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SENEGAL
Activity Data Sheet
>> AFR Regional Overview >> Senegal Overview PROGRAM: Senegal
TITLE AND NUMBER: Improved Enabling Conditions for Peace via Economic, Social and Political Development, 685-009
STATUS: Continuing
PLANNED FY 2001 OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: $1,258,000 DA; $400,000 CSD
PROPOSED FY 2002 OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: $2,365,000 DA; $200,000 CSD
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1999; ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: FY 2004Summary: A major constraint to Senegal's development is the protracted armed struggle in the resource-rich Casamance (comprised of the regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor in southern Senegal). The cost of the 18-year conflict between the MFDC (Movement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance) and the Senegalese army has been high in terms of GOS financial resources and social and humanitarian consequences. Security concerns obliged USAID to terminate its regular program in parts of the Casamance region in December 1997. Since June 1999, there has been intermittent progress in finding a solution to the crisis, culminating in the signing of a cease-fire agreement in March 2001. To support the peace process and to lay the groundwork for a progressive re-engagement of USAID's regular programming in this high potential region, USAID designed this Special Objective to facilitate reconciliation of the warring factions and help remove some of the primary causes of the conflict. Overall, USAID's interventions contribute to a cessation of hostilities and the return of peace and stability to the region. The achievement of the latter is a pre-condition to the resumption of USAID's regular assistance program in all parts of the Casamance region.
To achieve this Special Objective, three Key Intermediate Results (KIRs) are necessary: (1) improved standards of living for the affected population; (2) increased self-reliance for local development actors; and (3) improved conditions for local-level conflict resolution. In FY 2001, KIR 1 will receive $500,000 in agriculture funds, $175,000 in economic growth funds, and $267,000 in environment funds under the Development Assistance account and $200,000 in child survival funds and $200,000 in HIV/AIDS funds under the Child Survival and Diseases Account. KIR 2 will receive $100,000 in economic growth funds and KIR 3 will receive $216,000 in democracy funds in FY 2001.
In FY 2002, $2.365 million from the DA account and $200,000 from the CSD account are requested for poverty reduction, income generation, and food production; improvement of health conditions through support to local health centers; and sub-grants to local NGO's for peace and reconcilliation activities.
USAID's recovery plan will reach those most affected by the conflict: youth, women, children, and displaced persons. The program will be active in as much of the Casamance as security conditions permit, in order to encourage broad-based support for the peace process. This Special Objective also fosters sub-regional stability as many of the problems in the Casamance, notably refugees, banditry, cattle rustling and drug running, cross national borders into Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. This activity contributes to the Mission Performance Plan objectives of democracy, economic development and regional stability.
Key Results: The renewed presence of USAID in the Casamance, after a three year absence, has created an optimism among local groups that should not be underestimated and provides concrete evidence of donor commitment to assisting the Casamance if a peace accord is signed. Many donors stopped working in the region following USAID's decision to pull out in 1997. Therefore, USAID presence is perceived as a barometer for other agencies. In FY 2000, two USAID SOs began working in the more secure Kolda region of the Casamance. In addition to its work in decentralization, SO2 conducted an important conflict resolution forum on land rights and usage in an area plagued by conflict over land. The mechanisms put in place at the conference to resolve issues and prevent further conflict are a useful model for other similar situations.
Poverty and lack of employment are also key factors in the Casamance conflict- especially for youth who have a high potential to turn to banditry or drug abuse if not productively occupied. S01's launch of small and micro-enterprise development activities in the Kolda region will increase access to credit and business skills training.
The decentralization policy is often identified as one of the GOS's major responses to the Casamance conflict. Decentralization, if correctly applied, is a potentially powerful means of addressing some of the root concerns of the conflict: increased autonomy, means of raising revenue, etc. In support of the decentralization process, the SPO trained 200 local officials in decentralization principles and funded translation of relevant texts into local languages. The training was carried out in both urban and rural areas of Ziguinchor and was praised by both participants and government officials.
With USAID's guidance and support, a Senegalese NGO, APRAN GIE, has evolved from an agriculturally-focused association to a key participant in the peace process. APRAN GIE has had remarkable success in the areas in which it works in getting the population to talk about the conflict and about peace - subjects that were formerly taboo. APRAN GIE was able to do this by mobilizing villagers around a non-political event: cultural weekends. Villagers, including those in the MFDC and based elsewhere, helped to organize three-day events in which dancing, sporting events and theater events were presented. These are things people with diverging political views can enjoy. By working together with the population to make sure the weekends happened and that they were carried out in security, APRAN GIE established a reputation of being perhaps the only organization trusted by the GOS, the MFDC and the local population. More importantly, they provided a forum in which people were able to talk about the conflict and the effect it has had on the social structure in villages. In some areas, the cultural weekends were the first social events between villages in years.
Meetings to plan and implement the cultural weekends included both members of the MFDC and government officials. None of the meetings or weekends was marred by a security incident. These events would not have taken place without USAID's support. Furthermore, APRAN GIE has been instrumental in setting up meetings between the MFDC leadership and GOS ministry-level officials and has acted as a 'guarantor' for the safety of MFDC members to come to Ziguinchor to negotiate. Essential channels of communication between the GOS and MFDC were opened by APRAN GIE and have been critical in pushing the peace process forward. The GOS and the MFDC signed a cease-fire agreement in March 2001.
