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PROMOTING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN FRAGILE STATES



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PROMOTING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN FRAGILE STATES

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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of USAID.

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Abbreviations

ASDR	African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos and London
CPDC	Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Network, DAC
DAC	Development Assistance Committee, OECD
DAT	Defence and Security Advisory Team, U.K.
DFID	Department for International Development, U.K.
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training Program
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
SADSEM	Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security sector reform (security system reform in DAC documents)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Preface

Bilateral and multilateral agencies have provided economic and technical assistance for improving security, especially in postconflict societies. This assistance usually focuses on urgent problems, such as the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and reform of the police. However, there is a growing awareness among security sector experts that a limited focus on improving law and order is not enough; fundamental reforms may be required. Such reforms include structural changes in security policies, restructuring security sector organizations to improve their functioning, and ensuring that civilian authorities have the capacity to manage and oversee security organizations.

This paper provides a succinct analysis of the elements of security sector reform as well as lessons drawn from ongoing

work. The paper also examines major factors affecting USAID's emerging approach to security sector reform. I am confident it will stimulate further discussion on this vital subject, both within and outside USAID.

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Executive Summary

This paper addresses why the U.S. Government should be concerned about security sector reform (SSR), who should be involved in SSR work, the central elements of an SSR agenda, and its feasibility in fragile states. The paper also explores lessons from current work and major factors that shape USAID's approach to SSR.

U.S. security is enhanced by democratic security sector governance worldwide, since poor security sector governance contributes in no small measure to weak governance and fragile states. In these states, it is impossible to strengthen overall governance without attention to the security sector. It is also in the interest of the United States that security

security sector, especially when development donors undertake partnerships that offer complementary functional competencies. Regional approaches to security problems such as criminal and terrorist activities also benefit participating countries.

Though the broad SSR agenda is essentially the same for all countries, some adaptations are required for fragile states, where continuity of assistance is extremely important. More time may be required for preparatory work, including confidence building and developing a constituency for reform. Opportunities may be available in postconflict environments to set in motion broad-based reform processes and strengthen the capacities of civil authorities to manage and oversee security forces.

Strengthening democratic security sector governance requires understanding how local institutions function and cultivating relationships with key local stakeholders, including civil society actors and potential spoilers. Successful external interventions foster the reform-friendly environment needed for SSR and develop consensus on the direction of the reform process. These efforts are most successful when they are integrated into broader development work and reflect a comprehensive framework of a reforming government.

USAID brings critical elements to the table during SSR discussions. Among

Strengthening democratic security sector governance requires understanding how local institutions function and cultivating relationships with key local stakeholders, including civil society actors and potential spoilers.

forces in countries receiving U.S. assistance are accountable to democratically elected civil authorities and civil society. These security forces must be capable of carrying out their mandated tasks and need to abide by the rule of law and the principle of transparency. Though this responsibility mainly falls to local actors, external support can significantly benefit domestic efforts to transform the

these are the Agency's experience addressing justice, human rights, governance, and citizen security in developing and transition countries. Even more importantly for SSR purposes, USAID has experience developing the proficiency of civil authorities, building capacity of weak institutions, and working across sectors with a broad spectrum of functional expertise. The Agency's on-the-ground presence around the world is also vital. But developing an SSR approach tailored to USAID operations requires that attention be paid to developing a policy and legislative agenda and a programming approach, establishing partnerships with other donors, promoting interagency coordination, and identifying research priorities.

Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, development donors have increasingly engaged in security-related work. To inform U.S. Government policy discussions on the contribution of development actors to such work, USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) commissioned a report on security sector reform (SSR), with special emphasis

The 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* assigned development a major role in U.S. national security policy, which implies greater USAID engagement in security-related work, particularly security sector reform.

on conflict-affected countries. This report is timely for two reasons. First, the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* assigned development a major role in U.S. national security policy, which implies greater USAID engagement in security-related work, particularly SSR. Second, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) approved a policy statement and paper on SSR and governance in April 2004. This commits members of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—including the United States—

to reinforce work on SSR, which “requires strategic planning for improved policies, practices, and partnerships amongst all actors” (OECD 2004, 7).¹

U.S. National Security Policy

In assigning development a central role—along with diplomacy and defense—in promoting U.S. national security, the *National Security Strategy* recognized the important contribution that a community of well-functioning states makes to U.S. security:

A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy.

In their joint strategy, the U.S. Department of State and USAID noted (2003), “It is no coincidence that conflict, chaos, corrupt and oppressive governments, environmental degradation, and hu-

¹ DAC's definition of SSR is essentially the same as that used by others and in literature relating to development and security. One difference is the DAC definition includes as part of the security system nonstatutory security bodies, such as liberation armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, and political party militias. SSR considers these to be important actors influencing the quality of security in a country. Some DAC members believe “security system” more clearly indicates that the military is not the only security actor of concern.

manitarian crises often reign in the same places.” They agreed:

The broad aim of our diplomacy and development assistance is to turn vicious circles into virtuous ones, where accountable governments, political and economic freedoms, investing in people, and respect for individuals beget prosperity, healthy and educated populations, and political stability.

In short, the Department of State and USAID recognized that economic and political development cannot be achieved in countries wracked by violence and conflict. Accordingly, they adopted a joint strategic plan aimed at improving the capacity of both to contribute to peace and security and advance sustainable development and global interests. Elements of this plan that are particularly relevant for SSR include promoting regional stability, countering terrorism, combating international crime and drugs, and strengthening democracy and human rights.²

Donor Interest in SSR

SSR only recently made its way onto the international development agenda, emerging toward the end of the 1990s from discussions on how development

² Each of these strategic goals is described in more detail in appendix I. While the Department of State and USAID have begun to formalize their collaboration on issues relating to U.S. national security, many other government departments and agencies are likely to be engaged in addressing the four key strategic goals. Among the official actors identified as key partners by the joint strategic plan are the departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Labor; the various intelligence agencies; the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the U.S. Peace Corps. This reflects the cross-disciplinary nature of many issues relating to national security.

Box 1. Bad Behavior By the Police

Poor people identify three main types of bad behavior on the part of police:*

- **Lack of responsiveness:** Absent when needed; not coming when called or coming very late; only coming when someone has been killed.
- **Corruption:** False arrest, accusation, and imprisonment, with release only on payment of bribe; theft, including stealing money from children; bribes necessary to receive documents or register cases; lying; threats, blackmail, and extortion; demanding protection money; using drugs; conniving with criminals; releasing criminals when arrested.
- **Brutality:** Harassing poor people; confiscating identity documents; raping women who go to police stations; beating innocent people; torture; murder, including killing street children.

* *Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change*

assistance can contribute to conflict prevention and recovery and democratic governance. The development community had avoided interaction with the security sector in aid-recipient countries during the Cold War, and democratic governance and rule of law considerations were also largely absent from assistance programs. However, during the 1990s, it became increasingly evident that security is an essential co-condition for conflict mitigation and sustainable economic, political, and social development.

Participatory poverty assessments undertaken since then have consistently identified lack of security as a major concern for poor people. This is true in conflict-affected countries as well as those without recent experience of violent conflict. A World Bank study (Narayan et al. 2000) identified the main sources of insecurity, including crime and violence, civil conflict and

war, persecution by the police, and lack of justice.³ All too often, politicized or ineffective security bodies and justice systems have been a source of instability and insecurity that the poor feel disproportionately.

Across geographic regions, poor people complain that the police are unresponsive, corrupt, and brutal (box 1). Where the police do function, corrupt justice systems can completely undermine their effectiveness. Inadequate and corrupt public security and justice systems have often led people to attempt to provide their own security. Private enterprises, wealthy citizens, and the international community are especially likely to purchase private protection. The poor are

³ Other forms of insecurity identified by participatory poverty assessments related to the broader concept of human security, for example, survival and livelihoods, social vulnerability, health, illness, and death.

more likely to turn to “self-help” justice and security, including vigilantism.

The activities of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria demonstrate that such local groups can further erode the quality of security and the rule of law (Ukiwo, 2002). The Bakassi Boys were created because the police in the eastern Nigerian city of Aba were unable to protect traders against crime. Though its members engaged in extrajudicial killings from the start, the Bakassi Boys were popular. They reduced crime rates in their areas of operation, and the public knew that neither the police nor the courts had adequate capacity to provide justice. Over time, the “services” provided by the Bakassi Boys came to include adjudication of civil matters, such as marital and other family problems or unpaid debts. There is no doubt that these services are needed. However, accountability is lacking despite—or perhaps because of—the relationship between the Bakassi Boys and several state governments. The Bakassi Boys consequently acted with increasing impunity, and allegations of politically motivated activities escalated.

