|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| >> Regional Overview >> East Timor Overview | |||||||||||||||||||||
IntroductionOn August 30, 1999, the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence from Indonesia. In the wake of the vote, pro-integrationist Timorese militia supported by elements of Indonesia's military unleashed a devastating campaign of terror and violence. More than 70% of East Timor's housing, public buildings and essential utilities were destroyed. Some three-quarters of the East Timorese population were displaced, with more than 250,000 fleeing the violence on their own volition and many others forcibly driven across the border to camps in West Timor by the militia. Although some 150,000 displaced persons have returned, approximately 100,000 still remain outside East Timor. The exodus of people from East Timor included thousands of former Indonesian civilian officials, resulting in the collapse of all vestiges of government, public services and law and order. Left behind was a population with limited education, a heavily damaged physical infrastructure, a shattered economy and no indigenous institutions remotely capable of providing self-governance.U.S. efforts will focus on building democratic institutions and creating an economy based on free market principles. Pursuing nation building objectives in East Timor along with continued support for democratic reforms inside Indonesia offers the greatest hope for stability in the region. The Development ChallengeEast Timor is primarily an agricultural economy, with coffee as its only significant export. Approximately 90% of the population lives in rural areas. The territory ranks as one of the poorest areas in Southeast Asia, with an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $431 (1996) and with 30% of households living below the poverty line. Prior to the referendum, East Timor was heavily dependent on external transfers, with approximately 85% of recurrent and capital expenditure coming from Indonesia. Although officially recorded investment per capita ran at approximately double the Indonesian average historically, Timorese access to economic infrastructure and basic social services was lower than in any other Indonesian province.Anti-independence militia destroyed most of the country's schools, hospitals, water, power, transport and communications facilities. This destruction will probably reduce GDP for 1999 by 40-45%. To compound its problems, East Timor has no central bank, no currency of its own, no functioning civil service, and no official language. The prospect of its becoming self-sufficient in the near term is bleak. Predictions of an economically self-sufficient and democratically self-governing East Timor in three to five years appear to be extremely optimistic. Sustainable development in East Timor depends, in large part, on how quickly and effectively the conditions for stable economic growth are established, the extent to which East Timorese are involved in decisions about their country's future and their capacity to engage effectively in such decision-making. While there are many significant challenges to creating a sustainable East Timor, the first priority is getting East Timorese citizens into productive economic activities and then building a sustainable polity. Prolonged humanitarian support can create aid dependencies. An overwhelming presence of affluent expatriates and East Timorese migrating from rural areas to Dili for the few jobs available in the capital will only deepen the social distortions that have already emerged. Add to this the fact that the vote for democracy created high expectations for a better life. If East Timor is to achieve and maintain stability, making good on these expectations is essential. In the absence of a government, East Timorese civil society organizations will need to play a significant role in helping restore economic activity and social and political stability. However, East Timor has little in the way of civil society. Civil society was never encouraged during the 25 years of Indonesian rule, nor during the 400 preceding years of Portuguese administration. In the destructive rampage following the referendum, East Timor's media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were specifically targeted. Most saw their meager resources and offices completely destroyed. Civil society leaders were either killed or forced to flee. While church organizations seemed to have fared better than non-religious organizations, many of them have been crippled as well. Reviving and strengthening indigenous civil society organizations to take on active roles in rebuilding East Timor will be an important element of future development efforts. Other DonorsNearly 200 delegates from over 50 countries and international agencies met in Tokyo in December 1999 and pledged $522 million in bilateral and multilateral development and humanitarian assistance over the next three years. Japan pledged $129 million, Portugal pledged $91.6 million, the European Community pledged $70 million and Australia pledged $44.5 million. A significant portion of the assistance will be programmed through a World Bank administered trust fund and a second trust fund administered by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The multilateral and bilateral assistance will be aimed at rebuilding East Timor and smoothing its transition to independence.The reconstruction trust fund administered by the World Bank, partnering with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), will assist in the preparation, appraisal, and supervision of development projects. The UNTAET Trust Fund, which will be administered in conjunction with a newly established consultative council of East Timorese representatives, will be used for the costs of governing the territory in the absence of an elected government and to begin capacity building for East Timorese individuals who will be involved in various governance roles in preparation for independence. Significant attention to donor coordination and consultation with East Timorese political leadership will be required to ensure the various donor interventions are used most effectively to meet East Timor's vast needs.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
 |
|||
|
