USAID Conflict Prevention Workshop Notes

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OVERVIEW

The keynote address set the workshop's overall objective: to better understand the place and role of foreign assistance within the context of U.S. national security and foreign policy. A fundamental goal of US policy since WW II has been to help construct an international order of countries that can and do cooperate with one another. We have sought to integrate countries into this international order, the fundamental underpinning of which is the rule of law, and includes the effective guarantee of the individual's right to security of person and property, and the predictable, periodic, orderly transfer of power. American foreign assistance activities have, since their inception, had an important role in implementing this policy.

Photo of Dick McCall Now there is an erosion of cooperative order within the very countries that must be the building blocks of the international order that has been the hallmark goal of American policy for over 50 years. In the post-Cold War era, the effects of irredentist and separatist movements have impeded and, indeed, threatened the ability of the United States to achieve its goal. The breakdown of cooperative order and the outbreak of organized, collective violence sustained over long periods have made internal stability an issue of greater import and complexity perhaps than it was at the height of the Cold War. Yet this erosion and instability have often taken place in full public view. The world has failed to understand or accept the signaled intentions of the leaders of governments and opposition groups that have been at the center of the problem. The keynote speaker, Dr. Jane Holl Lute, cited this leadership and the direction of leadership as key variables in determining whether ethnic, religious or other factors would lead to violent armed conflict. There can be no sustained efforts --- and such efforts are the heart of the problem of internal conflict as it is relevant to US assistance activities --- without leadership and a strong organization.

Many developing countries are faced with the mounting burden of losing their ability to dominate their respective polities. Specifically, control of armed factions, capital and rule making processes by governing bodies are sometimes being transferred to private sector groups or organizations. Programs cannot be carried out and opposition cannot be mobilized without leadership and organization and they are difficult to hide for very long. If USAID is to play a role in preventing conflict or, in at least alleviating some of its root causes, it must not continue to ignore or misread the directions taken by the organizations of government and opposition under their respective leaders. To be effective, USAID programs must be conceived of and designed for the world and conditions that they actually face. The concept of pragmatic intervention, i.e., determining what tools and interventions are appropriate and able to be applied, must be used. U.S. policy has been accused as being unfocused, stretched too thin, too full of high expectations and of having policy inconsistencies. We have to make policy choices about when to intervene and when not to. To do so we must recognize and understand what triggers the need for the decision. When faced with these triggers, the US should keep in mind the ideas of pragmatic prevention and its primary goal which, from the perspective of foreign assistance, is often to secure the well-being of others.

In the following session, the discussion of concepts and terminology made it very clear that the Agency staff has a varied perception and understanding of what the problem of "conflict" is, and what are the phenomena associated with conflict. It is also clear that the terminology used is sometimes inexact and not consistently applied. This lack of a commonly shared set of concepts and terminology results in confusion and presents unnecessary hurdles when trying to deal with internal conflict and the associated phenomena. There is a tendency to view internal conflict as armed conflict that is already happening or that has only recently ended. This leads to a peacemaking or an emergency relief approach to the problem. Our ability to respond then is defined by tools with which we are familiar but which may not necessarily be the best means for responding when the goal is to prevent the outbreak of organized, collective violence. The traditional tools of U.S. foreign policy include preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, economic sanctions, arbitration and mediation, as well as assistance. For development assistance, the "tools" tend to not only be political, but economic and humanitarian as well. A key issue in their use is what role, if any, sustainable development programs can play in mitigating the root causes of conflict when applied late.

The problem of internal conflict is one that can take many years to develop. In terms of USAID's entire set of tools, the problem of loss of order and growing instability can best be dealt with much nearer to the point at which broad-based cooperation within the general population begins to breakdown rather than after violent, organized conflict occurs. The question then becomes how to identify the problem early enough to put more of USAID's tools to work effectively and, more to the point of the workshop, what is USAID's role in gaining this earlier warning?