Problems are not limited to the justice and public security sectors. Throughout the world, armed forces have engaged in violations of the rule of law. Rather than protecting people against external threats or internal rebellions, armed forces have protected repressive governments (including governments led by military officers). In some cases, they have even made common cause with rebels. In Sierra Leone in the 1990s, people took to calling soldiers “sobels”—soldiers by day, rebels by night—reflecting the complicity be-

tween the Sierra Leonean army and the Revolutionary United Front.

The experience of people of Tamil origin living in government-controlled areas in Sri Lanka reflects a more typical problem. During the ongoing conflict between the Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka, consistent harassment by government troops has affected the ability of Tamils to earn a living. For example, a rural poverty study in the late 1990s (Ranjan et al. 1998a, 7–10) found that Tamil fishermen from Trincomalee district were unable to sell their fish in the Colombo market because frequent army inspections of vehicles transporting the fish caused it to spoil before reaching Colombo. Tamil fishermen were thus restricted to local markets, where Sinhalese businessmen kept prices artificially low.⁴ What is more, fishing populations were restricted—ostensibly for security reasons—from purchasing engines above 15 horsepower, entering coastal waters that were designated security zones, and fishing at night. These restrictions further limited their economic opportunities (Ranjan et al. 1998b, 27–29).⁵

4 According to the study, the Sinhalese businessmen and the army sometimes colluded in preventing Tamil fishermen from reaching the Colombo market.

5 This report noted: “Due to the crisis situation prevalent in the North-East, fishermen cannot obtain loans from the banks to carry out fishing activities.” The Thirukadallur site report stated: “Due to the crisis situation that is prevalent in the country, the usage of fishing crafts with engines above 15 horsepower were prohibited. However only Tamils were mostly affected as a result of such a constraint. They cannot purchase such engines from outside and bring them into Trincomalee. This situation allowed the Sinhalese living outside Trincomalee district to purchase them at a cost of Rs. 75,000/- and sell them to Tamils at Rs. 100,000/-.”

Once the linkage between a lack of security and poor development outcomes became clear, the international development community began to ask what role, if any, development assistance should play in helping partner countries create and maintain a safe and secure environment.

DAC Policy on SSR

Much of the SSR debate occurred in the DAC’s Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC), which ultimately created a task team for SSR. The CPDC’s work was strongly influenced by practical experience donors were gaining in conflict-affected countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor Leste, and—most recently—Iraq. The work was also influenced by the activities of the U.K. government, the first donor to engage in SSR in a meaningful way.⁶ Another important factor was recognition that conflict-prevention efforts benefit from effective and efficient security bodies that are accountable to civil authorities in democratic states.

Despite the continuing concerns of some development actors, OECD donors concluded that they should support partner countries in reforming their security sectors. The policy statement and paper approved in April 2004 clarified the importance of security for development, poverty reduction, sound governance, and conflict prevention and recovery. The documents situate SSR within the context of efforts “to in-

6 This, in turn, owes much to the personal interest that former Secretary of State for Development Clare Short took in SSR.

Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity, and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures, and escape from poverty.

OECD/DAC Policy Statement, 2004.

crease the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law” (OECD 2004, 7) The adoption of the policy statement by high-level OECD officials reflects growing international acceptance of the need to strengthen democratic governance of the security sector.

Why Should the United States Be Concerned About SSR?

SSR comprises a broad range of activities that involve a wide variety of local stakeholders and external partners. The unifying factor is the focus on democratic governance. However, developing democratic governance of the security sector does not by itself guarantee a safe and secure environment. Two other important factors influence the ability of a security sector to provide the security necessary to expand the circle of development. First, security forces need to be able to carry out their constitutionally mandated tasks in an effective and professional manner. Second, legacies of war need to be addressed in countries emerging


from violent conflict (figure 1). The precise nature and scope of the overlaps shown in figure 1 will vary, but the intersections and core democratic governance activities constitute SSR.

Though an activity may contribute importantly to enhancing security, it may not be SSR. This distinction is more

than academic, since the SSR concept was developed to ensure that overlooked governance-related aspects of security receive adequate attention. Box 2 identifies 10 widely accepted principles of SSR relating to key aspects of democratic security sector governance. Experience shows that lack of attention to security sector governance leads to the following:

- tolerance of politicized security forces
- war as a means of resolving disputes
- flagrant disregard for the rule of law on the part of security forces
- serious human rights abuses by security forces

Figure 1. Security: Safe and Secure Environment for People, Communities, and States



- budget allocations skewed toward security forces, especially defense and intelligence
- diminished capacity of security forces to carry out their constitutionally mandated tasks of protecting people and the communities and states in which they live

If a major threat to U.S. security comes from terrorism harbored—if not fostered—by fragile states, the U.S. Government must give high priority to addressing major factors contributing to the weakness of states.⁷

There are many varieties of fragile states. As the USAID White Paper, *U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*, explains, fragile states “include those on a downward spiral toward crisis and chaos, some that are recovering from conflict and crisis, and others that are essentially failed states” (USAID 2004b).⁸ USAID

7 For example, the 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security (Weinstein et al. 2004, 1–2) concludes: “These weak and failed states matter to American security, American values, and the prospects for global economic growth upon which the American economy depends. Spillover effects—from conflict, disease, and economic collapse—put neighboring governments and peoples at risk. Illicit transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, target weak and failed states for their activities. Regional insecurity is heightened when major powers in the developing world, such as Nigeria or Indonesia, come under stress. Global economic effects come into play where significant energy-producing states, regional economic powers, and states key to trade negotiations are weak. Finally, the human costs of state failure—when governments cannot or will not meet the real needs of their citizens—challenge American values and moral leadership around the globe.”

8 The White Paper also notes that some fragile states may appear stable but are highly vulnerable to external shocks due to weak political, economic, social and security institutions.

also stresses that fragile states share two key characteristics: “Weak governance is typically at the heart of fragility, and weak commitment is often the main factor behind weak governance” (USAID 2004b, 19) Bad security sector governance contributes in no small measure to the weak governance that produces fragile states. Indeed, it is often a major source of weak commitment. U.S. security will thus be enhanced to the extent that democratic governance of the security sector becomes the norm worldwide.

What is more, the United States faces either the loss or devaluation of its investment in foreign assistance unless the problem of unaccountable security forces is addressed, whether that assistance is delivered through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), USAID’s support to fragile states, or humanitarian assistance. When assistance is diverted by security forces and cannot reach intended beneficiaries, when the benefits of projects are lost due to conflict, when corrupt behavior by security forces further impoverishes those already poor

Box 2. Ten Security Sector Reform Principles*

These principles are widely accepted as SSR benchmarks:

- Accountability of security forces to elected civil authorities and civil society
- Adherence of security forces to international law and domestic constitutional law
- Transparency on security-related matters, within government and to the public
- Adherence of security sector to same principles of public expenditure management as nonsecurity sectors
- Acceptance of clear hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the defense forces; clear statement of mutual rights and obligations between civil authorities and security forces
- Capacity among civil authorities to exercise political control and constitutional oversight of the security sector
- Capacity within civil society to monitor security sector and provide constructive input to the political debate on security policies
- Political environment conducive to an active role by civil society
- Access of security forces to professional training consistent with requirements of democratic societies
- High priority accorded to regional and subregional peace and security by policymakers

Meeting these benchmarks poses a significant challenge to all governments. Divergent trajectories of transition have produced a wide assortment of posttransition political configurations—some complementary and progressive, others contradictory and worrisome. This necessarily inhibits generalization. Nevertheless, many developing and transition countries are committed to the development of best-practice mechanisms to support sound security sector governance.

*See Ball and Fayemi 2004. These principles were first elaborated in DFID 2000.

...Policing is well regarded in Okpuje [Nigeria] because it maintains order in the community, but there are complaints about the tendency of the police to take money from people fraudulently. For example, police reportedly make illegal arrests, especially when they have not received their salaries, and demand money before they will free the arrested person. Poor people's inability to pay these bribes often results in detention and missed work. In some cases, the victim is forced to sell a valuable item in order to pay the bribe.

Voices of the Poor: From Many Lands

and drives them deeper into debt, when security forces are unable to protect people against crime and violence, the value of U.S. assistance is correspondingly diminished.

The situation in western Sudan in mid-2004 demonstrates the difficulty that militias created and supported by a country's armed forces can pose for even the delivery of humanitarian assistance—let alone the widespread disruption of lives and livelihoods that security-force impunity creates in a country long ruled by armed forces.

