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VII. Performance Results (continued)

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE GOAL 2 — Existing and Emergent Regional Conflicts are Contained or Resolved.

I/P: Prevent/Resolve Regional and Local Conflicts

INDICATOR: Status of Chinese Cooperation on Regional Stability
Department of State seal Outcome
JUSTIFICATION: China is capable of playing a significant role in reducing tension in the East Asia and Pacific region.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target China continues to host and participate in Six-Party settlement of the North Korea nuclear issue.
Results China continues to prioritize the Six-Party Talks as the best venue to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, and urges further participation in the talks by all parties. A fifth round of the talks took place in Beijing in November, but North Korea has refused to participate in subsequent sessions.
Rating On Target
Impact Chinese assistance in limiting North Korea’s WMD proliferation is critical to our greater nonproliferation objectives.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source Reports and memoranda of communication from U.S. overseas posts, intelligence reporting, regional allies, and NGOs.
Data Quality
(Verification)
The quality of the data is largely dependent on the number and types of observations. Widespread interest in this area ensures a significant source of information is available to verify results and conclusions. Steady diplomatic reporting has provided a solid basis for policy makers to make informed decisions.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005 China’s active diplomacy continued to result in forward progress in Six-Party talks. China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) enhanced confidence-building measures on trade and maritime ties. China, ASEAN and UN promoted Burma political opening.
2004 China played a constructive role in, and hosted, the Six-Party talks with North Korea, and has continued to improve ties and play a constructive role in South Asia. China generally was supportive of U.S. Middle East policies and provided modest assistance with reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq.
2003 China discussed its bilateral border disputes with Indian officials and played a crucial role in facilitating multilateral talks with North Korea on maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.

 

A Look to History: Regional Stability

Photo showing French President Charles De Gaulle, center, giving a reception at Elysée Palace for foreign ministers attending the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization meeting in Paris, on April 9, 1963. U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, is the fifth from right, to his right is U.S. Ambassador to France, Charles Bohlen.In 1954, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Intended as a mutual defense pact to contain the spread of communism and to achieve regional stability in Southeast Asia, the United States perceived SEATO as the Asian equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, the Asian defense agreement proved to be less effective than its North Atlantic counterpart. Despite treaty commitments only three members sent troops to fight in the Vietnam War. President Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with the communist People’s Republic of China also reduced SEATO’s significance. In 1977, SEATO members agreed to dissolve the treaty, though bilateral defense agreements between various members continued.

French President Charles De Gaulle, center, gives a reception at Elysée Palace for foreign ministers attending the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization meeting in Paris, on April 9, 1963. U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, is the fifth from right, to his right is U.S. Ambassador to France, Charles Bohlen. Photo: AP/Wide World

I/P: Conflict Management and Mitigation

INDICATOR: Number of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Activities Conducted Worldwide
USAID Seal Output
JUSTIFICATION: This is a measure of progress toward world peace that incorporates a balanced mix of coordinated outputs.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • 5% increase over FY 2005 in number and types of events in support of peace processes (i.e., peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, and seminars).
  • 5% increase over FY 2005 in number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills.
  • 5% increase over FY 2005 in number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns.
Results
  • 44% increase in the number and types of events in support of peace processes (total number of events in FY 2006: 1,952).
  • 124% increase in the number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills (total number of officials/decision-makers trained in FY 2006: 13,155).
  • 42% increase in the number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns (total number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns in FY 2006: 10,810,750).
Rating Significantly Above Target
Impact Working toward its mandate of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity within USAID’s traditional disaster, transitional, and development assistance portfolios, conflict management and mitigation has achieved positive results by supporting peace-building initiatives, conflict sensitivity training, and conflict mitigation-focused media campaigns. These contributions continue to improve USAID’s ability to more skillfully support local efforts toward peace and regional stability.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source Preliminary result data from USAID operating units.
Data Quality
(Verification)
Verification and validation of the Agency’s performance data is accomplished by periodic reviews, certifications and audits, including Data Quality Assessments and PART assessments, as well as annual certification of operating units’ strategic objectives and their relationship to the Agency’s strategic goals. Data validation and verification are also supported by extensive automated systems and external expert analyses.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005
  • The number and types of events in support of peace processes (peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, seminars) increased by 20% over FY 2004 (Total number of events in FY 2005: 1,355).
  • The number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills increased by 78%. (Total number of officials/decision-makers trained in FY 2005: 5,858).
  • The number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns increased by 4% (The number of people reached in FY 2005: 7,587,694).
2004

Baselines:

  • Number and types of events in support of peace processes (peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, seminars): 1,126.
  • Number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills: 3,301.
  • Number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns: 7,295,860.
2003 N/A.

