

OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

"...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world."

HANDBOOK OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAM INDICATORS



August 1998

Technical Publication Series

**Office of Democracy and Governance
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523-3100**

TO ORDER THIS DOCUMENT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE CLEARINGHOUSE:

- Please reference the document title (*Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators*) and document identification number (PN-ACR-211).
- USAID employees, USAID contractors overseas, and USAID sponsored organizations overseas may order documents at no charge.
- Universities, research centers, government offices, and other institutions located in developing countries may order up to five titles at no charge.
- All other institutions and individuals may purchase documents. Do not send payment. When applicable, reproduction and postage costs will be billed.

Fax orders to (703) 351-4039 **Attn:** USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)

E-mail orders to docorder@dec.cdie.org

ABOUT THE TECHNICAL PUBLICATION SERIES

The USAID Office of Democracy and Governance Technical Publication Series was launched in March 1998. The series includes publications intended principally for USAID personnel; however, all persons interested in the sector may benefit from the series. Authors of individual publications may be USAID officials and/or other individuals from the public and private sector. The Office of Democracy and Governance reserves the right to review and edit all publications for content and format and all are subject to a broad USAID review process. The series is intended in part to indicate best practices, lessons learned, and guidelines for practitioner consideration. The series also includes publications that are intended to stimulate debate and discussion.

A list of other relevant publications and ordering information are included at the back of this document.

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION

This handbook was developed to enhance the ability of strategic objective teams—those USAID officers and their partners responsible for program management—to monitor progress in achieving planned results and use performance information to guide program implementation.

Comments regarding this handbook and inquiries regarding USAID's ongoing work in the area of DG program indicators should be directed to

Margaret Sarles, Division Chief
Strategies and Research Division
Tel: (202) 712-1416
Fax: (202) 216-3231
msarles@usaid.gov

Office of Democracy and Governance
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523-3100

More information, including electronic versions of the DG Office's Technical Publication Series, is available from the DG Office's Intranet site at <http://inside.usaid.gov/G/DG/> and USAID's democracy Internet site at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/

ABOUT THE DG OFFICE

The Office of Democracy and Governance is the U.S. Agency for International Development's focal point for democracy and governance programming. The DG Office's role is to provide USAID and other development practitioners with the technical and intellectual expertise needed to support democratic development. It provides this expertise in the following areas:

- C **Rule of Law**
- C **Elections and Political Processes**
- C **Civil Society**
- C **Governance**

PREFACE

This handbook was developed to enhance the ability of strategic objective teams—those USAID officers and their partners responsible for program management—to monitor progress in achieving planned results and use performance information to guide program implementation. USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance undertook this effort, recognizing that defining objectives, establishing benchmarks, and assessing progress in the democracy and governance arena(s) present unique challenges to the Agency. The DG Office believed that real gains in our understanding of performance measurement could only come from a concerted effort, drawing together practitioners and experts of different kinds. The result is this handbook, which offers advice on the collaborative process of developing indicators and gives a broad selection of candidate (not mandated) indicators for monitoring each of the Agency’s democracy objectives.

The indicators included in this handbook were developed by four working groups, each responsible for one of the Agency’s four democracy objectives: 1) *strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights*; 2) *more genuine and competitive political processes*; 3) *increased development of politically active civil society*; and 4) *more accountable and transparent government institutions*. The groups included USAID officers, NGO staff members, performance measurement experts, InterAmerican Development Bank and World Bank staff, and others interested in improving monitoring systems for democracy programs. Starting with the democracy-governance portion of the Agency’s strategic framework, each working group developed or refined a hierarchy of objectives against which progress can be measured. Then indicators were developed to capture progress in meeting each objective in the framework.

Once draft indicators were available from each group, key indicators were selected for field testing in four countries: Guatemala, the Philippines, Uganda, and Ukraine. The countries represent different points on the democratic continuum and different circumstances regarding data availability and data collection expertise. Field test teams set out to assess the appropriateness and validity of selected indicators as well as data availability, the cost of collecting data, and data quality. The teams also looked at issues involved in setting targets and interpreting trendlines. While these four countries do not make a representative sample, the experience of testing the indicators in real-world situations gave the working groups valuable information about how institutional design issues affect the validity of given indicators, how trendlines behave, and how difficult it is to set targets. The information from the field tests was used to refine the menu of indicators.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The DG Office would like to thank the many individuals who contributed to the handbook. They worked with great diligence over the span of eighteen months. We believe the handbook benefits greatly from the variety of skills, experience, and regional expertise they brought to the process. They are identified according to the team or working group to which they were assigned. In addition, the DG Office would like to thank the USAID staff members in the “field test” countries and in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC).

PARTICIPANTS

Core Team:

Erin Soto, USAID Office of Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG), Team Leader
Steffi Meyer, DCHA/DG, Team Leader
Lynn Carter, Management Systems International (MSI), Team Leader
Rob Barr, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow
Mary Ann Scheirer, MSI Methodologist
Mitchell Seligson, MSI Methodologist

Rule of Law Working Group:

USAID

Debra McFarland, DCHA/DG, Sr. Advisor, Working Group Chair
Michael Miklaucic, DCHA/DG
Linn Hammergren, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow
Keith Henderson, ENI Bureau
Michael Henning, DCHA/DG
Cate Johnson, G/WID

Other Donors/NGOs

Madeleine Crohn, National Center for State Courts
Roberto Lavier, World Bank
Fay Armstrong, State Department
Pam Swain, DOJ/ICITAP
Chas. Cadwell, U. of MD, IRIS

MSI

Sheryl Stumbras, Working Group Coordinator
Mary Said, Consultant
Steven Golub, Consultant

Elections and Political Processes Group:

USAID

Amy Young, DCHA/DG, Sr. Advisor, Working Group Chair
Katherine Nichols, DCHA/DG, Working Group Chair
Mark Feierstein, DCHA/DG, Senior Advisor
Ron Shaiko, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow
Cate Johnson, G/WID
Nadereh Chahmirzadi, DCHA/DG
Katherine Stratos, ENI Bureau

Other Donors/NGOs

Keith Klein, IFES
Pamela Reeves, IFES Working Group Coordinator
Rudi Jeung, The Asia Foundation
Tom Melia, NDI
Pat Merloe, NDI
Cathy Westley, NDI
Lisa McLean, NDI
Marissa Brown, NDI
Dave Merkel, IRI
Frances Chappardi, IRI

Civil Society Working Group:

USAID

Gary Hansen, DCHA/DG, Sr. Advisor, Working Group Chair
Chris Sabatini, DCHA/DG, AAAS Fellow
Hannah Baldwin, DG Advisor, G/WID
Todd Amani, DCHA/DG, Senior Advisor

Other Donors/NGOs

Bob Asselin, Partners of the Americas
Rudi Jeung, The Asia Foundation
Jorge F. Landívar, IDB

MSI

Joan M. Goodin, Working Group Coordinator
Michael Bratton, Consultant

Governance Working Group:

USAID

Patrick Fn'Piere, DCHA/DG, Sr. Advisor, Working
Group Chair
Todd Amani, DCHA/DG, Sr. Advisor, Working
Group Chair
Pat Isman, DCHA/DG
Stephen Brager, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow
Phyllis Dininio, DCHA/DG, AAAS Fellow
Andrea Allen, G/WID
Lois Godiksen, CDIE
Johanna Mendelson, OTI
Cynthia McCaffrey, DCHA/DG

Other Donors/NGOs

Helen des Fosses, SUNY/Albany
John Johnson, SUNY/Albany
Robert Nakamura, SUNY/Albany
Camille Barnett, Research Triangle Institute
Lou Goodman, American University
Susan Rose Ackerman, Transparency International
Wendy Raymont, Transparency International
Susan Benda, NDI

MSI

David Hirschmann, Working Group Coordinator
Joel Barkan, Consultant

Field Test Working Group:

Rob Barr, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow
Linn Hammergren, DCHA/DG, Democracy Fellow

Lynn Carter, MSI
Mary Ann Scheirer, MSI
Jim Fremming, MSI
Sheryl Stumbras, MSI

HANDBOOK OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAM INDICATORS

CONTENTS

PART 1 INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MONITORING	5
A. <u>Step 1: Strategic Planning</u>	5
1. <i>Strategic Objective</i>	5
2. <i>Intermediate Results</i>	6
B. <u>Step 2: Developing and Selecting Indicators</u>	6
1. <i>Propose potential indicators for each level of results</i>	6
2. <i>Explore potential data sources for candidate indicators</i>	6
3. <i>Refine the indicators</i>	7
C. <u>Step 3: Using Indicators</u>	9
1. <i>Monitoring</i>	9
2. <i>Managing</i>	10
3. <i>Reporting</i>	10

PART 2 CANDIDATE INDICATORS

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESULTS FRAMEWORKS AND TABLES	13
Section A: Rule of Law	
<u>Results Framework</u>	17
<u>Definitions—Rule of Law</u>	19
<u>Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables</u>	24
<u>Indicators</u>	25
Section B: Elections and Political Processes	
<u>Results Framework</u>	57
<u>Definitions—Elections and Political Processes</u>	59
<u>Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables</u>	65
<u>Indicators</u>	66
Section C: Civil Society	
<u>Results Framework</u>	115
<u>Definitions—Civil Society</u>	117
<u>Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables</u>	122
<u>Indicators</u>	123
Section D: Governance	
<u>Results Framework</u>	151
<u>Definitions—Governance</u>	153

<u>Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables</u>	159
<u>Indicators</u>	160

PART 3 APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AND ADAPTING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

.....	227
A. <u>Selecting Indicators</u>	227
B. <u>Establishing Baseline Data and Targets</u>	233
C. <u>Interpreting Data Points and Trendlines</u>	234

APPENDIX B: ASSESSING DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES AND COSTS **237**

A. <u>Introduction</u>	237
B. <u>Using “Secondary Source” Data</u>	239
C. <u>Using Judgmental or Narrative Sources</u>	242
D. <u>Cost Factors for Sample Surveys</u>	245
E. <u>Rapid Appraisal and Other Qualitative Methods</u>	249

APPENDIX C: USING SCALES, INDEXES, AND SCORECARDS FOR PERFORMANCE

MEASUREMENT **255**

A. <u>Introduction</u>	255
B. <u>Definitions</u>	256
C. <u>Strategies for Increasing the Reliability of Scoring for Scales, Indexes, and Scorecards</u>	257
D. <u>Examples of Milestone Scales, Indexes, and Scorecards</u>	258

PART 1 INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this handbook is to help strategic objective teams—those responsible for program management—develop indicators that are useful for management decisions. Although it is primarily directed towards USAID democracy and governance (DG) officers and their partners, it may be of use to others who have similar development programs. Performance monitoring is a necessary and integral part of good program management. It is also related to the 1994 *Government Performance and Results Act* (the Results Act), the intent of which is to improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability. To this end, performance information from each operating unit is combined with broader trend information within the Agency’s goal areas to report results to the Office of Management and Budget, Congress and the public in compliance with the Results Act. The same basis informs the Agency’s budgeting process. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of performance indicators is at the operational level: to assist in making programmatic decisions and learning from past experience.

This handbook by no means represents the last word on good indicators for democracy and governance programs. The promotion of democracy is a complex, dynamic process only partially understood. These factors need to be recognized and accommodated in the development of performance indicators and targets. Because there remains much to be learned about how to capture changes in democratization, the handbook should be considered a work-in-progress that reflects current thinking about measurement under the present Results Act/AID monitoring system.

What the handbook contains

Part I of this handbook places indicators in the context of strategic planning and performance monitoring. This context is presented as a series

of steps: the first is developing a strategy, the second is developing indicators, and the last is using the indicators. Although the primary purpose of the handbook is to provide guidance on the second of these steps, the others are included to provide the proper perspective. Sequence and purpose are important to keep in mind so that indicators do not drive programming or absorb too much time and resources.

This section includes some key definitions for those unfamiliar with reengineering terminology and briefly describes the criteria for good indicators. The appendixes provide greater detail: Appendix A discusses the criteria for selecting indicators, gives tips for selecting targets and interpreting trend lines; Appendix B addresses different methodologies that may be used in collecting data; and Appendix C deals with the use of scales and indices, which are types of qualitative measures to track performance. Another useful source of information on indicator development is CDIE’s “Tips” series.

Part II contains candidate indicators. These are organized by two levels of results—labeled intermediate results and sub-intermediate results—under each Agency DG objective (*Rule of Law, Civil Society, Governance, and Elections & Political Processes*). There are a variety of results included, so objective teams should find some that closely match their own intermediate results and possibly their strategic objectives as well.

The indicators associated with these results, likewise, should be most useful for missions’ intermediate results, but hopefully also for strategic objectives. Agency objective level indicators have not been included, since these are not the responsibility of missions; nor have activity level indicators, since these are typically easier to devise and are not required in performance reporting to Washington. At this time, although the Freedom House Index is used as a gauge of overall country democratization,

there are no agreed-upon measures for each of the Agency’s four DG objectives. Agency indicators can be divided into the following categories:

Strategic Objective indicators

Used by a mission to manage for results by tracking performance toward the most ambitious objective upon which it expects to have a material effect. Required in performance reporting, and used in the R4 process. Candidate indicators might be found in Part 2.

e.g., S.O.: “Effective Justice Sector Institutions”

Indicator: Average time for case disposition

Intermediate Result indicators

Used by a mission to manage for results by tracking performance toward lower level objectives. Required in performance reporting, and may be used in the R4 process. Candidate indicators can be found in Part 2.

e.g., I.R.: “Increased Transparency in Justice Sector Institutions”

Indicator: Percentage of court cases open to the public

Activity indicators

Used by a mission to track implementation of a specific program’s activities.

e.g., Activity: Training of legal assistants

Indicator: Number of assistants trained

Caveats

1. The indicators in Part II are “candidate” indicators. The working groups tried to develop indicators that would work in a variety of settings. However, the inclusion of a given indicator in this handbook does not mean that it will always be appropriate for a desired objective. An indicator is a good choice when it fits a specific objective, program and country setting. Strategic objective teams may need to adapt many of these to make them applicable for

the local context. Nevertheless, the handbook contains a variety of indicators which should be, at a minimum, suggestive of good indicators to measure progress toward objectives.

2. These indicators are not “common” indicators as originally intended in USAID’s “common indicators exercise”—i.e., indicators in use by several missions (hence the term) which are working in practice and which could be shared with other missions. While many are being used by missions, the primary basis of developing them was not current usage. Instead, the working groups tried to determine what *would* be good indicators for various programs. This is a learning process—we hope to find out which ones *are* good indicators, and possibly which ones could be adopted as “common.”

3. The following pages contain criteria for good indicators, the same criteria which guided the selection of the indicators in Part II. However, because context is an important element in developing appropriate indicators, it was not always possible to meet all of these criteria. Sometimes the indicators do not have a sufficient level of specificity to be operational because it was not possible to define them in a way applicable to all country settings. This is more often the case with the multicomponent indicators, such as indexes. Similarly, some indicators call for complex data collection techniques which may be too costly to be feasible, unless multiple indicators use the same methodology.

4. Although there are multiple indicators provided for each objective, this does not mean that every one must be used if the mission has a similar program. Instead, it is a menu of options from which objective teams can pick and choose.

5. The framework used in Part II includes an intermediate result level and a sub-intermediate result level to provide a consistent hierarchy of results. We are not suggesting that these objectives take the same position in a mission’s results framework. For example, what we call an

intermediate result may be perfectly suitable as a mission's strategic objective.

6. Results frameworks are supposed to reflect a causal hypothesis, but this is not always the case with the framework used here. A causal framework, that is, should illustrate the rationale behind a program, so that reading down the results "tree" answers the question of how you are going to accomplish something, and reading up the tree answers the question of why you are engaged in a particular program or seeking particular intermediate results. Perhaps because a democracy, even a stable one, is composed of dynamic processes which are highly variable, it is a difficult concept to dissect and determine the causes behind it. As a result, some sections of the framework are more definitional than causal. In other words, lower level results may simply reflect aspects of the higher result, rather than the sub-results necessary to reach that higher result. For example, is improved timeliness of court processes a cause contributing to a fairer and more impartial justice system or is it merely one aspect or dimension of a better justice system?

7. The complex and dynamic nature of democratization also makes target setting challenging. Often it is not clear how much change should be expected from a certain level of activity, nor the rate of change. The specific advice provided for each indicator sometimes reflects this level of knowledge, although Appendix A contains some general pointers. Keep in mind, however, that a good target is set by using our best informed judgment. If the target is not met, an analysis should be undertaken, from which we could conclude that the target was too ambitious and therefore requires modification.

How to use the handbook

This handbook is designed to be a tool in assisting mission personnel and their partners develop useful and effective indicators for measuring program performance. The text and

the candidate indicators should serve as guideposts—points to consider and examples to use and/or adapt when determining which measures best facilitate program management. It is important to keep in mind that this handbook is not the last word on meaningful indicators; that the indicators included are not necessarily the best ones for given results; and that strategic objective teams do not have to draw from it. DG officers and their partners still need to work collaboratively in developing appropriate measures. To reiterate, this handbook is a basis for learning the best ways of monitoring DG programs.

II. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MONITORING

The following explains the general process of developing a performance monitoring system, which should help place indicators in the appropriate context. The process begins with a country analysis which helps identify development problems, as well as priorities and possibilities for assistance (both USAID and other donor assistance). Because this is the subject of the DG Office’s *Strategic Assessment Framework for Democracy and Governance Programming* (forthcoming), it is not covered below. Following the analysis is the development of a strategy based on the assistance goals, which is presented here as Step 1. This step involves the design of achievable and measurable program objectives (the terms objective and result are used interchangeably). The next step is the development and selection of appropriate performance measures for the objectives, which is where the handbook should be most helpful with its advice in the appendixes to Part 1 and the candidate indicators in Part 2. Step 3 addresses the use of indicators, including the performance monitoring plan and the R4.

A. Step 1: Strategic Planning

Strategic planning—the development of the assistance goal, program objectives, activities, and workplans—is the first step in developing a performance monitoring plan, and good objectives are necessary for good performance monitoring and measurement. A good objective is one with the following criteria:

- C **impact-oriented**, so that it represents a program objective rather than the output of particular activities;
- C **manageable**, in that it can be materially affected by USAID assistance;
- C **time-limited**, in that it is achievable

within the time frame of the strategy;

- C **uni-dimensional**, so that it targets a single development problem; and

- C **specific**, so that it cannot be interpreted in different ways.

Taken together, these characteristics mean that the objectives will be clear and specific, understandable, and measurable. The wording of the objective defines that which is to be achieved and, therefore, to be measured. If the objectives are vague or unrealistic, accurate and meaningful measurement will be difficult at best. Even a seemingly simple objective such as “Increased Independence of the Justice System” can be vague. What does independence mean? Is independence synonymous with impartiality, or does it merely imply a set of structural conditions which might permit neutrality? Does it mean independence from central and local government intervention, or from private sector corruption and bribery? The indicators may differ depending on the meaning, so it is important that each objective has the above characteristics to the extent possible.

The two levels of objectives in a strategic plan are the strategic objectives and intermediate results¹:

1. Strategic Objective

A strategic objective is the most ambitious result (intended measurable change) in a particular program area that a USAID operational unit, along with its partners, can materially affect and for which it is willing to be held responsible.

This is the highest goal that a mission hopes to achieve within the 5 to 8 year time frame of the strategy. It is also the highest level for which missions must report performance, and PPC has identified performance at this level as a focal

¹For details on these objectives, see the Agency guidance found in the Automated Directive System (ADS), section 201.5.10.

point in the R4 review.

Sometimes SOs are written at levels equivalent to Agency objectives or Agency goals, like “Sustainable Democracy Built,” and/or they bundle together multiple objectives, like “Improved Responsiveness of Democratic Institutions with Greater Citizen Participation.” A high or bundled objective can make performance measurement problematic, because precisely defining the specific objective—the thing to be measured—is difficult. Such an SO may also call into question manageable control and plausible attribution: for example, can any single donor really build, and is it willing to be held accountable for building, a sustainable democracy?

Agency guidance permits bundled objectives, but only when the components a) are implemented in an integrated manner (e.g., the two components are part of the same activity); b) are achievable by a common set of intermediate results and causal linkages in the results framework; and c) the component results are inseparable and mutually reinforcing (i.e., achievement of one facilitates the achievement of the other) (see ADS 201.5.10a).

If these conditions are not met, it would be best—from a performance monitoring point of view—to separate the objective into its component parts (while it is recognized that guidance from different bureaus on this point varies, from the perspective of overall Agency guidance, there are no restrictions on the number of SOs a mission can have). In the first example above, the SO could be “lowered” by breaking it apart to reflect the components of a sustainable democracy that the mission is working on. Likewise, the SO in the second example above might be broken into two SOs: one regarding responsiveness and the other regarding citizen participation. Although there may be reasons to limit the number of SOs and keep them at high levels, strategic objective teams may need to weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.

2. Intermediate Results

An intermediate result is a key result which must occur in order to achieve a strategic objective. Like an SO, it reflects a reason a program was undertaken. The difference between the two levels is simply that one must achieve the intermediate results before one can achieve the higher level strategic objective.

Although these results are at a lower level than the strategic objective and are essentially steps leading to the strategic objective, they are not activities. An IR is not, for example, a training session that must be completed in order to increase the effectiveness of an administrative staff. In this example the IR would be the increase in effectiveness; the activity would be the training session. Or, if the strategic objective is “Increased Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level,” an IR might be “Increased Local Government Capacity to Act.” In other words, the relationship between the SO and the IRs should reflect the development hypothesis. The more clearly this is articulated, the easier the task of developing appropriate indicators becomes.

B. Step 2: Developing and Selecting Indicators

Once each objective has been clearly articulated and defined, DG officers and their partners should ask: “how will we *know* if that result is occurring?” Determining what information is necessary to answer this question *and* how to provide the necessary information is the process of developing performance measurement indicators.

Indicators: *An indicator is one of a variety of mechanisms that can answer the question of how much (or whether) progress is being made toward a certain objective.* It measures the performance of a specific program by comparing actual results with expected results. It does not

answer the question of why progress is or is not being made.

The process of selecting indicators, like defining objectives, is iterative. The following steps will not necessarily occur in sequence, but they do illustrate the process that should take place after the objectives have been defined, as discussed in Step 1 above.

1. Propose potential indicators for each level of results

The group that discusses the logic underlying the program should begin by brainstorming possible answers to the question above—how would one know if the result is occurring. Part 2 of the handbook can be used at this step by providing initial, candidate answers and perhaps clues for more appropriate alternatives. A variety of indicators should be considered to best determine the most applicable choices for each result. If there are no possible direct measures, then consider proxies—measures which can indirectly inform managers of performance.

2. Explore potential data sources for candidate indicators

For each of the applicable indicators, explore what data sources are available (or might be available if the indicators are conceptualized in different ways). Only indicators for which it is feasible to collect data in a given country should be used. Determining feasibility will require conversations with people knowledgeable about various data sources (e.g., partners, government statistical or service agencies, public opinion survey organizations, university social science research centers, etc.). These contacts will help to understand what data are already being collected, whether existing data would be appropriate for a candidate indicator, whether the candidate indicators are relevant and feasible for the situation, and possibly what alternatives may work. Further, grantee and contractor programs often include data collection to

monitor their activities, which may provide potential data sources for the result's indicators. If there are no feasible or reliable data sources available, then consider proxy indicators for which good data will be available.

3. Refine the indicators

The last step is putting in place indicator details to make them fully operational and conform to the criteria below to the extent possible. Does the indicator specify the “operations” or actions necessary to provide the information? Is it crafted so that gender or minority-specific information can be collected? Will it reflect incremental change over time?

When determining which indicators to use, consider the following criteria of good results indicators. Each indicator may not have all of these characteristics in practice, but to the extent possible the following should be found in each indicator:

- C **useful for program management**, in that only indicators which can help strategic objective teams make management decisions should be used;
- C **appropriate for the result**, in that the measurement tool fits the task (just as one wouldn't use a thermometer to measure weight, don't use a population statistic to measure legislative quality);
- C **direct**, in that it measures the result as stated (don't measure citizen awareness if the result is legislative effectiveness), and at the correct level (don't measure capacity for effectiveness if the result is effectiveness itself);
- C **cost-effective**, in that the costs of measurement should be proportional to the benefits (the mission should not spend more than 10 percent of its SO budget on performance monitoring);

- C **based on reliable and valid data**, so that the measures are accurate and comparable over time (decisions based on incorrect data are unlikely to be better than decisions based on no data at all);
- C **operational**, so that data collectors understand *what* data are needed and *how* to collect them;
- C **objective**, in that everyone reviewing the data would reach the same conclusion about progress;
- C **sensitive to the size of the problem** (for example, including the numerator *and* denominator is more telling than the former by itself);
- C **sensitive to change**, so that the data reveal incremental change over time (a yes or no question, for example, does not show incremental change); and
- C **disaggregated** by gender or other population characteristics where appropriate.

See Appendix A for further detail and examples of these characteristics (also see CDIE’s “Tips” series).

Quantitative Indicators and Qualitative Characteristics

Although Agency guidance notes a “preference” for quantitative indicators, their use is not required (see ADS 203.5.5); indicators that measure qualitative aspects are perfectly acceptable. Simple quantitative indicators, or “counts,” are noted by the ADS for their objectivity, meaning that the data would be interpreted in the same way by different people. However, often these measures capture only a thin slice of something larger and more complex. For example, the number of citizens

attending town meetings is a straightforward count but it may not fully capture “Increased Participation in Local Government.” In order to fully assess this objective, one might also need to know the type or character of the interaction between citizens and local government officials. This is not an isolated example. Many attributes of democratization, moreover, are considered to be inherently complex and qualitative in nature. The working groups considered both types of measures; where appropriate, they offered simple counts as candidate indicators, but in other cases they decided that no relevant simple quantitative indicators existed. The handbook therefore includes many candidate indicators that attempt to capture the qualitative nature of DG programs.

Measures of qualitative aspects can take a variety of forms, and do not require a narrative. This handbook includes a number of measures based on judgmental assessments, such as quality scales, multi-component indexes and public surveys. For example, an indicator might rely on the assessment of a panel of experts regarding the quality of legislative processes, where one could report the combined score on an index of quality scales, deciding for each scale whether to award one to five points and applying clearly defined criteria to each scale. Or, where a single concept is being measured, the indicator can use a simple scale along a clearly defined range of scores from poor to excellent, for example. The “comments” section in the performance data tables, or the space provided in the qualitative measures form in the NMS, should be used to explain how the scores are determined. While the working groups made considerable use of such indicators, they sometimes felt that the range of country situations precluded establishing firm criteria. Decisions about the criteria were in these cases left to the user. Quality indexes can be valuable and useful tools, but they can also be quite complex. So that we collectively learn how to best construct these types of measures, please consult PPC/CDIE/PME and PPC/DG, and

advise DCHA/DG, when developing them. See Appendix C for greater detail on these indicators.

The key requirement for any indicator—whether based on simple counts or informed judgments—is that they be defined so as to permit regular, systematic and relatively objective interpretation regarding change in the “value” or status of the indicator. In order to make judgmental indicators more objective, they should be very clearly defined and narrowly specified, such as listing which aspects to consider when assessing legislative quality. For this reason, scales and indexes are more appropriate measures of qualitative aspects than simple descriptions in meeting the standard set by the Results Act. Nevertheless, there are no perfect indicators—just as simple quantitative indicators can be misleading because they do not tell the whole story, indicators about quality can be complex and are more subjective. And both types are subject to the problems associated with poor data. The trick is to find the best indicator or mix of indicators for the purpose of program management.

C. Step 3: Using Indicators

As mentioned in the introduction, indicators are used for the following purposes: first (and foremost) is program management at the operational level: managers need to know whether their programs are having the desired effects, and whether the activities need to be adjusted in order to achieve the result. If the indicators cannot provide this information, then reconsider their use. A mission’s performance monitoring plan keeps track of the data for this purpose. The next use of the indicators is to inform bureau and Agency budget decisions, although performance is only one of several factors used for these decisions. This data is presented in the R4 submission, which describes the progress of the mission’s program and lays out future needs. Finally, the same performance information is used for the Agency’s reporting on results in compliance with Results Act and on

what it has achieved with public resources. Washington uses performance data from the R4s to supplement and complement other information for this purpose.

For strategic objective teams, using indicators involves monitoring performance in order to manage for results, and then reporting on achievements.

1. Monitoring

Performance Monitoring Plan: *In the performance monitoring plans, missions provide detailed definitions of the performance indicators that will be tracked; and specify the source, method, and schedule of data collection.*

The purpose of the plan is to enable comparable performance data to be collected over time, even in the event of staff turnover, and to clearly articulate expectations in terms of schedule and responsibility. It details, in other words, the means for gathering the data required for the results indicators. By following the plan, and comparing the periodic data with the baseline data, managers should have in place the information needed to monitor their programs in an on-going fashion and thus make informed management decisions. It also provides the information used in the R4 submission.

2. Managing

Managing for results: *Managing for results is the use of performance data to inform management decisions regarding the best use of resources to achieve the desired objectives, as opposed to fulfilling specific activities.*

Strategic objective teams should use the information generated by the performance monitoring plan to inform their decisions. This information should help managers make basic programming choices, such as which activities to continue, to stop or to modify. In addition, it should contribute to the understanding of

democratic development by providing answers to questions like: Which programs work in which circumstances? What are reasonable rates of change? Which assumptions hold and which do not? These answers will contribute to program development and success.

3. Reporting

Results Review and Resources Request:

The R4 is the document which is reviewed internally and submitted to USAID/W by the operating unit on an annual basis. Judgment of progress is based on a combination of data and analysis and is used to inform budget decisions.

For the R4, performance is judged according to targets—whether programs met, exceeded or fell short of their targets for the year—for the strategic objectives and intermediate results. Although missions must report on both of these levels, priority in the review is given to the strategic objective level. Each indicator reported must identify baseline data and periodic targets. These targets should be annual, unless the program does not permit annual data collection (as might be the case for elections-related programs). See Appendix A for some common sense tips on setting targets. Also, the baseline data should reflect, as near as possible, the value of each performance indicator at the beginning of the program. For specifics on reporting, see PPC’s R4 Guidance Cable, State 010280, 1/20/98, and the USAID General Notice on performance measurement of 3/26/98.

When considering the suggestions provided in this handbook, keep in mind that performance measurement should support, not detract from, program implementation. Prudence and reasonableness should guide how much and what information is collected and used for decisions, while keeping in mind that bad data are not better than no data at all. Ultimately, professional judgment is required to establish what results are possible, and what measures and

evaluations provide the best evidence of performance. So that we can determine which are better and worse indicators, readers are encouraged to provide feedback about their performance monitoring efforts.

PART 2 CANDIDATE INDICATORS

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESULTS FRAMEWORKS AND TABLES

As a way of organizing the development and presentation of indicators, the four working groups first elaborated *results frameworks* in their respective areas. A results framework is a management tool commonly used by USAID to articulate the development hypotheses at work in a given strategy. It spells out inter-locking program objectives. These objectives or results are organized in a hierarchical pattern that attempts to specify cause-and-effect relationships. For example, *if (A) the legal and regulatory environment for civil society organizations improves; and (B) NGO financial and management practices improve; and (c) NGOs learn how to solicit and represent constituent interests to the government and the public-at-large; then civil society may have more direct impact on governmental policies.*

Spelling out the causal or influential relationships at work in democratization efforts is currently very difficult for two reasons. Often we do not yet have adequate empirical evidence to be clear about causal chains. In addition, the complexity of the results at each level makes it problematic to break apart the various components. For these reasons, the frameworks used to organize the indicators may sometimes appear definitional rather than causal. For example, *is Improving Access to Justice* a lower-level result which (along

with other accomplishments) contributes to a *Strengthened Rule of Law* or is it one aspect or dimension of a strengthened rule of law?

The four results frameworks are presented in a graphic form in Sections A through D. Each one begins with an Agency democracy and governance objective: 1) *Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights*; 2) *More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes*; 3) *Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society*; and 4) *More Accountable and Transparent Government Institutions*.

For each of these four objectives, the working groups developed two additional levels of results, intermediate results (IRs) and sub-intermediate results (sub-IRs). As one example, the Agency Objective of *Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society* has five Intermediate Results:

- C A Legal Framework to Protect and Promote Civil Society Ensured*
- C Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions*
- C Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs*
- C Enhanced Free Flow of Information*
- C Strengthened Democratic Political Culture*

These five Intermediate Results were believed to be the elements needed to constitute a strong and political active civil society. Each of these IRs then has a series of sub-IRs which contribute to the achievement of the principal IR. If, for example, we take the IR for *Enhanced Free Flow*



of Information, it has four sub-IRs:

- C Plural Array of Independent Sources of Information Encouraged*
- C Improved Investigative Reporting*
- C Increased Use of New Information Technologies*
- C Improved Financial and Management Systems in Media Entities*


Working groups defined each of these IRs and then developed indicators that would adequately measure the two levels of results. Indicators were not developed for the four Agency Objectives themselves. Currently, the Agency is reviewing the possible use of the Freedom House Index to measure the four objectives.

Following the results framework for each objective area, readers will find definitions of the results laid out in each framework. These will assist readers in understanding the frameworks and why they are constructed as they are. The definitions are then followed by the relevant indicators tables. In searching for relevant indicators, the starting point for strategic objective teams should be in trying to match their results or objectives with particular objectives in the results framework. Then they can locate those objectives on the indicator tables and review the associated indicators.

The tables are organized by objective, in descending order. Results or objectives are given at the top of the tables. In addition to presenting the indicator and its definition, the tables also provide recommendations on data collection approaches, tips on conditions or circumstances that might limit the utility of a given indicator, and advice on how trendlines tend to move for a given indicator.

Section A: Rule of Law

Results Framework



Definitions — Rule of Law

Agency Objective 2.1. Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Laws establish the terms of reference for the social contract under which citizens live together and are governed by a state authority. The rule of law prevails when the terms of the social contract are observed by both citizens and the state authority, when the terms are enforced either by voluntary cooperation or by legal processes and institutions, and when violations of the terms of the contract are punished according to the law. The Rule of Law ensures that individuals are subject to, and treated equally according to the law, and that no one is subject to arbitrary treatment by the state. A rule of law that contributes to the building of sustainable democracy is one that protects basic human rights (as enumerated in the Charter of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the U.S. Constitution, among others). It is one in which market based economic activity is enabled, and freely operates. It is one in which the processes and institutions of justice are available to all individuals without prejudice to their origins, religion, political persuasion, race, gender, or creed. A democratic Rule of Law is also one in which the processes and institutions of justice work efficiently and effectively to establish justice and resolve disputes. To promote the rule of law, USAID pursues the following approaches;

Intermediate Results 2.1.1. Foundation for Protection of Human Rights and Gender Equity is in Conformity with International Commitments

Under this approach USAID seeks to ensure that the constitutions and laws in force in the host country are in compliance with basic international human rights norms. By international human rights norms we mean specifically, the rights to life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment; freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, color, language, social status, or sex; freedom from incarceration solely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation; freedom from retroactive criminal laws; the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the right to participate in government; and the right to change of government. Protection implies defense of those rights against derogations on the part of the state as well as non-governmental social actors. Violations of these rights must be criminalized and/or sanctioned, citizens must have the right to protest violations, and be provided with means and mechanisms for doing do. USAID interventions might include assistance with drafting legislation or regulations protective of human rights, helping governments to establish and develop official institutions for the protection of human rights, or helping to build consensus and coalitions to advocate greater state adherence to both legal/constitutional and international human rights commitments.

The following sub-intermediate results represent key elements which need to be in place to bring about the principal intermediate result:

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.1.1. Legislation Promoting Human Rights Enacted

The first step a state must take toward establishing the foundations for protection of human rights is to enact legislation that codifies the state's commitment to those standards. Enactment might be through ratification of appropriate international covenants or treaties, or through promulgation of enabling legislation if those treaties and covenants are not considered self-executing. To meet this intermediate result the legislation must provide ordinary citizens with a means of redress in law against derogations of their rights. This requires the enactment of whatever statutes, regulations, and

rules of court and procedure are necessary to bring state authorities to account for human rights abuses. The framework must also enable ordinary citizens to appeal to international procedures for which they might be eligible by international law.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.1.2. Effective Advocacy for Adherence to International Human Rights Commitments Increased

Effective advocacy is defined as organized, non-governmental citizens* groups operating for the purpose of influencing state policy toward greater respect for human rights. Such groups must not be dependent on government funding. Influencing state policy might be through mobilizing popular interest and action, or direct appeal to state authorities. Operations, whether including paid staff or not, must be continual and on-going, and must result in demand that is visible to state authorities.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.1.3. Government Mechanisms Protecting Human Rights Established

The legal foundation for the protection of human rights must include provision for whatever special mechanisms are necessary to enforce the framework. The human rights ombudsman is one such mechanism. Specialized human rights courts, government human rights offices or human rights police units might also be established to fulfill this need. The official authorization of the operations of such units, and their operating procedures, must be clear and unequivocal.

Intermediate Result 2.1.2. Laws, Regulations, and Policies Promote a Market-based Economy

A market-based economy is based on the principles of private property ownership, the free purchase and sale of goods and services at prices established through supply and demand, with the minimum regulation necessary to protect the public interest, and minimum state intervention. Paramount to the sustainability of a market-based economy is the sanctity of contracts, and the existence of laws, regulations, and mechanisms (public or private) to resolve economic disputes in a fair and timely fashion. Equally critical is respect for property, both publicly or privately owned, and the ability to transfer ownership of that property according to internationally accepted business norms. A market-based economy that contributes to sustainable democracy also ensures the equal treatment of all economic actors under the law. USAID activities under this approach include assistance with drafting legislation and regulations that conform with sound economic norms, as well as shaping policies to promote those norms. In addition USAID assistance to advocacy groups supporting such laws, regulations, and policies is a component of this approach.

The following sub-intermediate results represent key elements which need to be in place to bring about the principal intermediate result:

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.2.1. Legislation, Regulations, and Policies Conforming with Sound Commercial Practices Enacted

A legal framework supporting a market-based economy includes laws, statutes, and regulations that consistently protect the sanctity of property and contracts and the rights and obligations associated with them. The framework must include provisions for transparency of commercial transactions whether conducted by the state or private entities, as well as equal access to and treatment for all before the courts in the case of commercial disputes. The enactment of such laws, statutes, and

regulations may be through administrative order, legislation or ratification, but must provide actionable means in domestic judicial fora for the resolution of disputes. The framework must provide private citizens with accessible means to challenge official state actions and be treated fairly in such disputes.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.2.2. Effective Advocacy for the Promotion of a Market-based Economy Increased

Advocacy groups are non-governmental organizations which serve the commercial and economic interests of citizens. Such groups must not depend on government funding and must articulate, represent, and advance the interests of citizens engaged in private commercial and economic activity. The strengthening of such groups entails either or both of the following: increasing their capacity to mobilize popular opinion and action; enhancing their capacity to petition state authorities for improvement in the market environment.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.2.3. Government Mechanisms that Promote Market-based Economies Established

The legal framework for a market-based economy must include provision for whatever specialized agencies are necessary to promote the implementation and enforcement of the framework. Commercial courts or arbitration centers may fulfill this need. Given the specifics of the country context, these might also include specialized business service units within state ministries or regional and local authorities.

Intermediate Result 2.1.3. Equal Access to Justice

Access to justice refers to citizens' ability to use various public and private services on demand. Equal access means that such ability (and the treatment accorded) is not restricted to certain classes or groups of citizens. Since access will in some sense always be restricted (e.g., one must have standing to bring a case, court's jurisdiction will be limited to certain kinds of cases, or individuals may be required to have a lawyer or submit to mediation before taking their case to court), the concern here is the basis for the restriction — and particularly that it not work to decrease the chances of already disadvantaged groups. Which groups are relevant is system dependent, but the usual concern is that access not be inequitably available according to gender, ethnic, or racial group, political or religious category, social or economic class, or physical incapacity. Where apparently equitable rules may in fact bar access to such groups, special measures may be introduced (e.g., subsidized legal services, interpreters for those who cannot communicate in the court language) in compensation.

The following sub-intermediate results represent key elements which need to be in place to bring about the principal intermediate result.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.3.1. Increased Availability of Legal Services

To increase access it is necessary to increase the supply of services and to target that increase to groups for whom the unmet demand is greatest. This is most often because of their own resource restrictions, but it may also be because of special needs even for resource rich groups (e.g., entrepreneurs who require timely and more specialized handling of a far greater number of cases).

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.3.2. Increased Availability of Information

Another necessary result to increase access is to provide more information, for normal users and for those normally excluded. Relevant information may be on system workings or relevant to a case in which the actor has an interest.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.3.3. Decreased Barriers

Finally access will also be limited if there are barriers, including formal and informal institutional and legal biases. Legal requirements may impose exceptional hardships on some groups (e.g., a requirement that a woman get permission from a male relative before appearing in court, or unusually large fees), services may be located so that some populations must travel long distances to tap them, or institutional members may work with certain conscious or unconscious prejudices in carrying out their duties.

Intermediate Result 2.1.4. Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

The legal system includes (but is not necessarily limited to) such institutions as trial and appellate courts, the judiciary, other court officials, administrative courts, the prosecution, public defense, police and other enforcement agencies, prisons, as well as non-governmental entities such as bar associations, advocacy organizations, legal aid service providers, law schools, and other private organizations. The binding characteristic is their involvement in legal dispute resolution. Effectiveness is the degree to which the legal system (and the justice sector institutions in particular) resolve disputes in a timely, predictable, and reliable manner; fairness is the degree to which the justice sector institutions uphold the principles of the law in a manner that serves the public interest while treating all individuals according to the same standards. Fairness would also prohibit any arbitrary favors to any individual or group, unless prescribed by law.

The following sub-intermediate results represent key elements which need to be in place to bring about the principal intermediate result:

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.4.1. Increased Transparency

Because it is a public service, and ultimately responsible to the people, justice (the authoritative means for resolving conflicts and imposing legally based social control) will only work if its operations and operating principles are widely known. Otherwise there is too much room for partisan, skewed, or arbitrary decisions.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.4.2. Increased Independence

Independence is relative and is both individual and institutional. What it means in both cases is that institutions and their members must be able to do their jobs according to the rules and principles established for them. Their actions and their tenure should not be dependent on the extraneous preferences of higher ranking officials or those outside their institutions. While there is always a tension between individual and institutional independence, ideally the institution should be responsible for and capable of enforcing individual compliance with legitimate institutional norms.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.4.3. Improved Management and Administrative Capacity

Since most justice system actors operate within organizations, their performance hinges on the ability of that organization to monitor and facilitate their activities. An organization which does not know what its parts are doing or cannot provide them with essential resources is not doing this. Management and administrative systems are critical to that ability and become more so as organizations grow in size and become more complex.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.4.4. Improved Functional Organization

Growth and complexity also require changes in organizational forms and operating rules for purely functional tasks. Indicators focus both on organizational characteristics assumed to aid performance and on outcomes indicating that the latter is adequate.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.1.4.5. Professionalization of Technical Personnel

Modern organizations are increasingly staffed by professionals, individuals with specialized, job-relevant training and skills. Personnel systems should be based on recognizing and rewarding professionalism.

Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables

The following categories of information are provided in the tables:

1. The statement of the indicator.
2. A definition of the indicator and its unit of measure.
3. The relevance of the indicator or why it was selected as a measure of that particular result.
4. Approaches to collecting data for the indicator and the approximate cost of collection. Three categories were used for cost: low (under \$500); medium/moderate (\$500 - \$1500); and high (over \$1500). The cost specifications are rough and should be treated cautiously, because costs may vary greatly from one country to the next. The cost of data collection for questions requiring surveys of the population (for example) will depend upon 1) the existence of periodic surveys which address the desired topics conducted by someone else; 2) the existence of surveys which do not address the desired topic but to which strategic objective teams could add questions; and 3) the need to conduct one's own surveys and the number of indicators for which that survey can serve as the data collection approach. Similarly, the cost for monitoring broadcasts or periodicals for specific content will depend on whether there is 1) a commercial monitoring service, which conducts monitoring for advertisers anyway, so fees can be very modest; 2) an NGO that uses this information for its own purposes anyway; or 3) a need to cover the entire cost of monitoring several periodicals and/or broadcast stations.
5. Issues related to target setting and the interpretation of trendlines. In this final column, we share what we have learned about how much progress might be made over what period of time. In some cases, such as changes in the level of political tolerance, we know very little. In other cases, it seems clear that an indicator should change sharply and immediately in the wake of particular interventions. We also discuss issues to be aware of in setting performance targets or in interpreting trendlines.

Not all categories will be discussed for every indicator. In some cases, the relevance of the indicator is clear and does not require any discussion. In other cases, we have little at this point to contribute to ideas about how to set targets.

Indicators

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.1: Foundations for Protection of Human Rights and Gender Equity Conform to International Commitments

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Number of human rights violations filed against government security forces per 100,000.	Number of human rights abuses filed against security forces divided by total population/100,000. Filed means in a domestic court, a regional human rights tribunal, like the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-America Court appropriate in the country.*	Direct measure of citizen confidence in the foundations & the willingness & ability of the government to address violations.	National Stats; International Organizations; State Dept. Reports. Cost: Low if there are case tracking or secondary sources. But possibly cost prohibitive if the information has to be collected.	It would depend on the specific problem as articulated by the mission. However, this indicator is most likely to be meaningful when effective means/mechanisms for filing complaints have recently been put in place. In this case, the number of violations filed should increase over the life of the strategy. It was suggested in Guatemala that this might be a good indicator only for a limited period of time. Once a large number of cases are filed, it would be impossible to track them (unless they all begin with the ombudsman).
*Comments: The indicator seeks to measure the violations that are getting beyond the ombudsman's office, thus that office would not be included in the definition of "filed." The only exception might be in a country where the ombudsman's office is not only vested with the authority to investigate but also to adjudicate human rights violations.				
2) % of detainees held in pre-trial detention.	Pre-trial detention includes the time from initial arrest to the time of trial or release, whichever comes first.	Direct measure of whether the foundations are providing protections.	Court records; national stats; if there are no reliable stats, then we suggest a sample survey. Organizations, such as Amnesty International and local human resource organizations may collect this data. Cost: Low if records are available.	% should decrease with time.
Comments: An initial question will need to be asked if there is a system for recording detainees. If not, this would not be an appropriate indicator. In many Latin American countries, it is more practical to look at pretrial detainees as a % of prisoners. Most countries in that region do appear to keep such statistics. In Uganda, however, we found that there were not reliable comprehensive statistics on this indicator. Nevertheless, there were reliable statistics on the <i>% of prisoners on remand for a period exceeding that provided for by law</i> . This indicator will not capture detainees until they have their first court appearance. It will also not capture people who are detained outside of formal detention centers, for example by military/security forces. However, it was the most reliable indicator we could identify. If "informal" detention is a concern then you may want to couple this indicator with human rights reports that report on the number of informal detainees. If you are in a country that has very good statistics, you may also want to accompany this indicator with an indicator measuring the <i>average length of pretrial detention</i> .				
3) Average time taken to process human rights complaints.	From the time a complaint is filed (with the police or courts, whichever is first) to the initial hearing before a judge. Average of a sample of complaints.	If cases are not processed within a reasonable time, then HR are not adequately protected.	Police and court records. Cost: Low if the records are good and are aggregated.	A downward trend would be positive. However, one may also want to look at the results, especially in the beginning and if there are few cases.
Comments: In Guatemala, interviewees suggested this might be difficult to track because very few cases are actually filed and no existing statistical system captures them from beginning to end, or even identifies them adequately.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) % of people who believe that they could file a human rights complaint without fear of reprisal.	% of population (males/females, by ethnic group, etc.).	Indicates whether people are willing to come forth and use the systems that are in place to protect their rights.	Survey. Cost: High unless a survey is being done anyway. However, if Gallup or some other agency is already doing any kind of survey, it may be fairly cost effective to include this as an additional question.	This may be the best proxy to use since it would be difficult to find a measure that captures the number of people that had their human rights violated but did not file a complaint.
Comments: Alternative suggestion, % of people who believe that they will obtain a fair hearing or % of people that believe that the government has a commitment to pursuing human rights cases. In the Guatemala field test it was suggested that tracking responses among different groups would also be informative.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.1: Foundations for Protection of Human Rights and Gender Equity Conform to International Commitments

Intermediate Result 2.1.1.1: Legislation Promoting Human Rights Enacted

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Ratification/ accession to major international human rights instruments.	These include the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as well as the Optional Protocol to the former, the CEDAW, and appropriate regional instruments (i.e., European Convention, Inter-American Convention, African Convention, etc.). Unit could be yes/no by instrument.	Demonstrates legal commitment to principles of human rights articulated in the international instruments.	U.N. and regional organization documents. Each country could take a set of 6-10 international and regional instruments as a sample. Cost: Low.	
Comments: Note, this is only a threshold indicator and is not meant to reveal information about the real human rights situation. In fact, it would probably only be used in cases where the USAID interventions were specifically aimed at ratification/accession.				
2) International human rights instruments become national law.	This indicator requires two elements: A. International instruments must be either self-executing within domestic law, or implementing legislation providing for enforcement must be passed. -AND-B. Any additional enabling legislation necessary to operationalize these instruments is enacted. Unit: Yes/No.	Without such provisions terms of international/regional instruments cannot be recognized in domestic courts.	Legal review. Cost: Low.	Note that this indicator would only be used with the above indicator, or in a country where the above indicator has already been achieved.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) Human Rights enumerated and explicitly provided for in Constitution or Basic Law.	Rights might include: the rights to life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment; freedom from slavery; freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, color, language, social status, or sex; freedom from incarceration solely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation; freedom from retroactive criminal laws; the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the right to participate in government; and the right to change government. The unit of measure would be a checklist.	While the constitutional enumeration of rights does not guarantee their implementation, it nevertheless signifies the terms of reference by which an individual is to take the state to task for derogations from those rights.	Legal review. Cost: Medium.	

Comments: As with the two previous indicators, this is not very meaningful in Latin America.