Problems in fragile states are well represented in work carried out for the World Bank's participatory research project, *Consultations with the Poor*. For example, while Nigerian police are frequently praised for their protection in times of disorder, on a day-to-day basis, the police service is viewed by the country's poor as more interested in extorting money from them than protecting them. Illegal arrests, intimidation, and extortion were cited as major problems.⁹

⁹ As the Nigeria example demonstrates (Narayan and Petesch 2002, 100), this problem is multifaceted. Security forces can play positive and negative roles, and at least some of their corrupt and repressive behavior can be traced to inadequate remuneration for their members.

Even countries that have recently achieved MCA status face similar problems. A recent assessment (Barnicle et al. 2004) relating to Sri Lanka concluded:

Despite the ceasefire, security is still the preeminent concern. The Sri Lankan Army continues to occupy high-security zones, harass ethnic minorities, restrict their movements, and is seen by many people as an occupying force that has never accounted for its past atrocities. The LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] openly recruits child soldiers, extorts money and goods from the populace, and intimidates or assassinates those who oppose it... Many citizens in the Eastern Province do not feel represented by their local government or protected by their local law enforcement officials. This is particularly the case for the Tamil and Muslim populations... While many forms of discrimination may no longer be state-sponsored, the perception of restricted access to agricultural land or fishing waters exacerbates the grievances of minority populations...

The United States clearly has an interest in ensuring that security forces in

countries receiving U.S. assistance are accountable, adhere to the rule of law, and are capable of carrying out their mandated tasks.

Who Needs to Be Involved in SSR?

Three factors are especially important to efforts aimed at strengthening security sector governance:

- The national leadership must be committed to a significant reform process.
- The principles, policies, laws, and structures developed during the process must be rooted in the reforming country's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions.
- The process should be consultative, both within government and between government and civil and political society.

Strengthening democratic security sector governance is thus first and foremost the responsibility of local actors. At the same time, appropriately designed and delivered external support (such as advice, information, analysis, financing, technical assistance, and coordination services) can significantly benefit do-

mental institutions must exist and function proficiently—including ministries of defense, justice, and internal or home affairs; independent ombudsman offices; civilian review boards; penal and correction institutions; legislatures; budget offices; audit units; and finance ministries. Civilians must have the knowledge to develop security policy and oversee its implementation, and they must act responsibly, in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

3. Give high priority to human rights protection. Civilians as well as security force personnel must respect human rights. While security forces are frequently responsible for carrying out violations of human rights, their orders often come from civilian elites who seek to maintain or acquire power. Additionally, both civilians and security force personnel may promote the creation of paramilitary groups to repress civilians—or specific subgroups of civilians—and prevent significant political or economic change.

4. Foster a capable and responsible civil society. Civil society encompasses a wide range of stakeholders, including NGOs, community-based organizations, professional associations (including trade unions), research and advocacy bodies, the media, and religious groups. The importance of an effective civil society in promoting economic and political development is well established. Civil society must be capable of monitoring security sector policies and activities. Civil society needs to be a resource for the security community and act responsibly, avoiding the pursuit of narrow, sectarian objectives and ensuring fiscally accountable operations.

5. Abide by the principle of transparency. Transparency is the cornerstone of accountable governance in any sector, including security. However, information about security policies, planning, and resourcing is often tightly held. This includes such basic information as the number of soldiers under arms, the type of weaponry in a country's arsenal, and the share of the budget allocated to the security sector, particularly to military and intelligence services. Although there are legitimate reasons to keep some information about the security sector confidential, basic information should be accessible to civil authorities and members of the public. The need for confidentiality should never be allowed to undermine civil oversight.

6. Develop regional approaches to security problems. All states confront the challenges of developing civil management and oversight of security forces, achieving transparency in security-related affairs, and attaining sustainable levels of security expenditure. Countries with shared problems and experiences within the same geographic area could work together to promote the main objectives of democratic security sector governance, reduce tensions, and enhance mutual security. When part of a regional process of confidence building, providing neighbors with access to information on military strategy—force size, equipment, procurement plans, national procedures for planning, and institutions involved in decisionmaking—has beneficial effects on a country's external security environment. Similarly, small arms proliferation may be most effectively addressed in a regional context.

Regional and subregional dialogues and structures for security cooperation can also enhance the internal security of participating countries. Organized criminal activities and terrorist activities invariably require attention on a regional basis. Additionally, by increasing transparency and making it easier for the civil authorities to oversee the activities of security forces, regional confidence-building measures can help improve security sector governance within individual countries. Furthermore, when information collected through regional and subregional mechanisms is made public, domestic transparency can benefit. This suggests that it is important for regional mechanisms to publish the information they gather.

Tasks for External Actors

There are two ways in which development donors can help strengthen democratic security sector governance. The first is by providing specific types of support. The second is by ensuring that the way in which assistance is provided supports a reform process in partner countries. Both are important.

Box 4 outlines the types of support that development donors can provide to help reforming countries achieve their objectives. While this assistance can be provided in theory, factors such as mandates, legislation, and long-standing practice often restrict the scope of donor engagement. This is why development donors need to think in terms of developing partnerships with other external actors with complementary functional competencies. There appears to be considerable overlap between the types of assistance donors and other ex-

Box 4. Categorizing Support for Democratic Security Sector Governance*

To assist developing and transition countries undertake six key tasks associated with strengthening democratic security sector governance, development donors can provide the following types of assistance:

- **Political and policy dialogue and initiatives:** Activities aimed at improving civil-security force relations, increasing civilian input into security policymaking, and preparing the terrain for reform. This can include confidence-building activities between civilians and security force personnel.
- **Armed forces and intelligence:** Activities aimed at improving governance of the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces, and other reserve or local defense units that support military functions, provide border security, and so on.
- **Justice and internal security apparatus:** Activities involving police functions, prisons, courts, secret services, and civilian internal intelligence agencies.
- **Nonstate security forces:** Activities involving private security companies and other irregular security bodies, which enjoy a degree of public authority and legitimacy not derived from the state itself or legal status, including political party militias/security forces, local militias, and bodyguard units.
- **Civil oversight mechanisms:** Activities involving formal mechanisms—the legislature, legislative select committees, auditors general, police commissions, and human rights commissions—and

informal mechanisms such as civil society “watchdog” organizations and customary authorities.

- **Civil management bodies:** Activities aimed at strengthening functions for financial management, planning, and execution; security policy development; personnel management in finance, defense, internal affairs, and justice ministries; president/prime minister’s offices; and national security advisory bodies.
- **Civilian capacity building:** Activities aimed at general capacity building and education initiatives that do not fit into the civil management and oversight categories, including activities designed to build capacity of civil society groups seeking to analyze and influence security policy and increase public literacy on security issues; academic or other training courses on security issues.
- **Regional initiatives:** Activities involving the role of foreign affairs ministries, peacemaking initiatives, and formal mechanisms such as defense treaties and pacts; regional security bodies for dealing with defense, criminal, intelligence issues, and the like.
- **Initiatives to demilitarize society:** Activities with a governance component in the area of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, with particular attention to child soldiers, small arms and light weapons, and others.

*This categorization was developed for the DAC survey of security-related work that provided input to the policy statement and paper approved in April 2004 (OECD 2004, box 3.1).

ternal actors can provide and the needs of countries engaged in strengthening security sector governance. In principle, reforming countries should be able to find the kinds of assistance they require.

Is the SSR Agenda Feasible in Fragile States?

Even under the best of circumstances, developing and transition countries require significant time to implement the tasks listed. Moving toward democratic governance in the security sector and strengthening human and institutional resource capacities can be expected to occur at a pace consistent with overall democratic consolidation. Fragile states clearly offer significant challenges, given their institutional and human resource deficits. For them, improving security sector governance may seem a second- or even third-order issue. However, since poor security sector governance has contributed in no small measure to the decline of economic and political governance in these states, it is impossible to strengthen overall governance without attention to the security sector. In fact, the agenda for strengthening security sector governance entails human and institutional capacity building. By definition, states seeking to implement it do not have strong institutions or abundant human resources.¹¹

11 All countries that qualified for MCA status in 2004—Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu—have weak security sector institutions and a limited human resource base. The same is likely to be true for countries that are very close to qualifying for MCA status.

The SSR Agenda in Fragile States

The broad SSR agenda and its underlying principles are essentially the same, whether the reforming country has MCA status, is close to having it, or is classified as a fragile state. Nonetheless, fragile states do require different treatment in a number of respects:

- In fragile states, a good deal of time may be needed for preparatory work (see box 4, political and policy dialogue and initiatives). Confidence building and dialogue aimed at developing a constituency for reform are particularly important.
- Institutions, policies, and practices that work in more stable political systems need to be adapted to conditions prevailing in fragile states. A wholesale transfer will not be successful.
- Postconflict environments offer a window of opportunity for SSR processes, though peace agreements may focus on only a limited part of the SSR agenda. Working with local stakeholders can maximize opportunities to set in motion broad-based reform processes, though such processes in the security sector must proceed in tandem with the development of basic governance capacity.
- Human capacity strengthening—in government and civil society—can and must be pursued irrespective of how weak (or strong) a state may be. In fragile states, it will be difficult for personnel to go abroad for training; instead, the international community could provide technical assistance in the form of mentors.