 

INDICATOR: Progress of Implementation of Sudan Peace Process
Department of State seal Outcome
JUSTIFICATION: A peaceful Sudan with an inclusive government based on the rule of law could be a hedge against regional instability and an important partner in the global war on terrorism. Ending the conflict would also alleviate one of the world’s worst humanitarian situations and stimulate regional economic prospects.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • Regional democratic elections are planned; non-violent transitions to appropriate new government in Sudan or at minimum, preparation activities toward a program of democratic elections are put in place.
  • Military reform continues with additional assistance provided to the southern Army.
  • Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) on both sides results in force reduction of 40% globally.
  • 40% of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home. Darfur IDPs and refugees return home.
  • UN authorizes extension of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in Darfur.
Results
  • Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation showed progress in security arrangements; less progress on power- and wealth-sharing protocols.
  • Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement completed. Both agreements complement framework of CPA.
  • Planning for elections barely in preliminary phase; however, technical preparations for a national census, a precursor to elections, are on schedule.
  • Military transformation and U.S. support for Security Sector Transformation have slowly begun in the South.
  • UNMIS verified redeployment on schedule with 63% Sudanese Armed Forces redeployed and 65% Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces redeployed.
  • The National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Commission has not met since it was established in February 2006. The Northern Sudan DDR Commission started preliminary assessment work in Darfur.
  • Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) are returning in the South, but displacements are increasing in Darfur.
  • UNSCR 1706 authorizes the extension of UNMIS to Darfur and expansion by up to 17,300 troops, 3,300 UN Police, and 16 Formed Police Units.
Rating Below Target
Impact The crisis in Darfur and Sudanese military offensive in Darfur have hindered progress on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and Comprehensive Peace Agreements are closely linked, and resolving the Darfur crisis is key not only to those affected by the crisis directly, but for all Sudanese whose future depends on the full and sustainable implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Reason for Shortfall Non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement as well as the Sudanese Government continue to escalate violence and further embroil the Darfur region in conflict. Additionally, both the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and particularly the National Congress Party have been slow to act on key aspects of the CPA which require direct cooperation among members of the Government of National Unity.
Steps to Improve Resolving the Darfur crisis through a two-tracked diplomatic and security strategy will be crucial to progress on CPA implementation. This includes broadening support for the Darfur Peace Agreement among non-signatories, full and expeditious implementation of the agreement, and deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur respectively.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source Embassy, USAID, UN, and NGO reporting.
Data Quality
(Verification)
UN and embassy reporting is generally detailed and accurate (e.g. monthly CPA Monitor). NGO reporting varies by location, event, and source.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005
  • In accordance with the CPA, the Government of National Unity and Presidency was formed and the Government of Southern Sudan was established. The donors conference in April succeeded in obtaining pledges to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement above request.
  • The UN Mission in Sudan deployed.
  • Following the untimely death of former Vice President John Garang in late July, Salva Kiir was announced as the new First Vice President of Sudan in an orderly succession process, signaling the resilience of the CPA.
  • Violence in Darfur and disruption of humanitarian assistance continued. In spite of some difficulty, Darfur peace talks in Abuja continued.
2004
  • Power and wealth sharing agreements signed.
  • Comprehensive agreement being negotiated.
  • Crisis in Darfur eclipses Government of Sudan (GOS) - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) peacemaking efforts.
  • GOS not yet able to rein in Jingaweit militia as humanitarian crisis worsens.
  • African Union deployed ceasefire monitors with U.S. assistance.
2003
  • U.S. Government continued playing a strong role in the Inter-governmental Authority for Development peace process. Talks continued moving toward conclusion.
  • Wide-ranging USG planning in the event of peace undertaken; most planning targets were identified.
  • Ceasefire monitoring continued; DDR planning underway.

