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Mitigating and managing conflict

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Acknowledgements Foreword Overview: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity Chapter 1: Promoting Democratic Governance Chapter 2: Driving Economic Growth Chapter 3: Improving People's Health Chapter 4: Mitigating and Managing Conflict Chapter 5: Providing Humanitarian Aid Chapter 6: The Full Measure of Foreign Aid Last updated: 26     Jump to Overview Sections: >> 50 years of development gains >> Promoting democratic governance >> Driving economic growth >> Improving people's health >> Mitigating and managing conflict >> Providing humanitarian assistance >> The full measure of U.S. development assistance-official and private >> Notes >> Background papers >> References Mitigating and managing conflict Understanding what, if anything, the foreign assistance community can do to help stop a nation’s slide to self-destruction is critical. By one count, there were 111 armed conflicts in 74 locations in the 1990s. Of these, 56 were counted as major, armed conflicts, meaning that military casualties exceeded 1,000 battle deaths, either in a year or over the course of the conflict. Although the number of new conflicts has been steadily declining since reaching a peak between 1992 and 1993, many of those that remain in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Sudan have become increasingly lethal and durable. The vast majority of recent conflicts have been internal, characterized by brutality, severity, and socially divisiveness. They cause tremendous human suffering, with a disproportionate share of the costs falling on civilian victims. Before the second World War, the ratio of military to civilian casualties was nine to one. By the close of the 20th century, that ratio had reversed, producing massive and protracted humanitarian crises. Hundreds of thousands have died in direct fighting, with many more forced into refugee states. Fueling religious and ethnic intolerance, these conflicts have led to an enduring climate of hate and fear that can take generations to overcome. In addition to the human costs, civil conflict has blunted and reversed prospects for growth, destroyed investments, and caused a dramatic deterioration in the quality of life. Not only has violence taken a serious toll on the economies of countries experiencing conflict, new research demonstrates that the economies of neighboring states and regions also take a serious hit. The financial burden of these wars on the international community is also staggering. In the 1990s the donor community pledged more than $60 billion in aid to assist in the recovery of war-torn countries. World Bank lending for post-conflict recovery alone has increased more than 800 percent. Between 1992 and 1997, peacekeeping expenditures rose by $3 billion, and emergency assistance, largely to conflict affected areas, rose by $33 billion. In these anarchic and lawless settings, a new breed of conflict entrepreneurs have found sanctuary, and the line between criminal violence and political violence has begun to blur. Transnational criminal organizations, terrorist networks, and local warlords have amassed enormous power and wealth through instability and violence. Indeed, many of the activities these groups engage in smuggling drugs, trafficking in people, counterfeiting currencies, trading chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are easier during conflict and with failed states. To move toward enduring solutions for the problem of mass violence, it is important to understand that violence is not the problem for these groups and individuals it is the solution, a political and financial step up rather than a step down. Conflict becomes more likely when causes operate at all of these levels. Clearly, the simple existence of poverty isn’t enough. Nor are ethnic divisions. Nor is access to the human and financial resources necessary to sustain violence. These grievances and conflict resources are likely to remain latent until political elites see a reason to tap into them to advance a political or economic agenda, often one that serves them more than the group they claim to represent. Similarly, if there are strong institutions in place that can address grievance or check the behavior of conflict entrepreneurs, then whatever incentives for violence exist in a society can find legitimate channels of expression or be successfully controlled. External pressures global markets, transnational weapons flows, criminal networks can also undermine efforts to keep the peace. But these forces are unlikely to lead to widespread violence unless they resonate in some way with internal causes. page 2

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