- Continuity of assistance is extremely important in fragile states, where institutional development takes longer than in more developed states. The weaker the state, the more important it is for external actors to commit to sustained assistance for a very long period of time.¹²
- There should be parallel efforts to enhance the operational capacity of security forces so they can carry out their constitutionally mandated tasks. At the same time, it must be recognized that the international community routinely gives attention to training police and military formations, particularly in postconflict environments. Far less attention is normally devoted to strengthening the capacity of civil authorities to develop and implement security policy or manage and oversee security forces. This imbalance is particularly problematic in states where security forces have enjoyed significant autonomy, a characteristic of many fragile states.¹³

Developing a Contextual Approach

Despite certain broad similarities among fragile states, they do not have exactly the same needs and capacities when it comes to security sector reform. Boundaries are not distinct between the three categories of fragile states that USAID recognizes. The Agency also recognizes

that some reasonably stable states still require significant institution strengthening before they can attain MCA status. Very likely, some strengthening is needed in the security sector. However, countries that share a broad range of characteristics may not have exactly the same SSR needs or capacities. Nothing can be clearly excluded for all conflict-affected countries, all failing states, or even all failed states. Nor is it possible to identify a specific sequence in which SSR must be carried out. Rather, the environment in which SSR is to be undertaken must be understood to identify entry points for reform and develop country-specific sequencing.¹⁴

There are several ways of tailoring SSR to individual countries. One way is to help a country carry out a detailed assessment of its needs and identify priorities. This is the approach of the security sector governance assessment framework developed by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ball et al. 2003).¹⁵ A second, more informal approach involves identifying approaches to SSR based on contextual criteria (box 5). Both approaches understand that every state has its share of obstacles to reform as well as opportunities for beginning a reform process.

¹² This should not be read as an argument in favor of open-ended support. Donors should understand, however, that they should be prepared to continue their support if progress is made.

¹³ It cannot be stressed too strongly that this is also true, to varying degrees, of all MCA-eligible states as well as those close to qualifying for MCA status.

¹⁴ Work for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2001–02 also came up against this question. Countries were initially viewed in traditional categories: conflict-affected countries, countries emerging from conflict, countries in transition to democracy, and so on. However, it proved extremely difficult to capture the full range of responses to country situations with these definitions. A contextual approach similar to the one presented in box 5 was considered promising. (Ball 2002).

¹⁵ The five entry points are: 1) rule of law; 2) policy development, planning, and implementation; 3) professionalism of security bodies; 4) oversight; and 5) management of security expenditure.

Box 5. Tailoring Responses to Country Context

Political context

Is the capacity of the civil authorities to exercise oversight and control over one or more of the security bodies weak?

If so, consider

- assisting the legislature as a whole and relevant legislative committees to develop the capacity to evaluate security sector policies and budgets
- supporting national dialogues on issues relating to security sector governance
- helping to strengthen and create oversight bodies, such as the auditor general's office, police commission, and human rights commission

Is democratic accountability of the security bodies to civil authorities inadequate or deteriorating?

If so, consider

- supporting civil society efforts to train civilians in security affairs, defense economics, and democratic policing; to monitor security-related activities; and to offer constructive advice to policymakers
- encouraging national dialogues that lead to the development of national strategies for strengthening security sector governance
- providing professional training for security force personnel consistent with norms and principles of democratic accountability, such as the role of the military in a democracy, democratic policing, and human rights training

Security context

Is transborder crime a major problem?

If so, consider

- supporting the development of regional policing capacity
- encouraging regional dialogues on security issues

Is the country at war?

If so, consider

- encouraging parties to the conflict to discuss security sector governance in the course of peace negotiations
- training civilians to enhance their capacity to manage and oversee the security sector

Economic context

Does one or more of the security forces have privileged access to state resources?

If so, consider

- supporting incorporation of security sector into government-wide fiscal accountability and transparency processes
- supporting anticorruption activities
- assisting civil society to develop the capacity to monitor security budgets

Do the security bodies receive inadequate financial resources to fulfill their missions?

If so, consider

- strengthening the capacity of legislators and economic managers to assess security budgets and carry out oversight functions
- encouraging participatory national security assessments that have the major objective of developing missions within a realistic resource framework

Social context

Do unaccountable security forces create a sense of insecurity within the country as a whole or among certain communities and groups?

If so, consider

- supporting the creation of police councils and other civilian bodies to monitor the behavior of the security bodies
- encouraging human rights and gender-sensitivity training

Is civil society prevented from monitoring the security sector?

If so, consider

- providing training for security forces in democratic policing and defense in a democracy
- empowering civil society through legislation and its own interaction with civil society on security issues

An in-depth approach is most desirable, but is not always feasible. Conducting a contextual analysis informed by the sort of agenda proposed in the Clingendael assessment framework and the DAC policy statement and paper may provide a useful starting point for dialogue with partner countries.

The starting point is to identify key contextual categories. Within each, a series of questions can be asked. When answered in the affirmative, a number of possible responses can be identified. This process is illustrated in box 5 and appendix 3. The contextual analysis is no more than an analytic aid. It can be used to help build up a picture of the country environment within which the security sector operates, as well as ways in which some problems could be addressed. Precisely how they are addressed should be the subject of consultations between local stakeholders (governmental and nongovernmental) and their external partners.

What Lessons Can Be Drawn from Current SSR Work?

Lessons to be drawn from any sort of development work pertain either to specific types of interventions or the process of providing assistance. To develop an Agency-wide approach to SSR, the focus should be on lessons relating to process, especially the effective design and delivery of assistance. Some mirror lessons learned about delivering effective development assistance in areas unrelated to security. These are reiterated because they have not been fully incorporated into development practice.

There are six process-related lessons:

1. Strengthening democratic security sector governance is a highly political activity.

Improving democratic security sector governance thus cannot be addressed solely by technical measures. Rather, it is essential to understand critical political relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, and incentives and disincentives for change. Strategies need to be developed for supporting reformers and minimizing the impact of spoilers. This is a particularly critical aspect of contextual analysis; it requires looking beyond formal legislation and organizational structure to develop a picture of how local institutions function.

External actors often focus on formal institutions and structures, leading them to undertake interventions that have no hope of achieving the desired outcomes. To obtain information needed for appropriate interventions, external actors need to observe the functioning of local institutions and cultivate relationships with key local stakeholders, including civil society actors and potential spoilers.

2. The most successful external interventions are those that build on existing local capacity and take local ownership seriously.

While the principles underlying democratic security sector governance are applicable to all societies, every country's unique history and mode of operations influence how these principles are applied. The objective of external support to SSR should be to help local actors identify how best to achieve transparency, accountability, civil manage-

ment, and oversight of security bodies in a manner consistent with the local context.

Even where it is weak, there is generally some degree of local capacity upon which to build. As in other sectors, local actors should be capacitated, not bypassed.¹⁶ In this way, efforts to build their commitment will be maximized, and implemented reforms are more likely to be sustained.

Of necessity, this is a long-term approach. Once embarked upon, the process of strengthening security sector governance needs to be shaped and conditioned by the pace of social and political change in a given country, not arbitrary donor timetables or funding decisions.¹⁷ The weaker the state, the longer the period is likely to be. It is extremely important, however, to make the necessary investment. Consultative processes that build consensus on the need for change and the direction and nature of change are critical for reform efforts.¹⁸ Such processes, however, require adequate time for stakeholders to reach a consensus. External stakeholders can help local stakeholders to do this, but the effort requires patience and an ability to facilitate politically sensitive discussions. Unless all key stakeholders

¹⁶ For example, a core operating principle of the UK Defence Advisory Team is "assisting and facilitating—not doing—through the provision of processes, frameworks, and methodologies" to ensure local ownership and build increased capacity (Fuller 2003, 12).

¹⁷ Timetables established for postconflict programs are often not geared toward maximizing local participation or ownership, and linkages with longer-term development activities are often not made adequately.

¹⁸ In the security sector, the highly consultative South African process is viewed as a model by developing countries—in Africa and beyond.

are in agreement on the way forward, it does not make sense to initiate significant work in the area of security sector governance.