 

Dialogue Helps Avert Conflict

Photo showing Community members participating in a traditional Murle dance in celebration of a successful peace meeting in Gurumuk.Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005 to end Sudan’s North-South civil war, USAID has been working with various ethnic groups to address potential and existing conflict. This effort paved the way for initial agreements on arms control and seasonal grazing access. In January 2006, these agreements were jeopardized when a disarmament initiative led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army resulted in a tense standoff between their troops and armed civilians in Lou Nuer ethnic group’s territory. Despite efforts to persuade the leaders to engage in dialogue, clashes ensued. Observers watched with dismay as the work toward stability seemed to unravel. They feared that old feuds would reignite and weapon supply lines would be reestablished. USAID responded by sponsoring initiatives with the Nuer Peace Council that brought together politicians, armed groups, and Lou leaders. This culminated in a peace meeting in Yuai, where more than 700 participants gathered, including Government of South Sudan President Riak Machar. The meeting resulted in agreements among Lou leaders on integration, disarmament, and peaceful engagement with their neighbors. Despite the fragile peace, participants from all sides said that the dialogue has profoundly influenced the course of events and averted conflicts that may have resulted in the collapse of delicate new relationships.

Community members participate in a traditional Murle dance in celebration of a successful peace meeting in Gurumuk. Photo: PACT

 

INDICATOR: Status of Regional Security in the Mano River Countries of Liberia,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone
Department of State seal Outcome
JUSTIFICATION: Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have been the site of war and other instabilities for at least the past 15 years, at untold humanitarian and economic cost to the countries and the region. Realizing a just peace will ensure that human resources and markets can better prosper and thereby decrease the region’s potential as a site for terrorist or other illicit activities, including environmental degradation.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • Liberia holds acceptable elections with nonviolent aftermath.
  • Security sector reform continues in Liberia with newly trained police and military units deployed.
  • The countries remain at peace, posting Gross Domestic Product growth twice that of population growth and boosting rankings on the Freedom House index of “free” nations by at least ten percentage points.
  • Seventy-five percent or more of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees return home.
  • All international/regional forces withdraw.
Results
  • Administration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated January 16, 2006, with no significant violence or unrest.
  • Security sector reform programs are underway for the army; training of units begun in July 2006. UN is making progress on police training and reform with U.S. assistance.
  • All three countries remain at peace although there is some concern about the post-Conte transition in Guinea. The most recent World Bank data indicate the following ratios of GDP growth to population growth: Guinea -- pop 2.2%, GDP 2.7%; Liberia -- pop 0.7%; GDP 2.6%; Sierra Leone -- pop 4.2%, GDP 7.4%.
  • 2006 Freedom House rankings are as follows: Guinea -- “Not Free”; Liberia -- “Partly Free”; Sierra Leone -- “Partly Free”.
  • All IDP camps closed in 2006. Approximately 100,000 refugees voluntarily returned to Liberia in 2006, some through UN facilitation.
  • UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) withdrew from Sierra Leone in December 2005, replaced by UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) political mission.
Rating Below Target
Impact Security and living conditions in Liberian returnee communities are slowly improving and more refugees are voluntarily returning. Lack of support for and focus on returnee communities could perpetuate security problems.
Reason for Shortfall Since many refugees have suffered multiple displacements during the long conflict, they have been slow to trust the peace. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR’s) official repatriation program is scheduled to be completed in mid-2007. UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) remains at some 16,000 personnel; drawdown is not expected until 2009.
Steps to Improve There is a need for a mix of diplomacy and post conflict reconstruction, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and recovery activities funded through U.S. foreign assistance. The Department will continue to work with UN partners to provide resources to encourage and support Liberian returnees and anchor refugee returns.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source Embassy, UN, NGO and press reporting.
Data Quality
(Verification)
UN and embassy reporting is generally detailed and accurate. NGO reporting varies by location, event, and source.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005
  • Liberia’s transitional government held elections in October 2005, and Sierra Leone continued post-conflict recovery.
  • UNAMSIL withdrew at the end of the year.
  • DDR and security sector reform activities were incomplete and greatly delayed, respectively.
  • As of the end of 2004, Sierra Leone had an estimated 48,000 Liberian refugees, Liberia 350,000 IDPs and thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees, while Guinea was hosting 6,000 Sierra Leoneans and 89,000 Liberians.
2004
  • The Liberian peace agreement was holding and DDR proceeding smoothly.
  • Sierra Leone remained calm as UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) continued its phased withdrawal.
  • IDPs and refugees were returning home.
2003
  • The Liberian civil war deteriorated starting in May 2003. Peace talks began in Ghana in June 2003 and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed on August 18, 2003.
  • The U.S. provided nearly $26 million in logistics support to enable the deployment of Economic Community of West African States peacekeeping forces.
  • The peace in Sierra Leone was still somewhat fragile, and Guinea’s stability was questionable.
  • 259,000 refugees and 425,000 IDPs in the region.
  • UNAMSIL began phased withdrawal, UNMIL was fully deployed and the DDR process began, along with planning for security sector reform.