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.1: Foundations for Protection of Human Rights and Gender Equity Conform to International Commitments

Intermediate Result 2.1.1.2: Effective Advocacy for Adherence to International Human Rights Commitments Increased

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of NGOs rated as effective on the advocacy index or showing improvements on that index.	See Appendix C, part D. "Effective" can be defined as reaching a particular number of points on the scale.	Direct measure of whether the NGOs are becoming more effective advocates.	Cost: Medium but this depends on the # of NGOs.	NGOs should rate higher with the passage of time. Note, exercise caution when adding new NGOs to the target group. Depending on where the NGOs begin on the scale, your targets will be effected.
Comments: The index can be adapted to fit local condition or particular program emphasis.				
2) Number of NGOs that identify human rights promotion within their mandate.	Number of active non-governmental organizations that specifically identify the promotion of human rights as part of their charter or mandate	This is a proxy indicator that gets at effective advocacy via more advocacy. It should only be used if a more direct indicator is unavailable.	Interviews with NGOs. Cost: Low.	This should increase with time. It may be more relevant in country where NGOs are just beginning to have a voice and are too nascent to see a measurable change in their ability to advocate—which would still be the long term objective. Few very strong NGOs may have more impact than several weak ones.
Comments: Might be difficult to track unless there is a governmental registry or as in Guatemala, a donor is doing an inventory of NGOs.				
3) % of International and local human rights groups that produce and distribute uncensored reports.	Groups are unrestricted with regard to freedom of speech and the press, and to distribute their materials without interference or coercion	Again, this is a proxy indicator that measures the environment for advocacy more than whether the advocacy is effective.	Survey of Groups. Cost: Low - High, depends on # of groups involved.	This should increase with time. Since this is a proxy indicator, we would not recommend using it if you were able to use the advocacy scale, mentioned in number 1 above, which is a more direct measure of the result.
Comments: Alternative: # or % of human rights groups who say they can publish and distribute their findings and analysis openly and without self- or government imposed censorship. There was some question in Guatemala as to whether this described a real problem, i.e., are there human rights organizations which produce censored reports anywhere? A better question might have to do with instances of repression of NGOs for the reports they published or a denial of access to information.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.1: Foundations for Protection of Human Rights and Gender Equity Conform to International Commitments

Intermediate Result 2.1.1.3: Government Mechanisms Protecting Human Rights Established

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) An independent human rights commission, human rights court, or ombudsman is operating.	To be considered established the commission must: 1. Have the legal authority to investigate violations. 2. The commission must be funded by the government (perhaps the commission received funding from the government more or less in accordance with its budget request). 3. The commission is actively investigating cases. Unit: Yes/No.	The important issue here is the acceptance by the government of the private right to file complaints in domestic institutions against governmental abuses.	Informal survey; document review. Cost: Low.	Establishment is a one time achievement.
Comments: If this is the focus of the USAID program, then the proposed indicator under APA 2.1.3 (effective and fair legal sector institutions) is likely to focus on human rights institutions.				
2) An entity and procedure for hearing human rights cases is in place.	This requires jurisdiction to hear human rights cases as well as power to adjudicate and impose sanctions. Unit: Yes/No.	A legislative directive to the judiciary conferring jurisdiction on human rights matters is an explicit political statement of intent to treat human rights issues as legitimate issues of contention between individuals and the state.	Informal interview, review of legislative directives. Cost: Low.	
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.2: Laws, Regulations, and Policies Promote a Market-based Economy

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % change in the number of commercial cases filed in the court system.	Commercial needs to be defined in the context of the mission program.	People are more likely to bring complaints to the court system if there are good laws and regulations consistently applied.	Court records. Cost: Low, if records exist.	Should increase over time. There may be time lag issue. Change in this indicator may take some time to follow system improvements. The provision of alternatives, such as arbitration, may affect the trendline. Note when determining whether to use this indicator, you should consider whether there are factors such as broad-based corruption that will prevent people from using the system. This indicator may be most relevant in the initial stages of putting a legal framework in place.
Comments:				
2) # of businesses registered in sample year.	Registration means official registration with a ministry or board of trade, commerce, or membership in a chamber of commerce.	Shows increased participation/confidence in the formal economic and legal sector. Easier registration, fewer disincentives or transaction costs for joining the formal sector (i.e., taxes, restrictions), better implementation of the law.	Review of business registration records. Cost: Costs are low if there is existing data/records.	Within the life of a CSP, an upward trend would be positive.
Comments: Some caution should be exercised in using this indicator. An increase in the number of businesses registered could also reflect economic growth or some other factor not associated with trust in the legal system.				
3) Change in the percentage of monetary assets secured by contracts. (Country Intensive Money).	Definition: the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply or $M_2 - C / M_2$ - where M is a broad definition of the money supply and C is currency held outside banks.	Shows that people are more likely to enter into contract, reflecting their confidence in the protection and enforceability of contract rights. This is a very high level indicator, capturing the results of broad systemic improvement in the justice system but also in some other areas such as bank supervision.	Contract Intensive Money (CIM) rate; Central Bank; IMF. Cost: Low. There are data on both the quantities of currency and the quantity of M subscript 2 for almost all countries. However, the costs should be high for ascertaining assets secured by contracts.	Rising trend indicates growing confidence in contract rights and the willingness and ability of the government to enforce contracts. May be a time lag problem, with CIM changing only after people recognize broad systemic improvement.
Comments: Allows international comparison, observation of changes over time as data is available every year.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.2: Foundations to Promote and Support a Market-based Economy

Intermediate Result 2.1.2.1: Legislation, Regulations, and Policies in Conformity with Sound Commercial Practices Enacted

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Legislation/ Regulations are consistent with WTO standards	Countries that accede to World Trade Organization treaty. Unit: Yes/No	Direct measure of whether a country has a set of laws that are recognized as conforming to international standards of commercial soundness.	WTO records. Cost: Low-Medium	Obviously this indicator is a one-time indicator. Once a country accedes to WTO treaty, this indicator will no longer be relevant.
<p>Comments: Alternate: % of WTO steps or criteria met. WTO membership implies a complex set of market-supportive arrangements as determined by the international community.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights
 Intermediate Result 2.1.2: Foundations to Promote and Support a Market-based Economy
 Intermediate Result 2.1.2.2: Effective Advocacy for the Promotion of a Market-based Economy Increased

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # or % of advocacy NGOs rated as effective or showing an improvement on the advocacy index.	See Appendix C, part D for the advocacy index. "Effective" can be defined as meeting a set number of points on the index. Unit: Number	Direct indicator of their strength in advocacy	Survey/interview. Cost: Medium, but this depends on the number of NGOs being rated.	Increase over time in relation to TA and training in elements included in the index.
Comments: The index can be adapted to fit local conditions or program emphasis.				
2) Number of NGOs that identify business advocacy promotion within their mandate.	There will need to be some standard defining what constitutes "identifying" on the part of the NGOs Unit: Number	Relevance is based on the assumption that proliferation of business advocacy groups indicates a strengthening of such groups within the sector. This is a less direct measure than the advocacy scale.	Review of NGO materials (equivalent to corporate capabilities). Cost: Low, depends on the number of NGOs in target group.	
Comments: More, weak groups may not be better than few strong groups but would like to see diverse interests represented.				
3) Number of commercial laws submitted to legislature that were drafted or reviewed by advocacy groups.*	This would require identifying target laws that NGOs were lobbying for out of some total that came before the legislature. Individual missions will need to define "submitted" and "reviewed" Unit: Number.	Measures actual impact of the advocacy.	Survey of NGOs; Committee Hearing Minutes. Cost: Low.	Should increase.
Comments: Alternative: % of all commercial laws submitted that were drafted or reviewed. *Perhaps not just advocacy groups, but by interested economic parties. Commercial advocacy groups may not represent most important economic interests and the views of the latter may be made known by other means in Latin America.				
4) % of target NGOs who believe their advocacy has lead to policy and legal changes and can provide specific examples of change.	Unit: Percent.	Measures actual impact of the advocacy. Higher level of measuring their advocacy abilities than #3, since it measures whether the advocacy had impact proxy to 1) above.	Survey of NGOs. Cost: Medium, depends on # of NGOs.	Should increase. This would require identifying target laws that NGOs were lobbying for.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
-----------	------------------------------------	------------------------	---------------------------------------	--

Comments:

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.2: Foundations to Promote and Support a Market-Based Economy

Intermediate Result 2.1.2.3: Government Mechanisms Established Which Promote Competitive Open Markets

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) State anti-monopoly regulatory unit is established.	Such a unit would be an official state mechanism for promoting competition and regulating monopoly practices. Unit: Yes/No.	Market-based economies depend on an environment conducive to fair competition among enterprises.	Informal interviews, documenting evidence. Cost: Low.	Creation is first step. May need them to look separately at how well it functions.
Comments:				

2) Specialized commercial courts are established.	Unit: Yes/No.	Court specialization is a measure of increased ability to adequately deal with the subject matter. This is more relevant in country with no history with commercial/ business litigation.	Review of the courts. Cost: Low.	
---	---------------	---	---	--

Comments:

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.3: Equal Access to Justice

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of new courts opened in rural and urban areas with concentrations of marginalized populations.	Areas or districts with concentrations should be those where 60% (or TBD %) of the population is poor, ethnically marginalized, etc. Measure per annum.	Local availability of courts, and the geographic distribution of courts is an indicator of access.	Court records and census data. Cost: Should be fairly low once areas are determined.	This would require an assessment of how many courts would be optimal. Obviously, more is not always better.
Comments: Alternative measures might include numbers of courts available for use, against a plan; and average daily utilization per court, in hours, number of court staff in posts. These indicators should be disaggregated by court type. If this indicator is very costly, reporting on it may be biannual, or at some other longer interval.				
2) # of courts, police posts per 100,000 population.	Disaggregate by court and police post.	Depending on the program emphasis, police posts might be deleted.	Court statistics. Cost: Low.	Should increase up to a point. Depends also on alternatives, level of demand.
Comments:				
3) % of citizens who say that they have access to court systems to resolve disputes.	% of those surveyed. Might do series of questions, one on distance, one on costs, one on other barriers (knowledge).	While this is not the same as having access, it is more than belief — question can be phrased less abstractly to increase validity	Survey. Cost: High, unless survey was already being conducted.	The survey questions would have to be worded in such a way that they only measured access and not fair justice at this level.
Comments:				
4) % of accused not represented at trial.	Unit: Percent.	If more individuals are represented at trial, arguably they are more aware of their rights to representation, the services are available, and there are no administrative or other barriers to getting the representation.	Court Records, aggregate stats if they exist; otherwise sample survey of criminal cases. Cost: Medium, but depends on how difficult it might be to compose a sample frame.	Should decline over time.
Comments: Some care needs to be used in determining whether to use this indicator. In Uganda, for example, the criminally accused have a right to representation. However, given the lack of public defenders, the result is that accused end up on remand for a longer period of time awaiting representation. Thus, the % represented may always be 100%. However, the time on remand awaiting representation would be more telling. Guatemala suggests a similar problem, and notes that it may be more critical to provide a defender when the person is arrested. Case loads of public defenders may be so heavy that the representation is very poor. Thus, it might also make sense to look at average case load per defender in addition to this indicator.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.3: Equal Access to Justice

Intermediate Result 2.1.3.1 Increased Availability of Effective Legal Services

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Number of public defenders, and defenders provided through legal aid, and law clinics defenders per 100,000 population.</p>	<p>Definition: <u>Public Defenders</u>: attorneys the state pays to defend the poor; <u>Legal Aid</u>: NGOs or other private or private/state mixed agencies existing to provide legal representation to the poor. <u>Law Clinics</u>: Groups established by the bar and law schools where students, under close supervision, give legal assistance to the poor. Unit: No. of defenders per 100,000 pop.</p>	<p>It is difficult to get into court without some type of legal guidance and/or representation.</p>	<p>Statistics and/or surveys; personnel records, MOJ, NGOs, etc. Cost: Most governments keep such figures. Many USAID programs are installing the information systems that allow it to happen. Therefore costs should be low.</p>	<p>The number should increase over time to meet growing population and growing need for conflict resolution. If numbers decrease, there is a problem. Most likely funding is difficult to come by. (May want to separate by rural and urban.) There is also a problem (Guatemala) of how to count pro bono or part time defenders. In some countries, every member of the bar is theoretically available to provide pro bono services.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>2) % change in the cases handled by public defender, legal aid, or law clinics</p>	<p>Definition: <u>Public Defenders</u>: attorneys the state pays to defend the poor; <u>Legal Aid</u>: NGOs or other private or private/state mixed agencies existing to provide legal representation to the poor. <u>Law Clinics</u>: Groups established by the bar and law schools where students, under close supervision, give legal assistance to the poor. Unit: Percent change from a baseline year.</p>	<p>While percent increase does not indicate quality of service, it at least shows services are available (their use may also indicate perceptions of quality — if they were ineffectual, who would use them?).</p>	<p>Court or service statistics Varies by size of country, shape of statistics. If USAID is funding only services it will have numbers, but if not this could end up being quite costly. Court statistics may be more easily obtained, although they would only show cases represented in court, not those where only advice is given or resolutions are reached out of court.</p>	<p>Generally, number would be expected to increase for most of countries where USAID is working. However, at some point subsidized legal service does become anti-economic. It could also encourage conflict. Need to compare increasing number with case loads per defender. Case loads could simply be growing. There is a problem with part timers here as well, although it may be less critical in this indicator (numbers should go up, just more slowly).</p>
<p>Comments: Alternative: # of cases handled.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) Number of cases using alternative systems.	Case is defined as a conflict between two or more parties. An alternative system is one that is legally recognized. Unit: Number of cases handled by alternative systems.	Indicates accessibility if not quality.	Statistics for legally recognized systems may be available; however, for tribal councils, etc, could be difficult.	Varies with source, could be rather high if there are a large number of alternatives and most of them are pretty informal. If under utilized there is a problem. Guatemala and other countries which recognize customary law add some difficulties — traditional “courts” probably don’t keep records, may not even consider “cases” in the same way. Here one may have to work with new ADR systems, court annexed, stand alone, and linked to traditional communities and use a sampling technique.

Comments: Alternate indicators include: % or number of ADR entities showing an increase in case loads of X% in the past year with X to be defined by program managers. In countries where national statistics are not very good you may want to consider whether partner NGOs are collecting information such as: % of villages where mediation services are provided.

4) Percent of plaintiffs appearing pro se who report that court documents and procedures were made available to them upon request.	One appears “pro se” in a legal action when one represents oneself without the aid of counsel. Unit: Percent	No country can provide 100% assistance to everyone, and part of the ideal may be reducing the need for lawyer services —making some actions simple enough so that citizens can handle their own legal work. To be effective, the plaintiffs would have to be able to access the information essential for them to effectively represent themselves	Sample survey of pro se plaintiffs.	Med to High—you would need to put together a list of pro se plaintiffs to draw a sample from a group of selected courts.	Should increase. Note, this in only a relevant indicator in country where pro se representation is allowed.
--	---	--	-------------------------------------	--	---

Comments:

5) Arbitration Centers for commercial dispute resolution are established.	Unit: Yes/No	This may be redundant, however we want to make it clear that we are providing services for economic as well as criminal cases.	Internal interviews; document reviews.		
---	--------------	--	--	--	--

Comments: Note, this is a cross over with APA 2.1.2.3. Y/N is really not adequate. After the center is established, then the indicators should change. One potential may be the number of cases handled. In many Latin American countries, centers are started and then do nothing for some time.

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.3: Equal Access to Justice

Intermediate Result 2.1.3.2: Increased Availability of Information

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of cases where notice was sent and received.	Notice = notification to parties of a pending case. Notification should be in compliance with the country's laws. Unit: % of total cases.	There is no access if you don't know there is a law suit/action.	Court records & sample survey. Cost: Probably moderate to high since where this is a problem, records are unlikely to exist.	If notice is not routinely sent, may be a matter of training and enforcement. Also logistical problems especially in countries with rural populations, large urban slums, lack of communication, transportation infrastructure. In Colombia, prosecutors frequently post notice in the court if they don't have the address of the defendant.
Comments: In a criminal case you may also want to measure % of cases where the defendants were apprised of their rights. You would measure this through a sample survey.				
2) % of cases where records are provided to parties.	% of cases (criminal, civil, etc.) where records provided to requesting parties.	These are public record and are needed for defense and prosecution of cases both civil and criminal.	Court records, statistics. Probably will not exist then a sample survey could be conducted.	This should go up and remain at a high level.
Comments: Alternative indicators include: % of lawyers/prosecutors who say the provision of records is rarely, sometimes, or often a problem. Guatemala liked this better than notifications (very important, but very difficult to track).				
3) Number of media stories, articles, and/or broadcasts covering changes in law/procedure or court case.	Unit: a) number of articles appearing as a monthly average; b) number of TV and radio programs as a monthly average.		Media records. Cost: Medium, time consuming requires absolute count over several months.	Trendline may be uneven if sensational cases hit the press.
Comments: In Guatemala, and most of Latin America, this is increasing by leaps and bounds, but interviewees were unsure as to how to measure it meaningfully, especially since quality and length of articles has also risen.				
4) Number of citizens by key population categories receiving information on legal rights.	Citizens receiving information via training, mass media, etc. Unit: number, diaggregated.		Survey, NGO records. Cost: Depends on size of country, number of NGOs in all.	

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
Comments:				
5) % of population who know how to access the legal system.	Disaggregate by gender, ethnic group. Will have to develop basic set of questions, for example, where would you go if you wanted to report a crime, if a friend or family member were arrested, if someone refused to honor a contract, if you were served with notice of a civil complaint. Unit: % correct responses to 5 to 10 basic questions.	Ignorance of system is one of primary barriers to access. Measures above the stated IR of availability of information and examines whether citizens have learned anything by virtue of having access to more information.	Sample survey. Cost: Moderate to high, depending on size of sample, number of questions, how representative a group.	Should increase over time. May also want to target certain at risk groups, or specific kinds of knowledge.
Comments: This may require some rethinking. What kind of an answer would the average person give in the States or Europe? How would one distinguish the level of legal literacy of a U.S. citizen from that of a Guatemalan villager? Part of the difference may be in how one uses often very minimal knowledge and their sense of efficacy. For example, I know if someone threatens a law suit I should find a lawyer, and I can guess at various ways of finding a good one, but beyond that I expect the lawyer to guide me. The Guatemalan villager might not have that different an answer.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.3: Equal Access to Justice

Intermediate Result 2.1.3.3: Decreased Barriers

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of population at least half day removed (by normal form of travel) from nearest court or police post.	Unit: %.	This measures physical access, it addresses barriers created by long distance travel and people's ability to afford it.	Court records, statistics, census data, survey. Cost: Will have to be on estimate; initial cost may not be that high, but may need to hire someone to do rough analysis.	Should decrease over time. Unlikely to change very rapidly unless many courts and police posts are being built.
Comments:				
2) Reform laws which directly, or through interpretation, limit access.	Limit access by imposing costs, defining who can be represented, establishing language requirements. Unit: Laws. Comparison of laws reformed with changes supported.		Analysis of laws, probably by informed observers. Cost: Probably moderate (depending on how much analysis and interpretation is necessary to define the universe of laws) one time analysis and then track thereafter.	This should decrease over time.
Comments: In order to use this indicator you would probably need to identify the universe of laws that were limiting access and work on amending them. In Guatemala, observers noted that all laws limit access— i.e., commercial cases go to commercial courts, justices of the peace can only see cases up to a certain amount, statute of limitations, provisions on standing, etc. Consequently, as phrased this was not found to be very useful. The suggestion was that in systems where specific laws limited specific kinds of access, the question should be rephrased to handle just that.				
3) User/filing fees either absent, nominal, or linked to ability to pay.	Unit: Scale: 1 (absent); 2 (nominal, affordable by most); 3 (nominal but informal payments add significantly to the costs); 4 (medium, poorest discouraged); 5 (high, discourage many).	Fees often pose a barrier; if they are in force, they should be lowered or eliminated for the poor.	Public record, observation, interview. Cost: Low.	Trend should be to eliminate fees that pose onerous barriers to poor, keep those in force that may help finance costs, perhaps discourage frivolous law suits.
Comments: Guatemalan interviewees were not enthusiastic about this indicator. mission may want to identify benchmarks that are appropriate for the country context/tailored to specific system. Examples might include: average filing fee for different kinds of cases; filing fees as a portion of monthly per capita income; filing fee as proportion of monthly per capita income for those below the poverty line. Also, illegal fees are usually a large barrier, and indicator might reflect efforts to eliminate them.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) % of cases dropped due to inability to afford the costs.	Unit: % of total civil cases that are dropped prior to resolution.	Would indicate discrimination against poor.	Court records, if they exist. Sample survey but may be difficult to draw a sample. Cost: Moderate to high.	Should decrease over time if this is an issue.
Comments: Alternative indicator classification of fees as high, medium, or low based on an analysis of per capita income (or per capita income for the lowest 50% of the population) with fees? Guatemala found this impossible to measure.				
5) Number of interpreters per 100,000 minority language population.	Unit: number per 100,000 minority population. May help to look at overall average as well as monitoring where they are located.		Court records. Cost: Low.	Will be more important in some contexts than others; also by region of country, rural/urban.
Comments: Alternative indicators: % of courts that should offer interpretation that actually do so— “should offer” would need to be defined locally. In testing these indicators, it was also suggested that we measure the # of courts with professional interpreters since in many courts, they use court staff that happen to speak the relevant language, but may not have the proper training to accurately translate information to the parties. In Guatemala, there is a program to provide interpreters, but the trial is not the most important place. Consultations in prisons and with police may be more important. By the time a case gets to trial, if it does, much of the damage may already be done.				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Average time for case disposition in new cases.	Average time from filing to disposition for criminal and/or civil cases. Unit: # of Months.	Timeliness is one of indicators of better service. Generally average time should drop.	Court statistics if available; otherwise sample survey; at pilot stage, will include only changes in pilot. Cost: If statistics exist or are created as part of project, costs will be minimal. Any pilot activity will also generate its own statistics.	In most cases, we would expect the average time to decline since the usual problem is excessive delays. However, in very disorganized systems, just completing a larger number of cases might be a goal. In some instances, this would not be an appropriate goal, especially if the problem is perfunctory handling of certain kinds of cases. This is likely for political cases, for example. In very disorganized systems, this can be changed to number of cases completed and the desired trend would be an absolute increase in the number. Where delay reduction is not an immediate goal, the average time should at least stay stable.

Comments: In countries where there are not aggregate statistics, the cost of this indicator would seem to be very high. Proxies such as percent of cases in backlog, percent change in backlog cases, or percent of cases that it takes longer than two years to resolve may be used. These latter indicators are not as sensitive to change as average case processing time but it may be more feasible in many environments. Also probably should be for new cases — if there is a big backlog, they will continue to skew the results.

2) # of criminal cases involving political, economic, and institutional elites taken to trial.	Political elites are elected office holders or are political appointees. Economic elites are top 10% of economic ladder. Institutional elites include high members of key institutions. This will vary depending on the country. Examples may include church, military, ethnic groups, and political parties. Unit is number of cases.	Willingness to pursue “important” suspects is an important indicator of the efficacy and impartiality of the system.	Media reports, informed observers. Cost: Low.	This is difficult as we have no way of knowing the number of crimes or potential suspects involved, nor whether the final disposition is fair or not. Also the universe depends on such things as the level of corruption. Conceivably, in a very honest system, the number would start and remain low, as it would in a very corrupt one with a dependent judiciary. Thus the target setting and relevance of the indicator will depend on the specific situation.
--	---	--	--	---

Comments: We contemplated deleting this indicator because it is so difficult to define, however we would like to retain it. How it is measured might be changed. We may want to measure “patterns” and report qualitatively rather than quantitatively. If this indicator is too advanced for a country, and therefore is not sensitive to change, a preliminary indication of change might be that these elite are investigated or charged. Note that in some countries, when a new regime comes to power it may bring previous elites to trial, but it’s motives are often not consistent with this I.R.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) % of citizens responding that they will be fairly treated if arrested, or if they file a complaint with the court system.	Response to survey question. Unit: %, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group where important.	While perceptions may not match reality, we assume there is some connection. Furthermore, one rationale for rule of law work is to increase citizen faith in democratic institutions. See comments in data collection column.	Surveys. Cost: High to moderate. Can be held down by sample size and by including as a question in a larger survey. Guatemala is already collecting very similar information, with some interesting results. Faith in the fairness of the system seems to be inversely related to education (although the educated may believe they can manipulate the system to win; one may want to be careful about that possibility).	In all cases, the desired direction is an increase in positive responses. However, responses may lag behind "real" improvements and will also be influenced by salient events. Thus, changes from one year to another are less important than a trend over several years.

Comments: Alternative: % of population saying they would take their case to court if they were the victim of a crime.

4) Convictions and settlements as % of reported crimes [or as % of real crime].	Settlements are crimes "mediated out"* by agreements between victim and accused. [Real crime would have to be based on a survey.] *Note: In Latin America there is a tendency to substitute mediation for property crimes which allows the accused to pay the victim for the damage without admitting guilt.	Presumably every reported crime has a perpetrator, and one purpose of a criminal justice system is to identify him and bring him to justice. For lesser crimes, some sort of reconciliation may also be possible.	Police and court records otherwise direct data collection at offices, or surveys. Cost: Low if records exist; if not, surveys will have to be done and these could be high cost. You are more likely to be able to get the % of real crime where surveys are completed which inquire whether people have been a victim of a crime and whether they reported that crime.	Generally one would expect the percentage to increase as the system improves. There are several caveats, however. First where there is no faith in the system, the denominator may not even come close to reflecting the real rate of criminal activity. As faith in the system increases, the rate of reporting may also rise faster than the ability to produce results. Second, in very repressive systems there is always the fear that every crime will have a guilty party regardless of whom the perpetrator actually is. A related indicator used in Guatemala to cover this last problem is the % of cases for which an investigation is done before a suspect is arrested. Also % of convictions based on evidence! Both obviously require a sample.
---	---	---	--	--

Comments: The ideal indicator would have "real incidence of crime" as the denominator. However, at best there will be statistics on reports which then becomes a proxy. This really tries to get at the heart of the question of efficacy for the criminal justice system. In countries that do not have solid statistics this may be very difficult. In Uganda, for example, the only information you could probably get is total number of police files opened during the calendar year and the number of cases that came to conclusion (acquittal, convictions). There is currently no systematic way to track the police number with the court number; nor does there appear to be reliable statistics on the real crime rate.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
5) % or # of felony cases involving government officials that are tried and resolved.	Unit: Annual # or % depends on situation.	An independent court must be able to take action against the powerful. While the ideal indicator is a percentage, in some countries just having a few cases processed will be an advance.	News media, word of mouth. Cost: Fairly inexpensive.	This is difficult to measure or to target because of the unknown size of the "universe". In most cases, a number will be sufficient, although increases could also be a sign (unlikely) of increasing corruption.

Comments: This indicator, like the above indicator on trial of elites, may be so difficult to define and measure as to not merit retention. However, it is a very important concept. Perhaps it is something that missions can report in their narrative, but not try to use as an indicator — except for very special circumstances which might make it easier to determine. In some circumstances it may also be necessary to further qualify that you are only looking at the number of government officials of the government currently in office.

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.1.4.1: Increased Transparency

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of cases holding hearings that are open to the public.	<p>Hearing may be a trial or may simply be one of a series of audiences. However, should be open to public. [May not be appropriate to include juvenile or other culturally sensitive cases in this indicator.]</p> <p>Unit: % cases with hearings over total of cases.</p>	<p>While there will always be some hearings that are closed for reasons of security or to protect the parties, most cases should involve some sort of hearing open to the public in general.</p>	<p>Court records, or sample surveys; in person visits. [For in person visits, the indicator should be % of hearings visited that were open.]</p> <p>Costs: Moderate if records or small surveys are used. May be difficult to get data for entire court system.</p>	<p>Targeting and predicted change depends on existing situation. Relatively transparent systems will not improve much; those that are closed should show an increase. Will be desirable to fix some ideal level, say 90% of cases, so as not to punish the already good performers. Lawyers working in Guatemala seemed to feel this should be limited to criminal cases — and that the law always defines more openness than exists in fact. One element accounting for this view is the US system's greater reliance (up to 80% of cases) on post verdict bargaining in civil cases. US attorneys apparently don't hold civil cases to the same level of transparency, in theory or in fact.</p>
Comments:				
2) Degree of access to cases as reported by journalists.	<p>Access to cases means the media can a) sit in on hearings and interview participants after the decisions are made and b) that they can publish on pending trials and on decisions within the confines of the law.</p> <p>Unit: Scale consisting of: (1-5) no access; limited access; occasional access; frequent access; or unlimited access.</p>	<p>Transparency denotes information on system workings and an ability to criticize them.</p>	<p>Interviews with journalists. This will involve some subjective judgments, but they will be unavoidable in any but the most extreme cases (absolute control of the press or absolute freedom).</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	<p>Targets will be set by the context, and probably involve a progression through the two steps. At the extremes, movement will be slight or nil. There is also the problem however, of a free but irresponsible press, one which editorializes without bothering to get information. One problem here will be restrictions imposed to protect privacy of parties and prevent press from influencing outcome. Several rights come into conflict here and are handled differently by various countries. At the very least, once a decision is reached, the press should be able to cover the results; interviews with officials during a case may be subject to reasonable restrictions.</p>
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) % of informed people who report that there is set of widely available written rules and regulations establishing procedures or internal regulations for carrying out decisions, actions, and major functions in the various sector institutions?	<p>Decisions, actions are major functional events, i.e., arrests, investigations, judicial findings, etc.</p> <p>Sector institutions are courts prosecution and police. Informed people would be the technical people working in those organizations as well as the professional that work with the organizations (such as lawyers, law academics, etc.).</p> <p>Unit: %, by major institutions.</p>	<p>Transparency depends on existence of predetermined rules or criteria for institutional actions. These are usually written but in any case should be widely known.</p>	<p>Public records/laws and internal regulations.</p> <p>Cost: Low.</p>	<p>The existence of rules is a precondition, but does not determine whether agencies actual follow them. However, without such rules decisions can be arbitrary or governed by some hidden agenda. Individual countries may want to pick out the areas or institutions of most concern, e.g., police and detentions, rules about gathering evidence, prosecutorial decisions as to whether to indict, etc.</p>

Comments: This indicator will not work in a country if there is a “gap” in the legislation. In that case, a more appropriate indicator might identify the gaps and measure the closure of those gaps. After the gaps are closed then this indicator could be substituted. Guatemalan observers had problems with this indicator. Latin America always has procedural rules and an “informed person” will know them. The problem is whether they are used, and in some cases this is as much a question of whether officials know or understand them, as one of corruption. The concept is a good one, but it needs more refinement. In Guatemala and other Latin American countries, projects have focused on specific procedural rules (e.g., time lapse before a detainee brought before a judge, respect for time limits on stages, required notifications, etc. This does not ease the tracking problem, but it does make the indicator more intelligible.

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.1.4.2: Increased Independence

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Judges may question constitutionality of laws and defer their application pending some authoritative decision.</p>	<p>Authoritative decision may be by Supreme Court, Constitutional tribunal, or some other mechanism. Unit: Y/N.</p>	<p>While full blown judicial review is still not universally accepted, there is emerging agreement that an independent judiciary should have some ability to question the legality/constitutionality of the laws it is expected to apply.</p>	<p>Laws, public documents. Cost: Low.</p>	<p>This still does not answer the very important question of whether the powers are exercised; one may want to add some measure assuring that they are more than theoretical. However, beyond that, factors like the quality of legislation make attempts to measure its use extremely difficult and extremely context relevant.</p>
<p>Comments: Guatemalan interviewees agreed that the abstract possibility is less important than the real use. Suggested number of constitutional challenges might be more important. However, in many Latin American countries where every other appeal seems to be based on a violation of one's constitutional rights, this could be difficult. Perhaps here it should be rulings in favor of the plaintiff or the actual derogation of a law either by the judiciary or as the result of their constant ruling against it in individual cases.</p>				
<p>2) % of a) new appointments and b) promotions in accord with objective, merit-based criteria.</p>	<p>Objective merit-based criteria means standards having to do with educational background, experience, knowledge, etc. Even if political criteria also come into play, the merit standards should set a minimum below which no contacts will help. Depending on the focus of the mission, this could be measured against Judges, Police, Prosecutors, or Defenders.</p>	<p>Independence requires that personnel policies not be dictated by internal or external contacts.</p>	<p>First is simple observation; second is probably a result of interviews with informed observers. Cost: Low if sole requirement is existence of standards. Will go up if one attempts to determine whether standards are applied.</p>	<p>The US would not get 100% on this, although the point is not an elimination of connections, but simply the application of some job-relevant criteria as well.</p>
<p>Comments: Problem, there is merit and there is merit. Does a law degree and several years experience count? How about a comparison of curricula? Is a test better? As countries begin to adopt merit appointments (in itself a big jump) both the many ways of getting around them and the difficulty of establishing relevant criteria have begun to cause difficulties. The concept is important, but each case will require a refined definition and some major judgment calls.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) % of sector professionals with security of tenure while in good standing.	Security of tenure means removal for cause or objectively determined poor performance. Tenure is an appointment for a fixed duration or until retirement age.	Whether career appointments are the best system or not is debatable, but judges and other professionals should have relative security of tenure (periodic "ratifications" are one solutions so long as the criteria used are transparent).	Court records, key interviews; survey. Cost: Low.	Institutional independence is compromised by external control over appointments; individual independence can also be compromised if personnel decisions are based on whim. In both cases, tenure should be contingent on professional department, not on contacts, party identification, or just which administration is in power. Note, the value of this indicator may be mitigated if there are "drummed up" charges that have no basis in fact.

Comments: In countries under reform, this may also require some judgment calls. In many cases, it is very difficult to determine whether a dismissal for cause is really for cause. Perhaps this might work best as the percentage of professionals **legally** covered. Then the narrative could discuss any problems with the seriousness of the legal provisions.

4) Judicial salary as a % of what a comparable professional makes in private practice.	Salary is wages plus benefits like housing, car, etc. costed out. Select 2 or 3 comparable professions and establish average salary range. Compare judicial salaries to this range. Salary in private practice is average. Unit: %.	Judges need living wages, as do police, prosecutors, etc.	Court and other institutional records. Cost: Low.	Often wages are lower for some kinds of judicial professional than for others. This can be compensated by averaging of the different categories covered. Once the level is about 80-90% of average private practice, it should peak.
--	---	---	--	--

Comments: Alternate: % change in salary/monetized benefits

5) Is there a functioning internal disciplinary/ internal affairs office which monitors for violations in the various key institutions?	Key institutions may be the Judiciary, Police, Public Defenders, or Prosecutors Office. Violations may include bribery, corruption, susceptibility to political pressures, etc. Both of these definitions need to be clarified by the mission. This indicator calls for a two part analysis. First is the institution established, and second is it working. Unit of Measure: Yes/No.	Establishing internal offices for violations will increase the ability of the branches to operate independent of these corrupting influences.	Institutions. Cost: Low - we are not asking questions about whether they are working effectively.	One time response.
---	---	---	--	--------------------

Comments: While it is probably best to leave this as a question of presence not efficacy, changes in the latter may be a goal of a project, and thus some means will have to be found to measure them. Honduras and Colombia (not surveyed with this exercise) are both attempting to do this simply by counting cases reviewed and their results. This obviously poses all kinds of risks, but it is worth contemplating in countries where such offices have been ineffectual for years (most of Latin America).

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.1.4.3: Improved Management and Administrative Capacity

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Budget submission corresponds to real expenditures.	The budget submission is the budget prepared by the institution. Unit: % correspondence; may also be broken down by categories, salaries, other operating expenses, capital budget (if it exists).	While many other factors may enter in, submitting a budget that approximates what will be approved and what will actually be spent is a pretty good reflection of the quality of institutional administration.	Official records. Cost: Low assuming records are public.	This will go from a situation where no institutional budget is submitted (the government just gives them money) to one where the submission, while probably lowered, will match real expenditures about 90%. We would expect the correspondence to increase over time.
Comments:				
2) % of time high level functional officials spend on administrative details.	Administrative details: decisions on hiring of individuals (not general policy), individual procurement, etc. High level officials: Judges and functional equivalents in the Attorney General's office.	While one or two of them may devote full time to administrative details, most should spend little or no time on such matters as how much officials are paid, vacation schedules, or approving appointments of individual staff not in their immediate courtroom.	Interviews with officials. Cost: Low <i>[Medium if it requires a survey]</i> .	Estimates will be rough, but generally once changes begin, interviewees will report a one-time dramatic decrease in time. If the changes don't work, they may reverse that initial decision.
Comments: It may be best to limit this to the courts, where we seem to have a clear trend (at least in Latin America, to less time being spent on these issues). In the AG's office people were less clear as to what the trend is or should be. In countries where the Ministry of Justice "runs" the judiciary, there is sometimes a move to give more not less administrative authority to justices. That a judiciary controls its own administrative offices should probably mean that its professional administrative officers are accountable to the Court or its president, not that all justices intervene all the time. A more sensitive indicator might tap this division of labor (perhaps noting an effort to divide administrative decisions into policy, seen by justices, and routine decisions, handled by administrators).				
3) Existence of an MIS.	Scorecard: MIS exists which provides accurate, timely (to within last quarter): 1. Info on number of officials and where located; 2. Info on number of cases handled in courts in capital; 3. Info on cases filed in district courts; 4. Data which are aggregated and analyzed. Unit: Scale 0 (no), 1 (yes) per element totaled.	Having even a rudimentary MIS is essential to running an institution.	Observation, court records. Cost: Low.	
Comments: The only problem will be refining this beyond the most basic levels. There may have to be categories for more sophisticated systems, should program managers be working on these. A fifth step would be the presentation of data in a user friendly form to high level officials, and their report that they actually read and use it to make decisions.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Time it takes a party to receive information on the state of a case.	Party is complainant or defendant or legal counsel. Unit: Average time in minutes, hours, or days.	May indicate other factors, but should also indicate presence of an adequate case filing and management system.	Interviews with users or random visits to courts to request info. Cost: Low - medium unless desire survey rigor.	In the beginning it is very likely that no information will be available for most cases; the next step is days. The goal is immediate to under an hour, depending on the demand. There may be urban/rural differences which will have to be factored in.

Comments:

5) Inventory and maintenance system exists for equipment and infrastructure.	System must include means for tracking existence of holdings and scheduling repairs. Unit: Y/N.	One of frequent impediments to efficacy is lack of equipment and loss of that which is provided.	Interviews, observation. Cost: Low.	This is very basic, but for many systems is a critical impediment to efficiency. Probably donor efforts will go into creating a rudimentary system, especially if they are also donating equipment.
--	--	--	--	---

Comments: In Guatemala, observers suggested an addition or modification to test whether repairs actually were done and equipment supplied in a timely fashion. The problem of course is that many systems will report that they comply, but whatever exists is nonfunctional. If this does not lend itself to easy measure, one might still do more qualitative reports on what really happens to accompany the indicator itself.

6) Merit appointment of administrative staff.	Staff must meet minimal skill requirements which are set out in appointment system. Unit: Y/N.	Untrained, incompetent administrative staff are characteristic of many inefficient systems. Jobs are given to friends or family with no regard to competence.	Legal provisions (interviews, observation, for tapping extent to which it works). Cost: Low to determine formal presence — could go up considerably if one is trying to assess the quality of the legal system and whether it is actually applied.	Over time both percentage of appointments covered and rigor and job specificity of tests should increase.
---	---	---	---	---

Comments: This may lend itself to percentages (if only certain institutions adopt it, or adopt it for only certain categories of employees). In Latin America, and we suspect more broadly, while the formal acceptance of merit appointments is an important leap, it remains honored in the breach. Also the definition of merit may become more rigorous over time — shifting from a minimal list of qualifications (and a “comparison of curricula”) to more job specific criteria and more rigorous and transparent means of applying them. This may lend itself to scaling: 1. Any job requirements at all; 2. Definition of job related skills; 3. Ranking and selection of candidates on the basis of skills testing).

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.1.4.4: Improved Functional Organization

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) a. Are there legal deadlines/ guidelines for case processing that are realistic -AND- b. % of cases processed within the time established by the guidelines.*</p>	<p>Mission may want to disaggregate this indicator by various stages, for example police investigation, prosecutorial investigations, actual trial, etc., depending on the specifics of the country.</p> <p>a) Yes/No</p> <p>b) % of cases (by type) processed within the time established by the guidelines.*</p>	<p>This will indicate both efficiency and realism of deadlines.</p>	<p>A. Need to be assessed through as expert assessment.</p> <p>B. Court statistics, sample.</p> <p>Cost: Low to high, depending on whether statistics exist, survey if no statistics.</p>	<p>Generally, positive change should come from both directions: more realist guidelines should be developed, and more cases should meet them. There may be differences by regions or type of case, or projects may only focus on certain of them (land disputes, serious felonies, etc). This will alter the target.</p> <p>Where deadlines don't exist, average time to resolution can also be used, generally should decrease. It should be noted that a careful assessment needs to be done. The deadlines may be too short as well as too long.</p> <p>Note, in some countries there may be guidelines rather than laws and in other countries neither may exist. In those countries the precedent established on cases appealed on the issue of timeliness may guide the determination of "reasonable."</p>
<p>Comments: Guatemala informants liked this indicator, although they would have to base results on the pilot courts where they are working. Otherwise statistics are not very good.</p>				
<p>2) Average caseload for different types of officials.</p>	<p>Choice of officials depends on where program is working and will probably be trial judges, persecutors, defenders and police investigators.</p>	<p>Indicator of greater efficiency, efficacy.</p>	<p>Court statistics, samples.</p> <p>Cost: Low to high, depending on whether statistics exist; survey if no statistics.</p>	<p>In most cases, productivity is low due to outdated, unnecessary procedures; thus generally would expect to increase. However, where there are too few officials, may decrease. May want to add another indicator of variance around the mean, since in some systems the problem is the inequitable distribution.</p>
<p>Comments: A large backlog reduction program or the introduction of filtering mechanisms may cause an enormous change in the averages. This will have to be explained in the accompanying text.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) % of cases annually cleared, disaggregated by criminal and civil cases.	This measure from the time a case is official registered by any judicial official (judge or judge-like person) to the time it is resolved or dismissed with prejudice. Unit: %.	Ideal is 100% which means they are keeping up with demand.	Official statistics or samples. Cost: Low to moderate depending on whether statistics are available.	Target is 100% over long haul; might be higher at beginning if there is a substantial backlog problem. Backlog reduction might also confuse things if they work on getting rid of old cases first. This means they could have 200% but that no new cases were being resolved.
Comments:				
4) % of reported crimes for which suspect is identified, and the investigation is completed.	Depending on program focus this could be used to measure the police or prosecutors' investigatory processes. Unit: %.	Indicates investigative capability of system.	Official statistics or samples. Cost: Moderate.	This should increase over time. Caveat is that "any old suspect" could be fingered. Thus other indicators needed as well if this is a concern (Note: Guatemala uses % of cases in which an investigation precedes arrest, just for this reason).
Comments: In two of the field tests this indicator was not feasible to measure. In Uganda, potential proxies included % of cases which were adjourned because of incomplete investigation; and number of adjournments due to incomplete investigations. average length of time to complete an investigation. In Ukraine average length of time to complete an investigation was seen as superior.				
5) % of reversals on appeal.	Unit: percentage of cases in which the decisions are reversed upon appeal.	Indicates "juridical security"—one aspect of Rule of Law.	Official statistics. Cost: Moderate.	Will have to make determination depending on analysis of system problems. Also depends on number of appeals. In Latin America and Egypt where "everything is appealed" % of reversals might be higher than in more stabilized system in which past history suggests that only certain kinds of cases are worth appealing. Timeframe may also be a problem. You may not show progress over the life of a 5 year strategy.
Comments: Depending on the constraints the mission is addressing, they may also want to consider measuring the % of cases are appealed. However, this is not a good indicator where there are no barriers to appealing a case and appeals are often used just to delay the outcome. Average # of appeals per case; and average length of time to complete the appeals process. Guatemala notes that this may be best in criminal cases, especially if post verdict bargaining ever becomes popular.				
6) Where there are conflicts of law, there is an authoritative means for deciding which law is applicable to a given situation.	Authoritative means would be an entity charged with making the decision and/or a logical system for prioritizing applications (i.e., hierarchy of laws). Unit: Y/N (Users may want to disaggregated by conflicts of substantive law and jurisdiction).	Such conflicts can be a source of corruption or instability and frequently characterize systems in the process of change.	Laws, interviews, observation of cases. Cost: Low.	Target is the existence of a system. A more sensitive measure would look at actual conflicts and the manner of their resolution, to check for uniformity of applications of mechanisms. Also there are likely to be areas where an authoritative mechanism does not work — for example certain kinds of conflict of jurisdiction. Some of these may also emerge over time as new types of cases develop.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

Intermediate Result 2.1.4: Effective and Fair Legal Sector Institutions


Intermediate Result 2.1.4.5: Professionalization of Technical Personnel

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Career system based on skills, job performance exists.	Career system defines jobs, stages for advancement, predictable trajectory. Unit: Y/N.	Links professional performance to advancement in organization.	Interviews, observation, official documents. Cost: Low.	May be less relevant for systems (US, Britain) where some officials (judges) are recruited on the basis of outside experience. Still for most officials career system is important to ensure professionalism.
Comments: This is an important indicator and could be refined further. That will make collecting data more costly, especially if one is attempting to determine the quality of the system and the extent to which it is followed. However, if this is a goal of the program, it is worth further work.				
2) % of officials given formal annual performance reviews.	To be considered a formal review 1) it must be written; 2) it must be included in a personal file; 3) the person evaluated must have been given an opportunity to respond in writing to the evaluation. Unit:%	Even for officials with permanent tenure, some sort of evaluation feedback is beneficial.	Interviews, observation, official documents. Cost: Low.	
Comments:				
3) % of new professionals given entry-level training.	Entry level course can be of varying lengths, content — may be classroom or mentoring. Unit: %.	Shows degree of interest in upgrading skills — proxy.	Personnel or training records. Cost: Low.	Should increase over time. May also want to look at quality if this is part of program.
Comments:				
4) Professional ranking of sector personnel.	Professional ranking is professional image as compared to all public and private professionals in same category. Unit: High, medium, low.	Jurists at least belong to a larger professional community; thus how they are ranked professionally compared to that community is an indicator of their professional quality.	Focus groups of opinion leaders. Cost: Low.	Target is that they are least ranked average. One expects that public sector professionals might not be the absolute leaders in the profession, but they should be ranked at least average. There may be differences with levels within the public sector. Often the highest level, in part because of their position, receive a higher than average ranking, whereas those at lower levels do not. <i>[Although we are leaving this as a proposed indicator there is some question whether the return is too low for the investment.]</i>
Comments: Indicator probably not sensitive to change.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>5) A continuing legal education requirement is incorporated into merit criteria or considerations on promotions/ transfers or is an element in the performance evaluation.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Continuing legal education could include formal and informal education, to be defined in country.</p> <p>Unit: Yes/No.</p>	<p>There is a great need for continually educating professional staff to maintain their knowledge and reputation as professionals.</p>	<p>Review evaluation. Institutional standards. Personnel interviews.</p> <p>Low if only want to know whether exists. If need to assess quality or compliance, cost will go up.</p>	
<p>6) % of judges, prosecutors, police officers, and prison and detention officers who are members of disadvantaged groups (might be gender, ethnic, racial, class, religious, etc.)</p>	<p>Percentage of officials disaggregated by type of employee.</p>	<p>This demonstrates integration within the generalized justice system, and extends beyond the establishment of specific institutions. It may not be a sufficient measure by itself but could be effectively coupled with another of the above proposed indicators.</p>	<p>Survey of personnel records (if available) or sample survey of court personnel.</p> <p>Cost: High if information not readily accessible in government records.</p>	
<p>Comments: For Latin America, ethnic, racial, religious representation may be more important than gender for fair justice. Also since most prisoners are men, why should large percentage of prison staff be women?</p>				

Section B: Elections and Political Processes

Results Framework



Definitions — Elections and Political Processes

Agency Objective 2.2. More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

A competitive political process includes, but is not limited to, an election in which political parties or independent candidates have the right to compete openly. The elections should be administered impartially, and all citizens should have the right to vote without unreasonable impediments. Political processes also refer to the role of institutions, such as political parties, and the environment within which they operate. Political parties should be representative and responsive bodies. Citizens should be knowledgeable about the political process and contemporary issues and have the right to shape party platforms and influence political decision-making. And elected officials need to be able to take office and govern effectively.

Intermediate Results 2.2.1 Impartial Electoral Framework

The electoral framework refers to those constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and institutions which govern electoral processes. Although not a sufficient condition, an impartial framework is a necessary condition for free and fair elections and electoral processes. Impartiality can take a number of forms, but will generally be recognized by a broad acceptance of the framework. Impartiality is therefore best served by fostering a substantive and inclusive debate on the framework.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.1.1. Substantive, Inclusive Debate on New Electoral Laws and/or Changes to Laws and Regulations

This result refers to those fora in which the creation of, and any revisions to, electoral laws and regulations are openly and publicly discussed. These laws and provisions are more likely to be impartial when the debate surrounding them includes a variety of perspectives from inside and outside the government. The specific fora of these debates will vary across cases.

Intermediate Results 2.2.2. Credible Electoral Administration

This refers to the process and system of electoral administration. In many countries, the administration of elections and related matters (e.g., voter registration) is largely delegated to an elections authority within a government ministry, or to an electoral commission. “Credible” means that the electoral administration is trusted and deemed worthy of its authority by the public.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.2.1. Impartial and Transparent Electoral Authority

“Electoral authority” refers to that body responsible for managing and conducting elections and electoral processes. While the electoral framework provides the legal basis for an election system, an electoral authority is the primary agency responsible for overseeing the law. An impartial electoral authority is one which carries out its duties in a neutral manner; one which does not manipulate the electoral framework to favor certain individuals/groups; and one which has sufficient resources to permit impartial administration. This is distinct from an impartial electoral framework since it deals with the authority’s performance under the framework.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.2.2. Effective Administration of the Electoral Process

An electoral administration, in order to be credible, must carry out its functions in a competent manner. Such an authority has sufficient professional staff and resources and the willingness and

ability to make decisions autonomously. It operates effectively when it conducts administrative and logistical aspects of the election, such as registering, designating polling sites, drawing up voters' lists, tabulating votes, providing security, educating voters and adjudicating complaints.

Intermediate Results 2.2.3. An Informed and Active Citizenry

Citizenry, under this IR, includes those eligible to vote, whether they are registered or not. The "citizenry" could also include adolescents (future voters whose attitudes toward government and politics may be influenced) or noncitizen residents of a country (whether or not they are future voters, they may place demands on the public institutions of a country for services or status). An "informed citizenry" is seen as the general objective of "civic education" programs, which inform citizens on key aspects of democratic political processes. "Voter education" programs have as their goal "an informed electorate" and generally are more narrowly focused on an upcoming electoral event. "Voter education" and "an informed electorate" are time-specific dimensions of "civic education" and "an informed citizenry." The framework presented below could equally apply to civic education programs not addressing election specific issues, as well as to voter education programs.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.3.1. Increased Understanding of the Political System Among Targeted Citizens

This result involves citizen understanding of basic elements of the electoral system and of political choices. Information presented to citizens regarding these issues generally come from three sources: a) official bodies, which include government agencies, election commissions, state-owned or managed news media (print, broadcast, or on-line), and state-directed schools/universities; b) independent, neutral, or disinterested sources, which could include independent and credible journalism, whether print, broadcast, or on-line/private schools/universities; civic groups, NGOs or religious bodies; and c) partisan or interest-group sources that explicitly or implicitly advocate a policy or electoral outcome, such as a political party newspaper or other publicity in the service of a candidate or cause. The source of information leading to greater understanding and confidence is not explicitly captured in the indicators below. If the purpose is to evaluate a particular voter or civic education program, investigators will need to discern the source of the information/knowledge as well as measure its existence.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.3.2. Increased Consumption of Political Information among Targeted Citizens

Consumption can take the form of listening to radio broadcasts, watching television news programs, reading newspapers or political literature. Political information includes, but is not limited to, current political issues, party platforms, and candidate positions. This, along with increased understanding of the political system, is a necessary part of an informed citizenry, recognizing that what citizens do with this information is what should ultimately be evaluated (i.e., does understanding of democratic processes actually increase? Do citizens engage in political processes more as a result of increased consumption?).

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.3.3. Increased Political Participation among Targeted Citizens

This refers to citizens' engagement and participation in the political process. It is comprehensive, including party membership, volunteer service, voting, talking about politics and membership in NGOs which advocate for various policies. It represents the notion that political involvement goes far

beyond the act of voting.

Intermediate Results 2.2.4. Effective Oversight of Electoral Processes

A key element in effective oversight of electoral processes is election monitoring. Election monitoring is carried out within a country by three types of actors: 1) political contestants, who monitor violations of their supporters' political rights and seek redress of such violations through complaint mechanisms and/or through public opinion; 2) nonpartisan citizen organizations, which mobilize election monitors and may also make use of complaint mechanisms where they have the standing to do so; and 3) international sources, which evaluate a country's electoral framework and functions compared to international standards and practices. Each of these three types of monitoring operate in the pre-election period, on election day and during the immediate post-election period. The purposes of such monitoring include: reducing the opportunities and incentives for electoral fraud, identifying shortcomings/problems in the electoral process with the intention of facilitating free and fair elections, and legitimizing a peaceful transfer of power.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.4.1. Effective Electoral Process Monitoring

This result refers to the activity of election monitors, both domestic and international. It addresses the monitors' ability to observe and evaluate all aspects of the political process and report the findings.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.4.2. Media Fulfills Role as Watchdog in the Electoral Process

The media plays a crucial role in the oversight of electoral processes through their reports. This result addresses the media's capacity to produce credible, and accurate reports about the preparations for and the conduct of elections.

Intermediate Results 2.2.5. Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

A representative and competitive multiparty system includes the following: 1) parties (through their statements, structure, and leadership) that demonstrate a commitment to transparent, inclusive, and accountable democratic political processes; 2) parties that adopt institutional structures that enable them to reflect the interests of those they choose to represent in government or in the opposition, and to compete effectively in periodic elections at all levels; and 3) political parties that enjoy the confidence of citizens, encourage citizen participation, and reinforce the legitimacy of democracy as a governing approach.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.5.1. Political Parties Have Institutional Structures Which Reflect Internal Democratic Procedures, That Are Judged to be Transparent, Inclusive, and Accountable and That Are Accepted by the Party Leaders

This result addresses a key role of political parties: as intermediary between the electorate and the elected. It therefore considers parties' ability to consider and respond to constituents' interests, which can be enhanced when a party, *inter alia*, holds periodic, democratic elections for party offices, nominating candidates who reflect party membership; establishes bylaws; holds/reports on open, scheduled meetings; ensures that the membership debates and approves the party platform; and has effective financial controls.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.5.2. Political Parties Have Established Functioning Political Party Administrative Structures That Advance Institutional Stability in the Long-term

Political party stability encourages citizens' political participation and promotes faith in the system. The specific administrative structures which can advance institutional stability will vary, but consistent elements will include the existence of and reliance upon bylaws (rather than personalistic control) and effective communication systems.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.5.3. Increased Institutional Capacity of Each Political Party to Identify, Represent, and Expand its Defined Constituency in the Electorate

In order to fulfill its role as intermediary between the electorate and the elected, a political party must have the ability to reach out to its constituency. A political party is representative (and non-discriminatory) when it, *inter alia*, excludes no member based on ethnicity, religious beliefs or gender; establishes a mechanism to identify and expand a defined constituency; is organized geographically at several levels; maintains accurate membership lists; and has the capacity to research demographic characteristics.

Intermediate Results 2.2.6. Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

A disadvantaged group is defined as any group which, in a given country, has historically been excluded from fair participation in political processes. The implication is that when this result is realized, the interests advocated by women and disadvantaged groups will fully be taken into account in political processes.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.1. Laws Pertaining to Elections and Political Processes Provide for Non-discrimination Against Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Discrimination refers to anything that deters or restricts participation in the political process. "Laws" includes the laws, regulations, and enforcement provisions guiding elections and political participation.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.2. Women's and Disadvantaged Groups' Legal Rights Are Protected Through Effective Enforcement of Non-discriminatory Laws Pertaining to Electoral and Political Processes

The relevance of this result depends on non-discriminatory principles being incorporated in legal and regulatory form. The result refers to the extent to which these laws and regulations are enforced in practice.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.3. Increased Participation by Targeted Women and Disadvantaged Groups on Election Day

Participation is defined here as voting on election day.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.4. Electoral Administration Is Free from Bias, Impartial in its Oversight, and Devoid of Discrimination Against Women and Disadvantaged Groups

This refers to the conduct of the electoral authority in its role as administrator of elections and in

its corporate operations.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.5. Effective Voter Education Provided to Facilitate Women’s and Disadvantaged Groups’ Understanding of and Ability for Political Participation

This result overlaps with those results concerning voter education, but it specifically addresses the extent to which voter education reaches women and disadvantaged groups, as well as the level of education on issues concerning the rights and participation of these groups.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.6.6. Political Parties Are Supportive of the Participation of Women and Disadvantaged Groups in Political Processes.

This refers to the inclusion of women and disadvantaged groups in the decision-making structure of political parties, the parties’ outreach thereto, and their willingness to back members of these groups as political candidates. At a minimum, parties should exclude no member based on ethnicity, religious beliefs or gender in the equal participation of party activities, both in terms of the written regulations and the behavior of the membership.

Intermediate Results 2.2.7. Effective Transfer of Political Power

This essential element is applicable to the cases where new individuals, groups, or political parties are coming to power in the legislative or executive branches of government, or at the national, regional, and local levels.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.7.1. Procedures for the Transfer of Power Are Established and Followed

This addresses the extent to which the laws regarding the process are followed.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.7.2. Newly Installed Officials Are Prepared to Fulfill Their Responsibilities

“Prepared” in this result refers to whether the officials are oriented to their new positions through training and ready to fulfill their responsibilities.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.7.3. Agencies of Government, Including Military and Security and Opposition Groups, Accept the Authority of the Newly Installed Officials

This refers to the extent to which government agencies and the congressional opposition follow the orders and/or cooperate with the new officials in their legally sanctioned realms of responsibility.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.2.7.4. The Public Recognizes the Legitimacy of the Process by Which New Officials Are Chosen

This refers specifically to the process, not to the officials themselves, and is evidenced by media statements, lack of public demonstrations, etc.

Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables

The following categories of information are provided in the tables:

1. The statement of the indicator.
2. A definition of the indicator and its unit of measure.
3. The relevance of the indicator or why it was selected as a measure of that particular result.
4. Approaches to collecting data for the indicator and the approximate cost of collection. Three categories were used for cost: low (under \$500); medium/moderate (\$500 - \$1500); and high (over \$1500). The cost specifications are rough and should be treated cautiously, because costs may vary greatly from one country to the next. The cost of data collection for questions requiring surveys of the population (for example) will depend upon 1) the existence of periodic surveys which address the desired topics conducted by someone else; 2) the existence of surveys which do not address the desired topic but to which strategic objective teams could add questions; and 3) the need to conduct one's own surveys and the number of indicators for which that survey can serve as the data collection approach. Similarly, the cost for monitoring broadcasts or periodicals for specific content will depend on whether there is 1) a commercial monitoring service, which conducts monitoring for advertisers anyway, so fees can be very modest; 2) an NGO that uses this information for its own purposes anyway; or 3) a need to cover the entire cost of monitoring several periodicals and/or broadcast stations.
5. Issues related to target setting and the interpretation of trendlines. In this final column, we share what we have learned about how much progress might be made over what period of time. In some cases, such as changes in the level of political tolerance, we know very little. In other cases, it seems clear that an indicator should change sharply and immediately in the wake of particular interventions. We also discuss issues to be aware of in setting performance targets or in interpreting trendlines.

Not all categories will be discussed for every indicator. In some cases, the relevance of the indicator is clear and does not require any discussion. In other cases, we have little at this point to contribute to ideas about how to set targets.

Indicators

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.1: Impartial Electoral Framework

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Degree to which electoral law/rules conform with international standards (could be a scorecard or index, see Appendix C for advice on these types of measures).	International standards: a) internal consistency and clarity; b) comprehensiveness; c) degree to which transparency is required; and d) degree of avenue of redress available to electorate.	There is a broad consensus on international standards for electoral/political legal framework.	Interviews with domestic and international monitors/panel of experts. Cost: Collateral with mission activities/moderate (monitoring).	Should demonstrate progress toward conformity with international standards in successive election cycles.
Comments: Assumes that electoral law exists rather than appointed commission that determines electoral policy.				
2) a) Degree of acceptance by all political parties.	Significance of the political party and degree of (non)acceptance should both be weighed in this indicator. Scale of acceptance according to key rules/laws by each political party.	Acceptance of electoral law/rules by competing parties legitimizes the electoral process.	Interviewing of party leaders/evaluation of public pronouncements by party leaders regarding acceptance of electoral rules. Cost: Interviewing/high (although depends on who conducts interviews), public record/low	General trend toward broad acceptance. Less than complete acceptance by some parties is not unusual in a polarized political setting. The opposition is likely to demonstrate less acceptance than the ruling party.
Comments: Mission should determine specific focus of acceptance, such as electoral rules regarding vote thresholds for representation, choice of proportional representation or plurality system, delineation of electoral boundaries, etc. In many electoral situations, opposition party complaints about the election framework are unfounded/based on self interest. This should be taken into account when utilizing this indicator and addressed in any text when reporting results.				
2) b) Degree to which multiple parties are recognized and sanctioned in electoral law/rules.	Political perceptions/actual language reflecting openness of party system. 5-point scale: no recognition to full recognition and sanction: 1=no language regarding multiple parties to 5=clear definition of rights/recognition of multiple parties in ballots.	Recognition and sanctioning of multiple parties provides the variety of choices for citizens and reflects the impartiality of the political system.	Content analysis of electoral law/rules. Survey or focus group to determine actors' interpretation and implementation of electoral law/rules. Cost: Content analysis/low, perceptions, moderate.	Trend toward increased recognition of multiple parties.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) Degree to which administrative or political problems occurred during an election process as a result of weaknesses in the law. (Scale OR qualitative assessment.)	Definition: Significant administrative or political problem: structural/management breakdowns in electoral administration due to vagueness or lack of direction in electoral law.	Clear guidance from electoral framework is vital to effective administration of electoral process.	Independent monitors' reports. Cost: Collateral with mission activity (monitoring)/moderate.	Decrease in administrative problems as electoral law is reformed.
Comments: Weaknesses relative to international standards, as identified in 1 above.				
4) Degree of independence of electoral authority (ies). (Scale or qualitative assessment.)	Definition: Independent body: Electoral authority is independent from influence/control by executive, ruling party, or other political forces. Survey/interview questions: assessing degree of independence.	An independent electoral authority serves as an impartial, independent institution in democratic societies.	Evaluations by independent monitors, domestic monitors/surveys of public acceptance of electoral authority as independent institution. Cost: Moderate/high. Interview/survey.	In many countries, including some developed democracies, elections are administered by a ministry of the government. This may or may not impinge on the perceived neutrality of the electoral authority. Also, public opinion may not track closely with improvements in independence.
Comments: Independence could involve different bodies or organizations, depending on the context. Mission should determine which is the appropriate focus (i.e., electoral authority's independence from ruling party or from the executive, etc.).				
5) Existing electoral laws modified in keeping with improvements sought.	Modification of electoral laws: changes made in existing law that improve the electoral process; through greater openness; cleaner delineation of voter, party; and candidate rights and responsibilities. Comparative assessment of existing law and reformed law against proposals for change by domestic/international observers (specific modifications and identification of those interests seeking modifications to be determined by missions, depending on country context).	Adaptability of electoral law to reforms articulated by the public is an important element in demonstrating impartiality in framework.	Comparative content analysis of existing laws/public proposals for change/reformed electoral laws. Evaluations undertaken by observers/monitors. Cost: Low/Moderate	Short term reform efforts followed by stability in electoral law.
Comments: See the legal reform scale in Appendix C as an alternative measure.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) Breadth of dissemination of election provisions and frameworks. (Index OR qualitative assessment.)	Breadth of dissemination by any means or format: Index of media attributes scaled from non-existent to high (1 to 5). Levels of dissemination/reach (see note below) or qualitative assessment by observers.	Importance of reaching citizens with message of electoral rules.	Comprehensive assessment of distribution/dissemination by media monitors/observers. Cost: Moderate/high.	Improvements would reflect more clearly targeted dissemination efforts.
Comments: Index of media attributes: a. print media (public/private); b. television broadcast; c. languages; d. reach illiterate, semi-literate; e. adequacy of distribution; f. government; g. parties; h. NGOs.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.1: Impartial Electoral Framework

Intermediate Result 2.2.1.1: Substantive, Inclusive Debate on New Electoral Laws and/or Changes to Laws and Regulations

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Nature of coverage of debate by public and private media. (Scale OR qualitative assessment.)	Volume/quality of media coverage. Column inches/minutes of coverage. Qualitative assessment of debate coverage.	Openness of debate is important measure of public support/acceptance of electoral process/rules.	Content analysis of media coverage of debate on electoral laws/reforms. Cost: Moderate/high, quite costly if extensive debate period. Could be modest if commercial monitoring services exist.	Content specific, increased coverage of debate by media.
Comments: "Nature" includes both extent/volume of coverage and quality of coverage. Coverage of high quality means, in part, that the media has fairly presented the choices (opposing sides of the debate) to the public. This is an indirect measure of inclusiveness; needs to be combined with other indicators if selected.				
2) Number of participants in debate fora.	Number of debates/average number of participants in each debate.	Level of participation reflects public interest in and attentiveness to change in electoral law.	Attendance lists or counts from debate fora/media accounts of attendance at debate fora. Cost: Low/moderate.	Context specific, increased attendance, and more opportunities for debate.
Comments:				
3) Diversity of participants in public debate fora.	Diversity of participants: multiple points of view represented in debate fora. Initial measure: presence/absence of multiple NGOs participating. Scale includes participation by only a few NGO representatives and individual citizens, to broad representation of NGOs and citizen opinions.	Diversity of participation reflects broad public interest in and attentiveness to change in electoral law.	Monitors in attendance at debate fora/media accounts of representativeness of debate participants. Cost: Low/moderate, depending upon number of fora and records of organizers.	Increased diversity, context specific.
Comments: Can be measured by level of NGO participation (scale) or level of participation by any other civil society groups.				
4) Diversity of participants in legislative debate. (Two-level coding: Y/N; if Y, then scale for diversity.)	Diversity of participants: multiple points of view represented in legislative debate. Initial measure = presence/absence of multiple points of view. Scale: includes participation by only a few members of the governance party/coalition to broad participation by members of both government and opposition parties.	Legislative debate should include diversity of view points in debate over electoral rules.	Observer accounts of legislative debates and diversity of participation. Cost: Low/moderates.	Increased diversity of participation in legislative debate, context specific.
Comments: See also legislative indicators.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
5) Degree to which public fora debate involves (interactive) dialogue.	Interactive dialogue: full exchange of ideas; ordered, rule-governed debate; and freedom of participation. Scale: limited debate/no exchange/disorderly to ordered debate with full exchange of ideas among participants.	Exchange of ideas and full, open debate is preferred over monologues without discussion.	Content analysis of public debate. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increasingly interactive debate in public fora.
Comments:				
6) Degree to which debate in legislature involves (interactive) dialogue.	Interactive dialogue: full exchange of ideas; ordered, rule governed debate, and freedom of participation. Scale: limited debate/no exchange/disorderly to ordered debate with full exchange of ideas among participants.	Exchange of ideas and full, open debate is preferred over disorderly monologues without discussion.	Content analysis of debate in legislature, focusing on key issues. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increasingly interactive debate in legislature.
Comments:				
7) Degree to which the new law, or changes to law, reflect outcome of debate (either debate in legislature or in public fora).	(See comments.) Qualitative judgment of impact of debate of electoral reform.	Debate results in change in electoral law.	Content analysis of existing law/reformed law and content analysis of debate. Cost: Depends on number of laws covered.	Increasing impact of public/legislative debate on electoral reforms.
Comments: The resultant changes to the law may reflect the consensus reached through legislative or public debates. It is possible to have an excellent debate without affecting the law. See also the legal reform scale in Appendix C.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.2: Credible Electoral Administration

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Degree to which significant political actors (parties and candidates) accept the legitimacy of the electoral authority as manager and arbiter of the electoral process.</p>	<p>Definition: Significant parties: those with the ability to command 5% of the national vote and/or with the ability to disrupt the peace with violent demonstrations or riots.</p> <p>Unit of measurement: A matrix utilizing low to high significance (on a 1-5 scale) and low to high acceptance (also on a 1-5 scale).</p>	<p>Acceptance of legitimacy of electoral authority by key political actors is crucial to the credibility of election administration.</p>	<p>Interviews with party leaders- leaders' assessments of election administration.</p> <p>Cost: Low/moderate (access to party leaders).</p>	<p>Increasing acceptance of legitimacy of electoral authority.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>2) Level of voter confidence in electoral authority (Scale).</p>	<p>Voter confidence in electoral authority scale: no confidence to full confidence (1-5).</p>	<p>Voter confidence is also a vital element in gauging the credibility of election administration.</p>	<p>Survey research/focus groups (registered voters).</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high. Cost depends on content of survey.</p>	<p>Expect increase in level of voter confidence in electoral authority. Confidence may not keep pace with actual improvements.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>3) Degree to which input and/or feedback by parties and candidates is considered by elections authority.</p>	<p>Each element on a 1-5 scale, forming an index. Index could be based on: announcement of call for elections; selection of electoral authority; debate over formation of electoral authority; implementation of electoral policy; and institutionalization of electoral authority.</p>	<p>Receptivity of electoral authority to comments/feedback from political actors demonstrates openness of electoral process.</p>	<p>Interviews with party leaders, interviews with members of electoral authority.</p> <p>Cost: Access to subjects; Low/moderate.</p>	<p>Increased consideration of views of political actors by electoral authority.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Degree to which election authority protects individual election-related rights and freedoms.	Protection of voter rights and freedoms: (to the degree that such responsibilities are mandated to the election authority) elements determined by election law itself.	Electoral authority must demonstrate that it is able to protect the rights of citizens in the electoral process.	Evidence collected regarding the lack of protection of rights and freedoms by citizens. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increasing protection of voter rights and freedoms, as delineated by electoral laws. Target setting should include only 1-2 years preceding elections.
Comments:				
5) Degree to which election authority protects rights and freedoms of candidates, parties, and organized interests.	Protection of rights and freedoms as specified in electoral law.	Electoral authority must demonstrate ability to protect the rights and freedoms of parties and candidates in electoral process.	Evidence collected regarding the lack of protection of rights and freedoms by citizens. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increasing protection of candidate and party rights and freedoms, as delineated by election law. Target setting should include only 1-2 years preceding elections.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.2: Credible Electoral Administration

Intermediate Result 2.2.2.1: Impartial and Transparent Electoral Authority

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Degree to which election authority is perceived to be constituted in a manner which allows it to be neutral. (Scale).	National election authority: the government ministry, agency, office, or commission charged with administering elections. Unit: 1-5 scale, from not at all neutral to total neutrality.	Perception of neutrality is not the same thing as true neutrality, but given the importance of perception in election politics, the perception of major political actors is a relevant indicator of true neutrality.	Focus groups or observer reports. Panel of experts. Costs: Medium	It is unlikely that any data sample will result in an "entirely neutral" judgment. In polarized societies, any "score" above 1.5 may be considered satisfactory.
Comments:				
2) a) Adequacy of resources provided to electoral authority. (Scale OR qualitative assessment.)	Minimum amount of resources necessary to carry out election law mandate: expert panel—evaluation of existing resources. Scale: 1-5, totally inadequate-sufficient.	Electoral authority must have the capacity to carry out its mandate in an independent fashion with adequate resources.	1. Determination of costs by experts. 2. Analysis of resources made available. Cost: Moderate.	Increased adequacy of resources.
Comments: Lack of sufficient financial resources is a structural constraint that can keep the electoral authority tied to government demands. This indicator also assumes the electoral authority may use various sources of funding including governmental, nongovernmental, and international.				
2) b) Degree to which adequate resources are provided in a timely fashion to election authority.	Timely provision: funding and materials provided to authority in order to carry out its mandate without delay or detriment to credibility of electoral process.	Lack of sufficient financial resources is a structural constraint that can keep the electoral authority tied to government demands.	Evaluation of timely provision of adequate resources by international monitors/panel of experts. Cost: Moderate. (Should be linked with 2) a).	Increasingly timely delivery of resources to election authority.
Comments: Assumes mission does not have access to Election Authority to gather information on this indicator directly.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) Public perception of election authority impartiality and transparency.	Survey/focus group questions to public regarding impartiality and transparency of election authority. Citizen perceptions on an indexed scale of 0-100 with 100 meaning perception of absolute impartiality and transparency. Scale: Low/high impartiality. Low/high transparency.	Important to have public support for election authority as impartial and transparent institution-legitimacy.	Focus groups/survey research. Cost: Moderate.	Increasing public support for election authority as impartial and transparent institution. Public perception may lag behind real improvement.
Comments:				
4) Perception of political actors regarding election authority's impartiality and transparency.	Survey/focus group questions to political actors regarding impartiality and transparency of election authority. Scale: Low/high impartiality. Low/high transparency.	Important to have support of political leaders for election authority as impartial and transparent institution.	Focus groups/survey research. Cost: Moderate/high, depending on number of interviews.	Increasing political leadership support for election authority as impartial and transparent institution.
Comments: Indicators 3) and 4) should be analyzed in tandem to demonstrate elite and mass support for election authority.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.2: Credible Electoral Administration

Intermediate Result 2.2.2.2: Effective Administration of the Electoral Process

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Number of years since update of voter registry completed and/or number of years since last audit completed.	Definitions: Voters registry: official government voter registration documents. Audit: thorough analysis of voter rolls. Comprehensive update: purging deceased voters, removing voters who have left district/region, adding voters who have become eligible since the last election, changes due to changes in address. Unit: Number of years.	An election authority's ability and willingness to administer credible elections can be partially measured by its ability and willingness to keep voter registration information up to date.	Interviews of election authority and/or press reports. Cost: Low.	At minimum, registry should be updated and as accurate as possible prior to a national election.
Comments: This is only appropriate where audits are known to be reliable; otherwise, some measure of audit accuracy may be more appropriate.				
2) Percentage of errors in voter registry.	Errors: Incorrect information in the registry, either typographical or factual, and omissions. Unit: percentage of errors, out of total entries.	Voter registry should be as free of errors as possible: omissions of eligible voters, inclusion of ineligible voters.	Results of audits undertaken by election authority/judgment of the comprehensiveness of audit undertaken by election authority. Cost: Low. Independent audit conducted by international/ domestic monitoring source. Cost: High.	Fewer errors in voter registry over time.
Comments: Measurement constrained by external auditing mechanism; it may be limited to available alternative vote tabulation efforts.				
3) Degree to which parties have opportunity to review voter registry and challenge inaccuracies if necessary. (two-level coding: Y/N; if Y then level of opportunity.)	A., Statutory language that allows parties access to voter registry (Y/N). B. Practical opportunities for parties to challenge voter registry (Scale: minimal to multiple opportunities).	Access to voter registry by political parties provides multiple external checks of the accuracy of election authority efforts to register eligible voters.	Analysis of statutory language regarding access to voter registry/interviews with party leaders to determine practical application of election law. Cost: Moderate/low.	Greater access to voter registry by political parties; increased ability to challenge inaccuracies.
Comments:				
4) a) Percentage of eligible voters registered to vote.	Eligible population: legal voting age population. Dissaggregate by gender, ethnicity, etc. where appropriate. Unit: percentages, disaggregated.	Voter registration percentages can be a superior measure of election authorities administrative effectiveness than voter turnout.	Collect data on number of eligible voters, which is usually available from election authority. Number of eligible voters is usually available only through (often unreliable) census estimates. Cost: Low.	While 100% registration of eligible voters is optimal, 80% would be considered a good participation rate in most countries, although this should be determined by mission.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
Comments: This is the first of two alternate indicators regarding voter registration participation. Mission should consider country context as well as the mandate of the electoral authority.				
4) b) Percent of voters who have officially sanctioned means of verifying their eligibility to vote.	% of voters turning out to vote who carry on officially sanctioned means of verifying their eligibility to vote.	Voters should be able to easily identify themselves at the polling station on election day. Often, voters are given a voter ID when they register to prove that they are eligible to vote at the polling station. Sometimes other ID documents are accepted for proof of eligibility.	Election day monitoring (international and domestic). Monitors could, for example, interview every fifth voter. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increasingly systematic voter registration and voter identification processes over time.
Comments: It would also be interesting to try to capture whether these means are being routinely accepted by poll workers. Monitors might be able to report on the extent of problems.				
4) c) Percentage of voters with proof of registration whose names do not appear on voting lists at polling sites.	Rejected voters with proof of registration, disaggregated by region/district, ethnicity, etc. to identify particular areas with problems.	Rejecting eligible voters at polling sites delegitimizes election authority and the electoral process more generally.	Election site monitors across nation. Reports from polling sites recorded/reported in media. Cost: Moderate/high, but it depends on quality of records maintained by authority.	Decrease in percentage of voters with proof of registration rejected at polling sites.
Comments:				
5) Key benchmarks in electoral calendar are accomplished.	Key benchmarks: predetermined deadlines for voter registration, candidate/party filing, fulfillment of ballot access requirements, etc.	Adherence to a pre-established calendar of election-preparation benchmarks is an important indication of the election authority's ability to effectively administer the process.	1. Obtain calendar from election authority at beginning of process. 2. Monitor accomplishments against calendar.	Accomplishment of all benchmarks on electoral calendar.
Comments: Accomplishment involves timeliness. The mission should choose which benchmarks are key, then determine the percentage of those which are accomplished.				
6) a) Degree to which vote tabulation and reporting votes is carried out accurately and transparently.	Counting: Qualitative assessment of both tabulation and reporting efforts (accuracy/transparency) conducted by international or domestic monitors. Tabulation: tallying of vote counts by central authority. Reporting: dissemination of election results.	Each step of the vote tabulation process should be carried out in an accurate and transparent fashion.	Reports of international and domestic monitors. Cost: Collateral with mission activities, moderate/high.	Increasingly accurate and transparent vote tabulation process.
Comments: This is the first of three alternate indicators regarding election results reporting. In most cases the assessment of accuracy and transparency should be conducted by independent monitors.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
6) b) Number of days required to tabulate and announce the official results.	Number of days.	Timely reporting of election results serves to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the election authority.	Monitoring of time elapsed between closing of polls and reporting of results of election. Cost: Minimal.	This can be highly variable across countries. In the U.S. and U.K., results are announced within hours of the closing of the polls. In other countries, a delay of several days is not unusual. The standard used should be prior history of multiparty elections in each particularly country.
Comments:				
6) c) If parallel vote tabulation—discrepancies between PVT and official results.	Parallel vote tabulation: alternative vote count conducted by independent monitor. Systematic methods of PVT are available for missions.	Significant discrepancies between the results of a well-done PVT and the official results can be highly indicative of malfeasance on the part of the electoral authority.	Domestic monitoring groups sometimes carry out a PVT, often with external assistance. Cost: Moderate/high.	Expected deviation between a well-done PVT and the official results should be no more than 2-3%.
Comments: PVT could be less accurate than official count.				
7) Percentage of polling places that opened on time on election day.	Number of polling sites opened on time/total number of polling sites.	The ability of the election authority to manage the logistics of getting people and materials to the polling places on time is a useful measure of the election authority's administrative effectiveness.	International or domestic observer reports. Could be either a complete reporting or a sample. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increase in percentage of polling places opened on time.
Comments:				
8) Percentage of polling places that ran out of materials during election day.	Number of polling sites that ran out of voting materials/total number of polling sites.	Inability to provide necessary resources to eligible voters reflects negatively on electoral authority.	International or domestic observer reports. Cost: Moderate/collateral.	Decline in percentage of polling sites with inadequate voting materials.
Comments: Materials should be specified (ballots, supporting documents, etc.).				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
9) Nature of complaints by political parties about equitable access to public print and electronic media.	International standards expect that all political parties be provided access to public media. Credibility of complaints to be judged by monitors. Unit: number and substance of credible complaints. Could convert to a scale.	Political party complaints about media access are often but not always a valid indicator of the election authority's failure to ensure equitable access.	Informal survey of political party leaders, evaluation of complaints by monitors. Media content analysis. Cost: Moderate/high, if there are a high number of complaints.	Decline in complaints by political parties about access to media.
Comments: "Nature" includes both extent/volume of complaints and quality/legitimacy of complaints. Election monitors will often serve to assess the nature of complaints.				
10) Nature of credible complaints by citizens, media, or political actors concerning election authority favoritism or succumbing to political pressure.	Favoritism/succumbing to political pressure: subjective measures to be assessed by monitors. Credibility of complaints to be judged by monitors. Unit: Number and substance of credible complaints. Could convert to a scale.	Complaints regarding perceived favoritism or succumbing to political pressures by electoral authority by public, media, and/or political actors challenge the impartiality and transparency of the authority.	Evaluation of complaints by monitors. Cost: Moderate/high.	There will always be complaints about the lack of neutrality of the electoral authority. In each country, a threshold should be pre-established, perhaps based on previous experience, for an acceptable number of complaints.
Comments: "Nature" includes both extent/volume of complaints and quality/legitimacy of complaints. Election monitors will often serve to assess the nature of complaints.				
11) Nature of complaints from significant political parties about election-related security arrangements.	Complaints related to incidents involving breakdown in the maintenance of safe and secure polling places.	It is the responsibility of the government to ensure the security of candidates and voters to the degree possible.	Evaluation of complaints by monitors. Cost: Collateral/moderate.	Decline in complaints regarding security problems.
Comments: Mission should specify type of complaints, which could be too many or too few police officers at polling stations, for example. It may depend on the types of problems experienced in previous election cycle.				
12) Breadth of dissemination and quality of voter education materials by election authority.	In most countries, it is the responsibility of the electoral authority to provide minimum information about election procedures to the electorate. Unit: both number and quality should be measured.	Citizens need to be informed about the mechanics of election procedures; voter education programs provide information necessary for citizens to participate in elections.	Analysis of voter education materials and dissemination process by monitors; assessment report. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased quality and breadth of dissemination of voter education materials by election authority.
Comments: Use only when electoral authority is responsible for voter education.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
13) Degree to which spoiled ballots are due to inadequate understanding of voting process, as assessed by election monitors.	Spoiled ballot: a ballot that is ruled to be unacceptable as a valid indication of voter choice by election authority.	A large percentage of spoiled ballots due to inadequate understanding of voting process could reflect lack of sufficient education campaigns undertaken by authority.	Assessment of spoiled ballots by monitors. Cost: Moderate/high.	A percentage of spoiled ballots greater than 5%, for example, is often an indication that voters were insufficiently informed about voter procedures. Exact figure should be determined by mission.
Comments: If unable to distinguish those ballots spoiled because of inadequate understanding, consider using the % of total ballots that are spoiled, although spoiled ballots could also reflect fraud or citizen protest.				
14) Percentage of eligible voters unable to vote due to irregularities at polling stations.	See 2.2.2.2. 4) c) Eligible voters turned away at polling sites/eligible voters turned away + eligible voters who voted.	Irregularities at polling sites reflect inadequate training of polling personnel, disregard for election rules, lack of impartiality.	Monitoring reports of voters unable to vote due to administrative irregularities. Cost: Moderate/high.	Decline in election day irregularities over time.
Comments:				
15) Degree of malapportionment based on provisions in the electoral law, in electoral districts.	Based on electoral law, voting districts that surpass limits of malapportionment by a significant margin.	One-person-one-vote standard as goal, taking into account political/ethnic/geographic factors in country.	Analysis of voter boundaries and voter populations found in each district, voting unit.	Electoral systems approaching one-person-one-vote principle are most democratically representative.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.3: An Informed and Active Citizenry

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Level of confidence in democratic processes among citizens.	Index of responses to questions regarding citizen confidence in democratic institutions, media, political parties, and election process; and measures of political trust.	Public confidence in democratic processes is important element in stabilizing the political system. Measures at a higher level than the stated result. Better planning indicator than program performance indicator.	Survey research/focus groups: public/target audiences. Cost: Moderate/high, unless a survey is being done to collect data for several indicators.	Increased confidence in democratic processes over time, but this would be an indirect measure of a program and may not accurately reflect improvements. Not worth measuring annually.
Comments:				
2) Level of efficacy regarding political system among citizens.	Index of responses to questions regarding citizens' level of activism, support role in the political system. Do citizen views matter, does citizen vote matter?	It is important that citizens believe that they matter or that they have a voice in the political system. May be a better planning indicator than program performance indicator.	Survey research/focus groups: public/target audiences. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased levels of efficacy among citizens, over time. Not worth measuring annually. Change likely to be slow. Movement may also be tied to levels of general education.
Comments:				
3) Level of political knowledge and understanding of political system among citizens.	Index of responses to questions regarding citizen knowledge and understanding of political institutions, laws, rights, freedoms, responsibilities, constitution.	An informed electorate is a necessary element in a democratic society.	Survey research/focus groups: public/target audiences. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increasingly better informed electorate.
Comments:				
4) Level of partisan or electoral activism among citizens.	Index of political activism — number and frequency of activities: voting, talking with friends about politics, volunteering with a party, etc.	A politically active citizenry demonstrates a civic vitality that is important to a democratic society.	Survey research/focus groups: public/target audiences. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased levels of political activism.
Comments: Regarding IRs below: Missions undertaking programs that target specific constituencies or groups should make every effort to identify clearly the targeted sector as well as preexisting levels for each of the indicators presented under each IR.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.3: An Informed and Active Citizenry

Intermediate Result 2.2.3.1: Increased Understanding of Political System Among Targeted Citizens

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Targeted citizens' abilities to identify and understand basic elements of electoral system.	Index of responses to questions of targeted citizens regarding knowledge and understanding of major political actors, political institutions, and electoral laws, compared with baseline responses.	Program activities should result in more informed target citizenry.	Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity. Cost: High. (Surveying targeted individuals over time in a panel survey is preferred but likely to be more expensive than comparable random samples among the target group but this depends on the size of the target group.	Increased levels of political knowledge and understanding of political system within targeted citizenry.
Comments: Pre- and Post-Activity Assessments.				
2) Targeted citizens' abilities to discern differences in political choices.	Index of responses to questions of targeted citizens regarding political choices available to citizens in political system, compared with baseline responses.	Recognition of differences among political candidates, parties demonstrates a discerning electorate.	Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity. Cost: High. See comments in indicator 1) above about panel surveys.	Increased ability of target citizens to differentiate between political choices available to them in electoral system.
Comments: Mission should specify which type of choice would be appropriate to follow. It could be, for example, differences among parties, between candidates, among policy positions, etc.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.3: An Informed and Active Citizenry

Intermediate Result 2.2.3.2: Increased Consumption of Political Information Among Targeted Citizens

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Newspaper reading, radio listening, and television viewing focused on politics, reading of party literature, reading of election materials, and other political communications by targeted citizens.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Index of information consumption; pre/post activity.</p> <p>Frequency of newspaper reading, for example: 6) every day, 5) 4-5 times/week, 4) 2-3 times/week, 3) once/week, 2) less than once/week, 1) never.</p>	<p>Increase in consumption of political information fosters better understanding of political system.</p>	<p>Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity.</p> <p>Cost: High. See comments in indicator 1) above about panel surveys.</p>	<p>Increased consumption of political information.</p>
<p>2) Existence of information gathering activities such as attendance at public fora, political rallies, political party events and activities, and educational programs by targeted citizens.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Index of political information gathering.</p> <p>Pre/post activity.</p> <p>Measure: Frequency of information gathering activities: 1) attendance at public fora; 2) attendance at political rallies; 3) attendance at political party events/activities; and 4) participation in political education activities. Each component could be scored as 1) never; 2) a few times; 3) often; 4) all the time.</p>	<p>Beyond media resources and party documents, citizens may seek information through participatory means.</p>	<p>Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity.</p> <p>Cost: High. See comments in indicator 1) above about panel surveys.</p>	<p>Increased efforts at information gathering.</p>

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.3: An Informed and Active Citizenry

Intermediate Result 2.2.3.3: Increased Political Participation Among Targeted Citizens

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Voter turnout among targeted citizens.	Past turnout rates of targeted citizens, compared with post-activity turnout rates. Disaggregate by gender and other relevant categories.	Reflects an informed and committed electorate.	Baseline turnout levels/turnout in targeted election.	Increase in turnout among targeted citizens. Since many factors affect voter turnout, data need to be handled carefully.
Comments: Increased voter turnout is not always a valid measure of an informed and committed electorate. As a country's political situation stabilizes, turnout may decrease.				
2) Political activity among targeted citizens.	Index of political activism among targeted citizens. Pre/post activity. Index: joining a party, volunteering service to party, serving as party poll watcher, contributing to party, campaigning for party, attending party functions, running as party candidate for office, talking to friends about politics, contacting public officials, attending political rallies, etc.	Increased political activism is indicative of an informed and committed electorate.	Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity. Cost: High. Conducting a panel survey of targeted individuals over time is preferred but likely to be more expensive and complicated than conducting comparable national samples.	Increase in levels of political activism among targeted citizens.
Comments: Increased voter turnout is not always a valid measure of an informed and committed electorate. As a country's political situation stabilizes, turnout may decrease.				
3) Party activity among citizens as perceived by political actors. Comments:	Index of party activism among targeted citizens. Pre/post activity.	Indicative of increased vitality of political parties as organizing agents for citizens.	Survey research/targeted citizens. Pre/post activity. Cost: High. See comment about panel surveys in indicator 2) above.	Increased levels of party activism among targeted citizens.

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.4: Effective Oversight of Electoral Processes

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Degree to which assessments by election monitors are acknowledged and received by electoral authority.	a) International monitors b) Domestic monitors c) Party pollwatchers and political party representatives. Scale range: closed process/no access to open feedback process facilitated by election authority through public hearings, ombudsman, etc.	Openness and receptivity of election authority to monitoring assessments. Oversight function served by monitoring activities must be linked directly to election authority.	Evaluation of openness and receptivity by panel of experts/monitors. Cost: Low.	Increased openness and receptivity by election authority to assessments of electoral process.
Comments: Missions may choose to focus on one or more of the monitoring efforts undertaken, as applicable.				
2) Degree to which election monitors assess the electoral processes over time. a) International monitors b) Domestic monitors c) Party pollwatchers and political party representatives.	Length of commitment by monitoring operations: 1) One election cycle. a. Pre-election. b. Election. c. Post-election. 2) Two election cycles. a. Pre-election. b. Election. c. Post-election. 3) Three election cycles. a. Pre-election. b. Election. c. Post-election. 4) Constant presence through more than three cycles.	Enduring presence of monitors provides continuity in oversight, as opposed to one shot approach without institutionalization.	Evaluation by mission/partners. Cost: Minimal/collateral.	Replacement of international monitors with institutionalized domestic watchdog groups.
Comments:				
3) Level of public confidence that election monitors serve as effective oversight mechanisms.	a) International monitors b) Domestic monitors c) Party pollwatchers and political party representatives. Public response to statement: "election monitors are effective at making sure that the election authority fulfills its responsibility to administer free and fair elections." Strongly agree, strongly disagree (5 point scale).	Public support of and confidence in monitors serve to legitimize their role in the electoral process.	Survey research/focus groups. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased public confidence in election monitors as effective oversight mechanisms.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
Comments:				
4) Level of acceptance of election monitors as oversight mechanisms by political actors.	a) International monitors b) Domestic monitors c) Party pollwatchers and political party representatives. Behavioral and attitudinal measures: 1) Assessment of the degree to which political actors seek to facilitate the work of election monitors; 2) Responses to questions regarding political actors' acceptance of election monitoring. Scale: from 1 no acceptance, to 4 full acceptance.	Political actors' support of and confidence in monitors serve to legitimize their role in the electoral process.	Focus groups: Political actors' assessments by panel of experts (party leaders, candidates, government officials). Cost: Moderate.	Increased acceptance of election monitors as oversight mechanisms by political actors.
Comments:				
5) Level of public confidence that media outlets serve as neutral, unbiased watchdogs of the electoral process.	Public response to statement: "Media outlets such as newspapers, radio stations, and television stations, serve as neutral, unbiased watchdogs of the electoral process."	An independent media serves as a watchdog in the electoral process.	Survey research/focus groups. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased public confidence in the media as neutral, unbiased watchdogs.
Comments: Missions should make preliminary judgments regarding the capacity of the media in country to perform such a role.				
6) Level of acceptance of media outlets as neutral, unbiased watchdogs of the electoral process by political actors.	Responses of political actors regarding their acceptance of the media as neutral, unbiased watchdogs of the electoral process.	Acceptance of the media as watchdog by political actors serves to legitimize their role in overseeing the electoral process.	Focus groups - political actors. Cost: Moderate.	Increased acceptance of media as neutral, unbiased watchdogs.
Comments: Missions should make preliminary judgments regarding the capacity of the media in country to perform such a role.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.4: Effective Oversight of Electoral Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.4.1: Effective Electoral Process Monitoring

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Access to all aspects of the electoral process, from the earliest stages of candidate recruitment by parties to post-election activities, by monitors. Comments:</p>	<p>a) International b) Domestic c) Political party representatives.</p> <p>Areas where “monitor access” is important include access to electoral process including election authority, political party organizations, polling sites, vote counting, and tabulation processes.</p>	<p>Measure of level of transparency, openness of electoral process.</p>	<p>Evaluations by monitors. Cost: Low/collateral. Collateral costs: costs of monitoring are funded under separate mechanisms so that missions do not bear such costs. Therefore, costs associated with this measure should be low.</p>	<p>Increased access to all aspects of electoral process by monitors.</p>
<p>2) Percentage of polling places covered by monitors. Comments:</p>	<p>a) International b) Domestic c) Political party representatives.</p> <p>Percentage of polling places covered by monitors.</p>	<p>Wider coverage allows for more systematic appraisal of election process.</p>	<p>Mission collection of monitors’ reports. Cost: Minimal/collateral.</p>	<p>Increase in percentage of polling places monitored.</p>
<p>3) Degree of access to tabulation processes by monitors. Comments:</p>	<p>a) International b) Domestic c) Political party representatives.</p> <p>More focused version of 1) above. Evaluation of level of access to vote tabulation processes by monitors.</p> <p>Scaled measure: Little or no access— total access.</p>	<p>Indication of level of transparency of tabulation process.</p>	<p>Mission collection of monitors’ reports. Cost: Low/collateral.</p>	<p>Increased access to vote tabulation process by monitors.</p>

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
4) Breadth of publication and dissemination of monitor findings. Comments:	A. Breadth of publication - Number of monitoring sources producing reports. B. Dissemination - Breadth of circulation of each of the reports (in country/externally, and in local languages.)	Degree to which results of monitoring efforts are presented to election authority, political actors, general public, international audiences.	Assessments by mission. Cost: Low.	Multiple monitoring sources, widely disseminated documents.
5) Comprehensiveness of assessments of electoral system by monitors. a) International b) Domestic c) Political party representatives. Comments:	"Comprehensiveness." Breadth in geographical, temporal, and issue area coverage.	Greater comprehensiveness reflects broader oversight of the electoral process.	Assessment by mission. Cost: Low.	Increased comprehensiveness of monitoring reports.

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.4: Effective Oversight of Electoral Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.4.2: Media Fulfills Role as Watchdog in the Electoral Process

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Breadth and accuracy of media assessments of the electoral process. Comments:	Number of media outlets providing critical assessments. Assessment of accuracy of media critiques.	Broad scope of media coverage increases ability to serve as watchdog.	Content analysis of media documents - newspaper articles, radio/television newscasts by trained media analysts, where possible. Cost: Moderate.	Increased breadth and accuracy of media assessments.

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.5: Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Degree to which electoral law facilitates multiple political parties in the electoral system. Comments:	Electoral law, governmental statutes, constitutional provisions, electoral commission rules and practices. Evaluation of legal framework.	Legal framework should not impede the development of competitive multiparty system.	Content analysis of legal documents relating to parties and elections by experts on electoral system design. Cost: Moderate/high.	Development of a legal system, free of constraints on party competition.
2) Degree to which political opposition is institutionalized in the form of a legal political party or parties. Comments:	"Institutionalization:" formal party organization, leadership structure, membership base, candidates running for offices, party platforms. Assessment of development of organized opposition parties.	Beyond legal framework, the actual institutionalization of opposition party (ies) is important in development of multiparty system.	Mission assessment. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased institutionalization of opposition party(ies).
3) Degree to which candidates for office running under political party labels garner the support of voters. Comments:	Percent of votes received by candidates running for office under political party labels.	Gauge of legitimacy of political parties by general public.	Analysis of voting data. Cost: Moderate/low.	Increase in percent of voters choosing candidates running under party labels.
4) Degree to which recognized political parties field candidates at all applicable levels of government. Comments:	Percent of candidates in national, state/regional, and local levels running for office under party labels. National %; state, regional %; local %.	Assesses the level of integration of political parties at all levels of government.	Analysis of candidate registration data. Cost: Moderate.	Increased presence of candidates running under party labels at all levels of government.
Comments: Nonpartisan elections may occur at local levels.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
5) Degree to which there is party competition in all regions of the country. Comments:	By electoral region. Scale of 1-5, from no competition to extensive competition. Report on the average score across regions.	Party competition throughout country is important.	Analysis of election data by region. Cost: Moderate.	Increased party competition in all regions of country. Only set targets for pre-election periods.
6) Degree to which competing political parties articulate distinct programmatic agendas that provide clear choices for the electorate. Comments:	Agendas: Public articulation of issues and policies that define and organize the party, often presented in the form of a party platform.	Policy differences defining political parties rather than personalities.	Content analysis of party platforms. Cost: Moderate.	Growing clarity of issue agendas between competing parties.
7) Degree to which citizens discern differences between competing political parties sufficient to affect their choice of candidates.	Voter assessments of party issue agendas. Voter acknowledgment of issue differences between party candidates is a significant factor in vote choice.	Perceived issue differences among competing parties demonstrate programmatic nature of parties.	Survey research (exit polling). Cost: High.	Increased ability of citizens to discern differences in issues among competing parties with increased impact of differences on voter choices.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.5: Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

Intermediate Result 2.2.5.1: Political Parties Have Institutional Structures That Reflect Internal Democratic Structures and Procedures That Are Judged to Be Transparent, Inclusive, and Accountable and That Are Accepted by the Party Leaders

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Political parties have written bylaws that promote internal democratic party governance and are adhered to by party leaders.	See comments, below. Unit: Number of political parties out of target group. Index with each element scaled 1-5 or score card. See Appendix C.	Internal structures of political parties reflect democratic principles of organization and governance.	Assessment of party bylaws, organizational structures, and decision-making processes. Cost: High, but depends on number of parties covered.	Increasingly open and transparent organizational structures and decision making processes within political parties.

- Comments: Criteria for evaluating adequate bylaws and appropriate internal party meetings include:
- a. The political party has clear functional (i.e., administration, finance, political, training, field) and geographic (i.e., local, regional, national) divisions that are defined on paper by an organizational chart or functional structure, such that staff and officers understand responsibilities.
 - b. The political party has bylaws, which:
 - i. establish rules for the party at national, regional, and local levels;
 - ii. govern different organizational functions and decision-making processes;
 - iii. are agreed upon by the membership or member representatives, registered (if necessary) and implemented by party leaders and members.
 - c. The political party has periodic, democratic elections of party officers at every level with an effort to give a voice to the membership.
 - d. The political party selects party officers at every level with efforts made to nominate and elect candidates that reflect the diverse membership of the party.
 - e. The political party holds regularly scheduled party congresses and/or conventions with standing committees elected or appointed at each level according to adopted bylaws.
 - f. The political party announces political party meetings with venue, time, and date according to bylaws and makes available to party members reports of meeting results.
 - g. At party meetings, congresses, and/or conventions, the political party discusses and debates issues, party positions, and/or platforms openly and tolerates differing opinions such that decisions are adopted based on processes that are transparent, acceptable to members/leaders, and according to established party bylaws.
 - h. The political party reflects in its bylaws, or through other internal procedures, mechanisms for periodic review of performance, whereby member recommendations for improvement are incorporated.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>2) Degree to which political parties allow for broad membership participation in drafting of party platforms.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Membership participation:</p> <p>a. The political party arranges for the membership to debate and approve the party platform according to established party rules and on a regular basis.</p> <p>b. The political party produces draft platforms and suggested amendments that reflect a degree of consultation with members, party constituent groups, and/or regional and local party leadership.</p>	<p>Assesses the degree to which each political party has a mass base that contributes to the policy debate within the party.</p>	<p>Assessment of internal decision-making processes of individual political parties.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high. (Access to internal activities of political parties may be difficult.)</p>	<p>Increasingly participatory decision making processes within political parties.</p>
<p>3) Degree to which political parties have internal communication structures that promote two-way communication between party branches and headquarters and reflect a commitment to transparency and accountability.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Internal communication structure: See Comments below.</p> <p>(Scorecard or index: Measures for each of five components.)</p> <p>Unit: Number of political parties out of targeted group.</p>	<p>Assesses the degree to which internal party communications reflect the informational role of leadership and the feedback role of membership.</p>	<p>Analysis of internal communication structure by panel of experts.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high. (Access to internal party activities may be difficult.)</p>	<p>Increased communication between party leadership and membership.</p>
<p>Comments: Expected internal communication structures would include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The political party demonstrates party activity that originates and is coordinated effectively from both the national and local levels, where appropriate. The political party has established systems for regular, structured communication between the organization at all levels (e.g., leadership tours, newsletters, regularly scheduled meetings). The political party has members that are informed of party initiatives and decisions and are incorporated into activities. The political party has an established system for regular coordination, interaction, and participation with its elected officials to advance the party's and the elected officials' goals. The political party has effective and enforced internal financial controls. 				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.5: Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

Intermediate Result 2.2.5.2: Political Parties Have Established Functioning Political Party Administrative Structures That Advance Institutional Stability in the Long-term

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Percentage of localities or regions in which political parties have offices or representatives. Comments:	Unit of measure: Number of localities or regions.	Measure of breadth of institutionalization of political parties.	Analysis of party records/verification of local offices. Cost: Low.	As parties develop, increased coverage of country with party representation.
2) Degree to which political parties maintain written documentation of organization leadership positions and responsibilities as well as a defined command structure to facilitate timely, well-informed decision-making. Comments:	Permanent record of political party organization and activities (existence of documentation).	Measure of permanence of political party.	Analysis of party documentation. Cost: Low.	As parties develop, increased presence of formal documentation of party organization, leadership, and activities.
3) Degree to which political parties have well-trained staff and/or volunteer staff support. Comments:	Number of paid and volunteer staffers in party headquarters/regional offices.	Level of permanent staffing: paid and volunteer.	Assessment of party work force. Cost: Moderate.	

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
4) Degree to which political parties have established leadership development programs. Comments:	Presence/absence of leadership development programs. Presence = Number of future leaders trained per year.	Sustainability of party leadership through development programs.	Analysis of leadership development programs. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased efforts at leadership development by political parties.
5) Political parties have established internal staff/volunteer training programs. Comments:	Presence/absence of staff/volunteer training programs. Presence = Number of staff/volunteers trained per year.	Professionalization of workforce through training programs.	Analysis of staff/volunteer training programs. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased professionalization of party staff/volunteers through training programs.
6) Political parties establish and maintain planning documents such as annual party plans, organizational budgets, and resource allocation mechanisms. Comments:	Presence/absence of planning documents within party organization.	Long-term planning/party development as indicator of persistence of parties.	Analysis of party planning documents. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased attention to long term planning by parties.
7) Political parties maintain internal public policy research institutions. Comments:	Presence/absence of research capacity within political party organization.	Ability to formulate and analyze policy positions, analyze electorate and party membership serves to enhance ability of party to plan strategies for elections.	Analysis of party organization structure for research capacities. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased ability of parties to plan strategically through the use of research produced internally.

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.5: Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

Intermediate Result 2.2.5.3: Increased Institutional Capacity of Each Political Party to Identify, Represent, and Expand its Defined Constituency in the Electorate

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Percentage of voters who can correctly link a given party with its basic principles and key issues, as well as identify individual candidates (of the given party).</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Survey responses: Party with issue agenda, Party with candidates.</p>	<p>Demonstration of degree to which electorate is informed regarding political choices available.</p> <p>Assumes parties have clear issue agendas or platforms.</p>	<p>Survey research/focus groups, general public.</p> <p>Cost: High.</p>	<p>Increasingly informed electorate.</p>
<p>2) Extent to which political parties conduct demographic research and/or electoral history on each electoral district and apply results to all appropriate functions.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Demographic research/voting history: Assessment of parties' abilities to conduct research and analyze voting behavior.</p>	<p>Measurement of abilities of parties to assess electoral behavior and to act on this analysis to solicit additional voters to their parties.</p>	<p>Assessment of party organizations to discern abilities to conduct or pay for public opinion research for agenda-setting purposes.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	<p>Increased ability of parties to analyze electoral behavior and to use information to further party goals.</p>

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
3) Extent to which political parties under-take or commission research to identify and prioritize constituencies' concerns and present policy options to party leadership.	Opinion research by parties: Agenda setting through analysis of constituency preferences.	Measurement of abilities of parties to assess voter opinions through survey research/focus groups.	Assessment of party organizations to discern abilities to conduct or pay for public opinion research for agenda-setting purposes. Cost: Moderate.	Increased ability to conduct or commission public opinion research in order to formulate party issue agendas.
Comments:				
4) Extent to which political parties establish and maintain accurate membership lists (separated according to administrative and/or electoral divisions) that are updated regularly.	Membership data bases: Information on party members including voting records, organized by electoral district/voting units. Assessment of party membership lists.	Measurement of parties' abilities to track members, to inform them through party communications, and to mobilize them at the time of elections.	Assessment of party membership lists. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased ability of parties to maintain comprehensive membership lists and to use them for electoral advantage.
Comments:				
5) Extent to which political parties conduct periodic membership drives or other recruitment measures to increase membership.	Membership recruitment: any party efforts to build and maintain a membership base. This could include number of membership drives, number of citizens solicited. Assessment of party recruitment efforts.	Measurement of parties' abilities to recruit and maintain a membership base.	Assessment of party recruitment efforts. Cost: Low/moderate.	Increased recruitment efforts by parties.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
6) Extent to which political parties organize and maintain auxiliaries for women, youth, and/or other groups at local, regional, and national levels.	<p>Auxiliaries: Segmented groupings within parties organized to maintain and mobilize distinct constituencies within parties. This could include number of auxiliaries or number of members.</p> <p>Assessment of party auxiliaries.</p>	Measurement of parties' abilities to identify and support distinct constituencies within party organization.	<p>Assessment of party auxiliary structures.</p> <p>Cost: Low/moderate.</p>	Increased auxiliary structures within party organizations.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Degree to which electoral laws are free of language that limits the abilities of women and disadvantaged groups to participate fully in elections, both as individual voters and as members of organized political parties.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Disadvantaged group: any group which, in a given country, has historically been excluded from fair participation in political processes.</p>	<p>Extent to which statutory framework provides protection for or facilitates the inclusion of women and/or disadvantaged groups in the political process.</p>	<p>Content analysis of electoral laws/regulations—assessment of degree of discriminatory language relating to women/disadvantaged groups.</p> <p>Cost: Low.</p>	<p>Increased statutory reform to eliminate discriminatory language that limits the abilities of women and/or disadvantaged groups from participating in society.</p>
<p>2) Degree to which political participation of women and members of disadvantaged groups mirrors the level of political participation of the general electorate.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Political participation may be defined to include voting, running for public office, serving in party leadership, contacting elected officials, volunteering in political organizations.</p>	<p>Equity in participation by women and disadvantaged groups demonstrates equal access to political system.</p>	<p>Assessment of participation levels: survey research; electoral administration; and party records.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high.</p>	<p>Increased levels of participation by women and members of disadvantaged groups.</p>

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.1: Laws Pertaining to Elections and Political Processes Provide for Non-discrimination Against Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Level of improvements in laws and regulations pertaining to elections and political processes that openly discriminate against women and disadvantaged groups, in comparison with planned improvements.	<p>Discrimination: anything that deters or restricts participation in political processes.</p> <p>Comparative assessment of original statutory/regulatory language adopted.</p>	Degree to which government seeks to address and reform statutes and regulations that are discriminatory to women and/or disadvantaged groups.	<p>Comparative content analysis is of existing laws/regulations and reform proposals, laws/regulations adopted or introduced.</p> <p>Cost: Low/moderate.</p>	To the degree that discriminatory laws/regulations exist, increased efforts at reforming existing legislation/regulations to eliminate discriminatory practices.
Comments:				
2) Level of improvements in providing penalties against discrimination, in comparison with planned improvements.	Penalties: Sanctions identified in anti-discriminatory laws/regulations that are created/improved upon and enforced.	Beyond existence of anti-discriminatory laws/regulations, extent to which such government provisions include enforceable sanctions that are imposed.	<p>Assessment of utility of anti-discriminatory laws/regulations.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	Increased enforcement of anti-discriminatory laws/regulations.
Comments:				
3) Degree to which electoral laws facilitate the participation of women and members of disadvantaged groups as candidates for office and as voters.	Electoral law language that identifies women and/or disadvantaged groups specifically and offers mechanisms, rights, etc. that facilitate their participation and/or representation in electoral processes.	Assessment of degree to which electoral law not only does not discriminate, but also provides mechanisms to facilitate the participation and/or representation of women and/or disadvantaged groups.	<p>Content analysis of electoral laws—assessment of language to discern degree to which women and disadvantaged groups are aided in electoral processes.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	Increased electoral law provisions that protest and facilitate women and disadvantaged groups' electoral behavior.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.2: Women's and Disadvantaged Groups' Legal Rights Are Protected Through Effective Enforcement of Non-discriminatory Laws Pertaining to Electoral and Political Processes

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Nature of complaints filed regarding discrimination against women and/or disadvantaged groups.	Complaints registered by or on behalf of women and/or disadvantaged groups against the government, electoral authority, political parties, and private organizations for violations of existing laws.	Measurement of noncompliance with existing non-discriminatory laws.	Assessment of formal complaints registered with proper legal authorities. Cost: Moderate (access).	Decline in the number and severity of formal complaints as government/authorities more effectively enforce existing laws.
Comments: "Nature:" quality and quantity. Again it is important to establish a baseline regarding relative repression, ability to voice complaints on discrimination.				
2) Percentage of complaints regarding discrimination that are remedied by proper legal/regulatory authorities.	Complaints that are judged to have merit and subsequently remedied by appropriate authority.	Measurement of level of enforcement of existing non-discriminatory laws.	Analysis of complaints/rulings by appropriate authorities. Cost: Moderate.	Greater compliance with laws should result in a decline in valid complaints.
Comments: Complaints against government, electoral authority, political parties, and private organizations.				
3) Percentage of complaints about the enforcement system registered by organized interests (NGOs) representing women and/or disadvantaged groups.	Organizations filing complaints on behalf of women and/or disadvantaged groups.	Measurement of degree to which enforcement of existing non-discriminatory laws is challenged by institutionalized political organizations.	Assessment of complaints. Cost: Moderate.	Increased organized political representation by NGOs in protecting rights of women and/or disadvantaged groups.
Comments:				
4) Percentage of targeted groups who acknowledge that rights are protected.	Organizational/individual responses to questions regarding satisfaction with enforcement of laws.	Level of acceptance of enforcement of existing non-discriminatory laws.	Interviews with organization leaders. Survey research: Women/disadvantaged group members. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased satisfaction with protection of rights.
Comments: Mission identifies targeted organizations representing women and/or disadvantaged groups or targeted audiences representing women and/or disadvantaged groups.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.3: Increased Participation by [Targeted] Women and Disadvantaged Groups on Election Day

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Percentage of eligible women/eligible persons of disadvantaged groups registered to vote [compared with target goal].	Voting age women/members of disadvantaged groups registered to vote/voting age population of women/members of disadvantaged groups.	Degree to which women/members of disadvantaged groups are mobilized to register to vote.	Analysis of government data on population of country and voter registration data. Cost: Moderate/low.	Increased voter registration among targeted groups of women/members of disadvantaged groups.
Comments: Target goals for voter registration established by mission.				
2) Percentage of registered women/persons from disadvantaged groups that vote, [compared with target goal].	Voter turnout among targeted groups/registered voters in target population.	Degree to which targeted voters actually vote.	Analysis of overall turnout patterns/turnout levels among targeted groups. Cost: Moderate/low.	Increased voter turnout among targeted groups of women/members of disadvantaged groups.
Comments: Target goals for voter turnout established by mission.				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.4: Electoral Administration Is Free from Bias, Impartial in its Oversight, and Devoid of Discrimination Against Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Level of representation of women and members of disadvantaged groups in election administration workforce, including voter registration workers, poll watchers, domestic election monitors, and the electoral commission itself.	Number or percent of women/number of members of disadvantaged groups in election administration workforce/total number citizens in election administration workforce (could be divided by type of work).	Representation of women and/or members of disadvantaged groups in administration of elections.	Employment data for election administration divided by gender/disadvantaged groupings. Cost: Moderate.	Increased representation of women and members of disadvantaged groups in election administration workforce.
Comments:				
2) Degree to which registration and polling sites are as accessible to women and disadvantaged groups as they are to men/dominant groups	Accessibility process of registration and voting unconstrained by physical barriers, threats, intimidation targeted at women and/or disadvantaged groups. Reports of inaccessibility by women/disadvantaged groups.	Identification of isolated and systematic efforts to constrain access to electoral processes by women and members of disadvantaged groups.	Assessment of reports of access to registration and voting by women and members of disadvantaged groups being limited. Cost: Moderate/low.	Increased access to registration and voting processes by women and members of disadvantaged groups.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
3) Degree to which adjustments are made to insure polling/registration sites are more accessible.	Number of substantively different types of complaints registered. Number of remedies presented by electoral authority.	Assess response to reports of inaccessibility in electoral process.	Assessment of actions taken by electoral authority to remedy complaints registered regarding inaccessibility. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased responsiveness of electoral authority to complaints of inaccessibility by women and members of disadvantaged groups.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.5: Effective Voter Education Provided to Facilitate Women's and Disadvantaged Groups' Understanding of and Ability for Political Participation

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Number of women/disadvantaged reached by voter education messages, compared to target goal.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Total number of women/members of disadvantaged groups contacted/educated by activity compared to target goal.</p>	<p>Breadth of coverage of activity in targeted audience groups.</p>	<p>Assessment of dissemination plans: documents printed; television/radio commercials purchased; viewership/listenership by target audiences.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high.</p>	<p>Activity specific/target goal expectation that future activities will reach additional numbers in target audiences.</p>
<p>2) Number of materials specifically geared toward inclusion of women and disadvantaged produced and widely disseminated, compared to target goal.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Number of written documents, audio and video materials produced, training sessions; circulation of documents/materials for targeted women and disadvantaged groups.</p>	<p>Breadth of coverage of educational materials in targeted audience groups.</p>	<p>Tracking of number of written documents and other materials.</p> <p>Tracking of circulation of documents/materials.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	<p>Activity specific. Target goal expectation that future activities will reach additional numbers in target audiences.</p>
<p>3) Level of increase in percentage of target population's understanding of key messages, compared to target goal.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Political knowledge of targeted message prior to activity among target audience members/understanding of message by target audience members after activity.</p>	<p>Measurement of understanding among targeted audiences following activity.</p>	<p>Survey research: pre-test/post-test.</p> <p>Cost: High.</p>	<p>Activity specific/target goal expected increases in future activities.</p>

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Number of women/disadvantaged who received election education training, compared to target goal.	Number of participants in election education training/target goal.	Breadth of training within targeted audience groups.	Attendance records at training sessions. Cost: Low.	Activity specific/target goal dependent upon funding of activity.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.6: Inclusion of Women and Disadvantaged Groups

Intermediate Result 2.2.6.6: Political Parties Are Supportive of the Participation of Women and Disadvantaged Groups in Political Processes

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Percentage of political candidates who are women or members of disadvantaged groups. Comments:	Number of candidates who are women/members of disadvantaged groups as a proportion of the total number of candidates in particular election.	Political representation of women/members of disadvantaged groups among political candidates.	Analysis of candidate lists. Cost: Low.	Increase in the percentage of women and members of disadvantaged groups running for office.
2) Level of equity of financial support of women and members of disadvantaged groups as candidates by political parties. Comments: Aggregated with all party spending combined or analysis of allocation within each party.	Measurement = average party spending on female and disadvantaged candidates divided by average party spending on all candidates. Scaled 0-25% of average for all candidates spent for women/marginal candidates = very low; 25-50% = low; 50-75% middle; 75-100% = optimal.	Degree to which party allocations of financial resources to candidates is biased against women and members of disadvantaged groups.	Assessment of financial records of parties and candidates (access and availability — potential problems). Cost: Moderate/high.	Increasingly equitable funding for all candidates by political parties.
3) Women/disadvantaged candidate success rates vis-a-vis all candidates. Comments:	Number of successful women and disadvantaged candidates/number of total women and disadvantaged candidates compared with the total number of successful candidates/total number of all candidates.	Measurement of comparative success of women and members of disadvantaged groups.	Assessment of election outcomes for all candidates. Cost: Low/moderate.	The trendline used in this indicator should start from the record of the previous election(s). Increased success of women and members of disadvantaged groups.
4) Number of major political parties with anti-discrimination regulations. Comments:	Language in party bylaws providing safeguards against discrimination of women and members of disadvantaged groups.	Explicit statements against discrimination reflect attentiveness to issue by parties.	Content analysis of party bylaws/governing documents. Cost: Low.	Increasing number of political parties adopting anti-discriminatory language in bylaws.