While development assistance actors have begun to work on operationalizing the policy commitment to ownership and participation, they still frequently do not practice what they preach. The maximum benefit accrues when providers of external assistance adopt a facilitative approach that helps countries identify their problems and develop their own strategies for addressing them. All too often, however, development and security actors use highly prescriptive and directive approaches (box 6). Nonetheless, examples of good practice are emerging. One group pioneering a facilitative approach to strengthening security sector governance is the U.K. Defence Advisory Team (DAT), which tailors advice to meet customers' needs and bases all activities on detailed in-country analyses (Fuller 2003).¹⁹

3. By giving high priority to developing a consensus on the desirability and direction of a reform process, external actors can help foster the reform-friendly environment needed for the success of SSR.

While full consensus on the desirability and direction of a reform process is unlikely, key stakeholders in government, security bodies, and civil and political society need to support reform if significant changes are to occur. By making security sector governance a regular component of policy dialogue, external actors can help create an environment conducive to reform and identify entry

...International actors must not neglect the sustainability—the financial, political, and operational sustainability—of reforms to police, military, and judicial institutions. Reforms must be affordable for local governments, and they must be sustainable from a technological and technical viewpoint for local actors. A major challenge for sustainability remains the incorporation of local officials and civil society in the design and implementation of security and justice reforms, thus far neglected in most peace operations.

Security Sector Reform: Lessons Learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, UNDP/BCPR Report, 2001

points for a reform process. They can also ensure that the security sector is included in public sector and public expenditure work, where relevant. They can identify and support change agents within governments and security bodies. They can also help civil society develop capacity to analyze security problems and demand change, and they can provide support for reform processes. Finally, external actors should explore how they can create incentives for key stakeholders to support efforts that strengthen security sector governance.

4. Situating reform efforts within a comprehensive, sector-wide framework has the potential to maximize the impact of the reforms on security and efficient resource use.

The security sector consists of a wide range of actors with many different functional responsibilities. In the past, attention has focused either on individual security forces, particularly the armed forces or the police, or on oversight,

particularly by the legislature and civil society.

While no reform process can be expected to encompass the entire security sector, decisions about priority needs and resource allocation should be made after a sector-wide review of a country's security environment and its broad security sector governance needs. Effecting sustainable change in the security system will almost always require a focus on one constituent at a time—defense, public security, justice, or intelligence.

Within this context, there may be a need to concentrate on a specific component or process (for example, the capacity of relevant legislative committees, the courts, the defense budgeting system, and so on). However, in the absence of sector-wide assessments of security needs and governance deficits, it will be difficult to determine how to sequence reform efforts.

External actors may be able to help reforming governments understand SSR

¹⁹ The Clingendael assessment framework is also relevant.

components and how they fit together. Two assessments mechanisms are the strategic security review, pioneered by the United Kingdom in Uganda and Sierra Leone, and the security sector governance institutional assessment framework, commissioned by the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.²⁰

While ambitious long-term objectives are important, external actors must be realistic about implementation capacity. They need to develop process-based benchmarks to measure progress reflecting political, human, and institutional capacity on a country-by-country basis. Such benchmarks will assure external partners that progress is being recorded and reduce the chances of local stakeholders being overwhelmed by the enormity of the reform agenda.

5. External interventions that reflect the reforming government's framework have the potential to provide the most effective support.

Frequently, when reforming governments have not had a comprehensive view of security sector needs, external actors provided a patchwork of assistance that failed to address security sector governance shortfalls. External actors need to agree on the policy to be

²⁰ The strategic security review methodology has not yet been documented. However, it involves a participatory process to identify major security threats facing a country and determine how each can be most appropriately dealt with. This analysis forms the basis of a national security policy. Many threats do not require the involvement of any of a country's security forces. For those that do, the next step is to determine which security force has primary or supporting responsibility for each threat. The agreed tasks of the different security forces then need to be prioritized. Once that is done, defense, public security, and intelligence policies can be developed and plans devised to implement those policies.

Box 6. Applying Appropriate Models and Behavior

"...Better analysis contributing to any overarching development model or strategy is more likely to identify the need to address governance issues within the security sector and beyond.... In the absence of such analysis, initiatives tend towards downstream technical solutions. Whilst it is necessary to address technical and systemic weaknesses, more often than not it has been Western experience and models, which may be inappropriate to developing country conditions, that have informed these technical solutions. Such models range from ideas about the size, shape, and role of the armed forces to the application of human-resource management policies that are at odds with national and institutional culture. This is not perhaps surprising, given the relative immaturity of comprehensive SSR programs at

present. Few have a complete understanding of the whole SSR canvass and its practical application, and often field practitioners have little experience of work in a developing country. Most will, quite naturally, fall back on the models, processes, and structures with which they are familiar back home without validating them in the local context. Others will find it easier to take on a function or complete a task rather than help develop their counterpart. As a result, enormous effort and resources can be wasted in creating institutions, structures, and processes that are not 'owned' by counterparts, will not work in the local environment, and are unaffordable, and therefore unsustainable, in the long term."

Defence Advisory Team Annual Report
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pursued toward individual reforming governments. Because of the complexity of SSR, local and external stakeholders in a particular country need to have a clear vision of the objectives of any SSR-related activity and how it fits into the broad spectrum of identified needs. This means that organizations providing assistance must be transparent about activities they support and willing to make a good-faith effort to coordinate policies and programs. To most effectively support local partners, external actors need to work collaboratively toward chosen objectives, maximizing scarce resources and bringing the appropriate mix of expertise to the table.

Five-year, rolling-forward planning cycles are desirable, as is sustaining

support for activities that begin during a postconflict transition period. When seeking to strengthen security sector governance, a programming approach—rather than a project-oriented one—is preferable. While development donors are increasingly supporting three- to five-year institutional reform programs in other sectors, funding mechanisms for postconflict recovery tend to have much shorter timeframes. This makes it difficult to support activities that need to continue over a longer period.

6. The most effective way for development donors to undertake security work is to integrate it into broader development work.

Many issues that donors should prioritize to strengthen security sector governance can be seen in other sec-

tors. Development assistance agencies routinely support work aimed at strengthening public sector institutions, improving public sector governance, and developing human and social capital. Most frequently, assistance is provided for public expenditure analysis and management, including anticorruption activities and civil service and administrative reform. Development assistance agencies also provide considerable support to democratization efforts, promotion of social justice and human rights, civil society capacity building, and legislative strengthening. All are relevant to the SSR agenda (box 4). Yet development assistance agencies have been slow to incorporate the security sector into these areas.

Development assistance agencies have not embraced the SSR agenda for the following reasons:

- a general desire to protect their “normal development work” from being derailed by engagement in politically sensitive topics
- a concern that they do not have appropriate expertise to address security-related work
- a lack of clarity concerning which activities are and are not ODA-eligible
- legal restrictions on engaging in certain types of activities or conservative interpretations of rules by legal departments that minimize risks

Addressing issues of security sector governance is clearly sensitive, but not inherently more so than promoting anticorruption activities and other elements of governance. These kinds of activities

were routinely avoided by development assistance agencies until the 1990s, but they are now a staple of many aid agendas. Indeed, applying a governance perspective to security-related issues may help allay concerns of many local stakeholders. Additionally, by collaborating with donors in the security field, development assistance donors can ensure that a broad range of expertise on SSR issues is brought to the table in discussions with partner governments.

What Are Some of the Major Factors Shaping a USAID Approach to SSR?

In developing an approach to SSR, USAID may wish to consider 1) environments in which SSR programming will occur, 2) the Agency’s comparative advantage in designing and delivering SSR assistance, and 3) the development of key partnerships.

The Environment for SSR Programming

In formulating an SSR approach, USAID faces conditions that shape its ability to respond and the nature of its responses. One is the necessity of meeting multiple purposes with the same funding. Another is the legal parameters defining what can and cannot be funded under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA). A third is the imbalance of power among different U.S. Government departments and agencies.

1. The problems posed by assigning “multiple and competing goals and objectives” to U.S. foreign assistance affect assistance for SSR as well as USAID assistance for all purposes.

This constraint is well known. It has been addressed at some length in USAID’s White Paper on U.S. foreign assistance through the proposal to allocate and manage resources against five core foreign aid goals (box 7). Ongoing efforts by USAID and the Department of State to more closely align foreign policy and development objectives could help mitigate this problem. Ultimately, however, Congress has to be persuaded that multiple tasking is counterproductive.