 

U.S. Assistance to Liberia

Photo showing Liberian Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Henry Reed Cooper, right, administering the oath of office to Liberian President elect Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in Monrovia, Liberia, January 2006.The United States has taken the lead in helping Liberia make the transition from conflict to stability. Our diplomatic and military intervention in 2003 helped end the civil war, usher in a transitional government, and pave the way for democratic elections in 2006. In collaboration with other donors and multilateral organizations, the U.S. is helping Liberia rebuild its government and security functions, build infrastructure and roads, create employment and training opportunities, and provide vital health and education services for the Liberian people.

Liberian Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Henry Reed Cooper, right, administers the oath of office to Liberian President elect Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in Monrovia, Liberia, January 2006.
Photo: AP/Wide World

 

I/P: Regional Security Cooperation and Arms Control

INDICATOR: Progress of Implementation of the Adapted Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty
Department of State seal Output
JUSTIFICATION: The 1990 CFE Treaty has long been considered a cornerstone of European security. Entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty and its smooth implementation will contribute to a stable and secure Europe. The U.S. works closely with NATO Allies in coordinating positions regarding CFE issues, reinforcing the U.S. role in European security.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target Entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty and accession discussions with additional Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states that wish to join.
Results Russia still has not fulfilled all Istanbul commitments. This is the long-standing prerequisite to permit most States Parties to pursue ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation. Russia reached an implementing agreement with Georgia on the status and future duration of its bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and began withdrawal on the agreed timetable, but no agreement was reached on the base at Gudauta. There was no further progress on Russian commitments regarding Moldova. The U.S. and other States Parties continued to press Russia in the JCG and elsewhere for further progress on these commitments.
Rating Significantly Below Target
Impact Until the adapted CFE Treaty enters into force, CFE states parties will be denied the benefit of its significant additional flexibilities concerning flank limits and accession provisions. The standoff between Russia and NATO states, which refuse to ratify the adapted Treaty unless Russia implements its political commitments to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia, perpetuates an atmosphere in which the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) is often stymied in its efforts to make even routine and non-controversial improvements in the implementation of the existing Treaty and provides Russia with a basis to publicly criticize NATO states and the U.S. for their continued inaction.
Reason for Shortfall Resolution of outstanding Treaty implementation issues, as well as application of the adapted Treaty, has now been stalled for several years. Accession and other new flexibilities provided under adaptation are not available. Successful Treaty operation continues, but with occasional lapses Russia attributes to the “obsolete” character of the current Treaty.
Steps to Improve The U.S. and its NATO Allies continually urge Russia in the JCG and in high-level bilateral and NATO meetings to take the steps necessary to fulfill its Istanbul Commitments and create the conditions that would allow the adapted Treaty to enter into force.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source U.S. representatives’ and Embassies’ reporting; reports of meetings; information released by states involved.
Data Quality
(Verification)
U.S. Mission and Embassy reporting is generally detailed and accurate. Information from other states is generally accurate, but in occasional instances is subject to clarification in the JCG.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005 Russia did not fulfill all Istanbul commitments. Russia reached a political agreement with Georgia on the status and future duration of its bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki, but no agreement was reached on the base at Gudauta. There was no further progress on Russian commitments regarding Moldova.
2004 Russia did not fulfill all Istanbul commitments. Russia still needed to reach agreement with Georgia on remaining issues regarding the status of the Russian presence at the Gudauta base and its future use, and the duration of Russian presence in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Russia also needed to complete the withdrawal of its forces from Moldova, which virtually stalled in 2004. The U.S. and NATO continued to press Russia to fulfill these commitments, but there was no progress on key issues to report in FY 2004. Russia and the Georgian government continued to meet, but progress on Russian withdrawal from remaining bases fell victim to broader Russian-Georgian problems.
2003 Major progress was made in calendar year 2003 on withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova; some 20,000 tons of Russian munitions stored in depots in the Transdniestrian region had been withdrawn by the end of the year. Russia did not meet the OSCE’s extended December 31, 2003 deadline to withdraw forces from Moldova. Progress on withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia stalled for most of 2003, despite limited progress on technical issues. Russian equipment levels in the CFE Flank region remain below Adapted CFE Treaty Flank Limits.

