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| >> Foreign Aid in the National Interest >> Chapter 5 >> Innovations, failures and the crisis in humanitarian aid |
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Initiated in 1989, Operation Lifeline Sudan was the first UN access agreement negotiated with
both a government and a rebel movement to ensure lifesaving assistance in the midst of a war.
Negotiated access agreements have become a basic model for delivering aid in conflict settings,
and have been used in countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. In a variation on the
theme, the United Nations has also negotiated "days of tranquility" and "humanitarian cease-fires" to deliver lifesaving aid.
Possible negative effects of assistancePart of the answer lies in the unintended negative aspects of relief, so evident during the 1990s and now well documented. Operation Lifeline Sudan is a case in point. This remarkable structure has averted and reduced famine in Sudan for more than a dozen years-but it is also thought to have prolonged the conflict. Warring parties, especially the government, deny access to some locations, and all sides use aid to finance the war. Military forces use days of tranquility and humanitarian ceasefires to regroup for the next round of fighting. In addition, aid supports belligerents who impose "taxes" or steal to obtain relief assets; makes civilians targets for militias that strip them of their assets; empowers belligerents by allowing them to control civilian access to resources; and absolves ruling parties from their welfare responsibilities by meeting local needs. Finally, introducing relief supplies into a resource-scarce environment may dramatically fuel a war economy in which many have a continuing, vested interest. Development economist Mary Anderson describes two kinds of negative aid impacts: tangible ones related to resource transfers that empower belligerents and reinforce a war economy, and intangible ones that convey unintended messages. Negotiating access, for example, unwittingly elevates the status of armed groups and confers legitimacy on conflict. page 2 |
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