?</i>	Whether radio can actually reach almost all of the affected populations in conflict prevention is critical. In a setting where all groups are not receiving the programming because of geography or transmission coverage constraints, impact would be reduced. The power of the messages and information reaching almost all the population, rather than a limited number of groups would seem necessary to contain conflict and promote peace. In Burundi, establishing an independent channel of communication for unreached audiences was an important factor. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated Nelson Mandela's speech about the negotiation framework into Kirundi so that a large audience would know about it. State channels broadcast this information mostly in French, which reaches only 15% of the population.
		Setting up a network with outside funds and programs rather than using local sources leads to the perception of the initiative as foreign based and less valid over time. (e.g., Radio FERN in Bosnia)
Regarding the implementation of the initiative (activity):	<i>How well is it implemented?</i>	Without very strict ethnic diversity in programming, the message is weakened. Teams of journalists that represent all groups have been successful in building public trust in the message. In those settings, people appear to look for representation in the discussion first before they tune in to the messages or even the reporting. People want to see their group represented in the face or the sound of

		the journalists. But trying to provide this consistently can be difficult.
		Using journalists from the region or country is critical to obtaining useful information. Outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting. International media attempts are less well received locally.
		High standards of journalism in fact finding and reporting are critical. The impact of the Studio's professionalism underlines the work that needs to go into providing balanced reporting. This starts with the choice of who covers the story and is not totally reliant on editing after the facts are obtained.
		Regulating the ethics of journalism is the work of the journalists themselves, not those they work for. Journalists should be asking themselves: Have we done good reporting? What do we know and how do we know it? Who are the sources and what is their stake? Have we verified the information? Can we conclude the truth or are we just looking at a collection of facts? Will the story have impact? What kind?
		Knowledge of local media practice and audience listening habits determines program success.
		Many cited the professionalism and relaxed tone of the broadcasts as a more effective way to reach broader audiences. Innovation is required to sustain audiences over time.
		Focusing on quality of programming instead of quantity helps build audiences.
Regarding the immediate context:	<i>Is it placed in fertile ground?</i>	Obtaining access to transmission sources is needed. Achieving this without compromising content can be tricky in certain political settings. In some geographic settings, access to regional media outlets can be an alternative to constrictive national situations.
		The issue of who transmits can confuse the listener. Some who listened to the programs broadcast on state stations were not totally aware that the program originated privately.

IV. COMPARING THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES: WHICH ARE MOST EFFECTIVE?

A. Comparative Impacts

Within the scope of this investigation, the MSI team examined several cases of each of three generic types of CSO initiatives that were set up to address particular conflicts in the GHA region. The aim was to determine whether these approaches are effective in controlling conflicts and with respect to which risk factors. We found that individual cases of every instrument have achieved each of the impacts that we are measuring, and that the extent an instrument achieved given impacts depended on the features of particular cases. At the same time, however, each instrument tended to do better in certain ways of affecting conflicts, and to perform more weakly or even counter-productively in other respects.

The MSI team then looked for the most important factors in the design, implementation and context of each of these interventions that appear to explain their strengths. Several guidelines were identified that can be used in making decisions as to whether the intervention is likely to be effective if applied in new situations, and if it is applied, how to carry it out to achieve the best possible results.

Part IV takes up the question of which, if any, of these generic approaches to conflict prevention, management or peace building is more effective than the others. If one were to choose this one or that one, would you be getting “more bang for the buck”? One hypothesis of this project is that differing generic instruments may tend to achieve different results, so that a practice identified as effective would be better served if one could learn what those differing potentials are. When one chooses peace radio, or mid-level dialogue, or local, traditional peace processes, does one achieve significantly greater effectiveness, or success, or are these instruments more or less interchangeable?

The table (following) draws on the case-study data about each type of intervention in the previous tables. It sums up the range of impacts that each type of intervention appears to be capable of achieving in relation to the various conflict dimensions that are being measured. By comparing how many different impacts each instrument had some impact on, and the extent of impacts involved, we can derive an overall assessment of the intervention and compare it to that of the others.

