Synopsis
Terrorist attacks, led by multi-national cadres in many
parts of the world, have focused the attention of US policy
makers and scholars on the Middle East and the entire Muslim
world. The growing antipathy in the Muslim world toward
the United States and the West in general spurred USAID
to re-examine the ways in which we provide assistance in
predominantly Muslim countries. Studies were completed that
focused on economic growth, governance, education and civil
society challenges in the Muslim world.
There will be a presentation on a USAID-supported program
in Indonesia, which engages Muslim organizations and groups
in a discourse on democracy, human rights and gender equality.
The program, which is managed by the Asia Foundation, has
32 local partner organizations and uses Islamic theology
and vocabulary to reach out to a cross-section of the population
– Muslim preachers, students in Muslim educational
institutions, educators and the general public.
Notes
Ann Phillips, Political Economist and Policy Analyst,
Policy and Program Coordination Bureau, provided an overview
of the Muslim world and general guidelines for outreach
programs. Claire Ehmann, Desk Officer, Office of Central
Asian Republics in the Europe and Eurasia Bureau, briefed
the audience on Muslim outreach programs in Europe and the
Religion, State, and Society Strategy in Central Asia. Stephen
Giddings, Chief of the Policy Outreach, Strategy, and Evaluation
Division in the Africa Bureau Development Planning, examined
innovative ways that the Bureau has tried to engage Muslim
sub-Saharan Africa. Oliver Wilcox, Democracy and Governance
Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa in the Asia/Near
East Bureau discussed Muslim outreach in the democracy and
governance sector. Krishna Kumar, Senior Policy Analyst,
Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, Center for Development
Information and Evaluation, presented findings from a study
that he and Boston University Professor Robert W. Hefner
conducted in Indonesia of the Asia Foundation’s program
on Islam and Civil Society.
Ann Phillips, Political Economy Policy Analyst,
PPC
Ann Phillips began by trying to define and capture the enigma
of the “Muslim world,” the need for which, according
to Phillips, became more immediate for the U.S. after the
attacks of September 11. She described it as a shorthand
term for a set of regions that comprise countries whose
populations have a Muslim majority. Though the term is widely
used in government agencies and in the private sector, many
people resent the assumption inherent in “Muslim World”
that Islam is the defining characteristic of every country
found therein—an assumption that is often incorrect.
There are currently 1.3 billion Muslims located in five
regions of the world: sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and
North Africa, Europe and Eurasia, South Asia, and East Asia.
USAID has missions in 27 of the 49 countries that have more
than 50 percent Muslim population. USAID assembled several
indices in order to better understand the scope of the Muslim
world and, most urgently, the significance of Islam in the
performance of “Muslim” countries.
Phillips displayed several graphs of aggregate Muslim world
data including national income variation, Muslim/non-Muslim
democracy and governance disparity (the greatest disparity
was found in political rights, the least disparity in economic
freedom), and results from two Pew Global Attitudes surveys
that compared Muslim and non-Muslim countries’ view
of the U.S. (See PowerPoint Presentation (1.9mb ppt) for
graphs.)
She also presented Muslim/non-Muslim country scores by
region in rule of law, corruption perception, and civil
liberties. When the data was examined by region, the distinction
between Muslim and non-Muslim countries in some regions,
like sub-Saharan Africa, was negligible (within the margin
of error). In addition, upon examining the Europe and Eurasia
data, Phillips remarked that the difference between Muslim
and non-Muslim countries along the range of indices is similar
to what would have been found in the Soviet era when Islam
did not play a significant role. Because the results changed
in going from aggregate to regional Muslim/non-Muslim data
comparisons, Phillips pointed to skepticism regarding Islam’s
influence on these indicators. (See PowerPoint Presentation
(1.9mb ppt) for graphs.)
In addition to obtaining empirical data on the Muslim world,
USAID sought out existing scholarship and commissioned scholars
to conduct studies in education, economic growth, governance,
and philanthropy.