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
5) Percentage of women/ disadvantaged who are members of major political parties, compared with the percentage of all citizens who are members of major parties.	Party membership by gender; analysis by party as well as aggregation: overall party membership by gender and disadvantaged groups.	Identification of presence or absence of bias in party membership.	a. Analysis of party membership lists. Cost: Moderate (access problem). b. Voter registration lists by party identification. May be difficulty in identifying of members of disadvantaged groups.	Decline in gender/disadvantaged imbalances in party membership.
Comments:				
6) Number/ percentage of women/ disadvantaged in party leadership positions.	Party leadership positions: top organizational positions in each party.	Degree of representation of women/disadvantaged groups in party leadership.	Analysis of party leadership records. Cost: Low.	Increased representation of women/disadvantaged groups in party leadership.
Comments:				
7) Number of parties with platforms that do not include issues that discriminate against women and disadvantaged.	Party platforms: Organizational and/or policy language in governing documents that discriminates against women/disadvantaged groups.	Degree of non-discrimination by political parties.	Content analysis of party platforms. Cost: Low.	Decline in discriminatory language against women and minorities.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.7: Effective Transfer of Political Power

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Newly elected/appointed officials take office, replacing incumbents.	Seating of new parliament/legislature following elections without incident.	Measurement of peaceful transferral of political power.	Analysis of the transfer process/media accounts. Cost: Moderate.	Context specific: Each successive election should result in more effective transfer of power.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.7: Effective Transfer of Political Power

Intermediate Result 2.2.7.1: Procedures for the Transfer of Power Are Established and Followed

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Steps for transfer of power are set forth in public document.	The procedures for handing over government office or governmental power are pre-established, written, and accessible to the public.	A valid indication of whether power-transferral procedures are established with their existence in publicly accessible documents.	Analysis of public documents relating to transfer process. Cost: Low	Establishment and maintenance of formal framework/structure in law for political transfer of power.
Comments:				
2) Degree of consensus among significant political and/or military actors on the procedures for transfer of power.	Acceptance of transfer procedures by party/NGO/military/bureaucracy leadership. Unit: numbers of actors.	Necessity for wide consensus on the mechanisms for transfer of political power.	Interviews, press reports. Cost: Moderate/high.	Context specific: increased consensus of the mechanisms of the political transfer process.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.7: Effective Transfer of Political Power

Intermediate Result 2.2.7.2: Newly Installed Officials Are Prepared to Fulfill Their Responsibilities

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Degree to which a start-up agenda is developed and implemented by newly elected (or appointive) deliberative bodies and executive agencies.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Four-point scale: 1 = not at all developed 2 = developed 3 = developed and communicated 4 = implemented</p>	<p>Measurement of the preparedness of new government to govern following elections.</p>	<p>Interviews with new political leaders/assessment of transition period and initial period of governance.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate/high.</p>	<p>Context specific: successive transfers will produce more transfer agendas.</p>
<p>2) Degree to which credible domestic sources find that new officials are prepared to fulfill their new responsibilities.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Credible domestic sources: NGO leaders, press accounts, party leaders.</p> <p>Four-point scale: 1 = not at all 2 = minimally 3 = largely 4 = completely</p>	<p>Degree to which transfer process judged to be acceptable by major opinion leaders.</p>	<p>Interviews with political leaders/NGO leaders.</p> <p>Media assessments of preparedness of new officials.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	<p>Increased credibility of transfer process in successive post-election cycles, as judged by major opinion leaders.</p>
<p>3) Degree to which orientation programs exist for newly installed officials.</p> <p>Comments:</p>	<p>Orientation programs: Training seminars/briefing for new members to prepare them for their new positions in government.</p> <p>1 = no orientation 2 = one or fewer training sessions 3 = several training sessions 4 = comprehensive orientation programs</p>	<p>Measurement of preparation of newly elected officials for the legislative/governmental responsibilities.</p>	<p>Assessment of orientation programs.</p> <p>Cost: Moderate.</p>	<p>Strengthened orientation processes in successive post-election cycles.</p>

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes

Intermediate Result 2.2.7: Effective Transfer of Political Power

Intermediate Result 2.2.7.3: Agencies of Government, Including Military and Security and Opposition Groups, Accept the Authority of Newly Installed Officials

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Degree to which government agencies perform their duties in accordance with duly constituted authorities following a transfer of power. Comments:	Four-point scale: 1 = refusal to follow orders 2 = passive resistance 3 = partial accommodation 4 = thorough accommodation	Acceptance of political transfer by permanent bureaucracy is important in legitimizing new government.	Analysis of bureaucratic responses to election results/new political leadership. Survey research/focus groups. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased acceptance of electoral outcomes by government agencies/bureaucracies through performance of required governmental activities.
2) Degree to which opposition groups/parties (former government leaders) participate voluntarily in new parliament/legislature/government. Comments:	Participation: Taking seats won in elections. No boycotts of legislative proceedings/no extra-institutional means of blocking legislative process. 1 = no cooperation/total boycott to 4 = full cooperation with new government.	Acceptance of results of election by opposition forces is crucial to the transfer of power.	Interviews/assessments of actions of opposition groups/parties and their leaders. Cost: Moderate.	Increased cooperation by opposition forces in new governments.
3) Degree to which military accepts the authority of newly installed officials. Comments:	Four-point scale: 1 = refusal to accept electoral results 2 = moderate resistance 3 = only slight resistance 4 = acceptance and accommodation.	Acceptance of electoral results by military is important to peaceful transfer of power.	Analysis of military response to electoral results. Interviews/media accounts. Cost; Moderate/high.	Increased acceptance of authority of newly installed officials by military.

Agency Objective 2.2: More Genuine and Competitive Political Processes


Intermediate Result 2.2.7: Effective Transfer of Political Power

Intermediate Result 2.2.7.4: The Public Recognizes the Legitimacy of the Process by Which New Officials Are Chosen

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Degree to which citizenry accepts legitimacy of newly installed bodies and/or officials. Comments:	Citizenry acceptance: Public support for newly elected officials and new institutions of governance.	Public acceptance of new government through electoral process is a crucial element in peaceful transfer of power.	Survey research/focus groups. Assessment at public response to new government	Increased public acceptance of electoral outcomes and resulting new government.
2) Degree to which relevant political actors, including opposition leaders, accept the outcome of the transfer process. Comments:	Relevant political actors: Party leaders/NGO leaders/military elite support for electoral outcomes and resulting new government.	Elite support is also important to legitimacy of new political institutions.	Press accounts/interviews/focus groups. Cost: Moderate/high.	Increased support by major political actors of electoral outcomes.

Section C: Civil Society

Results Framework



Definitions — Civil Society

Agency Objective 2.3. Increased Development of a Politically Active Civil Society

Citizens organizing to accomplish shared objectives constitute a vital force for the circulation of information and the representation of interests. The collective nature of civic action helps ensure that the interests of citizens, including women, disadvantaged minorities, and the poor, are weighed by public institutions that make policy and allocate resources. Civil society organizations (CSOs), which include free, independent, and democratic trade unions, can monitor government performance and demand leadership accountability both at national centers and in various localities. CSOs can inculcate democratic values, give people practice with democratic principles, and create opportunities for new leaders to arise. The following results contribute to the achievement of this Agency objective.

Intermediate Results 2.3.1. A Legal Framework to Protect and Promote Civil Society Ensured

The emergence and growth of civil society require an enabling legal and regulatory environment. Among the prerequisites are a body of fundamental laws and rules that permit the right of association, including the right for workers to organize and bargain collectively, encourage citizens to join together for a variety of other purposes, promote volunteerism and charitable contributions, protect communications media and information networks, and generally ensure autonomy from state interference.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.1.1. Strengthened Advocacy for Legal and Regulatory Reform

Strengthened advocacy can make an important contribution to achieving a better legal framework. CSOs may need to develop their capacity to analyze the policy environment and to advocate effectively for new or amended laws and regulations to encourage civil society organization. Strengthened advocacy may involve the formation of advocacy coalitions in which CSOs come together to analyze problems, formulate solutions, and undertake joint reform efforts.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.1.2. Increased Public Support for Needed Reforms

The public must understand, support, and participate in CSO efforts to reform the system. This, in turn, implies a two-way exchange between the CSO community and the general public.

Intermediate Results 2.3.2. Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions

Democratic governance implies popular participation, including by disadvantaged social groups, in both public policy-making and its implementation. In this process, civil society performs its classic role of complementing, and sometimes countervailing, the state. By promoting and protecting civil rights, CSOs ensure that citizens have the means to express their preferences, engage in dialogue with policy-makers, and affect decisions in the public realm. After policies have been chosen, CSOs perform as watchdogs of state performance by demanding accountability in the allocation and management of public resources. By performing selected public governance functions, CSOs can also lighten the state's burden and reduce the concentration of resources.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.2.1. Improved CSO Advocacy

In order for CSOs to intervene effectively in the policy formulation or reform process, they must gain or strengthen the advocacy skills of their organizations. Such skills run the gamut from simply collecting information on the subject at hand to such other tasks as obtaining or allocating human and fiscal resources to advocacy functions, coalition and network building, taking action to influence policy, and monitoring implementation once a policy decision has been made.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.2.2. Increased Openness of Public Institutions to CSO Involvement in the Policy Process

Public institutions must be open to CSO involvement in all phases of the policy process, including formulation, implementation, and oversight. For this to occur, mechanisms must exist for the exchange of information and views on the issues targeted. Such mechanisms might include, for example, public hearings, multi-sectoral boards or consultative committees, the appointment of CSO representatives to official decision-making bodies, and so forth.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.2.3. Increased Political Participation of Groups Representing Marginalized Populations

The expression “marginalized populations” refers to women, ethnic, and other disadvantaged groups, who in many countries have not been part of the traditional mainstream that has benefitted from development efforts. For this reason, these disenfranchised groups have tended not to participate in the political process, nor have they learned the advocacy or monitoring skills needed to represent or safeguard their own interests.

Intermediate Results 2.3.3. Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Whatever their specialized tasks, CSOs generally seek to improve their institutional effectiveness. To do so, they introduce organizational reforms and professional procedures into both internal management systems (e.g., for programs, personnel and finances) and external relations (e.g., with clients, governments, and donors). They aim to supplement the value of commitments and voluntary efforts of their members with fund-raising plans that would reduce donor subventions and lead to long-term financial self-reliance. At the same time, CSOs increasingly rely on participatory management techniques in a bid to embody the same democratic values and principles that they promote in the wider society.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.3.1. Improved Financial Management Systems

To build credibility and strengthen overall management capacity, CSOs must incorporate reliable systems for the efficient management of their finances and for reporting in a transparent manner their fiscal status to members, donors, and other interested parties. Indeed, accurate accounting records and favorable audit reports often become key tools for achieving and consolidating organizational recognition and influence.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.3.2. Improved Fund-raising Techniques

To achieve organizational independence from any given donor while solidifying their financial base, it is important for CSOs to develop comprehensive fund-raising plans and to assign to appropriate staff or volunteers the responsibility of carrying out those plans. Depending on circumstances, such plans might include, for example, individual contributions, institutional donations, or funds produced by the CSO’s own income-generating activities (i.e., sale of services or products).

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.3.3. Increased Participatory Management

The operation and image of CSOs as credible, legitimate voices for the citizens they claim to represent are directly linked to the manner in which they manage themselves. Increasingly, CSOs understand the wisdom of substituting participatory practices for traditional hierarchical or authoritarian management styles if, indeed, they are to build constituencies and be seen to “practice what they preach.” Such practices may include, for instance, the establishment of mechanisms for soliciting input from constituents on programming or operational matters, the involvement of staff in the decision-making process, and the election of board members.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.3.4. Improved Management Systems

Another facet of CSO institution-building efforts involves the incorporation of effective and efficient management and administrative systems. This includes the process of strategic planning as an on-going and participatory task, the establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems with appropriate data-collection techniques, and improved personnel management systems.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.3.5. Improved External Relations

In addition to strengthening internal management practices, it is important for CSOs to develop effective outreach mechanisms. Such mechanisms involve a two-way flow of information and relations with the public. On one hand, these organizations need to create ways to assess client needs as input for programming decisions, and on the other they need to report on their activities and accomplishments through community meetings, media reports, and so on.

Intermediate Results 2.3.4. Enhanced Free Flow of Information

In order to formulate interests and participate in policy debates, citizens must have access to a wide range of information. A set of independent and competent media institutions is key to providing citizens with information and to revealing abuses of power. Beyond the formal media, citizens can engage in informal networks of communication, through simple technologies like telephones and photocopiers or the more sophisticated innovations available on the information superhighway. A plural array of private and independent sources of information is extremely difficult for non-democratic governments to control.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.4.1. Plural Array of Independent Sources of Information Encouraged

For citizens to participate effectively in matters that affect them, it is important that they have access to a wide variety of diverse, independent information sources. These include both the electronic and print media (i.e., television and newspapers), as well as newsletters or bulletins published by relevant CSOs. Where there are sub-populations speaking minority languages, steps are also needed to ensure that those groups are reached by providing programming and print periodicals in those languages. Access to such other independent instruments as telephones, fax machines, and e-mail is also important for information-sharing and consensus-building.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.4.2. Improved Investigative Reporting

Information may flow freely but will be of limited value if it is of poor quality and can be harmful

if it is sensationalist. Increasing media attention to data collection, reporting of facts, and analysis and interpretation of data improves the quality of media information.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.4.3. Increased Use of New Information Technologies

New information technologies, which run the gamut from e-mail to use of the internet and the creation of home pages on the internet, are vital instruments for enhancing the viability and effectiveness of CSOs over time.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.4.4. Improved Financial and Management Systems in Media Entities

To ensure their own financial viability, independent broadcast and print media cannot rely merely on subscriber sales but must usually increase advertising revenues. In addition, improved accounting systems and cost controls, along with increased capital investment in equipment, may contribute to fiscal stability and overall sustainability.

Intermediate Results 2.3.5. Strengthened Democratic Political Culture

The consolidation of democracy depends on the acceptance by both citizens and political elites of a shared system of democratic norms and values. These include tolerance of political diversity, interpersonal trust, and a sense of political efficacy on the part of individuals. A democratic political culture also requires that citizens have knowledge about their system of government.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.5.1. Expanded Higher Quality Civic Education in Schools

In many countries, formal education remains rooted in outmoded or autocratic pedagogical modes. This is particularly true in newly-emerging or developing democracies, where repressive or dictatorial regimes may have used the education system as a tool for withholding information from the citizenry or as a way to assert control over the thoughts and actions of the population. In those cases, official curricula did not include the study of democratic principles or other aspects of civic education.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.5.2. Expanded Higher Quality Informal Civic Education Initiatives

In building democratic political culture, in addition to providing civic education in formal classroom settings, it is important to educate the adult population about democratic practices.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.3.5.3. Community-based Civic Action Programs Expanded/Initiated

Experience has shown that, to develop and sustain a democratic political culture over time, it is usually necessary to work from the bottom up by initiating civic action programs at the community level. Such programs are designed to engage the active participation of community members in initiatives aimed at meeting their needs and which they themselves help identify, such as petition drives, cases brought before appropriate judicial authorities, public hearings, lobbying local government officials, or regional regulatory agencies, etc.

Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables

The following categories of information are provided in the tables:

1. The statement of the indicator.
2. A definition of the indicator and its unit of measure.
3. The relevance of the indicator or why it was selected as a measure of that particular result.
4. Approaches to collecting data for the indicator and the approximate cost of collection. Three categories were used for cost: low (under \$500); medium/moderate (\$500 - \$1500); and high (over \$1500). The cost specifications are rough and should be treated cautiously, because costs may vary greatly from one country to the next. The cost of data collection for questions requiring surveys of the population (for example) will depend upon 1) the existence of periodic surveys which address the desired topics conducted by someone else; 2) the existence of surveys which do not address the desired topic but to which strategic objective teams could add questions; and 3) the need to conduct one's own surveys and the number of indicators for which that survey can serve as the data collection approach. Similarly, the cost for monitoring broadcasts or periodicals for specific content will depend on whether there is 1) a commercial monitoring service, which conducts monitoring for advertisers anyway, so fees can be very modest; 2) an NGO that uses this information for its own purposes anyway; or 3) a need to cover the entire cost of monitoring several periodicals and/or broadcast stations.
5. Issues related to target setting and the interpretation of trendlines. In this final column, we share what we have learned about how much progress might be made over what period of time. In some cases, such as changes in the level of political tolerance, we know very little. In other cases, it seems clear that an indicator should change sharply and immediately in the wake of particular interventions. We also discuss issues to be aware of in setting performance targets or in interpreting trendlines.

Not all categories will be discussed for every indicator. In some cases, the relevance of the indicator is clear and does not require any discussion. In other cases, we have little at this point to contribute to ideas about how to set targets.

Indicators

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.1: A Legal Framework to Protect and Promote Civil Society Ensured

Note: CSO stands for “civil society organization.”

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Laws support freedom of association and speech.	Yes/No. Improvements made against a list of proposed reforms; qualitative review against criteria.	Shows the degree to which the law upholds the right of citizens to organize.	Review of the Legal Code; data/studies by citizen organizations & universities Cost: Low, assuming data already exist.	Depending on country context, a list of proposed reforms and monitoring of progress toward their achievement
Comments: See Appendix C, Part D for example of a scale for measuring the progress of a legal reform.				
2) a) % of target CSOs that think the registration process is: 1. timely (or has become more timely, etc.); 2. transparent; & 3. low-cost. OR b) general CSO sense that process is timely or untimely, transparent or not, low or high cost.	The degree to which a group of target CSOs think/perceive the registration process to be: 1) timely; 2) transparent; and 3) low-cost. Each element could be laid out as a scale and, if desired, a composite index produced.	Shows the level of government acceptance of/support for citizens to organize to represent their interests.	Data collection from existing CSOs (registered & unreg.) via a sample survey. If key informant interviews or focus groups are used, then a percentage cannot be produced but only a sense of how difficult/easy registration is. Cost: Can be low or high. Depends on whether there is an existing survey instrument on which to tack these questions, or whether informal methods are selected.	If the percentage is low to begin with, we would hope for improvement over time. If the percentage is reasonable, it may stay relatively stable.
Comments:				
3) \$ cost of registration per CSO.	Financial cost of registering; application/other fees charged per CSO (includes informal payments).	(Same as above)	Govt. data, plus cross check with key informants in a range of CSOs or sample survey of CSOs. Cost: Depends on existence and reliability of government data.	A simplified process should reduce costs. There may be a one-time reduction in costs and not a gradual decline. Costs should be low enough to encourage registration of CSOs.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Average length of time for registration.	a) Average # months to register; OR b) length of time to register is high (over 1 year), medium (6-11 months), low (under 6 months).	Shows whether government hinders CSO organization.	Government data (sample or registrations) or sample survey of CSOs or key interviews with NGOs. Cost: low to high depending on data collection approach.	A simplified process should reduce the number of steps and therefore the time required to register. There may be a one-time improvement rather than a gradual decline. A factor to be analyzed is whether those groups with longest registration time are the most political or outspoken on human rights or other particularly sensitive issues.
Comments: b) may be better if data is collected via focus groups.				
5) Laws permit CSOs to raise funds/income.	a) Yes/No; or b) Laws improved compared to a list of reforms promoted.	Shows level of support for citizen organization & provides insight as to CSOs' prospects for self-sustainability.	Qualitative review of laws or of legal reforms made. Cost: Low but depends on the complexity of the law or the reforms made.	We would hope to see an increasing number of reforms made, but the potential impact of the reforms is more important than the sheer number.
Comments: See Appendix C, Part D for legal reform milestone scale.				
6) Tax laws favorable to CSOs.	a) Improvements made/constraints removed compared to a list of reforms; or b) % of CSOs that say tax laws are: 1. unfavorable; 2. favorable to raising money; or 3. effective rate of taxation.	Shows level of support for citizen organization & provides insight as to CSOs' prospects for self-sustainability.	Qualitative review of laws or of legal reforms made. Cost: Low but depends on the complexity of the law or the reforms made.	We would hope to see an increasing number of reforms made, but the potential impact of the reforms is more important than the sheer number.
Comments: See Appendix C, Part D for legal reform scale.				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.1: A Legal Framework to Protect and Promote Civil Society Ensured

Intermediate Result 2.3.1.1: Strengthened Advocacy for Legal and Regulatory Reform

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # out of target CSOs advocating for legal & regulatory reform	# out of target group of CSOs involved in advocacy vs. service delivery; # out of total target group.	A higher number of very weak CSOs advocating is obviously not necessarily better than a lower number of strong ones. However, a rising number may mean that more diverse constituencies are beginning to be heard. This needs to be paired with a qualitative indicator looking at the substance of the advocacy, such as the index in Appendix C.	Gather info. from CSOs re type of activities undertaken. A CSO federation or association may already have that info. Depending on country context, state of CSO and funds available, the collection method can be anything from key informant interviews to focus groups to a more formal survey. Cost: Low-moderate	Would hope to see an increase if very few are involved in advocating reform.
Comments:				
2) # of advocacy initiatives carried out by CSO coalitions for legal reform.	# of advocacy initiatives carried out jointly by two or more organizations in CSO coalitions to promote legal reform. User needs to define what constitutes an "initiative".	Shows amount of advocacy activity.	Gather info. from CSOs re type of activities undertaken. A CSO federation or association may already have that information. Depending on country context, state of CSO and funds available, the collection method can be anything from key informant interviews to focus groups to a more formal survey. Cost: Low if involved CSOs keep adequate records.	Establish a baseline of the # of times two or more organizations in a CSO coalition have jointly carried out advocacy initiatives; monitor increases (shows more advocacy) and decreases (may show weakened advocacy capacity by the CSO community as a whole, or decreased need for advocacy) over specific periods of time.
Comments:				
3) # of target CSOs active in advocacy coalitions.	# of target CSOs active in advocacy coalition(s) for legal reform.	Shows breadth of support.	Gather info. from CSOs re type of activities undertaken. A CSO federation or association may already have that info. Depending on country context, state of CSO and funds available, the collection method can be anything from key informant interviews to focus groups to a more formal survey. Cost: Low	Establish a baseline of the # of CSOs in advocacy coalitions; monitor increases (shows more advocacy) and decreases (may show "defeat" or "victory") over specific periods of time.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) # of target CSOs showing improvement on the advocacy index or reaching a certain level of expertise on the index.	Index — see Appendix C of the handbook, as applied to legal framework for civil society.	Shows improvement in advocacy skills of target CSOs.	See Appendix C. Cost depends on # of CSOs.	

Comments: Index can be adapted to fit country conditions and particular program emphasis.

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.1: A Legal Framework to Protect and Promote Civil Society Ensured

Intermediate Result 2.3.1.2: Increased Public Support for Needed Reforms

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of pop. aware of CSO legal reform concerns.	% of population that has knowledge of CSO messages re type of legal reform needed.	Knowledge is a prerequisite to support, and informed support is more useful than uninformed support.	Public opinion surveys conducted by professional firms. Cost: Depends on whether there is a pre-existing survey to which questions can be attached. If a survey needs to be conducted for this (and related) indicators, cost will be high.	Targets should be set in accord with CSO plans for public education on various legal reform issues.
Comments:				
2) % of pop. supportive of CSO legal reform initiatives.	a) % of general population that agrees with CSO reform agenda; b) # responses CSOs have affirming support; or c) # of citizens participating in supporting such initiatives in some manner (volunteering, contrib. cash, etc.).		a) Survey b) and c) Documents from CSOs showing affirmative opinions/responses (including protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc.) and interviews/tracking of government officials & legislators. Cost: Low if can add questions to a pre-existing survey. If no survey is done and CSOs are tracking responses and supporters, costs will be medium to high.	Should increase if CSO advocacy sparks interest.
Comments:				
3) % positive articles/segments in key publications and broadcast programs.	Articles or segments should discuss legal reform in positive terms.	Proxy for public support, when it is too expensive to collect information for indicator 1) and 2).	Commercial monitoring service would be least expensive. Monitoring by involved CSOs also possible. Cost: Low-medium.	May be difficult to solicit much media interest in this issue. Could be a flurry of articles/segments as the issue gains visibility, and then a drop off as media moves on to other topics.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.2: Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Public policies changed consistent with CSO advocacy.	#/type of policies/laws changed in accordance with CSO advocacy agenda (or proposed negative changes defeated).	The connection between actual policy outcomes & CSO advocacy is tricky. Compromises occur so relating advocacy input to policy outcome can be difficult. Only if there are policy changes of some kind is it possible to conclude that civil society is more influential and playing a role in decision making.	CSO monitoring of legal/regulatory changes adopted after (and in keeping with their advocacy efforts) have begun. Data from CSO records, reports by legislature & government admin. units, interviews Cost: Low. One would assume that if CSOs have an advocacy agenda, then they are monitoring progress. Other info. can be collected from official legislative/govt. records and interviews.	Some policy debates have very long life spans with no resolution for years, so this may not always be a good indicator for a limited strategy period. Would expect gradual rising trendline as government becomes more accustomed to working with CSOs and CSOs become more sophisticated.
Comments: The number is potentially deceptive. One change could have more significant impact than 15 changes. A qualitative review of the import of those changes must accompany this indicator.				
2) % or # of target CSOs that say they can obtain needed information from key public agencies.	# out of target group or % of target CSOs that they can obtain needed information from key counterpart government agencies on a scale of 1 (never); 2 (rarely); 3 (sometimes); 4 (usually); 5 (always) could also present average score across CSOs.	Proxy indicator for idea that information is necessary for CSOs to exercise oversight.	Sample survey required if % desired; otherwise, interviews with CSOs, back up documentation. Cost: Low-moderate if using # out of target group or pre-existing survey of CSOs exists. High if need to generate the survey, but cost depends on the total number of CSOs to be interviewed.	Improvements may be so gradual that groups will not easily notice change. Legal and regulatory changes dealing with information release could have the biggest and most noticeable impact on this indicator.
Comments:				
3) # out of target group or % of CSOs representing marginalized groups that believe/can document impact on the policy/oversight process.	# out of target group or proportion of CSOs advocating issues related to marginalization and have organized marginalized groups to be actively involved in advocating for legal and regulatory reforms. Standards for documenting impact can be set according to local circumstances.	Caution should be exercised in defining the universe understood to be "marginalized." This will vary from one place to another; criteria and a definition should be set before attempting to attribute representation or results.	Requires sample survey of groups represent the marginalized if proportion desired. Otherwise, interviews with target groups. Backup documentation of impact should be requested. Cost: Low to high depending on number of groups to be interviewed.	Hope to see growing number of NGOs having impact on policy. Growth may be slow.
Comments: This indicator is an alternative to counting the number of policies changed.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) % of public knowledgeable about or aware of an issue.	Proportion of the general public that understand the various arguments associated with a particular issue.	Getting an issue on the public screen is an important contribution.	Public opinion surveys done periodically to measure changes in awareness/knowledge of an issue. Cost: High but depends on the number of indicators included in the survey.	Mass media outreach should lead to a much higher percentage.
Comments:				
5) # of targeted issues which are receiving heightened public attention.	An issue is increasingly treated by the press; policy makers address the issue; legal/regulatory policy is formulated to address the issue.	While it is difficult to delimit these signs, they might include a govt. commission to examine the issue, parliament holding hearings, a ministry making a study or beginning to talk about the issue publicly.	Information collected on the frequency of reportage by media; #/type of meetings/speeches/policy initiatives by policymakers; # of laws/reg. policies drafted or in discussion. Data collected from CSOs, the media govt./legislative offices on frequency/perceived importance of issue; sample survey or focus groups with CSOs, reporters, legislators, business sector, govt., etc. Cost: Medium, but depends on the number of issues being tracked.	
Comments: Indicator could be constructed as a critical events agenda, scale, or index, or a quantitative indicator concerning media coverage, speeches, or public meetings.				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.2: Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.3.2.1: Improved CSO Advocacy

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of CSOs out of target group undertaking advocacy activities for the first time.	Advocacy standard should be defined modestly but to suit the local environment.	Proxy indicator. Advocacy index preferred. Good for places where civil society has been completely flattened. Less useful where civil society is well developed.	CSO records and reporting, interviews with CSO staff. Cost: Low to medium, depends on number of CSOs.	Hope for steadily increasing trendline.
Comments:				
2) # of CSOs showing improvement on the advocacy index or reaching a certain level of expertise on the index.	See Appendix C, Part D-1 for the index.	Index measures various aspects of advocacy. Where the index is simply too labor-intensive, other proxies could be used, such as: a) # of press conferences/press releases by target CSOs; b) # of meetings with MPs/staff.	See Appendix C, Part D-1. Cost depends on number of CSOs.	Should be very sensitive to improvements growing out of training, TA, or experience.
Comments: Index can be adapted to fit local conditions or particular program emphasis.				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.2: Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.3.2.2: Increased Openness of Public Institutions to CSO Involvement in the Policy Process

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) New mechanisms established.	#/type new mechanisms created, including public hearings, appointment of CSO reps. on government bodies, etc.	Measures foundation for openness.	Collect information from CSOs, govt. or legislative records Cost: Minimal. CSOs with advocacy agendas presumably collect this information.	Initial increase, can be expected to plateau after a time.
Comments:				
2) Frequency of use of new mechanisms, for a set of target issues.	a) # of times CSOs use new mechanisms; b) # of opportunities to take advantage of new mechanisms (# of hearings, commissions, etc.); c) Total # of CSOs participating in these opportunities. These could be calculated for a list of target issues.	b) Measures openness. a) & c) Measure extent to which CSOs take advantage of openness.	Collect info. from CSOs on frequency/# of times they have participated in/appealed through new mechanisms. Cost: Low - moderate since CSOs may need to track this info.	
Comments:				
3) CSO/other perception/opin. of willingness of public institutions to engage in dialogue.	% of CSOs; or # CSOs (& other organ.) out of target group whose leaders perceive that public institutions (including admin. & regulatory agencies & legislature) are: a) always; b) usually; c) sometimes; d) rarely or never open to dialogue.	Care is needed with this indicator, since perception may not always match reality.	Sample opinions/perceptions of CSO leaders and key observers (journalists, legislators, business people, educators, etc.) through surveys, key informant interviews, or focus groups. Cost: Cost can be moderate but depends on the number to be interviewed.	Increases in perception may lag behind improvements in openness.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.2: Increased Citizen Participation in the Policy Process and Oversight of Public Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.3.2.3: Increased Political Participation of Groups Representing Marginalized Populations

(Note: "Marginalized groups" includes women, ethnic, other disadvantaged sub-populations)

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of groups representing marginalized constituencies trying to affect government policy or conducting oversight.	# of groups representing the "marginalized" active in advocacy/monitoring work. (Users of this indicator will need to set some parameters regarding the amount & quality of the advocacy.)		Survey a sample of the marginalized groups identified to see if they undertake political advocacy. Cost: Depending on # of "marginalized" groups and data they collect, can be moderate to high.	We would not expect a constantly rising trendline. Few strong groups may be better than many weak groups.
Comments:				
2) % of mainstream CSO leadership positions held by marginalized groups.	Average proportion of CSO officers and key staff positions held by persons from marginalized groups. (This should exclude CSOs created by/made up of persons from marginalized groups.)	Proxy for how well integrated marginalized groups are into mainstream CSO activity.	Survey of CSOs/review of their documentation to: a) identify # "leadership" positions (both volunteer & paid); and b) how many are held by persons from groups identified as "marginalized." Cost: Moderate to high, depending on depth of CSO community and # of groups identified as "marginalized."	We would anticipate increases from a very low base but the trend may eventually level off. May increase very slowly in ethnically divided societies.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3:

Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of target CSOs that reduce their dependency on their largest single donor.	Proportion of target CSOs that either: a) decrease funds from major source w/out any loss of revenue; or b) increase other sources so that largest source provides a reduced % of revenue.	This indicator is not relevant when there is not a single dominant donor creating a potential dependency. Sign of financial viability. Ability to attract donors.	Survey of CSOs, annual reports. Cost: Low to medium depending on the number of CSOs.	In some very difficult environments, improvement may be slow and modest. Thresholds for a) and b) i.e., decrease funds from major source by how much, can be set accordingly.
Comments:				
2) # of target CSOs with increased %/amount of revenues from indigenous sources, including self-generated income.	# of target CSOs receiving increased proportion of revenues from local sources (user may wish to set a threshold percent, i.e., a 5% increase per annum).	Measures financial viability.	Survey of CSOs, CSO documents. Cost: Low to medium depending on number of CSOs.	% of revenue should increase over time but if an NGO is successful in attracting new foreign donor resources, this % could stay flat or even fall. If this possibility is foreseen, replace the % of revenue with the total amount of revenue in dollars from indigenous sources.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Intermediate Result 2.3.3.1: Improved Financial Management Systems

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of target CSOs with no major audit findings.	# of target CSOs that: a) have annual or biennial audits in accordance with local law; and b) have no major criticisms (findings).	If financial management systems are strong, audits should find only minor problems.	Target CSO financial records; auditor opinion letters contained in audit reports. Cost: Low to moderate—depends on # of target CSOs & how frequently they are audited.	Set targets for years in which audits are expected.
Comments:				
2) # of target CSOs that implement audit recommendations.	# of target CSOs with audits that implement recommendations.	Shows commitment to good financial management.	Same as above, plus review of audit recommendations implemented. Cost: Moderate to high, depends on number of target CSOs and frequency of audits.	Set targets for the year after and are expected.
Comments:				
3) # of target CSOs with improved financial accounting practices.	# of target CSOs that improve or introduce: a) adequate expense records; b) double-entry bookkeeping; c) internal controls, including approval of expenditures; d) production of financial statements on a regular basis.	Proxy indicator—small CSOs may not be audited all that regularly.	Target CSO financial records, interviews.	Should respond directly to TA and training in accounting.
Comments: Could turn this into a scorecard, scoring each element as 0 (no) or 1 (yes) and showing the total score. Scores for all CSOs could be averaged, or the number of CSOs reaching a set score could be reported. Scorecard elements may need to be adjusted to local conditions.				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Intermediate Result 2.3.3.2: Improved Fund-raising Techniques

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) # of target CSOs with a) increased # of successful income-producing activities or b) increased income from existing income generating activities.</p>	<p># of target CSOs with a) increased activities successfully undertaken for purpose of raising funds (i.e., there is some net profit); or b) increased income from existing income generating activities. If desirable, can set a threshold for the increase — i.e., 5% per annum.</p>	<p>Result of improved techniques and thus a higher level proxy. b) could measure improved management rather than the IR specified (i.e., better cost containment, greater efficiency).</p>	<p>Examination of target CSO fund-raising activities and their balance sheets. Availability of data may be an issue; it may depend on whether CSO activities are taxed. Cost: Low to moderate, depends on # of target CSOs and # of activities they undertake.</p>	<p>Increases will be gradual in very difficult environments.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>2) # of target CSOs with increased # of individual contributions and institutional donations.</p>	<p># of target CSOs with increased contributions and donations from individuals and institutions. Establish a baseline of: a) # of target CSOs; and b) # of individual contributors and institutional donors for each.</p>	<p>Shows decreased dependency on few donors, increased membership base, and diversification of revenue sources. Result of improved techniques and thus a higher level proxy.</p>	<p>Examination of target CSO financial data. Cost: Low to moderate, depends on # of target CSOs; # of individual contributors & institutional donors; and quality of their financial records</p>	<p>Should rise with concerted effort, but may level off after a period of time. Tax environment will affect this indicator.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>3) # of target CSOs with fund-raising plans in place and being implemented.</p>	<p>Plans need to be realistic in expectations for raising revenues in that environment. Plans should exist in writing, and staff and volunteers should understand and support the plan.</p>	<p>Partial indicator, measures one technique.</p>	<p>CSO plans.</p>	<p>Should respond directly to TA and training on fund-raising.</p>
<p>Comments: May need to relax criteria if working with community associations.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Intermediate Result 2.3.3.3: Increased Participatory Management

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of target CSOs with mechanisms for staff involvement in decision-making in use.	% of target CSOs that make regular use of a variety of mechanisms (staff meetings, etc.) to involve staff in decision making. 'Regular' needs to be defined.	Involvement of staff is one sign of partic. management.	Document review (i.e., CSO personnel policies; procedures, etc., if they exist); interviews with CSO leaders and staff. Cost: Moderate, depends of # of target CSOs, #/openness of leaders and staff.	Increases should result from training and TA but good intentions could trail off after a while.
Comments:				
2) % of target CSOs soliciting input from constituencies.	% of target groups holding annual meetings, etc. to solicit feedback from primary constituencies on a regular basis. "Regular" needs to be defined.	Involvement of constituencies is an important sign of participatory management.	CSO bylaws & reports/materials; interviews with CSO representatives. Cost: Moderate, depends on # of target CSOs.	# of target CSOs that solicit constituent input should increase over time. Care is needed in setting an appropriate standard for input.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased development of politically active civil society
 Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs
 Intermediate Result 2.3.3.4: Improved management systems

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of target CSOs with strategic plans being implemented.	# of target CSOs that: a) have strategic plans; and b) implement them (benchmarks are on track).		Interviews with target CSO leaders and staff, review of target CSO reports, other documents. Cost: Moderate; depends on # of target CSOs, openness of leaders & staff.	Some caution is needed in setting the standard for performance. If the standard for strategic planning is set very high, then targets should be modest. If the standard is set low, then targets can be higher. It is key to figure out what is reasonable in a given environment.
Comments: See also the index for strategic planning, which includes 3 factors: 1) CSO has a clear vision; 2) CSO has multi-year strategic plan; 3) CSO monitors plan's progress and continuing applicability. This is in Appendix A, p.15.				
2) # of target CSOs that: a) have monitoring & evaluation systems; and b) collect/use resulting data.	Standards or criteria need to be set for what constitutes an acceptable M&E system and what represents adequate data collection and use.		Gather info. from target CSOs re existence or not of M&E systems and how resulting data are used by those that do collect it. M&E plans and interviews. Cost: Moderate; depends on # of target CSOs and those that have M&E systems.	Some caution is needed in setting the standard for performance. If the standard for M&E is set very high, then targets should be modest. If the standard is set low, then targets can be higher. It is key to figure out what is reasonable in a given environment. Use of the data will be the most difficult step, requiring the most TA.
Comments: a) and b) could be turned into indexes with criteria laid out, and 1-5 points awarded for each criterion.				
3) # of target CSOs with improved personnel management.	Number of target CSOs with a) personnel policies and procedures in writing, b) job descriptions, c) staff knowledgeable about policies and procedures, d) staff doing what their job descriptions say. This could be a scorecard with 0 (no) or 1 (yes) point awarded for each element and the score totaled. It could also be an index with scaled responses of 1-5 points awarded for each element and a total produced. Elements can be changed to fit local circumstances.		CSO records and interviews with select staff. Cost: Medium but depends on number of groups.	Score card may show quicker change but be less sensitive to improvements in quality over time than an index.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.3: Increased Institutional and Financial Viability of CSOs

Intermediate Result 2.3.3.5: Improved External Relations

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of target CSOs that assess community/client needs in a participatory manner (involving the clients) in: a) planning activities (services and advocacy); and b) monitoring.	# of target CSOs that seek community/client input to identify priorities and conduct planning and monitoring activities. Criteria for input will need to be developed to fit local circumstances.	Shows whether target CSO plans and activities are based on the opinions of the few or on the priorities identified by the client population.	Interviews of CSO leaders & staff, as well as with a range of clients (focus groups, key informant interviews). Cost: Moderate to high; depends on # of target CSOs and area of outreach (i.e., how many communities; where they are located; # of people reached, etc.).	Some caution is needed in setting the standard for performance. If the standard for involvement is set very high, then targets should be modest. If the standard is set low, then targets can be higher. It is key to figure out what is reasonable in a given environment.
Comments:				
2) # of target CSOs holding community meetings on a regular basis to report on planning decisions and progress.	# of target CSOs that convene/sponsor meetings with community members on an on-going basis to provide feedback and status reports on their activities. "Regular basis" should be defined to suit local conditions.	Variant to indicator 1); easier to collect data. Measures one-way flow of information.	Review of target CSO documents; interview target CSO leaders & staff; survey members of communities where target CSOs hold meetings. Cost: Low to moderate; depends on # of target CSOs holding community meetings, where, how often, etc.	
Comments:				
3) # of target CSOs that initiate media reports on their activities/accomplishments.	# of target CSOs that disseminate info. on their activities/accomplishments through the media (news releases, radio/TV interviews, etc.). The indicator should establish a standard for how often this should be done.		Review target CSO documents; interview target CSO leaders and appropriate staff; interview key media representatives. Cost: Low to moderate; depends on # of target CSO leaders & staff and media reps. to be contacted.	Some caution is needed in setting the standard for performance.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3:

Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.4:

Enhanced Free Flow of Information

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of population: a) listening to radio; b) watching TV; c) reading the news.	% of population receiving news (disaggregated by political interest, gender, geog. & ethnic group). TV should be disaggregated from radio and print media; often TV is controlled by government. Index of consumption a-c, scaled as follows 1) never; 2) less than once per week; 3) once per week; 4) 2-3 times per week; 5) 4-5 times per week; or 6) everyday.	Shows extent of population reached by different information channels.	Review any existing data from news outlets (newspapers, radio, TV, UNESCO, World Bank, local surveys, etc.); if none available, survey a sample of population in diff. strategic areas, taking care to include targeted groups. Cost: Moderate to high; depends on existence of data and expanse of population to be surveyed.	Increases in the % of the population reading the news may depend on literacy and affordability of publications; access to TV may also be an issue; radio is usually the most accessible, utilized source of information. Rising education levels may affect readership size.
Comments:				
2) % of population that trusts available news sources.	% of population (disaggregated by above groups) that say they trust news sources (disaggregate sources, as above).	Trust is thought to correlate with the quality of media reporting and analysis.	Survey a sample of population in difficult strategic areas, taking care to include targeted groups (should be part of data collected for above indicator). Cost: This may be high; data likely to exist in very few countries. Lower cost if questions can be added to existing surveys.	Trust may not increase at the same rate or to the same degree as actual improvement in the media. We know little about setting targets for this indicator.
Comments:				
3) # of law suits for slander or libel against media organizations for criticizing government or those with close ties to govt.	# of times media organizations are sued for criticizing govt. or those close to it.	Proxy indicator — provides an indication of the severity of govt. or govt.-linked attacks on media organizations.	Records/interviews with key media organizations; court records. Cost: Low to moderate, depending on # of media outlets contacted.	Frequency of suits should decrease over time. Severity of suits also matters; one suit that threatens a media entity with near bankruptcy and jail time may serve to increase self-censorship by most media entities.
Comments:				
4) # of incidents of violence targeting journalists.	# of times journalists are the victims of violence or attempted violence.	Proxy indicator; high levels of violence will cause journalists and media entities to exercise self-censorship.	Same as above; police reports. Cost: Low to moderate, depending on # of journalists and visibility of violent activities.	Frequency of violence against journalists should decrease over time.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society
 Intermediate Result 2.3.4: Enhanced Free Flow of Information
 Intermediate Result 2.3.4.1: Plural Array of Independent Sources of Information Encouraged

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of non-govt. news sources.	# of private sector news sources that exist (electronic media, press, etc.).	Care should be taken in using this indicator. Non-governmental sources may be very partisan and could be extremist.	Collect info. on existing media outlets. Cost: Low; such data usually exist in govt. ministry (where media are regulated) or univ. If not, the # of outlets is not hard to establish.	Should increase but will respond to degree of openness of govt..
Comments: Newspaper circulation & radios per capita data available from <i>State of the World Atlas</i> .				
2) # of target CSOs publishing bulletins.	# of target CSOs that have publications for dissemination (i.e., newsletter, periodic reports, special letters/papers on their activities, etc.). A standard should be set for the expected frequency of dissemination: i.e., 2 times per year, etc.		Gather information from target CSOs Cost: Low; this info. should be readily available from target CSOs.	Linked to financial viability of NGOs.
Comments:				
3) # of a) telephones; b) fax machines; c) e-mail subscribers per capita for given level of GNP.	# and type of independent sources of info. per capita by level of country's GNP.		Telephone per capita data avail. in <i>The Book of World Rankings</i> by George Thomas Kurlan; Fax mach. & mobile cellular phones per capita data available in UNDP's <i>Human Development Index Report</i> , for 83 & 54 countries, respectively; Info. on computers and computing power per capita avail. in Lester Brown's <i>State of the World</i> report, or more directly from <i>Computer Industry Almanac, Inc.</i> Cost: Low depending on availability of books/ref. materials in country.	
Comments:				
4) a) # of hours of minority language programming on radio/TV; b) # minority language print periodicals.	a) # of hours per week/month dedicated by radio or TV stations to programming in minority languages; b) # of minority print periodicals appearing regularly (set a standard: i.e., at least 3 times per annum).	a) may wish to disaggregate by govt. and non-govt. sources.	Some countries have commercial monitoring services, mostly oriented toward advertisers. Sometimes CSOs monitor the media. Also, TV and radio stations can be monitored. Cost: Low to moderate; volunteer "listening" groups can be set up by target CSOs to track minority lang. programming, and CSOs can interview station managers.	b) increases will depend on minority population size and literacy, and possibly on community wealth (which would attract advertising support).
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.4: Enhanced Free Flow of Information

Intermediate Result 2.3.4.2: Improved Investigative Reporting

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of media space/time devoted to news analysis.	% of total newspaper space & radio/TV time dedicated to analysis of the news, rather than to entertainment programming.	This indicator may pose problems in highly divided societies, where “news analysis” may be inflammatory and divisive. Does not speak to the quality of the analysis.	Monitor newspapers and radio/TV broadcasts; interview newspaper editors/station managers. Cost: Low to moderate; data from media outlets can be supplemented by volunteer “monitoring” groups set up by target CSOs. Commercial monitoring services may also be able to produce data.	May not change rapidly.
Comments:				
2) Improved score(s) from a content analysis of a sample of news reports/articles published by targeted media.	Scoring protocols would need to be developed, but might include such aspects as: fairness to and inclusion of different points of view, appropriate use of facts/figures, separation of fact from opinion, proper attribution of facts to sources, and extent and placement of coverage.	Particularly relevant when a mission has been focusing on improved media or where control of media is an issue.	Sample coverage of key or controversial issues in the country. See Appendix B.C.2. of this handbook on “Content Analysis of Press Coverage or Other Documents.” Cost: Moderate - high, depending on availability of volunteer monitors/coders and number of media issues to be tracked.	Trendline should increase in response to training of journalists, but could be retarded by lack of commitment by media owners to improving the content of reporting.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.4: Enhanced Free Flow of Information

Intermediate Result 2.3.4.3: Increased Use of New Information Technologies

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of target CSOs using internet.	% of target CSOs that have access to and use internet.	Direct measure, for CSOs using new technologies.	Collect info. from target CSO leaders & staff. Cost: Low; info. already exists in target CSOs.	Should increase rapidly among more sophisticated urban based CSOs.
Comments:				
2) % of target CSOs with internet homepage.	% of target CSOs that have access to internet & have put up homepages.		Collect info. from target CSO leaders & staff. Cost: Low; info. already exists in target CSOs.	
Comments:				
3) % of target CSOs using e-mail.	% of target CSOs that use e-mail.	Shows ability of target CSO to network and exchange information.	Collect info. from target CSO leaders & staff. Cost: Low; info. already exists in target CSOs.	
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.4: Enhanced Free Flow of Information

Intermediate Result 2.3.4.4: Improved Financial Sustainability of Independent Media Entities

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Average % of media revenues derived from advertising by target independent media entities.	Level of media revenue that comes from advertising rather than sales or other sources in target media entities.	Advertising revenues are key to financial well-being.	Advertising revenues can be reliably estimated by using a calculation of average amount of space/time devoted to advertising times the unit cost (per line per minute) of advertising. Commercial firms that monitor the media for advertising purposes make these kinds of calculations all the time. Cost: Moderate; depends on the existence of commercial monitoring firms and willingness of target media entities to share financial data.	Should increase in response to training and TA. US standard for print media is that 60% of column inches is devoted to advertising.
Comments:				
2) # of target media outlets that show an improved balance between revenues and expenditures.	# of newspapers and radio/TV stations that are financially self-reliant (i.e., revenue meets or exceeds expenditures).	Direct measure of financial health but trendline is important. Need to look also at relationship between current costs and capital investment.	Annual reports, financial records. Access to this information could be a problem. Cost: Low, depends on number of media outlets.	Should respond to improved financial management and increases in advertising. However, other factors such as spiralling inflation could affect also.
Comments:				
3) % of weeks or months per annum when target media entities pay salaries on time.	a) % of times that target entities pay salaries on time; or b) number of target entities paying 90% salary payments on time.	Proxy indicator; reflects financial status of target media entities.	Collect information from target entities and staff. Cost: Low to moderate, depending on # of entities/staff targeted.	Salaries should be paid more punctually as the entity's financial health improves.
Comments:				
4) #/% of target media entities that make new capital investments.	#/% of target media entities that make new investments in plant or equipment.	Proxy indicator; reflects capacity of target entities to afford new capital investments. Capital investments are important to remaining competitive.	Target entity data, interviews. Cost: Low	Should increase but may take considerable time in very difficult environments.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.5: Strengthened Democratic Political Culture

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of citizens with civic knowledge.	% knowing selected rights and responsibilities (freedom of speech, due process, etc.); % knowing names of selected political reps.; % knowing functions of political institutions.	Shows whether citizens have a basic understanding of a democratic political system and their own role within it.	National sample of all citizens or a sub-sample of participants in civic ed. programs. Also, tests should be administered before and after civic ed. Any differences between groups must be controlled for extraneous influences like prior ed., exposure to media, interest in politics, etc.) Cost: High but depends on how many indicators are included in the survey. See Handbook Chapter III.	Targets depend on nature of intervention. If specific groups are targeted for participation in civil society, increases in before-and-after tests are to be expected. But if the intervention is aimed at the gen. public, and there have been no improvements in govt.. accountability to citizens, then no change is expected, or there may even be a decline. Little is known about how to set targets. These surveys should only be done at 2-3 year intervals; otherwise, changes may not exceed the margin of error.