I/P: Implementation of the Road MaP

INDICATOR: Progress of Implementation of the Road Map Leading to an Independent, Democratic Palestinian State Existing Side-by-Side with Israel in Peace and Security
Department of State seal Outcome
JUSTIFICATION: The indicator corresponds to the vision articulated by the President in his June 24, 2006, speech of two states, Israel and Palestine, existing side by side in peace and security, with targets geared to roadmap obligations.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • As comprehensive security performance moves forward, Israeli Defense Forces withdraw progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides revert to pre-September 28, 2000, status quo.
  • Immediate dismantlement of settlement outposts erected since March 2001, and freezing of all settlement activity.
  • Steps taken to improve the humanitarian situation.
  • Quartet convenes international conference. With Quartet, U.S. establishes a roadmap monitoring mechanism, including appointment of U.S. coordinator. Israeli, Palestinian, and regional Arab nonofficial experts resume dialogue on political, security, arms control, and other regional issues.
Results Pursuant to Israel’s successful disengagement from Gaza, the U.S. brokered an Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) in November 2005 which allowed for the opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and outlined a number of steps to promote greater movement of both people and goods. Free and fair legislative council elections in January, the first in a decade, brought to power a Hamas government elected on a platform of ending corruption and improving the lives of the Palestinian people. That government, however, rejected calls for it to be a partner for peace by accepting the principles outlined by the Quartet (U.S., EU, UN and Russia), leading most members of the international community, including the U.S. to break contact with those elements of the PA controlled by Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. PA President Mahmoud Abbas remained in office, providing a vehicle for continued limited U.S. engagement with the Palestinian leadership. The Hamas victory led to increased violence and lawlessness in Gaza, including frequent rocket attacks against Israel, resulting in increased Israeli security operations and closure of crossings. In June 2006 Hamas conducted an attack inside green-line Israel, killing two IDF soldiers and abducting a third. Israel responded with an extended air and ground operation. The USG has concentrated on the direct provision of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, while seeking to create the conditions that would allow the parties to return to the roadmap. Israeli settlement activity continued during the year and the GOI failed to make significant progress dismantling outposts. The U.S. Security Coordinator mission continued under LTG Keith Dayton, focusing on implementation of the AMA and supporting the office of President Abbas. In a September 19, 2006, speech at the UNGA, President Bush reaffirmed U.S. commitment to a two-state solution, indicating U.S. efforts would focus on strengthening and reforming the Palestinian security sector, supporting dialogue between the parties, and engaging moderate Arab leaders to help create an environment conducive to progress towards a two-state solution. A July attack by Hizballah provoked a month-long war between Israel and Hizballah, preventing progress on the Syria and Lebanon tracks.
Rating Below Target
Impact The purpose of this indicator is to fulfill the vision set forth by the President of two states, Israel and Palestine, existing side by side in peace and security, with goals geared to roadmap obligations.
Reason for Shortfall Hamas-led PA government refused to make itself a legitimate partner and govern responsibly by renouncing terror, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous agreements. Hizballah’s unprovoked attacks against Israel precipitated a war and prevented movement forward on the Israel-Lebanon/Israel-Syria tracks.
Steps to Improve Per the President’s September 19 speech to the UN General Assembly, the U.S. is focusing on strengthening and reforming the Palestinian security sector, taking steps to support Israeli and Palestinian leaders in their efforts to engage to resolve their differences, engaging with moderate leaders in the region, and welcomes European efforts to build and strengthen Palestinian governing institutions.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source Post reporting and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs reporting, Quartet announcements, site visits, other governments and institutions (World Bank, IMF, NGOs), media reports, intelligence reports.
Data Quality
(Verification)
Post reporting is reliable and well researched – utilizing many different resources: meetings with Israeli and Palestinian government officials, political figures, community leaders, as well as respected institutions working in the region.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005 Israel’s Government has concluded its withdrawal from Gaza, and the focus has now shifted to Palestinian efforts to establish order. Disengagement produced coordination on a number of levels between the two sides. The Palestinian Authority has begun to take steps to restructure and reform its security forces throughout the West Bank and Gaza, with the support of U.S. Security Coordinator General William Ward and assistance from the international community. Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn worked on his agenda of issues which intends to restore the viability of the Palestinian economy. Restoration of pre-Intifada Arab links with Israel continues, as indicated by the return of the Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors to Tel Aviv.
2004 Roadmap process is relaunched. Security cooperation renewed. Both sides progress through provisions in Phase I of the roadmap, including, but not limited to, on the GOI side: a) as comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides revert to the pre-September 28, 2000 status quo; b) immediate dismantlement of settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and freezing of all settlement activity; and c) steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the West Bank/Gaza.
2003 Roadmap is publicly released and used effectively as diplomatic tool to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Both sides progress through provisions in Phase I of the roadmap, including, but not limited to: a) as comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides revert to pre-September 28, 2000 status quo; b) immediate dismantlement of settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and freezing of all settlement activity; and c) steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the West Bank/Gaza. Israel’s border with Lebanon remains quiet.