Phillips highlighted important results of these studies.
First, in the education study, survey data suggested that
many Muslims prefer more than a purely secular education
for their children. Second, the economic growth study indicated
that poor governance, not Islam is the major deterrent to
economic growth. Third, in the governance study, three of
the primary findings were:
• In many post-colonial Muslim countries, minority
power in community-based systems perpetuates authoritarian
rule.
• Secular governments have been largely discredited
due to poor performance. Phillips warned that a rigid church-state
separation may be inappropriate in a number of predominantly
Muslim countries.
• Economic hardships and deterioration of basic social
services coupled with repressive secular regimes have worked
in the local communities to increase at least the tacit
support for radical Islamic groups.
The U.S. government has identified two major goals with
respect to its engagement in the Muslim world: (1) enhancing
domestic security and (2) promoting moderation among Muslims.
However, these two goals may be contradictory; for example,
security requirements often limit the government’s
ability to do effective outreach. Also, Phillips pointed
out that radical Islamists often represent the strongest
opposition group against repressive secular governments.
The U.S. government has several ongoing projects working
to improve initiatives in the Muslim world. It has tasked
missions with analysis and evaluation of regional and local
initiatives; a State/USAID Joint Policy Council working
group and an inter-agency working group on the Muslim world
have been established. The U.S. government has also sought
international support and resources through the G8, which
adopted the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
(BMENA) in June 2004.
Regional Examples of Outreach Efforts
Claire Ehmann, Central Asian Republics, E&E
Claire Ehmann explained that half of the countries in Europe
and Eurasia have Muslim majorities. Due to the Soviet Union’s
legacy of religious intolerance, two negative consequences
have befallen this region: (1) some governments continue
to deny people religious freedom and try to control religious
messages (2) there is a dearth of well-trained Islamic scholars
in the region who can effectively counter extremist propaganda
from foreign groups.
Most of the programs geared toward Muslim society in this
region do not address Islam itself, but try to promote democracy
and political, economic, and social opportunities that will
reduce the allure of extremist messages. For example, in
Albania, USAID is starting a new religious tolerance program
that brings together religious leaders and journalists.
The program trains them in promoting tolerance and in conflict-resolution
skills. Also, in Bulgaria, there is an ongoing USAID effort
targeted toward Muslim minority youth to reduce school drop-out
rates and improve economic opportunities for young people.
Ehmann also discussed the Mission-developed Central Asia
Religion, State, and Society Strategy. Its purpose is to
engage Muslim communities in the region to reduce the risk
of Central Asia from becoming fertile ground for terrorist
organizations. The strategy seeks “to integrate independent
and credible Islamic leaders into USAID’s development
activities” and “to create ‘cognitive
dissonance’” by challenging negative perceptions
of U.S. foreign policy.
The strategy includes bus tours, modeled after a successful
program in Bangladesh, whereby credible Islamic leaders
learn about USAID development projects. There have been
four tours thus far—Shymkent, Kazakhstan; Osh and
Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Ehmann concluded by calling attention to preliminary findings
learned from these initiatives. On the positive side, USAID
found a reservoir of pro-American sentiment and cooperative
and responsive religious leaders in these areas. However,
USAID found that radical Islamic groups are also quite successful
at spreading their extremist message through programs that
target the poor, women and the young.
Stephen Giddings, Sub-Saharan Africa
The USAID Africa Bureau has designed and implemented a variety
of Muslim outreach programs across the spectrum of countries
in sub-Saharan Africa with significant Muslim populations..
Muslim sub-Saharan Africa stretches from the Atlantic Ocean
coast to the Indian Ocean coast and includes 15 countries
with Muslim populations totaling 150 million people. Given
the great variety of Islam in this region, USAID has no
centralized approach to dealing with Muslim African world
in sub-Saharan Africa . Instead, USAID encourages bureaus
to tailor programs according to the specific needs of the
area.