In comparing the range of impacts demonstrated by each instrument under each of the seven criteria, we find that local peace processes had the most impact on more dimensions of conflict than either mid-level dialogues or peace radio. Local peace processes were the most effective in improving economic activity, mobilizing agents for peace, introducing social innovations, advancing political negotiations, and possibly improving group relations. In other words, local peace processes appear to have more “range,” “breadth” or “depth” in their influence on conflicts than the other two instruments. Dialogue was somewhat less effective than local peace processes in most of these areas, but was possibly equal to local peace processes with respect to controlling

violence. Peace radio was the least effective of the three in the first three areas. But we do not know whether it was also weakest in relation to political negotiations and violence, since it was difficult to obtain data on such effects.

But having noted that local peace processes may have the potential to affect more aspects of conflict than the other two, it is also evident that all three instruments tend to be most effective with respect to the same facets of conflict. While individual cases may shift the overall average performance of local peace processes above that of the other two instruments, they are strongest in the same areas as the others are strongest. And their weak areas tend to be the same as well. In short, all these NGO approaches are quite similar to each other in that they all mainly mobilize agents for peace and introduce social innovation, and they are less consistently influential in altering economic activity, governmental institutions and the level of violence. In short, NGO approaches are mainly good at strengthening various communication and organizational channels that operate outside governmental and the prevailing economic and political processes. Only under certain unusual conditions, do they appear to be able to make significant inroads into economics, social structures, government, politics, and violence.

Comparative Effectiveness of the Three Instruments. Table 7			
ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	Local Peace Processes	National Dialogues	Peace Radio
Expanded economic activity? • Commerce, trade	Low to High	None to Low	None to not known
• Resource Base	None	None	None
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict? • Groups participating in the conflict?	None to Plausible	Low: sometimes possible negative	Plausible
• Other groups influencing the conflict?	None to Medium	NA or Low	None or Low
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	Local Peace Processes	National Dialogues	Peace Radio
Mobilized agents for peace?	Medium to High	Low to High	Low to Medium
Introduced and spread social innovations?	Medium to High	Medium to High	Medium
Strengthened governing institutions?	Possibly negative to High	Possibly negative to Medium	Not known or Low to Medium
Advanced political negotiations • On lowest level	None to High	None to Medium	Not known
• On higher (e.g., regional) level	Possibly negative to Low	None or not known	Not known

ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	Local Peace Processes	National Dialogues	Peace Radio
Reduced violent behavior? • Lower conflict	None to High	None to Medium	Not known
• Higher conflict or actors	Possibly negative to Low	None or not known	Not known
Overall Comparative Efficacy <i>To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?</i>			

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
 Medium data suggests some impact
 Low data suggests a little impact
 None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
 Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
 Not known insufficient data
 NA Not applicable

B. What Makes for Effective Instruments?

Which features of the conflict, environment, design or implementation of the three measures explain why local peace processes achieved somewhat more diverse impacts than the other two instruments? The following factors that distinguished the local processes from the two national ones help to explain why local traditional peace processes were relatively more effective on more counts than the other two instruments:

- ❑ The scale of the conflict addressed (e.g., cattle raids compared to combat between organized armies),
- ❑ The extent of cooperation possible between the project and the governing authorities operating at the same level,
- ❑ Whether the activity involved could exercise coercive “police” authority over the parties to the conflict,
- ❑ Whether the activity was directed at achieving some legally binding agreement on specific disputes or involved the discussion of broader issues or general relationships of the parties in conflict,
- ❑ Whether the activity had autonomy in relation to influential outsiders because it was either ignored, tolerated or supported.

In sum, local processes were relatively more effective because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the capacity of the initiative involved to influence it. The two most successful local projects (Wajir and NSCC) were more effective in relation to the dimensions of conflict because the problem was smaller in the first place, they had control over the perpetrators of the violence (tribal members), the legal process for achieving resolution of the disputes involved (tribal council and tribal justice) and the public enforcement powers (the local police).