Comments:

2) % of citizens exhibiting democratic values.	% exhibiting attitudes of political tolerance (e.g., toward ethnic, religious, and political pluralism); % exhibiting attitudes of political trust: a) inter-personal trust (of fellow citizens, minority groups, CSOs, media outlets); b) trust in govt. (e.g., police, magistracy, local authorities, cent. govt. institutions); % supporting selected basic human rights.	Shows how citizens feel towards one another and toward government. Measures the level of social capital, which is held to be a prerequisite for democratization.	See indicator 1 for IR 2.3.5.	Each country must conduct its own baseline in order to target specific groups (those with especially low democratic values); specific campaigns can then be worked on for those groups. For example, in Nicaragua and Guatemala, small but statistically significant improvements have been seen in recent years in tolerance, and in Nicaragua participation has increased. In both countries, democracy has been consolidated somewhat over this same period of time. Values are harder to change than knowledge. Little is known about how to set targets. Do not do surveys at intervals less than 2-3 years.
--	--	---	-------------------------------	--

Comments:

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) % of citizens with civic skills.	% expressing a sense of political efficacy (e.g., find govt. policy process comprehensible, feel able to influence opinions of others, feel able to make political reps. listen); % with positive self-assessment of civic skills (e.g., public speaking, letter writing, consensus building).	Shows whether citizens have the necessary confidence and competence to be active citizens.	See indicator 1 for IR 2.3.5.	Sense of efficacy may be difficult to affect through short training problems. Growing education levels should have an impact on overtime.

Comments:

4) % of citizens participating in political activities.	% who discuss civic & political affairs (& how frequently); % who vote (whether registered as voter, whether voted in given elections); % involved in other forms of electoral participation (attend campaign rallies, work for candidate, etc.); % who contact political reps. (e.g., local councillor, legislator, govt. officials); % who engage in direct political action (e.g., boycotts, demonstrations); % with experience as civic activists (belong to CSOs, attend CSO meetings, speak at meetings, organize CSO activities).	Shows the extent of citizen participation in electoral and policy processes	See indicator 1 for IR 2.3.5.	For countries that have undergone a recent transition to democracy, voter turnout may decline between founding and subsequent elections. The more secure the election process seems, the lower the stakes and the more turnout may actually drop. Forms of political participation (other than voting) are known to be tied to high levels of socio-economic status, so targets in poor and illiterate countries should probably be very modest.
---	---	---	-------------------------------	--

Comments:

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.5: Strengthened Democratic Political Culture

Intermediate Result 2.3.5.1: Expanded Higher Quality Civic Education in Schools

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of schools offering civic ed. classes.	% of schools (primary, secondary, tertiary) offering at least one civic education class.	Shows extent of civic education in school system.	Annual reports of Ministry of Education & private school association; NGO implementors. Cost: Low, assuming the Ministry of Education or implementing NGOs are tracking.	When curriculum changes are made that introduce civic education, there should be considerable increases in the first few years. After that, there will be a leveling off.
Comments:				
2) % of schools with elected student govt.	% of schools (primary, secondary, tertiary) that have elected student governments that are active.	Indicates whether students are practicing democratic skills in the school environment.	Self-administered questionnaire mailed to school administrators or tracking by Ministry or implementing CSOs. Cost: Low if Ministry of Education or implementing NGOs track.	Likely to increase only if civic education program includes or encourages.
Comments:				
3) % of schools with higher quality civic ed. classes.	% of schools (primary, secondary, tertiary) that: a) use participatory teaching methods; b) assign students to applied action projects.	Indicates whether civic ed. curriculum uses methods known to correlate with higher student learning.	Sample survey of school classes. Probably requires observation and not just interviews and reviews of materials. Cost: Medium-high, depending on sample size.	May increase slowly in countries where rote learning is the norm.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.5: Strengthened Democratic Political Culture
 Intermediate Result 2.3.5.2: Expanded Higher Quality Informal Civic Education Initiatives

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of citizens reached.	# of citizens by target groups (espec. women & disadvantaged minorities) who have received informal civic ed. instruction.	Shows extent of outreach.	Lists maintained by CSOs implementing civic education programs.	# will increase relative to funding available for civic education.
Comments:				
2) # of CSOs engaged in civic ed. activities.	# of organizations (including both registered and informal groups) with civic ed. activities.	Shows plurality of civic ed. initiatives.	Self-administered questionnaire mailed to CSO administrators. Could probably do this more simply by asking select CSOs to name all the groups they can think of who do this. Cost: Low to medium.	Number will respond at least partly to the availability of donor funding for civic education.
Comments:				
3) % of CSOs with higher quality civic ed. programs.	% of organizations that: a) use participatory teaching methods; b) assign participants to civic ed. tasks	Shows quality of civic ed. initiatives.	Observation, interviews among sample of groups or among target groups. Cost: Medium	Increases can be interpreted as improvements in civic ed. quality.
Comments:				


Agency Objective 2.3: Increased Development of Politically Active Civil Society

Intermediate Result 2.3.5: Strengthened Democratic Political Culture
 Intermediate Result 2.3.5.3: Community-based Civic Action Programs Expanded

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Cost	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of civic action programs taken by target CSOs.	Number brought by civic action.	Shows type and variety of civic action.	Target CSO reports and interviews Cost: Low	May respond primarily to the availability of donor funding. A diversity of the types of action may be more important than the total number of actions.
Comments: Programs are civic education programs which organize citizens around real problems in their community.				
2) # of citizens reached by civic action programs undertaken by target CSOs.	# of citizens (by target group, espec. women & disadvantaged).	Shows extent of outreach by target CSOs	Target CSO records and interviews. Cost: Low to moderate, depending on # of CSOs and activities.	Increase = expanded outreach.
Comments:				
3) # of target CSOs engaged in civic action programs.	# of organizations with civic action programs.	Shows plurality of civic action organizations	Tracking by target groups. Cost: Low to medium, depending on # of CSOs targeted.	Increase = more plural sector.
Comments:				
4) % of targeted CSOs using innovative approaches to promote/carry out civic action programs at the community level.	# of targeted organizations: a) introducing new activities; b) testing untried methods	Shows innovation.	Surveys or interviews at target CSOs, plus observation/interviews/focus group sessions in participating communities. Cost: Medium to high, depending on # of target CSOs.	Increase = more innovation.
Comments:				

Section D: Governance

Results Framework



Definitions — Governance

Agency Objective 2.4. More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

The behavior of formal state institutions is an essential determinant of the degree of success or failure of developmental and democratic processes. Transparency requires that governments consult broadly to ascertain citizen interests, publicize plans and decisions, share information widely and in good time, and consistently act in an open manner. Accountability depends on governments taking full cognizance of, responding to, and being monitored by, organized public opinion. Transparency and accountability as defined here encompass the concept of responsiveness, and are served by sharing decision-making with local government entities (and with citizens by increasing the space for self-governance), respecting ethical standards, creating a constructive relationship between civilian and military authorities, enhancing the role of the legislature, and strengthening government performance in all stages of the policy process. Such behavior and institutional relationships support the long-term sustainability of democratic political processes and people's confidence in democratic principles. It also makes a vital contribution to promoting development and providing an encouraging environment for economic and social investment.

Intermediate Results 2.4.1. Increased Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level

Decentralization of government authority and responsibility can increase the competence and responsiveness of public agencies by reducing the burden on those at the center and allowing those most affected by an issue to make decisions about it. It enables citizens who are most directly concerned to influence decision-making by putting the source of the decision closer to them. The main focus of many programs to support democratic decentralization is on encouraging the devolution of authority to elected local governments that are directly accountable and therefore primarily responsible to local citizens; improving the effectiveness and openness of local governments; and increasing community involvement in local government decision-making and service delivery.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.1.1. Constitutional and Legal Reforms Devolve Power

The essential requirement for progress with devolution is that either by way of the constitution or other legal enactments, laws effectively transferring authority to elected local officials for a significant number of clearly defined governmental functions are passed and implemented, and respected by central government.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.1.2. Local Government Capability to Act Increased

Enabling legislation and implementation by central government will not ensure devolution of power. Effective devolution will occur when elected local governments have the necessary level of qualified personnel and financial resources to have the capability to formulate, implement, and enforce policy decisions, provide services efficiently and responsibly to citizen needs, and contribute significantly to their own recurrent and capital expenditures.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.1.3. Mechanisms of Participation Increased

For decentralization to be meaningful, local governments need to be democratic. Democracy at the local level includes regular competitive elections, opportunities for citizen participation through mechanisms such as town meetings and joint commissions, and the dissemination of financial and other kinds of information so that the public has the opportunity to study them before decisions are

made.

Intermediate Results 2.4.2. Increased Citizen Access to Improved Government Information

Access to information is important because it allows citizens to keep a watchful eye on government behavior. Perhaps even more significantly, it permits citizens to learn about government plans or actions that may be critical to their interests. Therefore, governments need to improve the quantity, quality and timeliness of the information that they make available to citizens and civil society organizations. In particular information about budgets, financial reports, bills, laws, tenders for contracts, recruitment opportunities and government services must be available to the public.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.2.1. Laws and Regulations Reformed

Passage and implementation of laws and regulations that require government to share information with the public on key issues establishes the basic standards for openness and accessibility in local government.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.2.2. Improved Dissemination of Information

Governments disseminate more, better, and more timely information to the public in various ways. These include advance information of public hearings to the public, the press, and civil society; full advertisement of jobs and contracts; information on public services; and by making budgets, financial reports, and other significant documents available in user friendly form to the public.

Intermediate Results 2.4.3. Ethical Practices in Government Strengthened

Strengthening those institutional mechanisms that exist to encourage ethical behavior and prevent corruption and abuse is also important. Improved transparency as discussed in 2.4.2 above is one important way of doing this. Other checks on formal state actors include civil service reform (i.e., restructuring incentives and punishments), limits on civil servants' discretion, strengthened audits and investigative functions, more effective internal procedures for enhanced oversight, improved operating systems in government institutions, and building a public constituency against corruption.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.3.1. Laws and Regulations Reformed

Basic standards for ethical conduct and practice can be established through a code of conduct for elected and government officials, freedom of information, and financial disclosure laws, and regulations defining corrupt practices and penalties for those who engage in such practices.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.3.2. Oversight Mechanisms to Maintain Ethical Standards Strengthened

To oversee the conduct of civil servants, governments maintain, and provide resources for an auditor-general's office, an inspector-general's office, an office of government ethics, and an independent anti-corruption agency. Effective oversight is demonstrated by regular professional auditing according to required standards of government agencies, in "findings" (indicating errors) of such audits that lead to full investigations and, if necessary, enforcement. Ethics in government will be enhanced further by the capacity of the legislature, the media, and specialized NGOs to monitor and publicize corruption.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.3.3. Professionalization of Staffing and Operations

Beyond laws and oversight mechanisms, high ethical standards and practices will be determined by the quality of the personnel and procedures of the public service. High quality is achieved through recruiting and promoting personnel based on competitive exams, paying competitive salaries, establishing sound financial management systems, and ensuring transparent and impartial service in licensing, procurement, and tax collection. Ultimately, the purpose of this more professional service is less corruption, less waste, and more efficient service to citizens.

Intermediate Results 2.4.4. Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

The military has overturned or compromised democratic rule in many developing countries. It often continues to control significant financial resources and productive assets during political transitions, enabling it to exercise power independently of civilian authorities. Therefore, changing the norms of the military and integrating these powerful players into a political process that operates according to different rules is an important requirement in ensuring the sustainability of democracy. Such change requires constructive dialogue between the military and civilians over the appropriate role for the military in a democratic society, respect by the military for civilian authority and enhanced civilian expertise in security matters. In some situations, it also depends upon the demobilization and re-integration into society of soldiers, particularly in states emerging from violent conflict.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.4.1. Constitutional and Legal Reform Authorize Civilian Role

The basis of civilian authority over the military and of a constructive civilian-military relationship is to be found in legislation clarifying responsibilities and relationships.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.4.2. More Accurate Information Publicly Available

Once formal legislation is in place, it is necessary for the government to make available to the public, the press, and civil society organizations accurate and useful information on the military. There will be some limitations on information that may threaten national security. The test of government willingness to provide good quality information will be observed not only in the documents that it issues, but also in public meetings, TV and radio/shows, and in newspaper articles analyzing the military and its role.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.4.3. Increased Civilian Competence in Defense and Security Affairs

Without greater civilian competence, the laws and the information alone will be of no use in improved oversight of the role of the military. For example, if the legislature is going to analyze the defense budget and national security policy, it needs to be qualified to do so. Therefore, for civilian authority to be respected by the military, responsive to the nation's security and defense concerns, capable of maintaining a constructive public debate, and making informed budgetary and policy choices, it is necessary to enhance competence in these areas among legislators, the media, and civil society organizations.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.4.4. Increased Civilian & Civil-Military Networking

In addition to making essential documentary information available to the public, governments should also share information and allow for public comment by holding open meetings for the public and joint commissions with civil society organizations.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.4.5. Reduced Size of Military-Security Forces

Reductions in the size of military and security forces, particularly in the wake of civil conflict, reduces the potential threat of these forces to civilian control, reduces cost, and makes it easier to reorient and professionalize the military. Reintegration into society is an important part of demobilization.

Intermediate Results 2.4.5. More Effective, Independent, and Representative Legislatures

In democratic systems, elected legislative bodies are fora where competing interests can be openly discussed and negotiated and important national decisions made about the use of public resources. By strengthening legislatures, citizens, through their representatives, are given greater access to the policy process and more influence over the behavior of the executive branch. In many countries, however, legislatures are relatively new and lack the competence or confidence to introduce legislation on their own. Legislatures need to serve both as checks on executive branch behavior and effective arenas in which citizens' interests can be raised and negotiated and conflict resolved. The role of the legislature in decision-making is enhanced by increasing its oversight of executive branch and military behavior, its influence over policy-making and the budget, and its ability to shape appropriate legislation. Its role as a representative body is enhanced by encouraging greater public access, that allows citizens to provide input and oversight.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.5.1. More Effective and Democratic Internal Management Systems

Improvement in internal management systems are both a requirement of an effective and autonomous legislature and a demonstration that it has the capacity to manage its own business. Such systems require enabling regulations and procedures which allow the legislature to operate effectively and democratically. "Effective management" depends on administrative and secretarial support, and might be reflected in agendas being published and salaries paid on time; and library and reference services, and electronic and other information systems being available and used, as demonstrated by better informed debate and legislative initiatives. "Democratic management" requires that all parties, majority and opposition, and where relevant, gender or community (minority ethnic or language or religious group) representatives receive equivalent resources and support. Efficient and democratic internal management of the legislature is an essential precondition to representation of the public, competent policy analysis and formulation, and to serving as an effective political counter-balance to the executive branch.

(Sub) Intermediate Results 2.4.5.2. Increased Legislative Capacity to Influence National Policy and Budget Priorities

Increased capacity to exert influence — both through contributing to formulation and overseeing implementation — of national policies and budgets requires regulations and procedures enabling the legislature to operate in an independent and democratic manner, sufficient time and information for full consideration of proposals and records of implementation, professional staff to assist in analysis and drafting, resources and authority to investigate and question the executive branch, and

an effective system of committee meetings (or some equivalent mechanism for legislative consideration or oversight). Such increased capacity will be observed in higher quality debates, more considered and constructive legislative initiatives and amendments, rigorous oversight hearings and effective action consequent upon those hearings.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.5.3. Increased Citizen Access to Legislative Processes

It is essential to transparency, accountability, and representation of the legislature that citizens, civil society organizations, and the media have substantial access to legislators and to the legislative process. Access for purposes of facilitating citizen “input” to legislative action can be realized through mechanisms such as public hearings that include the contributions of citizens and CSOs, joint commissions, town meetings, and through meetings between legislators and their constituents. Access for purpose of citizen “oversight” can be improved by reforms such as allowing citizens, CSOs, and the media to observe committee and plenary sessions; making available congressional records and records of joint meetings of legislators and citizens, and by allowing for in-depth analysis of legislative performance in periodicals; and by the development of NGOs that monitor the activities of legislatures and their members.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.5.4. Improved Capacity to Reconcile Societal Conflict in an Institutional Framework

Serious societal conflicts may result from ideological, historical, religious, or ethnic differences and may have led in some cases to violent conflict and/or a legacy of deep bitterness and mistrust. By allowing the antagonists to be represented in a national forum, to participate fully in debates, to have an input to policy-making and an opportunity to push their agenda within instructional rules and limits, and in some circumstances to see the value of compromise and coalition-building, the legislature framework has the potential to play a key role in helping to reduce or reconcile societal conflict, and begin to set precedents for peaceful rather than violent resolution of differences.

Intermediate Results 2.4.6. Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Whether it be through direct elections, as in the presidential system, or as leaders of the party that gains a majority in the legislature, as in the parliamentary system, the leadership of the executive branch, together with the cabinet and the bureaucracy over which it presides is a major actor in building and maintaining democratic and effective government institutions. The executive branch role in relationship to the legislature is key to effective governance — respecting and working with it as a full democratic partner in policy making, and accepting, and cooperating with it, in its executive oversight role. In its policy implementation role, the executive branch is required to provide leadership, oversight, and incentives that assure constructive intra-agency communication and cooperation among government departments, and ensure that the bureaucracy carries out its functions effectively and impartially, remains accessible to public participation, and accountable and responsive to both the legislature and the public. Finally, given its prestige and relatively greater autonomy to act, there are critical times when the leadership has a vital role in taking the initiative, for example, when democracy is threatened or conflicts may divide the nation.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.1. Rules Reformed for Making Policy Reform

Laws, rules, and regulations defining the division of responsibility for policy processes between the executive and other branches of government need to be passed and implemented.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.2. Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity Strengthened

Strengthened executive branch capacity in the various policy processes depends upon policy making skills such as policy analysis methodologies, resources, and personnel of the quality and in numbers sufficient to implement and oversee policy implementation, and a supportive legal and institutional framework for implementation.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.3. Intra-Governmental Consultation and Information Improved

Effective executive branch operations also require constructive intra-agency consultation and coordination and more accurate, timely and helpful information.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.4. Opportunities for Public Participation Increased

As with the legislative branch, the executive also needs to provide access to the public, citizens, and civil society organizations, to allow for public initiative, comment on and oversight of policy making and implementation.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.5. Executive Leadership in Enhancing Democracy

The executive branch, especially at the leadership level, tends in most countries to have very broad formal authority and discretionary power. Therefore it is not the intention to strengthen the executive role yet further. However, there are critical moments — possibly a strategic opportunity to augment democratic momentum, possibly when democracy is under threat — that executive leadership is critical.

(Sub) Intermediate Result 2.4.6.6. Executive Leadership in Resolving Divisive Conflicts

Following similar logic to 2.4.6.5 above, the capacity of the executive leadership to know when and how to intervene to prevent or resolve potentially divisive conflicts is also key.

Notes on Reading the Indicators Tables

The following categories of information are provided in the tables:

1. The statement of the indicator.
2. A definition of the indicator and its unit of measure.
3. The relevance of the indicator or why it was selected as a measure of that particular result.
4. Approaches to collecting data for the indicator and the approximate cost of collection. Three categories were used for cost: low (under \$500); medium/moderate (\$500 - \$1500); and high (over \$1500). The cost specifications are rough and should be treated cautiously, because costs may vary greatly from one country to the next. The cost of data collection for questions requiring surveys of the population (for example) will depend upon 1) the existence of periodic surveys which address the desired topics conducted by someone else; 2) the existence of surveys which do not address the desired topic but to which strategic objective teams could add questions; and 3) the need to conduct one's own surveys and the number of indicators for which that survey can serve as the data collection approach. Similarly, the cost for monitoring broadcasts or periodicals for specific content will depend on whether there is 1) a commercial monitoring service, which conducts monitoring for advertisers anyway, so fees can be very modest; 2) an NGO that uses this information for its own purposes anyway; or 3) a need to cover the entire cost of monitoring several periodicals and/or broadcast stations.
5. Issues related to target setting and the interpretation of trendlines. In this final column, we share what we have learned about how much progress might be made over what period of time. In some cases, such as changes in the level of political tolerance, we know very little. In other cases, it seems clear that an indicator should change sharply and immediately in the wake of particular interventions. We also discuss issues to be aware of in setting performance targets or in interpreting trendlines.
6. Not all categories will be discussed for every indicator. In some cases, the relevance of the indicator is clear and does not require any discussion. In other cases, we have little at this point to contribute to ideas about how to set targets.

Indicators

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.1: Increased Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
1) a) % citizens in target local govt. units who feel that local govt. is addressing their priority concerns; or b) % citizens showing confidence in their local government.	Same as indicators, disaggregated by gender, ethnic group, urban-rural or whatever divisions make sense.	These may be better contextual or planning indicators than they are program performance indicators, because the resource levels may need to be very high to affect confidence.	Sample survey of population in target local govt. units, stratified according to categories of disaggregation. Cost: High, unless a survey is being done for multiple indicators or questions can be added to another planned survey.	Both indicators should show gains as local government responsiveness grows. However, trendlines need careful interpretation. For example, they may not always reflect <i>actual</i> change, as there may be a lag time between actual change and <i>citizen awareness</i> of that change. Also, citizens may be influenced by extraneous factors such as changes in the economy or actions taken by the central government at the local level. There may be a possibility that higher levels of openness and transparency in new democracies could bring about a decline in confidence due to greater knowledge about problems.
Comments:				
2) % of eligible voters (male and female) voting in local elections.	Eligible refers to all adult citizens who are not excluded by law by reason of criminal record or insanity. It includes both registered and unregistered voters. % of eligible voters who vote. Recorded at each election. Can be disaggregated by ethnic group and gender if records are kept.	May be indirect measure of how citizens feel about the responsiveness of local govt.	Monitoring govt./local govt./records or/& NGO findings on registration & voting. Possibly (on a selective basis) working with local organizations to check on record keeping methods. Costs relate to ease & availability of records. May be affected by whether records are manual or computerized. Should not be a demanding undertaking, but depends on the credibility of local records.	Trend may be expected to jump at first, but it may reach a plateau and may very well decline after that. USAID should not be too ambitious since it does not have influence over voter interest & turnout; and a variety of factors may lead to lower turnouts. Voter turnout is difficult to interpret. Turnout could be high when an election is critical or the stakes seem very high and low when people feel very comfortable or good about the situation.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
3) # or % of women or minority elected local councilors (or members of task forces, joint commissions or other non-elected bodies set up to provide citizen input).	<p>Women or minority councilors — what constitutes a “minority” will be situational.</p> <p># or % of all elected members of the councils.</p> <p>After each election, unless some are appointed.</p>	<p>Diversity of representation on councils enhances democracy and likely increases chances of more equitable outcomes.</p> <p>This may be of general concern to USAID or it may only be so where USAID supports a program aimed at increasing women’s and minority representation.</p>	<p>Monitoring govt. or local govt. records.</p> <p>Cost: Should be easy to get information on men and women. In case of other categories, such as religion or ethnicity, definitions of identities and records may sometimes be less clear. If difficult, then it may be necessary to do interviews & therefore useful to work with a sample of local councils.</p>	<p>If programs to increase women’s representation and diversity are in place, then the trend should rise, but it is unlikely to be dramatic and could even go down after first successes; if there is no program in place, then it depends on local customs and on activism of local NGOs and numbers may not increase.</p>
Comments:				
4) a) # or % of major local govt. decisions in which input from participation mechanisms taken into account; or b) # or % of target local government units (LGUs) in which the majority of key decisions take into account citizen input.	<p>Same as indicators. Key decisions can be in target issue areas identified in advance. Participation mechanisms can include town meetings, joint commissions, etc.</p>	<p>Very important to assess whether citizens & NGOs are not only invited to meetings but that their views are having an influence.</p>	<p>Requires monitoring local council decisions, including the annual budget. If counting decisions, will need to be able to identify the base of total decisions in the year. Requires correlating citizen input with the decisions, so may need to interview NGOs, have minutes taken at town meetings, review joint commission reports, etc.</p> <p>Cost: Requires detailed and sustained attention and therefore could be fairly costly.</p>	<p>Should increase (probably rather slowly) as input from public improves and local govts. demonstrate increased willingness to listen and adapt policies.</p> <p>May be difficult to set an accurate target for a).</p>
Comments: A qualitative assessment will be needed to support the interpretation of any absolute numbers or percentages. Could also construct this indicator as a scale: no decisions take input into account; a few decisions take input into account; etc. A scale may be less labor-intensive than trying to track numbers of decisions.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
5) # or % of citizens who make use of, or are served by, programs, benefits, services of local councils.	Local citizens using or benefitting from services. # per annum per category of service. Disaggregation may be important here; depending on the community, this may refer to gender, class, ethnicity, or location.	Ultimately local govts. need to provide services to the public at a satisfactory level; this indicator demonstrates services are becoming more available and that citizens are benefitting or making the effort to make use of them.	Monitoring records of local govt. agencies which provide services such as electricity, garbage disposal, etc. Calculating the percentage will require good census data. May make sense to use households as the unit of measure for some kinds of services, such as water, sewage and garbage collection. Cost depends on quality of records. If these are reasonable, this should not be too demanding. May be demanding if records are poor and if one tries to observe too many councils & too many services. Disaggregation will obviously add to expense; how much will depend on the nature of the records. Suggest being selective.	If local govts. are serving communities better, this will increase over time. Initially, with the transfer of services to local governments, it may be ambitious enough to maintain service delivery at current levels. Wealthier communities will automatically do better at this indicator. Makes sense to set annual targets.
Comments: Rather than total numbers, it could be more important to look at equity issues and how local governments are serving poorer citizens.				
6) Service delivery indicators.	These can range from percentage of population satisfied with particular services to specific service measures such as number and percent of collection routes not completed on schedule, number of citizen complaints about a service per 1,000 households served, percentage of streets lit, number of water quality characteristics exceeding standards during the reporting period, etc.	Improvements in service or perception of quality of services.	Govt. records. Cost: Will vary according to indicator, quality, and degree of aggregation of records.	Will respond to attempts to improve efficiency and effectiveness of services. Perception of change may lag behind actual improvements.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
<p>7) Example(s) of decisions being taken at central govt. level as a consequence of pressure from either individual local govts. or organizations or associations of local govt. (See comments below.)</p>	<p>Example involves a clear demonstration that a branch of the central govt. exec took note of a petition or a visit by a delegation, a resolution, or some mobilization of opinion by local govts. and altered legislation or policy to conform to local request. The simplest unit of measurement would be: yes = central govt. did so respond; no = central govt. did not respond or had no occasion to respond.</p>	<p>Most local government measures focus on effectiveness of loc govt. at local level. This one seeks to assess whether local govts. are able to exert pressure upwards on central govt. and so represent the interests of citizens at the local level.</p>	<p>Interviews with key local govt. leaders, possibly to be confirmed by interviews with members of whatever branch or agency of central govt. that gave or was asked to give consideration to the petitions.</p> <p>Cost: This is not expected to be a frequent occurrence; and should require interviews with only leaders of local govts. or associations of local govt. It should therefore not be too demanding in terms of time or money.</p>	<p>A trend will be difficult to anticipate and may not make sense. In some years there may be more opportunities, and some years fewer. Rather it is important to detect whether central govt. takes note of, and acts, when local govts. make organized and effectively prepared petitions to it to do so. Therefore one would look forward to a consistent "yes" response as a target.</p>
<p>Comments: This indicator could be configured as the # or % of target LGUs that can name 2 or more decisions they have impacted at the central level in the previous 12 months. It might also be possible to put together a critical events agenda based on known issues that have come up between local government and central government. It could be useful to disaggregate local government associations from individual local govts.</p>				
<p>8) # of target local govt. units implementing investment or development plans a) with citizen input; and b) that meet quality criteria.</p>	<p>a) Criteria will need to be develop as to what constitutes adequate citizen input b) Quality criteria can be developed to meet local circumstances but might include clear objectives; priorities meet major needs; marginalized communities incorporated; revenue expectations to fund plan are realistic; etc. Each criteria could constitute a yes/no indicator worth one point.</p>	<p>Measures both openness to citizen input and dedication to quality service and planning. This is a high level indicator of meaningful citizen access because it focuses on <i>implementation</i> of investment plans.</p>	<p>Review of investment plans; interviews with govt. officials, NGOs, media.</p> <p>Cost: Medium, but depends on number of LGUs.</p>	<p>Would expect to see increases over a period of time. b) If the indicator were scaled with 10 criteria, each worth one point, could report on the number of LGUs which achieved a passing grade (i.e., 6 out of 10 points) or an excellent grade (i.e., 8 out of 10 points).</p>
<p>Comments: For b), see Appendix C information on score cards.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.1: Increasing Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level

Intermediate Result 2.4.1.1: Constitutional and Legal Reforms to Devolve Power

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
<p>1) # of key reforms passed in comparison with a list of recommended or promoted reforms.</p>	<p>Reform agenda established at outset, progress then measured in terms of achievement of items on agenda.</p> <p>See also legal reform milestone scale in Appendix C.</p>	<p>First & usually basic requirement (& test of central govt. commitment). Also answers the question whether there is an enabling environment. Therefore, it is necessary to note whether such laws are in place or which key aspects are in place. It has been observed that occasionally some of these powers are in effect devolved, or local govts. take responsibility, without or before such laws are passed.</p>	<p>Review of govt. documents, legislation &/or the constitution &/or an assessment of these documents by appropriately qualified persons.</p> <p>Cost: Low cost; requires annual monitoring of a few key documents and (if & when) in place should not require more attention.</p>	<p>Reforms could move forward all at once; or step by step, the sequence of steps depending on the local sensitivity of each and also on local capacity (i.e., transfer of power needs to relate to local capacity to use power well). Pace of change will also depend on pressure by civil society and by extent of donor programs & interest in bringing about change. If local govts. fail, a downward trendline may be expected as central govt. may reverse some of the legislation.</p>
<p>Comments: Necessary characteristics of reforms include: Scope of responsibilities clearly defined for each level; regular local elections with universal suffrage (there should be no provisions which have the effect of excluding women or minority groups); substantial scope of decision-making including budgetary authority; financial authority to raise & spend money commensurate with capacity and responsibility; appropriate number of tiers; equitable formula for allocation of revenues; & public access to local govt. information.</p>				
<p>2) a) # or % of laws which seek to devolve power being implemented by the central govt.; or b) level of implementation of key laws.</p>	<p>Laws which contain clauses which have the effect of devolving authority to local govt. "Implemented" means being carried out; that is, depending on requirements, that central govt. draws up & publishes regulations, stops collecting certain taxes or hiring certain personnel, transfers funds, or transfers funds under new conditions, stops intervening in certain decisions, etc.</p> <p>b) scaled measure of implementation (high, medium, low, non-existent).</p>	<p>Once laws are passed, the more important and more difficult step and test is their implementation in good faith by central govt.</p>	<p>Depending on the situation, this might require both monitoring of govt. records and communications (possibly in a ministry of interior or local govt., or finance or the president's office) & careful interviewing of key actors at all levels (both govt. and non-govt.). A scale could involve assessment by an expert panel.</p> <p>Cost: This might involve a medium to high level of investment of time as one might be watching fairly detailed changes in a number of locations. If local NGOs could be brought into the monitoring process, this might ease the responsibility. An expert panel would be comparatively less expensive but continuity in the panel would be required over time.</p>	<p>Trendline should rise but it might be a slow and tedious process. It will depend on central govt. or incumbent party's confidence & will to devolve authority, on past record of devolution in the country (it may have failed before), on religious and ethnic differences from region to region, & on local capacity to take on new responsibilities. While local capacity should not be used as an excuse for slowing down devolution, the pace of change must relate to local ability to use the new powers effectively & transparently.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
<p>3) a) # or % of target local govts. which note little or no interference in internal legislative affairs by the central government;</p> <p>or</p> <p>b) # or % of local councils' laws passed without hindrance from central government.</p>	<p>a) a scaled measure that marks the consensus of key local govt. officials concerning whether central govt. interference when the local govts. considers or passes a law is high, medium, low or non-existent. Would be useful to specify criteria for what constitutes a high level of interference (i.e., more than 6 times per year), etc.</p> <p>b) This indicator could focus on key laws or draft legislation. "Without hindrance" means without opposition from the central govt.</p>	<p>This is a test primarily of central govt.'s willingness to implement decentralization; in this case allowing local govts. to make decisions for which they have been given authority. The indicator could also reflect on local govt.'s capacity to draft laws & undertake new responsibilities.</p>	<p>a) Interviews with key local officials in target LGUs; interviewers would do the scaling;</p> <p>b) Reviewing central govt. & local govt. records to see how long decisions/confirmations of local govt. decisions took, or if there were examples of obstacles, and any reasons given. It will be necessary to interview key actors in local govt.</p> <p>Cost: a) may be less costly than b) If there are no central govt. impediments at all, data cost will be low. But more likely, it will take a medium level of effort to observe this, particularly where financial ceilings & checks have been built into the system. Help from partners or NGOs may be necessary.</p>	<p>As the "comments" section below notes, some level of central government oversight is merited. We would not expect oversight to fall to zero. We would hope for a declining trendline if there is heavy central government interference at the outset. It should be noted that if there is absolutely no central government interference or oversight, this could simply be a sign of a very weak and negligent central government and not of complete decentralization or central govt. contentment with quality of local govt. decisions. Meaning of this indicator will be contextual.</p>
<p>Comments: Not all monitoring or reasonable delays to check on legislation should be seen as "hindrance"; the early process of decentralization might involve a certain amount of "paternalistic" monitoring of expenditures over a certain amount; or prevention of local discrimination against minorities might require this. It could be informative to look at the content of laws rejected to see if there is a pattern at the local or central level of discrimination against women and/or other minority groups.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.1: Increasing Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level

Intermediate Result 2.4.1.2: Local Government Capability to Act Increased

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. Costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Degree to which legislative authority transferred to local councils to levy local taxes and fees.</p>	<p>Yes/no by category of taxes and fees. Could be measured on scale of none, very limited insufficient, sufficient, etc. or could set up a list of categories of taxes & fees w/points assigned to each category (either weighted or 1 pt. per category).</p>	<p>Although a subset of measures of central govt. willingness, it is so essential to the process that it may be worth separate focus.</p>	<p>Monitoring of legislative enactments & related rules & regulations. Could be by an NGO or independent panel of experts.</p> <p>Cost: Should be relatively easy, since this focuses on laws & rules and not on actual amounts raised.</p>	<p>Change may occur all at once in the initiating legislation; or trendline should rise but it might be a slow and tedious process. It will depend on central govt. or incumbent party's confidence & will to devolve authority, on past record of financial behavior by local councils (they may have failed before), & on local capacity to take on new revenue raising responsibilities. While local capa-city should not be used as an excuse for slowing down transfer of authority to mobilize resources, the pace of change must relate to local ability to use the new powers effectively & transparently.</p>
<p>Comments: Local expertise necessary to determine which are more important sources of revenues necessary to meaningful decentralization.</p>				
<p>2) % of all local govt. staff completing skill training courses who say they are using their new skills on the job.</p>	<p>Elected officials and civil servants who have been trained and who say that they are using their new skills on the job. (They should be required to provide examples of how they are using it.) (Disaggregation by gender & other social categories may be informative.)</p>	<p>A fairly low level indicator. One indication of local govt. capacity to effectively serve the local public is the skill level of its salaried staff. Direct measure of the outcomes of training.</p>	<p>Monitoring local govt. or training institution personnel & training records. Survey should be no earlier than 3 - 6 months after training. Could do a sample survey if number of trainees is large enough. Directly relevant to trainers' planning of additional training.</p> <p>Cost: Medium but depends on the numbers trained and whether a census of sample survey is done.</p>	<p>If the training is high quality, the percentage should be high, unless there are institutional barriers to using skills.</p>
<p>Comments: Could expand this indicator to include recipients of technical assistance.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. Costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>3) a) Average % of local govt. middle and senior level civil servants hired by local govts. or local govt. public service commission; or b) % of local govts. in which the majority of middle and senior level civil servants are hired by local govt.</p>	<p>Personnel recruited by local govt. out of total number of such personnel (assumption that the rest are recruited by central govt.). Could be refined to include only more important posts or posts in particular sectors (public finance, public security, etc.).</p>	<p>Indicates that central govt. has given this authority to local govts. and has confidence that local authorities can make the choices based on merit of individuals and programmatic need (it is fairly common for central govt. to continue appointing personnel, especially key persons); and shows that in practice local govts. are hiring their own staff including their senior staff.</p>	<p>Monitoring central govt. PSC or local govt. PSC or local council's personnel records, or govt. gazettes or newspapers in which posts are advertised. Latter may not give complete information.</p> <p>Cost: Should not be a heavy responsibility, but will depend on accuracy & timeliness of records and whether they are centrally maintained or not. Poor records will add to the burden.</p>	<p>As with many aspects of local government, it will depend on central will and local resources and performance. Should change all at once or in substantial increments in response to legislation or policy changes.</p>
<p>Comments: There is a possibility of great difference between local govts. of the main urban city & the poorest rural district. Possibly a median might be more appropriate than an average or some other refinement might need to be added.</p>				
<p>4) Incorporation of merit principles, based on the following 3 (illustrative) questions: a) Are there merit principles in place b) are there clear job descriptions in place for key positions; and c) # complaints about violations of merit principles in hiring.</p>	<p>a) and b) yes/no. Posts covered may vary but should take into account: seniority, training, professional requirements; education; & decision-making power. Merit is to be distinguished from non-transparent recruitment process which may allow personal whim, nepotism, old-boy networks, discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, etc.</p>	<p>Indicates improvement in local government capacity and transparency in a number of ways: has the capacity to analyze and define job descriptions; to reduce personal whim etc., in recruitment process; and promises better results because of improved level of staff.</p>	<p>Document review (merit principles and job descriptions, and complaints); interviews. Indicator c) requires that a system for registering complaints be in place.</p> <p>Cost: Likely to require a medium level of effort.</p>	<p>Changes will depend partly on political will and partly on capacity to develop comprehensive job descriptions, manage hiring process & availability at local level of qualified personnel, and local leaders' acceptance of merit principles. If systems are new, complaints may be high for a period of time but then should decline. There are always likely to be some complaints. Whether prospective job applicants choose to complain or not will depend partly on whether they know about merit principles. No complaints may equal lack of public knowledge, not perfect merit hiring.</p>

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. Costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
Comments:				
5) a) % local civil service positions which are advertised or posted; or b) % of local government staff who are replaced after local elections.	As noted in the indicator but out of all positions filled during the year. May wish to limit to target local govt. units. Positions could be limited to certain sectors or top posts.	While the two indicators are very different, they are both trying to demonstrate the extent of merit hiring.	Local govt. records. Cost: Medium, if records exist in some form. Depends to some extent on the number of target local govts..	Would like to see a rising trendline on a) but will never reach 100%. b) If starts high, would hope for a decline but may not be steady trendline. Would hope to maintain at some minimal level.
Comments:				
6) % of total local revenue generated by local govt.; or Dollar amount of local revenue generated by local government.	Revenue refers to all the financial resources used for capital & recurrent expenditure by local govts. Generated means collected or raised by local govt. If using dollar amount, should compare increases with inflation rate.	Another essential measure of meaningful decentralization and local govt. capacity to operate. Weak generation of local resources has been a major limitation on local govts.' autonomy & is sometimes used as a rationale for continued central govt. control.	Review of financial records of Central Govt. (there may be one ministry that keeps records on local govts.) &/or of local govts.; budgets. If there are many local govts., it may be necessary to look at records of a representative sample. Costs: Such records are probably available & therefore this should not be a demanding activity. Poor records probably accompany weak local mobilization, and this will make the task more demanding.	Trendline should rise in aggregate, but it will depend on sources agreed to by central govt., capacity of local govt. to collect, state of the economy; and there are likely to be major discrepancies between richer and poorer areas of the country. "Dollar Amount" may be more appropriate than the % in cases in which local government is generating more revenues but the central govt. is also transferring more revenues. If central govt. transfers go up at the same time, the percentage could stay level. Practical & useful to measure annually.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. Costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
7) % of locally generated revenue retained locally.	Revenue refers to all revenue raised locally through taxes, licenses, user charges, etc. & not sent to central govt.	Significant measure of central govt.'s willingness to allow local govt.'s to take over substantial responsibilities & reward them for collection.	Review of financial records of central govt. (there may be one ministry that keeps records on local govts.) &/or of local govt.'s budgets. If there are many local govts., it may be necessary to look at records of a representative sample. Cost: Such records are probably available & therefore this should not be a demanding activity. Poor records probably accompany weak local mobilization, and this will make the task more demanding.	Trendline should rise as long as central government commitment to devolution continues and loc govt. capacity to mobilize resources improves. Increases may correspond to legal changes. Practical & useful to collect annually.
Comments:				
8) a) % of centrally collected revenue delivered to, for use by, local govts.; or b) \$ amount.	Revenue refers to total financial resources collected by central govt.; % refers to that proportion allocated/ guaranteed <i>and</i> delivered to local govts.;	Almost everywhere even strong local govts. receive some subventions from central govt. The percentage is an indicator of central govt. will to allow local govts. to be effective; and also points to the likelihood that local govts. will manage their work effectively.	Review of financial records of Central Govt. (if there is a ministry that keeps records on local govts.) &/or of local govts.; central govt. budget will provide information on projected allocation to local govts.; loc govt. budgets should provide info expected allocations from central govt. Cost: Relatively easy.	Trend should be upwards. It is possible that if the % is satisfactory that the amount (controlling for inflation) may become more relevant. While the percentage is a good measure in most circumstances, it is also possible, although not likely, that the amount might rise but the percentage go down because of a substantial increase in the size of the total budget. Increases in the dollar amount should take into consideration the inflation rate. Practical & useful to collect annually.
Comments:				
9) a) # times/# months government transfers fall into arrears; or b) % local govt. salaries in arrears or average # months not paid on time or not paid at all.	a) # times per annum transfers are late or not made and/or (average) number of months transfers fall behind. b) by number of salaries and not \$ amount, or average number of months that salaries are not paid within x days of the due date.	The timeliness of transfers can have a huge impact on local government functioning.	Government records, interviews with local government staff. Cost: Medium, depending on number of target local govts. working with.	Would hope to see improvements in timeliness but may reflect on national government capacity, something a local govt. strategy is likely to do little to improve. If the problem is political will, there could be a big improvement and then a leveling off. There may or may not be regional differences in terms of when transfers are made.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. Costs	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
10) a) % of (target) local govts. improving collection of taxes by at least x%; or b) tax collection rate.	a) Out of total owed taxes. Threshold improvement % can be set in accord with local circumstances. b) % of selected owed taxes that are actually collected.	Indicates local govt. more effective in collecting taxes and probably that it is providing more effective services and therefore that taxpayers may be more willing or used to paying.	Review of local govt. tax records. The less accurate these are in terms of potential taxpayers and payment, the less useful the records are for this purpose. Cost: If records are good, then this should not be time consuming. If they are not that good, it will take more time. If they are poor, then it is probably not feasible to collect.	Trend should be upwards, but usual list of factors will affect the trend. Target should allow for impact of inflation and actuals should be interpreted in comparison with the inflation rate. In order to discern changes, should be collectable every two years.
Comments:				
11) a) Ratio of capital to recurrent expenditure; or b) # target LGUs improving the ratio.	Usually budgets divided into recurrent expenditures (on-going, salaries, maintenance of services) & capital investment (new plant, facilities, equipment). Ratio of capital to recurrent.	Indicates that local govts. are able to raise revenues that go beyond the demands of recurrent expenditure and also able to plan for larger projects on a multi-year basis. Also demonstrates efficiency. If salary rolls are padded, recurrent expenditure will take up large chunk of budget, allowing few resources for investment.	Review of recurrent and capital parts of the budgets of local govts. provide good data. But annual expenditure reports will be more accurate as they provide information on actual as opposed to projected expenditure. May be an issue with the timeliness of data. Cost: Providing there are such records, this should not be difficult. If information is consolidated by one govt. agency, this would make it even easier. If it is not and there are many local govts., then it may be necessary to focus on a sample only.	Trend should be upward in aggregate, but will vary between richer and poorer areas, and from year to year within the same local govt. Collectable every year or two.
Comments:				
12) a) % (target) local govt. units that belong to a local govt. association; b) level of financial support to local govt. associations by (target) local govt. units.	a) As in indicator. b) in USD.	Local govts. will have more impact on central govt. decision-making if they join together and work through associations.	Association records. Cost: Should be nominal.	The association may only be effective if membership reaches a critical mass. Once it is perceived as successful, it should attract additional members. If there are a number of competing associations, then these indicators may not be helpful. b) Increases in the dollar amount should take into consideration the inflation rate.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions
 Intermediate Result 2.4.1: Increasing Government Responsiveness to Citizens at the Local Level
 Intermediate Result 2.4.1.3: Mechanisms of Participation Increased

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
1) a) % of local government elections that are failed elections; or b) % of local government units in which competitive elections are held regularly.	a) Failed elections are those which are not free or fair. The definition may be expanded to include problems with violence, and perhaps refusal by some to accept the results. b) "Regularly" needs to be defined in each situation, depending on the electoral structure.	Competitive elections in which numerous candidates sponsored by different organizations (possibly but not necessarily parties) compete, in which local issues are emphasized, and voters are free to choose, there is no intimidation, are an essential and obvious requirement of democracy at local level.	Requires monitoring of nominating process, campaigns, & elections. If local credible monitoring organizations are in place, they should be relied upon. If not, international organizations &/or donor(s) will need to be very selective in number of places observed. In some conditions — possibly first time or very strategic election — international organizations could play an active observation role. Cost: If local organizations are in place this should not be a heavy responsibility; if they are not, then it may be a more serious undertaking in terms of effort and money. Local level manipulation of elections may be far more difficult for outsiders to understand than national elections. It is suggested that use be made of local organizations & donors augment their work in a few key selected locales.	a) The trendline should decline, as more localities hold satisfactory elections. b) The trendline should rise at first. It is possible that over time a plateau will be reached.
Comments: For additional elections indicators, see Section B on political processes, Tab 7.				
2) a) total # or average # of people attending town meetings organized by local govt.; or b) % of local govts. holding more than x town meetings in the last year with more than Y people attending.	a) Participants can be disaggregated by gender but may be difficult to do by ethnic group. or b) % of target local govts.; threshold for number of town meetings and average # participants annually can be set according to local conditions.	One important mechanism for allowing public participation in local decisions. Town meetings must be well advertised in good time, held in convenient place and time, and open to whole community.	Observation of some or all meetings or interviews with non-govt. & govt. informants; likely that local NGOs may monitor and keep records. A systematic sample of meetings &/or of local govts. might be used. Cost: Depends on how many meetings and how many communities are observed. Need not be too heavy especially if reliable NGOs can act as informants.	If there is a legacy of hostility or distrust or low expectations, the trend might move up slowly; if there is new excitement, it may move more quickly and then might decline. Participation will also depend on the importance of the issues and how controversial they might be.
Comments: Another possibility is to count the percentage of (target) local govts. making regular use of legally-provided participation mechanisms. "Regular" would need to be defined. Another option might be the % of citizens (male/female) who can name at least two mechanisms for participation. This measures knowledge of ways to participate rather than actual participation. It would be expensive to collect this data unless a survey were being conducted to gather other data. If a survey is being done anyway, actual participation rates can be examined. Keep in mind that in heavily rural and largely illiterate societies, participation rates (except in elections) may be low. Significant change could be difficult to bring about.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. Issues
3) a) # of meetings of joint citizen-local council commissions/ boards; and b) # of joint boards.	Meetings of joint commissions (names will differ) in which citizens or NGOs have significant membership (m/f & ethnic group participation should be recorded). # of meetings per annum and number of boards.	Another potentially useful mechanism for citizen or NGO participation. Breadth of representation should be considered.	Observation of some or all meetings or interviews with non-govt. & govt. informants; likely that local NGOs may monitor and keep records. A systematic sample of meetings &/or of local govts. might be used. Cost: Depends on how many meetings and how many communities involved.	Trend should be upwards, as this is usually a novel mechanism and fewer people who have a more focused interest are likely to be involved. It should be anticipated that a ceiling will be reached after a while. Makes sense to measure annually.
Comments:				
5) Budgets/financial reports of local councils available in good time to councillors, the public, the media and NGO; or b) # or % of councils that bring out these materials in time.	1) a) Budgets are available x weeks prior to approval (yes/no); 2) At least one fora for public discussion of the budget is held, with due notice given (yes/no); and 3) Financial reports are made available no later than x months after the close of the reporting period (yes/no). b) The # of target councils that satisfy definitions of timely publication of these materials.	These are complex documents but among the most important. It is essential that various parts of govt. and civil society have time to read and prepare for discussion.	Monitoring local govt. records and checking with NGOs & the media. In the case of many councils, it may be necessary to focus on a representative sample. Cost: Depends on how comprehensive the coverage will be. But these involve only a few key events a year, and it should not be too time consuming to follow this in some local councils.	As capacity of local councils improves and willingness to open these materials for public viewing and participation, this situation should improve with time, but it is likely to take time.
Comments:				
6) a) Internal & external audits of local govt. expenditures a) takes place in accordance with required schedules and b) are published and available or c) # or % of local govts. in which both a) and b) above are met.	Audits accord with national audit standards & full information disclosure. a) and b) Yes/no. or c) % of local govts. that satisfy these requirements, a) + b) out of all local govts.	Key aspect of transparency. Citizens require information in order to be able to participate.	Monitoring the records of local councils or central govt. ministry responsible for local govt. &/or auditing firms. Cost: If this system is working at all, records will be available & the effort should not be heavy. If there are no records, the system is probably not working.	If there are programs in place which have govt. support then the situation should improve steadily (depending on govt. will, training of auditors, resources available to pay external auditors). Eventually this should occur in all local govts. Makes sense to measure annually.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.2: Increased Citizen Access to Improved Government Information

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline
1) Citizens believe they have adequate information on political & economic issues and on key aspects of government proceedings/activities.	% of citizens who answer survey question(s) that they are satisfied that the govt. is providing adequate information (in terms of accuracy & sufficiency). Disaggregated by gender and other relevant categories.	Indicates level of public confidence in govt. information about its own proceedings and public servants.	Sample survey of the public. Sample to include social categories relevant to disaggregation such as men and women. Cost: Expensive if USAID has to carry out the survey itself; less expensive if items can be included in a survey carried out by a local organization or if USAID itself is doing a survey for several DG indicators.	Findings should be treated with care & will need expert interpretation, i.e., open information about mismanagement or corruption will probably cause negative rather than positive feelings among the public. Useful to collect every two or three years.
Comments:				
2) Journalists believe that govt. is providing them with full opportunity to observe & pursue issues or other key user groups believe.	% or (possibly) panel of informed political correspondents and editors who feel confident that they are able to cover & investigate most of the important public concerns.	If the press is reasonably satisfied, then it probably shows that govt. agencies are making a serious effort to open up records and proceedings to the public.	Annual interviews with key informed members of the press or a survey. It is important to include representatives of the independent and opposition press. Cost: Selective interviews with key informants should not be costly in time or money; a survey would be more so but still not overly expensive.	Even if level of openness rises trendline may rise and fall depending on the sensitivity of issues, govt. confidence, and press track record in dealing with investigations. Useful to collect every year or two.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.2: Increased Citizen Access to Improved Government Information

Intermediate Result 2.4.2.1: Laws and Regulations Reformed

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1a) Laws and regulations requiring government information sharing on key issues are in place; or b) improvements made in the requirements for information sharing compared to a list of reforms promoted.</p>	<p>Key areas include requirements for freedom of information, holding of public meetings, open records and reports, information on availability of services, and on-going administrative investigations. Could be yes/no; or there could be score against a checklist of desired laws.</p>	<p>Rules requiring govt. ministries to hold public meetings, allow for public input are an essential basis for access to information. Increasing the number of situations which govt. has to open proceedings to the public & press indicates improved environment for citizen access.</p>	<p>Monitoring of govt. documents, and/or laws and/or regulations. Cost: Low.</p>	<p>General rules for all govt. departments could be established fairly rapidly; specific rules for different ministries and situations might increase incrementally.</p>

Comments: See also the legal reform scale in Appendix C.