 

People’s Forums Foster Peace

Photo showing a Muslim appealing to people's forum representatives in Kinniya, Trincomalee district, whose population is equally divided between Sinhalese Buddhists, Hindu Tamils, and Muslim Moors.To address ethnic tension and civil conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils in rural Ambagamuwa in central Sri Lanka, USAID sponsored a people’s forum, where representatives of both ethnic groups identified an acute need for improved health services in both communities. This gathering resulted in more than 300 people from both groups volunteering to share a day of labor in the community. Forums generally begin by addressing community development issues as a first step, and then move toward more difficult issues of peace building as they evolve. The forums aim to encourage citizen participation and consensus-building through community projects and discussion groups that work towards developing action plans that identify common needs and outline ways to meet those needs. These ambitious agendas run the gamut from education and job skills training to recreation and social services. Through the forums, communities are beginning to craft a vision for their collective future, often including mission statements in their action plans. The number of community forums is expected to expand to 72 by FY 2007.

A Muslim appeals to people’s forum representatives in Kinniya, Trincomalee district, whose population is equally divided between Sinhalese Buddhists, Hindu Tamils, and Muslim Moors. Source: Academy for Educational Development. Photo: AP/Wide World

I/P: Iraq and Gulf Security

INDICATOR: Free, Democratic, and Whole Iraq at Peace with Itself and Its Neighbors
Department of State seal Outcome
JUSTIFICATION: A free and democratic Iraq would contribute to economic and political stability in the region.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • Draft permanent constitution successfully adopted in October 2005 referendum.
  • Law enforcement institutions begin to enforce and the judiciary begins to uphold civil liberties protections in the new constitution.
  • Political parties announce coalitions and register for December elections, offering voters real choices. Parties and coalitions campaign peacefully. December 2005 elections successfully held. Results of elections receive broad public support.
  • Newly elected government takes power peacefully in early 2006 with broad domestic and international legitimacy and support.
  • Iraq assumes primary responsibility for its own security, able to defend itself without being a threat to its neighbors.
Results Recognizing progress in establishing a democratic society, international donors have increased assistance for Iraq, announcing $900 million in new pledges since the Madrid conferences. International recognition of and exchanges with Iraq have increased, including through opening of Embassies.
Rating Below Target
Impact Success will contribute to security, economic and social development, and political reform in the region.
Reason for Shortfall
  • Governance capacity shortfalls have resulted from inadequate training resources, and the Iraqi failure to obligate and spend a large majority of ministerial budgets.
  • Development of civil society institutions has been inhibited due to a perilous security environment, and a lack of devoted Iraqi resources and attention.
  • Security forces are failing to achieve levels of quality and quantity required to allow Government of Iraq to assume primary responsibility in the current security environment.
  • High attrition retards the rate of Iraqi Security Forces growth while corruption and infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties instead of the Government of Iraq is resulting in the Iraqi Security Forces, especially police, being part of the problem in many areas instead of a solution; the Minister of Interior recently stated that 2/3 of MOI forces should be fired.
Steps to Improve
  • Accelerate National Capacity Development Program across central ministries, and focus enhanced Mission field resources to develop provincial ministry capacity.
  • Put in place defined processes and requirements to obligate and execute 2007 Iraqi budget.
  • Support programs to promote Iraqi national reconciliation efforts, which will reduce politically driven violence and intimidation.