2. FAA provisions and interpretations of them affect USAID’s ability to engage in SSR.

The FAA divides foreign assistance into economic assistance and military assistance. USAID regulations prevent economic assistance from being used to finance goods or services “where the primary purpose is to meet military requirements of the cooperating country” (USAID 2004a, 312.4a). Exceptions to this rule are not allowed. To determine whether economic assistance is being diverted to military purposes, USAID

Box 7. Five Core Operational Goals for U.S. Foreign Assistance*

- Promote transformational development
- Strengthen fragile states
- Provide humanitarian relief
- Support U.S. geostrategic interests
- Mitigate global and transnational ills

* From USAID, *U.S. Foreign Aid*, 2004.

asks whether the aid primarily benefits the military and, if not, if it subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. USAID's legal advisers make determinations on a case-by-base basis. Section 660 places stringent restrictions on assistance to law enforcement forces, although subsequent legislation has widened the scope for such assistance in postconflict countries and in Latin America and the Caribbean (U.S. Congress 1961, sect. 660 and 534). Over the 30 years that section 660 has been in place, USAID's general counsels and regional legal advisers have been called upon many times to determine the legality of proposed activities involving technical assistance and training for foreign law enforcement bodies. Their decisions have been highly dependent on each circumstance.

Given the variation in country conditions, flexibility in interpreting FAA provisions is desirable, but legal constraints on the use of USAID funding are said to have had a chilling effect on the willingness of Agency staff to pursue SSR-related programming. Not only is it difficult to know whether a particular activity or program will be acceptable, it is extremely time-consuming for staff to have activities and programs vetted. Faced with a myriad of programming possibilities, it is not surprising that USAID staff place low priority on programs that could run afoul of legal restrictions on supporting military and law enforcement bodies.

3. Unlike aid agencies in many other OECD countries, USAID is at a distinct disadvantage when decisions are made about U.S. security-related policies.

Economic reform and development of effective institutions of democratic governance are mutually reinforcing. The successful transition of a developing country is dependent upon the quality of its economic and governance institutions. Rule of law, mechanisms of accountability and transparency, security of person, property, and investments are but a few of the critical governance and economic reforms that underpin the sustainability of broad-based economic growth. Programs in support of such reforms strengthen the capacity of people to hold their governments accountable and to create economic opportunity.

FAA, 102 (b)(17).

The Agency may not have a seat at the table during SSR discussions, and its voice is muted even when it does. The balance of power very much resides with departments and agencies with traditional responsibility over U.S. security policy, although USAID and the Department of State are attempting to work more closely and there is greater understanding that promoting development also promotes U.S. national security.

USAID's Comparative Advantage

During SSR discussions, USAID brings a number of critical elements to the table. First and foremost, USAID addresses issues that are central to the SSR agenda in developing and transition countries: justice, human rights, governance, and citizen security. The FAA clearly recognizes linkages between economic development and the quality of democratic governance, which incorporates rule of law, justice, individual security, and protection of human rights.

While other U.S. Government agencies can support the development of security forces that are accountable to democratic governments, adhere to the rule of law, and respect the human rights of citizens, these agencies cannot support the development of ministries and agencies in the civil sector that play crucial roles in managing and overseeing security bodies. Nor are other agencies qualified to support the development of civil society's capacity to engage effectively in security sector governance.²¹

²¹ There are some exceptions with regard to civil society. For example, the regional strategic security centers of the Department of Defense (DOD)—the Marshall Center, African Center for Strategic Studies, and so on—work with members of civil society, and their programs may help to capacitate members of civil society. In principle, DOD can support the development of counterpart ministries, but that has been an extremely limited portion of the assistance it provides. Most of DOD's assistance is aimed strictly at building capacity of defense forces. Similarly, the support given to the public security sector through the Department of Justice and other U.S. Government agencies is primarily aimed at improving the technical capacity of police services.

Furthermore, USAID has considerable experience working across sectors. For example, promoting sustainable agriculture requires technical support to farmers; attention to environmental management; economic policies that do not discriminate against smallholders or the rural sector; and sound governance at national, regional, and local levels. The concept of drawing on different areas of expertise to achieve an objective is consequently well understood within the Agency. The on-the-ground presence of USAID staff also is vital for understanding critical relationships among local stakeholders and historical and cultural environments where development takes place. Last—but by no means least—USAID has experience in building capacity of weak institutions. Such experience is critically important in developing the proficiency of civil authorities to manage and oversee the security sector.

Developing Key Partnerships

Effective SSR assistance requires inputs from a broad spectrum of functional expertise. In turn, this requires developing partnerships within individual donor governments and among other external actors. Partnerships with other donor governments and multilateral bodies that provide SSR support are especially critical for USAID, given its limited budget and the likelihood that developing a critical mass in favor of SSR within other key U.S. departments and agencies will take some time. Internal partnerships among U.S. departments and agencies are needed to develop a coherent approach to SSR and effective implementation.

Box 8. The U.S. E-IMET Program*

Expanded IMET (E-IMET), created in 1991, is a subset of the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. E-IMET's programs do not teach combat or technical skills, but focus on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice.

The education is available to foreign civilians and military personnel, including personnel with defense responsibilities in government ministries, legislators, and nongovernmental actors.

According to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency's E-IMET Handbook, the program's purpose is to educate U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their defense resources, improving their systems of military justice in accordance with internationally recognized principles of human rights and fostering a greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military.

* <www.dscsa.osd.mil/programs/eimet/eimet_default.htm>

In many fragile states, security forces enjoy considerable political and economic autonomy. They often play a direct or indirect role in the political system, gravely complicating efforts by reform-minded civil authorities to introduce or strengthen the rule of law or democratic process. SSR thus involves helping to modify attitudes and behavior of security force personnel so that they support—rather than undermine—accountable, transparent, democratic governance.

Personnel from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Department of Justice, and various law enforcement bodies—including the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program—have a role to play. They can also provide assistance in building the capacity of civil authorities to address security issues—for example, through the E-IMET program and courses offered by the regional

strategic studies centers (box 8). These actors cannot, however, assume primary responsibility for educating legislators on their roles and responsibilities in developing and overseeing security policy; training staff of auditor generals' offices on auditing security institutions; or educating ministry of finance officials in assessing defense, intelligence, or law enforcement budgets. Helping improve the capacity of the civil authorities to carry out these and other management and oversight tasks should be the primary responsibility of USAID.

The United Kingdom is the only OECD government that has made a serious effort to develop a cross-departmental approach to SSR. Its experience illustrates many challenges that face any government seeking to overcome the differing SSR perspectives of the foreign ministry, the defense ministry, and the development ministry. The U.K. Department for International Develop-

ment has put a relatively large amount of resources from its sizable budget into SSR work. In this way, it has been able to drive the SSR agenda.

These conditions will not be replicated in the United States. U.S. security institutions are unlikely to soon embrace the rather new notion that a lack of democratic security sector governance is a major source of insecurity and instability, and improving such governance in other countries—particularly in fragile states—can make a major contribution to the security of the United States. Further, USAID does not have the resources to compel other departments and agencies to adopt its perspective. However, the Agency might be able to progressively widen the circle of those with agendas aimed at strengthening democratic security sector governance in fragile states. To do this, USAID will need to have a comprehensive approach to SSR that demonstrates that all relevant U.S. Government actors have a role to play. The DAC policy paper can provide a starting point for the development of a USAID approach, and will be an important reference point for discussions with other departments and agencies. The DAC paper cannot, however, substitute for an approach tailored to U.S. conditions.

Tailoring the SSR Agenda to USAID's Circumstances

1. Developing a Programming Approach

As USAID develops a programming approach to SSR, it should consider three main issues: 1) aspects of SSR on which to focus; 2) methodology used

to determine which aspects of SSR to address in a given country; and 3) how to develop the capacity to undertake SSR-related work.²²

Box 4 describes nine main categories of donor support for SSR processes, some more relevant for USAID than others. A first step might be to identify overlaps with major areas of current Agency programming. A second might be to identify where USAID's current capacity is adequate to engage in programming and where additional capacity might need to be developed.

The two methodologies described—the Clingendael assessment framework and the more informal contextual analysis—provide a starting point for developing SSR programming in specific countries. Irrespective of how USAID decides to develop SSR programming, the methodology needs to be embedded in a broad view of SSR to help partner countries determine what requires priority attention.²³

USAID may find that it already has a sound basis for engaging in SSR programming. For example, if USAID has the capacity to develop legislative strengthening programs in non-security areas, it has the capacity to help legisla-

tures improve their capacity to oversee the security sector. If USAID has the capacity to develop public expenditure management programs in non-security areas, it has the capacity to assist finance ministries, auditors general, and public accounts committees to oversee security-related budgets. However, until USAID determines the aspects of SSR on which it will focus, its capacity to provide that assistance cannot be assessed.

2. Establishing Partnerships with Other Donors

The most obvious mechanisms through which USAID can establish partnerships with other donors are at the country level. Apart from Afghanistan and Iraq, there is donor interest in SSR-related issues in Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, among others.

