COLOMBIA

	FY 1998 Actuals	FY 1999 Estimate	FY 2000 Request
Development Assistance	$20,000	---	---
Economic Support Funds	---	---	$4,000,000
International Narcotics Control Funds	$500,000	$7,000,000	$7,000,000

Introduction

The principal U.S. national interests in Colombia are: (1) reduction of production and trafficking of illicit drugs; (2) promotion of participative local governance in preparation for a negotiated end to the internal conflict; (3) increased observance of human rights; and, (4) continued Colombian support to U.S. Hemispheric objectives, including Summit of the Americas goals and the advancement of free trade. President Pastrana’s inauguration in August 1998 marked a sea-change in Colombia’s relationship with the United States, leading to progress on illicit drug eradication, the peace process, and participative democracy. The Colombian Government (GOC) seeks to bring the fruits of full democracy and peace to a county which has now endured more than a generation of armed violence and the corrupting influence of a massive illicit drug industry. Secretary of State Albright designated Colombia as a Democracy Opportunity Country in January 1999, one of four worldwide that will receive high-level attention.

USAID experience in Bolivia and Peru has demonstrated that alternative development -- when combined with interdiction, law enforcement, and eradication -- is effective in reducing illicit drug production. Alternative development offers a sustainable means of providing licit incomes for rural people while extending legitimate governance to the coca and poppy areas. The peace discussions have had a higher political profile in early 1999, and the GOC acknowledge the need to take more corrective measures to achieve increased respect for human rights.

USAID's presence in Colombia was to end in FY 1999, but has been extended in light of President Pastrana's initiatives. The portfolio, emphasizing judicial reform since 1994, has been expanded to include alternative development and an array of democracy and human rights activities.

Development Challenge

Democracy and Human Rights. The 1991 Constitutional reform did not change the judicial system from a private, written, inquisitorial system to a public, oral, accusatorial one. Colombian judges continue to receive written files from the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Office of the Public Defender, read them in chambers, and render a verdict without hearing arguments. The 1991 reform, however, does provide for many investigative and judicial functions to be carried out by the Chief Prosecutor independent of established criminal procedures. The change threatens due process safeguards that can be maintained only when investigative, prosecutorial and judicial functions are woven into a single overarching judicial process. The system is slow and cumbersome, and insufficiently transparent. As few as three percent of criminals are ever tried and punished for their crimes.

Colombia is plagued by high-profile human rights abuses with little success in curbing abuses. Paramilitary units continue to carry out extrajudicial execution. Both the guerrilla and the paramilitaries regularly abuse the rights of non-combatants as the adversaries vie for control. The Vice President has been designated the Human Rights Counselor. He, along with the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Human Rights Offices of the Attorney General, and the Human Rights Chief Prosecutor are charged with improving the human rights conduct of the police and military.

President Pastrana was elected with a mandate to find a negotiated end to the four decades of civil conflict. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) control about 40% of the thinly populated rural area, mainly in the south and east, but with little popular support or political legitimacy. The guerrilla rely on protection and extortion from drug producers as well as kidnapping and extortion from ordinary citizens. Resolving the conflict is complicated by the need for bipartisan GOC support, narcotics production and trafficking, skewed income distribution, historically unresponsive local governance, and by over a million Colombians internally displaced by the violence. The challenge for USAID is to lay the foundation for an emerging pluralistic and participative government without upsetting the balance of the peace discussions.

Reduced Cultivation of Illicit Crops. Successful reduction of illicit crop production will cause economic hardship for thousands of small farmers and wage laborers who have come to depend on coca and poppy as reliable sources of income. Experience in Peru and Bolivia has shown that farmers will accept the need to eradicate coca provided that three conditions exist: 1) the availability of licit income sources through introduction of agricultural and off-farm opportunities; 2) social stability through greater personal security and participative governance; and 3) availability of social services provided by the GOC, such as primary education and basic health care. The challenge to USAID and the GOC is to satisfy these conditions while negotiating an end to the civil conflict.

The 6.0 magnitude earthquake of January 25, 1999, Colombia's most devastating this century, left approximately 40,000 families (about 200,000 people) homeless in the city of Armenia and surrounding towns. USAID provided $2 million in emergency assistance to support search and rescue operations, and to provide food, water, health care and temporary shelter. Other pressing needs in-clude reconstruction of health centers, stabilization of the city aqueduct, and reconstruction of housing for lower-income families. With additional funds, the USG proposes to finance low-income housing for an estimated 6000 poor families and is working with the GOC to identify additional reconstruction needs.