  • Significantly enhanced focus is required on present-for-duty strength of Iraqi Security Forces units, versus numbers initially trained and equipped, and upon developing true capability and readiness.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source U.S. Mission post reports.
Data Quality
(Verification)
Post reporting is reliable and well researched - utilizing many different resources: meeting with Iraqi government officials, political figures, community leaders, as well as respected institutions working in the region.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005 Credible elections for Transitional National Assembly and local governments were held on time; the change of government occurred in an orderly fashion and ahead of schedule; preparations are on track for constitutional referendum and December election; the rule of law and civil society are being established more firmly as time goes on; free media has been a responsible watchdog on governmental power; Iraq has progressively assumed increasing responsibility for own security.
2004
  • Transitional Administrative Law drafted and approved.
  • Iraqi Interim government assumes full sovereignty; continued political, legal and economic reform. National Conference held.
  • Iraqi Interim National Council selected and begins operating.
  • Democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society, and free media started.
  • Accountability and anti-corruption efforts began to take hold.
  • Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq established and begins preparations for January 2005 elections, assisted by the UN.
2003 Saddam Hussein’s regime overthrown. The Department worked closely with DoD and Coalition Provisional Authority to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The Department continues to support the development of strategies to move Iraq toward democracy, rule of law, build free market economy, including non-oil sector; build Iraqi security forces, subordinate to constitutional authority, capable of relieving U.S. and Coalition forces. UN agencies made critical contributions in humanitarian assistance and economic reform in Iraq.

I/P: Security Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa

INDICATOR: Percentage of U.S.-Trained African Units Deployed to Peace
Support/Humanitarian Response Operations
Department of State seal PART Output
JUSTIFICATION: A U.S.-trained African unit or one trained by U.S.-trained trainers will perform better than one not provided such training or its equivalent. African peacekeeping requirements are expected to remain high and therefore improved African capability will lessen calls for the use of U.S. forces.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in Peace Keeping Operations globally, approximately 75% will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.
Results Approximately 79% of all African battalions (or other military contingents) deployed on peacekeeping missions globally have significant staff and/or unit training experience through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program.
Rating On Target
Impact ACOTA partners populate all peace support missions in Africa and represent over 75% of the African contingents deployed on these missions.
PERFORMANCE DATA Data Source United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Embassy and NGO reporting.
Data Quality
(Verification)
UNDPKO reporting is detailed and accurate. The African Union’s African Mission in Sudan reporting varies, backed up by U.S. Embassy reporting from troop contributing country locations. NGO reporting varies by location, event, and source.
PAST PERFORMANCE 2005 ACOTA trained and/or equipped 11,442 African partner military personnel with $28 million. Fifteen ACOTA-trained contingents routinely deployed on UN or African Union peace support missions. African units trained by U.S. trainers came from Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Kenya in significant numbers.
2004 Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in peacekeeping operations globally, approximately 65% had significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.
2003 Seven African contingents trained by the U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers engaged in peace support missions. An additional five contingents planned for Peace Support Operations participation in Liberia and Burundi. The Economic Community of West African State forces, with significant U.S. support and training, deployed to Liberia.

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