USAID/Military Cooperation
Facing a deteriorating security situation in March 2004, USAID/Iraq and the 1st Cavalry Division initiated
collaborative efforts in al-Thawra (Sadr City). The joint program was overwhelmingly successful, contributing
to the rapid success of the stabilization mission, reduction of costs, and quick delivery of program
benefits. Reconstruction benefits, delivered in conjunction with political negotiations, helped to restore
the peace and strengthen the position of the Iraqi Provisional Government negotiators. USAID gained
greater access to the needy population while benefiting from added security for the projects. In March 2004, the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav.), Major General Peter
Chiarelli, responsible for counterterrorism operations in northern and eastern Baghdad and USAID/Iraq
agreed on a method of operation to stabilize local political and economic situations in post-battle environments.
Militias were attempting to control the Baghdad suburb of al-Thawra (Sadr City) and taking
control of the southern cities of Najaf and Kut. The open environment that had allowed USAID programs
to operate rapidly faded, yet a reconstruction presence was essential to political stability. Collaboration
between USAID and 1st Cav. in al-Thawra eventually disbursed $41 million for reconstruction work, covering
both short term (60 days) projects that showed concrete improvements in the lives of Iraqis, while
opening the way for long term (270 days) development.
Coordinated priorities and processes were communicated throughout both organizations. A 1st Cav.
liaison officer was placed on USAID’s staff to ensure good communications. Military patrols monitored
projects, freeing USAID staff to manage program obligation. Patrols were briefed on implementation arrangements.
To the Iraqi population, projects appeared to be implemented by soldiers, although the design
of the projects conformed to sound development criteria provided by USAID.
Small grants for rapid impact after military operations were awarded using USAID and CERP funds. Iraqi
staff, supervised by an American USAID employee, met with neighborhood leaders to negotiate arrangements.
A joint 1st Cav.-USAID review panel vetted proposals for sustained community stabilization
(USAID’s priority) and conflict reduction (the 1st Cav’s priority). The projects were often labor intensive
clean-up or refurbishment, draining pools of sewage from streets, and light construction.
Complex infrastructure projects were divided according to the limitations on USAID and CERP funding
and comparative advantage in procurement (CERP funds are limited to projects that enhance military
tactical objectives). U.S. troops provided physical and personnel security, with some site security by the
Iraqis. USAID oversaw major water and sewer repair – trunk lines and feeders – with a commercial Iraqi
contractor. Individual connections to homes were funded by CERP, allowing soldiers to have direct,
positive contact with Iraqis in the neighborhood.
Economic development activities took advantage of detailed the 1st Cav. knowledge of the urban population,
allowing USAID’s civilian specialists to work in an otherwise non-permissive area. Iraqis used
small grants to rehabilitate irrigation systems for near-by fields and gardens, and to provide seed and
fertilizer. Market structures for food and general merchandise were repaired or built. When possible,
U.S. business advisors met with Iraqi entrepreneurs in “safe zones”. USAID and the 1st Cav. provided
funds for 238 grants to start small businesses and reviewed 647 additional grant applicants.
Major General Peter Chiarelli described this cooperation as “the perfect marriage.” These efforts have
continued with the 3rd Infantry Division, which replaced the 1st Cav. in the area. USAID briefed the 3rd
ID on these efforts prior to its deployment in Iraq, and continues to maintain close contact with Major
General Webster and his staff and commanders.
USAID has since been able to draw from this model, pursuing post-conflict reconstruction efforts in conjunction
with military representatives in Falluja, Najaf, Samarra, and Tal ‘Afar. In Najaf, the USAID team
worked in coordination with the U.S. State Department, Civil Affairs teams in the area, PCO, and local
government officials to develop a rapid and flexible political transition strategy to support stabilization
efforts in the area. USAID quickly began clearing funds for short-term employment clean-up projects in
strategically targeted neighborhoods as well as school and clinic rehabilitations. Since then, additional
projects have been funded for a total of 76 grants totaling $10 million in assistance to the strategic city of
Najaf. USAID/Iraq anticipates similar coordination with the Multinational Forces Iraq in the future.
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