Other Donors

The USAID Country Strategy, to be submitted in FY 1999, emphasizes coordination and collaboration with other donors. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has a substantial portfolio of public infrastructure projects as well as an $80 million loan in support of alternative development. The World Bank has had a lower profile portfolio. After the earthquake, $190 million in emergency infrastructure credits have been extended by the IDB and World Bank. Few other bilateral donors are currently active; numerous U.S. and European NGOs are involved with human rights monitoring and work with internally displaced persons.

FY 2000 Program

Accelerate investigation and prosecution of criminals through the establishment of special units of investigators and prosecutors for counternarcotics, money laundering, and human rights.

Assist the Superior Judicial Council to introduce oral, public trials, instill modern judicial practices and concepts, and reduce case backlogs. Expand the Casa de Justicia program (court-annexed alternative dispute resolution).

Enhance protection of human rights by strengthening the office of the national Human Rights Counselor (the Vice President), the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the justice system.

Within the overall U.S. policy framework, support governmental and civil society mechanisms that lead to conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Initiate alternative development activities in areas of opium poppy cultivation and plan for alternative development in areas of coca cultivation. Assist the GOC to create and maintain an effective counterdrug coordination mechanism to integrate and oversee its programs.

COLOMBIA

FY 2000 PROGRAM SUMMARY
($000s)

USAID Mission Director: Carl A. Cira

USAID Strategic and Special Objectives	Economic Growth & Agriculture	Population & Health	Environment	Democracy	Human Capacity Developmnt	Humanitarian Assistance	TOTALS
SO 1 - Democracy strengthened and human rights observance enhanced. - ESF - INC	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---	4,000 2,000	--- ---	--- ---	4,000 2,000
SO 2 – Illicit crop production reduced in target areas - INC	5,000	---	---	---	---	---	5,000
TOTALS - ESF - INC	--- 5,000	--- ---	--- ---	4,000 2,000	--- ---	--- ---	4,000 7,000

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ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: Colombia
TITLE AND NUMBER: Democracy and human rights, 514-SO01
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCES: FY 2000: $4,000,000 ESF, $2,000,000 INC
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1999 ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: FY 2003

Summary: The violence of guerrilla warfare undermines Colombia’s democracy. Political and criminal violence harms Colombian society and its economy -- directly and immediately through the destructive action of the combatants and indirectly through a reduction in economic opportunities. Political violence has generated abuses of human rights that threaten freedom of expression and the right to petition for a redress of grievances.

President Pastrana was elected with a mandate to find a negotiated end to four decades of civil conflict. Winding up the conflict is complicated not only by the need for bipartisan support for the GOC, but also by the effects of narcotics production and trafficking, skewed income distribution, historically unresponsive local governance, and the several million internally displaced Colombians who have fled their homes to escape the violence. The eventual introduction of participative democracy into guerrilla- and paramilitary-controlled areas will likely encounter problems similar to those in the demise of one-party states: an increase in crime, environmental destruction, and economic uncertainty. The challenge for USAID is to lay the foundation for an emerging pluralistic and participative government without upsetting the balance of the peace discussions.

Key Results: USAID’s democracy and human rights activities strike at the roots of political violence by strengthening the effectiveness of and increasing access to the justice system, promoting the enforcement and protection of human rights, assuring that the required legislation is passed to strengthen the justice system and enforce and protect human rights, and by strengthening the legislative and analytical capacity of the National Congress. These activities help consolidate democracy and governmental legitimacy, which are important facets to an eventual peaceful settlement to the armed, civil conflict.

Performance and Prospects: USAID’s support to enhanced democracy and greater respect for democracy and human rights includes activities in five areas.

Effective Administration of Justice. Judicial effectiveness will be increased through the introduction of oral, public trials, with a subsequent trend of increasing the quality of these trials. Oral, public trials help ensure a transparent judiciary, resistant to corruption. The transition to such trials is supported by dialogue, technical assistance and training of the Superior Judicial Council, the Prosecutor General’s staff, and the Public Defender’s Office. USAID will train prosecutors, judges, and public defenders. With the media, academics, the bar association, and civil society organizations, USAID will foster the development of a judicial culture supportive of the oral process.