The DAC will continue to work on SSR-related issues. In addition, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. have discussed collaborating on defense budgeting oversight and management.

Given legislative restrictions, USAID may benefit more than other donor agencies from partnerships. Such partnerships may enable the Agency to participate in a broad SSR program without the requirement for legal determinations.

3. Promoting Interagency Coordination

Implementing the National Security Strategy implies developing partnerships with other U.S. departments and

²² Such an approach needs to clarify whose security is being promoted. Any government's primary concern is the safety of its territory and its citizens. However, the premise of external support for SSR is that one's own country is more secure to the extent that an expanding community of countries is abiding by the principles of democratic security sector governance. Therefore, the focus of U.S. support to SSR should be the creation of a safe and secure environment for partner countries and their populations.

²³ A broad view of SSR will also help demonstrate whether the specific support USAID proposes to provide should actually be addressed by country in question at that particular moment in time.

agencies and other development assistance actors. The State-USAID joint strategic plan offers a clear entry point and the coordination services provided by the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction at the Department of State may facilitate such interactions.

USAID may also want to begin to identify other potential like-minded bodies within the government and develop a strategy for building alliances with them.

4. Developing a Policy and Legislative Agenda

For USAID personnel to engage as fully as possible in SSR programming, senior USAID officials need to clearly indicate that SSR is a priority. Additionally, policy decisions need to be taken relating to development's priority in the *National Security Strategy* as well as constraints to USAID's ability to engage fully in SSR-related work. In some cases, legislative remedies may have to be pursued.

5. Identifying Research Priorities

Linkages between security and development are well established, as are linkages between unaccountable, poorly managed security forces and insecurity, violence, and conflict. Though further research into the potential benefits of SSR for development is not a priority, research into two broad areas would help support SSR programming.

The first is to examine systems of security sector governance in partner countries. There is ongoing research in Africa and Latin America, but considerable scope for this work in Africa and

elsewhere.²⁴ The second is to investigate why SSR processes have succeeded or failed. There is very little written on this subject, though it is fundamental to sound programming.

Security is fundamental to people's livelihoods, reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services, and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development, and vital for the protection of human rights.

Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems, and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity, and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures, and escape from poverty.

Security is important for improved governance. Inappropriate security struc-

tures and mechanisms can contribute to weak governance and to instability and violent conflict, which impact negatively on poverty reduction. As the UN Secretary General notes in his September 2003 report on the Millennium Declaration, "We must make even greater efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence well before tensions and conflicts have eroded polities and economies to the point of collapse."

OECD governments and their development actors aim to help partner countries establish appropriate structures and mechanisms to manage change and resolve disputes through democratic and peaceful means. Support for security system reform (SSR) forms part of this assistance. It seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law. Given restrictions on Official Development Assistance (ODA), interested OECD governments may need to draw on non-ODA sources to assist activities in this area.

SSR is a key component of the broader "human security" agenda, developed with leadership from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and described in *Human Security Now*, the report of the UN Commission on Human Security. The human security agenda includes, for example, issues of livelihoods and social organisation of the poor that go beyond those covered here. SSR itself also extends well beyond the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance

²⁴ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and ASDR in Ghana are collaborating on a project examining the defense budgeting process in eight African countries; see <http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_africa_proj.html>. ASDR is overseeing a second project that seeks to develop fuller understanding of the nature and functioning of security sector governance mechanisms in Africa, monitoring changes in those mechanisms over time, and providing recommendations on how to improve the capacity, transparency, and accountability of such mechanisms. This project covers approximately a dozen African countries; see <<http://www.africansecurity.org/governing-security.html>>. An examination of the defense budgeting process in Latin American countries under the leadership of Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina will shortly produce findings of its first four case studies; see <<http://www.resdal.org.ar/main-transparencia.html>>.

on defence, intelligence, and policing. The security system includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services and similar bodies, judicial and penal institutions, as well as the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, and the Defence Ministry).

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Appendix I. Key Strategic Objectives, Strategic Goals, and Performance Goals in the Joint State-USAID Strategic Plan

Strategic Objectives	Strategic Goals	Performance Goals
<p>Achieve peace and security</p>	<p>Regional stability Avert and resolve local and regional conflicts to preserve peace and minimize harm to the national interests of the United States</p> <p>Counterterrorism Prevent attacks against the United States, our allies, and our friends, and strengthen alliances and international arrangements to defeat global terrorism</p> <p>Combat international crime and drugs Minimize the impact of international crime and illegal drugs on the United States and its citizens</p>	<p>Existing and emergent regional conflicts are contained or resolved</p> <p>Stable political and economic conditions established that prevent terrorism from flourishing in fragile or failing states.</p> <p>States cooperate internationally to set and implement antidrug and anticrime standards, share financial and political burdens, and close off safe havens through justice systems and related institution building</p>
<p>Advance sustainable development and global interests</p>	<p>Democracy and human rights Advance the growth of democracy and good governance, including civil society, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and religious freedom</p>	<p>Measures adopted to develop transparent and accountable democratic institutions, laws, and economic and political processes and practices, and universal standards [to] protect human rights, including the rights of women and ethnic minorities, religious freedom, workers rights, and the reduction of child labor</p>

Source: U .S. Department of State and USAID, *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004–2009*, 42 , 43.

Appendix 2. DAC Policy Statement. Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice

With this policy statement and paper, DAC donors intend to help their own governments/organisations, developing countries, and international organisations to reinforce work on SSR. This requires strategic planning for improved policies, practices, and partnerships amongst all actors. The DAC also reaffirms its commitment to work on the security and development nexus agreed in the DAC Guidelines and Policy Statement: *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.

To support SSR work with partner countries and other actors, DAC donors confirm a commitment to the following basic working principles. SSR should be:

- People-centred, locally owned, and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.
- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations through more integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
- Founded on activities with multisectoral strategies, based upon a broad assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.
- Developed adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform

such as transparency and accountability.

- Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively.

Against this background, the DAC agrees to the following ten recommendations for action in order to:

Promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and poverty reduction.

Clearly demonstrating how peace, security and development are mutually reinforcing is vital to building the commitment and resources needed to establish sustainable security systems that contribute positively to development goals. Developing a shared international understanding of SSR concepts, issues and approaches will lay the ground for effective policy frameworks and assistance programmes, integrated, and less contradictory international approaches to SSR. Therefore, DAC donors plan to:

1. Work together in partner countries to ensure that the rationale, principles, and objectives of SSR work are clearly communicated. Both external and local stakeholders need to establish a shared vision, and consider how any particular SSR-related activity fits into

the broad spectrum of SSR and development needs in the country. This can be assisted through an assessment—such as a national security system review—of the country’s security needs and context for reform, carried out by, or in collaboration with, relevant local actors.

Take whole-of-government approaches to SSR and consider making necessary institutional changes

In establishing development and security policy as integrated areas of public action through overarching approaches to SSR and democratic governance, DAC donors, working within their governments and organisations and with the international community, should:

2. Improve policy coherence by taking a whole-of-government approach to SSR:

foster interministerial dialogue, implement institutional change, and **mainstream security** as a public policy and governance issue in donor and partner country governments. The absence of a whole-of-government approach may mean that actions by government departments compound rather than mitigate security problems. Mainstreaming the SSR concept across the whole-of-government is also important in view of the increased emphasis on counter-terrorism in some OECD security assistance programmes. (The DAC has issued a policy statement and reference paper, *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action* (2003), on issues relating to terrorism and development.) The DAC has also recently clarified definitions of what counts as ODA in a manner that takes account of the need to safeguard the integrity and

credibility of DAC statistics. Whole-of-government approaches would facilitate the provision of needed assistance that would combine financing from ODA and other relevant budget sources.

3. Develop greater co-ordination, harmonisation and an effective division of labour among development and other actors working in a partner country.

Effective donor support to existing mechanisms at the country level is essential. It is particularly important given the varying legal limitations and operational capacities of development agencies to work across the range of security system reforms. In dividing responsibilities, each actor should be able to pursue its comparative advantage without undermining the common effort.

4. Recognise the role that OECD governments should play in addressing security-related issues

such as: international corruption; money laundering; organised crime; perpetuation of militia-linked private security forces, including through support from multinational enterprises; human trafficking; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism prevention; and illicit trade in small arms, light weapons.

Facilitate partner country-owned and led reform efforts

Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms. Assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather

than determining that path and leading them down it.

A major problem in the area of security system reform in some regions, particularly in Africa, has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. This issue is most significant in “difficult partnership” countries.