Giddings highlighted some of the local Muslim outreach
programs within the Bureau, including education, media outreach,
and conflict resolution programs. In East Africa, the Education
in Marginalized Communities Program (targeting area populations
that are predominantly Muslim) works to increase the partnership
between schools and communities, to improve school management,
and to better relationships between parents and school officials.
It also engages in curriculum development and teacher training,
including targeting critical reading skills, and endeavors
to increase girls’ enrollment.
In West Africa, in Mali, USAID sponsors a community schools
initiative that involves the collaboration of madrasas,
government-funded, and community-funded schools. In what
is called the ‘cluster approach,’ teachers and
administrators from schools located reasonably close to
each other, be they Koranic, community or government run,
meet and discuss problems and open up their teaching approach
to more participatory methods and more creative classroom
instruction.
USAID Muslim outreach programs have also enlisted Muslim
organizations to facilitate HIV/AIDS outreach programs.
In the Kaduna region of Nigeria, Muslim leadership and the
local government approved a USAID-sponsored popular film
advocating abstinence that would later be disseminated throughout
the entire country.
USAID has also cooperated with local Muslim leaders in
conflict-resolution activities in Senegal, Nigeria, and
Mali (Northern Mali Strategy) and with National Union of
Muslim Women’s Association of Mali to sensitize women
to their political rights and increase to their role in
politics. Finally, USAID Missions in several countries support
the secular activities/broadcasts (with careful attention
to laws concerning the separation of church and state) of
Muslim radio stations as well as messages/programs promoting
tolerance on public radio stations. USAID/Mali was even
asked to provide Internet connections for a mosque.
Oliver Wilcox, Middle East and North Africa
Oliver Wilcox focused on Muslim outreach in the context
of democracy and governance programs in the Middle East
and North Africa. However, he began his discussion by telling
the success story of an intervention in Bangladesh centered
specifically on Muslim outreach. During a pilot phase, Bangladeshi
imams (Islamic prayer leaders) were taken on bus tours and
received exposure to development issues, such as health,
basic education, human trafficking, and local governance.
The Islamic Foundation in Bangladesh (made up of 5,000–6,000
Bangladeshi imams) has approached USAID and requested that
this program be institutionalized. The institutionalization
of this program is now in the process of being developed.
It is assumed that the training components involved in the
pilot program will be integrated in the continuing education
curricula of Islamic Foundation Centers, which total eight
across the country.
Wilcox pointed out the tangential nature of Muslim outreach
in the democracy and governance (DG) sector. For example,
DG’s political party work has incorporated Islamist
parties or Islamist members of parliament in Afghanistan
(since March 2002), in Morocco, in Yemen, and in Algeria
(a non-presence country, though USAID-funded message development
and constituent outreach included Islamist parties).
The reasons for Islamist participation in these programs
include:
1. USAID’s political parties policy: as long as parties
are non-violent, democratic, inclusive, and not anti-statist,
USAID can help.
2. Presence of liberal autocracies: This context allows
political space for Islamists to organize and participate
in electoral politics.
3. Ascendance of moderates within Islamist movements: They
see the practical benefits of receiving U.S. assistance
that provides them with the skills necessary to better compete
in their political environments.
Other DG programs in the Middle East that have dealt with
Muslim outreach include expanding women’s awareness
of their legal rights in Morocco, an anti-domestic violence
program with a legal reform advocacy component in Jordan,
and a civic education program in Asia and Middle East that
focuses on the learning process (getting away from memorization
in schools and asking students to solve concrete problems
in their communities). These programs are likely to broaden
and deepen in part due to successes and consequent increased
funding from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
and USAID.
Wilcox concluded his presentation by bringing attention
to some remaining challenges for DG programs:
1. How to address Muslim outreach more systematically—in
ways that make sense technically and in terms of country
context.
2. Civil society needs to be addressed in Muslim outreach
especially with respect to civil society. To date USAID
support has generally been for urban-based elite groups
with very little in the way of grassroots constituencies.