In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, such as policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments examined, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE APPROACHES AND BROADER OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Effectiveness of the Three Approaches

This section summarizes our major conclusions about the effectiveness of each of the three approaches examined:

- ❑ Local Community-Based Peace Processes
- ❑ Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue
- ❑ Peace Radio Initiatives

For each approach, we summarize what desired impact it is most effective in achieving, and then the factors that determine the effectiveness of the approach. This section concludes with a brief summary of our comparative analysis.

A.1. Local Community-Based Peace Processes

Local peace processes have the ability in specific applications to affect all the major dimensions of conflict, including arresting the escalation of violence. But they are apparently more consistently effective in:

- ❑ Mobilizing agents for peace,
- ❑ Introducing and spreading social innovations, and interestingly,
- ❑ Improving local economic activity.

Where local peace processes were effective depends most on whether:

- ❑ Outside actors (e.g., national level political elites, military personnel from outside the country, etc) controlled major political and military events that affected the local conflict arena,
- ❑ Specific peace agreements were sought through specific institutions that incorporated the distinct communities that are in conflict,
- ❑ The initiative worked through the mechanisms of an established local institution,

- ❑ The activity was initiated by educated, skillful professionals who actively sought support and cooperation from significant local groups,
- ❑ A methodical grass-roots process was followed to designate representatives of the local communities,
- ❑ Lengthy consultations were used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions,
- ❑ The activity “tapped into” and articulated intensely felt local needs, such as were evoked by recent violent events, and
- ❑ The local institutions within which the peace process was carried out are able to encompass the parties that are engaging in violent conflict, and to control the behavior of those who are using deadly force, through effective sanctions.

A.2. Middle-Level Non-Official Dialogue

Although middle-level non-official dialogues also have had all the impacts on all the indicators of success related to structural factors, channels of communication, and triggers and inhibitors described in at least one case (NCKK in Kenya), many of these impacts are slight. The approach is apparently considerably more effective in:

- ❑ Introducing a social innovation, though not spreading it,
- ❑ Mobilizing agents for peace; and plausibly,
- ❑ Improving relationships between divided communities.

Less consistently, dialogues occasionally help to suppress violence. But they also can exacerbate it. The cases show that dialogues do not greatly affect governing institutions and official political negotiations. They have little or no effect on improving local economic activity.

Effective dialogue was achieved to the extent that:

- ❑ The conflict is largely non-violent over political and policy issues rather than a militarized conflict involving active armed combat,
- ❑ A rough balance of power exists between the parties to the conflict and yet a political stalemate exists, so that all sides have something potentially to gain by engaging in it,
- ❑ The dialogue process gets social and political support from a significant national civil society and/or generates support from an established grassroots constituency in the broader public,
- ❑ The dialogue process is clearly directed by nationals in the countries concerned,

- ❑ The non-official dialogue is actually quasi-official because it encompasses the representatives of the key parties to the actual or potential conflict in the country, and thus its decisions can be crucial to them, and
- ❑ The dialogue process is regarded as vital for thwarting possible violence, so that the parties to the conflict feel they have a lot riding on whether it occurs and makes some progress.

A.3. Peace Radio

Peace radio clearly can create an innovative presence with a new message in a conflict setting. It is most effective in:

- ❑ Assisting other organizations to get their message out and recruit members,
- ❑ Serving as an impetus to upgrade state media practices through establishing an independent source of news,
- ❑ Setting a tone that over time has the effect of improving the climate of inter-communal relations, although it is difficult to know how this is actually translated into increased, more amicable inter-group behavior.

Less consistently has it advanced ongoing official negotiations and deter violence. It has no apparent impact on economic activity.

The effectiveness of peace radio depends mainly on:

- ❑ The level of fighting and polarization that exists,
- ❑ Whether radio can actually reach almost all of the affected populations,
- ❑ The perception of the initiative as based in the region and using journalists from the region or country,
- ❑ Knowledge of local media practice and audience listening habits,
- ❑ Ethnic diversity in programming,
- ❑ High standards of journalism in fact finding and reporting,
- ❑ Producing innovative, quality programming that is appealing to audiences, and
- ❑ Obtaining access to transmission sources without compromising content.