The peacemaking and emergency relief approaches are hardly unique to USAID. They are characteristic of many other donors whose policies and methods are heavily influenced by the historical role of the Red Cross. USAID's links to other donor agencies therefore reinforce the tendency toward peacemaking and emergency relief methods rather than those of prevention. This causes a problem not only in developing effective means of prevention but also in dealing with other USG foreign policy and national security agencies. These organizations have a more strategic vision and understanding of instability and organized, violent, internal conflict. An important factor here is that the greatest understanding of the phenomena and problem and how to prevent them lie with these other USG entities and not with donor agencies. The Agency has to become more active in resolving these conceptual and definitional problems. It must also recognize there is no "clean" way to analyze whether and how to use USAID resources to intervene in a destabilizing situation. Policy remains an art form and not a science. Still, common concepts and definitions are necessary and will help at all levels.

The luncheon address helped define the limits within which donors must operate by sounding a cautionary note. "Do No Harm" must be our first concern and one that continues throughout our efforts. The simple presence of foreign assistance resources and activities can contribute to the outbreak of violence. For example, groups may initiate or continue fighting to gain control of commodities provided by foreign donors. Long-term programs that have not been carefully considered and properly monitored can undermine the fragile stability of vulnerable countries even though their purpose is to bring about stability rather than undermine it. For example, civil society activities mobilize small groups. Sometimes these small groups engage in activities designed to promote their own interest at the expense of others, i.e., to engage in rent-seeking behavior. This can contribute to the breakdown of cooperation beyond the parochial interests of the small groups. Yet it is the wider cooperation being lost that is needed to build broad political coalitions that are more representative of the entire society. All donors must be aware of this problem and consciously work to overcome it.

USAID is faced with the need to help achieve overall American goals but in a more complex and dangerous world than we, as an Agency, have considered for some time. The first step in such an undertaking is to identify and understand what we have learned and to make those lessons available to Agency staff worldwide.

A region that has suffered terribly from the breakdown of order and collective violence is Sub-Saharan Africa. The Africa Bureau has led the Agency in recognizing the problems and attempting to deal with them. The afternoon session of the first day provided examples of some of the most effective activities and the planning and analytical methods used in their development and management. Perhaps the main lesson to be drawn from the Africa experience is that of the absolute necessity of being willing to recognize the problem, identify its actionable components early, and work forthrightly for its resolution. Denying that the problems exist or delaying action to deal with them simply make things worse, increasing not only the obstacles we face but the intensity of human suffering borne by those whom US assistance is supposed to help. A third key lesson from the Africa case is that, even though the available analytical methods are inadequate, there are constructive means of identifying vulnerability and gaining an understanding of the problems a country faces. The Africa Bureau has been an Agency leader in developing or adapting warning methods, such as the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) methods, and in attempting to design broad programs of response, such as the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). An important and relevant result is the Bureau's growing ability to take proactive, constructive steps early in the processes.

Other examples of how the instability and internal conflict problems have been approached in other regions were presented on Nepal and the Central Asian Republics. These presentations were especially valuable because the types of problems are very different. In the Nepal case, the Mission's program was 85% earmarked and there are few resources available to deal with the growing insurgency. Moreover, there seems to be little understanding of the scope and nature of the conflict, both in Nepal and in the donor community. It was very clear that the impediments to effective action are both imposed on and internal to the Agency. Once again, the need to be able to recognize the problem early was underscored as well as the need for understanding its root causes and components.

The entire second day of the workshop dealt with USAID's traditional, sectoral goal areas and their relation to prevention of conflict. An important lesson from the Democracy, Governance and Conflict session is the high priority that must be assigned to security sector reform (military, police and intelligence organizations). If this sector is not reformed and its ongoing reform properly monitored, then all of USAID's development activities are threatened, regardless of how well they may be implemented. Governance is critical across the entire spectrum of problems and issues faced by host governments and donors alike. However, because the security sector can be a threat to the fundamental guarantees of individual security of person and property, the rule of law and the acceptability of the courts, its reform must be given high, immediate priority.

Ten years ago, UNDP would pull out of a country in crisis, because it was not viewed as part of its mandate. The UNDP has come far since then. Currently over 50% of UNDP's activities falls under governance and 94 countries have these programs. UNDP has found that the strongest demand for its help is for helping strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions and governance. The general programmatic goals involve promoting good governance through 1) securing structural stability, 2) assisting countries in designing coherent policies, and 3) assisting in the pursuit of peace agreements.