DAC donors are committed to facilitating partner country-owned and led reform through efforts to:

5. Recognise that needs, priorities and circumstances governing SSR differ substantially by country.

Magnitudes, objectives, perceptions and approaches vary greatly. A country specific approach is important. Flexibility in donor policy frameworks and programming is therefore essential. This should be underpinned by the understanding and analysis of differing capacities, willingness and ownership to embrace SSR.

6. Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen institutional frameworks and human capacity

for managing the security system in a manner consistent with sound democratic governance practices and transparent financial governance. Help to create local demand and vision for change by supporting activities that help:

- Increase dialogue among the security forces, actors in the wider security system, civil society organisations such as women’s groups and ethnic minority groups and the general public and bring an appropriate mix of expertise.

- Demonstrate how to integrate the security system into government planning; public sector management, expenditure and budgeting processes; and anti-corruption efforts.
- Support regional dialogue and confidence-building mechanisms.

7. In this context, make it a priority to encourage governments to develop workable multisectoral strategies, and to help stakeholders determine what will work best for them. Challenges include how to maximise the use of scarce resources and find ways to build incentives into their systems to promote change. This often requires innovative approaches to broaden the discussion, since needs and priorities governing SSR, such as incentives for reform, differ.

8. Support civil society efforts to create a pro-reform environment for democratic governance of the security system. In particular in countries with a lack of government commitment and weak capacity, it is important to prepare the political and policy terrain. This requires supporting dialogue through civil society and regional networks and providing information and examples about how other countries address SSR challenges.

9. Identify entry-points and develop methods of working through local actors, and seek to build on existing initiatives to avoid imposing organisational structures and modes of operation on partner country governments.

10. Adopt a regional perspective even when assistance is provided in support of a national reform programme,

and support and work through regional or sub-regional organisations involved in security-related activities, where feasible. Regional and cross-border dynamics can have major positive or negative impacts on national development and security system reform processes. Internationally supported regional confidence-building measures can help to reduce suspicions and tensions that may lead to militarisation and increased risk of violent confrontation between neighbours.

Next steps

DAC donors thus agree to use this policy statement and paper to the fullest and call on the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation to assist or sponsor regional workshops with partner countries to deepen understanding of these concepts and consider concrete ways to stimulate policy making and institutional change. Other areas the CPDC should consider are good practice on: administrative and funding mechanisms to promote policy coherence in SSR; and encouraging positive incentives for SSR in-country.

Appendix 3. Tailoring Responses to Country Context

The questions and responses below are illustrative, and do not represent the full range of possible questions and responses.

Political Context

1. Is the capacity of the civil authorities to exercise oversight and control over one or more of the security bodies weak? If so, consider

- assisting the legislature as a whole and relevant legislative committees to develop the capacity to evaluate security sector policies and budgets
- supporting national dialogues on issues relating to security sector governance
- assisting the finance ministry, ministry of defense, office of national security adviser, and other relevant executive branch bodies to improve their capacity to formulate, implement, and monitor security policy and budgets
- encouraging participatory national security assessments
- helping to strengthen or create oversight bodies such as a auditor general's office, police commission, and human rights commission

2. Is democratic accountability of the security bodies to civil authorities inadequate or deteriorating? If so, consider

- supporting civil society efforts to train civilians in security affairs, defense economics, and democratic policing; to monitor security related activities; and to offer constructive advice to policymakers
 - encouraging national dialogues on security sector governance that lead to development of national strategies for strengthening security sector governance
 - providing professional training for security force personnel consistent with norms and principles of democratic accountability, such as the role of the military in a democracy, democratic policing, and human rights training
- 3. Is power centralized? Are attempts to increase participation opposed? And do public officials exhibit disregard for the rule of law? If so, consider*
- supporting, where feasible, civil society in efforts to encourage dialogue within society and between civil society and government on rule of law, human rights protection, and democratic security sector governance
 - assisting civil society to build capacity on security-related issues
 - working to develop an appreciation for democratic accountability of civil authorities

- identifying and supporting potential reforms in government, oversight bodies, and security forces

4. *Is the legal basis for democratic accountability of the security forces to the civil authorities poorly developed?* If so, consider

- supporting revisions of the legal framework consistent with democratic principles and norms such as civil supremacy, appropriateness of means in the use of force, and rule of law
- supporting regional efforts to codify democratic principles such as nonrecognition to governments coming to power through coups d'état

5. *Is the legal basis for democratic accountability of the security forces to the general population poorly developed?* If so, consider

- supporting reviews of the national legal framework for consistency with international law and democratic norms, especially the protection of human rights and laws of war, and providing support for revisions, as needed

Economic Context

1. *Does one or more of the security forces have privileged access to state resources?* If so, consider

- supporting incorporation of security sector into government-wide fiscal accountability and transparency processes
- supporting anticorruption activities
- assisting civil society to develop the capacity to monitor security budgets

2. *Do the security bodies receive inadequate financial resources to fulfill their missions?* If so, consider

- strengthening the capacity of legislators and economic managers to assess security budgets and carry out oversight functions
- encouraging participatory national security assessments, which would have the major objective of developing missions within a realistic resource framework

3. *Are fundamental institutions such as the financial management system poorly developed or not functioning adequately?* If so, consider

- assisting national stakeholders to develop mechanisms to identify the needs and key objectives of the security sector as a whole and specific missions that different security bodies will be asked to undertake
- assisting national stakeholders to determine what is affordable, allocate scarce resources according to priorities within and between different security sectors, and ensure the efficient and effective use of resources

Social Context

1. *Do civilians experience difficulty in interacting with members of the security bodies?* If so, consider

- training civilians in security-related issues to increase their confidence on substantive issues when dealing with members of the security forces
- arranging for security force personnel to learn behavior appropriate to

democratic societies when interacting with civilians from other security bodies in the region or a trusted international partner

- promoting confidence building measures, such as facilitating dialogue between civilians and security force personnel in a neutral setting and arranging for local stakeholders to observe constructive civilian-security force interactions among international and regional partners
- encouraging greater accountability through, for example, requiring security force personnel to wear identification badges, requiring security force vehicles to be easily identified, and supporting unofficial citizen-monitoring activities where feasible
- encouraging human rights and gender sensitivity training

2. *Is civil society prevented from monitoring the security sector?* If so, consider

- providing training in democratic policing and defense in a democracy to security forces
- seeking ways of empowering civil society, for example, by encouraging changes in legislation that limit civil society activities, inviting civil society organizations and local security experts to participate in meetings, or soliciting civil society opinions
- encouraging regional confidence building measures aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability of the security sector
- working with members of the security sector to enhance public transparency

3. Do unaccountable security forces create a sense of insecurity within the country as a whole or among certain communities and groups? If so, consider

- supporting the creation of police councils and other civilian bodies to monitor the behavior of the security bodies
- encouraging dialogue between civilians and security body personnel in a politically safe space if conditions permit, i.e. when reprisals against civilian participants seem unlikely
- identifying the underlying causes of unaccountability and devising a strategy to address these causes

4. Does civil society lack substantive knowledge of security-related issues? If so, consider:

- supporting efforts to develop indigenous training capacity for civil society
- providing scholarships in security studies, defense management, law, and other relevant subjects

Security Context

1. Is transborder crime a major problem?

If so, consider

- supporting the development of regional policing capacity
- encouraging regional dialogues on security issues

2. Is the country at war? If so, consider

- encouraging parties to the conflict to discuss security sector governance in the course of peace negotiations

- supporting postconflict demilitarization efforts, such as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the disarmament of ex-combatants, irregular forces, and the population at large
- training civilians to enhance their capacity to manage and oversee the security sector

3. Do regional tensions create arms races and provide a justification for greater resource allocation to the security sector? If so, consider

- encouraging regional dialogues on security issues

4. Although the country is not at war, is there a tendency to resolve disputes domestically and with other countries through the use of force? If so, consider

- reducing access to weapons by all parties, for example through arms-sale moratoria
- strengthening democratic accountability of civil authorities to the general population
- supporting the development of a capacity to defuse conflicts, thereby reducing the likelihood of a resort to violence

5. Do neighboring countries seek to destabilize the government, for example, by arming dissidents? If so, consider

- encouraging the development or strengthening of regional security mechanisms
- encouraging regional dialogues on security issues
- working to reduce access to arms

6. Are fundamental institutions such as the criminal justice system poorly developed or not functioning adequately? If so, consider

- assisting in development and implementation of criminal justice policy
- supporting democratic policing, judicial strengthening, and legal training
- supporting efforts to demilitarize police, for example, by separating them from the armed forces and promoting democratic policing
- supporting efforts to depoliticize the judiciary
- supporting civil society's ability to monitor the activities of the criminal justice system and provide training for members of the criminal justice system
- supporting the development of regional policing capacity to address crossborder problems and strengthen commitment to democratic principles and practices

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