Krishna Kumar, Islam and Civil Society (ICS) in
Indonesia
Krishna Kumar presented the study that he and Robert W.
Hefner conducted for PPC. The study was summarized in a
paper titled “Engaging Muslim Civil Society for Promoting
Democracy and Pluralism: An Assessment of the 'Islam and
Civil Society Program' in Indonesia.” This report
presents the findings of an assessment of the Asia Foundation’s
(TAF) program on ‘Islam and Civil Society’ (ICS)
in Indonesia. Funded by USAID since its inception in 1997,
the program involves collaboration with Muslim leaders and
organizations to support democracy training and civil society
development. Using the symbols and vocabularies of Islam,
the program encourages the development of a politically
secular Indonesia based on the values of freedom, religious
tolerance, and pluralism. Thus, the program seeks to promote
the twin objectives of the U.S. foreign policy of strengthening
democracy in the largest Muslim country and of engaging
Muslim leaders and organizations in fight against extremism
and terrorism.
The Development Evaluation and Information Office of Bureau
of Policy and Program Coordination undertook an in-depth
assessment of the program during February- March, 2004.
The purpose was not simply to assess the nature, achievements
and shortcomings of the program but also to draw policy
and programmatic lessons that can be applied in other Muslim
or predominantly Muslim societies.
Program Activities
Having begun with twelve partners, the ICS program today
works with 32 institutions and organizations, ranging from
large mass organizations, like the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah,
to Muslim universities and small non-governmental groupings.
Its ongoing activities include civic education, democracy
training through mosque and peasantran networks, pluralism
and tolerance initiatives, media, gender equality and policy
reform.
Civic education has been a central component of the program
since its inception. Its eight current partners are engaged
in a wide range of activities including seminars, meetings
and civic education at institutions of higher learning.
With the support of the program, State Islamic University
(UIN) in Jakarta and the private Muhammadadiyh University
in Yogyakarta have developed courses in civic education
reaching out to tens of thousands of students every year.
The curricula materials and pedagogical techniques used
in these programs are of high quality.
ICS activities also seek to encourage and to promote democratic
values in classical Islamic academies (pesantren) and mosques,
which are the only sources of civic education that many
Indonesians receive. The current four projects in this area
undertake many activities ranging from conducting workshops
for students, training for religious preachers to the distribution
of flyers on democracy and human rights in mosques after
Friday prayers.
As the program expanded, TAF and its partners realized
that it was not sufficient to promote values of religious
pluralism and tolerance, but also necessary to mainstream
the pluralism and variety of approaches within the rich
Islamic tradition. As a result, the program has undertaken
many activities to raise awareness about pluralism within
the Islamic community. For example, one partnering organization,
the Paramadina Institute, supports Muslim scholars re-examining
Islamic jurisprudence for the purpose of showing its compatibility
with democracy and human rights. The program has also supported
the establishment of the International Center for Islam
and Pluralism which aims to promote scholarly exchanges
between Indonesian Muslims and Muslim scholars in other
parts of the Muslim world.
The program has focused on mass media, and its 10 partners
have undertaken many media activities aimed at an array
of age groups, social classes, and regions. One of its successful
activities is “Islam and Tolerance,” a radio
talk show, which is relayed by 68 networks of 40 radio stations
in 40 cities. The partnering institution, Institute for
Studies on the Free Flow of Information–Liberal Islam
Network, also provides half-page columns based on the talk
show to more than 100 newspapers every week. The program
also supports a monthly and a magazine which examine contemporary
issues from a liberal, Islamic perspective. In addition,
several other radio talk shows, seminars, and training activities
are undertaken under the auspices of the program.
The ICS component on ‘Islam and Gender’ works
to support gender equality, women’s political participation,
and nonviolence, with target audiences ranging from women
preachers to listeners on radio programs. One partner, Fatayat,
the young women’s corps of Nahdlatul Ulama, has established
20 domestic violence counseling centers and women’s
advocacy centers. Another, Puan, aims to educate male and
female pesantren leaders on Islam and violence against women.