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.2: Increased Citizen Access to Improved Government Information

Intermediate Result 2.4.2.2: Improved Dissemination of Information

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # or % of occasions (for which it is required to do so) for which govt. agencies provide adequate notice of public hearings.	"Adequate" will vary according to the complexity and length of materials to be read; "customers" should be consulted on what is reasonable & realistic taking account of normal constraints on govt. time.	Advance notice is first indication of govt. sincerity about opening up investigations, deliberations, etc. to the public and to interest groups. Also indicates sufficient advance planning about information dissemination by govt. agencies.	Monitoring of govt. agencies that are required to hold public hearings or select agencies. Interview key NGO leaders. Cost: Might be costly if there are many opportunities for public hearings and it is a large country; would be relatively inexpensive if select agencies only are observed.	Should show positive trendline especially if there is a focus and programmatic support, but may differ from ministry to ministry.
Comments:				
2) # or % of occasions (for which they are required to do so) for which govt. agencies provide adequate notice to the press of public hearings	As above; "adequate" depends on circumstances, but press needs less time than organizations that need to respond.	Advance notice to the press is an indication of govt. sincerity about opening up investigations, deliberations, etc. and informing the broad public.	Monitoring of govt. agencies that are required to inform the press or only select agencies. Interview key press people. Cost: Inexpensive if kept to select agencies and if good use is made of key informants in the press.	Should show positive trendline especially if there is a focus and programmatic support, but may differ from ministry to ministry.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) # of target agencies; (or % of agencies out of those required to do so; or in a specific locality; or functional area) providing full information to the public about the services they are required to deliver.	Information provided in good time and through a variety of channels accessible to different types of communities; i.e., through mass media, including radio, govt. notice, extension officers, health officers, or to relevant NGOs and in relevant languages could develop an index, if useful.	It is essential that the public knows what it has the right to expect from a govt. agency; it gives the public some basis to judge services; and puts pressure on agency to live up to promise.	Monitoring of govt. agencies (or a sample of select ones) that are required to inform the public; interviews with key NGO leaders. It may be necessary to rely on a qualitative review of the information provided. Cost: The more comprehensive, the more expensive; suggest focusing on select sample of agencies and functions.	Trend might rise at first and then possibly decline if difficulties are caused or govt. is embarrassed by press informing public of errors or wastage.
Comments:				
4) # or % of govt. jobs advertised in a set number and category of news channels and in good time.	# or % of jobs fulfilling this requirement out of all jobs at these levels to which people are recruited. # and type of channels and adequacy of time should be worked out locally in consultation with govt. public service commission and NGOs.	Full, timely advertisement of recruitment opportunities and procedures is a first and key step in open recruitment procedures.	Monitoring of govt. requirements concerning recruitment, govt. documents, media and locales for adverts. Cost: The more comprehensive the more expensive; possibly look at select sample of levels of employment; or check if other interested actors (NGOs, opposition parties) are monitoring.	If govt. is becoming more transparent, the trendline should be up, but this will depend on political will of govt., strength of patronage systems, ethnic differences, alternative employment opportunities in the private sector, etc.
Comments:				
5) # or % of govt. contracts or % of monetary amount of govt. contracts advertised in a set number and category of media channels.	Procedures, channels of publicity, and required time should be worked out in consultation with govt. contracts office and business community.	Full, timely advertisement of bids/tenders for govt. contracts is a first and important step towards open govt. bidding and contract system; reduces opportunities for corruption.	Monitoring of govt. requirements concerning contract, govt. documents, media and locales for adverts. Cost: The more comprehensive the more expensive; possibly look at select sample of possibly larger contracts; or check if other interested actors, particularly business persons, but also NGOs & opposition parties, are monitoring.	If govt. is becoming more transparent, the trendline should be up, but this will depend on political will of govt., strength of patronage systems, ethnic differences, alternative sources of contracts in the same lines of business.
Comments: Qualitative assessment by experts, NGOs or business persons of general trend.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) Budgets available in good time to legislators, the public, the media, and civil society.	Actual time will vary, depends on local view of what constitutes enough time to give full consideration. Once time set, then this could be a simple yes/no, or it could measure how late it is by weeks or days.	Budget is possibly the most important govt. policy document; the more information is available the better - key groups must have time to consider it fully.	Monitor legislative documents & records. Consult stakeholders about what constitutes adequate time. Cost: Relatively easy as this is a key document.	Trendline should show decrease in difference between satisfactory time and time of actual delivery. Pace of difference will depend on increased competence and political will of staff and legislators to open access of key documents to the public.
Comments: With reference to budget information, progress could also be measured by the type of budget produced, from line item (least informative) to program (more informative) to performance (most informative).				
7) Financial reports on govt. expenditures available in good time to legislators, the public, the media, & civil society.	Actual time will vary, depends on local view of what "constitutes enough time to give full consideration." Once time set, then this could be a simple yes/no, or it could measure how late it is by weeks or days.	Financial reports are very important govt. policy documents; the more information is available the better, key groups must have time to consider it fully.	Monitor legislative documents & records. Consult stakeholders and experts about what constitutes enough time. Cost: Relatively easy as these are key documents.	Trendline should show decrease in difference between satisfactory time and time of actual delivery. Pace of difference will depend on increased competence and political will of staff and legislators to open access of key documents to the public.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.2: Increased Citizen Access to Improved Government Information

Intermediate Result 2.4.2.3: Improved Civilian Competence

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. cost	Target setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of well publicized govt. meetings open to citizens & citizen groups (functional areas/ministries of significant relevance to be selected).	Govt. meetings might include one type such as town hall meetings, or might include a variety of types of open meetings. To be "open," meetings should be held at times and places which make them accessible to, or do not exclude women &/or potentially marginalized groups.	Indicates citizens have been made aware of opportunity, opportunity is "real," and they have sufficient interest to participate.	Monitor records of govt. agency(ies) or of relevant NGOs or the press. Cost: Depends on how many opportunities there are for such meetings; possible to focus on more significant public issues.	Trendline should rise; it may decline if political tensions increase or the public become apathetic or feel that it makes no difference. May be difficult to set an accurate target for # meetings.
Comments:				
2) # of joint commission meetings between govt. & civil society (functional areas/ministries of significant relevance to be selected).	Number of public-private commissions or number of times that all such commissions meet to discuss substantial issues ex education, health.	Indicates govt. open to sharing plans, information, & ideas with and listening to civil society or key informed individuals.	Monitoring govt. records or through contacts with relevant NGOs or key informants who participate in joint commissions. Cost: It depends on number of meetings and complexity of political and govt. system; if no local organization monitors, then possibly a select group of issues should be followed.	Trend should increase although in the medium term the quality of the interchange and the influence of the private citizens and of the commissions will be more important than the number of meetings.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.3: Ethical Practices in Government Strengthened

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) Public perceptions of corruption in the delivery or provision of selected gov't. services, as reported in opinion polls.	% of population (disaggregated if possible and judged relevant) perceiving corruption as a serious problem.	Relevant, because although these measures are subjective, they are derived from surveys of either the general public or most relevant client groups; i.e., property tax payers, water users, and business persons (whose assessments can indirectly affect flows of international private capital). However, perception may not always track closely with reality.	Survey. Cost: High if data must be collected by USAID. Low to medium if data could be collected as part of other surveys, particularly by local market research organizations. Very low to zero if surveys are undertaken by other organizations.	This will need to be set and interpreted with care. It is possible with increased openness and more media attention that public perception may be more negative at first. Targets might need to take this into account at first and then look to improvements. Targets could be set at intervals of 3 to 5 years by specifying some desired amount of change since first benchmark survey.
Comments:				
2) Perceptions of corruption by surveys of businesses or firms attempting to do business with the state.	% of owners or managers of registered businesses (representing different sectors and sizes, and if relevant ethnic/religious or regional populations) perceiving corruption as a serious problem.	Highly relevant, because although these measures are subjective, they are derived from surveys of an important and interested client groups, (whose assessments can indirectly affect flows of international private capital).	Survey or sample surveys. Cost: Since sample is small and targeted, this would cost less than a public opinion survey. Would be even less expensive if part of another survey.	Targets will need to be set and interpreted with care. It is possible with increased openness and more media attention that business people's perceptions may be more negative at first. Targets might need to take this into account at first and then look to improvements. Targets could be set at intervals of 3 to 5 years by specifying some desired amount of change since first benchmark survey.
Comments:				
3) a) Time and b) real cost to customers of getting a license(s) from a selected gov't. regulatory or licensing agency (ies).	Time would be from the moment of application to the moment of receipt of the license. Real cost would include cost of license, cost of "extra" payments such as bribes, time given a financial value and transportation. Disaggregation by social category might be informative since marginalized or minority groups are often more vulnerable.	Viewed from the perspective of the customer, these two measures are a very useful method of detecting improvements in management and reduction in corrupt practices.	This will require a decision about which are key areas of licenses, and then interviews (or a survey) with a cross section (i.e., rich/poor, men/women, ethnic groups) of the public involved in obtaining licenses. Cost: There may be records which, if reliable, would make it relatively easy. But in most cases findings would need to be confirmed through interviewing the relevant public, and this could certainly take time.	Trendline could be expected to decrease. One should keep in mind that trends will also depend on good management and not only on reduction in corruption; and also that an improvement in services may lead to increased demand and that may once again increase delays.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.3: Ethical Practices in Government Strengthened

Intermediate Result 2.4.3.1 Laws and Regulations Reformed

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Does country have a code(s) of conduct and other necessary supportive and legally binding rules and regulations requiring ethical behavior of elected and govt. officials? or Improvements made in the legal requirements aimed at strengthening ethics compared to a list of requirements promoted.</p>	<p>Code and other regulations and laws specify and prohibit any forms of behavior regarded as unethical, illegal, involving a conflict of interest, or otherwise incompatible with holding office; stipulates procedures and agencies responsible for investigation, arbitration, and enforcement; provides protection for 'whistle-blowers'; guarantees independence of the main monitoring agencies; and includes freedom of information act and financial disclosure laws. Could be simple binary (i.e., yes or no) indicators of a factual nature; or could be set up as some kind of quantitative indicator comparing laws passed to laws proposed.</p>	<p>Highly relevant, because without such codes there is no formal statement of inappropriate or illegal behavior and thus no standards of ethical behavior.</p>	<p>Review of country's constitution and principal statutes. Cost: Low. Questions can easily be answered in a short period through efforts of one or two mission staff.</p>	<p>If country has no statutes at time of initial review, targets could be set for the end of some specified period when relevant codes of conduct would be on books.</p>
<p>Comments: See also legal reform scale in Appendix C.</p>				
<p>2) Does the country have freedom of information and financial disclosure laws?</p>	<p>Refers to laws requiring govt. to provide and give public access to information, including a law requiring financial disclosure of major transactions including procurement & expenditures. Could be yes/no; or it could be scored against a number of desired reforms.</p>	<p>Laws requiring govt. to provide information to the public are essential legal instrument that gives the public, the media, & CSOs the right to demand information; and lets govt. officers know that full disclosure will be required.</p>	<p>Perusal of government laws and regulations. Cost: Low.</p>	<p>These are a test of govt. commitment to disclose information and reduce corruption. If govt. is so committed, these should be passed rapidly; if not, they will not be passed, or passed with limitations. The trend will then depend on an interplay of ruling party/govt. determination to limit openness and opposition and/or civil society determination to increase it.</p>
<p>Comments: See also legal reform scale in Appendix C.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions
 Intermediate Result 2.4.3: Ethical Practices in Government Strengthened
 Intermediate Result 2.4.3.2: Oversight Mechanisms to Maintain Ethical Standards Strengthened

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) Does the country maintain an independent (a) auditor-general's office or equivalent organization that regularly (i.e., annually) audits govt accounts; (b) inspector-general's office that regularly monitors govt. contracting & procurement practices; (c) office of govt. ethics to monitor and implement the code of ethics in govt; d) anti-corruption agency to provide public education about, prevent breaches of, and enforce all laws, codes, etc. regulating corrupt practices?	Simple binary (i.e., yes or no) indicators of a factual nature for each of the four offices. Names of offices and division of responsibility will vary from country to country but accounting, procurement, ethics, and corruption all need to be monitored.	Highly relevant, because without the existence of independent institutions for the purpose of exercising oversight over govt. departments, there is no check on potential illegal or unethical activity by public officials.	Review of country's laws and structure of govt. Cost: Low. Can be done quickly by USAID mission staff.	If country does not have any of these three offices or equivalent at the of time of initial review, targets could be set for the end of some specified period when such institution could be established and functioning.

Comments:

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
2) Availability of adequate resources providing for the existence & staffing of offices of an auditor-general, an inspector-general, ethics or anti-corruption.	Simple binary (i.e., yes or no) indicators of a factual nature for each of the four offices. Names of offices and division of responsibility will vary from country to country but accounting, procurement, ethics, and corruption all need to be monitored. Obviously defining "adequate" will be problematic; but there should be resources for office space, professional staff, communications facilities, investigative/monitoring & arbitration capacity. (A money amount spent each year on these offices may be one simpler and only partial way of measuring this.)	Follow on to the above. Resources are essential to effective monitoring of ethics, and also indicate govt. seriousness of purpose.	As above and in addition govt. budget and annual expenditure reports. Cost: Not heavy commitment, but will require some care to check on financial documents.	As above, but presumably might take longer. Also actual amounts will vary from year to year depending on overall govt. policies, revenues, & expenditures.
Comments:				
3) Administrative capacity of the auditor-general's, inspector-general's, ethics & anti-corruption offices' equal to the task.	Example: for auditor general a) Adequate number of appropriately trained staff to conduct audits? b) Adequate equipment & materials to perform work (office equipment, vehicles, financial resources for internal travel)? c) Existence of appropriate reporting mechanisms? d) Are audit reports regularly produced at prescribed frequencies? e) Are reports easily available to members of the public or press? f) Are reports (or summaries) submitted for review to an elected legislative body? Assessments would be either binary (yes/no) or an ordinal scale consisting of 3 or 4 subjective data points. For example, d) and e) could be scaled: "most of the time," "some of the time," "rarely or never."	Highly relevant, because it summarizes the level of performance of an institution charged with upholding ethical standards. If such an institution exists, but cannot function it is essential to determine such.	Document review and interviews by experts. Cost: Medium.	
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) % of govt. budget audited according to required standards in the last financial year and/or % of govt. contracts & procurements reviewed by the inspector general's office.	% which have been audited (according to standards and requirements set or accepted by a reputable agency private or public or training, domestic or international) out of a total amount of the budget or out of the total # of govt. agencies In the case of review of contracts, similar definition but reference to 'contracts' and "inspected"	Auditing of govt. accounts, and inspection of govt. contracting mechanisms and processes, especially when these conform to high standards, are essential instruments of monitoring and discouraging waste and corruption.	Review of govt. audit office & inspector general's office annual reports. Cost: Assuming govt. agencies provide annual reports in good time, this should not be a demanding indicator to monitor. If govt. agencies do not do so, possibly firms employed for this purpose may have the information. If not, interviews will be necessary but this will probably not reflect on the whole process.	Trendline should rise as training increases (which depends to some extent on the existence of a pool of people qualified to be trained), resources for the auditor's and inspector general's offices grow or at least remain adequate, and government accepts new practices of improved auditing and inspection.
Comments:				
5) Either % or # of govt. departments & agencies with major audit findings (i.e., that find a major error) and/or equivalent for inspections of contracts & procurements.	% of those departments in which there is a major finding (a term which means that there is a substantial error) of all departments in which audits are carried out. # refers to # of govt. departments in which there is a finding.	This can indicate two very different but both important processes, which will look to different trendlines. First it can indicate that the auditors are investigating more effectively. Second, it will indicate that the auditors are finding fewer errors and therefore there is less evidence of waste or misuse of funds.	Review of auditors' reports; augmented by interviews with auditors. Cost: As above.	Trendline here may be complex. If one is in a situation where there have been widespread misuse of funds and no serious auditing, & a major focus of the program is on strengthening auditing, then one should look to an upward trendline as the new system reveals problems. If one is in a situation where there has been widespread misuse of funds and auditing has been systematic and the focus is on anti-corruption programs, then one might expect a downward trendline as misuse of funds is reduced. It is also possible that the first example will be relevant at first and the second will occur in time so that the trendline should be expected to rise at first and then fall.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) % or # of examples of full investigation of significant breaches of procedures or ethics at relatively high level being pursued fully and fairly to transparent outcome, & if necessary to enforcement.	<p>% of significant cases in which such full investigations occur compared to all such cases.</p> <p># would refer to the # of occasions on which this occurred.</p> <p>Examples can be in the form of brief “case studies” illustrating that the system is working and at both high and low levels of govt.</p>	Only way of observing whether the rules, the agencies, and the resources are coming together and having the desired outcome.	<p>Review of responsible govt. agency records; possibly of newspapers; interviews with complainants or watchdog NGOs.</p> <p>Cost: Should not be onerous if govt. is relatively open and if only selected cases are taken up; obviously the more cases the more time.</p>	If there have been no such examples, the positive trend could be expected to rise to a few significant examples which provide evidence of govt. will to reduce corruption at high levels. Positive conclusions may be tempered by the continuation of cases which are known to have been overlooked or only partially pursued.
Comments:				
7) Effectiveness of legislative oversight.	Overall, a subjective measure, but based on concrete pointers which might include: a handbook of regulations and procedures has been distributed to all legislators and made available to the public; role of opposition and minor parties is clear and unfettered in practice; the public and press have access to the legislative process; main committees meet; the public and press have access to individual MPs; voting records are public; the legislature is able to carry on its business without hindrance from the executive.	Relevant to all settings. Rules must be transparent, available, and enforced for the legislature to be effective.	<p>Analysis of written handbooks, documents, and legislative records, survey of legislators; a case study of a specific legislative issue could be useful.</p> <p>Cost: Medium cost except a case study would be relatively more expensive.</p>	Initial resistance and spotty enforcement might be expected.
Comments: See also legislative development indicators under IR 2.4.5.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
8) # of NGOs with specialized expertise & capacity to monitor, analyze, and publicize govt. corruption.	NGOs that have a mission to focus on corruption and have personnel with the necessary specialized skills.	In addition to independent govt. agencies, it is necessary to have non-govt. agencies to observe the reality of independence and the effectiveness of these agencies, to act as consumer protectors and advocates, to make the public aware, and play a policy advocacy role on this topic.	Observation of NGO activities and publications in the area of corruption. Cost: Relatively inexpensive. It is assumed that there will be few of these types of NGOs.	If one begins with none, or one or two, then the trendline could be expected to rise slowly. It may soon become static which is not a problem; then the more important question relates to their effectiveness rather than their number.
Comments: See also civil society indicators.				
9) Quality of media investigation and reporting of corruption.	Index might be appropriate; taking into account a) numbers of papers, journals, radio and TV programs covering corruption; b) effort invested in investigation; c) use of documentary and interview findings; d) a variety of views (including those of the investigated); and e) perseverance with an issue.	Media has an especially important role to play as a watchdog and publicizer of corruption. Some bias is inevitable, but it is important that the media keeps some balance insofar as it listens to and reports all sides of the case. If the media is not independent, this indicator is irrelevant.	This will depend on a careful monitoring of the media. There may be NGOs or the media itself may do this. If not, then it may be possible to rely on a panel of experts; or it may be necessary to set one up; and they should make their assessments on a fixed set of criteria along the lines suggested in the second column. Suggest choosing selected publications and broadcast programs. Cost: If media performance is already being monitored by a credible and autonomous organization, then this is easy. Establishing and consulting with a panel possibly every year or two will not be demanding.	There are many variables, including levels of corruption, govt. openness, public interest, editorial policy, editorial integrity, NGO interest and activism, training and experience of reporters, etc. Donor programs can add a positive influence. Every two years should suffice.
Comments: See also media indicators in Section C, Tab 8, IR 2.3.4.				

Agency Objective 2.4:

More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.3:

Ethical Standards in Government Strengthened

Intermediate Result 2.4.3.3

Professionalization of Staff and Operations

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of new officers hired by competitive exam conducted in a "fair" manner.	% of all officers. Disaggregation by gender and other social category might be relevant since minorities are often more vulnerable to unfair practices and extortion.	Highly relevant. Relates to the professionalization of recruitment into the civil service which is a significant step towards raising levels of ethical behavior.	Requires review of govt. requirements and interviews about practices with those who administer, those affected and those who monitor them Cost: Depending on govt. records & 'openness' should not be too onerous on time and should be inexpensive.	Indicator value could change rapidly in response to a new rule requiring competitive exams for more positions
Comments:				
2) Average salaries of selected levels of civil servant as percentage of salaries of roughly the equivalent levels in the private sector.	"Average" can be derived in a number of ways; i.e., select 5 categories/levels of professional or technical personnel in the civil service and determine an average of their actual salaries, or average for those posts; and then do the same for roughly equivalent levels in the private sector. Another way might be by comparing salaries of people with the same education and experience.	Poor public service salaries are considered one cause of corruption, because people who are, or feel, seriously underpaid, feel greater need and even justification in taking money.	Govt. records, and records of the private sector, such as company records, or research by a chamber of commerce, or university or think tank, or by interviewing some key informants. Establishing rough equivalence will take some time with key informants. Cost: Govt. records on salaries and benefits should be readily available in many countries. Private sector may be harder to track down; there are a number of reasons why they might not want to disclose full information. If a chamber of commerce or professional organizations keep records, then it will not be too time consuming; if not, then a few selected corporations who are willing will need to be contacted.	This is more of an indicator that one can normally use to anticipate or explain corruption than one which is susceptible to direct donor influence or correction and used for purposes of program performance. Also it is difficult to generalize what the right comparative averages should be. If there is a specific program to raise the salaries of key public servants, and if the govt. has the resources to do so, then one might anticipate some reduction in the gap. Some discrepancy between public and private salaries is to be anticipated. Job security in the public sector and other benefits may offer some balance with higher private sector wages.
Comments:				
3) # or % of govt. financial/accounting systems operating under Integrated Financial Management System (IFM).	Systems refers to those systems that operate in ministries, departments, state owned enterprises, etc.	IFM is a key instrument for more effective management and monitoring of revenues and expenditures, intended to lead to enhanced information and management and reduced opportunity for hidden transactions.	Reviewing with govt. officers' budgetary/accounting/financial practices in various agencies. Cost: This should not be too time consuming. If there is an attempt to measure qualitative improvements over time in the implementation of the system that will take more time and advice of experts.	Trendline should be upwards if the govt. has committed itself to implementing the system and training the personnel to manage it. The pace of change will depend on resources devoted to training and implementing and also the number of people in govt. (who stay in govt. after the training) who have the prerequisite expertise to receive the training.
Comments: Could also construct as the % of government budget managed under IFM.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Time and real cost to customers of "connection" to utilities by a govt. utilities company or agency.	Time would be from the moment of application to the moment of receipt of the license. Real cost would include cost of license, cost of "extra" payments such as bribes, time given a financial value, and transportation. It might be simpler to report on time separately and not give it a financial value. Disaggregation might be informative because of vulnerability of minorities.	Viewed from the perspective of the customer, these two measures are a very useful method of detecting improvements in management and reduction in corrupt practices.	This will require a decision about which are key types of connections, and then interviews (or a survey) with a cross section (i.e., rich/poor, men/women, ethnic groups) of the public that has gone through the process. Cost: There may be records which, if reliable, would make it relatively easy. But in most cases findings would need to be confirmed through interviewing the relevant public, and this could certainly take time. Records are unlikely to permit easy disaggregation.	Trendline could be expected to decrease. One should keep in mind that trends will also depend on good management and not only on reduction in corruption; and also that an improvement in services may lead to increased demand and that may once again increase delays.
Comments:				
5) Transparent procedures for a) licensing, b) procurement, c) privatization, d) tax collection, & e) customs. (One "collective" measure or 5 separate measures.)	Index might be appropriate taking into account the following (these are illustrative examples): a) timely publication for all bids, tenders, auctions, applications, etc.; b) user-friendly information; c) publication of decisions; d) clear rules of appeal; e) examples of fair appeal processes; f) sense among stakeholders of impartiality in decisions; g) sense of impartiality among the informed public. Panel of experts could use criteria such as these as basis for discussion, or after discussion, each member could score each criteria along a scale from 1 - 5, & these scores could be aggregated and averaged.	Transparency of all stages of key transactions in which govt. has the power to select among private partners/contractors, to grant or withhold permissions, licenses or exemptions, or facilitate or hinder processes, and involving either or both large numbers of people and large amounts of money, is fundamental to reducing opportunities for corruption. This indicator seeks to measure how far govt. has come in establishing and practicing such open and fair processes.	A panel of experts — possibly a mix of lawyers with expertise in these areas, business persons, academics, members of business associations, think tanks, ex-senior govt. officials and would have to be established. Members of the panel would need to agree on appropriate criteria and how to score and weight the criteria. They would need to meet every one or two years. Cost: Setting up a panel will initially take time, as there has to be a high level of confidence in the members' expertise, and willingness to participate regularly. Also while impartiality of members should be sought, it may be necessary also to seek balanced membership. Thereafter the proceedings should not be too costly in money or time.	Benchmark and trendline will obviously depend on how "bad" the situation is at the outset, how widespread & longstanding the practices of corruption are. (Is there what might be referred to as a culture of corruption? Have public and private actors known any other way of conducting business?) And how demanding are the changes, the novelty and complexity of new undertakings such as privatization or of new procedures ex property valuations, procedures for appeal etc. Therefore how much training is required, how strong a political will is needed, what incentives public servants need to abide by the rules, & how much public education will make a difference. If there is a serious problem of corruption, the benchmark will be low and then, assuming there is political will and relatively effective programs aimed at enhancing transparency, some improvement should be anticipated. But it should also be anticipated that stakeholders who benefit from corruption will consistently seek to circumvent new procedures and provide alternative incentives. A smooth upward trendline therefore should not be expected.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) a) Evidence of military respect for constitutional limits; or b) # of violations by the military of constitutional limits; and c) # of civilian orders to the military, which violate constitutional limits.</p>	<p>a) Whether each military activity has been approved by executive branch and congress; or b) and c) # of significant violations of constitution and/or legislature/executive oversight. (If human rights, women's rights, protection of minorities are enshrined in the constitution, violation of these rights should be included here as demonstrating "lack of respect.")</p>	<p>Proper formal process of oversight needed in democracy. Lack of violations or low number of violations does not necessarily mean that there is civilian control.</p>	<p>Following key events limiting/affecting military in politics. May not always be easy to track. Cost: Moderate?</p>	
<p>Comments: Some presidents declare states of emergency to preempt legislatures. Some military take that action in some areas.</p>				
<p>2) % of govt. budget for military; or b) \$ amount.</p>	<p>a) % of total budget devoted to the military; or b) Total military budget in US dollars may be relevant in situations where total budget changes dramatically.</p>	<p>Military budget should be adequate but not excessive, but the appropriate amount will differ, for example, based on external and internal security needs. Too low a budget could cause military alarm and threaten civilian control.</p>	<p>Calculate from all main budgeting instruments. Will need advise from expert panel on what appears to be appropriate and on extent of "security threats." Cost: Little since much of this information should be in the budget. If some is kept secret, this information may be unobtainable.</p>	<p>Judgment needed as to proper size. This will vary between countries, and trendline may go up and down depending on security demands. Should be tracked annually.</p>
<p>Comments: Military may receive extra-budgetary resources. In using this indicator, need to be clear about how defining the military, and whether in-budget resources represent the bulk of what the military receives. a) May decline if there is good economic growth and the overall budget is growing. b) Should be adjusted for inflation.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) a) % of military expenditure derived from sources other than govt. appropriations; or b) \$ amount.	% of military expenditures not covered by public budget.	Private sources of military budget decrease civilian control.	Data unlikely to be available. Knowledgeable Informant needed for this and then they may only be able to produce an estimate. Cost: Complicated to identify sources and amounts.	% should go to zero, but will take time if military is well established in private sector. Not worth tracking annually.
Comments: There is a serious issue in countries with hyper inflation and when the military is involved in the private economy.				
4) a) Ratio of civil/military expenditure in key functional areas; or b) Ratio of civilian/military run facilities/ services	Civilian/mil expenditure (recurrent and capital) non-defense related areas, i.e., civic action, crime fighting, health, infrastructure, environmental protection, etc.	It can be risky to civilian control of the military if military involvement in civilian society is widespread and deep. Military involvement in narco-trafficking in Latin America is one such example. Civilian control can be safeguarded by building up civilian capacity in these areas.	Monitoring military activity in those areas where they are/have been active; if there is an open military budget, that will be informative. If cannot get budget data, will need to reconfigure as # key functional areas in which military is very active. Cost: Low to high, depending on availability of budget data.	In each functional area mil role should cease as civilian capacity increases. Change may not be very dramatic nor worth tracking annually.
Comments: This is perhaps the major issue/indicator since civilian capacity is so low in many areas. The key point is to have a plan to increase civilian capacity and refocus military on its key role of defense. Even in long-term Western democracies, military may have non-military roles - vis. US Army Corps of Engineers. b) is a proxy when a) is unavailable.				
5) # of substantial changes introduced to defense budget and legislation as a result of legislative initiative.	Changes introduced as a result of legislative committee and/or plenary initiative influence the outcome of defense legislation and budget. "Substantial" is difficult to define in advance; possibly it could be agreed to post hoc when it becomes clearer whether a decision was significant or not. Could limit to key areas.	Legislature should not be a rubber stamp. Assumption is that the main initiative comes from the executive branch possibly with large military input.	Observe process of bills, hearings, debates, and final legislation; or an expert panel could make assessments. Cost: Little, particularly if a panel can be called upon or if an NGO does the monitoring.	The trendline should be expected to be upward; but pattern of change will depend on the authority given to, the information provided to, and the expertise of, the legislature. Also on degree of problems with the military budget, etc. Trendline should eventually level off.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) a) NGO's perception of valid engagement with govt. on defense policy issues.	a) Perception could be scale: frequent and substantial on all key issues; reasonable engagement on most key issues, limited engagement and seldom on key issues, and no engagement. "Valid engagement" refers to a situation in which NGOs feel that they were given the opportunity to present their views, were listened to, and taken into account in policy decisions.	Civilian society should have an influence over military policy and expenditure. It might be preferable to measure changes that resulted from NGO input, but this will be difficult to trace and NGOs may well give contradictory advice.	Observe bills, hearings, position papers and legislation; interviews with key NGO informants. Cost: Moderate depending on # of NGOs to be interviewed. Could focus on key issues to limit interviewing.	Movement in trendline will depend on NGO capacity as well as civilian govt. and military willingness to countenance input.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

Intermediate Result 2.4.4.1: Constitutional and Legal Reforms Authorize Civilian Authority

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline
1) # or % of laws improved in comparison with a list of changes proposed.	Yes/no against a list of promoted reforms.	All military should be governed by modern, laws; bad or outdated laws can produce structural problems.	Review of legislation with help of military legislation expert. Cost: Will require consultation with military and constitutional experts.	Good laws reviewed by competent legislature. Legislative capacity problems need to be reviewed in setting targets.
Comments: See also Appendix C for Legal Reform Milestone Scale.				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions
 Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy
 Intermediate Result 2.4.4.2: More Accurate Information Publicly Available

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of public meetings on military and security issues and civilian-military relations.	Public events. For example, conferences, roundtables & speeches on these issues and on civilian-military relations.	Expresses the opportunity to openly discuss & exchange on civilian-military relations.	Reviewing notices in newspapers & announcements by universities & think tanks. Cost: Time of officer(s) in USAID or NGO partners or grantees. Since the number will probably not be that large, it should not be too time consuming.	Steady increase from initial base should be goal. May level off over time. Will be event driven so may be very difficult to set targets for.
Comments:				
2) # of TV & radio shows discussing the military and security issues.	Public media events discussing civilian-military relations. Could also convert to a scale of frequency: (1) no coverage; (2) 1-4 programs per year; and so on. Could include news programs that cover civilian-military issues as one segment.	Indicates information is readily available to the public.	Reviewing TV & radio schedules as available. Cost: Medium amount of time of officer(s) in USAID or NGO partners or grantees or commercial media monitoring service. The last is the cheapest when it exists.	Steady increase should be the goal. May level off over time. May also be event or crisis driven.
Comments: Data will not be complete, but an estimate will be worthwhile.				
3) # of newspaper and journal articles.	# of newspaper and journal articles discussing military & civilian-military subjects in selected publications. If there are many of these, could convert to average # per month.	Indicates availability of public information on the subject.	Systematic and regular review of a constant representative sample of newspapers. If money is available, then a content analysis might be appropriate. Cost: Time of USAID officer(s); could be shared with USIS and/or this work could be contracted to an interested NGO. Commercial monitoring service may already cover main periodicals.	Steady increase should be the goal, at least in the medium term. Then it may reach a ceiling if major controversial issues are resolved. May be event driven. May be difficult to set targets.
Comments: Choice of appropriate newspapers will change as papers fold and start up.				
4) NGO rating of availability/quality of military-provided information.	Index could be constructed as follows: (1) no information; (2) some information, but of limited significance or quality; (3) some information, quality and/or significance better; (4) more information, good significance, reasonable quality; (5) considerable information of high quality and significance.	Measures military openness.	Survey of NGOs with interest in military matters. Cost: Probably low to moderate. May not be many NGOs to be interviewed, but scale needs to be developed and pre-tested and then applied.	Would hope to see rising quantity, quality, and significance as military becomes more open. Obviously, there are matters of national security that should remain confidential.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
5) Itemization of the military budget.	Yes/no, annual budget itemizes resources for the military into meaningful categories.	Demonstrates increased transparency; often correlates with civilian control.	Budget. Cost: Low.	May be a one-time change.
Comments: May be more interested in the degree of itemization. For example, in Guatemala, there is some degree of itemization but the categories are rather general and vague.				
6) # publications on military or security affairs published by think tanks, NGOs, watchdog groups.	As noted in the indicator.	Increases availability of information and analysis, and variety of perspectives, about the military and security topics.	Monitoring of relevant groups and their publications. Cost: Low.	Should go up over time but may be event or crisis driven. May be difficult to set targets for in later stages of development. Indicator more useful at earlier stages of development.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

Intermediate Result 2.4.4.3: Increased Civilian Competence in Defense and Security Affairs

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of civilian legislators, legislative staff and govt. staff trained in military & security issues who say that the training improved their skills and they are making use of the skills.	# of individuals out of total trained who have been trained and who can say they have used their training and preferably can give concrete examples of how they have done so. Disaggregate by category of personnel.	It is essential to meaningful oversight that there exist a pool of trained civilian advisers and oversight managers. Direct outcome of training; trainers should have and use this information.	Training records and survey of trainees. Informants should always be requested to back up positive answers with example(s). Cost: Medium.	Number should increase depending on extent of training and education initiatives. Report on number out of total trained. In setting targets, need to think about whether barriers to the use of new skills other than knowledge exist.
Comments: Indicator can be applied to the expected outcome of TA as well if significant TA given.				
2) Amount of resources available for the functioning of legislative agencies responsible for military oversight.	Size of budget of oversight agencies/# of staff/existence of offices.	In order to function, these legislative and other govt. agencies need budget, staff, and offices. Indicator is relevant only if there is such a legislative agency.	Directly contact agencies for information on resources. Budget for legislature should also break down expenses for this purpose. Cost: Telephone calls/visits — not heavy.	Should increase to levels allowing efficient functioning. Assess increases in light of inflation.
Comments: Sometimes agencies are authorized but not funded.				
3) # of NGOs which are actively engaged in working on military and security issues.	# of NGOs wholly or partially dealing with security & defense. If they are self identified, then it may need to be confirmed by independent observers. "Active engagement" needs to be defined.	Competence needed in civil society to provide oversight experts.	Record kept of NGOs involved in this area. Cost: Maintaining records should not be time consuming as there are unlikely to be a large number.	# should increase for a period; then probably reach a ceiling. A large number is less important than having a few strong NGOs.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) # of publications by NGOs on civil-military & military/security issues.	# of publications. "Quality" publications might be insisted upon when NGO expertise & development reach a relatively advanced stage, and when agreement can be reached on how to define "quality."	Shows capacity of NGOs/civilian society to participate in open discussion.	Counting publications (and possibly limiting this to quality publications once agreement is reached on a definition). Cost: Interview NGOs that undertake this work. Keep records and find criteria to distinguish more serious from less serious materials.	# should increase as public discussion of the military opens up; but a ceiling may be reached.
Comments: Could also develop a scale combining quantity (coverage of all major issues) and quality (use of facts and figures, analysis, exam). Of different points of view, projection of implications of particular policies for the country, etc.				
5) # of civilian non-govt. experts with specialized training in military & security affairs who say they make use of their training.	# having completed formal training in special programs in defense policy (out of total trained) who can point to specific examples of the use of their new knowledge and skills.	There needs to be some formal and specialized training of civilians to oversee various aspects of military and security policy. Direct outcome of training — trainers need this information.	Training records and survey of trainees. Cost: Medium but if few trained, burden should be low.	Assess whether barriers other than lack of knowledge are likely to keep some trainees from using skills.
Comments:				
6) # of media representatives with specialized training who report use of training.	# of reporters and editors with such training who say they use it and can give examples demonstrating how the training has raised the quality of their work.	Good reporting on military/security needs knowledgeable reporters & editors. Direct outcome of training — trainers need this info.	Training records and survey of trainees. Cost: Medium, although if few trained, burden should be light.	Assess whether barriers other than knowledge may preclude trainees from using new knowledge prior to setting targets.
Comments:				
7) Assessment of the quality of legislative debates on military policy.	See index in Appendix C. Quality of legislative debates on budgets and laws affecting the military, and defense policy, determined by a panel; and based on use of data, policy alternatives raised, time devoted, different viewpoints. Possible use of scale from no debate, low quality, reasonably informed, well informed to high quality debate.	This is key indicator of democratically elected legislature's competence and power of oversight of the military.	Observation of debates; but it will require a panel of local experts using criteria as suggested. Cost: Probably not heavy, depends on attention given to military, and availability of local experts.	Quality of debates should improve as legislature (members and staff) becomes more fully informed about main issues.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

Intermediate Result 2.4.4.4: Increased Civilian and Civilian-Military Networking

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of public fora on military/security organized by NGOs.	# of public, open, publicized fora organized by NGOs.	Shows NGO capacity to organize and participate in open and informed discussion.	NGO records. Cost: Low.	# should increase. May be difficult to set targets. There could be sudden increases due to crises or scandals.
Comments:				
2) a) # of occasions NGOs work with govt. on public civil-military policy, or b) # key issues on which NGOs work with government on civil-military policy.	a) # of times NGOs consulted on policy & legislation. b) Requires quality criteria to be established. For amount and kind of engagement.	Shows involvement of civilian society.	Survey NGO directors; NGO records. Cost: Low if record keeping is put into place early on and maintained.	# should increase. May be difficult to set targets for a) but will show a more quickly rising trendline than b).
Comments:				
3) # university courses dealing with military or security issues.	Count of such courses at all universities.	Indicates military and security issues being dealt with seriously at a civilian institution and participants include civilians and possibly military personnel jointly.	University catalogues, interviews with university personnel. Cost: Low.	Would hope to see an increase but will level off at some point.
Comments:				
4) # of training courses that include both civilians and military.	# of training courses on civilian-military relations or defense policy involving both civilians and military.	Training involving both groups is preferable.	Have informants identify courses; also there should be training records that could provide this information. Cost: Low.	# should increase and then plateau.
Comments: Courses may vary in length from a year to short-term.				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.4: Strengthened Civil-Military Relations Supportive of Democracy

Intermediate Result 2.4.4.5: Reduced Size of Military-Security Forces

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of military forces demobilized.	Discharged and weapons turned in.	Direct measures of reductions in force.	Military personnel records. Cost: Low, counts should be available. Accuracy could be a concern.	May decrease quickly (in wake of conflict or peace accord) or gradually.
Comments:				
2) % of demobilized military/security forces who have been resettled.	<p>% of all forces demobilized who have been reabsorbed into civilian society (i.e., they have received land, agriculture inputs or training; they have jobs, etc.).</p> <p>May set standard for reabsorption modestly, i.e., receiving training or, more ambitiously, jobs, agricultural land producing crops.</p>	Not a direct measure but rather a useful adjunct in the wake of large scale demobilizations where concerns about violation and large scale social disruptions loom large.	<p>Military records, records of those assisting with resettlement, surveys of the resettled.</p> <p>Cost: Low to medium depending on the availability of good records.</p>	Would hope that forces would not be demobilized until a resettlement program is in place. Would hope that percentage would start high and stay high.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.5: More Effective, Independent, and Representative Legislatures

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) a) level of confidence among political actors (or maybe just legislators) that legislature has the capacity to perform its function; b) level of confidence among legislators that legislature acts as an independent body; c) level of confidence among citizens that legislature acts as a check against the executive (in presidential system); d) level of confidence among citizens that legislature represents their interests.</p>	<p>% of legislators who agree/feel that or % of citizens who feel/agree that ...</p> <p>Two sample categories are being suggested here: legislators & citizens; and 4 different types of questions focusing on: legislature's capacity, independence, ability to check exec branch, & represent people.</p> <p>Detailed definitions will depend on the sample and specific focus of survey.</p> <p>Dissaggregation could be useful.</p>	<p>"Level of confidence," particularly among citizens, may be an important high level indicator: if the citizens have confidence, this could be a very significant measure of improvement in the role of the legislature. It is therefore more appropriate in more mature late transition/consolidation situations. It is also probably a better planning indicator than a program performance indicator, given the high levels of investment and time required to improve performance to the level that citizens could be expected to pick up change.</p>	<p>Survey either of legislators or some other select stakeholder group or of a representative sample of citizens.</p> <p>Cost: Survey of legislators would be inexpensive; national survey would be expensive. However, the costs would be reduced if the questions could be included in an already established survey instrument.</p>	<p>Interpretation here will always be difficult and require not only statistical expertise but political insight. There may be lags in the time taken for improvements to be appreciated by the public; the legislature may be doing a good job, and one scandal, or bad press publicity, could detract from the perception of the public; poor economic performance and other factors could lead to a negative assessment even if the legislature is being effective.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) b) Index for quality of legislative processes.	See Appendix C, Section D.2. for a description of this index.	<p>This is the purpose of much of the work on legislative strengthening; but to capture quality is difficult; this indicator and accompanying scale attempt to do so by taking a variety of factors into account.</p> <p>Measures effectiveness and representation.</p>	<p>An expert panel might be convened (possibly annually) at the end of the legislative session to rate the quality of debate and legislative process. Each member should independently rate that session on each factor using a scale such as suggested in column 2. Then the panel would convene to discuss their ratings, perhaps with an opportunity to alter their ratings. Scores of individual members would be added, then averaged. Both total scores and extent of initial and final variability would be of interest.</p> <p>Cost: If qualified people are available, this requires organizing a panel, agreeing on factors to be used in the scale and then calling a meeting once a year. So after initial effort this should not be too time consuming.</p>	<p>Targets should be modest. Given training, technical assistance, and new equipment the trendline should be expected to go up, but possibly slowly, since quality should not be expected to change dramatically. It might decline temporarily if many inexperienced members are elected, resources decline, or the executive branch reasserts its dominance of the legislative process.</p>
Comments:				
2) Degree of legislature's oversight of Executive branch behavior.	<p>An index which could contain the following elements:</p> <p>a) review of legislation drafted by the executive; and</p> <p>b) review of executive branch implementation of the law and executive branch behavior.</p> <p>Scores of 1-5 could be totaled in each element. More elements may be needed to better specify what is involved in overseeing executive branch behavior.</p>	Partially captures independence, measures oversight.	<p>Panel of experts.</p> <p>Cost: Could be done annually or every 2 years. Selecting a panel at the outset may take time as people need to be qualified and prepared to serve over time.</p>	<p>Discerning clear trends will not be simple. Over the medium to long term, the trend should go up, and then flatten out. In the short to medium term, the trend is likely to go up and down depending on capacity, quality and determination of legislators, on the importance and divisiveness of specific issues, on the party structure in the legislature etc., as well as on the behavior, record and attitude of the executive.</p>
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) a) % of total, substantial legislative bills emanating from the legislature; b) the % of bills drafted by the executive that are substantially amended by the legislature.	Can be quantitative in measuring number, but needs informed qualitative judgment as to what constitutes substantial "amendment;" and for the alternative whether legislative initiatives other than bills should be considered.	Relevance is that MPs are not only joining the policy debates but are influencing outcomes. a) allows for cases where the legislative body takes the initiative; b) assumes that the executive initiates most of policy agenda.	Monitoring & comparing bills at first submitted with those finally passed. Interviews with legislators or other informed observers will be needed to check on attribution as who is responsible for what will not always be clear. It might make sense to focus only on key legislative processes, or on areas targeted for improvement. Cost: Fairly low unless a large amount of legislation initiated; in which a smaller sample should be selected for observation.	As legislature becomes more effective (as a consequence of training, use of the committee system and improved research and information support), the trendline should rise. But it should not be expected to be steady and will depend to some extent on issues that arise, the political environment and effectiveness and initiative of the executive branch. Elections and changes in the composition of the legislature might change the trendline.
Comments: It is possible that the number or percentage of bills initiated by the legislature will increase when the same party is in charge of both the executive and legislative branches. May be useful to examine a) in conjunction with % of those bills passed.				
4) % of new laws which, as bills, were a) accompanied by a written technical analysis, opinion papers, and/or legislative study; and b) were the subject of a congressional public hearing.	As stated in the indicator, a) and b) can be separated or reported as one indicator with two standards, both of which must be met. Latter presents a more rigorous standard.	Proxy for quality, effectiveness, and representation.	Identify key laws passed during the year, or take a random sample. May be able to contract with NGO to collect data. Cost: Low.	If treated as two indicators rather than one, trendline may increase more rapidly.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.5: Strengthened Representation, Effectiveness and Independence of Legislatures

Intermediate Result 2.4.5.1: More Effective and Democratic Internal Management Systems

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Regulations & procedures passed enabling legislature to operate more efficiently & democratically in comparison with a list of reforms proposed.</p>	<p>Minimal requirements of such rules include 1) clear and workable procedures relating to roles & rules for debate & documentation in plenary & committee sessions; 2) a legitimate role for all members, including opposition members, to speak, vote, introduce legislation, participate in committees & share in the resources necessary to these activities; & 3) full oversight and questioning of the executive. This could be a yes/no measure; or it could be a # of improvements compared to a list of improvements.</p>	<p>Relevant to all settings. Rules must be transparent, available, and enforced for the role of the legislature to be democratic & effective.</p>	<p>Analysis of written handbooks and documents; selective reading of legislative minutes; survey of legislators. Interviews with key observers would help in understanding significance of various rules and possible covert impediments. Cost: Minimal; although a case study would involve higher costs.</p>	<p>This should be expected to rise, but the context will determine the pattern. For example, much of the necessary legislation & rule making might take place at once, and refinements and improvements follow; or reforms might be “squeezed” out of a reluctant incumbent party or executive branch one at a time.</p>
<p>Comments: See also the Legal Reform Milestone Scale in Appendix C.</p>				
<p>2) Extent of implementation of regulations & procedures enabling legislature to operate more efficiently & democratically.</p>	<p>A subjective measure, but based on concrete pointers which might include: a handbook of regulations & procedures has been distributed to all legislators and made available to the public; role of opposition and minor parties is clear & unfettered in practice; the public & press have access to the legislature process; main committees meet; the public & press have access to individual MPs; voting records are public; the legislature able to carry on its business without hindrance from the executive. A list of such key pointers to measure extent of implementation can be agreed upon and a multiple item scale worked out as a measure.</p>	<p>Relevant to all settings. Rules must be transparent, available, & enforced for the role of the legislature to be effective.</p>	<p>Analysis of written handbooks, documents, & records; a case study of a specific legislature issue could be useful. Cost: Moderate cost, depending on number of regulations and procedures examined.</p>	<p>Initial resistance and spotty enforcement might be expected. Low enforcement may be due to low capacity rather than weak political will.</p>
<p>Comments: See also the Legal Reform Milestone Scale in Appendix C, which would allow combining this indicator and the previous one.</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
3) # of months each year that MPs and staff receive promised remuneration in timely manner or average delay in payment of salaries to MPs and staff in # of days per month.	Unit would be # of months; or # of days per month. This assumes salaries paid monthly.	Relevant in all situations, but mostly in cases where tardy payments have been problem for the effective running of the legislature. The legislature's capacity for internal management is critical to its ability to have an effective policy and oversight role, as well as to interact constructively with civil society and constituents.	Review of records of legislature's financial disbursements; key informant interviews; annual member and staff surveys of satisfaction. Cost: State of record keeping will determine level of effort required; but in general it should not be costly.	Trendline will depend on how severe the problem was; the seriousness with which the legislature is taken by the executive; the availability of govt resources; & the legislature's internal management system. With support for a legislature strengthening the trend should move up rapidly, but it could "backslide" if resources decline or legislature is unable to sustain the improvements made with donor support.
Comments: This indicator could be converted into a score card. See Appendix C for more information.				
4) % of plenary meetings, with advance agendas, are convened as scheduled.	% of plenary meetings (out of total number of sessions) called in time, schedule followed, agendas for sessions established, publicized in advance & followed.	Good indicator of improved planning & management & seriousness of purpose of legislative body.	Review of records of dates of public & legislature notice of meetings and dates of holding of meetings, and comparison. Interviews will be useful to confirm dates. Costs: Depends on record keeping of legislature &/or interested NGOs; but should not be too demanding.	As internal management (and also will to be transparent and acceptance of full debate) improves so the trendline should be upwards.
Comments:				
5) Number or % of laws benefiting during drafting from the use of improved information systems.	Laws developed with benefit of electronic internet access or other improvements in information system.	Indicates installed electronic system and/or other improvement and accompanying training being used effectively in legislative process.	Choose a sample of laws and interview key staff involved in the drafting. Cost: If NGOs watch legislative process consistently, this should not be very demanding. If not, interviewing and also observing the process could be fairly time consuming.	The trendline may move slowly depending on installation, training, and will of key staff.
Comments:				
6) % of MPs & staff who say they are able to obtain information when they need it.	% of MPs and staff who say this.	Indicator of improved information retrieval and management system.	This would require a survey of both staff and MPs. Cost: A full survey would be relatively time consuming; a sample survey would be sufficient.	It could rise as MPs and staff are trained in delivery, demand, research and use of information services. There is a possibility that as the level of demand rises and becomes more sophisticated there could be a decline if the number and skills of those providing the information have not kept pace.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>7) a) Rules permit equitable participation by opposition (yes/no); b) % of time used by opposition members in key debates, or % of speakers in those debates who are from the opposition; c) opposition members are given resources comparable to ruling party members (e.g., resources for meetings with constituents); d) % of (key) committee members from the opposition in key committees; or e) bills of opposition members are given due consideration.</p>	<p>b) - c) not useful unless answer to a) is yes. Can also convert elements to an index; i.e., extent to which opposition members express themselves in plenary.</p> <p>Each criterion given a value on scale of 1-5 with 1 indicating “no opportunity” and 5 indicating “full and equal opportunity;” and then the panel can record and aggregate their scores.</p>	<p>A democratically functioning legislature requires that full opportunity be given for participation by the opposition. This indicator seeks to measure this by setting criteria indicative of opportunity for participation, and use of that opportunity, by the opposition.</p>	<p>This will require a person(s) to observe plenary and committee work so as to observe proceedings, and also accounts to see how money and/or support personnel resources are allocated between parties. It may be possible to focus on significant legislation only. It may also be possible to achieve this end by perusing and doing content analysis of Hansards.</p> <p>To establish whether formal rules allow for opposition participation will not be demanding. However, to find out if these rules are being followed may be demanding. If a person or organization is required to do only this task, it will be expensive. If the task can be added to the work of a full time parliamentary watch organization, it will not be expensive. The expense may be further reduced by looking only at specific pieces of legislation of more direct concern to the opposition.</p>	<p>The novelty of democratic and particularly parliamentary practice, the depth of democratic culture, the heterogeneity of the society, the political nature and sense of security of the incumbent party, the capacity and strength of the opposition party (ies) will determine both the benchmark and the likely trend. The expectation would be that as procedures are practiced, respected, and accepted, the trendline would rise.</p> <p>The role played by the opposition is likely to be tied to the number of seats it occupies. Targets should keep this in mind.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.5: Strengthened Representation, Effectiveness and Independence of Legislatures
 Intermediate Result 2.4.5.2: Increased Legislative Capacity to Influence National Policy and Budget Priorities

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) a) Laws or constitutional reforms passed enabling legislature (thru contribution to legislation or oversight) to operate as an independent & democratic body (yes/no); or b) Improvements in laws or constitutional provisions in comparison with a list of reforms proposed.	Minimal requirements of such rules include 1) a legitimate role for all members, including opposition members, to speak, vote, introduce legislation, participate in committees, & share in the resources necessary to these activities; & 2) full oversight and questioning of the executive. This could be a yes/no measure; or as the second option implies, it could be a # or % of improvements made compared to a list of improvements proposed as suggested above in this column.	Relevant to all settings. Rules are an essential first requirement toward a democratically operating legislature.	Analysis of written handbooks and documents; survey of legislators. Interviews with key observers would help in understanding significance of various rules. Cost: Minimal; although a case study would involve higher costs.	This should be expected to rise, but the context will determine the pattern. Much of the necessary legislation & rule making might take place at once, and refinements and improvements follow; or reforms might be “squeezed” out of a reluctant incumbent party or executive branch one at a time.
Comments: See also the Legal Reform Scale in Appendix C.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>2) a) Extent of implementation of laws or constitutional reforms & procedures enabling legislature (thru contribution to legislation or oversight) to operate as an independent & democratic body (yes/no); or b) Improvements in the implementation of such laws and constitutional provision in comparison with a list of reforms proposed.</p>	<p>Overall a subjective measure, but based on concrete pointers which might include: a handbook of regulations & procedures has been distributed to all legislators and made available to the public; role of opposition and minor parties is clear & unfettered in practice; the public & press have access to the legislature process; main committees meet; the public & press have access to individual MPs; voting records are public; the legislature is able to carry on its business without hindrance from the executive.</p>	<p>Relevant to all settings. Rules must be transparent, available and enforced for the legislature to be effective.</p>	<p>Analysis of written handbooks, documents & legislature records, survey of legislators; a case study of a specific legislature issue could be useful.</p> <p>Cost: Low cost except a case study would be relatively more expensive.</p>	<p>Initial resistance and spotty enforcement might be expected.</p>
<p>Comments: See also the Legal Reform Scale in Appendix C.</p>				
<p>3) % of legislative sessions (plenary & committee) during which translation services are provided.</p>	<p>% of such sessions out of all sessions. Translation should be provided throughout the session. There needs to be some discussion locally of what is feasible/realistic since some countries have hundreds of languages/dialects.</p>	<p>Only relevant in bilingual or multilingual situations; but shows intention to overcome language divisions and to be inclusive of groups that do not speak main language. Also reflects good management.</p>	<p>Survey of minority language MPs.</p> <p>Cost: Low, unless there are many of these.</p>	<p>A scale may be more sensitive to change than the % of legislators.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Adequacy of legislative review processes: a) Executive submits budget; b) Congress has sufficient time to consider budget; c) Appropriate committee re-views budget; d) Budget analysis prepared; e) Legislature holds hearings on budget; and f) Legislature amends budget.	Indicator is a scorecard. Each element a) to f) receives a score of 0 (no) or 1 (yes) and the scores are than totalled.	Measure of increased capacity re the budget process. If quality of elements b)-f) matters, then consider converting the scorecard to an index with 1-5 points awarded for each element.	Legislature records; key informant interviews. Cost: Low. NGOs may already track.	Collect annually.
Comments: See also the Legal Reform Scale in Appendix C.				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>5) Index of committee capacity: a) committee structure appropriate for issue area (i.e., an education committee considers only educative issues); committees have sufficient resources (i.e., professional staff) at their disposal; c) committees have the authority to initiate & amend legislation; d) committees exercise their authority.</p>	<p>Index would be based on criteria such as these (or others which may be more appropriate in local circumstances). For each of these criteria, there could be a scoring system on a scale from 1-5 with 1 representing a complete negative and 5 representing well established capacity & consistent practice. A panel of experts could then discuss the topics and prepare individual scores and then an average of the total scores could be used.</p>	<p>Some, but not all, legislative systems rely to a great extent on committees to oversee research, conduct hearings, investigate, propose & formulate, sound out opinion, and negotiate & propose amendments. They thus play a vital legislative role before bills are brought to plenary meetings. This indicator seeks to measure the extent to which the committees have the capacity to play this role.</p>	<p>This would require a panel of experts on political processes, including a mix of ex-MPs, academics, think tank or advocacy personnel, who would agree to participate on annual or biennial basis.</p> <p>Cost: Setting up the panel and agreeing on suitable elements would take time at the initial stage. After that this should not be a time consuming affair, especially if the same panel can be used for some of the other qualitative/scale indicators.</p>	<p>Benchmark will probably be low at the outset as committees are usually not well developed in the early years of new legislatures. Where parliaments decide to use committees the trendline should rise, but the rate would depend on resources given in support of, and time given to, committees. Also it may depend on a willingness to, and then experience with, delegating these roles to committees.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) Index of committee oversight: a) are there oversight hearings? b) do oversight committees have sufficient resources to conduct independent investigations? c) do oversight committees have authority to question executive branch?	Index would be based on criteria such as these (or others which may be more appropriate in local circumstances). For each of these criteria, there could be a scoring system on a scale from 1 to 5; with 1 representing a complete negative (i.e., they lack authority or resources) and 5 representing well established authority, etc. A panel of experts could then discuss the topics and prepare individual scores and then an average of the total scores could be used.	Some, but not all, legislative systems rely to a great extent on committees to conduct a variety of roles (see # 5) before bills are brought to plenary meetings. Committees also may play a key role in overseeing the implementation of laws by the executive branch. This indicator seeks to measure the extent to which the committees carry out that role. This therefore relates to both the effective functioning of the legislature, but also, & more specifically, to its constructive role as a check on the executive branch.	This would require a panel of experts on political processes, including a mix of ex-MPs, academics, think tank or advocacy personnel, who would agree to participate on annual or biennial basis. Cost: Setting up the panel and agreeing on suitable indicators would take time at the initial stage. After that this should not be a time consuming affair, especially if the same panel can be used for some of the other qualitative/scale indicators.	Benchmark will probably be low at the outset as committees are usually not well developed in the early years of new legislatures, and executives tend to dominate. Where parliaments decide to use committees to oversee and challenge (which does not necessarily mean in a confrontational manner) the performance of the executive branch, the trendline should rise; but the rate would depend on resources given in support of, and time given to, committees. Also it may depend on a willingness to, and then experience with, delegating these roles to committees. Finally, it will depend on executive-legislature relations including the executive's willingness to cooperate.
Comments:				
7) % of legislature's budget (or dollar amount) devoted to a) modernization; b) research & information.	As stated in the indicator. Dollar amount may be more appropriate if legislature is starved for resources.	Shows commitment to build capacity.	Leg. Budget. Cost: Low.	We hope to see early and significant increases. Increases should be assessed in light of the inflation rate.
Comments:				
8) # of staff per legislator or per committee.	As stated in the indicator. Includes technical, professional, administrative and clerical staff.	Inadequate staff support clearly hampers legislative performance.	Personnel records. Cost: Low.	Should increase slowly. Govt. budget deficits and slow economic growth will affect the indicator's performance.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4:

More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.5:

Strengthened Representation, Effectiveness and Independence of Legislatures

Intermediate Result 2.4.5.3:

Increased Citizen Access to Legislative Process

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) # of public hearings open to citizens, citizen groups & the press: a) inside the capital, & b) outside the capital.	<p>Count number of actual meetings open to the public which take place, with legislators actively participating.</p> <p>To satisfy definition of "open," meetings should be held at times and places that do not exclude women and other social groups ex religious groups.</p>	<p>Relevant to any country, openness of legislature to public participation, usually through NGOs, and the media essential element of democratic process. This attempts to measure how many meetings were actually held.</p>	<p>Observation, analysis of public meetings & hearings & legislative debates; key informant (legislators, media, NGOs, and citizens) interviews; monitoring press coverage; case study of specific piece of legislation in which the public has shown interest.</p> <p>Cost: Low, especially if local watchdog organizations are in place to observe legislature; and attend public meetings and hearings, etc; and there is monitoring by the press on a regular basis.</p>	<p>Should be a positive trend at first, then it may reach a ceiling. Depends on openness of legislators to the public, public interest and focus, and importance of issues being discussed. At a later stage, sense of public efficacy will be relevant; that is, if the public or its organizations feel that their opinions are taken into account, interest may rise and the trendline will go up, or stay relatively high; if not they will loose interest. Once hearings become commonplace, it will not be useful to count the number held.</p>
<p>Comments: Requires qualitative analysis of who is participating and in what manner.</p>				
2) a) average # of meetings legislators hold w/constituents; or b) % of MPs who meet with NGOs & constituents more than x times a year.	<p>Meetings involve discussion between two parties in which citizens or NGOs have substantial input, i.e., puts a question, makes a request, suggests an option.</p> <p>b) threshold for # meetings per year should be set according to local circumstances.</p>	<p>Building a responsive relationship between legislators & constituents is a significant element of representative democracy not often appreciated in the early days of transition. This indicator attempts to measure progress in this area.</p>	<p>There would need to be reliance on records of MPs and of NGOs. It may be necessary to select and monitor only a representative sample of MPs and/or NGOs.</p> <p>Cost: If MPs keep records and NGOs can confirm, then monitoring a few selected MPs should not prove too demanding. If no records are kept or they are unreliable or there is no way of checking, then this would be difficult.</p>	<p>If a program is put in place to encourage MPs and to train them in building constituency relations, then the trendline should rise. The rate may be partially dependent on resources available for local travel for MPs.</p>
<p>Comments: Less relevant in party list systems where electoral areas are large, and there is less incentive for these meetings. Nevertheless, this kind of contact with constituencies remains significant to democratic process.</p>				
3) % legislators with functioning regional or local offices of MPs.	<p>% of legislators who have established in offices in their constituencies which are open for more than (for example) three months a year to deal with constituency services.</p>	<p>Building a responsive relationship between legislators & constituents is a significant element of representative democracy not often appreciated in the early days of transition. This indicator attempts to measure progress in this area with a focus on building constituency relations.</p>	<p>There would need to be reliance on records of MPs, with some cross-checking to see if the offices are open.</p> <p>Cost: Low.</p>	<p>Here the benchmark will be very low in most places since "constituency relations" of this kind is both a new idea, and puts demands on scarce resources and time of legislators. In the beginning it may be unclear to legislators what the purpose and incentives are for these kinds of practices. Trendline should be expected to rise, but slowly.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>4) % of legislative committee meetings in selected issue areas in which citizens participate. (See last column suggesting why in some circumstances # of meetings or % change in meetings might be more appropriate measures than %.)</p>	<p>% of all committee meetings in which citizens are invited well in advance, given required information, and reasonable opportunity to participate.</p>	<p>The importance and role of committees has been described in a number of places. By focusing on citizens and committees, this provides one measure of the openness of the legislative system to participation by the public.</p>	<p>This requires on-going monitoring of committee proceedings; or a combination of reading committee records backed up by some observation. It may be possible to follow some selected issues rather than observing all of them.</p> <p>Cost: Like most measures that require on-going observation, this would be costly if someone had to be employed especially for this. If someone is already observing a variety of activities of legislative committees then this would not add a great deal to the task. Reading reports rather than observing all sessions would further reduce costs, as would selective rather than a comprehensive focus.</p>	<p>Benchmark and trendline would need to take account of the fact that two interrelated processes are involved: number of meetings and number of meetings in which citizens participate. For example, it might occur that there are a higher total of meetings, and also a higher number at which people are participating, and, even though this means that participation is increasing, the % may not go up. Therefore, it might sometimes be preferable to use the # of meetings or % increase in number of meetings as indicators. As both committee meetings and citizen participation are usually novel practices, one should assume a low benchmark and then a rising trendline; the speed of change will depend on both the legislature and the public, including political will, capacity and interest level.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
5) Scorecard of citizen access: a) do citizens have access to records of meetings; b) are citizens able to find out who or what group is responsible for particular areas and decisions; c) are citizens able to obtain voting records of MPs; d) are citizens granted access to meetings of the parliament; e) are citizens granted access to committee meetings; f) are plenary and committee meetings open to the press?	Scorecard would be based on criteria such as these (or others which may be more appropriate in local circumstances). For each of these criteria, there could be scoring of 0 (no) or 1 (yes). The scores for all elements would then be totaled.	Citizen & NGO access to meetings and records of all aspects of legislative proceedings is an important measure of democratic legislative process and willingness on the part of the legislature & legislators to be transparent and accountable for what they do.	This would require one or two experts on political processes. Cost: This should not be a time consuming affair, especially if the experts can be used for some of the other qualitative/scale indicators.	Benchmark will probably be low as these are new and fairly demanding undertakings. They require both political will and substantively enhanced management capacity on the part of the legislature. Therefore while there should be a rise in the trendline, it should not be expected to be rapid.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
6) a) Legislature permits the operation of periodicals devoted to the reporting of legislative activities; and if so, b) extent and quality of the coverage.	a) Laws and regulations allow observers to witness proceedings, interview MPs, and publish analyses; and freedom to publish remains undeterred even after articles critical of the legislature. This could be yes or no or broken up into steps. b) Extent may refer formally to numbers published but it would be better to have an expert panel to assess readership, influence, and quality (including relative accuracy, use of information, rigor of analysis, clarity of writing & whether articles are picked up by the regular press.)	Periodicals go further than newspapers in that they provide more in-depth, carefully supported & considered assessments, and as such may help to deepen understanding of practices and possible recommendations among scholars, MPs, politicians and interested civil society.	Part a) requires first the perusal of relevant laws and regulations, observation of publishing of periodicals, and then checking with writers and publishers to see if there is any harassment as a consequence. Questions of extent and quality should be put before a panel of experts, and assessment should be based on agreed criteria as suggested in column 2. Cost: Inquiry into rules should be inexpensive. Interviewing a few key people should also not be demanding. The setting up of a panel will initially take time, but once in place, will need to choose a sample of articles to review and criteria by which content analysis will be performed.	Inquiry into the rules and regulations should simply yield a yes or no response. Inquiry into actual operation might be yes or no or might lead to some gradations from “not allowed in practice” to “as long as it is not too critical” to “full freedom,” and so a trendline might be anticipated to proceed along that line if democracy makes progress. Extent and quality will probably commence at a low level given that these are probably new initiatives and that they depend on both the willingness of the legislature and the skills, resources, & capacity of writers & publishers.
Comments:				
7) % of bills which incorporate the proposals made by the opposition.	% of all bills in which the final form of the bill incorporated substantial proposals made by the opposition.	It is important in assessing the extent to which democratic practices are taking hold in the legislature to enquire whether the opposition is contributing to debates, and whether its contribution is making an impact on policy. This focus of this indicator is on the impact of the opposition.	Sample survey of bills. This would require a careful reading of committee & plenary reports, and a comparison of what was said by members of various parties in debates with the original and final drafts of bills. Interviews with key actors either to point the way to more important issues, or after reading the material to get a more refined interpretation of the records would be essential. Cost: Medium but depends on sample size. Could also do only for key pieces of legislations.	It is difficult to generalize. If goodwill and openness prevail, the target may not have to be that low and improvements might depend mainly on the capacity of the opposition to take advantage of procedures and prepare themselves (plan strategically, strengthen arguments, build coalitions,) for substantive contributions to debates. In situations of parliamentary tension and conflict and/or of insecure dominant party, the benchmark may be very low and improvements will depend on a variety of factors including opposition numbers and skill and the will of the incumbent party. In this case, change will probably not be rapid.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
8) Degree to which legislature manages societal conflict, and attempts to reduce sources of the conflict.	<p>Societal conflict refers to serious or potentially serious conflicts of a racial, ethnic, class, religious, ideological, or regional nature.</p> <p>Could establish a critical events agenda for a key conflict or conflicts in advance and measure progress in meeting agenda items. Could also do an ex post facto analysis that sets out criteria for conflict management/resolution and measures legislative performance against criteria.</p>	<p>While formally the role of the legislature is to formulate legislation and check on the executive, it has a broader role of carrying out its role in a manner that reduces or avoids societal conflicts; for example, by working in a broadly inclusive manner & considering the divisive impact of legislation and regulations.</p>	<p>This would require a panel of experts on political processes, including a mix of MPs, academics, think tank or advocacy personnel, a representative sample of incumbent & opposition MPs and reps of stakeholder groups involved in conflicts, who would agree to participate on annual or biennial basis.</p> <p>Cost: Setting up the panel and agreeing on suitable bases for discussion would take time at the initial stage. After that, this should not be a time consuming affair although the composition of the panel may have to be added as the areas of conflict change.</p>	<p>If there is one longstanding and/or fundamental conflict dividing a society, it may be possible to provide a qualitative benchmark based on the depth & extent of the conflict and the extent and manner in which parliament is dealing with it. Then, to the extent that it can be observed that the level of conflict is being reduced and that parliament devised strategies, formulated policies, included diverse opinions, etc. and generally acted in way that helped bring this about, it could be concluded by the panel that the body is making a positive contribution to reduction of societal conflict. If there are a number of conflicts or the basis of conflict changes then it becomes not impossible but certainly more complex to set even a notional benchmark or anticipate a trend.</p>
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
9) Perception of a) political actors or b) NGOs regarding the legislature's role in managing societal conflict.	Since this will depend on a survey, the unit would be % of pol. actors or NGOs who agree that the legislature is effective in improving its role... or who rate the legislative performance as good... NGOs should be those who track these conflicts.	While formally the role of the legislature is to formulate legislation and check on the executive; it has a broader role of carrying out its role in a manner that reduces or avoids societal conflicts; i.e., by working in a broadly inclusive manner & considering the divisive impact of legislation and regulations.	Survey. Cost: Medium to high depending on numbers to be interviewed.	If interviewing political actors, opposition and party-in-power could both have biases that render the indicator useless. Needs to be tested first. NGO perceptions could have greater validity.
Comments:				
10) Content of public participation in committees factored into legislation & budget.	Will be subjective measure although responses must provide concrete examples demonstrating how ideas, etc. were taken into account or were ignored. It could be yes/no or be based on scale which could go from "many times" to "very few" to "none." Do for key pieces of legislation and budget.	This is a key indication that not only are legislators meeting with people, but that they are taking their input into account and including it as they design policies, laws, etc.	If govt. or NGOs keep records of meetings, these could be looked at. If not, it would require observations or interviews with NGO representatives. To trace whether suggestions were included or factored in would require monitoring laws, budgets, and policy actions of all kinds. Cost: If selected areas and selected topics were followed, this is manageable. But it will take time and care and conferring with local experts to determine the extent to which legislation was influenced in this way.	The will and procedures & capacity of the legislature will determine whether this will improve or not. But if there is such will and there is a program to support this type of participation and take it seriously, then the trendline might rise, but it should not be expected to be rapid.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of citizens who believe that the executive branch has transparent, participatory, and thoughtful policy processes.	As in the indicator, disaggregated by gender, ethnic group, etc. "Thoughtful" in this instance means well-considered, using facts and figures and doing analysis and projections of impact.	Demonstrates citizen confidence in the policy process. Perception may not line up with reality so some caution is needed in using this indicator. May be a better planning indicator than program performance indicator.	<p>Survey which should be part of a larger survey; this is relatively expensive, but less so if a polling process is already in place in the country. If surveys are not affordable, it may be possible to get a "sense" of the mood of citizens through a series of group interviews.</p> <p>Cost: Expensive if USAID has to carry out the survey itself; less expensive if it can be included in a survey carried out by a local organization.</p>	Findings should be treated with care & will need expert interpretation. Can citizens separate the process from the results of the policies formulated during the process? The trendline should rise over time as policy processes become more democratic and more sound from a substantive angle. May be a time lag between improvements in the process and popular perception of improvements. Targets should be modest; change may not be dramatic. Not worth conducting annually.
Comments:				
2) # key Executive Branch policies which appear to be having their intended impact in comparison with a list of policies supported.	As noted in the indicator. Could be limited to particular sectors. The assessment is likely to require special indicators for making the judgment about impact for each policy considered. These indicators could be substantive (small enterprise growth, #s employed by small enterprise) or perceptual (what do stakeholders, beneficiaries, and experts think about the impact of a given policy?)	Indicates that application of variety of policy analysis skills and broadened consultation process are leading to more effective and more implementable policies. Note that some degree of unintended consequences may be anticipated.	<p>Depends on the policies. One method could be annual detailed interviews with key informed members of relevant stakeholder groups. It would be important in initial interviews to set up key elements to watch; i.e., effects of lifting of price controls on production and demand among certain categories of people; also if there are ways of observing whether the consultative process made a difference to quality and implementation.</p> <p>Cost: Will vary depending on the policies. Selective interviews with key informants should not be too costly but it will take some time as this requires detailed and well supported evidence to demonstrate how a particular sector has been affected by a specific policy.</p>	Even if level of openness rises, trendline may rise and fall depending on the sensitivity of issues, govt. confidence and press track record in dealing with investigations. Need to establish a reasonable time frame for when impact might begin to be seen, particularly if relying on perceptual measures.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Intermediate Result 2.4.6.1: Rules for Making Policy Reform

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) Improvements in the laws and rules on division of policy responsibilities compared to a list of reforms promoted.</p>	<p>Laws, etc., must make clear the roles, responsibilities and relationships of and between the different branches and levels of govt. While there are no universal rules, there should be substantial roles for the executive and legislature branches, some balance of powers, and forms of checks and balances.</p> <p>Can be yes/no; or # or % out of key reforms promoted.</p>	<p>For the product of policy processes to be effective and implementable and for the process to be consultative in and out of govt., requires for a start that laws and regulations clarify roles, etc., and ways of checking powers and of resolving conflicts of substance and procedure.</p>	<p>Monitoring of govt. documents, and interviews with govt. and non-govt. stakeholders to determine whether the laws in place are being implemented and the text of the laws conforms to the titles and stated intentions of the laws.</p> <p>Cost: Reasonably low; and once in place and operating, may not need to be assessed again. However, it is possible for laws to be undermined by practice and therefore this may need constant watch.</p>	<p>This will be very specific to different situations, traditions, and systems. Broad terms of division of responsibilities and balance/separation/checks of powers might be defined in constitution; or it may require series of laws and regulations or even conventions; in some cases an independent court may come to determine some of the details as disputes arise. At a formal level the outlines at least should be in place soon; at a more refined and substantial level improvements will take time.</p>
<p>Comments: See also Appendix C for the legal reform scale, which represents an alternative measure.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4:

More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6:

Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Intermediate Result 2.4.6.2

Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity Strengthened

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
1) % of people receiving TA/training who say they have used their new knowledge and skills and can give examples.	As in the indicator, out of all those trained or receiving TA on policy processes. It may be important to disaggregate on basis of gender and other bases.	This is a proxy measure for utility of the assistance and increased capacity in policy analysis. It requires that such people have been through a process of technical assistance and are prepared to say that they have made use of what they learned to be more effective.	Sample survey. Interviews with people who have undergone training or worked with advisers. It is important that interviewees be pressed for convincing examples. Cost: Moderate, but depends on how many people were to be included.	Should be expected to show positive trendline especially if there is focused, applicable assistance and programmatic support. First targets should be set no earlier than 6-12 months after training.
Comments:				
2) # or % of users applying policy analysis tools to policy.	Users could be individuals, govt. offices, NGOs or other entities. Tools include political mapping, stakeholder analysis and others. Could convert the indicator to a scale of frequent use, occasional use, limited use, or no use for a list of key policy issues and then average the scores across the issues.	This indicator seeks to get at the actual use of the various methods that have been learned, both the variety and level of skill and sophistication. The emphasis should be on methods that both improve quality of formulation and feasibility of implementation.	Detailed interviews with sample or panel of observers and govt. and non-govt. stakeholders. In determining improved quality, detailed interviewing will need to take place. Cost: Inexpensive or moderate depending on number of users to be interviewed. Interviews will need to be carried out by persons familiar with policy analysis methods.	Should be expected to show positive trendline especially if there is focused, applicable assistance and programmatic support. First targets should be set no earlier than 12 months after the tools are taught.
Comments:				
3) a) Budget and b) personnel allocations to implement selected policies.	Money and staff are allocated to carry out the policy. This would be based on views of panel of govt. and non-govt. stakeholders who would be required to explain their assessments. This could be based on a scale indicating seriousness of purpose in implementing the policy: i.e., no/minimal, insufficient, sufficient for a modest level of achievement, sufficient for substantive level of achievement.	By focusing on two essential elements of effective policy implementation, this indicator tries to measure the quality of the policy, and also the political will to implement (which in turn indicates that political leaders are persuaded by it) and the likelihood that it will be implemented.	Monitor annual budget and expenditure reports to observe quantitative changes; in addition interview relevant and informed persons to get more subjective assessments of adequacy of resources allocated for implementation of specified policies. Cost: Not a major undertaking; the more policies focused upon, the more time consuming.	Indicators are trying to gauge adequacy of money and personnel for a particular purpose rather than simple quantitative increases over time; policy implementation may require more people in the early period of implementation and fewer later or vice versa. Keeping "adequacy to achieve results" in mind, the trendline should stay high or show a movement up the scale.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
4) Legal and institutional framework to implement selected policies.	If necessary to facilitate implementation of policy, new or adapted laws and rules and institutions are in place; or those which may have hindered implementation are altered or rescinded. This could be yes/no; or based on a scale from serious obstacle; to unhelpful, to facilitative of a modest level of achievement; to facilitative of a substantive level of achievement.	Although this is a more qualitative indicator than 3) above, it serves the same purpose by looking at two other factors essential to effective policy implementation.	Monitoring of govt. laws, rules administrative regulations; interviews with informed observers and govt. and non-govt. stakeholders to assess appropriateness of laws and adequacy of design (and later) operation of institutions to facilitate implementation. Cost: Moderate, but careful assessment of adequacy of laws and institutions will take care and time.	As above in general terms. Laws should be in place from the start or be adapted as lessons of implementation indicate need for change. Operation of relevant institutions should show improvement over time.
Comments:				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Intermediate Result 2.4.6.3 Intra-Governmental Consultation and Information Improved

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection Methods/Approx. Costs	Target Setting/Trendline Interpret. Issues
<p>1) a) % of policy makers who say they have sufficient information on which to make decisions, or b) # offices or Ministries whose policymakers agree that they have sufficient information</p>	<p>Might organize by ministry of office. Policy makers are those in govt. who propose, formulate, or supervise implementation of a selected policy or set of policies. 'Sufficient' will be based on their opinions, but they will be asked to back up their opinion with supporting evidence.</p>	<p>One (admittedly subjective) method of getting at whether improved information is available for policy making resulting from better consultation of various kinds and better information systems.</p>	<p>Interviews with govt. personnel involved in policy processes. Cost: The more comprehensive or the larger the sample, the more expensive; but should be inexpensive given that not that many people are involved.</p>	<p>The trendline should be up as long there is clear programmatic and govt. departmental support for the consultative process and use of new and better information.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				
<p>2) # of mechanisms used for intra- and inter-ministerial consultation.</p>	<p>Mechanisms include committees, semi or permanent commissions, newsletters, e-mail and list serves and requirements for exchange of drafts. They should be used regularly in order to qualify as a "mechanism used."</p>	<p>A problem (sometimes the established practice) in many govts. has often been that policies have been developed in the isolation of one unit. This indicator measures efforts to establish new ways of broadening consultation. It becomes more meaningful if one requires regular use and defines 'regular.'</p>	<p>Interviews with govt. personnel in departments which are involved; observation of meetings (if possible) and of selection of copies of newsletters or electronic communication. Cost: Interviews will not be time consuming. Checking on few meetings and looking at a few examples of use of e-mail/list serves & newsletters also should not take much time.</p>	<p>If policy processes are becoming more consultative and at more stages (including monitoring and evaluation of implementation), this trendline should increase for a while, but we are not talking about large numbers of mechanisms. With time, it may be found that some are no longer required or do not work and there may be a decrease in number. At that stage, numbers of meetings and quality of deliberations becomes more important.</p>
<p>Comments: Frequency of use of mechanisms may be an important consideration.</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Intermediate Result 2.4.6.4: Opportunities of Public Participation Increased

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
1) # of well publicized policy meetings open to citizens and citizen groups.	"Publicized" includes publication in channels that are easily accessible to the public at large and targeted efforts to inform citizens and citizen organizations with specific interest in the topic; and notice should be in "good time." This depends on local view of what "constitutes enough time to give full consideration." Once standard is set within a local context, the number of such meeting should be recorded. To satisfy the definition of "open," meetings should be held at times & places that make them accessible to all social categories of society.	Indicates executive branch is opening up the policy process to the public and those organizations with particular interest in a topic.	Interviews with private and NGO sector people concerned; monitoring of govt. notices and newspapers. Cost: Relatively low if focused on selected policies, and if there are established channels for govt. notices.	Trendline should go up steadily at first and then reach a plateau. If the trend declines, it might be indicator of govt. reducing opportunities for the public to participate or/and the public losing interest. Will be difficult to set targets.
Comment: See also civil society indicators.				
2) # of meetings of joint policy commissions between the executive branch and representatives of the for-profit and/or not-for-profit private sectors on selected policies.	# of meetings over a period of a year on all stages of policy processes.	As above; only more clearly focused on the private and PVO sectors which should be actively involved in the policy processes.	Interviews with private and NGO sector people concerned; monitoring of govt. notices and newspapers. Cost: Relatively low if focused on selected policies, and if there are established channels for govt. notices.	As above. May be difficult to set targets.
Comments:				

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
3) # or % of private firms and/or NGOs who say they have experienced a valid engagement with the executive branch in the process of policy making and/or implementation.	"Valid engagement" refers to a situation in which these organizations have been invited in good time, give good information, have been listened to and have a sense that their views have been taken into account. The number could be related to one policy instrument, or a sector or selected policies or govt. policy making in general. (Where relevant, an effort should be made to include women's & minority organizations as a test of inclusiveness of the process.)	Goes beyond 1) and 2) by focusing on whether the opinions, information, etc., of the private and NGO sectors that have chosen to participate are seriously being taken into account.	Interviews with senior persons in private and NGO sectors. Quality of information will be helped by talking to a few govt. officers. Cost: Medium, depends on number of groups to be interviewed.	As program takes effect, trendline should rise. If executive is committed to substantial increase in non-govt. input into policy processes, this should be reflected in sharp increase; if commitment and management is weak the trend will of course be more gradual.
Comments: This indicator could be converted to a scale with criteria laid out for high level of engagement on all substantive issues, medium engagement on most key issues; limited engagement and seldom on key issues; and virtually no engagement.				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch

Intermediate Result 2.4.6.5: Executive Leadership in Enhancing Democracy

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) Example(s) of major initiative launched by the executive branch to enhance (broaden or deepen) democracy.</p>	<p>Example involves a clear demonstration that the executive branch is willing to take the lead in a major initiative in strengthening democracy, possibly in face of indifference or even antagonism from parts of the public: for example, in fighting corruption, or for women's rights, or against ethnic discrimination. The requirements of a "major initiative" would include launching a public campaign, establishing task force with high level appointments, devoting resources, setting an example, providing incentives and sanctions.</p>	<p>The executive branch, particularly at higher levels is often the agency most able to push the democracy forward or save it from slipping back by (pro)actively taking major initiatives. While this cannot be measured by # or %, initiatives of this kind from time to time demonstrate the executive branch's commitment to and willingness to show leadership in furthering democracy.</p>	<p>Monitoring high level executive branch statements and actions; at this level actions should be dealt with in the mainstream media; so following TV, radio, newspapers should be sufficient.</p> <p>Cost: Easy to follow; no special effort involved. However, to establish level and perseverance of commitment might require monitoring over time.</p>	<p>Not a question of trendlines. Only required in certain situations. If situation seems to require it (and that will need some consensus of informed observers) then the test is whether the executive branch responds and the level of the response.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

Agency Objective 2.4: More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions

Intermediate Result 2.4.6: Enhanced Policy Processes in the Executive Branch
 Intermediate Result 2.4.6.6: Executive Leadership in Resolving Divisive Conflicts

Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measurement	Relevance of Indicator	Data Collection methods/Approx. costs	Target setting/Trendline interpret. issues
<p>1) a) Example(s) of use of good offices of the executive branch to resolve/reduce/prevent significant divisive conflicts.</p> <p>or</p> <p>b) a critical events agenda for issues known to be divisive.</p>	<p>Example involves a clear demonstration that the executive branch is willing to take the lead in a major initiative to resolve, reduce, prevent a major divisive, or potentially major conflict. This could be ethnic, religious, ideological or resource based. Overtly this may include launching a public campaign, establishing task force with high level appointments, devoting and promising resources, setting an example, providing incentives and sanctions; but it may also be done in an covert or low key manner. A critical events agenda would lay out certain steps to diffuse or resolve issues and would track progress in achieving those steps. The steps would include a time frame.</p>	<p>The executive branch, particularly at higher levels is often the agency most able to push to resolve or prevent major conflicts which can lead to loss of life, tear the social fabric, reduce political trust, and hinder economic progress all of which are not only damaging in themselves but will undermine democracy. While this cannot be measured by # or %, initiatives of this kind demonstrate the executive branch's commitment to and willingness to show leadership in conflict reduction and avoidance.</p>	<p>Monitoring high level executive branch statements and actions; at this level, actions should be dealt in the mainstream media; so following TV, radio, newspapers should be sufficient. However, if initiative is covert or low key or negotiations are secret which may all be appropriate. Then best information may observe from high level contacts with senior exec officials.</p> <p>Cost: Easy to follow; no special effort involved. However, to establish level and perseverance of commitment might require monitoring over time.</p>	<p>Not a question of trendlines. Only required in certain situations. If situation seems to require it (and that will need some consensus of informed observers), then the test is whether the executive branch responds and the level of the response.</p>
<p>Comments:</p>				

PART 3 APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AND ADAPTING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

A. Selecting Indicators

When selecting indicators, the first thing to consider is whether the performance information collected will be useful in making program decisions. If this is not the case, then reconsider the use of the indicator. To the extent possible the indicator should meet the following nine characteristics.

1. *Match the indicator to the type of entity and result USAID is trying to achieve*

When developing indicators, it is vital to match the type of measuring tool used for the indicator to the type of entity and result that USAID's activities are intended to achieve. For example, just as one would not use a thermometer to indicate changes in "weight," so one should not use a population statistic to measure changes in "quality of legislative processes." Each result should be carefully matched to an appropriate type of measuring tool. Consider the following examples:

Number and/or percent of people, as well as demographic ratios based on population statistics—appropriate when the objective involves changing individual attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors or when the objective involves the provision of services to the population.

Numbers and/or percent of other entities, such as service delivered, decisions, meetings, cases, etc.—appropriate when the objective involves extending the scope of that entity or how it is processed.

Checklist, scorecard, milestone scale, or index for a multi-dimensional process—appropriate when the objective is a complex developmental

process, such as "strengthened effectiveness of the legislature" or "improved NGO management." See Appendix C for additional details on these types of indicators.

Quality ratings by experts or peers (usually using a list of criteria)—appropriate when quality improvement is the objective, such as the quality of a piece of legislation.

C Comparison to a standard, such as a ruler for measuring length or model legislation for assessing legislative quality.

No one measuring tool is intrinsically *better* than others. Each must be considered in the context of what entity or result is intended to be measured, as well as the feasibility, reliability, and validity of the data from that measuring tool.

2. *Measure the result as directly as possible*

A basic principle is that indicators should measure the achievement of a result or an objective as directly as possible. This includes measurement at the correct level—if an indicator measures the intermediate result, it should not be used for the strategic objective.

Example:

Result: *Expanded citizen knowledge of human rights*

Weak Indicator: *Numbers reached by civic education*

Better Indicator: *Percent of specified target group understanding specific rights*

The better indicator matches the result, whereas the weak indicator is at a lower level. The point is to know how well civic education is working—to what extent knowledge of rights has expanded. The number reached by civic

education programs is not necessarily the same as the number of those with expanded understanding of rights. To assess the knowledge of rights conveyed through program interventions, a sample survey is required. The information gleaned from such a survey would provide valuable information to managers, allowing them to adjust the content of their programs if the messages are not being heard and retained.

3. *Plan for cost-effective measurement*

Sometimes an indicator matches a result perfectly but is too difficult to measure or too costly (3-10 percent of the total budget is the expected range of performance monitoring costs). In these cases, strategic objective teams will need to turn to proxy, or second-best, indicators. There can be trade-offs between more expensive direct measures and less expensive proxy measures. Decisions about which to use should be based on the utility of the information that the indicator provides.

Indicator 1 would require a panel of legal specialists and intense review of a sample of cases. It might be very costly to develop a sample frame, compile all the needed case records, and collect these data. There could well be reasonable differences among expert panel members concerning the judgment made in any given case, since legal specialists may differ on the meaning of the law. Such differences could be difficult to reconcile.

Indicator 2 is a possible proxy with low data collection costs. It assumes that citizens will be more willing to file cases if they think that the law will be correctly and predictably applied. Strategic objective teams should, however, think about whether other factors could be responsible for an increase or decrease in the number of cases, prior to choosing this as an indicator. For example, market reforms and growing private investment could lead to a rise in the number of commercial cases, even without substantial court improvements. There may also be a time lag problem with this indicator, since it may take

some time before businesses or citizens recognize that the system has improved and are willing to bring cases.

Indicator 3 relies on testing the knowledge of a sample of judges (not possible in some countries). The indicator should be accompanied by self-reporting on whether the judges thought they were applying this knowledge. Any survey of judges, which relies on self-reporting, should ask about specific cases in which the new knowledge had been applied. However, if self-reporting is used, bias will be a concern. This indicator measures below the result and assumes that improvements in knowledge will lead to improvements in practice.

Indicator 4 could represent a clever response to a difficult measurement problem. If there are

Example:

Result: *Improved Application of the Law by Judges in Commercial Cases*

Possible Indicators:

- 7) *Expert review of a sample of cases to check on whether the law was appropriately applied;*
- 2) *percentage change in the number of commercial cases filed;*
- 3) *percent of judges knowledgeable about specific aspects of the law;*
- 4) *sample of particular kinds of cases to gauge correction of common misapplications of the law;*
- 5) *percent of local/foreign businesses whose CEOs say that they are willing to resolve disputes in the courts; and*
- 6) *survey of commercial lawyers practicing before these courts concerning application of the law.*

common and identifiable misapplications of the law (i.e., in bankruptcy cases) and if judges are trained to understand those aspects of the law, then one could develop and review a sample of

cases involving only those aspects to see if the application of the law was correct subsequent to training. Data collection for this indicator might be less expensive than for indicator 1, although putting together the sample frame could still pose problems.

Indicator 5 would require a sample survey of local and/or foreign-owned businesses. This would probably be easier than reviewing a sample of cases, and surveyors might pick up a lot of useful information about what was limiting or encouraging business use of the courts. There may be a time lag problem here but perhaps not one as serious as with counting cases in indicator 2. Also, if timeliness is an issue, judges applying the law more predictably may not do much to persuade business owners to settle serious disputes in court.

Indicator 6 would require either a sample survey of practicing lawyers or an expert panel chosen from active lawyers of good reputation. There should be no time lag problem here. If improvements were made, lawyers with adequate commercial case loads should recognize them. However, there could be problems of bias if, for example, a lawyer on the panel just lost an important case.

In this example, there is no single perfect indicator. Selecting one requires thinking about the trade-offs. How much accuracy is needed? How can the information be used and by whom?

4. Consider data sources when selecting indicators

Indicators should be selected in conjunction with a review of data sources because data *validity* and *reliability*, as well as timeliness, are critical. There needs to be consistency in the source and data collection methodology across time in order for the data to be truly comparable. In cases where the data are unreliable or uncollectible, proxy indicators will have to be selected. Whatever indicators are used, they should balance the quality and utility of the information with practicality of data collection.

For example, as noted above, it may be possible to collect very useful performance data relating to court improvements from lawyers practicing before the courts. A sample frame could be composed of Bar Association membership lists or from government lists of law licenses granted. Lawyers in the sample could then be interviewed about a range of court phenomena. The choice of data collection method will have an impact on the articulation of the indicator. In this example, a survey of lawyers cannot produce data for an indicator such as “*percent of cases in which the defendant’s counsel obtained timely access to court records,*” but it can produce data for a similar indicator - “*percent of active criminal lawyers who say that they a) never have trouble obtaining access to records in reasonable time; b) sometimes have trouble; c) frequently have trouble; and d) never try because they believe they cannot get records.*”

The important point here is that if indicators are developed without a careful look at data collection methodologies, a mission may end up with a list of indicators requiring several different methodologies— aggregate statistics of court case data, surveys of lawyers, surveys of businessmen, and so on. Multiple methodologies will make data collection expensive and time-consuming. Sometimes settling on one data collection approach means that some of the indicators are less direct than might be desirable, but the trade-offs between cost and quality issues are important to examine.

5. *Make indicators operational*

Indicators are operational when the concept that is being measured has been specified in terms of the actions used to measure it. In other words, data collectors understand exactly what data are required and how those data need to be generated and organized.

Example:

Result: *Increased availability of legal services*

Weak Indicator: *Availability of legal services*

Better indicators: *Number of public defenders per 100,000 population; or percent change in the total number of cases handled by public defenders.*

The weak indicator is not fully operational because it specifies neither the legal services involved (public defenders, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, etc.) nor the unit of measurement (total number of services, number of services per district, number of districts with public defenders, etc.). As worded, this indicator does not provide sufficient information for the data collector.

In the candidate indicators tables in Part 2, specific definitions are provided where needed to operationalize the indicators. However, some indicators will require further specification by the strategic objective teams. Common among these are scales which should be scored according to very specific criteria (see Appendix C for information of this type of indicator). For example, the “degree to which resources are provided to the election authority in a timely manner” may be scored on a 5 point scale, each point of which has specific standards. Because the standards may vary from country to country, working groups were not always able to provide universal criteria. Strategic objective teams may need to do so in order to make the indicators operational in the country context.

6. *Make indicators objective*

Indicators are objective when they will be interpreted the same way by different people. This permits comparisons over time, even if different people collect the data from year to year. So, an objective indicator is one which leaves no confusion about which data to collect, how to organize the data, nor which criteria to use in judgmental indicators. If there is confusion about these issues, then making year-to-year comparisons will be suspect, since the data collectors may have collected different data and/or used different standards.

However, for democracy and governance programs this will not always be fully feasible. As discussed earlier, some attributes of democratization do not lend themselves to simple count indicators which tend to be less subjective than indicators which try to capture complex qualitative change. Nevertheless, the latter should be crafted to limit their subjectivity as much as possible. Making the indicators operational should also help them be more objective. See the discussion in Part 1, Chapter II, Step 2, for more detail on various types of indicators, and see Appendix C for advice on using scales and indexes, which are ways of making qualitative information more objective.

7. *Show the size of the problem whenever possible*

Quantitative measures should be expressed not just in terms of a numerator (i.e., what has been achieved) but should include the denominator whenever possible. It is the denominator that indicates the size of the problem being tackled.

Example:

Result: *Government deals more effectively with human rights violations*

Weak Indicator: *Number of reported human rights violations investigated*

Better Indicators: *a) Percent of reported human rights violations that are investigated; and b) percent of investigated violations that are prosecuted.*

The weak indicator leaves us with no sense of the magnitude of the problem, in terms of how many violations are reported and perhaps not investigated. If 100 reported human rights violations are investigated, it makes a difference whether this is 100 out of 1000 reported violations or 100 out of 125 reported violations. The better indicators give us the scale of the problem.²

There is an exception to the preference for ratios or percentages over absolute numbers. When the base (i.e., the total population) is very small, it could be misleading to formulate the indicator as the percentage. For example, if there are 10 partner cities in a municipal development program, a percentage of those cities adopting public-private partnerships will not be a very telling indicator. If the mission proposes to increase the number from 2 to 4 partner cities in one year, the percentage would rise from 20 percent to 40 percent, a percentage that those not knowledgeable about the progress could interpret as a grand achievement. In this instance, it is better to report the number of partner cities with partnerships out of the total number of target cities.

² However, the better indicators do assume that most violations are reported. If this is not the case, due to fear of reprisals, then the indicators do not adequately measure the objective.

Often, both the absolute number and the percentage can be reported from the same data and give a more complete picture of the changes occurring.

8. Ensure that indicators are sensitive to change

Because of the need to gauge performance at regular intervals, it is important to select indicators that are sensitive to change. Indicators which show target groups or institutions reaching a *threshold* of some kind, but which do not reflect progress below or above the threshold, may not be sufficient to gauge progress. The most common example is the yes/no question. For example, one can respond to “fund-raising plans established” with only a yes or a no. This does not show incremental change over time or changes in the quality of the plans. How close is a plan to being established? How extensive is the use of the plan?

Consider also the following:

Example:

Result: *Improved management of civil society organizations*

Weak indicator: *Percent of CSOs that have a written strategic plan with clearly formulated and realistic objectives.*

This is a threshold indicator; CSOs either meet the minimum threshold or they do not. Improvements below and above the threshold will be lost.

How one sets the threshold standard will also affect the extent of progress that can be shown. For one mission using an indicator similar to the one in the example above, the definition of the threshold was so modest that the 1997 baseline study showed that a very high percentage of target NGOs had already passed the threshold. USAID will only be able to demonstrate modest

additional progress from that high base. If 78 percent of target NGOs have already crossed the threshold, how much of an accomplishment is it over a 5 year strategy period to increase that percentage to 86 percent? Setting too high a threshold can be equally problematic because then it may be difficult to show any progress at all.

Example:

Better indicator: percent of CSOs showing improvement in strategic planning on an index.

This indicator can show incremental change. The index (see Appendix C for information on constructing indexes) could lay out key factors believed to be related to high quality strategic planning, each of which would be scored with a range of points. In this indicator, all CSOs which show an increase of 3 or more points, for example, out of a total of 15 possible points could be counted as “improved.” The index could be constructed as follows:

- 1) CSO has a clear vision (1-5 points)
Factors to consider: clear written vision statement; vision developed in participatory manner; vision a realistic extension of current operations; board/staff/volunteers understand vision statement and support it
- 2) CSO has multi-year strategic plan (1-5 points)
Factors to consider: plan developed in participatory manner; plan has clear objectives; plan exists in written form; plan premised on realistic revenue generation, staffing level, and feasible activities; key plan elements understood by board, staff, and volunteers
- 3) CSO monitors plan’s progress and continuing applicability (1-5 points)
Factors to consider: plan has clear benchmarks, progress monitored using data,

and corrective action taken when needed, staff periodically assess external environment and critical assumptions

The advantage of this indicator is that it is sensitive to small gradations of change. A panel of experts or a small group of CSO leaders and project managers would work through the index annually, awarding anywhere between 1 and 5 points for each of the three elements. It is, however, more labor intensive to collect data for the index than it would be for the threshold indicators. Missions working with large numbers of groups might still opt for the threshold indicator.

9. Disaggregate indicators by relevant population groups

It can be critical to disaggregate data by gender or other population characteristics (i.e., rural-urban, ethnic group) relevant to the country and a given strategy. Strategies can have very different impacts on different population groups due to societal factors. These factors may be structural or cultural and they can be subtle or blatant. Strategic objective teams need to know if their activities are affecting all groups as intended. Disaggregation may increase the costs of data collection. The expected utility of the data does need to be compared to the cost of gathering those data.

Another point to consider is whether the indicator should refer to a specific population which the mission is targeting or the whole population. For example, do the local governance indicators apply to selected municipalities or all municipalities? Do the indicators gauging democratic attitudes refer to the entire adult population or only groups receiving civic education?

B. Establishing Baseline Data and Targets

1. Baseline data

Once indicators have been selected, planners need to choose the year (or years) that will serve

as the baseline, or starting point, from which progress will be measured. It is preferable if the baseline immediately precede the start of a new strategy because we are trying to gauge the progress of a particular strategy. It will not always be possible, however, to secure baseline data for the chosen year. In that instance, the baseline should be the most recent past year for which the relevant information exists or can be acquired.

In selecting a baseline year or years, it is important to examine the trendline of past performance. There could be unexpected spikes or dips in the trend and a year in which one or the other occurs would be a poor year to select as the baseline year. Often, of course, we lack trendlines in democracy indicators, and it is either not possible or prohibitively expensive to construct them.

2. *Setting targets*

Setting targets for democracy measures is very difficult. We know little at this point about probable rates of change and what factors affect those rates. What follows here are common sense tips for setting targets.

a. Think about how easy it will be to set targets while selecting indicators. For example, an indicator that purports to measure improved interaction between local government and civil society groups, such as the number of meetings between the two, could pose difficulties for setting targets.

b. Think about what the trend has been in the past for any given indicator. Historical data for some period prior to the start of the strategy (perhaps for 5-10 years) is useful in assessing how rapid change has been in the past and can be used to project the future. Some years ago, strategic objective teams in the trade and investment sector in country x projected export targets (as a result of their trade and investment strategies) that showed growth over time but which actually lowered the trendline. This was not because

they anticipated that external circumstances would drive the trendline down but because they had not thought to look at the pattern of growth over time.

c. Consider parallel experience from other countries. For example, data on participation rates of various kinds exist for Britain. While those levels of participation are probably very high relative to what can be expected in newer democracies, they could be used as a ceiling. In other words, in a country with high illiteracy rates, considerable rural isolation and a history of repression, it would seem in most instances sensible to set targets for the proportion of citizens contacting local government officials or writing letters to the editor well below those of Great Britain. We are beginning to obtain comparative data on participation from some newer democracies³ and can refer to these data for comparison.

d. Think through *when* program activities, and those of other key donors and partners, will have an impact on indicator values. Do not “straight line” targets (i.e., increasing a variable by 2 percent per annum over 5 years because you project a total change of 10 percent).

e. Think about external conditions which may affect indicator values over time. For example, in one country the number of citizens attending town meetings was used as an indicator to demonstrate municipal governments becoming more responsive. The number attending town meetings did rise for a while, but then suddenly dropped off rather precipitously. Reportedly, participation declined when a sum that municipal governments had been given by USAID for small development projects was exhausted. In this case, USAID funds directly triggered the increased participation

³ The work of Mitchell Seligson in Latin America is one example.

so the indicator did not tell us much about the interaction of municipal governments with citizens.

f. Consider setting a target *range* rather than a single numerical target. For example, the number of local governments appointing community organizations to special commissions will increase by 5-10 percent between 1998 and 1999 instead of pinpointing a 6 percent change in that period. The range should be kept narrow, so that the level of accountability is clear.

g. Consider how clearly the target or the actual will communicate and how the trendline will move when deciding upon an indicator's unit of measurement.

h. When indicators are disaggregated, targets should be disaggregated as well. When relying on preexisting data, it is important to check whether the source disaggregates the data. It is common, for example, to see indicators for "proportion of population registered to vote" and "proportion of population voting" disaggregated by gender. It is not always common, however, for election administrations to record information by gender. Acquiring the data by gender would require a) persuading the election administration to obtain additional information and set up its records differently; or b) conducting a national sample survey subsequent to an election.

C. Interpreting Data Points and Trendlines

It can be difficult to be certain about the meaning of data for particular indicators. Consider the possible meanings for an indicator such as "the number of reported human rights violations per 100,000 population." If the number is increasing from one year to the next, it could mean a worsening situation with more abuses. On the other hand, it could also be a hopeful sign, with the climate for reporting abuses improving. Citizens may now feel that

they run fewer risks of revenge when they report incidents and that the government is now prepared to take such reports seriously.

In yet another example, declining or low voter turnout (number of adults voting as a proportion of the total voting age population) can signify a number of things: 1) relative satisfaction with democratic government; 2) declining satisfaction with democratic government; 3) fear of election day violence or manipulation of results; 4) lack of knowledge about the mechanics of voting or the issues and candidates; or 5) lower stakes in the current elections compared with past elections. Typically, transition elections draw very high voter turnout. The percentage voting is likely to decline from its early high as people begin to feel that democracy will last. In addition, in some countries such as the United States, there are multiple opportunities for voting, reducing the stakes (and therefore the turnout) in each election. By contrast, high or rising voter turnout could result from successful voter education campaigns, institutionalization of democratic norms related to participation, higher stakes, or manipulation by elites who use patronage networks to get out the vote.

The point of these examples is to suggest that the interpretation of indicator data must be country specific. Similar patterns in indicator data may signify different things in different countries.

APPENDIX B: ASSESSING DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES AND COSTS

A. Introduction

This section provides guidance on the potential advantages/disadvantages and costs of several different data collection methods for democracy and governance indicators. These methods include sample surveys, using data from governmental or other agency sources, using judgmental sources, and using several types of rapid appraisal methods (including field observations, focus groups, and case studies). In addition to considerations of data reliability and validity, the costs of data collection are an important factor when choosing or designing indicators. In addition to providing some pointers on weighing the pros and cons of various data collection methods, this section also gives guidance as to how to estimate the costs.

Any discussion of factors to help estimate data costs usually involves specifying the different tasks or elements that produce costs. Most costs discussed here are for people with different background capabilities doing various steps in an overall process to acquire the needed data. For this reason, outlining cost components also requires outlining and discussing the major tasks needed to collect each type of data, and the skills needed for those tasks. Thus, this section should also serve as a broad guide to major tasks and capabilities needed to implement the several types of data collection. The specific affiliation of the staff members—DG officers, partners, contractors—carrying out each task is not distinguished here, as this will vary for different indicators and countries.

1. *Generic data collection tasks*

In general, producing indicator data requires three major types of tasks: a) planning the indicator(s) and developing data collection instruments, procedures, and criteria; b) actual data collection; and c) managing the data, analyzing it, and producing reports on the data. These steps are amplified for each of the types of data collection discussed below. Often the costs for the first and third step - planning and analysis - are as great as for acquiring the data itself. However, often the work needed for these steps is underestimated, leading to poor data, cost overruns, staff “burnout,” and other major problems that might have been avoided if realistic cost (and time) estimates had been used.

Over Time. If the same method is used over time for the same indicator, the costs for second and subsequent waves of data collection (for example, annual surveys) should decrease. Planning and development will be substantially reduced, but not eliminated as each data wave should reassess the continued appropriateness of the procedures, assumptions, and data definitions. Actual data acquisition costs will be nearly the same for each data wave, but may increase with inflation. Data analysis steps may be reduced somewhat with new waves of data, as procedures for analysis and presentation will have been worked out using the first wave data. However, new findings will require consideration and discussion of their meaning and implications; these discussions are likely to generate new questions from stakeholders and other users that will require more analysis. So, the budgets for data analysis should be retained for each wave of data.

2. *Skills needed*


For some of the methods described below, staff may need to consult with those who have specialized knowledge and skills for data

collection. Normally, this is acquired via graduate level training, with course work in measurement/instrument design, research methods, and/or survey research. A necessary

skill is knowing how to assess data quality, such as validity and reliability factors. Often, skills for less traditional methods, such as judgmental ratings and focus groups are taught in courses

Decision Chart for Selecting Data Collection Approaches for Indicators

The following flow chart assumes that an indicator has been defined conceptually, perhaps in draft form.



labeled “Qualitative Methods.” The skills needed for data base construction, data management, and manipulation of large data sets are usually associated with computer systems managers, who may or may not have backgrounds in the data collection methods needed to acquire the data. In general, we assume that computer capabilities are available at, or through, the mission (or contractors/cooperating agencies) for data processing and analysis. Finally, the statistical skills needed for survey sample design or data analysis and presentation are a further set of specialized topics; these disciplines are widely taught and persons with these skills should be available to missions, for example, on a contracted basis.

When considering the costs and technical details involved in setting up good quality data collection methods for indicators, administrators often wonder if all costs are really necessary. Couldn’t they obtain nearly as accurate data about results by cutting down substantially on the costs? The answer is usually “no,” because poor quality data are often worse than no data at all, if they seem to provide information about the result being measured, but really reflect primarily the characteristics and flaws of the measurement methods. Particularly if the data are for indicators to be compared over time, it is essential that data be consistently of high quality (reliable and valid), so that trends over time show *real* changes, and that users of the data have confidence in the credibility of the results shown by the indicators.

In the more specific presentations below, the cost elements for conducting sample surveys are discussed in some detail, as field experience using these methods for surveys of democratic values is available for deriving cost estimates. The remaining methods are outlined in less detail, but with descriptions of the differences in tasks needed to conduct them. Many of the concerns and considerations for sample surveys

will also apply to these other methods.

B. Using “Secondary Source” Data

1. Data from government or international agencies

a. Description/Definition. This refers to statistical data already being collected systematically, often on an annual basis, by a host country agency. For example, the ministry of justice may have statistics on the numbers of human rights cases tried in its court system, or an election authority will have data on the number and percentages of citizens registered to vote. Sometimes, these statistics are kept for jurisdictions smaller than the whole country, such as provinces or court districts; if available these can provide a basis of comparison of “districts targeted by USAID versus those not targeted” as well as looking at trends over time. In addition to government agencies, other organizations may collect and keep relevant data, including other international or private agencies, universities or other academic centers doing research, or even commercial firms that collect data for business purposes.

b. Cost Elements. This type of data may seem almost cost-free, but may have hidden costs, that are necessary in order for staff members to conduct the following actions:

(1) Specifying precisely what data elements are needed for the indicator, including the bases for percentage calculations and break-outs needed. (For example, as percent of the country’s population? percent broken out by gender? percent of citizens?). Specification may require discussion between mission and government/agency staff.

(2) Negotiating with the agency or organization. Finding the office(s) and staff members (statisticians) that keep the data

within each agency; securing permission to access the data, if not published; arranging for its regular (e.g., annual) transmittal to USAID.

(3) Learning about the original data collection procedures and quality. How did the agency acquire that data, what definitions were used, and what procedures were used to assure uniformity and accuracy of collection across various jurisdictions? How accurate do agency statistical staff consider that data element to be? This step may require study of detailed technical manuals by staff members who have statistical and data management skills, to understand fully the original data characteristics.

(4) (Sometimes) Cost sharing. if data are being collected by another agency; or as payment for data from a commercial organization.

(5) (Sometimes) Extracting data from original records. If data are available only in individual records (for example, a paper file for each court case), rather than compiled as aggregate statistics, considerable time may be needed to extract data from paper records (or a sample of them), or for data processing to aggregate machine readable case data into the needed statistics.

(6) (Sometimes) Acquiring data from numerous jurisdictions. If data are compiled separately in several jurisdictions, such as provincial governments, considerable effort may be needed to acquire it from all jurisdictions, to assess the extent of uniformity in the original data collection, and to compile it into aggregate statistics.

(7) Maintaining the data at USAID in forms that are retrievable over time, usable by various staff members, and well documented

as to meaning and source. This is likely to involve setting up a spread sheet or MIS data file, particularly if data elements are broken out by ethnic group, gender, or jurisdiction.

(8) Data analysis and presentation graphs, if needed. This may be as simple as showing trends over time on a graph, but might require analysis of data from several jurisdictions or compiling and analyzing data obtained from multiple sources.

c. Comments and Caveats. Secondary sources are often a very attractive data source for indicators. A major problem may be obtaining information on data quality - how accurate are the statistics obtained? Can you connect confidence intervals to the data — e.g., is the percentage obtained from the data within plus or minus 10 percent of the “true” percentage? Were data elements fully defined for the original collectors or coders, so they classified things (such as type of court case, type of citizen request) in the same way across cases and jurisdictions? If data quality is low, indicators will be unreliable, and using such indicators to track change over time may be problematic. It is very important to assess early on how much aggregation will be required. We found this to be a major consideration during the indicator field tests.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. Low cost, if data are already aggregated in needed form; about 2 to 5 days of staff time *per data element*. For multiple jurisdictions, this amount of staff time may be needed for each jurisdiction. Moderate to high cost, if data are extracted from individual records; depends on the number of sources and records, and the extent of data extracted from each record.

