The Role of Foreign Assistance
in Conflict Prevention

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Listen to audio clips from this session  January 2001 Conference Report TOC     Session IV: Coordinating a More Effective Conflict Prevention and Crises Response Capacity within the U.S. Government A. The Role of the Department of Defense and the Increasing Need for Inter-Agency Interaction A great divide currently exists between the civilian and military worlds. While intervention in non-strategic areas has been primarily the task of civilian agencies, the military has substantial experience with conflict prevention, although at the "downstream" end of the process of deterioration, as well as greater resources and implementation power. However, differences in institutional language and methods of operation, as well as traditional turfism, continue to obstruct civilian-military interactions. Five years ago, the national military strategy tasked the regional CINCs (Commanders in Chief) with "shaping" their theater environments. This new mission, which is a quasi-diplomatic, non-combat one, sparked debate within the government and military about expanding the Defense Department's role in foreign affairs. The regional CINCs firmly believe in the need for a better interagency dialogue and a more well-planned interagency approach to regional problems. The CINCs, sometimes in conflict with the Pentagon leadership, have tried to better coordinate their efforts with the State Department and other civilian agencies. When DoD realized how vast their programs had become, they ordered each CINC to produced a classified report, or "Theater Engagement Plan," detailing their activities in each country. The accounting prompted a debate within DoD, with some CINCs advocating that the plans be distributed to Congress, which funds their "peacetime engagement" activities, to stimulate consensus building. Others argued for restricted distribution to preserve institutional prerogatives and flexibility. Another debate emerged regarding the appropriate role of the military in non-traditional missions such as international humanitarian crisis, the drug war, counter-terrorism, HIV/AIDS, and nation-building deployments. The military has taken over major responsibilities in these areas largely by default due to its significant resources. However, the uniformed military leadership is conflicted about these non-war operations and will refuse to truly integrate them into its long-term, service-specific reorganization, training and equipping plans until the country's civilian leadership first decides explicitly that it wants the military to adopt these missions. The first step in making their missions more effective will be to bridge the communications gap between the military and civilian agencies. Including the military in workshops and conferences sponsored by relevant civilian agencies is a start. Civilian agencies such as USAID can benefit from the military's expertise, and vice versa. Another suggestion is to enhance the influence of the State Department's Political Advisor to the CINCs and, perhaps, to add an economic advisor. Other improvements include more effective Congressional and State Department input in planning engagement activities. The Balkans: A Test of Civil-Military Cooperation on Conflict Prevention Civilian-military coordination on issues such as security faced a major challenge in the war-torn Balkans, where the problem of police primacy emerged. While the United Nations police solved problems of violent conflict, they were unwilling to deal with underground organized crime and inadequate to the task of accomplishing such a goal. Cash-strapped members were either late in providing trained civilian police, or unable to provide personnel due to pressing domestic issues. Yet there were exceptions, such as UNPREDEP in Macedonia, where a small military contingent (roughly 1,100 troops from the United States and several Nordic countries) understood its mission and implemented a reasonably-defined provided by civilian-led political mission (consisting of a 200-member staff). The program's success led UNPREDEP to be characterized as "the exception that proves the rule." If the United States military is to become involved in nontraditional security issues related to conflict prevention, such as the democratization process, several strategies need to be developed: Transition mechanisms, and the monetary support to accompany them, need to be established to coordinate effective transitions from military to civilian authorities.. Development of effective leadership is essential for a successful transition. Coordination between NGOs and the military should be enhanced. Increased recognition that development is not a succession of individual projects but a means toward a greater end. A greater understanding that the military's role need not be limited to intervention or no intervention. B. The Changing Role of the Civilian-Military Relations On the issue of democratization, the United States has traditionally engaged in "push" packages where viable plans for democratization and development assistance were presented to those states in crisis mode. While such ideas have merit, countries often do not know how to "pull" the appropriate expertise and resources from the donor organizations. The challenge for the new civil-military conflict prevention vision is to recognize that democracy is a combination of economic, human, and social development. Increased dialogue amongst the broad array of organizations involved will result in changed thinking for participants and a greater understanding concerning the need for change. It will also stimulate a need for "pull". Therefore, encouraging more dialogue and