Still others sponsor meetings and seminars and talk shows
for general audiences.
Finally, several ICS partners are engaged in policy advocacy
and efforts to professionalize the operations of Muslim
political parties. For example, a Jakarta-based NGO, Desantara,
conducts hearings, legislative research, and direct advocacy
for religious minorities. The Institute for Social Institutions
Studies runs programs to help Islamic parties to improve
their platforms by focusing on substantive needs rather
than formalistic issues like the implementation of Islamic
law.
Program Impacts
Probably, the most important contribution of the program
is that it has expended a national dialogue on the issues
of democracy, human rights, and gender equality. A cross-section
of the people—students, Islamic leaders, women, and
even the informed public—are participating in it.
What is still more encouraging is that the issues of democracy,
pluralism, and tolerance are being discussed with reference
to Islamic theology, practices, and symbols, as well as
the problems and challenges facing contemporary Indonesian
society.
The program has also contributed to the strengthening of
institutional capacities of many of its partners. The financial
and technical support provided by the program to its partners
has enabled them to develop innovative projects, acquire
new expertise, and even secure resources from other organizations.
Many organizations have grown over time. Although their
growth cannot always be attributed to their partnership
in the program, there is little doubt that it has helped.
Finally, the program has facilitated formal and informal
networks among 32 Muslim organizations that have begun to
see themselves as an emerging force committed to building
a pluralistic, democratic country. These organizations often
share their ideas, people, and resources. They help each
other in many ways. Within this large network, there are
several sub-networks—one on Islam and gender rights,
one that plugs pro-democracy Islamic media into mainstream
media, and one that facilitates cooperation among Islamic
educational institutions. For example, when a pro-polygamy
campaign was begun by Islamist groups in Indonesia, the
Islam and gender network mobilized a multi-pronged media
attack, publishing columns in the nation's largest daily
newspaper, having ICS partners speak against polygamy on
Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, or JIL) radio
show, and also on a national TV station in Yogyakarta.
Lessons for Replication
Four pre-conditions:
1. The existing political system should allow the civil
society, the media and political groupings to engage in
discussions of public policy issues. Soeharto’s Indonesia
was not a free society, but the regime did not prohibit
public discussion of major policy issues. Although there
has been some liberalization in countries such as Jordan
and Morocco, most of the Middle Eastern countries do not
permit even limited political freedom. They directly and
indirectly control civil society organizations and political
parties. In such countries, programs like ICS cannot be
initiated and implemented. However, there are many other
Muslim countries, such as Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Niger,
or even Pakistan, where similar programs could be launched
on a modest scale.
2. At least a section of the credible religious leaders
should be committed to democracy and pluralism and willing
to take the initiative to promote them. Indonesia has enjoyed
a legacy of mass Muslim civil society organizations whose
leaders largely subscribe to the vision of a pluralistic,
democratic Islam. Most of them were educated in secular
social sciences or other fields with a loosely “civic”
orientation. In most Muslim countries, the leadership of
Islamic civil society organizations is in the hands of conservative
religious leaders, with little exposure to secular education
and no commitment to democracy and pluralism. Such leadership
cannot be expected to sponsor and support programs for the
promotion of democracy and human rights in their societies.
3. The country should have a well-established intermediary
organization(s), which enjoys the trust of local Islamic
leaders and organizations as well as of USAID, to initiate
and manage the program. The success of ICS program also
depends on the experience, expertise, and reputation of
the Asia Foundation. It enjoys an impeccable reputation
among religious and political leaders in Indonesia. It also
has a proven record of managing international projects,
which has endeared to it USAID. Such intermediary organizations
are needed to provide a buffer between USAID and recipient
Muslim religious organizations. While USAID should be assured
that its funds would be managed and accounted prudently,
Muslim religious leaders and organizations must be confident
about the motives underlying assistance. Indonesian experience
indicates that an established intermediary organization
can protect recipient Islamic organizations from being accused
of being pawns in the hands of a foreign power. Suitable
intermediary organizations are difficult but not impossible
to locate. For example, the American Universities in Beirut
and Cairo may perform such intermediary functions if USAID
were to launch a civic education program in Middle Eastern
countries.
