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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
Objectives, Outcomes and amounts of foreign aid
>> Foreign Aid in the National Interest >> Chapter 6 >> Objectives, Outcomes and amounts of foreign aid Jump to Chapter 6 Sections:
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Objectives, Outcomes and amounts of foreign aid
Although early programs focused on supporting the Cold War and providing targeted humanitarian relief, foreign aid has long been seen as a tool for promoting economic growth in developing countries. In 1961 U.S. President John F. Kennedy said that to productively absorb external capital, recipient countries first had to-on their own-mobilize resources, implement reforms, and pursue other self-help measures. Yet the Marshall Plan’s success in rebuilding European nations misled some analysts into believing that similar capital assistance could be used to build developing nations.
Objectives and outcomes
Since 1951 Western countries have given developing countries more than $1 trillion in economic and humanitarian aid.2 How has this money improved the lives of people in these countries? The different types of U.S. foreign aid-humanitarian relief, security assistance, and economic development-have had varying success. Disaster relief and humanitarian aid have been successful and have also drawn the strongest support from the American public (box 6.1). The United States has been a leader in delivering goods, coordinating disaster relief, and leveraging vast resources from private contributors. USAID has helped countries implement immunization campaigns, feeding programs, and public health emergency measures that have saved countless lives around the world.
Guaging public support for government aid (Box 6.1)
Public perceptions of foreign aid reflect U.S. values and principles. In public opinion polls Americans have always ranked domestic affairs higher than international ones. Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. public named as its top five priorities reducing the threat of international terrorism, stopping international drug trafficking, halting the spread of AIDS around the world, protecting the global environment, and getting Saddam Hussein out of Iraq.
Until the mid-1990s, 65-75 percent of Americans believed that the country was spending too much on foreign aid. But in 2000 several surveys found that only 40-47 percent of Americans still held that view. A study in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, found that Americans were becoming more interested in aid for humanitarian than for security purposes. Whether that has remained true since the September 11 attacks is unknown. But in general, Americans have never strongly supported economic aid to other countries. For example, three surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations since the end of the Cold War have found that the U.S. public is divided on whether to give economic aid to other countries. In the most recent survey, in line with the previous two, only 13 percent of Americans favored increasing federal spending on foreign economic aid-while 48 percent favored reducing it.
Americans strongly endorse supporting the United Nations, ending world hunger, and alleviating human pain and suffering worldwide. Yet they historically have had doubts about the effectiveness of foreign aid, including concerns about corrupt foreign governments. These misgivings may be related to general distrust of the federal government and international organizations, which consistently rank near the bottom in U.S. surveys on confidence in institutions. Much as they advocate self-reliance in welfare programs, Americans want foreign aid that shows results in countries with honest and compassionate governments.
Source: Bostrom 2001; PIPA 2001; Belden and Russonello 1994; Rielly 1999; Independent Sector 1999.
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Last Updated on: October 07, 2009 |