interaction on the ground could help define and refine the process. These civilian-military relations were put to the test in Kosovo. The military was well equipped, knew how to implement its goals, and was able to move in and establish dominance. The experience generated several valuable "lessons learned": Civilian organizations involved in the process of nation building need to emulate the military's organizational expertise and its ability to function as part of a cohesive multinational force. They also need access to comparable resources and to develop clearly stated missions. The actual relinquishing of military control to civilians is always the most difficult aspect of any project. In Kosovo, the lag between UNMIK/USAID's acquiring funding for project management and the readiness of the military to give up control took as long as eight months. The lack of leadership and coordination with the local leaders was a problem; in many cases no responsible individual was available to turn the project over to. When a lack of leadership was identified (as there was for the coordination of infrastructure), KFOR filled the void as they saw fit. Effective communication between the EU, UN, UNHCR, and OSCE was important to the mission's success. From the beginning there were daily meetings between KFOR, UN officials, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General. While these organizations had effective communications amongst themselves, information did not always pass down to the municipal level. KFOR, at times, got too involved in local politics, which was a mistake. Military forces should confine the relations with local leaders to matters of security and international civilian leaders must rapidly establish their leadership in political, economic, and social matters. Disagreements over objectives produced conflict among foreign assistance groups. First, there was a lack of alignment of objectives. Second, there was confusion over conflicting objectives between the various NGO's agendas and the USAID agenda. NGO agendas often conflicted or contradicted the UN's objectives. Even within the United Nations, there was a lack of agreement on how to implement Security Council Resolution 1244. Frustration also arose when there was no authority to amend the earmarked money to match the changing needs as dictated by the environment. The goals of the military and those of other agencies, primarily those with the funds to carry out the process of state building, did not always coincide. Clear delineation of responsibilities and agreed areas of cooperation are essential to success before a military intervention. KFOR needed to develop a holistic view of security. Though the international police capacity was better that the Bosnia case, disorganized police were often engaged to fight organized crime. Such problems need to be tackled with a vision that involved cohesion, organization, and discipline. Civil-military coordination in conflict prevention situations could be improved in several ways: All cases of intervention need to establish the primacy of civil authority (political, economic, social, and security). The primary responsibility of the military is to provide a safe and secure environment for democracy and market economy development. The role of the military is essential, but not sufficient. Nation building should not be a pejorative term. The core issue is institutional development/nation building, with emphasis on leadership development. Institutional development will not succeed without leaders. Success requires engagement at both the national and international level. Internal state building cannot be established independent of the international community. Emerging states need to be linked to the international community if they are to emerge as viable actors. Civilian support structures should better mirror those of the military. Civilian leaders should possess vision, responsibility, accountability, and authority. Until the civilian component develops the same capabilities with appropriate resources as the military, true peacekeeping will not be achieved because political, economic, and social development is a civilian task. A cadre of civilian leaders should be developed, like the military does in its leadership development. The military has the advantage over its civilian counterparts in training expertise and related tools. But without a mission and vision, holding responsible authorities accountable is a haphazard endeavor. A task force to examine and develop this cadre of civilian leaders needs to be established immediately. AUDIO CLIPS FROM THIS SPEECH Click here for audio clip#1 of William Nash. [RealAudio non-streaming file, 170k] Transcription of audio clip: "It took six to eight months before we had an operational procedure between the United States Army and the United States Agency for International Development. And we set up a very good one. But it was one that was not set at the beginning. I told [former USAID Administrator] Brian Atwood as I came out of Bosnia that the next time I went to one of these things an AID fella with a bag full of money would be riding on the lead tank." Click here for audio clip#2 of William Nash. [RealAudio non-streaming file, 126k] Transcription of audio clip: "We must all remember that in all cases of intervention or conflict prevention or conflict resolution the primacy of civilian goals and objectives. And military support to those ends, including peacekeeping operations, is but a continuation of policy by other means." [This audio clip requires RealPlayerTM. The RealPlayer software is available for free download from RealNetwork at http://www.real.com/player/index.html.]

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