Still, even with this very clear progress by UNDP, its record in working with crisis counties is checkered. It has invested rapidly in post-conflict programming, while there has been too little work done on preventive measures. UNDP's emergency response division has largely focused on disarmament and displacement, but has missed the boat on many core sociopolitical issues that development assistance can resolve. In non-crisis countries, governance dominates, but this has yet to affect UNDP programming in crisis countries. Clearly there is a leadership vacuum in this area and it is one in which the United States, through USAID, can play a key role according to the Economic Growth and Conflict session.

The lessons from the Economic Growth and Conflict session, like those of the first session, were important in developing a new understanding of the causes of conflict. The research findings presented by Dr. Paul Collier of the World Bank provided a unique and empirical perspective on the underlying, long-term causes of conflict. The key lessons were that countries that experience slow, erratic growth are highly vulnerable to conflict whereas those that achieve and sustain significant growth are not. The implication is very clear. Economic success helps resolve the political problem so starting the engine of growth --- and maintaining it --- is supremely important. A second point from this session that underscores the importance of governance and of the "Do No Harm" message, is that strong governments --- whether democratic or authoritarian --- are less vulnerable to instability and internal conflict than are weak governments --- whether democratic or authoritarian. Reform is essential but it must be carefully and knowledgeably planned and carried out. This is especially important to USAID because, among donors, the Agency's comparative advantage lies in our ability to address institutional changes, that is, to deal with reform of the rules like the laws, policy regimes and regulatory structures and their supporting organizations. Still, USAID is hampered by legal, funding strictures, tight budget and staff and external actors that leave little leeway and prevent the Agency from carrying out many of the broad-based activities essential for such reform. This is a problem that limits the entire Agency, geographically and functionally.

With the demise of the Cold War, there has been a systematic attempt to redefine the concept of security- moving away from the concept of security as the state's ability to protect itself and maintain its borders. Instead, there is increasing interest in broadening the idea of security to include newer and more non-traditional threats that can undermine the stability of a country. An area that is beginning to receive some attention within the Agency is the linkage between environmental degradation and conflict. Although environment alone is not a sufficient cause of conflict, scarcity caused by degrading the environment contributes to migration, undercuts economic activity. It can lead to domination of natural resources by elites and, in this world of failing states, environmental degradation can lead to the weakening of states. The environment/conflict link did not really get attention until after the Cold War ended. Its focus has been primarily on interstate conflict based on the internationalization of rivers that had, previously, been internal to the former Soviet Union. In the last few years however, more attention has been directed at how environmental degradation within a country can cause or contribute to internal conflict. The case of Chiapas in Mexico is probably the most well known example. The Chiapas problem was complex. The intrusion of outside interests into the forests and land of the region resulted in the loss of security of person and property for many of those who lived in the region. By degrading the forests, the intrusions reduced the ability of those people to live in their traditional areas and there was a violent reaction. Environmental activities must be cognizant of the potential negative impact of both environmentally degrading practices as well as the programs to alleviate them. Here we must be doubly certain to do no harm. Again, the importance of governance is underscored since a primary role of national governments must be to prevent the kind of intrusions and resulting exclusion that happened in Chiapas. The fact remains though that, in spite of the Chiapas example, while the environment/conflict link is quite real, the problem is usually more of a contributing and complicating factor than it is a direct cause of internal conflict. It is nevertheless very real and ever present in countries in which the misuse of environmental resources is a common and destructive practice.

The relationship between land and internal conflict was the subject of the final sessions. A very important insight to emerge was that the problem of land is one of exclusion of individuals from the basic guarantee of security of person and property and of equal access to and equality before the law. It is made worse by the lack of supporting systems, such as cadasters and financial markets, but the problem is at the most basic level of human rights. In the case of Guatemala, the Peace Accords raised expectations that these fundamental problems would be resolved. But, to date, fewer than 3,000 individuals have received their promised land. Clear title remains a problem and the acceptability of the courts as the means of settling the problem is at issue. The problem is complicated by the fact that, in some areas, property is held communally by ethnic minorities. These minorities often have practiced communal ownership throughout their histories and the practice accepted within their communities for hundreds of years. The imposition of new forms without the supporting capabilities of sound governance, can have highly negative impact. The possibility of resulting organized, violent, conflict is very real in these circumstances.

USAID Workshop onConflict Prevention Management

OVERVIEW

USAID Workshop on
Conflict Prevention Management