A.4. Results from the Comparative Analysis of the Three Approaches

When comparing the three types of approaches with one another in terms of effectiveness as we did in Section IV, local processes were found to be relatively more effective because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the capacity of the initiative involved to influence it. The two most successful local projects (Wajir and NSCC) were more effective in relation to the dimensions of conflict because the problem was smaller in the first place, they had control over the perpetrators of the violence (tribal members), the legal process for achieving resolution of the disputes involved (tribal council and tribal justice) and the public enforcement powers (the local police). In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, such as policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments examined, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

We found five cross-cutting ingredients in effective initiatives, no matter which generic approach was applied:

- The parties to the conflict addressed take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to concretely benefit or harm their perceived interests,
- The approach was appropriately scaled to specific dimensions of the conflict,
- The activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness,
- The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national),
- The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

B. Broader Observations: General Ingredients of Success

Having examined the effectiveness of each of three civil society approaches to conflict prevention, management and peace building in Part III, and then compared their effectiveness in Part IV, we turn in this part to a few broader observations on cross-cutting ingredients in effectiveness.

Have any ingredients of effectiveness surfaced repeatedly in the several cases and approaches we have examined above? These may provide us with guidelines of general applicability.

Most of the factors that were associated with more effective practice of each of the three instruments were specific to that approach, such as the elaborate consultative process that is used by traditional local peace settlements to reach consensus. However, a few factors can be found in some form in relation to at least two and sometimes three of the instruments. Distilling these common elements provides us with the most important factors to respect in order to achieve effective results, no matter which type of initiative is being applied.

Characteristics that were found to be associated with effective approaches more than once are as follows:

□ **Conflict Factors**

- The main stakeholders actually or potentially involved with the conflict are either already incorporated within the conflict prevention activity, or they believe that their interests are affected by it, and therefore take the activity seriously. At a minimum, they feel that their concerns are represented or reflected in the activity. In other words, the parties take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to benefit or harm their perceived interests;
- The conflict that is addressed has not become violent and militarized.

□ **Design Factors**

- The planning and implementation of the activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness.
- The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national).

□ **Implementation Factors**

- The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

Some of these factors, once stated, may seem obvious, and thus do not require research. But others are either not necessarily understood as important to keep in mind, or though obvious, may often be forgotten.

C. Implications for Further Research

Additional research is needed to get more reliable information about the effectiveness of particular interventions and combinations of them. It is one thing to identify whether or not certain kinds of activities can have a positive impact on conflict. This study has done that. But it is quite another to measure how much impact an initiative has had in relation to the total range and power of the forces that are driving a given conflict.

Another limitation of the study is that it could not identify whether the desired secondary and tertiary impacts from a given primary impact occurred or not. For example, though peace radio may make a certain number of people more favorably inclined toward inter-ethnic reconciliation, we do not know whether that change in attitude led to any change in individual or collective behavior. Studies of media impact suggest that media messages are more likely to be effective in changing behavior if they are reinforced by the immediate environment of the listener. Thus, a message of reconciliation might be more influential if it is heard in the context of an organized activity that allows the listener to engage in some reconciliation activity.

A third limitation is that conflict theory does not yet understand which of the various structural and more immediate factors that drive a conflict situation may generally be most important and how they interact. Consequently, even if we can determine that an initiative has had a certain kind and depth of impact in relation to one or other of the dimensions of a conflict that have been assessed in this study, we cannot tell how significant that impact is in relation to the several other dimensions of the conflict.

In sum, research is needed that is able to probe more deeply into the magnitudes of particular kinds of impacts, the possible subsequent chains of causation that may or may not result, and the interactions of impacts on each other; and also to develop stronger conclusions about general applicability of these approaches across diverse settings. This may suggest two kinds of research design:

- A research design that looks more in depth at individual representative cases, and several differing kinds of initiatives within such a setting, rather than examining only one type of initiative in several diverse cases. Such evidence would help greatly to verify the conclusions reached by these case studies, which have to be considered as preliminary hypotheses.