2. Data from contractor or grantee records

a. Description/Definition. These are data obtained from USAID’s partners. An example might be the records from partners working with the management systems of civic organizations. This guidance assumes that the data are already being collected, and just need to be extracted for USAID indicators.

If *new* data collection or monitoring systems need to be set up, costs would be more extensive, including developing definitions/specifications for all data elements; developing data collection instruments and record keeping forms; training data collectors - often these are project staff members; piloting the procedures and checking the quality of the resulting data; and setting up data storage and analysis systems. Usually, these costs will be part of the grant or contract, but will be a noticeable part of its budget. Estimate about 5 to 10 percent of the cost of activity delivery as the cost of data collection.

b. Cost Elements

(1) Specifying the data needed, in what formats, with break-out groups and percentage base(s) identified. Assessing data quality characteristics.

(2) Negotiating with grantees to produce those data, if the specifying was not done jointly.

(3) Training grantees in monitoring and evaluation.

(4) Collecting data.

(5) Data transfer and processing. Are the data already in computer-readable format? Is any further coding or transformation of the data needed to produce the statistic needed for the indicator? Data cleaning of case level data may be needed to remove any duplicate cases, examine the extent of missing data (if

more than one data element is obtained per case), to make sure that all data elements are within the appropriate range, etc.

(6) Data analysis to produce “user friendly” presentations for USAID and its stakeholders, such as graphs showing trends, breakouts for different locations or subgroups, or other analyses to show instances of higher or lower results, to be used for program improvement.

c. Comments and Caveats. Applicability for national level data may be limited, unless the contractor is working with the whole country, or collecting data from representative samples. This could involve much higher costs if the monitoring system involves multiple components, although these costs will usually be part of the funding for that activity.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. Low-cost (e.g., 2 to 5 days of staff time, per indicator), assuming that the monitoring system already exists, but it may be a bit higher the first time the data are acquired and analyzed at the mission/contractor/grantee level, as procedures and presentation graphs are developed. Costs will also be higher if the grantee requires training in data collection and analysis or supervision in carrying out the work.

C. Using Judgmental or Narrative Sources

1. *Expert panels and peer judgments*

a. **Description/Definition.** This refers to using the judgments of people about a given topic as the major source of data. These might be purely narrative judgments of quality factors, or judgments recorded on one or more rating scale(s). The classic example is peer review of scientific proposals and manuscripts for publication. In the field of democracy and governance, an expert panel might be used for reviewing the qualities in written documents, such as rating election laws for their conformity to international guidance for conducting elections. People believed to be unbiased but informed observers of political or governmental processes might be called upon to rate the characteristics of a given process, using the components of an index devised by the mission as the guideline criteria for their rating (see Appendix C for examples). For example, local NGO leaders might be asked to periodically rate the “democratic processes” of their local governmental bodies that are being assisted by a USAID project, using rating forms provided by USAID for the indicator. The “experts” should make their ratings independently, but might come together as a panel to discuss their observations to see if they reach consensus. Written documentation of the ratings should be expected, either as a narrative review, or using a written rating form of specified criteria.

b. **Cost Elements** (see also Appendix C)

(1) **Constructing the criteria or rating scale.** This may take several weeks of effort, if done anew by the mission, as it requires specification of the sub-parts or dimensions to be rated, clear definitions as to what these mean, and written directions for what raters should do. Requires the involvement of stakeholders, for reaching consensus on

what are the proper criteria. Examples of scales and criteria are spelled out in the indicators tables.

(2) **Selection of and invitations to raters.** This involves identifying raters or panel members who: 1) have the needed expertise and/or are in the location to observe on-going activities; 2) are believed to be unbiased (not a participant or beneficiary of the activity to be rated); 3) are literate in the language to be used; and 4) are willing to participate as raters (whether on a voluntary or paid basis). If the use of raters is extensive or will be done annually, a data base of information about potential raters may be needed by staff member(s) managing the rating operations. Potential raters must be contacted individually to see if they are willing and available to participate in this task. Individual judgments are usually kept confidential, although the raters’ names in an overall panel may be made public.

(3) **Training raters.** If this is a new activity, a technical assistance session is needed to orient raters to the nature of their task and why it is being done, the meaning and use of the specific criteria to be used, and the operational procedures they will follow. Ideally, this would include rating example materials or “vignettes” to train raters in the use of the criteria and to increase cross-rater reliability.

(4) **Costs of the rating process.** This may include costs of one or more panel meetings, travel costs for both staff and raters for such meetings; potential payments to raters, cost of reproducing rating forms and directions, also any costs involved in collecting the rating forms, if the raters do not come together for a meeting with project managers.

(5) Compilation and analysis of reviewers' ratings. Tasks and costs for this step will vary, depending on the extensiveness of the ratings. For example, if 12 civic and legal experts rate the characteristics of the national laws that establish local governmental powers, the analysis task may simply compare and compile their 12 judgmental reports into a summary report. In contrast, if local "expert observers" periodically rate (e.g., quarterly) the performance characteristics of their local governments, analysis of these reports is likely to require setting up a statistical data analysis system, similar to a survey analysis, for data maintenance and analysis over time. The extent of agreement among raters of the same entity (reliability) should be examined.

(6) Summary and presentation of data. This may be included with data compilation (e.g., when narrative expert ratings are used), or may require a separate step for presenting the findings as indicators, for example in easy-to-understand graphs.

c. Comments and Caveats. This may be an appropriate data collection method when the indicator refers to the *quality* of a major document or process. The credibility of this type of indicator depends heavily on the credibility of the raters themselves, and their reputations as unbiased and well-informed about the relevant topic, as well as how systematically the rating criteria are developed and carried out. If the ratings are done more than once, with comparisons across time, attention must be paid to across-time reliability, especially if different raters are used at different time points.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. Specific cost estimates will vary substantially, depending on the extensiveness of the rating to be done.

2. *Content analysis of press coverage or other documents*

a. Description/Definition. This method refers to the use of research staff for systematic content coding of publicly available documents, such as newspaper accounts, political flyers, local government budget reports, and so forth. The methods might be used to construct indicators of, for example, the "fairness" of coverage of all political parties by local media, media reporting on corruption, the types of issues covered by political parties' campaign literature, or the adequacy and transparency of publicly available government budgets.

b. Cost Elements

(1) Gathering documents to be content analyzed. Careful thought needs to be given to the selection of documents, if it is to be a sample of some larger total population of media, such as "press coverage." Which newspapers and/or other press will be included, for what time period? Will regional and/or local publications be included, or only those from the capital city? Systematic sampling methods may be needed, if the total is too large for complete analysis. A person or agency (e.g., a press clipping service?) must be designated to monitor relevant publications and carefully extract all relevant materials. If agency documents will be analyzed, an explicit definition is needed for which documents to include. For example, if local government budgets are the target documents, the definition of "local governments" must be established, then a listing of them specified and possibly sampled. The unavailability of relevant budget documents from some local governments would itself be an important data element, for example, as the percent of governments lacking required budgets.

(2) Establishing coding criteria. Unless the indicator measure is simply a count of documents (or perhaps inches of press

coverage), the elements to be coded from each document, and the criteria for defining each element, must be carefully specified in advance. For example, in reviewing local government budgets, what items should the coder extract or rate? What are the criteria for “fairness” if one is reviewing press coverage of political parties? Often, establishing the criteria and their definitions should involve stakeholders and/or experts in that content area to help establish credible criteria. Pilot tests of the draft coding criteria, the written forms to be used, and the coding conventions should be undertaken to check for clarity and agreement on definitions.

(3) Selecting and training coders. Sometimes coders will be staff members of USAID or from a contractor/grantee, or temporary staff may be hired for this purpose. Staff doing this task should have some background in the content domain of the documents to be coded, for example, in accounting for analyzing budgets, or in political study for analyzing press coverage of political parties. A training session (e.g., one to three days) will be needed to orient all coders in the nature of the task, to clarify why it is being done, to achieve a detailed understanding of each code category, to practice coding sample materials, to test for reliability among coders, and to discuss the procedures that will be used. Several practice materials should be coded and discussed for resolution of any problems or differences in how to code items. Then, reliability among coders should be established by having all coders code the same document independently, and checking the percentage of agreement among their coding data.

(4) Coding the documents. Coders use the established codes and other criteria to complete the rating form for each document. Costs of this step can be established during

training, by observing the average time needed by coders for each document, multiplied by the number of documents. To continue reliability checks, a sample of documents should be coded twice, by different coders, with their codes assessed for agreement.

(5) Entering data from coding for analysis. A statistical analysis package will often be needed for this step. Data are entered, then checked for accuracy and completeness, using the same methods as for other original data collections, such as survey data.

(6) Analyzing and presenting data. Usually, the first step in the analysis of content coded data is producing simple frequencies for each content category. Often, it is desirable to present these with examples of the types of original material included in each category, such as verbatim quotations showing “fairness” or the lack of it in publications reviewed. Further analysis should usually examine the coded material, broken down by sub-categories, such as “fairness” in capital city versus local newspapers, or completeness of budget presentations in localities helped by USAID versus those not receiving USAID’s support. This may require 5 to 20 days of a statistical analyst’s time.

c. Comments and Caveats. This method is somewhat similar to the use of expert judgmental raters, but content coding places greatest emphasis on objectively rating the stimulus materials. If the code categories are clearly constructed, the ideal is that all trained raters will reach the same coding decisions on each document. In contrast, for the use of expert raters, the emphasis is on the competence of the raters and their capabilities to judge complex materials in an unbiased fashion. They will not necessarily view the materials similarly, and different judges might be chosen *because* they

represent different areas of expertise.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. This will vary extensively, depending on the extensiveness of the documents to be coded and the number and complexity of code categories to be rated. Again, most of the costs are for staff time to do the specific tasks, although moderate cost might be involved in acquiring the documents to be coded. Calculate staff time needed for each cost element, as listed above, then add a generous amount for underestimation.

D. Cost Factors for Sample Surveys

1. Background

Modern survey research has become a complex field with well established norms of questionnaire design, sample design, field work, and data analysis, which promises to produce reliable and valid data if carefully conducted. Surveys have become popular in countries that recently emerged from long years of authoritarian rule, and local USAID missions have available to them numerous organizations (NGOs, local universities, and for-profit enterprises) that claim expertise in this complex area. Often these organizations do not possess the full range of expertise that one associates with highly professional survey work. Rather, one will find local organizations that might be expert at sample design, but not at questionnaire design. In rare instances when both of these talents are found locally, it would be even more unusual to find competent data analysts associated with the same local organization. One might find local organizations that have been conducting demographic surveys, which normally means a high level of expertise in sample design and field work, but no knowledge as to how to structure or analyze a survey of (for example) democratic attitudes and behaviors. Other local organizations have become very good at election polls, which generally consist of “quick and dirty” samples and questionnaires,

since the only variable of real interest is the vote. In determining costs, then, it is very important for strategic objective teams to keep in mind that unless the questionnaire, sample, field work, and analysis are competently performed, the resulting data may be seriously flawed.

One alternative to designing and implementing a survey on one’s own would be to add questions to surveys (usually commercial in origin) that are already being implemented on a periodic basis. This is a low cost alternative, if data for only a few straightforward indicators are required. There are some disadvantages to this approach, since multiple questions may be required to explore complex concepts, such as attitudes or beliefs. “Buying in” may therefore work better for questions related to behavior. It will also limit opportunities to explore the relationships between various data elements. For example, a mission working on improving the justice system might want to know why some citizens think that justice is being administered fairly while others do not. Only by being able to run an analysis on the data set relating justice to socio-economic, demographic, political, and other variables will these patterns emerge. Finally, while national samples are important, missions often need special purpose samples on specific geographic areas where USAID focuses, or on specific beneficiary groups or potential beneficiary groups. General purpose samples will rarely if ever provide this level of information. It is therefore very important to look at the sample design when considering buying questions in a pre-existing survey.

2. Cost estimates

The cost of surveys is considerable, although this will depend in part on whether citizens, NGOs, government departments, or some other entity is being surveyed. The cost may be more than reasonable if a given survey allows the collection of data for a number of indicators. Obviously, no one will choose to conduct a

survey to collect data for one or two indicators.

Cost estimates are based on extensive experience in Central America. Costs should be adjusted somewhat based on GNP per capita for higher or lower cost areas. The following costs are initially based on actual direct costs to acquire the services described. Final costs, as shown in the table at the end of this section, will attempt to factor in institutional overhead expenses.

a. Questionnaire design. Cost estimate = \$ 8,500. This aspect of the process is the only one for which it is not easy to provide reliable cost estimates. That is because it is difficult to provide cost accounting for what often becomes a very diffuse process. Typically, questionnaires have become “committee projects” in which each stakeholder inserts a list of “must-have” items. There are several problems with such a process. The first is the risk imposed when non-specialists write survey questions to measure democracy and create poor items, resulting in poor quality data. Measuring democracy through surveys has occupied some of the best minds in the political science field for the past thirty years. While there may be no single universally agreed upon set of questions that measure democracy, there are countless ways to do it wrong, and committee-designed questionnaires by laymen are risky ventures. Committee involvement should come at the outset, when each involved unit should specify what it is trying to gain from the survey, and the expert survey researcher should indicate if those objectives can be achieved. The actual writing of survey questions is best done by survey specialists.

United States nationals, expert in questionnaire design, familiar with the local culture, and fluent in the main language of the country being studied, normally receive a daily consulting fee of \$325 to \$435/day, but could review and revise an instrument in two (six-day) work weeks, including travel to/from the country to be

studied, for direct costs in the neighborhood of \$5,220 plus travel (est. \$1,000) and per diem (14 days @ \$150), for an estimated rounded total of \$8,500. The proposed expert should have extensive experience with the design of surveys and not be merely a consumer of surveys housed in national data banks. There is no substitute for extensive, on-the-ground field experience in questionnaire design and implementation.

b. Sample design. Estimated cost = \$4,500. All surveys must be based on a probability sample, otherwise known as a random sample. If the selection of respondents is not random, nothing can be said about whether results meaningfully represent the country, and follow-on surveys to measure change will be completely unreliable. Fortunately, this is an area in which considerable expertise exists locally. Most countries have experts in sample design associated with government agencies (e.g., ministries of agriculture, labor, the census bureau). These individuals have sometimes developed satisfactory “sample frames,” i.e., the “list” from which the respondents are to be chosen. These lists are often detailed census maps in which each dwelling unit in the country is shown. These maps are not without their problems, however, since they are sometimes very out of date, and therefore do not reflect recent population shifts resulting from rural-urban migration. Another even more serious problem is that sometimes access to these maps is highly restricted by the military or by agencies that jealously guard their “property.” Often, however, USAID can use its contacts with the government to overcome problems of access, especially when it is prepared to pay for the cost of copying the maps.

Sample design, then, involves selecting a local expert trained in the science of sampling and providing him/her with the sample frame. Local experts can often be hired for \$100/day, and the design of a national sample should not involve more than four weeks of work in the hands of a

competent technician, for an estimated cost of \$2000. Obtaining and copying census maps could add an additional \$2,500 to this cost. Alternatively, a local firm might contract for the field work and supply the sample design expert, but USAID would need to review the resume of that expert to be certain that the individual has training and experience in sampling.

Another factor the strategic objective teams need to consider is whether a national sample or a specialized sample is required. When there are target populations of special interest (perhaps because of the mission's work with these populations), specialized samples need to be used or perhaps added to the national sample. But those samples need to be "random." For example, if USAID is working with members of a group of local civil society organizations, then a list of members needs to be obtained and what is known as a "systematic sample" would be drawn. Then, comparisons can be made between the changes in attitudes and behaviors of the specialized groups compared to national trends uncovered in the national sample.

Sample size always is subject to great debate, but it should not be. Sample size for national samples is entirely independent of the size of the population of the country; a sample of 1,200 respondents from Costa Rica will have the identical margin of error as a sample of 1,200 respondents from China, given that each sample is appropriately selected. Normally, a margin of error⁴ of less than 3 percent is considered sufficiently precise for most work in the social sciences since 95 percent of the time the survey will be able to pick up changes in national sentiment no greater than + or - 3 percent of the actual value had everyone in the country been interviewed. A sample of 1,200 respondents has a margin of error of 2.9 percent. If this sample were increased to 2,000, the margin of error

⁴Technically, we are referring to the "confidence interval."

would only drop to 2.2 percent, so the added cost is normally not justified. However, when USAID is interested in specialized subsets of the nation (e.g., the northern zone versus the south, or the indigenous population versus the non-indigenous population, or women versus men), the level of precision for subsets depends upon the sample size of each subset. Thus, with six ethnic groups in the country, each group of proportionately the same size, then a total sample of 1200 would yield a sample size for each group of 200, with a margin of error of plus or minus 7.1 percent for ethnic group breakdowns. If one wishes to further subdivide each ethnic group by gender or education or age, then the margin of error becomes very wide. In sum, it is important to establish sample size with a clear notion of the breakdowns one wishes to see in the analysis.

c. Data collection. Estimated cost = \$12,600. This is sometimes thought of as the most expensive part of the process but in fact it is often less expensive than the analysis phase. Many local firms have expertise in conducting surveys. Their costs are (or should be) very low since the interviewers are hired on a per-survey basis, and normally paid an hourly wage with no fringe benefits (if interviewers are used from local areas). Experience in Central America finds that labor costs to the survey firm range from \$2-4 per interview, based on wage rates of about \$1/hour. This includes an interview of between 30 and 45 minutes, travel time, locating the household and the pre-selected respondent. Added to those costs are the costs of supervision, with one supervisor for each 5 or 6 interviewers. If we estimate \$8 per hour for supervisors (including per diem), and pro-rate those costs for a team of six interviewers, this would add an estimated \$64 per team-day. The total direct labor cost per interview, including supervisory cost, would come to about \$5.50.

For a national sample, there are travel costs for bringing interviewers into a central location for

training. It is difficult to estimate this cost since much depends on the distances interviewers have to travel. In smaller countries, the capital city can be used to train all of the interviewers. In larger countries, trainers may have to travel from location to location. Additional travel costs, normally requiring jeep rentals, are for the transportation of supervisors to the various field sites. This transportation also includes the cost of moving questionnaires to the field and back to the central office. Experience has shown that a budget of around \$6,000 is reasonable for the transportation costs (jeep rental, fuel, insurance) of interviewers and supervisors. Interviewers should normally be experienced, and therefore training does not have to take more than a few days.

Summing up the costs of data collection, with a per-interview cost of \$5.50, a sample of 1,200 plus supervision and transportation should cost about \$12,600. In higher cost areas, where wage rates are considerably higher than shown here, these costs would increase proportionately.

d. Cleaning, coding, and data entry. Estimated cost = \$1,800. Once the field work is complete, questionnaires need to be cleaned and coded. If the survey has been done well, nearly all items will be closed-ended and therefore no coding will have to take place. If many open-ended items are used, costs can spiral out of control. Data entry is performed by highly experienced data entry clerks, normally earning fairly low wages. A standard questionnaire could normally be entered in 15 minutes. Each survey has to be entered two times, the second time being for verification purposes, so total data entry time should come to 600 hours for a sample of 1,200. Total costs should amount to \$1,800 when labor costs are \$3.00/hour for data entry clerks.

e. Analysis. Estimated cost = \$26,000. This step needs to be carefully thought through by strategic objective teams, as seldom will the “data speak for itself.” What we normally want

to know is how variables relate to each other. For example, we want to know if rural citizens are less supportive of their political system than urban dwellers, or if males are more politically tolerant than females, or what level of education is associated with acceptably high levels of political tolerance. We might be interested in comparing regions or project areas to the national norms. We almost certainly want to examine indexes for various dimensions of democracy (tolerance, opposition to military rule, etc.) rather than relying upon a single question or number to tell us everything. Survey firms often generate masses of tables, but little or no analysis. In this area, technical assistance is needed so that the investment in the prior steps will have real payoff for USAID. It could take an experienced researcher up to 60 days to prepare a statistical analysis and narrative for a national sample. If a specialized sample were included as well, the cost could go higher. It is assumed that the cost per day would be \$435 x 60 = 26,100 or rounded off to \$26,000.

Overall estimates for a sample survey (costs per indicator depends on how many indicators use the survey data):

Task	Rounded Estimated Costs
1. Questionnaire design	\$8,500
2. Sample design	\$4,500
3. Data collection	\$12,600
4. Coding and data entry	\$1,800
5. Analysis	\$26,000
Sub-total	\$53,400
Indirect cost and fringes [for international consultants] (60% of # 6), see note below.	\$32,040
Total costs	\$85,440

A note on indirect costs: For each of categories 1-5 above, indirect costs are involved, but they

vary widely depending upon how the work is contracted. Normally, a very efficient method is for USAID to contract the entire project under an IQC. Such a procedure reduces considerably the contract negotiation efforts of USAID staff. Another approach is to contract a local for-profit or an NGO. In both of these scenarios, sub-contracts would normally be used to obtain the full portfolio of talent required under points 1-5 above. Indirect costs, then, would vary depending upon the indirect cost rate and fringe benefits of the contracting organization.

E. Rapid Appraisal and Other Qualitative Methods

These methods may or may not be useful for indicators of overall results. They are likely to be less reliable than the more systematic methods described above, as they depend heavily on the observer's or interviewer's skills, and on the specific examples for which data are collected. They are particularly valuable for quick information for planning purposes or on the conduct of projects in the field and for learning about the reactions of participants to the activities supported by USAID. They may be less appropriate for indicators to be reported over time, as the results may be substantially affected by minor variations in how the methods are used.

1. Direct observations of field activities

a. Description/Definition. For this method, the data collector visits sites where activities of interest are occurring, such as observing election procedures in local precincts, attending "town meetings" conducted by local governments, or observing courtroom procedures for fairness and due process. The observer should be prepared with a list of topics to be observed and recorded, but this is usually a set of "open ended" topics rather than detailed recording of all actions or a pre-coded rating form. This method is particularly appropriate for assessing the quality of public activities when they can be observed unobtrusively and for checking whether program activities as delivered match reasonably well with program plans. The methods can become more rigorous and accurate by using sampling methods to select the examples to be observed.

Sometimes data can be obtained on processes affecting individuals (such as applying for a governmental benefit, using "freedom of information" processes, or treating all ethnic groups equally in civil service proceedings) by having data collectors "pose" as citizens

requesting those benefits, or by asking actual users to serve as data collectors. Then, data are recorded about that instance of government service, such as: was clear and full information provided; was the official polite but efficient; was the process easy to follow and not too time consuming for citizens; are all citizens treated equally or do some receive preferential treatment?

b. Cost Elements

(1) Planning for the field observation. Even with more open-ended methods, careful preparation is needed to clarify what indicator topics will be assessed, what activities are to be observed, and whether the observation sites will be a representative sample from a listing of all sites or, instead, an informal selection of those sites most convenient for observation. Usually, at least a topic list is prepared to guide observations, and sometimes a more formal written instrument is used, e.g., with prepared rating scales and questions for the observer to address. Sometimes permission for observation or meeting attendance must be obtained. This planning step may require three to ten days of staff time.

(2) Selection and training of observers. Since the observer *is the measurement tool* in this method, the observers should be skilled in unbiased observational methods, knowledgeable about the content area and specific topics to be observed, and well oriented in the specific procedures and recording methods to use. Training in anthropological field methods is ideal. If more than one observer is used, an orientation session will be needed to coordinate their understanding of the underlying concepts and procedures to be used. Allow one to two days per observer for training, plus time for selecting and hiring.

(3) Collecting the observations. This is the actual field observation with initial data recording. To estimate time needed, multiply the number of sites to be observed by the observation span—perhaps a full day for election observations, or two hours for attending a town meeting. Be sure to allow travel time and costs if needed. The number of sites needed will differ depending on the purpose: a few sites (3 to 10) may be sufficient for exploratory purposes, to “get a feel for how things are going,” but a more systematic sample will be needed for a representative picture of that program.

(4) Processing the observations. Data collected in field notes or observation forms must be further processed by the observer after leaving the field site, such as by transcribing notes into full descriptions, or summarizing several types of information into narrative, or writing full item responses on a standard format. This step can take as much time as the initial observation; for example allow about one day for this processing step for each day of observations. This step is needed to translate the observers’ notes, observations, and insights into recorded forms that are useable by other people.

(5) Analysis and reporting. Sometimes the observers’ report(s) are the final step if only a few sites are being observed, but often cross-site analysis is needed. This involves comparing sites for similarities and differences on each topic observed, looking for the range of practices and activities observed, discussing the major categories within each topic, and assessing whether different types of sites differ in identifiable ways. Unless the observations have been coded into numeric formats such as scales or ratings, the presentation will usually be in the form of a narrative report or “cross-case analysis.”

c. Comments and Caveats. This family of methods is very useful for project monitoring, particularly for assessing the extent and processes of implementation of USAID's interventions. Whether direct observations will be useful for annual indicators is not entirely clear. A key caveat for use of this type of data collection for indicators: if data from field observations will be used over time, then the methodology should be kept the same over time. This is difficult to maintain when the major measurement tool is individual observations and insights.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. Costs will vary a lot, from about 15 days minimum for informal observation of a few sites, to several months of expert staff time for a full observational study in multiple sites.

2. *Focus groups and key informant interviews*

a. Description/Definition. These are methods for obtaining target people's opinions, observations, and understandings about the topics of interest. A focus group brings together individuals from an identified category (which may be all citizens, or those who participated in an USAID-funded program, or those in particular roles). Discussions by small group discussions of 6 to 12 people are facilitated by trained focus group leaders to elicit the participants' views in some detail. Usually the range of opinions on the focus questions are explored, with careful and gentle probing to understand why people hold those views. The discussion is recorded as fully as possible, by recording equipment or a skilled note taker. Each focus group should be homogeneous so that the more strata of society that need to be queried, the higher the cost and time involved.

Key informant interviews are often used with government officials or leaders of a particular activity to explore the interviewees' roles,

priorities, actions on a particular issue, or opinions on specified areas of their expertise. Usually, the interview is guided by a set of open-ended questions, rather than closed-ended survey-type questions. The interviewer must be knowledgeable in the content areas being discussed, skilled in devising probe questions to amplify the interviewees' responses, diplomatic to keep up good rapport during the interview, and able to record quickly key elements of answers. These interviews are best done in-person, but can sometimes be done by telephone, if the phone system works and the interviewee is collaborative (not threatened or likely to be defensive).

These are good methods for exploring a content area, prior to designing a more formal systematic data collection tool such as a survey questionnaire. They are also used when the priority is to understand the interviewee's perspective, such as the meaning they attach to given events, their priorities and value choices, or how they interpret a topic of interest, such as a law they are supposed to implement. It is less clear whether and how these methods would be used for indicators to assess change over time, as the particular selection of focus group participants or key informants is likely to affect the data obtained.

b. Cost Elements

(1) Planning for topics to be covered. This is a key to obtaining useful data. It may require document review, discussion with stakeholders, etc, to identify major issues and sub-topics to use as probes for full understanding.

(2) Selecting focus group participants or "key informants" to be interviewed. This requires specifying clearly what types of people are desired and why. How will they be selected? How will they be contact to arrange for participation or interview time and place?

How will locations be arranged for the focus groups?

(3) Selecting and orienting focus group leaders, interviewers and recorders. Training will be needed, particularly if the people in this role have a good content background, but lack the facilitation or data collection skills.

(4) Conducting the groups or interviews, with data recording.

(5) Processing the initial data recorded. This requires transcribing tapes, if used, or summarizing notes taken during the group or interview.

(6) Data analysis and reports. Usually a summary report is organized by major themes or topics, preserving the “flavor” of original material by using examples and quotations to illustrate the points. Analysis is qualitative, using words rather than numbers.

c. Comments and Caveats. Usually these data should not be reported quantitatively, such as percentages of those who participated, because audiences may believe the percentages are from a sample survey and represent a larger population’s opinions. Percentages may also mislead.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. This is fairly inexpensive for small scale projects; allow at least 2 person-days for *each* focus group (for preparing; selecting, and contacting potential members, a facilitator, and a recorder during each group; and transcribing/summarizing after each group). Additional time is needed for overall planning of topics and summarization. For open-ended interviewing, allow about 3 hours of staff time for each hour of actual interviewing; more if travel will be needed.

3. *Case studies*

a. Description/Definition. A case study brings together multiple sources of information to examine a particular occurrence, site, or other phenomenon within its natural context. Often this method is used to examine complex social systems or institutions as they change over time. Traditionally this research method has been used to understand how and why the case changes over time, the processes needed to implement a complex activity, or the contributions of multiple actors and organizations to broad scale development, such as “systemic change.” Usually, diverse types of information are brought into the case report, such as interviews, site visit observations, document review and analysis, and even quantitative data about that site. Multiple case studies can also be conducted, with cross case analysis to compare features and summarize findings.

For indicators, the use of case studies is uncertain but could be helpful. For example, brief narrative case studies could help illuminate the meaning behind a complex quantitative indicator. Or a series of case studies might be conducted over time to assess progress in complex processes such as institution building. For example, a set of 12 case studies of civic organization development might document their progress, if done annually and compared over time. Some aspect of national development might be examined as a single case, such as the factors leading to the passage of a major piece of legislation affecting human rights.

b. Cost Elements

(1) Identifying the factors to be examined in the case study. Usually this requires background reading of relevant documents, consultation with stakeholders, and/or preliminary interviews to specify why the case study(ies) are being done, and what to look for. A topic list for things to be done and observed while on site should be developed, often supplemented by open-

ended questions for each person to be interviewed. This is usually done by the person(s) who will do the case study. However, additional case study researchers may need to be hired, oriented, and trained. Allow several days of staff time; more if complex background documents must be reviewed, or multiple site visitors work together to develop procedures or must be oriented/trained in the topics and procedures developed by others.

(2) Selecting the sites for case examination.

There should be a clear rationale as to why the specific sites are selected, when several sites are included. They might be sites that made particularly strong or weak progress, for example, with the case studies conducted to identify reasons for these results. They might be sites using different strategies or models to reach a program objective, with the case studies done to illuminate how these strategies work in practice. Preliminary data may be needed to characterize sites on the dimensions of interest, in order to select sites wisely. If the sites are individual organizations, permission may be needed to conduct the case studies.

(3) Collecting the information. Often the major sources of information are derived from a site visit, which includes brief observations of on-site activities and interviews with several types of individuals, such as program administrators, “front line” staff, and participants, or local government officials, politicians, and involved citizens. Focus groups might also be conducted. (See methods above in 2.a. for key informant interviews and focus groups.) Documents are often collected while on site, such as cost records, local press reports, example case records, public notices or announcements, etc. It is preferable to have at least two site visitors make each visit, so they can compare observations, contribute new probes for

interviewing, and increase the validity of the findings. Other information might be obtained from external sources, such as relevant government statistics, press reports of events concerning the case, records of USAID’s program activities, and so forth. In addition to the time needed on site, allow time for contacting those to be interviewed prior to the visit, setting up group meetings, securing permissions for observing activities, and making travel arrangements, if needed. Don’t forget actual travel costs.

(4) Compiling the case study. Usually, notes from on-site observations and interviews need to be completed and amplified after leaving the site, while the material is fresh in the observer’s memory. Then, all the sources of information are used in writing each narrative case study, generally following the outline provided by the key topics developed in the planning stage. Charts and diagrams are often helpful to show the flow of activities, the network of factors involved in decisions, and so forth. Allow at least 5 to 10 days of analysis and writing time per case.

(5) Cross-case analysis and summary reports.

Case studies tend to generate lengthy sets of narrative materials, even if each case is confined to 10 to 15 pages. A summary of findings is essential, even from a single case, and especially from multiple cases. Use cross-case analytic techniques for comparing multiple cases.

c. Comments and Caveats. The insightfulness of case studies depends on the skills of the people conducting them. Like the other methods in this section, the person is the major instrument for collecting data, and should be well prepared in the use of *qualitative methods*.

d. Summary Cost Estimate. Each case study involving about one week’s site visit by two people will require 4 to 6 weeks of time in total for preparation, travel arrangements, conducting

the visit, collecting and reviewing other materials, analysis of all information, and writing the case. Allow additional time for the overall planning for a series of case studies, and for cross-site analysis and summarization.

APPENDIX C: USING SCALES, INDEXES, AND SCORECARDS FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

A. Introduction

As Part 1 of this Handbook has emphasized, developing and using indicators appropriately can be a complex process with many considerations. Often, there are no clear-cut answers to questions concerning which *are* the best indicators for a given result. This appendix amplifies considerations for a family of potential indicators involving rating scales, indexes, and scorecards. Before turning to these measures, however, missions should remember the principle of “parsimony”: do not search for a complex tool or explanation if a simpler tool is available to do the job. As applied to indicators, if simple counts or statistics from secondary data are applicable to your activities and their results, then a complex index is not likely to be worth the trouble and expense required for its development and data collection.

In using measures involving scales, indexes, and scorecards, two concepts are of central importance:

- C Validity - Does the indicator measure what we want to measure? Do various audiences for the indicator agree on its meaning?
- C Reliability (or replicability) - If the indicator data were collected again, by a different person or a short time later, would they yield the same answer?

Measures which rely on qualitative data collection may do well in meeting the validity test, but can fall down on the reliability criterion.

When the data for democracy indicators are very subjective and not collected in a standardized way, there is a risk that we end up measuring differences among data collection teams rather than actual changes in performance.

The three methods described in this appendix can be used to develop indicators that help in quantifying complex results. Three such approaches are 1) rating scales; 2) indexes, which combine ratings into an overall score to serve as the indicator; and 3) scorecards or checklists. These tools permit the quantitative analysis of answers that derive initially from ratings or assessments by people. While these methods are often based on the “subjectivity” of individual judgments, strategies are available for enhancing their reliability (see below). Such judgments are not necessarily inappropriate bases for measures. For example, progress in scientific publications and biomedical research grant awards rests heavily on the subjective judgments incurred during “peer review” concerning what is “good science.” Many other fields—art, literature, some Olympic sports, and so forth—depend on the judgments of experts for determining what is good performance.

When the mission’s purpose is to facilitate the development of complex democracy-related institutions (such as “legislative capacity” or “organizational infrastructure”) it is unlikely that simple measures will capture the complexity or magnitude of the changes being attempted. Using a simple but invalid indicator in such circumstances can often be counterproductive, if it encourages heavy emphasis on those activities that are *counted*, to the neglect of other essential changes in the developmental process. Further, indexes which include the whole range of dimensions believed necessary to the result are often good management tools to aid program development and self-assessment. Using such indicators fosters the twin goals of performance measurement: reporting to higher levels the results achieved via USAID’s resources and

using the measures as feedback mechanisms to foster actual achievement of desired results.

Another major concern in choosing indicators is the resource burden for developing the indicator and collecting the data. More complex indicators are likely to cost more; especially if data need to be collected from a large number of organizations. Sometimes, systematic sampling can reduce the data collection burden, but still produce reliable data; for example, use a sample of NGO's or local governments relevant to a process, or a sample of all the bills considered by a legislature during a session. Alternately, a scorecard or checklist approach that is simpler than an index may provide a "good enough" indicator, when data are needed from a large number of entities. Budgeting for data collection from or about numerous organizations may require similar resources to a population survey for collecting data from individuals. (See Appendix B of this handbook, on "Assessing Data Collection Approaches and Costs").

B. Definitions

A *scale* is a rating device that presents a range of responses. Terms like "excellent" and "high" define one end of the scale, while "poorly done" and "low" define the other.

1	2	3	4	5
Low				High

Scales allow us to gather information on "soft" dimensions of democracy, such as the quality of laws passed, the fairness with which laws are applied, the extent to which a complex set of processes have been completed, etc. A scale enables the transformation of the complex human judgments on whatever dimension is being rated into numbers that can be combined, averaged, and otherwise processed statistically. But the numbers and the derived statistics can also be misused, if the underlying ratings are not valid and reliable.

Scales for individual ratings can be combined into a multi-item *index* containing multiple bits of information about the thing being measured. A common example of an index is a knowledge test in education, which uses the percentage of items correctly answered as the overall measure of learning. An index may be ordered in terms of a set of steps or stages that are expected to occur sequentially, called here a Milestone Index. An index can also be simply the combined score from rating scales for a number of characteristics of the process or object being rated (see examples below).⁵

Scorecards and checklists are similar to indexes in that they also combine multiple bits of information. Here, we use the term scorecard for a scoring system in which each item is a discrete "yes" or "no" response, not depending on a rating scale. Sometimes each item must reach a threshold level before it is checked as "yes." When appropriate, a scorecard can be easier to develop and use than the more complex judgments usually required for an index. Further examples are provided at the end of this appendix.

C. Strategies for Increasing the Reliability of Scoring for Scales, Indexes, and Scorecards

Scales. While it may be straightforward to think of the factors we need to measure using rating scales, scales are not necessarily reliable tools when a number of different people will be

⁵Unfortunately, the term "scale" is often used in both everyday language and methodological literature to mean both a single-dimension rating scale, as used here, and a combination of multiple items to assess the overall concept, which we are calling an "index." Thus, Quality of Life Scales in the health literature and commonly used "attitude scales" are multi-item indexes, in our terminology. We have tried to consistently distinguish these terms, to avoid confusing readers.

applying them. There are a number of concerns which need to be addressed to ensure that scales pass the test of being both valid and reliable measures:

- C Understand that different people tend to use rating scales differently; i.e., some seldom use the ends and show a tendency to rate most items toward the center. Others tend to use the extreme values extensively. Often raters who have participated in an activity tend to rate it positively.
- C For the examples included here, each element is scored or rated on a scale from 1 to 5. Often people wonder how many values such a scale should have. There is no set answer to this, but the convention is usually to provide a large enough range for those using the scale to show differences among scale values, but not so many values that they get bogged down in fine distinctions. We suggest the 1 to 5 range, with “1” representing “no action,” or “never done” and “5” meaning “excellently” or “at every opportunity.” We include the middle value “3” for raters to use when they are truly neutral, or feel that the positive aspects on the item are balanced by the negative or no progress aspects.
- C Introduce strategies to help raters achieve consistency in ratings. One of the best ways to do this is to define what each point on the scale means, by defining the detectable increments of change. For example, point 1, the NGO has no long term plan; point 2, the NGO has a rudimentary plan but objectives are not clearly articulated and resource expectations are unrealistic; and so on up the scale. This approach is called a Milestone Scale - see example D-3 below. If this approach to defining the points on the scale is used, then the total score will equal the number of changes that have occurred.

Indices. A number of additional strategies apply to both individual scales and their combined indices:

- C Train raters—even with well-defined scales that are to be combined into an index, raters must be trained. This gives raters opportunities to practice, to ask questions about the meaning and interpretation of each item, and to compare or calibrate their ratings, so that to the extent possible, different raters will score each item with the same number for a given situation. It is often helpful in a training session to do “trial” ratings, for example of a written example situation, then to compare and discuss any differences in ratings. Training reduces the differences in scores which emerge as a function of differences in rater experience or knowledge. The need for training exists even when raters are experts in a field. It is also a good idea to pre-test the index.
- C Some “pointers” that might be included in instructions to raters are the following: a) When using such rating scales, there are no conclusive “right or wrong” ratings, particularly for values in the middle of a scale; b) The preferred strategy is to use comparative judgments, among the items in one index or among several similar entities that are the focus of the index being rated (advocacy organizations, laws being passed, etc.). For example, when using the CSO Advocacy Index (see below), it is appropriate for the raters to think comparatively about the items—which ones are we doing better on, and which ones less well? Then score them accordingly. Use of comparative judgments is one reason why it is good to have external observers do the rating, when possible, so they observe the variations among CSO’s, for example, and rate them comparatively; c) It is also important that scales and indices used as indicators of USAID’s progress are not

scored too highly on the initial rating. If the scores are already close to “excellent” during the baseline, there is no room to show improvement later! This is called the “ceiling effect” in measurement. If the activity is already being done excellently, why should USAID provide funding for improving it?

- C Whenever feasible, use the same team of raters each time the indicator data are collected, or a panel with “revolving” members, so that new raters are trained and “calibrated” by older members. For “peer review,” it is important that the peers be in agreement concerning their standards and how to assess them, i.e., the meaning of the scales in their ratings that will be used to construct an index.
- C Using the average ratings among multiple raters will also tend to counter individual differences in perceptions, and will make the overall aggregate indicator scores more reliable.

D. Examples of Milestone Scales, Indexes, and Scorecards

Often indicators working groups noted that several key results which they were trying to measure fell into a pattern of stages or processes. For such situations, it appeared that a Milestone Index might be helpful, with data collection designed to provide evidence concerning progress among the stages on each scale. In other cases, the result to be measured involves rating the qualities or characteristics of a product or process. In this case, an index of these important qualities is a good indicator, composed of a set of rating scales.

With this type of measurement index, the specific elements assess the amount or quality of progress for each step or characteristic, within the relevant units (for example, local government legislative bodies, or the country as a whole). Diverse types of data would be used to provide evidence for each component scale and for different steps, while the score for the index as a whole measures the aggregate assessment of progress. For upward reporting purposes, the mission should use the aggregate index score as the indicator. For internal management and activity improvement, the mission and its partners may want to examine the ratings on individual scales, to detect areas of strength and weakness.

The collection and use of data for the indicator could be viewed as using several “levels” of evidence. For example:

Level 1 evidence: Local scoring of the progress on each relevant component by USAID and/or contractor/grantee staff, using narrative evidence and judgments, when “harder” data are not available. Staff members would compile the evidence used, such as news accounts, focus groups, secondary data, their own experience within the organization, etc., focusing on whether

or not the situation on that component has changed since the previous annual assessment of that Index. The assessment could also be conducted jointly with the group whose progress is being evaluated.⁶

Level 2 evidence: Review panel of outside expert observers (such as local or international academics, newspaper editors, major foundation or NGO executives, prominent citizens, or performance measure contractor staff) scores each component of the Index, using evidence supplied by the entity being evaluated, the contractor/grantee and the USAID mission, as well as relying on their own knowledge and judgments. Usually, the panel would meet to discuss their independent ratings, as well as to assess the types and consistency of the evidence available. While level 2 evidence is preferable to level 1 from the standpoint of the neutrality of the raters, it might not present the same opportunity for increasing the understanding of those directly involved in the program.

Level 3 evidence: Systematic data are available and used for scoring the extent of change on some or all components of an index, for example from national statistics. An example here would be the elements that make up a Consumer Price Index. If multiple sources of data are available for individual components, they may need to be

assessed and combined by a Level 1 or Level 2 process.

Often the most appropriate type of evidence depends on the entity being assessed, and the types of evidence available. Sometimes, a combination of evidence from several levels may be most appropriate. For example, when multiple NGO's are each providing similar activities, such as advocacy, then intensive self scoring of the Advocacy Index may be most feasible, backed up by an external review of evidence or spot checks of a sample of the NGO's by outside experts, to ensure the overall validity of self ratings. When a single national entity is being assessed, such as the quality of a new law or the quality of legislative processes, then a single review panel of expert observers is likely to be most useful.

⁶The use of self assessment is rather controversial currently, with some evaluators advocating "empowerment" and other participatory methods which use self assessment extensively, and others discouraging use of such methods, with concerns that a substantial bias may enter these ratings. We propose a middle ground for indicators, with self assessment used when it appears to be the only feasible or advantageous (from a training perspective) method, but with cross-validation of such ratings by an external observer for at least a sample of the entities, as suggested above.

D-1 Example: Civil Society Organization (CSO) Advocacy Index

Because measuring CSO advocacy is a concern for all four Agency democracy objective areas, we have used this as an example of a multi-component index. The index is intended to be scored concerning one or more advocacy issues for a CSO. For example, given this issue, to what extent and how intensively did the CSO perform each component? The elements following each component are given as examples of the types of evidence to think about when scoring that component. Not all elements are likely to be relevant to every situation. The total score needs to be accompanied by a narrative explaining progress or strengths and weaknesses.

Each of the index components should be rated on a scale such as the following:

2) CSO collects input about the issue: (Circle one number)

None, not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extensively

The scores for each component are added to form the score on the overall CSO Advocacy Index, which will range from 7 to 35 (given 7 components, as at present).

Components of the CSO Advocacy Index (scored for one or more issues):

Score:

- 1) Issue is timely, with the following possible elements:
 - Issue is of vital concern to the group's constituents
 - Issue is critically important to the current or future well-being of the CSO and/or its clients, but its importance is not yet broadly understood
 - New opportunities for effective action exist
 - At least a few key decision makers are receptive to the issue

- 2) CSO collects information and input about the issue, with the following elements and examples:
 - Relevant government agencies and their respective roles in the issue are identified at national and local levels; knowledge and positions investigated
 - General public input is solicited (including from women and minorities) on the issue via public meetings, focus groups, etc.
 - Representative input is collected on the issue via surveys (including from women and minorities, where appropriate)
 - Existing information and data on the issue is collected, such as for summaries or positions papers
 - Policy analyses, such as the legal, political, social justice, or health aspects of the issue, are conducted

- 3) Formulating a policy position on the issue, with the following elements and characteristics:
 - Policy formulation done in participatory (and gender-sensitive) manner
 - Policy being advocated exists in writing, with formats and levels of detail that are appropriate for various audiences and policy makers
 - Policy position is clearly and convincingly articulated
 - Rationale for policy is coherent, persuasive, and uses information collected in component 2
 - Presentation of policy position uses attractive and effective formats, such as graphs
- 4) Obtaining and/or allocating resources (especially time and money) for advocacy on the issue, with the following elements and examples:
 - Contributions collected from members, interested citizens, and/or from other organizations (businesses, foundations, religious groups, etc.)
 - Financial or other resources assigned to the issue from within the CSO
 - Volunteer time to help advocate for the issue obtained and well managed
 - International agencies with interests in the issue area identified, and their procedures for applying for financial support determined
 - (Other resources?)
- 5) Coalition and network building, to obtain cooperative efforts for joint action on the issue, with the following elements and examples:
 - Other groups and individuals with interests concerning the issue identified or persuaded to take an interest (may include govt. organizations which share concerns)
 - Coalition formed (defined as any type of joint working group)
 - An existing or new coalition or network activated, such as by having informal contacts, joint meetings, identifying common interests, sharing resources, etc.
 - Joint or coordinated actions planned (see #6 and #7 below, for carrying out the actions)
- 6) Taking actions to influence policy or other aspects of the issue, with the following elements and examples:
 - News releases generated or public meetings held
 - Members/citizens encouraged to take appropriate actions, such as writing letters to legislators
 - Active lobbying conducted for the policy position, such as by testifying in hearings, personal visits to legislators, etc.
 - Model legislation drafted and circulated to legislators
 - Policy relevant position papers and recommendations disseminated, based on the input collected and coalition's joint interests

- 7) Follow up actions, after a policy decision is made, to foster implementation and/or to maintain public interest, with the following elements and examples:
- Monitoring the implementation of a newly passed law or policy, such as by making sure that authorized government funds are disbursed, implementing regulations are written and disseminated, checking implementation in field sites, asking members for feedback on how well it is working, etc.
 - Some staff or volunteer time and resources are allocated to the issue or policy for monitoring
 - [If desired policy was not passed] At least a minimal level of advocacy methods maintained to take advantage of next opportunity for pressing the issue, perhaps with a reformulated approach or different specifics
 - [If desired policy was not passed] Public awareness and interest in issue monitored, to look for examples, incidents, opportunities to create or renew a sense of urgency on the issue

Data could be collected for this index by one or more of the methods laid out earlier in this section.

D-2 Example of an Index for Assessing the Quality of Legislative Processes (in General) or the Quality of Processes for Legislation on a Particular Issue

The index suggested on the next page could be more fully developed and used as an indicator to capture progress in strengthening legislative processes. It can also be used to monitor the legislative process with respect to one particular issue, such as reforming the criminal code or the laws on decentralization.

As shown in the draft below, a legislature would score between 8 and 40 points. Criteria for each of the eight components would need to be more fully fleshed out. The components could be changed or adapted to fit local circumstances. An expert panel could be convened once each year toward the end or immediately after the legislative session, with each panel member independently rating that session. Then the panel would convene to discuss their ratings, perhaps with an opportunity for panel members to adjust their original ratings. Scores of individual members would be added and divided by the total number of panel members in order to obtain an average. Both the total scores and the extent of variability among the raters would be of interest. Too much variability might suggest that the scale is insufficiently detailed or that raters need more training in its application.

Over time, however, a panel of raters is likely to become more consistent, as they share understandings about the components, and become more observant of processes throughout the year. Data could be drawn for making the assessment from the legislative record, documents produced by the research service, panel members' contacts with MPs and staff, etc.

Score each component on the following scale:

Never or Poorly 1 2 3 4 5 Excellently, at every opportunity
Moderately

During the period from xxx to xxxx (or when working on the target legislation), how well did the legislature, in general, perform on each of the following quality characteristics?

Score:

- 1) Use of facts and figures, of data drawn from reference service, Internet, or other sources
- 2) Thoughtful use of legislative models and experience from other countries
- 3) Use of analysis from reference service or other sources (think tanks, NGOs, etc.), including projections of impact on the country from various provisions
- 4) Focus on constituent interests in considering legislation; MPs in frequent touch with constituents; information flows in both directions
- 5) Inclusion of NGO and expert testimony; openness to hearing outside testimony; reference to testimony in considering legislation
- 6) Wide involvement in committees and debate of deputies from different factions and parties
- 7) Relevant government agencies and ministries work with legislature on drafting key items of legislation
- 8) Drafting competence, clarity of language, internal consistency, and consistency with other laws

D-3. Example of a Milestone Scale for Measuring Progress in Achieving a Legal Reform

Making progress in reforming the law is fundamental to several results in the democracy and governance framework. The process of obtaining a reform is not, however, such a simple one. It involves a number of steps or stages and missions aiding the beginning of a difficult reform process may want to measure progress short of the actual achievement of the legal reform.

For a given piece of legislation, this indicator could simply be scored by mission staff or an expert observer, with the score being the highest stage (Milestone) passed during that year. If the processes are not sequential, then the score could be the number of stages completed. (For assessing the *quality* of these processes, see example D-2 above.)

- | |
|---|
| Stage 1) - Interested groups propose that legislation is needed on issue.
(Stakeholders, public interest groups, think tanks, key donors, and others are active in pressing for new legislation, such as by sharing relevant legislation and models from other countries, soliciting press coverage, sponsoring public fora or hearings, scheduling meetings with government officials and elected officials, publishing papers, etc. Stakeholders may form networks or coalitions to advocate.) |
| Stage 2) - Issue is introduced in the relevant legislative committee/executive ministry.
(The issue is raised, discussions are being held, studies/research are being conducted, hearings are being conducted by committee) |
| Stage 3) - Legislation is drafted by relevant committee or executive ministry.
(If drafted by the executive, it is submitted to the legislature.) |
| Stage 4) - Legislation is debated by the legislature.
(Might include additional committee hearings, and/or consideration of alternative model laws, projecting likely impact of various provisions, and broad participation from delegates and stakeholders representing different factions and parties. This stage might extend over a considerable time, if revised versions are needed before passage is scored.) |
| Stage 5) - Legislation is passed by full approval process needed in legislature. |
| Stage 6) - Legislation is approved by the executive branch (where necessary). |
| Stage 7) - Implementing actions are taken.
(Such as executive agencies passing operating regulations, information disseminated to citizens about the new law, administering agencies informed and provided with technical assistance to fill any new role required by the law, etc.) |
| Stage 8) - No immediate need identified for amendments to the law.
(Shows law was well crafted) and lawmakers believe that given time it will have its intended effect. |

Stages 2 and 3 above may need some adjustment depending on whether the executive branch is the primary drafter of legislation, which the legislature then reviews.

D-4 Scorecards

Another type of index is a scorecard that more simply examines a law, a process, or an organization to determine whether or not it has each of a set of desirable characteristics. As defined here, a scorecard is an index that uses a simple “yes” or “no” scoring, with a “yes” scored as 1 and “no” as 0 (binary scoring) for each of a number of characteristics or components. A scorecard is usually most appropriate when the judgments to be made are straightforward (e.g., a court has a judge with a recognized law degree or it does not). An index with rating scales for individual components may be better when more complex qualitative judgments are needed.

A weighting system can also be used to assign a greater or lesser value to each characteristic. However, weights should be based on careful analysis, preferably empirical evidence, that those items weighted more heavily are truly more influential in achieving the overall result being addressed.

The following is an example of the *format* of a scorecard system for assessing improvement in NGO’s financial management:

	Score		Weight	=	Weighted Score
1. Has a double entry bookkeeping system	_____	X	2	=	_____
2. Has an annual audit	_____	X	2	=	_____
3. Produces accurate and timely quarterly financial statements	_____	X	1	=	_____
4. Controller is a chartered accountant	_____	X	1	=	_____
TOTAL					_____

Yes = 1 point; No = 0 points

Note: The above is intended only to show the *format* for this type of scorecard. It does not include all the components that might be needed to assess “financial management.”

This very simple yes/no scorecard requires minimal training and inter-rater reliability testing, but it still requires some. The scorecard can be adjusted to adapt to NGOs at relatively early or late stages of development.

TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS FROM THE OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

(Click on title of publication to download .pdf version)

PN-ACP-335

Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioners Guide

PN-ACP-331

Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned

PN-ACP-336

Case Tracking and Management Guide

PN-ACP-337

Civil-military Relations: USAID's Role

PN-ACP-338

Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development

PN-ACP-339

Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook

PN-ACR-210

Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework

PN-ACM-007

Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality

PN-ACR-211

Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators

PN-ACR-212

A Handbook on Fighting Corruption

PN-ACR-213

Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes

PN-ACR-214

The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach

PN-ACR-215

USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening

PN-ACR-216

USAID Political Party Development Assistance

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS FROM THE DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE CLEARINGHOUSE:

- Please reference the document title and document identification number (listed above the document titles on this page and on the cover of this publication).
- USAID employees, USAID contractors overseas, and USAID sponsored organizations overseas may order documents at no charge.
- Universities, research centers, government offices, and other institutions located in developing countries may order up to five titles at no charge.
- All other institutions and individuals may purchase documents. Do not send payment. When applicable, reproduction and postage costs will be billed.

Fax orders to (703) 351-4039 Attn: USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)

E-mail orders to docorder@dec.cdie.org



PN-ACR-211

Office of Democracy and Governance

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, D.C. 20523-3100

Tel: (202) 712-1892

Fax: (202) 216-3231

Internet: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/

Intranet: <http://inside.usaid.gov/G/DG/>