4. USAID and the American embassy should be totally committed
to the program and be prepared for the risks involved in
working with Muslim civil society organizations. USAID in
Indonesia enjoys the unquestioned support of the American
Embassy for the Muslim Civil Society program. Both USAID
and the Embassy have been aware of the risks involved in
working with Muslim religious leaders, who do not necessarily
share USAID’s vision in international arena. The essential
point is that USAID should have a long-term strategic vision
for engaging Islamic leaders that is shared and supported
by the U.S. embassy. Both should realize that many of the
leaders and organizations who would receive USAID funds
might disagree with USAID policies and programs. Moreover,
some of them might even turn against USAID. Unless USAID
and the embassy are both willing and able to take risks,
and even face failure, USAID should not design and support
such initiatives.
Program Design
1. The program should be owned and managed by indigenous
groups and leaders. In Indonesia, program partners own the
program. They plan and implement their own activities. They
decide what they will do and how they will do it. The Foundation
plays only a supportive role. Local ownership, while promoting
commitment and initiative, also deflects the criticism that
program partners work for a foreign power. The ICS model
seems most suitable in the present political climate in
Muslim countries which harbor serious misgivings about U.S.
intensions.
2. The program should engage multiple Islamic groups working
on different issues and problems. The ICS program has partnered
with different groups. Its partners have launched civic
education curricula in Islamic institutions of higher learning;
promoted civic education in pesantren and state schools;
established women’s crisis centers in cities and towns;
published and disseminated highbrow and popular books on
pluralism and democracy; and organized meetings and seminars
targeted to different audiences. Working with multiple partners
is a promising strategy for two reasons. First, it protects
the program from abject failure if one or more partners
do not perform well. Second, it creates a synergy in which
various sponsors of program activities mutually reinforce
and help each other. Depending on the local circumstances
and interest, the program should seek to engage groups such
as women’s religious groups, Muslim youth organizations,
Islamic schools and educational institutions, and the interested
print and electronic media entities.
3. The program should be designed as an evolving initiative
that can respond to emerging opportunities and challenges.
One conspicuous feature of ICS program is its flexibility.
It is not blue-printed with precise indicators. TAF enjoyed
unprecedented autonomy and was able to reorient and redirect
the program in the aftermath of the fall of the Soeharto
government. The program is able to recruit new partners
as opportunities arise and drop old ones when they fail
to operate. The obvious lesson is that any Islamic civil
society program should enjoy maximum flexibility to respond
to emerging challenges and opportunities. They should be
able to change and modify their plans, when necessary. Such
projects should be free from the regulatory requirements
imposed on development programs. Perhaps USAID should either
provide grants or sign cooperative agreements with intermediary
organizations to ensure necessary flexibility of the planned
program.
4. The program should be managed by staff members who possess
intimate knowledge of the Islamic traditions in the country
and are able to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and
institutions. The ICS program in Indonesia is highly staff
intensive, as it involves working directly with grassroots
organizations. Both TAF and USAID have excellent staff members,
who are not only knowledgeable about local conditions in
different regions, but are also sensitive to local culture
and traditions. In fact, within USAID the program is managed
by a local expert who enjoys superb rapport with civil society
organizations. Therefore, it is important that at the planning
stage, USAID provide for staff members who possess an intimate
knowledge of Islamic traditions in the country and are able
to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and institutions.
Question and Answer Session
What was the main challenge that you all encountered?
How much was the evidence of say, Wahhabi, intrusion to
in these areas? How much challenge or opposition did they
pose to the program?