Performance and Prospects: USAID anticipates making significant contributions in different sectors to stabilizing the situation in the Casamance in the next two years. To help alleviate poverty and increase income and food production, activities will include: cash crop promotion (primarily sesame), microfinance and environmental watershed management. Health conditions will be improved through USAID support for local production of iodized salt, vaccination campaigns, and restocking of health centers. Victims of the conflict will be provided with stress counseling and conflict resolution mechanisms will be promoted. To consolidate the peace process, peace and reconciliation sub-grants will be made to Senegalese organizations - an expression of USAID's commitment to work as much as possible with local partners.
If the peace process continues in a positive direction, USAID may be called upon to assist returning refugees or displaced persons. Rapid mobilization and flexibility in using funding will be key to enable the kind of quick response that can help to solidify the peace process. Stability and security in the Casamance are likely to remain an issue for some time. USAID's program is helping to show that conditions can improve, and encouraging other donors to return to the region.
With the recent cease-fire agreement, the time is right to invest in a lasting peace. Because USAID was the first donor to launch a program to address the conflict, all sides view USAID as a key player. Supporting development in the Casamance is also a high priority for the GOS as demonstrated by the recent initiation of dialogue on the Casamance between the Minister of Finance and the donors. This program has important implications for sub-regional stability.
Possible Adjustments to Plans: Some adjustments to plans are anticipated depending on the evolution of the peace process. The dynamic security conditions in parts of the Casamance require flexibility in defining performance indicators and affect the achievement of performance targets.
Other Donor Programs: At USAID's suggestion, the European Union and UNDP re-activated a donors group for assistance to the Casamance. This group has begun to meet regularly to coordinate donor aid with the GOS. The European Union (EU) has pledged US$30 million over several years. Bilateral donors, working through non-governmental organizations (NGO) intermediaries, include France, Germany, Belgium, Canada, and Italy.
Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: USAID currently works with four partners: APRAN GIE (local NGO), Catholic Relief Services, AFRICARE, and UNICEF. Four more PVO/NGO partners will be selected in FY2001.
FY 2002 Performance Tables
Performance Measures:
Indicator FY97 (Actual) FY98 (Actual) FY99 (Actual) FY00 (Actual) FY00 (Plan) FY01 (Plan) FY02 (Plan) Indicator 1: Days of sponsored local events in which the "mouvement des forces democratiques de casamance" (MFDC) and Government of Senegal (GOS) are represented, with no incident NA NA 0 15 15 30 45 Indicator 2: Number of community leaders trained in decentralization sponsored by the SPO NA NA 0 191 169 240 280 Indicator 3: Number of USAID SOs or SPOs present in each of the two regions of the Casamance NA NA 0 2 2 3 3 Indicator Information:
Indicator Level (S) or (IR) Unit of Measure Source Indicator Description Indicator 1: IR number of days of local events Program monitoring system; local partners This indicator seeks to measure events in which active (combattant) members of the MFDC and representatives of the GOS (military, administrative) are present with no security incidents taking place. Local events include cultural weekends and meetings to organize these weekends. Indicator 2: IR Number of community leaders Implementing partners, USAID Community leaders include elected officials, leading citizens, or members of civil society (women's groups, heads of NGOs and associations). They are people who are able to spread the information on decentralization and to use it effectively due to their social, political, religious, or economic status, which can influence community or individual decision. In 1996, Decentralization laws transferred a wide range of responsibilities to existing local governments (rural and urban councils) and new regional councils. The transferred authorities include land tenure; environment and natural resources; health, popularion, and social affairs; youth and sports; culture; urban planning and housing; education; land development; and development planning. Specifically, USAID has sponsored training in the opportunities and challenges of decentralization; the constituents and stakeholders within the rural council; the various roles and responsibilities; and the budget and planning processes Indicator 3: IR Number of SOS or SPOs USAID The presence of SOs and SPOs means the return of normal programming in Casamance, following the pullout of USAID in 1997. Casamance encompasses two regions, which are Kolda and Ziguinchor.
U.S. Financing
(In thousands of dollars)
Obligations Expenditures Unliquidated Through September 30, 1999 1,500 DA 0 DA 1,500 DA 0 CSD 0 CSD 0 CSD 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 FSA 0 FSA 1,500 DFA 0 DFA 1,500 DFA Fiscal Year 2000 1,999 DA 224 DA 0 CSD 0 CSD 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 FSA 0 DFA 157 DFA Through September 30, 2000 3,499 DA 224 DA 3,275 DA 0 CSD 0 CSD 0 CSD 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 FSA 0 FSA 1,500 DFA 157 DFA 1,343 DFA Prior Year Unobligated Funds 0 DA 0 CSD 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 DFA Planned Fiscal Year 2001 NOA 1,258 DA 400 CSD 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 DFA Total Planned Fiscal Year 2001 1,258 DA 400 CSD 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 DFA Future Obligations Est. Total Cost Proposed Fiscal Year 2002 NOA 2,365 DA 600 DA 7,722 DA 200 CSD 243 CSD 843 CSD 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 ESF 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 SEED 0 FSA 0 FSA 0 FSA 0 DFA 0 DFA 1,500 DFA
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Last Updated on: May 29, 2002 |