- A research design that looks at several different kinds of initiatives within a particular setting, or a particular initiative applied within a range of settings, but using a comparative approach across selected countries in different regions of the world (e.g., the Balkans, Southern Africa, Central America, South East Asia). This design would necessarily limit the depth of the examination in each country, yet nonetheless would yield valuable insights on the efficacy of distinct approaches, and how they do or do not work together, in diverse settings. A comparative approach would allow us to strengthen our conclusions regarding characteristics associated with the effectiveness of approaches that may provide us with guidelines of general applicability.

D. Possible Implications for USAID and NGO Decision-making

Note that several of the general factors that are associated with effective results do not have to do directly with the more or less controllable aspects of an initiative such as the design of the activity or its implementation, but rather with the less directly controllable factors such as the

historical, socio-economic or political-military context and the nature of the conflict. This suggests that to the extent conflict impacts are to be expected, more attention should be paid to the settings in which initiatives are introduced and thus whether given approaches, and sets of them, are likely to be viable and efficacious in the settings in which they are introduced. To achieve this, certain procedures are advised in making choices.

At the individual project level: When considering inaugurating a particular type of project, a prior appraisal should be done to ascertain whether the setting is conducive to the particular kind of instrument that is being considered, and that it embodies the features that have been identified as important for effectiveness (as brought out in the checklists in Part III).

At the level of the conflict arena (local or national): Rather than asking whether a given project or type of initiative should be adopted in general, the primary question that should be addressed is what the scope and nature of a given conflict in a given setting is, and what are the various kinds of responses that the decision maker's organization and others might make that are appropriate to that situation.

In this sense, the pursuit of which kinds of initiatives work or not is starting with a limited question. No one approach in itself holds the key. Rather than asking whether a particular approach should be the main response that one might implement to address conflicts in many situations, the process of making choices among approaches should start with an analysis of the several sources of conflicts in particular local, national or regional arenas, identify the various entry points into a conflict that these sources may offer. Then one could ask which mix of various instruments should be applied to address the various sources of conflict in that situation.

Ideally, a process including the following basic steps in strategy formulation and implementation should be undertaken within each conflict arena:

- ❑ **Conflict analysis, diagnosis** (“What is the problem?”)
- ❑ **Identify possible actions** (“What is appropriate to do?”)
- ❑ **Prior appraisal of possible instruments** (prospective evaluation - “What will work in this context?”)
- ❑ **Implementation** (“Who does what, and when?”)
- ❑ **Monitoring and Evaluation** (retrospective evaluation). (“What are the results?”)
- ❑ **Strategy Modification or Termination** (“How can we do better?”)

Hence, rather than producing analyses that reach conclusions about which types of intervention work best, or how to do specific projects, and then disseminating those lessons, another way to produce effective practices is to build capacity to carry out conflict assessments and conflict response analyses by funding and implementing organizations so they themselves can come up with the practices that fit given conflict arenas.

This process would not only suggest which individual initiatives to adopt, but what combinations of initiatives are needed. The analysis would identify certain packages or combinations of projects of different types that would be needed. The present study has suggested that CSO initiatives have some inherent limitations in achieving conflict prevention and management. This suggests that a broader repertoire of instruments needs to be considered and applied, thus including instruments that may be carried out by governments and other actors. Any given organization cannot undertake all of the initiatives necessary to prevent violent conflict. But rather than only respond by undertaking one or two individual projects that have limited impacts, some actors may take on the role -- as their project -- of mobilizing a range of actors to provide the several kinds of instruments needed to be effective toward the several dimensions of conflict, and thus that can make individual projects more likely to pay off.

VI. APPENDICES

- A. Overview of GHA Project
- B. GHA Case-Study Questions to Address (evaluation framework)
- C. Case Studies
- D. Internet Survey
- E. References and Acronym List