Phillips:
In Indonesia, I know of a survey that shows 3% of people
feel more affinity with radical Islamic traditions. In many
local committees they opposed the programs. There might
be some opposition working in madrasas. The good thing is
that the visibility of program is quite low. The opposition
was kept to the local level and did not extend to USAID.
One problem was that many of the groups that were very enthusiastic
lacked organizational capacity. Some factors helped us,
such as the Bali bombing. It very much crystallized people’s
repugnance toward Islamic radicalism. However, Iraq made
the task difficult.
You didn’t mention whether you were dealing
with Sunni or Shiite Muslims. I assume you were talking
about Sunni Muslims. Have any initiatives been done in the
recent past or in the future with relating or with encouraging
the center of Sunni learning and outreach, which is the
al-Azhar University in Egypt. My understanding is that the
Egypt mission in the late 70s and early 80s actually commissioned
the al-Azhar University to do several studies to pave the
way for specific programs, like child survival and maternal
healthcare which are all detailed in the Islamic way, but
I am concerned with its being brought out to be very simplistic
messages that can be transmitted through various program
methodologies. What has been done in Indonesian Islamic
universities?
Phillips: We do look
at all of the strains within Islam to understand the dynamics
there. This Seminar took on a broader view of the outreach
issue. One of the key issues that other scholars have identified
is anticipation of some kind of tectonic shift between the
kinds of authority that Sunnis and Shiites have. These are
all things that we need to be sensitive to.
Wilcox: To my knowledge, we haven’t
specifically addressed the Sunni-Shia split. In Bahrain,
a non-presence country, the National Democratic Institute
is doing its political and parliamentary work through the
CEPPS mechanism. In Bahrain, you have a situation where
the majority of the population is Shia and the political
associations which are most politically active are Shia
and Shia Islamist. So they have a religious political identity,
so there is a particular challenge there. With reference
to the al-Azhar, I’m not familiar with the details.
I understand that there has been at least consideration
if not some efforts in the past to enlist some cooperation
from the al-Azhar. I know that in Jordan the Ministry of
Endowments and Religious Affairs has been involved in working
with USAID in maternal and reproductive health.
I just returned from an assessment mission in the
West Bank and Gaza. There we found widespread concerns about
the anti-terrorism certification process including American
and local Palestinian NGOs. Do you have any advice as to
how we can convince local partners of the need for and the
merits of signing on to this sort of certification?
Phillips: We are very cognizant of the
problem. I’ve heard from German development organizations
which are concerned that the certification process is turning
the landscape over to the more radical groups. Many organizations
have subsets of the organizations with very radical political
wings. We are talking about it in our interagency groups.
If you are interested in giving me more specific examples,
I’d be happy to bring that into the discussion.
Oliver Wilcox: The Gaza -West Bank situation
is a particularly tough one on this issue. In other Arab
countries, like Morocco, there may not be quite this degree
of difficulty. In the DG sector there, at least one implementing
partner has been able to give sub-grants to local NGOs.
It may vary from country to country.
This has been interesting, but very superficial.
We do need some kind of workshop. With respect to the few
surveys that you mentioned, I don’t think we’ve
gotten under the surface as to what are the root causes
that are fueling anti-Americanism? We haven’t talked
about foreign policy or unemployment. Who would organize
a forum in which we can discuss these points? How do educate
ourselves before begin to educate others?
Phillips: I did mention briefly the economic
and social conditions as a factor, but I agree that we have
just skimmed the surface. I refer you back to the papers
that I mentioned, the studies on economic growth, governance
and education in which these issues are discussed more in
detail. I mentioned the Zogby poll which show very strong
negative view toward the U.S. due mainly to U.S. policy.
We are looking at these things in the State/AID working
group. We cannot assume that U.S. policy in not part of
the picture. You can find the Zogby Poll and Pew Surveys
online to see what questions they’ve asked.
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