Access to Justice. Access, especially by the poor, is a basic requirement for belief in the value of the rule of law as a better alternative to authoritarian justice. USAID’s assistance will provide greater access to justice and the rule of law by Colombia’s poor majority by increasing the availability of public defenders and by increasing the number of conflicts presented to and resolved, formally or informally, by community-level offices called "Casas de Justicia" (Houses of Justice). USAID and the Ministry of Justice will improve the participation and coordination among the agencies involved in Casas de Justicia, in addition to providing training and technical assistance in alternative dispute resolution. At the Public Defender’s Office, USAID is helping to implement an information system to organize and manage defenders' caseloads, as well as train public defenders.

Human Rights. USAID will work with GOC entities to reduce impunity from prosecution of human rights violators by enhancing the abilities of public authorities to investigate and prosecute human rights violations by guerrilla, paramilitary and military forces. Protection of human rights will be enhanced by strengthening the office of the national Human Rights Advisor (currently the Vice President), the Attorney General’s office, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General to present cases to the justice system and to adequately follow-up. USAID will also support NGOs active in the field of human rights.

Civil Society. USAID focuses on organizations that work toward a long-term solution of the underlying causes of human rights violations, one of the most egregious of which is impunity from prosecution. USAID will help build a coalition of Colombian organizations engaged in civic education, conflict resolution and reconciliation, and will help establish a "Challenge Fund" to encourage Colombian and international financing of innovation and support activities for conflict resolution and reconciliation.

National Legislature. The Colombian congress has requested USG assistance to modernize its administration and committee functions and to increase the participative quality of its deliberations. USAID will also consider ways to increase popular access to the legislature though public hearings and to strengthen the legislature's oversight capacity with respect to judicial discipline.

Peace Process: Within the overall U.S. policy framework, USAID will support both governmental and civil society mechanisms that lead to conflict resolution and reconciliation. These may include local government councils, human rights organizations, or church-led groups. Initially, USAID will seek opportunities where people can work together locally in well-defined and transparent activities, defining areas where reconciliation can occur. The justice and human rights segments of the USAID program reflect demands that are expected to be made in any eventual peace negotiations, as they were in the Guatemala and El Salvador negotiations. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) control about 40% of the thinly populated rural area, mainly in the south and east, but with little popular support or political legitimacy. The guerrilla rely on protection and extortion from drug producers as well as kidnapping and extortion from ordinary citizens. As communication between the GOC and the guerrilla entities evolves, USAID will position its program to lend support to meaningful dialogue among the parties and to contribute to a reduced scope of the conflict. USAID will work closely with the U.S. Embassy and through international and civil society organizations.

Possible Adjustments to Plans: USAID will submit a country development strategy in FY 1999 that provides greater detail on its democracy and human rights program. The rate of achievement of performance targets will be affected by the evolution of negotiations for ending the civil conflict.

Other Donor Programs: In administration of justice, USAID collaborates with U.S. Department of Justice programs for improved investigation and development of criminal cases. There is little bilateral presence in strengthening democracy, although numerous U.S. and European NGOs are active in human rights monitoring and working with internally displaced persons.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Colombian universities, U.S. and Colombian NGOs [to be determined] , and the GOC Vice President’s Office.

Selected Performance Measures:

Performance measures will be developed during FY 1999 on the basis of the Mission's Country Strategy and in collaboration with the parallel activities of the State Department.

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ACTIVITY DATA SHEET

PROGRAM: Colombia
TITLE AND NUMBER: Illicit crop production reduced in target areas, 514-SO02
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCES: FY 2000: $5,000,000 INC
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1998 ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: FY 2003

Summary: One of the highest USG foreign policy goals in the western hemisphere is to reduce and eventually eliminate the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States. Colombia is the world's largest producer of coca leaf and is an important source of heroin for the United States. The narcotics trade contributes to official corruption, debases the police and judicial systems, and is known to have affected even the election of the Colombian president in 1994.

USAID has experienced substantial success in Peru and Bolivia with counternarcotics programs that use a three-pronged approach of alternative development, strong interdiction and law enforcement. Indeed, this success has had the effect of concentrating illicit production in Colombia. However, this counternarcotics approach has had limited success in Colombia due to the absence of the important alternative development element. The GOC’s National Plan for Alternate Development (PNDA) initiated operations in 1995, receiving its first substantial international support (from the Inter-American Development Bank) in 1997. With the support of the Pastrana administration elected in 1998, it is now feasible to considerably expand alternative development efforts in Colombia.

USAID will contribute to achievement of USG counternarcotics goals in Colombia by introducing or improving alternative, licit economic opportunities for those living in the coca- and poppy-growing areas and for potential migrants to those areas. This will result in abandonment or prevention of coca and opium poppy cultivation, and lead growers to cooperate in, or consent to, elimination of the illicit crops. An initial grant of $500,000 was made in September 1998 to the GOC’s PNDA to initiate program planning.

Key Results: By September 2003, the alternative development program in Colombia will have reduced illicit crop production (coca and poppy) through voluntary abandonment by up to 3,300 hectares of opium poppy and up to 40,000 hectares of coca through a combination of alternative development, law enforcement, and aerial eradication. A fundamental assumption of the strategy is that the security situation in target areas will improve to a level where systematic alternative development activities can take place.

Performance and Prospects: USAID’s alternative development program in Colombia will work in five areas:

Policy and Planning: USAID, the PNDA, other GOC agencies and international donors will work in a coordinated manner towards a common vision of voluntary abandonment of illicit coca and poppy crops in favor of licit economic alternatives. The GOC will establish a high-level, national counterdrug coordination mechanism that brings together leaders in alternative development, law enforcement, budget, and the GOC sectoral ministries to reinforce efforts at reducing illicit crop production. Policy dialogue will include the nexus of alternative development and anti-poverty efforts, as well as the criteria for selection of the geographic zones where these concurrent and complementary actions will take place.

USAID will strengthen PNDA staff in program planning, management and oversight to provide uniform coverage of program areas through on-the-job training, technical assistance, and purchase of computer hardware and software. USAID will assist PNDA to conduct rapid evaluations of selected regions to evaluate program options and identify and strengthen local governments, NGOs and the private sector as the principal intermediaries of alternative development actions.

Licit Economic Opportunities: The main thrust of the alternative development program will be grants for activities to substitute licit sources of income for the illicit income lost as a result of abandonment and non-replanting of coca or poppy. It will focus on activities in targeted areas with active community participation through local governments, NGOs, and private sector entities. The key to providing grants will be eradication agreements signed between PNDA, municipalities, and community organizations with community leaders responsible for ensuring that farmers comply with their commitment to eradication. Successful grant applicants will clearly link abandonment of illicit cultivation in favor of licit economic alternatives. Grants would finance credit for community-based private sector investment activities: small, local-level social infrastructure; infrastructure improvements (farm-to-market roads) necessary for sustained reactivation of licit economic activities; commodities, including improved seed varieties; basic irrigation; agricultural inputs and processing; studies; technical assistance; and local project implementation costs.

Initially, there will be two geographic concentrations of this effort: the southwest departments of Cauca, Huila, and Tolima where high-altitude opium poppy is produced, and the lower altitude coca- producing departments of Meta and Caqueta. The rate of program expansion will be dependent upon successful experience in these five departments.

Environmental management: Plantation-style coca production (half or more of the coca crop in Colombia) involves clearing forest cover planting on tropical soils which are inappropriate for sustainable agricultural production. Poppy production in higher altitudes is generally undertaken on small plots of land within national parks and reserves in the macizo Andino, the principal watershed for the Cauca and Magdelena Rivers that dissect the country. The use of chemicals for production and processing of illicit crops results in serious contamination of nearby water sources for human and animal consumption.

The environmental management activity will focus on preventing or reversing the deterioration of natural resources (soil, water, flora, and fauna) caused by cultivation and processing of illicit crops in ecologically fragile areas. Appropriate management and recovery of natural resources will have a focus on sustainable, alternative economic forestry production, harvesting, and marketing opportunities through soil terracing, reforestation, management of forestry reserves for conservation and production, grazing in and around protected areas, ecotourism, and environmental education and community organization.

Possible Adjustments to Plan: USAID will submit a country development strategy in FY 1999 that provides greater detail on the alternative development program. The rate of achievement of performance targets will be affected by the evolution of negotiations for ending the civil conflict, as much of the coca-producing area is in territory where FARC guerilla control is strong.

Other Donor Programs: The GOC’s alternative development program received a $80 million loan from the IDB in 1997, primarily for public infrastructure improvement and agricultural processing. The United Nations Drug Control Program has been active in Colombia since 1987 with annual financial assistance of $2.5 million annually. The USAID-financed alternative development activities will be closely coordinated with the aerial fumigation activities financed through the State Department.

Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: PNDA, U.S. and Colombian NGOs to be selected during 1999.

Selected Performance Measures:

	Baseline (1998)	Target
Hectares of poppy	3,300	0 (2003)
Hectares of coca	80,000	40,000 (2003)
GOC coordinating mechanism established	No	Yes (1999)

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